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University of Durham

Department of Theology

WILLIAM TEMPLE'S CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHICS:

A STUDY IN METHOD

by

ALAN MASTIN SUGGATE, M.A. (Cantab.), B.D. (Lond.)

Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

1980

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WILLIAM TEMPLE'S CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHICS: A STUDY IN METHOD

BY ALAN M. SUGGATE

ABSTRACT

This theological study seeks to uncover and evaluate the ways in which Temple tried to bring the resources of the Christian faith to bear on social affairs.

Part I makes full and original use of primary material in describing Temple's thought in three areas (Industry, International Relations, and Education) so as to exhibit his method.

Part II relates Temple's method to the international context of Christian social ethics in his day and evaluates it. Temple employed three basic approaches: the way of principles (his most characteristic), of love and justice, and of natural law. Chapter IV considers Temple on love and justice. A fresh comparison with Reinhold Niebuhr indicates that Temple had an inadequate sense of the dialectical relationship of love and justice - a legacy of his Anglican background. Chapter V first shows Temple's use of natural law, and then simultaneously exhibits his fundamental thinking in his way of principles and compares it in an extensive and new way with two representatives of the Roman Catholic natural law tradition, H. Rommen and J. Maritain. There are strong resonances, but also marked differences, and in these Temple is superior. Evaluative comments on Temple are then made over the questions of ontological thinking and a doctrine of man; the transition from principles to practicalities *via* middle axioms; and situation ethics. Chapter VI considers the relation of the Christian faith to natural morality. The ambiguities of Temple's philosophizing are exposed, and a fresh attempt made to resolve them using recent thought. Temple's critics are considered only in Chapter VII, as they tend to be shallow or incoherent. The present new appraisal recognizes their valid points in striving for greater balance and theological depth.

In conclusion two sets of proposals are put forward. The first concerns a more adequate theoretical method in Christian social ethics. The second, based on personal experience, urges the formation of local groups to work on the connections between Christian faith and daily social life.

In memory of

MARGARET

1942 - 1977

Preface

I gladly acknowledge my debts to a large number of people for help in writing this thesis. I am particularly grateful to my supervisor, Professor S. W. Sykes, and to Dr. J. R. Atherton, Miss Margaret Kane, and Mr. E. J. Sewell for all their advice and encouragement. I would like to thank the Governors of the College of St. Hild and St. Bede for granting study leave, and Mrs. Towers for typing the thesis with such care. I can never thank my close relatives enough for their continued support, particularly my parents, who typed the whole of the first draft, and my long-suffering wife and children. I know they will approve of the 'in memoriam'.

Declaration

None of the material contained in this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree in the University of Durham or any other university.

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a critical study of William Temple's method in Christian social ethics. My aim is theological: I wish to uncover and evaluate the ways in which Temple tried to bring the resources of the Christian faith to bear on social affairs. The word 'method' does not imply a simple procedure yielding ready-made solutions, but rather denotes approaches to thinking through social problems.

Part I is mainly descriptive. I set out the evidence for Temple's thought in three social areas: Industry, International Relations, and Education (Chapters I-III). These three areas are selected because they are the ones in which he said and did most. Quite often I follow a historical order, but since the continuities of Temple's thought are often as striking as the discontinuities, this is by no means always necessary. I am only secondarily interested in the conclusions Temple came to on specific issues. They were ephemeral, and in any case determining their correctness would, if possible at all, require knowledge of several disciplines. My chief aims are to let Temple speak for himself, and so to set out the evidence that his Christian method on social questions is highlighted. I do make a limited number of critical remarks at this stage, but in the main I explicitly point forward to Part II for critical discussion of the basic method.

In Part II I seek to relate Temple's method to the context of the Christian social ethics of his day and to evaluate it. To do this I deliberately look outside the insular Anglican tradition. This is appropriate to Temple himself; for although he was heavily indebted to the

tradition which went back through Westcott and the Christian Social Union to Maurice, he was a driving force behind the emergence of the World Council of Churches. In any case, the future of Christian social ethics depends on an ecumenical approach. There are three basic approaches Temple used. His most characteristic, which he employed for most of his working life, was the way from principles to policies. Secondly, in the last ten years of his life, under the influence of Reinhold Niebuhr, he became concerned with the relationship between love and justice. Thirdly, in the last five years, particularly in response to the Christendom Group, he became very interested in seeing the value of Natural Law and Natural Order. These three approaches were never integrated, as can easily be seen from the structure of Christianity and Social Order. I look first (Chapter IV) at Temple's handling of love and justice. Though this is not the first chronologically, I believe it is the point at which Temple was at his strongest, and it provides a critical perspective from which to see the other two approaches. I set out the evidence, discuss Temple's professed change of mind, compare him with Reinhold Niebuhr, and suggest that the significance of his divergences from Niebuhr lies in Temple's background in Anglican social ethics and in T. H. Green in particular. I then turn to Temple's way of principles and the question of Natural Law (Chapter V). I first show Temple's actual use of Natural Law and the value he saw in it. I then conduct an exercise in which simultaneously I exhibit Temple's fundamental thinking in his characteristic method, and also compare it with two representatives of the Roman Catholic Natural Law tradition, Heinrich Rommen and Jacques Maritain. I find that there are strong resonances between Temple and this tradition, especially between Temple and Maritain. This is not surprising, given that Temple is representative of a tradition which has a strong sense of continuity with the pre-Reformation Western Church. There are, however, marked differences between Temple and the more traditional

Rommen, and I find that on these occasions Temple has the edge, being more in touch with currents of contemporary thought. I also offer three sets of reflections prompted by the comparison, in which I utilize more recent thinking in order to see more clearly Temple's value and limitations. The reflections are on the need for ontological thinking and the doctrine of man, on middle axioms and on situation ethics.

I then (Chapter VI) take up the question of the relation of the Christian faith and natural morality (and within that context natural law), particularly as this has become an increasingly important issue in the last forty years through the growth of a pluralist society. I bring out the ambiguities of Temple's philosophizing, and his groping after a more satisfactory position in his final years. I draw on the more recent work of J. F. Padgett, O. C. Thomas, and especially N. H. G. Robinson, to put forward a position which would help to resolve the conflicts in Temple. I also draw on D. M. Mackinnon to show how an answer to the question which Temple saw in 1939 - that of the implications for social ethics of a religion which speaks both of creation and of redemption - highlights the questionableness of the enterprise of Christian social ethics.

I consider a number of Temple's critics together at the end (Chapter VII). They are at the end because they are weak. I am selective because they are repetitious. They reveal the poor state of Christian social ethics among English churchmen.

In conclusion (Chapter VIII), rather than merely summarize, I offer in the light of the thesis two sets of proposals which tentatively map out tasks for the future. I first indicate some characteristics of a more adequate method in Christian social ethics. The limitations of Temple, to say nothing of his critics, make it urgent that

we make headway on this more theoretical front. I draw attention to the recent work of James Gustafson on Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics. Secondly, at the practical end, I suggest that the Church should encourage much more than it does at present the formation of groups of men and women at a very local level to work on the connections between Christian faith and the problems and opportunities which are thrown up by their daily experience, and I suggest a number of hallmarks of these groups if they are to perform their task adequately.

I have departed in two ways from the usual format of works on Temple. First, I have dispensed with an introductory chapter on Temple's background. This is partly because the task has already been competently performed by, for instance, Robert Craig, J. M. Decker, and E. N. MacConomy. The other reason is that it can be more illuminating (and in the end less repetitious) if background is brought in at appropriate points within the text, rather than separated off at the start. There is an inevitable price, but it seems worth paying in the present state of Temple studies. Secondly, I move <u>from</u> the specific issues <u>to</u> more general concepts and basic method. Studies of Temple so far have focussed on his theology or philosophy and have brought in his ethics and moral stances in shorter sections at the end (e.g. J. F. Padgett and Robert Craig). The focus of my concern is method in Christian social ethics, and here we find theory and practice developed together in Temple. Often the pressure of particular events sharpened the reflection; it was not a case of mere deduction from theory. Temple rightly backed a dialectical method which tried to avoid pure deduction and pure induction and to oscillate between theory and fact. We may therefore start at either end and be fair to Temple, and there is a good chance of bringing most light at this stage in Temple studies by departing from the prevailing approach.

This critical treatment of Temple's method in Christian social ethics is substantially new. Naturally, however, it relies heavily on previous studies. The standard biography is F.A. Iremonger's William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury (1948), a mine of information shot through with the devoted admiration of a close friend. Joseph Fletcher's William Temple, Twentieth Century Christian (1963) aims to produce an account of Temple's views which will be useful and readable for non-professional readers. This aim is admirably realized, and backed up by scholarly notes. An excellent critical treatment of Temple's theological philosophy is Jack F. Padgett's The Christian Philosophy of William Temple (1974), and I am very much in Padgett's debt in my chapter on Christian faith and natural morality. Owen C. Thomas's William Temple's Philosophy of Religion (1961) is also a very valuable work on this aspect of Temple. Robert Craig's Social Concern in the Thought of William Temple (1963) is the best critical work on Temple's social thinking. The focus of concern is Temple's basic theological and philosophical position and its implications for his social teaching. As the accent goes very much on the fundamentals and does not reach far into the social teaching, this work should be seen as complementary to the present thesis. J. D. Carmichael and H. S. Goodwin produced a book of poor quality in 1963, William Temple's Political Legacy; I shall consider it along with other critics of Temple in Chapter VII. E. R. Norman has recently, in Church and Society in England, 1770-1970, made a strong attack on the stream of Christian social thinking to which Temple saw himself as an heir, and I shall look at his specific remarks on Temple in the same chapter. W. R. Rinne offers a useful survey of Temple's thought in his The Kingdom of God in the Thought of William Temple (1966), though I am doubtful whether the notion of the Kingdom of God is really focal in Temple's case.

There are several Ph.D. theses on Temple which bear on this thesis, and their details are given in the bibliography.

(i) E. N. MacConomy's The Political Thought of William Temple is notable chiefly for its monumental bibliography, far exceeding Fletcher's. The thesis itself is a work of devoted toil. Its purpose is to explore Temple's political philosophy - its background and sources, its concepts and its effects. There is therefore some overlap with the present thesis in the descriptions of Temple's thought and action over unemployment and economics, war and reconstruction. However, in spite of the massive bibliography, MacConomy tends to fall back on lengthy precis of a very limited number of works of Temple. Furthermore, there is no attempt at comparison with other political thinkers. The thesis is entirely descriptive, so that the description has no disciplining orientation towards a critical examination.

(ii) R. L. Heaton's thesis is on the interrelation of sacramental and ethical conceptions in the thought of Maurice, Scott Holland, Gore and Temple. It suffers from excessive breadth. It lacks adequate documentation, clarity and incisiveness, and makes some surprising assertions about Temple's views on Natural Law and ecclesiology. Its focus is complementary to my own.

(iii) G. W. Speedy's Christian Education in the Light of the Theology of William Temple is a competent piece of work which focusses on Christian Education in the sense of Christian nurture in the Church. There is an overlap of basic material offered, but the main concern is rather different from my own.

(iv) A very high proportion of J. M. Decker's thesis William Temple: Christian Apologist is devoted to Temple's background. The rest deals with the category of personality as the basis for Temple's apologetics.

(v) J. L. Vanderlaan's The Structure of William Temple's Ethics: Sacramental Love concentrates on the

nature of man as a moral being,and on value and love in particular. He imposes on himself a number of limitations, and does not venture away from high level generality (except by way of illustration) into specific issues or into method in social ethics. The core of the thesis is really an exposition of parts of Christus Veritas and Nature, Man and God. The work is almost purely analytical. The bibliography is restricted to sixteen of Temple's books and five by others. Vanderlaan does helpfully relate Temple's use of Natural Law and Natural Order to his concept of a sacramental universe.

The notes have the overriding purpose of giving the sources and cross-references, not of amplifying points in the text. They are therefore gathered at the end of the thesis. To aid the reader, at the top right hand corner of each page is an indication of the chapter and the specific notes to be found on it.

The bibliography is divided into four basic sections. First comes archive material. Numerous enquiries have led me to realise how little there is which has survived and is accessible. Then comes a major section on works by Temple - the staple material of the thesis. Because Temple wrote and spoke so much, there is a good deal of repetition of ideas; but almost all the works listed are cited in the text and notes. The remaining two sections cover works about Temple and other works relevant to the thesis. All the works here have been consulted, and have helped to further my understanding of Temple and the issues I consider; but only a proportion of them have been directly cited in the text and the notes.

When Temple died in October 1944, Reinhold Niebuhr wrote of him that he "was able to relate the ultimate insights of religion about the human situation to the immediate necessities of political justice and the proximate possibilities of a just social order more

vitally and creatively than any other modern Christian leader". (The Nation, 11 November, 1944, p.585) The following pages are not a direct evaluation of that remark, but they are spurred on by it.

PART ONE

CHAPTER I

INDUSTRY

A. Industrial Relations

1. Temple's early years

William Temple was evidently a child prodigy in his passion for social justice. In his seventh year, whilst on holiday with his parents in the Lakes, he discovered class discrimination in the cuisine: his favourite roast chicken for the guests, but never for the servants. Young William burst into tears and asked why not.[1] Whatever the immediate answer of his parents, their greatest gift was their own experience of life and an education at Rugby and Balliol.[2] It was the perfect background for the assimilation of the outlook of the Christian Social Union, which Temple joined as a young man. It is easy to document from his early pronouncements two of its characteristics: a strong sense of the way evil becomes embedded in institutions, and the conviction that the character, words and methods of the Incarnate Christ must act as a criterion for exposing that evil and suggesting a remedy. In particular we see a concern for the development of personality in institutions and for the corresponding pursuit of justice and not merely charity.

Thus in 1907 Temple, now a young don, was involved with the Christian Social Union in mounting a Sweated Industries Exhibition at Oxford. This brought home to him

the conditions and wages of many in the matchbox and other trades. In the handbook he points to the system as diseased and to Christianity as a criterion. "It is the system which is foul and rotten. Producer, capitalist, consumer - all are entangled in the meshes of its net ... (If) we listen, there is ... the desolate cry of the Son of Man: 'I am hungry and ye give me no meat'."[3]

Both these points are amplified in a sermon delivered four years later when Temple was Headmaster of Repton. Women are driven to prostitution in order to supplement low wages at work. "And the goods so made enter in the open market into competition with other goods and lower prices. So it is literally true that every shilling I possess buys more because of that traffic in sin. We are told to use only clean money; but the purchasing power of all money is tainted ... And we know that all this horror arises simply because men generally are as good as we are and no better. No one ever deliberately planned the state of society which now exists in England ... It is the working out of just our own character - our own selfishness and our contempt for humility, our own un-Christ-likeness." Temple also reminds his privileged pupils that most of their contemporaries are already at work. The problem is that as a rule the best paid work gives them no real training, so that for want of a useful trade they drift as adults into the casual labour market, picking up jobs as best they can, always first to be out of work in times of depression.[4]

In the Bishop Paddock Lectures, delivered in New York in the early part of 1915, Temple deals in a more extended way with the defects of British industrial organisation.[5] He claims to know what is the root of labour unrest in England because of his concern with the Workers' Educational Association, though he admits that his contact is with picked men. The root is a sense that the whole organisation of life constitutes a standing insult to the personality of the poor man. Thus the well-to-do man can secure medical

attention, but the poor man often depends on voluntary institutions. "It is quite compatible with gratitude to those whose generosity maintains these institutions to feel that for such service he should not be dependent upon anybody's charity at all - whether the solution is to be that the State maintain such institutions or that every man who is doing his fair share of the country's work receive for himself the wage that will enable him to deal with such emergencies as they arise." The denial of personality is felt above all in the organisation of industry. The regulations of an industrial firm invade a man's home, determining when he shall get up or go to bed, and whether he shall have any leisure for the pursuit of any interest of his own. Men feel that they are the tools of other men, 'hands' not persons. Control of an industry may well be in the hands of a Board of Directors which meets only a few times a year in London, and never sees the people whose lives and destinies they control. The shareholders who want their dividends make no enquiries as a rule about conditions of work. If the Board of Directors mismanages its business, a whole village may go hungry. If the Board takes on a large contract when it already has a full supply of work, the village works overtime. In all this working men have no voice. They have no opportunity of making their views understood except by the threat of a strike. "Whatever else that is, it is not liberty, and in the judgement of the people themselves it is not justice. And indeed it is not either justice or liberty as we have learned in other spheres to understand those terms. The economic organisation of life comes far closer to the individual citizen than the political organisation, and the development of justice remains incomplete until it has secured liberty of an economic as well as a political kind."

The central problem is thus the denial of personality; the formula for describing the justice we shall desire to practise in the State is 'the recognition of personality'.

The method of Christ requires that we demand opportunities for the development of free personality; and if indeed we are 'members one of another' then a Christian investor, for example, should find out the conditions under which his dividends are going to be earned.

2. The years of high idealism: 1916-1920

Temple did not wait for peace before resuming comment on industrial affairs. He was far from alone in this. J. Oliver has rightly said that the First World War opened many people's eyes to social inequalities and hardships and made the poor determined to maintain and improve the higher living standards which wartime full employment and high wages had brought.[6] Lloyd George's Government itself shaped ambitious schemes of social reconstruction, as if to carry further the reforms begun in 1906.[7] The Whitley Committee recommended in 1917 the creation of national and local industrial councils with representatives of both management and labour to improve industrial relations.[8] In the Lords in the same year Lang, the Archbishop of York, saw as the central problems the unequal distribution of the rewards of industry and the dehumanising way in which industry was organised, and he stressed the need for labour to share in the control of industry as well as in its profits.[9] By 1918 the Report of the Archbishops' Fifth Committee of Inquiry, Christianity and Industrial Problems, was defending the application of the Christian faith to economic and industrial problems, pointing to a series of defects rooted in the social order itself, and outlining relatively specific remedies in keeping with the function of industry as service and its method as association.[10]

Temple took over the editorship of the weekly Challenge in the summer of 1915. His first editorial on post-war industrial affairs occurs on 8 September, 1916. From this and

subsequent editorials, from his contribution to a debate in the Lower House of the Convocation of Canterbury, and from Mens Creatrix and Fellowship with God, we can piece together how his thought was developing. His principal concern is that there should be no reversion to the bitter struggle between Capital and Labour.[11] In September 1916 people in industry, so Temple thought, were co-operating more; the need was for co-operation as a normal rule. "For in fact industry always does rest upon the actual co-operation of Capital, Management and Labour."[12] In 1918 in the Lower House of the Convocation of Canterbury Temple seconded a motion calling on the Church to support Labour demands for a national minimum wage and all efforts to promote closer fellowship and co-operation between employers and employed in their service to the whole community.[13]

In the same year he is writing as if social harmony can be achieved by a Hegelian synthesis of perspectives. He believes that the difference in outlook between the well-to-do and Labour is an ethical difference, though he cannot agree with those who speak as if there are different ethical rules for different classes; there is one ethical, and similarly one economic, truth. Different experiences prompt different questions and answers, but each set may be true within the limits of its own presuppositions. However, we find that synthesis is only the apparent aim of Temple; in reality he is an enthusiast for Labour. The difference in outlook, he says, goes back to the Industrial Revolution, which destroyed the old organisation of industry and substituted individualism, with wealth almost entirely in the form of shares. 'The social philosophy of the shareholding classes has been based on the doctrine that every man should first seek his own interest, morality coming in as a mere check on the process. The labouring classes have never been individualistic in this sense at all ... Their whole experience drives in upon them the fundamental law ... that if one member suffers

all suffer with it. So the employees of a whole railway company, if not of all the railway companies in England, threaten to go on strike because one guard has been dismissed for refusing to obey an emergency order not handed to him in writing. To the middle-class point of view this seems fantastic; from the working-class point of view it is elemental sanity. It is not that the working folk are free from selfishness in a unique degree, but their whole experience shows them that the interest of the individual and the interest of the community to which he belongs in the long run always coincide. If this is not grasped, there can be no real understanding of the labour problem; but as soon as it is grasped, it surely becomes apparent that the Labour point of view is fundamentally Christian." The main responsibility for mutual understanding lies with those who have the advantage of position and education.[14]

The assault on individualism is also pursued in Mens Creatrix. Temple notes how in the past men opposed industrial legislation in the name of freedom. Freedom here, he writes, is freedom from external control - which is indeed indispensable, but is not sufficient in itself. On this view of freedom legislation is a necessary evil, to be reduced to a minimum. The basic unit here is the individual; the policy evolved is laissez faire; "and liberty so understood is simply anarchism tempered by so much of government as may make it tolerable". Temple remarks that "it seems probable that the position derives its attractiveness for some moral philosophers from the fact that they belong to the respectable and leisured classes ... (T)hey easily regard the law as directed primarily against other people. This view derives further plausibility, and indeed much ground in fact, from a system under which a small section of the community controls legislation; for this section will tend to legislate against tendencies in the other rather than against its own." So this kind of freedom may be complete in principle and yet negligible in result, for instance in freedom of contract in an industrial system.[15]

Temple also returns to the false application of the notion of charity to the industrial problem. "Our present system constitutes a standing insult to the poor man; he is dependent on the goodwill of others to an extent which those others would never tolerate if they held a view of his personality such as either religion or any wholesome ethic would require them to hold. To give or to receive charity is excellent when equality is first assured; but to be dependent upon anything in the nature of charity for the reasonable necessities of civilised life is an outrage."[16] Temple elucidates further in Mens Creatrix that it is not charity that is wanted but the recognition of men as rational responsible beings. You will accept charity from a friend, for you assume that he is glad to give. 'But when the relation of friendship is not there, and the charity is a working off of superfluity to satisfy the impulse of compassion, or is even the giving away of comforts in answer to a general and abstract sense of duty, there is involved the denial of true freedom to the person whose necessities can only be met in such a way."[17]

In Convocation Temple rejected the view of the Guardian to the effect that our aim should be good wages and kind treatment on the one side, and hard work for a good day's pay on the other. Why, asks Temple, should relations depend on the good-will of the one as to whether he should mete out kind treatment or not? Men resented 'kind treatment' and expressed their feelings in the banner slogan, 'Damn your charity; we want justice'.[18] Elsewhere he also writes that however benevolently the "autocracies and bureaucracies" may govern industry, they cannot give the necessary basis of freedom and justice. Labour should therefore receive a full place as a partner in the management of industry. One of the difficulties with Temple is that he does not always use terms in a precise or consistent way. In the same article he chooses to use the word charity in a different sense. "Nothing in the settlement of disputes," he writes, "can ever be

permanent except justice; and justice can never be found except in charity."[19]

The justice which Temple presses for in this period is two-fold: the living wage, and a share for Labour in the control of industry. Labour should get a fair share of the proceeds of industry.[20] Indeed, the reward of Labour should be the first charge on industry.[21] Everyone who is willing to do a full day's work ought to be assured a living wage.[22] In Convocation he argued that it was the concern of the State that no one on whose labour the wealth of the community rested should be left to live in a condition incompatible with full physical, mental and moral efficiency. A minimum wage was in fact sound economy: there could be no more disastrous waste of capital than to allow the energies of a people to degenerate through lack of the necessary conditions for maintaining vitality. It was the clear claim of justice too.[23] Temple also continued to complain about conditions of work. Supporting the Report of the Committee on Adult Education, appointed by the Minister of Reconstruction, he demanded very extensive reconstruction over long hours of labour, overtime, the shift system and night work, and pointed to the subtle influence of sordid surroundings.[24] Temple approved of Convocation's demand for housing reform and saw slums as one facet of the whole social problem.[25]

The central issue for Temple is, however, undoubtedly the control of industry. The editorial of 8 September, 1916 devotes far more space to this than to the question of wages. In Mens Creatrix Temple writes that the control of industry must pass largely into the hands of those immediately concerned; what galls is not the low wages but being treated as 'hands'.[26] He is not at all precise about the form of control he seeks. Sometimes Temple speaks in terms of consultation: Labour itself should be taken into full consultation as a matter of permanent right, not as an occasional concession. Later in the same editorial he speaks of giving Labour a full place as a partner in the management of industry.[27]

There seem to be several factors disposing Temple to an uncritical enthusiasm for Labour at this time. First, he shared the guilt feelings of the Christian Social Union about the role of the Church towards the working-class during the Industrial Revolution. He believed that Labour was rightly suspicious of the Church. Not that this deprived the Church of the right to speak criticially; for "the Church's aim must be not to conciliate possible opponents but to further the cause of right".[28] But the charge of the working-class was largely true: You have ignored us until now, but now we are becoming powerful and so you come out to us.[29] Temple doubtless felt that the Church should lean in the direction of coming out in a spirit of encouragement.

Secondly, Temple tended to be uncritical of Labour because the only working men he met were those who had his own ideals, and because he believed in the power of idealism. In an editorial of 1917 he tells us that the more thoughtful minds in the Labour Movement have become increasingly convinced that the real root of social problems is spiritual. It is not merely the inequitable distribution of the proceeds of industry against which they protest and rebel; it is still more the low estimate of the workers' personality.[30] Elsewhere he writes as if the whole of Labour were united in this diagnosis;[31] and he claims that the Labour Movement is an effort to organise society on the basis of freedom and fellowship.[32] Let Labour keep this ideal true, and "the material will come right"; that is "the message of Easter".[33]

Thirdly, Temple tended to pose differences in the form of general moral antitheses and then uncritically declare one position as Christian. We have already seen him opt on Christian grounds for solidarity against individualism.[34] Similarly when he announced in Convocation on 1 May, 1918 that he had just joined the Labour Party, he quoted the view of one of its leaders that the main purpose of the Party was to secure comparative equality of circumstances

to citizens, and to substitute the service of the community for private gain as the chief in industrial enterprise. This, Temple claimed, was a Christian thing to do.[35] Underlying this is the contrast between selfishness and love. "Now the whole fabric of our system has come tumbling down and we have to rebuild it from the foundation. Consequently we have definitely to choose our foundation-principles. Are we going to build again upon competing selfishness and mutual distrust? Or are we going to try this time to build on the one truth of all things, the revealed nature of God, the supremacy of Love?"[36] (Note the implication here is that man has moral freedom to choose his future: "The world is plastic now," writes Temple in December 1918.[37]) Now, having set up an issue in such simple terms, it is fatally easy to be deductive without discrimination or control. In 1916, in a rare article critical of Labour, Temple sees the preference of the Trade Unions for craft rather than industrial unions as an impediment to the co-operation of capital, management and labour.[38] In 1918, as we have seen, the national solidarity of railwaymen is treated uncritically as an example of Christian fellowship.[39] Thus within two years Temple offers us two simplistic and incompatible deductions from his general moral principle of fellowship.

It was through his reflections on the management of industry that Temple edged his way towards a view of what he as a Christian - an ordained Christian - and what the Church meeting in its official bodies can say on the matter of social principles and policies. In an editorial in 1917 entitled "Wanted: A Policy" he writes: "Is the Church still going to preach only principles? ... If they are left entirely in the air, they will have little appeal, and the world outside will not believe our sincerity." Temple is clear that the Church cannot adopt a particular detailed programme. 'But having proclaimed its principles we would see the Church quite deliberately adopt a programme of social advance, which should be the Church's policy for

this time. It should, of course, be open to amendment and modification as it comes under criticism, or as it is worked out in experiment. But there should be a programme. If for example we believe in the principles of the Report recently presented and adopted, urging the establishment of joint committees of employers and work-people for the management of industry so far as the conditions of workers are concerned, then the Church ought to say so."[40] Temple himself clearly had much sympathy with the Whitley Report. In Convocation he noted the welcome Labour had given to it, and spoke of it enshrining the principle of joint control of industry, which reflected a recognition of the real personality of the worker.[41] If we try to import some clarity into vague and confusing terminology, we can perhaps say that Temple wants the Church to press beyond the enunciation of general principles (such as the importance of the personality of all men, and so of workers), to more specific principles (such as joint control of industry). These specific principles (by 1924 at the latest they were being called 'middle axioms'[42]) would be the Church's "programme of social advance" or "policy" at any one time. It would be left to bodies like the Whitley Committee and the Government to devise particular programmes (such as the establishment of joint committees of employers and work-people) to implement the specific principles. This method does seem to represent an advance on the simple moral antithesis. It still, however, invites the question whether sufficient place is given to a consideration of the facts of the case, including men's motivations and interests and the sheer fact of power - a matter to which Temple is only fitfully sensitive. I shall take up these matters in Part II.[43]

At this juncture we should note the tension between sober realism and high-flown idealism in Temple's article "The Moral Foundation of Peace", written for The Contemporary Review in 1920 at the height of post-war idealism.[44] Temple is encouraged by evidence of a change of attitude in

industry. In 1914 the shareholding class appeared to be ready for a fight to the finish. Now the attitude of the best representatives of Capital is very different. The financial position of Labour has improved. The question is how to take this development further, in order to secure stability. All citizens must become acquainted with the main facts about the aims and interests of other sections of the community. Further, we must visualise what we read so as to appreciate the facts in terms of human joy and sorrow; imagination creates sympathy. Thirdly, we must eradicate the competitive standard of greatness. The moral principles of Bismarck were simply national egoism; we must see other nations as comrades and seek the common welfare of humanity. Fourthly, we must cultivate a "moral opportunism". The meaning of these words can best be grasped from these words: "Our duty is the very difficult one of maintaining an ideal while adopting in the most realistic manner the steps which are in fact best calculated to lead to its attainment." It is "most perniciously wrong" to suppose that in inter-national affairs, for instance, there is some absolute moral claim independently of all actual consequences. The introduction of personal morals can be out of place. We must simply do the best thing for humanity in all the circumstances. Temple believes that in autumn 1918 people might have responded to an idealistic call, but it did not come. Instead there was vindictiveness and selfishness in the name of an abstract justice. In industry Temple is not blind to the mutual suspicion. If the capitalist press now proclaims the true principle of the natural fellowship of Capital and Labour, Labour naturally feels this would have been more effective and appropriate in the days when they were weak. Temple's appeal is for Labour to accept voluntarily a principle which Capital is in no position to practise: the Brotherhood of Man and the Duty of Forgiveness. He calls on all to refrain from allocating blame. "'Judge not'

is a Christian maxim of supreme importance in industrial politics." And he looks for men to cry 'Quits!', hard though it is. 'We shall find peace only when those who have both the right and the power to punish choose instead to promote the common interest. For the moral foundation of peace in a perfectly ordered world is justice. But our world is disordered. And when evil has come in, it can only be expelled through suffering voluntarily accepted by the innocent; in our world the moral foundation of peace is self-sacrifice." I defer discussion of this passage until the treatment of love, self-sacrifice and justice in Part II.[45]

3. The strife of the 'twenties

Temple had anticipated in 1916 that the most immediate post-war problem would be unemployment. There would be a sudden stop to war products and only a slow resumption of normal industry. The ensuing employment crisis was likely to be embittered by the flood of demobilised men who would have first claim on a job.[46] As it happened, the mean percentage of unemployment rose quite moderately, from 0.8% in 1918 to 2.4% in 1920. It was only in 1921 that there was a leap to 14.8%.[47] Temple's contribution to The Contemporary Review still belongs to the period of euphoria. We must now see how he faces the crises of the 1920's, particularly in the Coal Industry. I cover this in some detail because I shall consider later the criticism made of Temple in 1926 during the Miners' Strike.[48]

Unrest in the Coal industry had broken out soon after the end of the war. The miners pressed not only for wage increases, but for complete public ownership and workers' control of the industry. Because of the great shortage of coal, the Government was obliged to counter a strike threat in February 1919 by setting up a commission to investigate wages and hours in the industry and report on

the matter of nationalisation. It even caved in to the demand of the Miners' Federation to be allowed to approve six of the thirteen members of the commission. The Chairman was Mr. Justice Sankey. The Government pledged in advance to accept the report, and on 21 March Bonar Law reassured the miners' Secretary, Frank Hodges, with the words: 'The Government are prepared to carry out in the spirit and in the letter the recommendation of Sir John Sankey's report." The first three interim reports appeared on 20 March recommending a seven-hour day, a rise of two shillings a day, and a levy of a penny a ton on output to improve miners' housing and amenities. This compromise was finally accepted by the miners and the Government. On 20 June four reports on the nationalisation question were published. These agreed on the nationalisation of coal itself, the improvement of retail distribution, and the appointment of a Minister of Mines. On the nationalisation of the industry, seven members (the miners, the economists approved by the Federation, and Sankey himself) were in favour; five (the mineowners and two industrialists) were wholly opposed; the third industrialist, Sir Arthur Duckham, recommended a compromise of amalgamation. Lloyd George used the disagreement to make no move towards nationalisation.[49]

By 1920 the miners were actually on strike. Its settlement provided for a scheme whereby above a basic rate wages would be linked to the output of the industry as a whole. Temple saw the settlement as "full of promise". This was not because the terms could possibly be a basis of permanent satisfaction - that would require either a change in the miners' frame of mind or the alteration of the entire system of management and perhaps of ownership. The reason was that the terms were consistent with the miners' outlook. "Repeatedly well-intentioned plans for arriving at justice in the reward of labour have failed through the fact that the workers have been credited with the same individualistic standards as have for a century

or so been accepted by the middle classes ... The living problem is how to give the average worker a desire that the quick worker shall work quick. Those who work for weekly wages live very close to one another; the good opinion of a man's neighbours is of far more importance to him in such circumstances than the chance of earning an additional shilling or two for himself. In other words, fellowship is a far more potent factor in the lives of the working classes than in other sections of society. This is partly due to circumstances; but whatever its origin, the existence of fellowship claims the sympathy of Christians wherever it may be found. The promotion of general fellowship in industry is one of the main tasks of Christian politics in our day."[50]

Temple develops this line six months later in The Pilgrim. "It seems to be generally agreed that the miners were right to refuse the terms first offered by the owners. Further, it is generally agreed that the terms offered at a later stage were a great advance on anything ever proposed by the owners before." The word 'further' suggests that when Temple says the miners were right, he means 'right in justice' rather than 'right in tactics'. He goes on: 'The demand for a 'national pool' is a demand that the basis of industry shall be fellowship rather than self-seeking. It is not a proposal to eliminate the self-regarding motive; it is a proposal to set limits to its scope and to supplement it by concern for the welfare of the fellowship. The miners of South Yorkshire have been resisting proposals by which they would profit in order that they may act in fellowship with others less fortunately placed. That is plainly a Christian course of action, and so far as the miners have understood their own case, they deserve full credit for a genuine idealism." So far Temple is running true to form. However, he also sees that the owners have a case, and that idealism cannot generate its own success. 'The owners, on the other hand, know what the motives to enterprise and initiative have been in the past -

they are perfectly right to be wary in giving up an incentive known to be effective for the sake of a method calling for moral qualities whose existence is doubtful." This last point leads Temple to say that this idealism can only become practically effective if the demands of a new order on personal character are met by faith in God.[51]

Indeed, Temple even sees that much Labour talk of fellowship is not in the least a reflection of genuine idealism. The supreme moral achievement of the Labour Movement, he writes, is that of making fellowship the ideal of a political party. To a great extent that principle is a living influence in its ranks. The demand for nationalisation, be it wise or foolish, derives its force from the conviction that nationalisation is the economic expression of fellowship. But the fellowship of Labour is largely spurious, resting in part on a common antagonism to a system and to a social class. The movement is unable by itself to realise its own ideal. Sudden success in abolishing capitalism would result in the disintegration of the movement through internal pugnacity. For Temple the antidote is again religious: the Kingdom of God is a fact of experience, and it alone can provide true fellowship through a common devotion to an enterprise where all can succeed.[52]

After the 1920 strike negotiations had begun between the owners and the miners on the miners' objectives of a national wages settlement under a National Wages Board, and a system of pooling profits; but as soon as the Government announced the restoration of the industry to private enterprise with effect from 31 March, 1921, the owners were prepared to offer only district agreements with wage reductions of up to 49%. The miners' return for a three months strike was indeed a National Wages Board - but only district wage agreements,[53] which thus left them vulnerable to the whims of local employers.

In fact, the climax of the crisis in the Coal Industry was delayed. Indeed, a wage agreement as late as May 1924 gave the miners a substantial rise in the national minimum addition to the basic rate.[54] Temple was meantime preparing as Chairman for the Conference on Christian Politics, Economics and Citizenship (COPEC). In an important article in January 1923 Temple takes up again the position of the November 1917 editorial "Wanted: A Policy".[55] This is clearly a conscious modification of his more idealistic trend of thought; for he distinguishes at length between ideals and principles. He sketches three possible attitudes of the reforming mind. The first stresses the organic nature of society and warns that all changes of system are from the known to the unknown. It will try to remedy evils which the general conscience of decent citizens condemns. The State may do much to check evil; but it can do little positive good. Thus it was right to pass legislation to protect children from employment in mines and factories; but nationalisation would be wrong, because 'public control' would diminish 'private initiative', and it is at best doubtful if any equally effective incentive to enterprise and industry could be discovered. Christianity does have some affinities with this safe and dull method. Christ did not instigate revolution or agitate for the abolition of slavery. The second attitude thinks up an ideal system and then sets out to realise it. This is very attractive, but its defects are that the ideal is sure to be seriously defective, and that the idealist creates havoc because he is very impatient of considering what dull improvements can be achieved in the immediate future. Christianity does have its idealistic hope for the Kingdom of God, but it gives us no detailed account of the Kingdom as a social order. In fact Christianity has affinities with the first two methods exactly so far as they may be followed compatibly with the third. This rests on the belief that there are ascertainable principles of conduct which are always valid and should be applied to every phase of life.

This method is Idealist in that it goes beyond the negative activity of remedying admitted evils, and suggests positive relationships to be established; but it is Realist in that it is always concerned with the application of principles to what is, rather than with dreams of what might be. This method is more risky than the conservative one, but it is also more hopeful, for it deals with the root causes of social evils. It is less risky than the Idealist method: if a mistake is made, the situation can be retrieved before great harm is done. Beyond question, Temple writes, Christianity's own method is that of principles (and also, and fundamentally, a gift of power). "The Gospel, being a proclamation of the true nature of God and Man and of the true relationship between them, necessarily consists of principles from which some others may with perfect security be deduced ... (The precepts of the Sermon on the Mount) are explicitly based on the unchanging character of the eternal God and the unchanging relationship of His children towards Him." Temple then for the first time co-ordinates into a set of four the social principles which he (and many other churchmen) had already been using: respect for personality; fellowship; the duty of service; the power of sacrifice.[56] On the fundamental principles he thinks there is universal agreement, and his hope for COPEC is this: "There is now a danger that constant reiteration of them may lead to their being regarded as pious phrases not intended to be taken seriously. Our need is to work out the form in which they become specially applicable to our own circumstances. That does not mean the fashioning of a Programme or the forming of a Party ... Christian men and women must exercise their own judgement on all points of expediency. But it is at least conceivable that Christianity may have much to say, in general terms, about the right of wage earners to be consulted on all decisions of the management affecting their own lives, about the quantity of leisure to be rightly claimed by a man engaged in purely mechanical

work ... Our aim therefore must be to work out the primary principles of the Gospel into those secondary principles which may make them effective guides to action in the world of our own time, yet without seeking to determine the details to which judgment of practical expediency is always relevant."

In a further article in April 1923 Temple relates these four principles to his earlier critique of industrial life and the remedies he has proposed: Labour no longer to be seen as a commodity, but as men labouring; workers to have a voice in determining conditions as of right; partnership in control of industry.[57] The article does not say very much that is new, but it does co-ordinate much of what Temple has written and to some extent curb the tendency towards idealistic generalities through the determination to be incisive over specific issues. This framework remained essentially unchanged until Temple's death. It is over the notion of self-sacrifice that Temple is most unsure of himself. On the one hand sacrifice, he writes, is at the very heart of the Christian religion. "Real progress comes by self-sacrifice. In a society that had never become corrupted, fellowship might rest on justice; but when once corruption has set in, it can only be based on self-sacrifice ... The Cross is the means of salvation." Temple cannot see that either Labour or Capital is yet ready to suffer rather than risk receiving unrighteous gain. On the other hand he recognises that "it may be right for Labour to resist by force a forcible aggression of Capital," and thinks that real progress comes from men's sacrificial constancy in the hardship of a strike.[58] Temple's uncertainty is reflected in the remark: "We have scarcely dared to apply (the principle) to social or international questions even in thought." I shall consider Temple's use, and later abandonment, of the principle of sacrifice in a connected way in Chapter IV;[59] the other principles and their application figure in Chapter V.

In the same article Temple considers further the question of control of industry. He holds that absolute ownership by the contributors of capital is objectionable in principle and disastrous in result. On the first score, even if Capital takes risks in financing a venture and has to wait for a return, it cannot thereby be just that it should have sole ownership. Secondly, the owner thinks he may dispose of an industrial concern as he pleases. If a man sells out as a "boom" nears its end, the transaction is treated as if only buyer and seller are affected. But the works may have to close down. If so, the sale is anti-social and therefore a wicked act. Temple makes an important distinction here between individual and social sin. "We must not condemn any individual who acted thus when the general standard of commercial life permitted it; but we must condemn that general standard and ourselves for tolerating it."[60] It was probably Temple's experience as Bishop of Manchester from 1921 which did much to crystallise his thought. No doubt he saw examples of the speculative mania in the period of boom which Cole and Postgate graphically describe.[61]

Certainly Temple was drawing on his Manchester experience when he made his maiden speech in the Lords in 1925, just a fortnight after he had been introduced. Backing up Garbett, the Bishop of Southwark, in a debate on housing, he referred to a case in Ancoats where members of a family had slept and eaten in a room where the corpse of a relative lay awaiting burial. His speech shows his sense of the multiple nature of problems and their solution: not only decent new houses but slum clearance is required; to that end the social status of the building industry needs to be improved to reverse the drop in recruits. Social, industrial and political health interlock: "Where you get really bitter disaffection towards the institutions of the country it is nearly always in districts where bad housing prevails ... There is nothing which makes the settlement of industrial disputes so difficult as the embittered

atmosphere due to housing conditions, which any of us with an ounce of imagination must see at once are of a kind to produce the most profound irritation and nervous fretfulness."[62]

Meanwhile the financial position of the coal industry had rapidly deteriorated. The owners predictably proposed wage cuts and longer hours. The miners, though they had felt let down by the T.U.C. General Council in their 1921 strike, nonetheless appealed again for support. A strike was called for 31 July 1925, with a blockage of all movements of coal enforced by the railway and transport unions. Baldwin at the twelfth hour offered a subsidy to maintain existing wages for nine months, and established a Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Sir Herbert Samuel to examine the industry's problems and propose a satisfactory re-organisation.[63] Temple approved both of Baldwin's delay and of his capitulation. The precedent was very serious: it was wrong for an industry in difficulties to be bolstered by a tax on other industries. On the other hand, the alternative was a general strike and the danger of revolution. Evidently in Temple's view Baldwin had combined reference to principle and public utility in the right manner in the circumstances. Temple shows appreciation that both sides have a strong case. For the owners the reduction in world demand requires reduced prices to undercut competitors - which requires reduced wages. This should attract sufficient orders to increase production, employment and aggregate earnings. On their side the miners have very low wages already. Any reduction would be at the expense of miners in other countries, and Labour has an international perspective. Besides, other exporting countries would undercut British coal. Temple's verdict is that the case of the owners is irresistible on the existing basis of the industry, the miners' case on any basis whatsoever. The remedy proposed is centralisation of the industry. This would provide more efficient and economic working. Temple thought some

reduction of prices could be had immediately through drawing on the profits of the richer pits.[64] He does not give any evidence of calculations. One suspects that either he assumed the correctness of the majority on the Sankey Commission, or he saw an affinity between centralisation and his social principles, and therefore assumed its effectiveness. Or perhaps he just accepted the Miners' Federation view that the management of the industry was inefficient and chaotic, and thought that somehow it was possible to avoid both reduction of wages and increased unemployment.

The Samuel Commission's Report was published on 11 March, 1926. It rejected nationalisation as a permanent solution but it also rejected the owners' point of view. It proposed State ownership of royalties and of unworked or undiscovered coal, large scale amalgamation of mines, and several measures to improve labour relations, including joint pit committees, and family allowances. There should be no increase in the working day, but some small unprofitable mines should be closed. As a temporary expedient it was recommended that there should be some reduction of the national minimum percentage addition to the basic rate, but not of the subsistence rates of the lowest paid. The subsidy, it said, "should stop at the end of its authorised term and should never be repeated". Both sides should try to settle the issue of national or district wage settlements for themselves.[65] On 24 March Baldwin announced that the Government was prepared to accept the report in its entirety if both parties did so; the Government would even offer an additional subsidy of £3M to cushion the wage reductions. The slogan resounded from the miners: "Not a penny off the pay, not a minute on the day". The owners pressed now district agreements, now a longer working day. The General Strike lasted nine days (3-12 May); the miners stayed out into the autumn.

Temple's first extended comment is in The Pilgrim of July 1926.[66] His judgements are entirely determined by whether an action was likely to conciliate or not. No doubt this reflects the operation of his principle of fellowship and his dictum that industry is co-operation in the public service.[67] He is sensitive to the legacy of past relations. The Government had not implemented the Sankey Report. The miners were naturally once bit, twice shy. All depended on the proposals for wage reduction and for re-organisation being kept absolutely on a level. His estimate of Labour is that they were motivated primarily by loyalty to their own folk - there was no bitterness and no revolutionary ferment. The T.U.C. had not been preparing for a strike, and was not committed to calling a strike simply if the miners were not satisfied. However, the refusal of the Printers' Union on 2 May to set up the Daily Mail leading article hostile to Labour, was "an unpardonable act". And though the T.U.C. had disowned this act, a general strike, even if strictly only an extended "sympathetic strike", could not be justified in a democratic country; for it was bound to cause widespread suffering to innocent people, and to have a tendency to civil war and revolution. The Government was therefore quite right in refusing to negotiate with those who called it. The owners for their part had shown deplorable insensitivity in Temple's view; they had left the miners only $1\frac{1}{2}$ days to decide whether to accept their terms;[68] they had said much about average wages, but the individual miner does not feed a family with the average wage, but with the money he actually takes home. As for the Government, it was a pity some members had lapsed into war-time psychology. It was also deplorable that it had broken off negotiations because of the printers' action. But this was the only mistake for which Baldwin had any responsibility. He had proved a Christian statesman, never failing in firmness or charity. Temple particularly commends Baldwin's offer to renew the subsidy for a period if negotiations could be started on a basis which

would give some real promise of a solution. This was made before the strike and had been declared still to stand.

This offer and Baldwin's personality were the first two of what Temple described as five great conditioning factors, by which he appears to mean that they influenced the situation in the direction of conciliation, or at any rate extrication from deadlock. The third was the unofficial intervention of Sir Herbert Samuel. He saw Baldwin and then produced a memorandum of his own, which suggested a renewal of the subsidy during negotiations, a National Wages Board with an independent Chairman, and no reduction in wages without assurances that the re-organisation would be carried out. Sir Herbert was careful to point out that he had no authority to say the Government would accept his terms. The fourth factor was the declaration of Sir John Simon (with which Mr. Justice Astbury agreed) that the strike was illegal and the Unions liable for damages.[69] Fifthly, Temple speaks of the "immense influence of the leaders of the Christian Church," through the publication by the Archbishop of Canterbury, Randall Davidson, of the "Appeal from the Churches". Temple particularly approves of two features. First, the document distinguishes principles (" the spirit of fellowship and co-operation for the common good" which should lead to resumption of negotiations undeterred by obstacles) from the cautious practical suggestions (a return to the status quo of 30 April together with simultaneous and concurrent cancellation of the General Strike, renewal by the Government of its offer of assistance, and withdrawal by the owners of the new wage scales). Secondly, Temple believes the appeal in no way undermined the position of the Government by putting these three proposed actions on a par.

For the owners he shows withering contempt: they have adopted an impossible position and are nearly enemies of the community. For people whose industry has just received

from the Government (that is, from the public) £23M, to say that all they want is freedom from interference by the Government (that is, by the public) is gross impertinence; "for people who supply a public necessity to say that the public must go without while they settle their own quarrel is constructive treason". The miners' position is equally impossible. Industry cannot go on with the existing wages. The Royal Commission is emphatic that there shall be no reduction for the lowest paid; but some of the others must accept reductions for a time. "Reduction there must be, and re-organisation there must be, so we come to the one hope of settlement - the Report, the whole Report, and nothing but the Report."

By chance Temple was out of the country during the General Strike.[70] Shortly after his return he joined a group which came to call itself 'The Conference of Members of the Christian Churches which is seeking to mediate in the coal dispute".[71] It consisted of Anglicans (including ten Bishops) and members of seven other denominations. On 19 July, after consultations with both sides, representatives of the Conference saw Baldwin in a vain attempt to break the deadlock. One upshot was a furore in the correspondence columns of The Times, which began even before the Conference's own statement there on 24 July and abated only after Temple's letter printed on 21 August.[72] The critics will be considered later.[73] The two letters from the Conference and Temple are not purely defensive, but positive statements of aims, principles and historical events. We may conveniently take them together.

The Conference's letter stresses the "spiritual and moral aspects" of the dispute - the privation of miners, their families and others in other industries, and the impairing of mutual trust, forbearance and goodwill. The only basis for lasting peace is "justice and co-operation, expressed in such practical methods of organisation as may secure that the worker, in return for efficient service, may receive adequate renumeration and enjoy humane

conditions of labour". The spirit of "a fight to the finish", sometimes thoughtlessly uttered, is anti-Christian; the mode of arbitration proposed is a practical expression of the New Testament ethic. Temple writes in August: "As Christians, and most of us Christians charged with official responsibility, we saw two parties doing great injury to the community, by a continued conflict which was bound to be ended by negotiation sooner or later; our religion and our office requiredof us that we should do anything which lay in our power to bring them, in the literal sense, to reason ... We felt a responsibility for trying to secure that the settlement should be not only economically sound in itself, but reached with the minimum of bitterness or resentment and the maximum of goodwill."

It is quite evident from both letters that, whatever the merits of the group's action, the intention was to respect the authority, expertise and position of the parties involved. They took no action until there was a deadlock, with increasing bitterness but without steps to bring the parties together. They were careful to meet representatives of the Coalowners' Association and the Executive of the Miners' Federation to hear their views. The only proposal made by the group itself was a return to the Report of the Royal Commission, "as being a document prepared by men of independent judgment, great ability and unquestioned integrity". (Temple) During the meeting with the miners a number of important points emerged: that the Commissioners should interpret their own Report; differences should be referred to joint committees; the decision of an impartial chairman should be accepted in case of failure to agree; and in order to facilitate resumption of work, while this machinery was set in operation, the industry should be given some financial assistance for a period not exceeding four months. It was thus not a case here of Churchmen proposing and miners accepting. The group saw here the withdrawal of the

miners' slogan (even if the points had yet to be put to the miners) and thought this justified an approach to the Government with six proposals. These were:

(i) An immediate resumption of work on conditions obtaining on 30 April, including hours and wages. The settlement shall be on the basis of a national agreement.

(ii) A national settlement to be reached within a short defined period, not exceeding four months. Financial assistance to be granted for this period, under a scheme to be drawn up by the Commissioners who prepared the Report.

(iii) The terms of the re-organisation scheme and the reference to wages in the Report to be worked out in detail by the Commissioners, and the results to be incorporated in a Parliamentary Bill or Bills.

(iv) Implementation of the scheme at the earliest moment practicable.

(v) The Government to give an assurance that those parts of the Report which require legislative sanction shall be placed on the statute book at the earliest possible moment.

(vi) At the end of the defined period, if disagreements still exist, a joint board, consisting of representatives of both parties, shall appoint an independent chairman, whose award in settlement shall be accepted by both parties.

These proposals had been accepted by the Miners' Federation Executive with the assurance of "their readiness to make every endeavour to assist in the re-organisation of the mining industry to ensure its success".

The group's confidence was all the greater because of the similarity of these terms to the unofficial suggestions of Sir Herbert Samuel. They also made it clear that the proposals were put forward only as a basis for negotiation, not for immediate acceptance or rejection. Further, they took the precaution of enquiring into the

possibility of a loan, so that the idea of a subsidy should not be the only one in the field.

In the event, Baldwin interpreted "financial assistance" as a subsidy, and published the group's terms, together with a rejection of the idea of subsidy, even before the deputation saw him on 19 July. The owners declined to alter their position. By October Temple was mournfully castigating the blindness of the Government to economic and psychological consequences.[74] From an economic point of view the question was whether the grant of a subsidy would shorten the strike by a period sufficient to balance the cost of subsidy. But beyond that: 'There are psychological or 'human' considerations which are in their own way equally important. Indeed these are themselves, on any long view, part of the economic situation itself. It is of no use to arrange terms on which the industry can pay, if no one will consent to work on those terms. And even if the miners are ultimately driven to accept terms which they regard as unreasonable, it is clear that they will return to work unwillingly, and the output of the industry will suffer. It is worth a good deal to the country to secure a settlement that causes no bitter resentment; it is good business to buy goodwill if it can be not otherwise obtained." It would have been better, he said, to offer £3M. subsidy, and leave it to the industry to make it go as far as it would. The Government had interpreted "economic considerations" too rigidly. Moreover, it had forced through its Eight Hours Bill. To this Temple had three objections, even though he acknowledged that in pure reason there was much to be said for it. First, it might have gone through as part of a comprehensive measure of re-organisation, but by itself it was odious. Secondly, the miners feared that what was offered in lieu of wage reduction would in fact reduce wages; for wages were paid by the shift, so there might be a reduction in the number of shifts if they were lengthened. Thirdly, the Royal Commission had said that an increase in hours would only intensify the problem. Temple also made the point,

though not in criticism of Baldwin, that to insist that men are revolutionaries when they are not is to make them into revolutionaries.

By November the miners were forced back - without the negotiated settlement. In a mood of disillusionment Temple described the end of the strike as utterly unsatisfactory, and a humiliating episode in our history. It was a chapter of waste, folly, and obstinacy. The owners had been inflammatory, the Government supine; miners and owners had "behaved like sulky children in an ill-managed nursery". He feared that the Miners' Federation would be a purely fighting machine.[75] Two years later Temple suggests an Industrial Parliament with legislative powers, but subject to the veto of the national Parliament. His dictum here is that as soon as any group has real power, it should be treated as responsible. One should throw on conflicting voluntary associations the legal responsibility for maintaining their own peace. One advantage of an Industrial Parliament would be that it would reduce the tendency for each side to try to win the Government to its own view in order to secure favourable legislation.[76]

Temple's disillusionment might have been less had he been more sensitive to the facts. His whole approach is top-heavy with moral considerations. His conviction that the conflict was bound to be ended by negotiation was completely falsified, mainly by the employers' power, a factor which G. W. McDonald brings out very well.[77] And as S. Mews shows, the actual influence of the Archbishop of Canterbury's intervention was vastly less than Temple and others thought.[78] I shall try to see more precisely in Chapter VII what can be learnt from this whole episode for a Christian approach to social issues.

4. The closing years

Temple's thought on industry changed very little in substance or approach in the remaining years of his life. However an interesting new departure is to be found in a letter Temple and nine others wrote to The Times in 1933.[79] A group of business and professional men had been meeting at the Economics Department of Leeds University with the object of studying the inter-related problems of industry, agriculture and finance. A special concern was price levels, on which the group had made recommendations to the Government. It was felt that with a larger background they would carry sufficient weight to influence public opinion. Approval had therefore been given to establish a Yorkshire Institute of Industrial Affairs, with three objects: (a) to form an active and intelligent body of public opinion on the needs of industry and land in relation to finance and national welfare; (b) to investigate the problems of industry and land in the light of modern thought on economics and finance; (c) to develop constructive proposals towards the co-ordination of industrial, agricultural and financial affairs. The Institute would be strictly non-political, and its driving power would derive from the knowledge, expertise and interest of its members, together with the active policy pursued by groups under its aegis. This is a significant move towards a corporate, interdisciplinary approach to social problems which reflects a more empirical view. Certain features of Temple's thought are given a new prominence: respect for expertise, the sense that problems interlock. We shall find a similar instance in the field of unemployment.[80] However, many of his other remarks in this period are more personal ventures which run counter to the rationale of the Institute.

The advent of the Second World War drove Temple to reflect much more on control at the level of high finance.

Within that context and his advocacy of "a vast extension of public control of private enterprise",[81] he continued to press for Labour's share of control,[82] but he has rather different ideas about the form this would take. "Labour has historically been very reluctant to accept a share in the control of industry or the direction of its policy. It is doubtful whether Labour at present would generally accept its proportion of places on the Boards of Director, or make a very good use of those places if it did. There is need on any showing for a new enterprise of planning in Industry and this must obviously be undertaken by the State. It may be that Labour will best exercise its control, at any rate at first, through the organ of Government responsible for this."[83] Temple follows this up with a note which is his strongest comment on the Trade Unions since 1927. They were constituted to deal with the chief problems of the nineteenth century and are structurally and psychologically ill-adapted for the chief opportunities of the present. They see their chief task as the defence of hours, wages and conditions for those in work, whereas really it is that of security of employment. "It is a natural consequence of this that they produce few leaders able to take a strong personal initiative. For the first thing a strong Labour leader must do is to remodel the Union of which he is an official. He will find that it is exactly as difficult to overcome the vested interests of Labour organisations and those who gain a living by working them as it is to overcome the capitalist vested interests which Labour rightly denounces. The source of the trouble is not wealth; it is sin - which is the perquisite of no class ..."[84] On such evidence as we have it looks as if Temple believed his fear that Labour would become a belligerent defensive force had been partly realised, whilst he himself had moved on in the 'thirties to see unemployment as the key issue, and through that in the 'forties to consider the wider context of industry. At this point his disillusionment with Labour may well have

reinforced his pre-occupation with public control through the State.

Not that this deterred Temple from advocating improved wages and conditions. He declares that experts are of opinion that to adopt the five-day week would increase rather than diminish output, by saving human fatigue and with it much wastage of material. But as usual it is the human rather than the economic aspect which carries most weight. The larger the city the more a man's half-day holiday is eroded. His need for rest would be better met by two consecutive days off.[85] Temple also favours holidays with pay. This principle is important in three ways: "It recognises the status of the worker in the industry and is a repudiation of the notion that he is an external factor hired for the hours when his labour is needed and no more; secondly, it recognises that the process of recreation is essential to the quality of his work and therefore to the welfare of the industry; thirdly, it gives better opportunity for that freedom of enjoyment which is necessary to fullness of personal and of family life."[86] Naturally this requires stability of wages to be effective, and Temple proposes an equalisation fund out of surplus profits for the maintenance of wages in bad times, even if hours of work be reduced.[87] Within the factory Temple shows increasing concern about mass-production, on the grounds that it respects neither individuality nor community. "This widespread sense of frustration and futility in the modern world sprang from the lack of any personal allegiance to a community to which the individual truly 'belongs', and which values the individual as a person. Men worked in herds at their appointed tasks of mass-production; certainly that is the reverse of solitude, but a mass or crowd is not a community, because in it the individuality of each man is irrelevant. In much modern industry each workman is no more than a part of the machine which has not yet been invented; when it is invented, he can go. And outside the works, physically

weary and nervously jaded by monotony, he still finds no real community. In the modern big town human beings are jostling atoms, and each must fend for himself."[88] This concern is also expressed by reference, not to the first two of Temple's four social principles, but to the third, in the form of vocation.[89] It is "a great evil" that work is often so monotonous and engages so few human faculties. It is hard for a man to find in it any real vocation. True, God's vocation may be to self-sacrifice. But only a perfect saint could perform such tasks 'as unto God' because it was his contribution to human welfare. It is "sheer mockery" to expect an ordinary man to do so. He cannot therefore worship in any full sense. "For worship is the offer of our whole being and life - therefore very prominently our work - to God." Moses had not promised the Israelites in Egypt a specially beautiful Church to lift their thoughts above mundane cares to heaven. 'He said, 'We can't worship God here; we must get away from it.'"[90]

Lastly, Temple appreciates the rising position of Management in the running of industry. "It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the position in Modern Industry of the Manager."[91] This is hardly surprising. Temple has long deplored the "broken fellowship of Society", expressed in the clash between Capital and Labour.[92] A root problem in his view is the profit motive, manifest when, for example, directors take decisions according to economic rather than public interest.[93] True, "the great Managing Directors tend to rule the Boards of which they are at once members and servants. The present system makes them technically the employés of the Directors representing the Shareholders ... But all their interest is in the actual process of production, not in its incidental financial results." What Temple would like to see is wise reform which will bring managers as close as possible to the active factors in production. "If there is to be tension at all, let it

be between the financial interests of Shareholders and the productive interests of Management and Labour in co-operation."[94] So too, in an address to the Institute of Industrial Management in 1943 he declares efficiency of service to the community to be the proper (and usually the actual) professional interest of Management.[95] The scale of industrial firms now means that the risk of failure through inefficient management by Capital is "a social evil too great to contemplate". With the emergence of the manager into the foremost place, the motive of profit-seeking, in the sense of personal advantage, goes into the second place, as compared with efficiency of service. True, Management could become a bureaucracy, - which is better than plutocracy or mob Government, but would be the enemy of the development of responsible citizenship, which is the essence of true democracy. And if managers are really sensitive to human interests, the danger will be avoided. This will mean not only training of managers in the workings of the machinery which the men under his control have to operate, but even more importantly the kind of education which will enable them to understand the men themselves.

Temple sees this development as being a much more practical way to the realisation of his social principles than the earlier call to Christian Social Union members to attend shareholders' meetings and raise the demand for improved conditions for the workers. One may hazard a guess that he believed Labour could thereby be drawn out of its insularity and defensiveness. He certainly thinks that "if this (development of partnership) were carried out universally it would inaugurate a system of National Guilds or Guild Socialism. The principle of that system has much to commend it. But it is certainly a mistake to begin with the picture of a supposedly ideal system and try to establish it. The way of Christian progress is to ask where an existing system is breaking down and readjust it in the light of Christian principles."[96]

Temple's own readjustment would be in the direction of a planned economy (combining control and enterprise) where management would be responsible to the State as much as to Directors representing shareholders, and the State would nominate members to the Boards of Directors. 'Thus alike in the general plan and in the particular administration the consumer through the State would have his effective voice."[97]

Temple's comments during the Second World War are personal meditations on his social principles, and are notable for the degree to which they issue in specific recommendations. The contradiction to the method of the Yorkshire Institute is all too obvious and will require further comment.[98]

B. Unemployment

"Unemployment is the testing point of our contemporary civilisation."[99] We have already seen Temple censure the Trade Unions in 1940 for failing to recognise unemployment as the key issue and to act vigorously. Temple himself showed considerable vigour, especially from 1931 onwards. Not surprisingly that year was a turning-point for him, and it is appropriate to divide an exposition of his thought and action into two parts around that date.

1. Before 1931

Temple's concern with unemployment goes right back to his days as an Oxford don. On 12 September, 1908 he wrote to his mother in reply to her complaint about the difficulty of finding labour in the country districts.[100] There are two aspects of this letter which set the pattern for the future. First, he writes: "I can't answer your riddles. But in general the difficulty is due to two things; first, and chief, that working men are rather stupid about finding what work is going on, and (more importantly) have few means of finding out. We need a regular system of Labour Exchanges, where information of all the work offered may be obtained ..." Here we see already Temple's assertion not only of the importance of individual responsibility, but also of the need for it to be supported by suitable institutions of immediate practical value. Secondly, Temple reflects on an economic factor affecting chances and choice of employment. "Why should the accident of possessing £52 a year beyond what is needed for life, enable (your friend) to say 'You shall

do the work I choose, or starve'? She is enabled to set her will against theirs on a matter vital to their whole lives. WHY? Now as far as I can see there will always be inequalities in wealth; and these will always give a certain amount of power to the richer over the lives of the poorer. But if capital is in the last resort under the control of bodies representing all classes, you will at least allow the workers to make their wishes felt, otherwise than by dying on Dives' doorstep." Here then is an early concern about the effect of the economic structure on individual lives.

We have already seen Temple locate one cause of casual employment and outright unemployment in the poor provision for the training of young people within industry. Up to 1931 he suggested one or two other causes, but there was never any coherent analysis. In his editorial notes of The Pilgrim, April 1923, he mentions Ramsay Macdonald's protest in the House of Commons that except in an economic boom the only alternatives seem to be spending millions of pounds a year in relief, or allowing people to starve. Temple comments that if it is true of the existing order that employment can only be secured for all citizens at rare intervals, there is certainly an irresistible case for modifying the system.[101] But 'the system' is not in any way analysed. In 1926 his moralism is a substitute for analysis. "No doubt (unemployment) is largely due to causes which we cannot control; but many of us are making it worse. All forms of luxury and extravagance tend to produce unemployment. Foolish and ignorant people sometimes say that extravagance is good for trade. It may bring grist to the people engaged in a particular trade; and of course the sudden cessation of any luxury would cause dislocation and unemployment. But all the money spent on luxury is withdrawn from encouraging the making of necessities, which always employs more labour for every pound spent on it than do the luxury trades. People who flaunt their wealth in West London or on the Riviera are

not only intensifying irritation and class-bitterness, they are actually increasing unemployment by their unproductive consumption of the nation's wealth."[102]

On the whole Temple has no clear idea about the causes of unemployment except that the whole issue is very complex. To illustrate his philosophical understanding of causality he takes the case of unemployment. If an investigation be made, unemployment is seen to mean not merely being out of work, but a whole system of conditions which is itself part of the larger system called the industrial organisation of the country. Elements may be focussed on as cause and effect, and singled out as capable of improvement by practical means.[103]

Temple is valuable chiefly for his recognition of the effects of unemployment in human terms. Unemployment is a "desperate evil causing widespread misery and degradation of characters".[104] His concern for the school-leaver is shown again in 1926: he has to seize the job that offers before his own best friend, putting Number One first. This is the practical instruction which the competitive social system gives him, and that is more influential on his character than any amount of exhortation. How can such a lad believe that human life is one great family affair under the universal Fatherhood of God?[105] And even when a man is in work he suffers from the nightmare of insecurity, and there is no encouragement to practise prudence and thrift.[106] This fear for the morrow is a new form of poverty, rooting man in his own self as effectively as any riches. 'The 'poverty' which is spiritually desirable is that which provides a sufficiency for the needs of a real human life, but not enough to mark a man off from the majority of his fellow-citizens, and so make difficult the widest fellowship."[107]

Temple's own remedial suggestions are mainly sporadic personal comments arising from his reflections on the

effects of unemployment in the light of his social principles. On the wider front he says there is no cure except the re-establishment of world trade.[108] Domestically he thinks the State should provide against unemployment; everyone who is willing to do a full day's work ought to be assured a living wage; the terror of insecurity ought to be removed.[109] There should be an extension of out-of-work Insurance.[110] The dictum that if a man will not work neither shall he eat is valid as a moral principle, but it should not be the basis for legislation, for a Christian sociology will lay great stress on the right to property. "It will desire that every citizen should possess enough property to support bare life even though he does no stroke of work for it; for so his work and service will be more nearly free and personality will have a fuller scope."[111] Temple would also like to see the adoption of the Shaw Committee's recommendation for an end to casual labour. For men in that position are led to press for the highest wage they can get, which is a short term view and ignores the root evil that labour has no adequate voice in industry.[112]

2. After 1931

The crisis of 1931 sharpened churchmen's concern over unemployment.[113] Temple responded with an article published in April 1932, which is his most connected piece of writing on unemployment and economics.[114] He is more realistic than usual, recognising that circumstances impose a choice between evils. He was deeply dismayed at the necessity of reducing unemployment benefit and social (particularly educational) services. However, financial insecurity was so great that this was the lesser evil, even for the poorest classes themselves. He acknowledged this with the greatest reluctance, for in the nineteenth century "every possible reform or advance was resisted precisely on the

ground that it would spell ruin to those whom it was intended to benefit." Unemployment was objectionable not so much because it was a burden on industry or a condition deserving sympathy, but because it was demoralising and a real affront to men's personalities; for it created the sense that they were not wanted. As for a cure (and here Temple is very general), the problem of unemployment was principally a selling problem. The view that production would create new purchasing power to make it profitable no longer applied. The market was over-stocked; the problem was excessive abundance. It was now no longer profitable for the producer to produce. Because of mechanisation, demand could not keep pace with production. "The aim of the new school of economic thought" (Temple mentions no names) "is to create demand by distribution of such purchasing power as will set all the nation's productive plant working."[115] Hitherto we had been preoccupied with making production profitable; the new approach of making produce marketable seemed "more consonant with Christian principles," because it began not with goods but with men. The whole problem would need international solution, not by a super-State but by mutual agreement; for "we are members one of another".

Temple's most notable achievement was his enquiry into the human effects of unemployment. "I am inclined to think that the enquiry did represent what would have been a new departure in method for him - though the immediate threat of war prevented this from being at all widely employed - viz. the creation of small groups of men to think out the relations of this, that, or the other social problem."[116] W. F. Oakeshott is here writing of the investigation which culminated in the production of Men Without Work in 1938. We have already seen how in 1933 Temple supported the creation of the Yorkshire Institute of Industrial Affairs.[117] In the same year he invited a group of people to consult with him about unemployment. The following January the group issued a manifesto to test and elicit public support;

it set out the claims of the unemployed as persons and insisted that only a tiny minority of the unemployed were work-shy.[118] The group also formed a committee, which became convinced of the need for a far more thorough investigation of the work that could be done by voluntary societies for the unemployed, and saw that this would involve an enquiry into the effects of unemployment and the real needs of the unemployed man. In 1936 the Pilgrim Trust agreed to finance such an enquiry, and gave responsibility to certain members of the Committee, whilst nominating one or two additional members itself. The reconstituted committee consisted of the Bishop of Chichester, the Master of Balliol, Miss Iredale, Dr. Thomas Jones, Sir Walter Moberly, Dr. J. H. Oldham, Sir Edward Peacock, and Temple as Chairman. They were backed by "a capable band of investigators". Oakeshott himself was given four terms' absence from Winchester School to take part.[119]

The significance of this venture for Temple can be gauged by what he himself said in the Introduction to Men Without Work and in the House of Lords debates, and also by his comments on unemployment in the last ten years of his life. Study here reveals that even if there was a "new departure in method", in no sense was there a volte face. His social principles stand, as does his conviction that there can be no divorce of the economic from the moral and religious sphere. What is new is that he really acts on the insight he had long recognised in theory - that the right thing to do is the right thing in the circumstances - and sets about having the circumstances expertly investigated.

Temple's delight with Men Without Work is expressed in these words: "It is a genuinely human document, which being readable as well as scientific, may well win the attention of a large public."[120] Scientific the document certainly was. The team included specialists: Mr. Owen,

the Secretary of the Civics Section of Political and Economic Planning; Dr. Singer, an economist; Dr. Wagner, a psychologist who had already taken part in a survey of unemployment in Marienthal. It was evident at the outset that they must begin "with a fairly exact account of the unemployed themselves". They had to know types of local unemployment and the needs which these create. "It is impossible to consider the effectiveness of any of the voluntary enterprises without first understanding the situation with which they are faced and the peculiar problems, physical, psychological and moral, to which unemployment gives rise." The document itself shows the scientific thoroughness of the investigation. It proposes to study "Who are the unemployed? What kind of men are those who are out of work, and why has the disaster of unemployment overtaken these and not others?"[121] It explains why long unemployment was selected as the focus of study,[122] and why the six areas (Deptford, Leicester, the Rhondda, Crook, Liverpool and Blackburn) were chosen.[123] It gives the rationale of the sampling, and shows how and why selection and chance are both operative.[124] It publishes the case record card[125] and a large number of statistical tables. It carefully distinguishes between and within the physical, psychological and moral problem, and looks specially in turn at the wage problem, and at the particular predicament of the older men, the younger men, and unemployed women.[126] The last part relates these findings to the social service movement, estimating its effectiveness with close attention to local characteristics.

The document is 'human', not simply in the sense that it deals with voluntary bodies whose emphasis is on a personal approach to the unemployed. The report itself also "represents a new approach to the problems created by unemployment, and one which I am persuaded gets much closer to the real difficulties than a purely economic approach could have done". For, says Temple, the report exposes an intolerable human situation. "Because the issues

raîsed are largely personal, they are easily understood. We can deal with them from a personal as well as an administrative point of view ..."[127]

The very method of investigation brought this personal dimension to the fore. Out of 1086 persons in the complete sample, 880 were visited in their homes.[128] The case record card had space for the interviewer to record more personal details: the atmosphere of the family, the man's attitudes, his relations with the local social institutions. In this way it was possible to form a picture of the effects of unemployment on the ordinary man.[129] The influence of subjective factors was recognised, but it was believed that these personal factors, even if they could not be measured or stated in terms of figures, were important if a real analysis of the needs was to be made.[130]

The report must have confirmed Temple in several beliefs he already had: that unemployment is complex in its causes and ramifications; that the psychological or moral effects are of paramount importance; that practical help through institutional channels is required. As early as March 1934 Temple urged fellow-Christians who paid income tax to let the Government know that, if taxation could be reduced, the restoration of the cuts in allowances for the unemployed should take precedence over any other concessions, including remission of income tax. Since man was no longer obliged to spend all his time and energy securing subsistence, the long-term aim should be a re-distribution of working hours, so that unemployment did not fall unfairly on one section of the community. Till then we should make sure 2½ million people were not prevented by malnutrition and depression from engaging in creative activities; National Insurance was never intended to provide subsistence for victims of an industrial slump.[131] However, Neville Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was not impressed by this 'interference'.[132]

The influence upon Temple of the Committee's work is evident in two directions. First, Temple writes in 1935: "I don't think I ever appreciated, until I looked into this question (of unemployment) in England, how deeply penetrating are our Lord's words that it is more blessed to give than to receive. So long as the work undertaken consists of doing things for the unemployed it is quite unredemptive and leads to no restoration of character. The only experiments, now I am glad to say very numerous in England and rapidly spreading, which show that effect on character, are those which invite the unemployed to give what they can for the community ... The unemployed have no money to give, but they have themselves to give."[133] Temple here cites the case of a co-operative scheme which has benefited the whole community. In the report itself there is a fairly full account and assessment of the Wigan Subsistence Production Society and the Lincoln People's Service Club. The former made a frontal attack on poverty by producing goods and aimed to restore fellowship in work; the latter tried to restore a man to his function in the community by arranging jobs for him which the community needed.[134] Iremonger records that 1500 occupational centres were started in the period between January 1938 and September 1939.[135]

Temple makes the same point more pungently in Christianity and Social Order. The worst evil is that the unemployed feel they have fallen out of the common life. Worse than physical need is the fact that they are not wanted. That has the power to corrupt any man not already far advanced in saintliness. The man has no opportunity for service and is turned in upon himself, to be a contented loafer or an embittered self-seeker. The only answer to moral isolation is for a man to do something needed by the community. "For it is part of the principle of personality that we should live for one another". The only long-term answer to futility and frustration is that we find a social order which provides employment steadily and generally.

Christian sympathy demands this.[136] Clearly Temple is appealing here to the social principles of fellowship and service, and his position is reminiscent of his strictures on charity and his emphasis on freedom and responsibility.[137] In the appendix to Christianity and Social Order Temple tentatively advocates that the "State should maintain a certain number of works beneficial to the community, from which private enterprise should be excluded, which it would expand or contract according to the general demand for labour at the time. Such works would include prevention of coast-erosion, afforestation, new roads and the like." Training centres should be established on a large scale. We may infer that, however great the contribution of voluntary bodies, Temple thought State provision was essential, should unemployment come anywhere near the pre-war level.[138]

The second effect of the report was to persuade Temple to call for financial support in the precise form of Family Allowances. This, he said, was the only proposal strongly advocated in Men Without Work.[139] In 1939 he spoke in a House of Lords debate on population problems. He deplored the prevailing system whereby a man with a large family could receive more money on the dole than at work. Only Family Allowances, short of a profound modification of the entire economic system, could have the effect both of encouraging the birth of future citizens and of discouraging their parents from choosing to be unemployed.[140]

Three years later, less than a month after his introduction into the Lords as Archbishop of Canterbury, Temple took his reasoning further in a debate on Family Allowances.[141] If people were in effect encouraged to be unemployed that would be as unacceptable as its opposite, the principle of less eligibility in the Poor Law Act of 1834. He argued that by Family Allowances relief could be given to the worst types of poverty - "and

none of us, I imagine, would wish to say that the people should be held in any way guilty for what they are suffering". He believed payment should be made to the mother, principally as a recognition of her self-sacrificing care for the family. He raised the question of cost but disclaimed special competence to discuss it. Nonetheless, he was sure it would be all a matter of internal adjustment, the wiser distribution of wealth; and in the circulation of resources, all would be spent on necessities, on those goods which create the largest amount of employment in their production. It would therefore be investment rather than expenditure. Therefore we could certainly afford it. Once again, however, the principle of justice was more important to Temple than economics. Not only parents, but the State too, is rightly concerned with the care of children; it should therefore take its share of the burden. Temple knows that some people fear erosion of parental responsibility and family affection. But quoting Masterman's The Heart of the Empire , which he had read forty years before, Temple asserts that Family Allowances will actually strengthen family life, for they will relieve intolerable strains and anxieties. 'There is an appeal to sympathy, but it is more than an appeal to sympathy. It is, I think, a real appeal to justice on which the case for Family Allowances must rest."

Men Without Work was not concerned with the wider causes of unemployment. Temple cannot resist making suggestions, without any detailed analysis. Mechanisation is one factor.[142] Another is that men cannot be profitably employed - profitably to whom? Temple asks.[143] Thirdly, there is materialism. Men put material goods, which are finite in quantity, in place of knowledge, beauty, courage, love, joy and peace, which are unlimitedly available. From this attitude flows, in the last resort, our unemployment.[144] There is no more connected exploration than the article of April 1932, but Temple remained convinced of the link between unemployment and economics on an

international scale. Indeed his concentration on the economic system in his closing years was to earn him a measure of notoriety.

C. Economics

1. Basic convictions and diagnoses

Temple's address to the Pan Anglican Congress in the year 1908 propounds two basic convictions which he held to the end. The first is that economics cannot be divorced from ethics and religion. Jesus did confer material benefits, and His Kingdom includes every department of human activity. If the economic problem is how to secure maximum output from a man, that involves considerations of human personality. Economics cannot give practical advice without making assumptions that fall within the region of the Christian religion. Christianity is therefore concerned not only with individuals, but with the social system itself. This is the slow product of human choice, and human choice can alter it. The second conviction is that Christianity is opposed to unlimited competition; for that is selfishness. If you can really get the best out of a man by appeal to self-interest, then Christianity is wrong. Competition can only be allowed by Christianity within the limits set by the principle of co-operation.[145]

The first conviction is a constant which appears in many forms. Temple's Malvern Conference of January 1941 was a conscious effort "to cancel the divorce between theology and economics which was silently decreed in the latter part of the 15th century ..." One conviction of the Conference was that there is a divinely appointed order or hierarchy of human activities and functions. Economics is a means, which must be pursued with the effect (and motive as far as possible) of realising the

end - religion, art, science, life itself.[146] Christian principles suggest that the well-being of individual men and women is more important than maximum economic wealth.[147] Economic methods and structures must be tested on economic grounds for their efficiency, as must any improvement of them proposed on humanitarian grounds. But we must also ask: "Does this economic method or structure either help or hinder the development of persons in community?"[148] Human sin has created an order which makes the economic life supreme, and once created it perpetuates and intensifies the sin of self-interest from which it sprang.[149] It disintegrates society: men are used for efficient output irrespective of social ties and traditional roots. "And if we plan only for prosperity and comfort we may create a society which is comfortable, contented and spiritually dead."[150] Governments should not become preoccupied with economic considerations.[151] "The Capitalist tends to think of the economic issue in isolation; his apprehension of it may be clearer because of the comparative absence of disturbing sentiments; yet at the root it is false, because it depends on an abstraction which is not acknowledged. At the moment of crisis the Capitalist is likely to see more clearly, and therefore to be at that moment a safer guide. But when the crisis is past the error of the abstractly economic view will prepare for the next disaster, unless the human interests which are truly fundamental are fully met." Thus in 1926 the coal owners' proposals were more immediately practicable, but gave no hope of permanent peace without full attention to the human values of Mr. Cook, the miners' leader.[152] And Temple agrees that Capitalism "has certainly given to the mass of the people a higher standard of life - a larger enjoyment of material goods - than any previous system. Moreover, it seems nearly certain that no other system would have developed so rapidly or so far the new powers conferred by modern science". However, according to Natural Law or Natural Order, the economic process is not

an end in itself; and even if a system delivers the goods, it may still be condemned on moral grounds because it intensifies divisions and hostilities and is a source of wrong personal relationships.[153]

Temple naturally refers to the classical exponents of the Political Economy. The so-called Laws of Political Economy, he said, are neither divine decrees nor axioms. They are generalisations from experience, and therefore hypotheses. Approving of Ruskin's attack in Unto this Last, Temple says the theorists assumed self-interest as the only relevant motive. "They not only set forth the laws which (in the main) the commercial world of their day was following; but they made conformity with these expressions of greed into a system of ethics." True, some economic principles stand firm: the impossibility of permanently carrying on any business at a loss, or of distributing goods which have not been produced; but they are few. True, there is plenty of selfishness in the world. "The economists were not so very far wrong ... in their reading of the facts. Their disastrous error was the assumption that those facts were unalterable."[154] Among modern political economists Temple accepts Marshall's dictum that the two greatest influences moulding character are religion and the economic structure of society.[155] For Temple, the task of the Church is to lay down what Christian morality requires, without discussing the exact political or economic adjustments by which it is to be secured.[156] It must rebuke any confusion of means with ends, and try to restore activities to the Natural Order which is God's purpose for them.[157]

A purely or predominantly competitive system, says Temple, cannot be regarded as neutral.[158] Competition pervades the whole of our life; it is simply organised selfishness. "A great deal has been said in praise of competition, and most of it is rubbish. It is said, for example, that you must not interfere with natural processes;

you must let the cream come to the top. But the scum comes to the top quite as much as the cream."[159] Actually, the chief means by which the species succeeds, even in the competitive struggle, is by being co-operative; and in history we see that selfish purposes do fail.[160] Temple was not wholly opposed to competition. He could see that appeal to the self-regarding motive could yield results.[161] It is good if a man has to stand on his own feet in a world of fierce competition. But it is bad if he has to fight for his own interests to avoid submersion.[162] Historically the trend since the Renaissance has led to "headlong individualism" and a widespread belief in the moral, social and political value of unfettered competition. The result has been economic anarchy, and wage slavery for the majority. In reaction, value has been seen in the whole society alone, as in Communism and Fascism. "If we are to preserve and develop freedom it must be by maintaining a true balance between the two elements (individual and community) in the divine purpose ..."[163]

By 1940 Temple had developed a general interpretation of the economic system. It owed much to the diagnoses of Major C. H. Douglas and the Christendom Group, though Temple was much more wary than they were over Douglas' ideas on social credit.[164] Deeply suspicious of the profit-motive, he believed industry and economics largely rested upon it. Contrasting this with the service-motive, he asserted that finance controlled production. This was an inversion of the Natural Order, in which finance properly serves production and production exists for consumption.[165] Not that there is anything wrong about profits as such: "It has always been recognised that both the producer and the trader are entitled to a profit as their own means of livelihood, which they have earned by their service to the community. Further, there can be no profit except so far as the needs of consumers are being met. But it is possible none the less for these two to get into the wrong order, so that the consumer is

treated, not as the person whose interest is the true end of the whole process, but only as an indispensable condition of success in an essentially profit-seeking enterprise."[166]

But if there is no profit unless consumer needs are met, how can the system go awry? "Science has enabled us to produce wealth in wholly unexampled abundance, but our organisation of life is based on the expectation of expanding markets to absorb expanding production; and the markets do not any longer expand in that degree. So it happens that the ease with which we produce becomes a reason for not producing at all, because the markets are glutted, though human need is not satisfied. Under existing conditions we can only solve the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty by abolishing the plenty!"[167] Food is destroyed while men are hungry, because they do not have the means to make their need constitute a market.[168] Worse than that, the economic system "contains the seeds of war, because it relies so largely on the profit-motive, with which love of power is closely bound up". Few businesses profit by war, and most industrialists desire peace. But they also desire what tends to destroy peace, so the system leads to international rivalry, jealousy and conflict, if not open war.[169]

Though production exists for consumption, this does not mean, says Temple, that producers exist for consumers. It is people who produce, and they should not be thrown out of work or denied the opportunity to realise their personality and fellowship in the process of production. What is wanted is the whole view, and that is very difficult to consider.[170] I shall examine Temple's relationship to the tradition of Natural Law in Chapter V, commenting there on the influence of the Christendom Group on Temple's approach to economics.

2. Remedies

Temple's general remedial suggestions at an international level in the 1940's are these: calling on all nations to co-operate in raising living standards; commerce as the exchange of goods for mutual advantage, involving the repudiation of a favourable trade balance; changes in the social and economic order of many countries; and the restriction of the acquisitive impulse.[171] More specifically States should submit their tariffs to the League of Nations for free consultation, which could lead to the lowering of tariff walls and the undermining of economic nationalism.[172] By international agreement tariffs might be imposed on imports calculated to raise the price of the imported article to that of fully efficient producers of the home product - but no further; this would prevent undercutting and tend to raise the standard of life wherever labour is cheap by removing some of the advantage gained by exploitation. And international commerce should be a negotiated volume of trade, so planned as to utilise the productive capacity of all parties.[173] It is interesting that for many years, from Joseph Chamberlain's hey-day, Temple supported Protectionism. We can see from letters that his general purpose was British social welfare, which was threatened by "unmitigated competition"; he saw Tariff Reform as a specific means of furthering the general policy of stable and secure home markets.[174] Now, in the aftermath of economic and political crises in the 'thirties, both international in scale, he follows his own principle of checking narrower by wider loyalties, and re-thinks the tariff question in a presumed context of international economic co-operation.

Temple also had much to say about the domestic role of the State in relation to the economy. Already in the First World War Temple had noted without demur the increased role of the State.[175] By 1935 he was asserting

that some advance in a planned economy was a stark necessity which no-one denied. It was a question of method and lengths. He felt able to justify this advance in general terms by appeal to his understanding of freedom.[176] Eight years later he wrote: "It is quite true that every kind of planning involves the diminution of some liberties; but the chief enemy of freedom to-day is not an intelligent plan but the irresistible pressure of blind forces. We must gain control of those forces, and that involves planning ... We must plan for freedom, for the exercise of responsible citizenship in real community."[177] He rejected the idea of distributivism as impracticable; mass production had come to stay. He also rejected Sir Richard Acland's proposal of universal communal ownership. That would create an immense bureaucracy, "and human egoism would find its outlet in laying hold of the levers of the bureaucratic machine".[178] Communism and State Socialism are rejected, for they "ignore the fact that a man is still a human being in his activity as a producer and not only as a consumer; he ought to have free play for his personality, as far as may be, in the act of production - and this is the root-truth of individualistic capitalism. Our task must be to do justice as far as possible to the truth of capitalism, as well as to the truth of socialism."[179] We should welcome the proposals of the Uthwatt Report, aimed at combining the advantages of public ownership and ultimate control with private initiative, and we should see that its proposals are not whittled down by concessions to vested interests. We could not expect men to be guided by motives of service, but we could so organise life that self-interest prompted those actions which were of the greatest social service.[180] The right of ownership was one of administration not of exclusive use;[181] public interest should be secured against private depredations.[182] This particularly applied to primary requisites of life - but that did not necessarily mean national ownership.[183]

This brings us to the most specific of all Temple's suggestions. They must be read both in the light of his broad principles and also in the light of his disclaimers: "I offer these proposals not as dogmas but as matter for discussion and as indications of a spirit rather than as a definite policy. It may be that there are other and better ways of attaining our object."[184] "I do not ask you to believe anything I say about (credit); but I do ask you to think about it."[185] "I think it most improbable that every Christian should endorse what I now go on to say."[186] He felt the necessity to be more specific than he had been in the body of Christianity and Social Order, and both Keynes and Tawney supported the inclusion of the Appendix.[187]

First, there is the matter of land. Temple goes back to the Law of Moses, where the purchase of land in perpetuity is forbidden, since the land belongs to God and is granted to His people for their use. This is in accordance with the principle of maximum personal freedom, but no exploitation (in this case the formation of large estates at others' expense). Applying the principle to England, he says landowners hold not absolute dominion but the use of the land subject to public interest. The critical question is whether the owner discharges a social function. In Temple's view the rural landlord does, and "as family tradition in this field is a valuable social asset I should personally urge the total exemption of all agricultural land from death duties". He believes the present system leaves the private landlord in possession but makes it impossible for him to discharge his social responsibilities. Land nationalisation, pace some socialists, is no answer for Temple. It is urban ground landlords whom Temple would like to see eliminated, because they perform little social function. He would not support mere confiscation but would cripple them with drastic death duties, and forbid the sale of urban land except to the public authority. He would also prevent a landlord deriving

private profit from the additional value land may acquire through the enterprise of others or through communal activity. He passes on the suggestion of a general valuation of all land, which would place a ceiling on the sale price or the rent as a percentage, unless the landlord had increased the value by his own action.[188] Tax should in any case be levied on land, not buildings. It was absurd that tax should be decreased for a landlord who neglected his property, and increased if he improved it.[189]

Temple is even more severe with the ordinary shareholder; his social function does not exist. Temple favours the application to shares of the ancient Law of Jubilee, whereby once every 50 years the original equal distribution of land in Israel was to be restored. "It can be done in any one of three ways or by a combination of these: shares may take the form of debentures and be repayable at a certain date; or invested capital after bearing interest for a number of years may lose a proportion of its value each year until it is extinguished; or the inheritance of it may be curtailed by drastic death duties." The basic purpose was that "no-one by investing capital alone can become possessed of a permanent and saleable right to levy a tax upon the enterprise in which he invests his money together with a voice in the control of it. Thus the grip of profit-seeking capital upon industry will be loosened."[190] The type of enterprise, the degree of risk, delay in returns upon outlay, and similar factors, must be taken into account in determining the maximum profits, the period during which the capital sum remains intact, the rate of interest, and the rate of decrease after that period.[191] Interest should be related to the service rendered, not to the relative strength and weakness of the parties to the transaction.[192]

Social justice, Temple claims, requires that limitation of liability should carry with it limitation of profits. The early Christian Socialists had advocated this, and the world would have been saved much evil had their warnings

been heeded. Surplus profits should be allocated to: an equalisation fund for the maintenance of wages in bad times even though hours of work be reduced; a similar fund for the maintenance of interest to shareholders at a specified minimum; a sinking fund for the repayment of invested capital; a fund for the extension of fixed capital; a public service fund, to be administered as a rule by representatives of the workers (including management) and of the national, state or local authority.[193]

On 1 July, 1942 the Secretary of the Trustees Corporation Ltd., wrote to the Ecclesiastical Commissioners reporting payment of rent in respect of Winchester House, and enquiring whether the time had come for no more return on the original investment. Temple replied that his principle did not apply to rent of land or buildings; in any case, even assuming the Commissioners agreed with him, any such move in advance of legislation would be an act of individual benevolence, and Trustees like the Commissioners had no right to be benevolent with other people's property.[194]

Turning to the banks, Temple acknowledged with gratitude the stability of the banking system and the ability and integrity with which it was administered. Nonetheless he believed that it was unjustifiable in modern conditions for the Banks, even the Bank of England, to meet national needs by creating credit which earned interest for themselves. The State must resume the right to control the issue and cancellation of every kind of money. It was a false principle for a body within the community to control what was vital to the welfare of the community.[195] Any monopoly in a universal necessity like credit should be taken under public control.[196] In May 1940 Temple favoured nationalisation of the Bank of England and the Joint Stock Banks; later in Christianity and Social Order he preferred Public Utility Corporations to State ownership and operation.[197] As a corollary, Temple viewed with profound mistrust a proposal for a World Bank designed to control the credit of the world. It would be an enormous instance of

irresponsible power, which was always an evil. For it would plainly be a long time before there was anything like a World Government, to which it could be responsible. In any case the scheme for a World Bank seemed to assume absolute fluidity of labour, which would be inhuman.[198]

Temple's thinking is an attempt to apply to modern conditions the doctrine of the Prohibition of Usury, found in the Old Testament, Aristotle, and persistently in Christian history. The principle is that money is a medium of exchange; those who handle it should be remunerated for their integrity and honesty in dealing with it, but should not be able to manipulate it to create new values which do not correspond to any useful services to the community. Speculation in foreign currency was Temple's prime example.[199] Theological moralists would also have been "very shy" of systems of mortgaging, he said in February 1943, even if this was the only way in which quite necessary security was obtainable.[200] Just a week later Temple explained in a reply to the Director of the Banking Information Service that his anxiety about mortgaging was the risk of exploitation of the weaker by the stronger, and the danger of property being mortgaged for personal purposes when public interest would be jeopardised. He also acknowledged difficulty in the application of the doctrine, but suggested an important distinction was between loans for objects that involved some risk, and loans where the principal was secure; in the latter case there was no proper partnership in the enterprise, and there should be a limitation upon the return.[201]

The other doctrine to which Temple appeals is that of the Just Price. The principle, stated in past ages "as part of a complete theology", was that "the price of an article should be fixed on moral grounds with due regard to cost of material and labour and to reasonable profit; the vendor is not entitled merely to ask the utmost that the purchaser will pay. Above all, he must on no account

charge more because the buyer's need is great."[202] In the Middle Ages "reasonable profit" was estimated with regard to 'the current habit of society and the kind of position that society was expecting you to maintain". Calculation was easier because society had a fairly rigid structure. Whatever the gains of the later shift to a society on a contractual basis, the nineteenth century acceptance of the law of supply and demand was totally repudiated by the doctrine of the Just Price. Temple favoured a recovery of that doctrine in the interests of human fellowship and the richness of human personality.[203]

Temple received much criticism for his views, and I shall consider a selection relating to his Albert Hall Speech of 26 September, 1942 in Chapter VII. Suffice it to say here that Temple has deserted the corporate approach of the Yorkshire Institute and the Pilgrim Trust enquiry, and indulged in personal reflections, where both diagnosis and remedy are arrived at primarily by moral considerations. This lays Temple open to the accusation of impractical sentimentality from self-styled Christian realists. I shall seek to disentangle truth from falsehood on both sides.

CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A. Pacifism

Temple was no pacifist. True, he was always prepared to agree with pacifists that "all war is contrary to the mind and spirit of Christ". He writes in 1914: "Members of the Body of Christ are tearing one another, and His body is bleeding as it once bled on Calvary, but this time the wounds are dealt by his friends. It is as though Peter were driving home the nails, and John were piercing the side." All war is "devil's work".[1] Yet Temple does not infer the pacifist answer. Similarly in 1924 the COPEC Conference passed a resolution that "All war is contrary to the spirit and teaching of Jesus Christ". But when the Jesuit Fr. Francis Woodlock complained in a letter to The Times that this meant all Christians should be conscientious objectors, Temple replied that this was not so: it did not follow, when once the spirit and teaching of Christ had been deserted by some nation or group of nations, that armed resistance was un-Christian.[2] Again, Temple is prepared to say in 1916 that all war is sinful, but not that it is always sinful to engage in war.[3] By 1939 he expresses it this way: Killing is right in some circumstances; yet it is still sinful, for it belongs to an order of things which has departed from the rule of God.[4] Clearly there is no inconsistency here,

since Temple in effect distinguishes sins for which a man is personally responsible from sin in which he is implicated through his membership of a sinful order.

Temple was in no doubt both in 1914 and in 1939 that Britain was right to go to war. In 1914 there was "no honourable way of escape".[5] War may be a duty, especially if the strong attack the weak. "As long as we ask what England's duty was and is, only one answer is compatible with elementary morality."[6] And in 1939: "But as the fact that we are right now does not obliterate our past sin, so our past sin in no way alters the fact that we are right now".[7]

Temple's appeal to "elementary morality" does not mean that his case against pacifism is either simple-minded or secular-minded. It is true that he always had a great respect for the basic moral convictions of ordinary men. He was also glad to go as far as he could in reconciling philosophy and Christianity. But his case here flows from an attempt to be thoroughly theological.

On several occasions Temple commented on specific Biblical texts relating to the issue of pacifism. In 1936 he described as delusion the idea that non-resistance was the essential principle of Christian ethics as a whole. Even if the principle was stated decisively in the Sermon on the Mount, the illustrations showed that there was a special and limited reference. "In the first place the injuries or grievances specified are such as concern only the person whose conduct is in question, not any third party. In face of this it is illegitimate to argue that the command not to resist evil, or the evil man, is rightly interpreted as a command to stand by in idleness while he maltreats another. St. Thomas is perfectly justified in his comment - Patiently to endure injuries done to one's self pertains to perfection; but patiently to endure injuries

done to another pertains to imperfection and even to vice." Secondly, the aim in the illustrations is to turn the relation of demand or claim into a relation of fellowship. Thirdly, what is represented is a spirit: the injuries are such as most irritate a man in whom self-concern is strong, but to a truly converted man are seen to be no real injuries at all. 'Here as always our Lord is not legislating but indicating a spirit by which we should live; it is the spirit of non-resentment which is, so to speak, the reverse side or negative aspect of the spirit of love. Resentment is absolutely condemned, but not, in all possible circumstances, resistance." In fact the essential principle is rather that we should be perfect, like God; and that means that "Christian ethics is very definitely a department of Christian theology".[8]

In the same passage Temple refers to the saying of Christ: "He that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one." Whatever these words symbolise, says Temple, it is not non-resistance. In a letter dated 26 April, 1944 he writes: "You seem to assume that Our Lord Himself was a complete pacifist. I am sure that is not true. If it was, how did there come to be two swords in the little company of His disciples right at the end of His Ministry. He Himself said that if He were concerned with an earthly kingdom His servants would be fighting. He seems to me plainly to recognise that it would be right to fight for an earthly kingdom or civilisation, but it cannot be right to fight for spiritual truth itself because that wins its way only so far as it is freely accepted, and to try to uphold it by force is in fact to betray it."[9] Whatever the value of the exegesis here, the distinction between "spiritual truth" and "earthly kingdom" will turn out to be of great importance to Temple.

Equally, Temple cannot interpret the commandment "Thou shalt not kill" in a pacifist sense. It was not so interpreted in Old Testament times; it was acknowledged that there is justifiable homicide.[10] Temple thinks "Thou shalt do no murder" a more accurate version, "that is to say ... killing for personal advantage, or the satisfaction of personal passion." He goes on: "There is a great deal in the Gospels that is very terrible, as well as all that is said there about love and peace, and we have no right to take one part without the other."[11]

Temple has thus rejected the idea that a Biblical text can be taken as a straightforward action-rule to be applied without exception, and has suggested that the bearing of Christianity on the issue of war must be determined by the broad consideration of the total Gospel witness. In fact, he means something even broader than this.

One of Temple's most forthright pronouncements on pacifism occurs in the York Diocesan Leaflet of November 1935, when he declares that it is heretical in tendency. This does not apply to those pacifists whose decision is based on the view that to engage in modern warfare will almost certainly do more harm than good; for that is a judgment concerning a balance of values, not a judgment of principle. The pacifists he has in mind are those who say it is, as a universal principle, un-Christian to use in support of law whatever degree of force is requisite, even to the taking of life, in restraint of lawless force or violence. This position he sees as dubious in three ways, "and in many cases I have thought that all these heretical tendencies were combined". First, it is an essentially Marcionite attitude; whereas the Christian view is that the New Testament completes, and therein corrects the deficiencies of the Old Testament, but does not supersede it. Secondly, it is Manichaean in tendency; whereas the Christian view holds that matter and material forces can be completely subordinated to the spirit, and that spirit normally manifests itself by directing and

controlling what is material. Thirdly, he says, it is Pelagian in its assumption of man's capacity, apart from conversion and sanctification, to obey the Counsels of Perfection; whereas according to Christianity man is incapable of living by love unless the grace of God has both converted and sanctified him, so that the law of love is not applicable to nations consisting in large measure of unconverted or (as in the case of most, if not all, of us) very imperfectly converted citizens.[12]

It is clear from the leaflet that friends had been puzzled by Temple's claim in the October leaflet that pacifism is heretical. He is careful to explain that he did not call any individual a heretic - there was no question of personal condemnation. Perhaps because of possible misunderstanding Temple did not persist in using the term 'heretical' or refer to the three ways by title. There is, however, no doubt that his theological criticisms of pacifism are in effect against these three forms of heresy, sometimes singly, usually in combination, over more than thirty years.

Criticism of the Marcionite tendency is found most clearly in "A Conditional Justification for War" (1940).[13] Given that the highest ethical axiom is "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" the question is not simply: How can we show love to Germans? The question is: How can we show love to Frenchmen, Poles, Czechs, and Germans, all at once? If it can be said that Britain is fighting to overthrow Nazi tyranny and secure for all whom her action may affect a greater measure of freedom, then resistance of Germany by force is a way of loving Germans themselves as well as others. "In the world that exists, it is not possible to take it as self-evident that the law of love forbids fighting. Some of us even hold that precisely that law commands fighting." Fighting is not a direct expression of love; it becomes an expression of love only because every alternative is worse. "What things it is right to do may be very much affected by

circumstances." To prevent a human brute killing a child it may be not only permissible but obligatory to kill him; "and that obligation is rooted in love". The rightness of most acts is relative and not absolute; but this does not mean that the rightness is doubtful. "The general principle is that relative terms are absolute in their appropriate relations. To kill is right, if at all, relatively and not absolutely; that is, it can only be right in special circumstances. But in those circumstances it is absolutely right." Temple's strong sense that every act is a link in a chain of cause and effect disposes him to doubt if any act is right "in itself".

Temple proceeds to dismiss the view that the indiscriminate character of modern warfare always makes it unjustifiable. His principal two comments are, first, that the crux lies in balancing the evil of causing suffering to the innocent against the evils which may be checked as a result; and secondly that, although war does not distribute suffering justly, neither is it totally unjust, since "no citizen can claim to be totally innocent of his country's wrong-doing". Here Temple is using the same sort of distinction as was noted earlier in connection with sin.[14] Nor will Temple allow the fact of our guilt to disqualify us from fighting. The mistakes in the Versailles Treaty and the failure fully to operate the Covenant of the League of Nations mean that we are in part responsible for Hitler and for the course of events which culminated in the war. However, "the fact that we failed to do our duty at an earlier date is no reason why we should fail to do it now". And even if it is true that we have acted belatedly because our own interests are involved, our duty is to act justly.

For Temple the whole question comes down to this: "Is the Nazi threat to civilisation so serious that the evil of allowing it to develop is greater even than the monstrous evil of war?" His answer is an unhesitating yes. The questions are then posed whether all this might

not be said by a pagan moral philosopher, and whether the Christian should not respond to that call which is higher than justice and earthly loyalty. Temple's answer reveals his understanding of the relation of Gospel and Law. The Gospel does not destroy but fulfils the Law and the Prophets. So Christianity does not sweep away all wisdom attained apart from it. The kingdoms of the world have their place by God's appointment. They are not the same as the Kingdom of God, but they have powers and rights which are to be exercised in obedience to God's laws. "To check the aggressor and to set free the oppressed are ways of doing this." So too, if the Gospel fulfils the Law we must not fail to discharge our elementary obligations. "We must pay our debts before we give away our goods in reckless generosity."

This argumentation partly reappears in a letter Temple wrote to a young friend in November 1939, but it is even more theological. The move from the absolute to the relative realm comes about because the order of things has departed from the rule of God. "So we are involved in an entanglement due to the sin of mankind, including our own, in which the best thing we can do is still a bad thing. None the less it is right to do it, because it is the best possible. And so we have got to do it and be penitent while we do it. That is the only hope I can see of both resisting injustice and securing that justice comes out of it. Where the method of redemptive suffering is possible and the people concerned are capable of rising to it, it is no doubt the best of all; but there is no way that I can see in which we could redemptively suffer so as to change the heart of Germany and deliver Poles and Czechs; and if there is, our country is not yet anything like prepared to do it. So once again we have to do the best we can, being what we are, in the circumstances where we are - and then God be merciful to us sinners!"[15]

Here, then, Temple clearly sees the necessity to retain the way of justice and law, even though this falls short of the way of redemptive suffering. But if the Marcionite tendency is in effect repudiated, so also, here and elsewhere, are the Manichaean and the Pelagian. Both involve the question of the relationship of the individual Christian to society and the State.

As early as 1912 Temple wrote of the social or political necessity for compromise, "arising from the fact that we are members, whether we will or no, of the society in which we live; and certainly it seems to me that our capacity to raise that society depends upon our being veritable members of it, working for the highest things which we can work for in it, but not cutting ourselves off from it, not standing aside and giving good advice from the touch-line." A thoroughly Christian nation would refuse to fight if only its own interest were at stake, but the Christian citizen of a state which has not yet reached that pitch should not refuse to fight, "because if he does he may be putting himself entirely out of touch with the great stream of life which at the moment may be a far nobler thing than any practicable alternative". The problem of motive enters in here. "Perhaps the noblest character of all is the one that would refuse to fight; but the man who is ready to give up his own life for the sake of his country's gain, or in obedience to his country's command, is clearly a better man than one who shirks fighting on the ground of self-interest, and there is a serious danger that a man by attempting to force the highest will, as a matter of fact, only encourage the lowest."[16]

Temple's queries concerning the effect and the motivation of opting out of society were to recur in both wars, and he does not mince his words. In the Challenge he remarks that it is absurd to be neutral at Little Trumpington when England is at war, for the pacifist is protected by the Navy and will also share in the fruits of

victory. To refuse to recognise one's membership of a country at war is to rebel.[17] In 1939 Temple described the pacifist as in a sense a modern representative of the monastic principle. Just as not all Christians are called on to be monks or nuns, neither should all Christians be pacifists. "If all Christians took that course, there would be no Christian impulse behind the civic enterprise of justice. I have been urged to receive the evil of the Nazi regime into my own soul as a redemptive sacrifice, instead of resisting it. But no one has told me how I am to do this. The actual effect of our all turning pacifists would probably be the continued obliteration of the Polish and Czech States and the avoidance of any diminution of our own material wealth."[18]

So too in "A Conditional Justification for War" he recognises the way of the monk and of the Christian citizen as two ways of Christian obedience. But if a pacifist merely refuses to fight then he enjoys the immunity and food provided by the Armed Services, so he has made a very slender witness to the supremacy of love. He should go further and contract out of the advantages as from the obligations of the secular order of society. Those who do this - for instance, by sharing the lot of the very poor in order to bring them new strength and hope - really are pioneers of a better order. But those who accept the common obligations of men are also pioneers. "The Kingdom of God uses the service of both - of the Good Samaritan and the Good Centurion."[19]

The other form in which Temple's anti-Manichaean thrust appears is in his treatment of the question of force. True, Christ could not win His Kingdom by force.[20] But we are left with the fact of the existence of force, and the issue with the pacifist can be put in the form: Is the true Christian principle the abolition of force or its consecration? In the Church Assembly in 1932 Temple posed

this question to pinpoint the difference between himself and a pacifist speaker. His own view was for the consecration of force, as of all other powers possessed by man. This meant using the means of force only in ways agreed, either by the national community or the community of nations, for the maintenance of its own general law.[21] So too in 1941 Temple said force was an indispensable element in the ordering of life. To consecrate force is to subject it completely to law, the law which should be expressive of the highest welfare of mankind at large, and must be continually revised to that end.[22]

Temple's accusation in 1935 that pacifists had Pelagian tendencies undoubtedly arose from his strongly held belief in the limited yet indispensable role of the State. The issue is set out remarkably well as early as 1914.[23] Can the State obey the Christian law at all? "Has self-sacrifice any real meaning when applied to communities, and if so is it in their case a virtue?" And if the Christian law is held to be inapplicable or unattainable by a State, what is the individual Christian to do? Most Christian men, says Temple, reject pacifism; for the nation is not prepared to accept it; and in any case the war would go on, evil forces would triumph, and heroic sacrifices would fail of result. Men sense their solidarity with the nation, and so give it their utmost support. "In adopting this attitude they do not feel that they are compromising Christian principle. A nation has a real existence. It, as well as the individual, has a contribution to make to the Kingdom of God. The individual cannot live wholly to himself ... Nevertheless it does seem to involve us in ... the entanglement of sin ... A sinful man cannot live the life of Christ; a sinful nation cannot perfectly obey His law; and the citizen of a sinful nation cannot escape altogether from his nation's sin." Temple quotes St. Paul: "Wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

Temple is at his most explicit on this matter in correspondence he had in 1944 with Mr. Derek Fane, who had written to him on the question of pacifism and ordination.[24] In his first reply Temple wrote: "I believe that there are Christians who are called to personal pacifism and to give the special witness which this carries; but if they go on to say that all Christians ought to be pacifists, I believe that they are involved in profound theological error - and that of such a kind as to be disastrous to the cause of Christian Civilisation." Fane's position is that pacifism is either right for everyone or for no-one, otherwise it cannot be standing for any objective standard of right. He presses Temple to say where a competent and authoritative statement of the "profound theological error" can be found - "one which is neither a bare statement of the opposing view, nor a statement of theological principles with which we agree as fully as anyone". Temple's reply is succinct. There is no formal pronouncement of the Church. 'But the error in question consists in one or other of two lines of thought which may also be combined. One is the notion that the National State ought in its dealings with other National States to act upon principles that would be proper for Christian individuals to adopt for the guidance of their conduct; the other is the notion that Christians can and should detach themselves from their civic obligations when these require them to do as citizens what they would not do as isolated Christian individuals. There is a theology of the State which involves obligations for Christian citizens, and it seems to me that as a rule my pacifist friends have a theology of the Church but no theology of the State at all."[25]

Because of his theology of the State Temple can refute the view that what is morally wrong cannot be politically right.[26] He can also distinguish between fighting for the Kingdom of God and fighting for a Christian Civilisation.

"If you look at the New Testament carefully there can be no doubt that there is a theology of the State as well as of the Church, and that it is our duty to do as citizens in support of the State things which it would be inappropriate to do as Churchmen in support of the Church and its cause. The soldiers are therefore quite right when they say that war is not Christianity, but they would be quite wrong if they went on to say that therefore Christians ought not to fight. The duty to fight is a civic duty which, if the cause is good, Christianity accepts and approves, but it is not a duty which has its origin in Christianity as such."[27] The nearest he came to obliterating this distinction was in his Enthronement Sermon at Canterbury, where he favoured the utmost effort to win the war, not only to keep open the possibility of a Christian civilisation but also to prevent the destruction of the Ecumenical Movement, on which he set high hopes.[28]

Temple has no illusions about the dangers of resorting to force. It is very hard, he says, to extract justice from strife; passions evoked by war blind vision and distort judgment; victory will not result in pure justice, but it can result in something far nearer justice than a Nazi domination.[29] "No positive good can be done by force ... But evil can be checked and held back by force ..."[30] And he had no doubt that it was vital to pursue justice by force if necessary. One of his most forthright statements came in 1935, only a few days after his remarks about the heretical tendencies of pacifism. It well illustrates the anti-Pelagian dimension. Speaking at Pontefract he replied to a letter in The Times from the pacifist C. E. Raven. He agreed that the goal was peace; the problem was the way. "Of course the ideal of mutual love holds for all men and women and for all human groups." Converting the world to the Christian faith is the primary task. "But if, while that process of conversion is incomplete, the Christian calls nations to act by love

only, when justice is still insecure, he is likely to receive immediate applause but to produce no actual result. Love of neighbour is very hard for individuals; for nations it is much harder. God's grace makes each possible for those who seek that grace; but till nations, as nations, learn to do this, the law of love is beyond their reach. The virtue that can be effectively established is justice, and I have no doubt at all that we must hasten the coming of the Kingdom of love at this stage by pointing to it as the only true object of man's hopes, by calling all men to the practice of Christian faith and religion, whereby alone those hopes can be fulfilled, and meanwhile by bending our energies to establish for its sake the rule of justice among nations."[31]

Temple used one other line of attack on pacifism. Again it is theological in its root. He believed that some pacifists subscribed to the view that physiological life is absolutely sacred. This would, says Temple, be a Hindu or Buddhist position, but not a Christian one.[32] For it rules out giving one's life as well as taking another's. But if the Christian is not to count his life dear, then as compared with some other things loss of life and taking it are a small injury. The New Testament word for "life" has the deeper connotation of personality capable of eternal life, not merely life in the animal sense. War is certainly horrible; but so is a Nazi concentration camp, or the suppression of national community. The question is therefore: How can I prevent the greatest imminent evil or promote the greatest practicable good? And Temple warns about emotions playing us false: "And we cannot in the proper sense <u>think</u> about this except by achieving such a measure of detachment as to seem cold-blooded; the alternative is to be swayed by feelings, and then we easily think that to be most wrong which we feel to be most disgusting - which may have very little to do with the moral issue."[33]

Temple was never prepared to rate suffering as the principal form of evil. The root evil lay in Nazi tyranny which was destroying European civilisation;[34] the issue was a matter of justice for nations and individuals; it posed the question whether the form of civilisation which had grown up out of the Christian doctrine about God was to have wider scope or not.[35] Nor was he willing to look on war itself as the principal evil. "So far as I can see, we shall be playing upon the surface if we regard war itself as the evil rather than as one form in which the evil of the world is peculiarly obvious, when it occurs."[36] The real disease was not war itself, but selfishness and self-seeking; true peace could be secured not by the prohibition of force, but by instilling the root principle that we are members one of another.[37]

It is difficult to convey the strength of Temple's conviction that pacifism as a universal principle was a serious error. The gulf he felt between pacifist and himself is perhaps best appreciated by words of almost bitter disappointment spoken in 1941. "Is it not true that the peace movement in the period following the last war was desperately weakened by an attempt to compromise between those who were persuaded that force must be used, and even ought to be used, and those who believed that it ought not?" It was no good pursuing a common goal by diametrically opposite means, even if it was sad to part company in practice with those whose goals were the same. "With all friendship for those who must disagree with us, we must say 'If you can win a majority, go your way; if not, we must go ours'."[38]

The word 'friendship' is not a vacuous term. Temple was well respected in pacifist circles.[39] Early in the Second World War he helped to gather a group of pacifists and non-pacifists whose prime aim was to affirm their ultimate unity in Christ. To this end they produced a statement "Towards a Christian Britain" and then the book Is Christ Divided? Temple consistently held the view that

some Christians were called to be pacifists.[40] It was a one-sided testimony, which counter-balanced the tendency towards sheer materialism and worship of force;[41] it bore witness to the un-Christian character of war;[42] to the supremacy of love, and to the world-wide family of God.[43] This was similar to the vocation of some men to point to a pure ideal of social relationships in fellowship and love, which probably could not be translated immediately into any political programme or picture at all. He quotes St. Francis's vocation to embrace holy poverty. However, says Temple, St. Francis never said everyone ought to abandon worldly goods; and it would have been "a stark dereliction of duty" for Pope Innocent III to join the Franciscans.[44] Temple seems to have been influenced here by Jesus' "double principle" - in the world but not of it. His way of doing justice to both and finding "the line of true adjustment" is to reject pacifism as a universal principle, but to respect "personal pacifism".[45] However, Temple soon realised that this position was no satisfactory synthesis in the eyes of pacifists. In Is Christ Divided? he admitted that "the difference is profound and incapable of adjustment".[46] He had immediately in mind here the pacifist who based himself on an absolute imperative, but equally he could find no adjustment with those like C.E. Raven who differed from him more at the level of the effectiveness of the rival positions. The book brings out well both the strength of the two positions and the impossibility of synthesis. In fact Temple's treatment of pacifism is the best illustration of the way his propensity for Hegelian synthesis can take the edge off the dilemmas which Christianity is uniquely equipped to recognise. This point is inseparable from Temple's conception of the relationship of love and justice, and I shall return to it in that context in Part II.[47]

Temple's respect for personal pacifism made him a staunch defender of the recognition of conscientious

objection in both world wars. The issue, as he saw it in 1916, concerned the adjustment of the duty and rights of the State and the duty and rights of the individual. He upheld the duty of the individual to follow his conscience, in the sense of his deliberate judgment with regard to the right course to follow. But the State also had a moral judgment to follow. If there was a clash, each party ought to respect the other, and remember that conscience is fallible. The State should sift out true conscientious objectors. Many objectors were devoted servants of the country, and it was only through individuals that progress was made. Since the State could only deal with acts not motives, it should say "'I believe that you are wrong. I believe that I have the right to say that you must either defend your country or cease to be a member of it. But I will not say this. I will appoint you to work unconnected with the war; work disagreeable and not well paid; so I shall test those who are acting by a genuine moral judgment. And you, if you are honest, will make no complaint.'"[48]

Consistently with this position Temple argued the following year that the State had the right to debar conscientious objectors from voting; but it was not wise to do so, since conscientious objection had already been recognised by the State without threat of subsequent disabilities, and many objectors were vigorous workers for a better ordering of society. More fundamentally, there was a danger of Britain, like Germany, making the State supreme in the moral sphere. The first duty of the State was not to secure its own safety but to recognise the authority of Christ. We should therefore be more lenient and respectful to the conscientious objector who had interpreted Christ's claims differently from the State.[49]

B. War

In both world wars Temple offered some theological reflection on the causes of war which led him to make suggestions about the spirit in which Britain should face war. In a sermon preached in February 1916 Temple said: "One has heard people during this war speak about it as if God had deliberately caused the war in order to punish mankind for certain sins ... that God has deliberately brought into the world all the agony of the war to punish men, at any rate in this country, for certain conspicuous vices or failings, such as drunkenness or impurity or Sabbath-breaking. I venture to say that is sheer superstition. We can trace the actual causes of the war, and we know quite well that its causes were in human wills ... All the way through (the) Gospel of St. John we are taught that a judgment of God is not a deliberate act of His intervening in the world to make guilty people suffer, but an automatic product of His Presence and Revelation. So we shall think of this war. It is, indeed, a judgment upon the world of sin ... The sin which led immediately to the outbreak of war we may believe to be mainly in one nation, but the root is to be found among all peoples, and not only among those who are fighting, but neutral peoples just as much. The punishment for that sin comes through the moral order which God has set up in the world, an order which reacts upon those who break it."[50]

Clearly Temple believed it was fundamentally the doctrine of God that was at stake. Another source of misconception was, in Temple's view, the fact that in an age singularly free on the whole from pain and suffering "we almost came to think pain the greatest evil in the world, and pleasure the only good". Now, however, "we have been recovering, to our great gain, through the suffering in which we are being purged, the sense that the real good for man is not enjoyment, but that he should

be used, and used up, in the service of God and man. But, if so, love will be stern quite as often as it will be indulgent."[51]

In the inter-war years Temple saw the defeat of Germany as a visitation of the Son of Man in judgment;[52] the state of Britain he deplored as suffering from the collapse of spiritual and moral authority, which was reflected in the hedonism of contemporary literature.[53] At the outbreak of the Second World War it is basically the same message. It is a time of crisis, and that means judgment.[54] "Alike in the Old Testament and in the New we are taught to trace God's judgment in the working-out of those laws of cause and effect in the moral world which are a part of creation as God has ordered it." By this ordering men's lives are frustrated and distorted by intrigue and faction and war as a consequence of their selfishness as individuals, as families, as economic classes, as nations. Men need not order their lives on selfish principles; but if they do, they involve themselves and others in catastrophe. The Gospel message that God is love must be a message of judgment as well as consolation; for it pronounces the doom of antagonism against the supreme power in the universe upon every selfish purpose or person or nation. "Under that judgment and that doom we now stand."[55]

Temple never gave a detailed analysis of the causes of the wars. As we have already seen, he was sometimes inclined to see a direct causal connection between competitive trade and war. "The whole system of mutual supply is converted into one of internecine rivalries of which war is the logical outcome."[56] Elsewhere he sees the British industrial system and Prussian militarism as two manifestations of "the spirit of grab and push".[57] He consistently singles out nationalism as the central issue. During the First World War the chief foe is idolatry of the national state by Germany; for this repudiates all conception of the world-wide Kingdom of

Christ.[58] He is more detailed just after the war. He contrasts it with the wars of the English mediaeval kings. These were out of personal ambition, whereas the rise of nationalism and democracy from the Renaissance onwards had meant that the war of 1914 was the expression and result of movements of real national wills. Not that any nation actually desired war. But "the whole development of German policy initiated by Bismarck and whole-heartedly adopted by the entire country necessarily led to such a result. For what Bismarck gave to Germany was not chiefly a political scheme or programme but chiefly a moral attitude to political questions ... The moral principles of Bismarck were simply national egoism and the superiority of the State to all obligations."[59] In 1943 the diagnosis is the same: since the Middle Ages one department of life after another had claimed autonomy. "So the State came to be thought of as an end in itself - a doctrine long held in Germany and nakedly proclaimed by the Nazis: the idolatry of the State."[60]

This criticism was not directed at Germany alone. Britain's own patriotism was tribal.[61] Any patriot should remember that Christ died nec miles nec pro patria.[62] Temple's consistent view was that there could be a Christian patriotism. Even a defective patriotism could partially deliver one from self-centredness;[63] hence even Bismarck's principles were more moral than immoral.[64] But what was wanted was loyalty to one's own nation always checked by recognition that "we are members one of another", and that every other nation has its own place with its own excellencies to contribute.[65]

The only answer to the crisis was a return to Christian belief. In our enjoyment of life, he said, we had thought that what we had learnt to value must be prized by all sane men. The trouble with the Nazis was not that they did not practise what they preached. Their actual standards were perverted. For Temple the only ground of confidence in our values was God as Christ had

made Him known. Yet the paradox of modern English culture was that it was largely Christian in quality, yet regarded faith in God as a dispensable indulgence. Neglect of God naturally led to violation of His law; the first need was to return to God. It was astonishingly silly to say that a man's religion was a private affair between him and his Maker; and we were not going to extirpate fervent Nazi belief by a "mild haze of cautiously held opinions".[66]

It is little wonder that Temple persistently called his fellow countrymen to penitence. He was a leading figure in the National Mission of Repentance and Hope in 1916. The call is most insistent in the hour of victory or when the tide is turning in Britain's favour. In his editorial "Quid Gloriaris?" immediately after Armistice Day he stresses Britain's responsibility, and wonders whether we have really learned our lesson and repented. At Christmas 1942 he quotes Psalm 51 and warns of the danger of pride and forgetfulness of God.[67] For Temple penitence is a necessary basic attitude in facing the massive suffering which the war entailed.

Nothing roused Temple more than self-righteous talk of reprisals. He would have only the minimum of suffering inflicted on the enemy.[68] True, our duty in the Second World War was to fight, and fight effectively.[69] Yet that did not give us carte blanche to inflict whatever suffering we liked. In an editorial of 1915, Temple deplored high-level and therefore indiscriminate bombing. It was not true that any methods of warfare would do. "Men are not logical machines and they have not such perfect control of their own psychological mechanism that they can permit themselves to commit outrages in war and yet remain as morally sensitive as ever when peace returns." We should not minimise risk to our lives without taking moral considerations into account. Temple distinguished reprisals (injury inflicted in proportion to injury received) from retaliation as a policy of preventing further injury to

the defenceless. But he doubted whether either would be effective. Above all we had to bear in mind the purpose for which we were fighting: "Our capacity to advance the cause of international law will be enormously increased if out of respect for it we have submitted to outrages which we were only able to prevent by imitating our enemies' disregard of that law."[70] So too, in the Second World War, Temple saw the bombing of dams and the crippling of the war effort in German cities as legitimate acts of war. There was no harm in satisfaction at that, provided that it did not degenerate into gloating. He drew a sharp distinction between causing something by direct intention, and causing it incidentally; and he extracted an assurance from the Government that their principles (with which he agreed) governing the choice of military objectives remained unaltered.[71] Fearing this degeneration of character, Temple's watchwords are steadfastness, vigilance, discipline.[72] Not only must men show no hatred. "The religion of Christ is the defiance of what - apart from it - seems to be nature": we must love and pray for our enemies.[73] Love of enemies was quite compatible with severity, but there was an immense difference between severity and ill will,[74] as the behaviour of Christ to his opponents showed. Similarly, any prayer which denied the Germans had the same right of approach to God was unacceptable. The Lord's Prayer was a model, for in war-time Englishman and German could have knelt side by side and meant the same thing as they said it.[75] Temple was certainly aware of the immense difficulty of combining severity and sensitivity in the name of love. This is most apparent in his correspondence with Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Salmond, who complained that Temple's reported regret over necessary military operations was likely to sap men's strength of will in a hard and ruthless task. Temple's reply contained the words: "It is of real importance to maintain, as far as one can, sensitiveness to the horrors of war even while one is facing them. I do not the least believe that it

diminishes the readiness for endurance or for thoroughness, but it does something to counteract the inevitable hardening tendency of war of which the final result is as expressed in Shakespeare's terrible line 'All pity choked with custom of fell deeds'".[76]

Temple's concern for the relief of suffering earned him very wide respect. In 1944 he asked in the Lords whether the Government had any information concerning the supply of food for enemy occupied countries.[77] He said it was important, because Britain was so well fed, to keep alive a capacity for sympathy. He made it clear he was not condemning the Government, but was eager to press for the utmost to be done without damage to the war effort. Lord Selborne, for the Government, welcomed the question, and assured Temple that the Government had no wish that their policy should be judged by any other than Christian principles. 'But when you are attempting to apply Christian principles in war-time, you are faced with a continuous choice of evils, because the whole fact of war is proof of failure of one party or the other to attain the Christian standard." The problem was not only an administrative one. The Germans had let Greece starve because she could contribute little to the war effort; they had revenged themselves on Poland and Yugoslavia by giving them worse economic conditions. They could easily nullify any supplementary ration from the Allies by adjusting their supply of the basic ration. In short, the Government would do all it could, but nothing which would prolong the war. In response Temple withdrew his motion; he was content in the circumstances to have had the matter ventilated and a statement and assurance given. Lord Selborne was of course a kindred spirit in his appeal both to principles and to consideration of consequences.

Temple personally showed his support for Poles by speaking at the Anglo-Polish Christian Circle.[78] It was

however to the case of the Jews that Temple devoted the greatest energy in the relief of suffering. As early as 1933-34 Temple had collected evidence about the concentration camps, submitted it for examination by a High Court Judge, and written a personal appeal to Hitler. It was eventually received and acknowledged by Ribbentrop.[79] Temple was always watchful about signs of anti-semitism in Britain, and in 1938 joined with others to write a letter of assurance to the Chairman of the Jewish Board of Deputies, Neville Laski, repudiating anti-semitism as wicked folly.[80] During the war he became President of the Council of Christians and Jews.[81] Twice he pressed hard the case of the Jews in the Lords. In 1942 he looked for extra measures of relief: there appeared to be vacancies according to the schedule for immigration to Palestine; perhaps aid could be given to the Swiss Government to support Jews there; why not offer visas to those reaching this country, the number of whom was likely to be small? At all events we should do all we could and not be impeded by administrative categories. Viscount Cranborne replied with a dubious ploy, claiming both that the Primate had not made it clear what he would like the Government to do, and also that what he had proposed was impracticable; asylum could not be offered to an unlimited number of people.[82] For Temple it was a matter of reculer pour mieux sauter. In 1943 he again pressed for greater help and temporary asylum for those in danger of massacre who could get away. This time there was a far greater amount of information, supplied by Jewish bodies; a telling instance of how the visa regulations for entry into the country had operated very inhumanely; and more detailed suggestions for supporting Jews in neutral countries, together with a proposal that the Government appoint someone of high standing with special responsibility for these matters. He anticipated certain objections, and also, later in debate, turned the tables on Viscount Cranborne. For on the one hand he had been much more specific, yet on the other he claimed his proposals were

only illustrations of action that might be taken, and he knew that the Government was more conscious than others of the practical difficulties, whereas those with no direct responsibility could be a little impatient. His chief protest is against any shelving of responsibility by delay in decision. "We have discussed the matter on the footing that we are not responsible for this great evil, that the burden lies on others, but it is always true that the obligations of decent men are decided for them by the contingencies which they did not themselves create and very largely by the actions of wicked men. The priest and the Levite in the parable were not in the least responsible for the traveller's wounds as he lay there by the roadside, and no doubt they had many other pressing things to attend to, but they stand as the picture of those who are condemned for neglecting the opportunity of showing mercy. We at this moment have upon us a tremendous responsibility. We stand at the bar of history, of humanity, and of God. I beg leave to move."[83]

Temple also gave what encouragement he could, limited though it was bound to be, to the German Confessing Church. In January 1943 he preached at Pastor Niemöller's birthday service in the German Lutheran Church in London. Here he honoured the leaders of the Confessing Church thanking God that "the one effective centre of resistance to Nazi oppression in Germany had been the Christian Church". He did however express regret that they had not protested so far at the extermination of Poles and Jews. "It has been protest in self-defence rather than protest on behalf of outraged justice and of brotherly love." What was at stake was not the survival of an ecclesiastical institution but the capacity of the Christian fellowship to give fearless testimony to Christian truth. By contrast Christians in Holland had condemned the treatment of Jews.[84] But there was no essential difference, Temple

was delighted to learn in 1942, between his own views, as expressed in broadcasts and printed pronouncements, and those of the Confessing Church.[85] And it was to those who had resisted Hitler that he looked for the re-education of the German nation after the war. "I set great hopes upon those people in Germany who through this time have been suffering bravely and constantly for the truth, persecuted and oppressed, and who will be recognised afterwards as having alone been loyal to what would have saved their nation from disaster."[86]

C. Peace

1. The First World War

Much of Temple's early thought about peace reveals an unsatisfactory juxtaposition of sober realism about international politics and fantastic flights of idealism about the capacity of the Church to raise the human race towards the Kingdom of God. Take a sermon of January 1915.[87] Temple acknowledges that there is some worth in peace construed as "mere neutrality", where nations exist over against each other and only avoid war. But he soon rises to a rhapsody on the Church and the Kingdom of God. Religion, he says, starts with God and sees how in the light of revelation all the solution of man's problems is to be found. It is the Church's task to inspire the nations with a sense of their relation to one another. 'The Church's task is simply to turn men's attention and the nation's attention away from the things that have to be divided among men to those things which become the property of all ... We are co-operative already in the things that really matter. In the love of God we are united; we only need to find it out." True, the Church should support schemes for international arbitration; but they can only carry authority where nations agree to settle their differences by law. And "what court or authority can dominate the nations sufficiently to make them feel that what unites them together is more precious than anything which separates them? There is only one ideal that can do that, the ideal of the Kingdom of God ...". These words do not remotely reckon with the intractable material on which the Church has to act, or with the highly ambiguous nature of the Church itself as the mediator of God's judgment and salvation in history. I shall comment on the position of the Church in Part II.[88]

It is in fact sometimes the very sense of man's predicament which drives Temple to his highly idealistic antidote. In Christianity and War he takes a depressed view of man's capacity for loyalty wider than national. The Church is neither One, nor Catholic, nor Holy. The need is for a united international society devoted to Christ, reviving the Christendom of the Middle Ages but free from its failure - that of using "the world's methods for God's purpose". "Peace in the sense of an absence of war may be secured by commercial or financial interests for a time ... The only true peace ... must consist in the recognition of all nations and races as parts of the one Kingdom of God realised on earth." Loyalty to such a Christian society "would not be an effort which many good men despise as Utopian, and which is paralysed by (the individual member's) own lurking doubt of its value. Such a society, by binding its members to itself, while leaving them still fully citizens of their own countries, would aid enormously their desire to rise a little nearer to the ideal of Christ and draw their country with them."[89]

These flights of idealism did not blind Temple to the necessity of facing complex realities as peace became a possibility. In an editorial of 1916 he recognised there would soon be a demand that the Government should open negotiations for peace, and he stressed the need for a popularly elected assembly in Germany, if her word was to be trusted. We had to remember our responsibilities not only for Belgium and France, but also for the people of Eastern Europe, who were looking to the Entente to secure their freedom. If everyone were equally guilty, then justice would be a return to the status quo. But most held the war was the result of long-prepared and wanton aggression by the Central European Powers. We therefore had to protect civilisation. Temple was particularly forceful about the notion of forgiveness. The duty of forgiveness implied the duty

of repentance and restitution by the guilty. "To deny this is to repudiate the foundation truths of Christianity." We should not barter away the issue we held in trust through unwillingness to endure to the end. In any case, it was easier for us to be magnanimous because we had not suffered as much as Russia or France. We could not afford to detach our interests from theirs or forfeit their friendship and thereby the best hope for peace. "An insecure peace will enthrone militarism in every nation in Europe, till the fabric of European civilisation goes down in a new and vaster catastrophe."[90]

This prophetic fear was not an isolated occurrence but a nagging anxiety. He could easily see that a League of Nations would be no necessary panacea. Alliances in the past had often been formed at the expense of liberalism. There was the danger that the nations constituting such a League might actually check the growth of freedom, or break up the League itself. Another danger was that the League might be controlled by a ring of international financiers. "We earnestly desire," Temple concludes, "the establishment of this League of Nations; we wish it all possible success; but we dread above all things its failure, for if it is established and fails, the whole cause of peace and international goodwill must of necessity be put back for many generations."[91]

A few weeks before the end of the war Temple stressed the need for representatives in the League of Nations to be truly representative: it must be a League of Nations, not of Governments only. And, to allay German fears, hope must be offered that membership would be open to all, including belligerents and neutrals. The League would need to sort out economic questions, including the allocation of raw materials.[92]

In his more idealistic vein Temple also proposed in 1917 an international inter-denominational Christian conference which would be an act of witness and a call to

nations to find fulfilment of their destiny in the service of Christ as King. Temple hoped such a conference would discover how far there was agreement over the principles for securing peace, and would also increase the opportunity of the Church to guide the world when the war was over.[93]

In October 1918 Temple commented on the German peace proposals. His principal concerns were that international law should be maintained and extended, and that free rather than despotic institutions should have the greater influence. To this end he made four main suggestions. First, German troops must withdraw within their own frontiers. Secondly, the Allies must not impose on Germany any particular organisation of her life - it was not for us to dictate what she should do with her emperor and others. Thirdly, however, we could give more generous terms if they re-organised their life on a democratic basis. Temple's fourth point was crucially at variance with Lloyd George and the mood of the country: "We must consider all doubtful matters from the point of view not so much of our own estimation of justice, as of the peace and prosperity of the world for a generation yet unborn ... We must, above all things, be careful not to satisfy any passion of our own at the cost of involving them in any repetition of this world disaster; and we must remember that nothing is so likely to damage the peace of the world as the inclusion in the settlement of any terms which seem to any of the peoples involved a humiliation or an outrage. We all of us need humility; but humiliation is seldom the road to it. What we want is a peace of which German citizens of A.D.1950 or 2000 will be prepared to say, 'That was a settlement dictated by no self-interest in any quarter, but by justice alone '."[94]

A week later Temple returned to the question of the treatment of Germany. He hoped for an International Court to try those directly responsible, but warned that it must be an impartial court. We were quite right to

demand a changed outlook in Germany; merely to palliate evil-doing only wrongs the evil-doer. We should be joyful if there is any sign of change; but we should not demand the psychological impossibility of plain signs of conversion all at one blow.[95]

2. The Inter-war Years

Humility by humiliation was the impossible way Lloyd George and the British electorate chose to travel. J. M. Keynes wrote of the election of December 1918: "A vote for a Coalition candidate meant the Crucifixion of Anti-Christ and the assumption by Germany of the British National Debt. It proved an irresistible combination."[96] Intoxicated with the idea of hanging the Kaiser and extracting £6,600M. reparations, Britons can hardly have noticed Temple's warnings. His article of July 1920 is a compound of high idealism and common sense summarized in his phrase "moral opportunism". The mood of the people (and even the Church Times) was for a high-minded primacy of justice over mercy; Temple called for imagination, for self-sacrifice, and for thoughts to be fixed "not on satisfying abstract justice, but on promoting the highest welfare of humanity in the days to come". The people pursued the short-sighted policy of crippling Germany; Temple pointed out that to keep Germany poor was to prevent Britain herself from reaching her own highest wealth. He denied this was a piece of pure expediency. 'The economic law is merely an expression of the law of God, who made us, so that if one member suffer all must suffer with it ..."[97][98]

By early 1921 Temple was bitterly depressed about British political life. The perverseness of the policy towards both Germany and Ireland drove him to write: "Opportunism is triumphant. Political life is directed according to no intelligible principles and towards no distinguishable goal."[99] He recorded some gloomy

reflections on the Paris Conference. It was "more concerned with justice than with reconciliation, and with justice as interpreted by judges who are themselves plaintiffs. A proposal to make a great nation tributary for more than a generation shows either very little concern for peace or else very great contempt for psychology. A policy of generous forgiveness might or might not bring Germany into the fellowship of nations as a willing and loyal member of the community. A policy of stern retribution can do nothing but stiffen the resolve to fight again so soon as ever a chance of success emerges."[100]

Temple was distressed by incessant talk of Germany's guilt. In July 1922 he pleaded for the cessation of all argument about war guilt. Germany was indeed the aggressor, but the guilt was that of all Christendom. Besides, talk of guilt obscured the fact that all European nations were inevitably interdependent, in more than an economic sense.[101] Ten years later he was still pleading. He preached at Geneva before the international Disarmament Conference, including the words: "One clause there is in the existing treaties which offends in principle the Christian conscience and for the deletion of which by proper authority the voice of Christendom must be raised. This is the clause which affixes to one group of belligerents in the Great War the whole guilt for its occurrence ... We have to ask not only who dropped the match but who strewed the ground with gunpowder." The sequel was a flurry of critical correspondence, which Temple answered in a preface to the sermon on its publication. The prize piece of misrepresentation was by Sir Austen Chamberlain, who took Temple to say that all nations were equally guilty, and lectured him on Christian morals. Perhaps this indicates the degree to which men were addicted to "abstract justice". Certainly it brings to light a dilemma which Temple never found it possible

to resolve. "If you fasten on a point like the War Guilt Clause," he wrote to his brother, ... "a lot of people forget (or never read) what you actually say, and attack you for something else. But if you only state principles, without any concrete application, no one knows that you have said anything at all".[102]

For Temple, as we have already seen, the central international problem was nationalism. To this he opposed loyalty to the whole human race through loyalty to one's own nation; the former should check the latter. It was the Church's task supremely to be a society in which all divisions are bridged.[103] He reminded his readers that nationalist ambition was one of the sins which brought Jesus to the Cross.[104] Temple agreed that the existence of the League of Nations must mean the pruning of the sovereignty of the national state. But this did not mean that the end should be a super-national State, for this would militate against that freedom which was the goal of the State.[105] He was aware of the difficulty nationalistic states had in appreciating the position of other states. He confessed his own "astonished anger" when an American had told him that German militarism was no more a danger to the world than British navalism;[106] and he seriously wondered whether British prefernce for a balance of power in Europe was a genuine concern for justice, or nothing more than "self-interest in decent habiliments".[107] No doubt he hoped the League would enlarge the imagination of nations.

Temple's watchword is: "If you want peace, prepare for peace, not war".[108] But how was one to prepare for peace? Temple's thinking about the League of Nations shows the continuation of both idealistic and sober thinking. On the one hand the message of the Christian Church, he says, to the nations of Europe is, Seek ye first the Kingdom of God. God is love; love is the ultimate power. You may repudiate it, but if you do,

you perish. This is no impracticable dream; it is fundamental sanity and elementary common sense. The corner-stone of the only enduring civilisation is the humanity that expresses the supreme love. If you fall on that stone you will be broken; if it falls on you, it will scatter you as dust.[109] Consistently with this, Temple warns that even a perfect scheme for the League of Nations will fail unless there is the spirit of dedication which no political machinery can call forth.[110] On the other hand, and particularly as the efforts for peace proved futile, Temple increasingly threw the emphasis on the relative value of the machinery. Talk of the partiality of any international tribunal was nauseating cant; for we still knew it was better to let courts decide than to appeal from them to force, which did not even aim at impartiality or justice.[111] In fact, "the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice represent, not a derogation from the sovereign rights of the national State, but the fulfilment of the State's essential principle. For the essence of the State is the subordination of all force to the authority of Law, and it is only through the League and the Court, or some strictly analogous organ-isation, that this subordination can be effected in international affairs ... It is mere folly, and blindness to the laws of cause and effect wherein God's judgment is manifest, to suppose that mere good-will, apart from any appropriate organ of activity, can prevent disputes from issuing in war."[112] In this struggle Temple was very conscious of the necessity to mobilise public opinion. In a message to Lord Robert Cecil Temple commended the National Declaration on Peace and Disarmament put forward by the League of Nations Union. The League, he said, could have no more strength or authority than the member nations gave to it.[113]

In an article of 1935 we find that the strands in Temple's thinking are beginning to fit into a more coherent

structure. The ideal of the uniting Church remains; but he shows more clearly how the ideal can bite on the facts of life, partly by distinguishing the Church from the Christian citizen, and partly by reflecting on how Christianity can grapple with corporate egoism, to which Reinhold Niebuhr had recently drawn attention. The Church is to be supranational; uniting men in a fellowship to which all natural divisions are irrelevant. It is to uphold certain basic principles: God as the Father of all men and the King of all nations; the importance of the individual; and the family of mankind. However, when it comes to practical policy, "the Christian citizen is bound by his faith to direct his political influence and to use his share of political power in accordance with this principle of world-fellowship". In the matter of means there is plenty of room for dispute. One complicating factor is the difference between peoples in level of cultural attainments and ethical principle. Another is the fact, not inevitable but indubitable, that "all natural societies or groupings of men are animated by a measure of corporate egoism more intense than that which animates their component members as individuals". For this the only cure is the conscious acceptance of Christianity. Until then "the problem of Christian statesmanship is therefore to find the way in which national egoism may be subordinated to, and if possible made to serve, justice, peace and goodwill. For such a task we have no infallible guidance ..." Temple suggests that no nation should judge its own cause; that competition in armaments should cease; that therefore the League of Nations should be strengthened. Even if we did not obtain what we considered justice from the International Court, we would get the benefits of an ordered community. Individual nations and the international community could then mutually defend each other.[114] So too, a few months later, Temple could write: "It is vain to ask of nations, such as they are, that they love one another - that is to say, that each will treat the

interest of the others as on a level with its own apart from any further inducement. But it is possible to establish a measure of external justice among them, securing such conduct as love would prompt by making departure from this injurious to self-interest ... We must use (political adjustments and contrivances) for what they are worth, while our spiritual attainments are so small. But the only true security for peace is in the goodwill of mutual love; and mutual love among men is the fruit of the Love of God in their hearts, and cannot spring from any other root."[115]

As we review Temple's comments on the League of Nations in the 'thirties we can see his growing sensitivity to the power of self-interest, whether in the form of inertia, or nihilism, or corrupted idealism. In the Church Assembly debate of 1932 in which he rejected pacifism, he also resisted the view that Britain should declare it would take no further steps towards disarmament until other powers honoured their pledges. Temple's reasoning was that he favoured the proposal that all military aircraft be internationalised and fleets be at the disposal of the League of Nations, and did not want to see a principle laid down which would preclude this.[116] Later in the same year he wrote with eight bishops to The Times expressing anxiety that there was no progress at the Disarmament Conference. He felt it a test of British sincerity whether she was willing to prohibit or substantially reduce those types of armament which were prohibited to Germany by the Versailles Treaty.[117] When Hitler produced his Thirteen Points in 1935 Temple supported The Times over its leader: peace could not be maintained by differentiating against Germany on the matter of arms. It was no longer justifiable to keep the Versailles position. We had to recognize the fact that we were members one of another, and overcome international anarchy by co-operation as equals in the common enterprise of civilisation.[118]

Temple constantly urged the British Government to act not so much with as through the League of Nations. He deplored the way the Government had waited until the League ruled that there should be an embargo on arms to Japan, because of its aggression against China, and had then imposed its own embargo on both Japan and China. One consequence could be that if all sizeable nations declared embargoes, smaller nations might have difficulty in securing arms for their own defence. In indulging their virtuous sentiments the great nations would then have increased their own preponderance. Any form of isolated action therefore did harm.[119]

Much worse was to follow. By August Temple was writing again to The Times, urging upon the Government the principle that Britain should leave no doubt about her determination to use the machinery of the League if other States would join us. The issue was Italy's attack on Abyssinia. To fail now in loyalty to the League, said Temple, because loyalty might be costly, would be "sheer wickedness involving indelible disgrace".[120] Temple half-expected the League to call on member States to use force on behalf of Abyssinia.[121] But by 1937 he was deploring the massacre of men, women and children as a reprisal for an assassination attempt on Italy's chief official in Addis Ababa. Failure to protest, he said, was tantamount to acquiescence. "Without protests standards imperceptibly change; that which yesterday all agreed to regard as permissible to no civilised power becomes to-day the accepted commonplace, not alone of colonial rule but of war everywhere. Tomorrow we may be the object or victim of the methods we have allowed, by acquiescence, to become permissible."[122] But neither the League nor the British Government would act with sufficient determination to prevent the deterioration of the situation. They were equally ineffective over Spain. In 1936 Temple rejected Franco's claim to be representing Christianity, and he feared a dictatorship

in alliance with a reactionary Roman Church.[123] The following year he deplored the bombing of Guernica, supported an appeal for funds to evacuate Basque children, and finally joined in sending a manifesto to Franco, warning him that wars started for high ideals could degenerate into a bitterness which obscured or even replaced the original causes of war, and urging him to make clear to the world the reasons which he deemed sufficient for the continuance of the war.[124] Inevitably there was no response.

Dr. Kurt Hahn rightly described Temple as one of the main disturbers of appeasement.[125] There is however no doubt that he did welcome Neville Chamberlain's assurance of 'peace in our time' after the Munich conference. But his letter to The Times shows that it was a qualified welcome. In particular he saw that although Germany had a real grievance over the case of Czecho-Slovakia there was bound to be terrible hardship in the immediate future. He supported a plea that Britain should give out of taxation an estimate of the cost of one week's war to the Czechs as a contribution to resettlement.[126] His support for this suggestion - almost a species of charitable 'ambulance work' by the guilty - is an index of Temple's desperation. All that remained was the collapse of the promised peace.

3. The Second World War

A study of Temple's thought in the period of the Second World War reveals the deployment of most of the positions he had built up over twenty-five years. He repeatedly criticised the Versailles treaty: it had created a real sense of grievance by humiliating Germany.[127] It would have been far better in any case to defer a permanent settlement for at least five years and then to secure it by a general Congress of Europe

which would have included Germany.[128] In correspondence in the Daily Telegraph he demonstrated against criticism that the Allies had agreed that the Peace Treaty of 1919 should be based upon the Fourteen Points of President Wilson's address, but had then failed to keep their word.[129] Temple warns against a repetition of vindictiveness.[130] This is bound up not only with the question of peace aims but also with war aims. He was adamant that there could be no peace with Hitler's regime, not because it was undemocratic but because it was utterly untrustworthy. But if we could assure German opponents of Hitler that there would be no vindictive settlement, there was a chance that the German people themselves might eventually overthrow Hitler.[131] In February 1940 at the invitation of the Primate of Norway Temple was able with others to confer with leaders of the Scandinavian Church and agree that it would be right for Britain to enter into negotiations with Germany if the Czechs, Slovaks and Poles were guaranteed independence and included with others in a congress to negotiate a definitive peace.[132] Temple's consistent policy was a dual one: defamation of the Nazis but justice to the German people.[133]

We can see the development of Temple's thought about love, power and justice from four contributions he made. They show increased penetration of thought about the application of Christian concepts to harsh realities. The first concerns a settlement with Germany after the war.[134] Temple puts forward the proposition that we must aim at International Justice in the post-war settlement; this, he says, will not be disputed in any quarter. But some take this to mean simply either punishment of Germany or equal treatment of Germany, and some develop elaborate schemes "which ignore many essential factors in the situation. If we are to think clearly about this immense subject we must keep some distinctions carefully in mind". Temple then distinguishes first between an interim and a permanent settlement, and secondly between Corrective Justice (sub-divided into Retributive, Deterrent and Reformative) and Distributive Justice.

Temple believed it necessary to follow the principle of justice that no man should be judge in his own cause. True, if we won the war, we ourselves would have to settle the terms of the Armistice, where the primary consideration would be effectively to hinder the enemy from renewing hostilites; this might involve a temporary occupation of Berlin. Then would come the need for a speedy interim settlement, so that economic life might start again, and any financial crisis in Germany be offset. In making this settlement all nations defeated or occupied by Germany should have a voice, with neutrals as assessors. Temple gives two reasons for making an interim settlement: first, passions could cool and dispassionate judgments be formed - in a period of five years men would be able to see what are the real problems; secondly, preparation for a general peace conference could go ahead through the collection of facts and consultation. The interim settlement should be in part penal, to avoid any condoning of German actions. "It must be made clear to all German people that such aggression brings calamity to the aggressor as well as to his victims. This is required by justice, and is, I think, a necessary preliminary to the re-education of the German mind vitiated by years of Nazi propaganda. But the penal element of the truce should be such as to touch the national and political rather than the personal and economic life of the people; only so will it be relevant."

Temple denies that this is contrary to the Christian principle of free forgiveness; for forgiveness, to be real, must be costly; and secondly, no nation has ever been Christian in a degree that makes free forgiveness applicable to it, so "infliction of a just penalty is nearer to Christian righteousness than such action as seems to condone the wrong". In a note Temple stresses that free forgiveness is in fact conditional. The first condition is repentance in the sense of a change of heart

which leads us to take God's view of the world instead of our own - reversal of our Original Sin, which is not in our power. Secondly, there must be no condonation of evil. This condition is fulfilled on the Cross, since there we see what man's injury to God really was and is. "It is only when forgiveness is accompanied or preceded by such agony that it is altogether right. That is why St. Paul says that the Cross enables God to be just while He forgives, to forgive while remaining just. No man can quite reach that height. No nation can come near it, nor ever will be able to do so while History lasts. For History is the record of man's entanglement in sin; and though in the final consummation sin will be done away, that consummation lies beyond the historical process. So we have not got to consider what perfectly righteous England might achieve, but what is the best that sinful England may hope to do."[135]

As for a permanent settlement, all thought of Corrective Justice must be eliminated. It must aim at Distributive Justice, "all nations, including Germany, taking part on equal terms in the negotiations, and all having equal claim to consideration and their fair share in organising the common life for the common good". The "embittering conditions of a penal peace" must be avoided, for any penal element would, as the years passed, press upon citizens not guilty of the crime.[136]

Elsewhere Temple makes two further distinctions. First, he says it is too easy to make too much or too little of the moral unity of a nation. On the one hand "while the war lasts, the identity of the (German) State with the whole body of its citizens - except so far as they rebel - appears to be the most relevant consideration". Hitler cannot be checked without shooting German soldiers; we cannot simply hold Hitler and his immediate colleagues guilty and therefore decline to shoot a German citizen. On the other hand, after the war punitive measures on the

whole nation should be limited in the interests of justice for generations yet unborn. That must be our aim. "We may not reach it; indeed we know we cannot reach perfect justice. For that is only found where love already reigns. But the establishment of proximate justice is the necessary pre-condition of the growth of anything that can properly be called love."[137] Secondly, in the case of Hitler himself, first must come just retribution, the criminal being identified with his crime, in order to bring home to him the nature of his act, to express repudiation of it, and to deter others. Then should come a distinction between criminal and crime in which we work for his reformation, if we truly seek his ultimate welfare.[138]

The second important essay appeared in The Fortnightly in November 1941, under the title "The Future of Germany".[139] By this date Temple was convinced that whether there was total German military defeat, or internal collapse of morale, or internal revolution, military occupation for a time after the war would be unavoidable. Indeed, it should be welcomed. For the chief need was to exorcise the Prussian tradition of State militarism. "Our aim must be the conversion and re-education of the German people."[140] This cannot be done by force. But in the judgment of very many, of whom I am one, a complete, manifest and continuing demonstration of the failure of the Prussian enterprise is a necessary preliminary. Questions about collective, as distinct from individual, psychology are here involved. An individual may be converted by a sacrificial act prompted by love; a nation, though it consists of individuals, cannot be thus turned from an egoistic ambition, because its citizens exhaust their capacity for generous response by the offering of their lives to their nation in service of its egoistic aim. Whatever may be true of individuals severally, those same individuals acting collectively will be turned from their self-assertiveness only by its total failure. Consequently we should on moral grounds by no

means refuse, but rather welcome, the necessity on political grounds for a military occupation of Germany. It is the one and only possible method of bringing home to the soul of Germany the completeness of its failure."

Temple again distinguished stages of settlement, and, spurred by a current Political and Economic Planning Council broadsheet, sharpened his mental separation of different spheres of German national life. The Versailles settlement had been topsy-turvy: politically generous, economically severe. Military and economic power should as far as possible be subject to international control, and divorced from the national structures, which would have an administrative and cultural aim. The economic settlement, feeding Europe and re-starting industry, should come first, while order was maintained through military occupation. Heavy industry with a war potential should be under international control. Politically the occupying powers should determine frontiers which would be provisional only, pending transfer to an emerging international authority and then a Congress of Europe after about five years. Temple hoped that continuous adjustment would obviate the need for a definite peace settlement, which might be hard to modify without threat of war. His long term hope was for a free association of allied nations, with Germany drawn in as far as possible, leading to perhaps a Federal Council of a United Europe within fifty years.

Temple stressed that all this was a speculative sketch, offered as illustrating a spirit and a method rather than as a programme of action. He characteristically warned not only against vindictiveness, but against the opposite tendency. "Nearly always the difficulty of the Christian way consists in the need to combine two or more qualities which are fairly easy to maintain in separation." It is easy to be either a libertine or a Pharisee. Vindictiveness would be easy; so would indolent generosity, in a

"mood of selfish relaxation while we talk piously about forgiving those who injure us. (But they have not injured us very much as compared with what they have done to others. I notice some people who are always repenting of their fathers' sins and forgiving Germans the injuries done to Czechs and Poles; and I am not impressed.) The course to which we are called is far harder. It is to carry the burden of securing the restored peace of Europe by disarming Germany, remaining armed ourselves, and effecting a military occupation of at least key points in Germany; but to do this without exploiting that situation to our own advantage, and steadily handing over to an international authority the control which we shall have won and exercised."

Temple could see in 1940 that any settlement with Germany would raise the question of the effectiveness of any future League of Nations. An important article appeared in The Fortnightly in May 1940, entitled "Principles of Reconstruction".[141] It begins with a statement of five relevant principles. We are already familiar with three: the principles of men as children of God, of personality as sacred, of men as members of one family. Significantly, Temple's fourth and fifth principles relate to sin and to nations. Men are self-centred; deliverance can come only by the active love (grace) of God calling out surrender and trust (faith). "So far as this has not happened or has incompletely happened ... they need to be restrained in their self-assertiveness and induced by appeals to their self-interest to respect justice in their mutual dealings." Nations exist by God's providence; national loyalty is by its own nature wholesome, but is infected by self-centredness. 'Thus if there is to be any approach to a brotherly fellowship of nations before all men are converted to a life of perfect love, it must be by the same method of so organising their relationship to one

another that national self-interest will itself urge justice in action." Thus guided by realism elevated to a principle Temple thinks that, short of the leavening influence of an effective universal Church, the way forward best lies in the organised co-operation of groups of peoples sufficiently close in tradition and interest for this to be voluntarily accepted, yet sufficiently disparate to introduce some effective checks and balances. He suggests a Danubian group; the Czechs, Slovaks and Poles; Scandinavia; and Great Britain, France and the "Benelux" countries. Temple is searching for something practicable, intermediate between complete national autonomy and a general federation.[142]

Including these local federations would be a more comprehensive League of Nations. A critical question was whether the authority of the League should be moral only or also coercive. Here Temple is clearer in his negative than his positive views. We had to get rid of uncertain sanctions, either by making them certain or by abolishing them. Experience had taught us not to leave the application of sanctions to sovereign States. As Temple puts it elsewhere, the old League had relied on sanctions but left national States untouched in their sovereignty. As a result the moral authority of the League had been undermined, since attention was diverted away from it to the question whether force was to be applied - and application was precarious.[143]

The main weakness of the Disarmament Conference, wrote Temple, was that it never decided which of the two terms in the phrase 'Disarmament by Agreement' was to have priority. Temple put agreement first, and claimed this was implicit in the whole idea of the League. Even an agreement to maintain the status quo in arms for five years and then meet again would have been a decisive step. To put Disarmament first was to follow the line of ephemeral national interest.[144]

The fourth significant contribution was made in a House of Lords debate in December 1943 on the Allied Conferences.[145] It was perhaps his greatest demonstration of realism. Temple claimed there was much confusion over power politics. 'The Machtpolitik of Germany ... has so alienated people who have any hope of seeing politics based on a moral foundation that they have become unwilling to recognise any permanent place for force in the organisation of the world, and there has come to pass a desire to regard power as a passing factor which the progress of the world will dispense with. Therefore it seems to some of us of very great importance, if we disagree with that, to lay the foundation clear that power, though it is not an aim to be rightly accepted as the governing principle in our policy, is none the less a fact in the world, and will continue to be a fact in the world, which must be recognised and controlled." Thus Britain's desire for a balance of power in Europe cannot be an end in itself, but it is an indispensable condition for any worthy goal, because no nation which feels itself threatened can devote itself wholeheartedly to the tasks of peace in a co-operative spirit. The whole British Commonwealth should remain strong.[146] Many friends in Europe had felt deserted by Britain in the period after 1918. If this time we helped to maintain a balance of power, a good neighbour policy might be built up, which would include even Britain's present enemies. Our aims should therefore be, in order, first to provide security against aggression, even if that involved surrendering some of our sovereignty; secondly, the social welfare of all peoples, partly under the auspices of a new League of Nations encompassing much more than the political field; thirdly, to diminish the excessive significance of political frontiers, which curiously had been a product of the growth of democracy. Temple saw the Political and Economic Planning Council proposal to treat N.E. France, W. Belgium, and the Ruhr as a single economic unit under

international control as a way of mitigating any threat of the Prussian war tradition. Again Temple distinguished different aspects of national life: there should be as much cultural autonomy as possible; economic autonomy should be limited by consideration for the weaker groups so that military imperialism was not succeeded by economic imperialism. Political autonomy should be as great as could be compatible with security against aggression; and everywhere we should attempt to secure full human rights - freedom of speech, meeting, association and religious belief.

There can be no doubt that Temple's sense of the harsh reality of life is more marked at the close of his life. There was, however, no radical change. He appreciated the necessity of compromise at least as early as 1912.[147] And there is no abandonment, even in his latest writing, of lofty aspirations; the hope for an effective international Church grows with the development of the Ecumenical Movement.[148] In Chapter IV I shall co-ordinate Temple's views on love and justice and consider the adequacy of his position with particular reference to Reinhold Niebuhr.

CHAPTER III

EDUCATION

William Temple's most obvious educational legacy is his contribution to the Education Act of 1944. It would, however, be a gross mistake to suppose that he was mainly interested in legislation. As ever, he saw legislation as one means of realising principles. We need to start with his understanding of the purposes and foundations of education, and his ideas about the strategy for educating people of different ages. Only then can we see in perspective his defence of the dual system and his work for the 1944 Act.

1. Purposes

Temple's view of the purposes of education is both simple and constant. The aim of education, Temple wrote in 1925, is the development of personality in fellowship.[1] In 1943 he spoke of "our permanent aim - the development of persons in community".[2]

Temple prefers the word 'persons' to 'individuals' because of his hostility to individualism and because 'personality' for him points to the communal as well as the individual dimensions of human life. He frequently insists on the sanctity of personality and the development or training of personality, rather than of individuality.[3] He rarely uses the word 'individual', and where he speaks of developing the resources of individual life through

education he immediately adds the words: "while deepening at the same time the experience of fellowship with men and communion with God".[4]

We find a similar thrust in his handling of freedom. In 1914 he urged teachers to claim all methods for Christ, "even if they are employed at present mainly by agnostics or atheists, if only they tend to produce a fuller manhood. For he who liberates or develops any man's manhood has been an agent in the creation of a child of God."[5] The climax of an editorial in the Challenge claims that the supreme task of all true education is to set personality free in every man, to grow through the discipline of life unto a perfect man.[6] Part of that discipline is submission to objective truth. 'The modern world with its strange, new and probably transient belief in 'progress', tends to give much credit to 'originality', even to the point of doubting whether anything else is quite sincere. It wants a new contribution to thought; and in its grotesque individualism supposes that every man who truly expresses his own relation to the world will say something different from what anyone else would say. But there must be some great and fundamental truths in comparison with which the peculiar reactions of individual souls are an irrelevance and an impertinence, and of which a man should seek to be no more than an undistorting medium. Where the eternal truths are concerned the search for originality by speaker or hearer is a puerility."[7] Temple's understanding of freedom is consistent with that of personality, and we shall presently see more clearly what it is and how it affects his view of educational strategy.

Temple was adamant that education had the aim of service to the community. In Mens Creatrix (1917) he remarks that society is still passing from barbarism to true civilisation, so "there is nothing so vitally important as to secure that the influences tending towards the formation of a truly social character predominate over those which tend to develop egoism and self-seeking in the

training of the young".[8] In the same year he said that he hoped to see the predominantly competitive system of the 'educational ladder' replaced by one which "would perpetually enforce the belief that the State trains us because it needs our fullest service and the citizens would gradually come to feel it a mere act of justice that they should use for the community the powers which the community had developed".[9] In the Second World War the accent is the same: "It is the purpose of education to fit children for their life in the world so that they may conduct it in appropriate relation to their environment."[10] Temple's own call for "training for citizenship"[11] is echoed in a joint Anglican-Free Church statement which pleads that education be made effective training for Christian life and citizenship.[12]

The two dimensions of the individual and the communal are brought together and linked with service at various points. In 1926 Temple, by the social principle of sacredness of Personality, finds educational facilities wanting; by the principle of Fellow-membership, which "follows at once to correct a possible distortion of the first," the individual must use his liberty in pursuit of the general good. But now parents are found wanting: "Parents and uncles and aunts and cousins are much more disposed to refer to education as providing a chance to follow a lucrative career ... What we want is an articulate public opinion that believes that we are really and truly members one of another."[13] Seventeen years later, in a major speech in the House of Lords, Temple describes the aim of the whole educational process as the production of responsible citizens. For this two things are necessary: we should do our utmost to develop individual aptitudes, and we should train these in an atmosphere which leads to service, not self-seeking.[14]

Any statement of the purposes of education presupposes an understanding of man. Temple draws on two principal sources for this understanding. First, he persistently

roots education in Christianity. Secondly, he draws frequently on Plato, particularly for his ideas about a broad strategy in educating children.

2. Foundations

In Temple's view only Christianity can provide the right understanding of man and sufficient power to fulfil the purposes of education. The conviction that there could be no neutrality about the foundations of education is evident in 1917: "Our root mistake for the last two generations at least has been that we have thought that we could leave the religious question open and have a secular education that was neutral, on to which a religion instruction should be tacked as an appendix. What we want is a religious conception of education through and through." The context clearly shows that he does not mean all education should be under ecclesiastical control. He means something broader: 'The intelligence and imagination of children are the gifts of God; the development of them is something that we owe in gratitude and loyalty to the Creator. To neglect this is a blasphemous apostasy."[15] This conviction became far stronger in the face of Nazi Germany. In 1940 he remarks scathingly on the paradox of modern English culture, which is largely Christian in quality, yet regards faith in God as a dispensable indulgence. This reaches its climax in the belief that education can be religiously neutral whereas in fact an education which is not religious is atheistic. If God is left out and subsequently introduced, He is an excrescence. "He becomes an appendix to His own creation."[16] Temple traces back to the Renaissance the process by which one department of life after another claimed autonomy, from politics to education. In politics there arose that idolatry of the State now nakedly proclaimed by the Nazis. "And now Education is recognising as never before that its job is to develop personality, but refuses to guide its activities by any general conception of what personality is."

However great the development in each department consequent upon the assertion of autonomy, in life as a whole it had led to chaos. What was now needed was re-integration in a coherent pattern of life with some intelligent principle. "Not long ago it was hoped by many that the human values of the old tradition could be preserved without that entire view of the world and of life under the cover of which they were first appreciated and were in some measure established. But the voices of these non-religious humanists sound rather plaintive to-day; they echo in our ears as the utterance of a dream long ago dissolved. The harsh realities of experience are too much for them." For Temple it was the Christian religion that offered a principle of integration.[17] The urgency was all the greater precisely because Communists and Fascists had a clear concept of Persons: "Education is at last recognised as the training of Personality at a moment when no one dares to say what is the function or destiny of Persons, except Communists and Fascists who alike degrade them into Robots."[18] Temple's address to the National Society in June 1942 is delivered not only with a future Education Bill in mind, but with a strong sense that the central issue of the war is religious. The experiences of the war "have impressed upon us more forcibly than ever before that all true education must be religious in its basis and texture". It is not simply religious instruction which he has in mind but education as a whole. "For the fact is that education must be in its effect, whatever the motive of those who organise and impart it, either religious or atheistic. There is no possibility of neutrality. To be neutral concerning God is the same thing as to ignore and deny Him ... If the children are brought up to have an understanding of life in which, in fact, there is no reference to God, you cannot correct the effect of that by speaking about God for a certain period of the day. Therefore our ideal for the children of our country is the ideal of a truly religious education." If there is a super-human as well as a physical and human environment, then the relationship of the child to God will

in very large measure determine the mode of his activity in relation to the other two. "To leave out this, or to treat it as optional, as a matter of private opinion, or something which is dependent upon individual temperament, is entirely to ignore the reality of the whole situation in which our work is to be conducted." Temple is persuaded "that the primary need of our country is to recover a real philosophy of education ... As Dr. Oldham has put it: We have learnt that the purpose of education is not the matter taught, but the person who has to learn it. We are concerned with teaching persons rather than subject matter, but we have at the same time apparently ruled out of court all enquiry concerning the nature and destiny of personality." Dr. Arnold knew what he was aiming at; since then we had learned much about the technique of education - so much indeed that we were in danger of forgetting the purpose of it.[19]

For Temple, only Christianity can provide adequate purpose and adequate power for education. The process of education, he says in 1917, fashions a man's soul into a unity so that he is fit to take his place in the community in pursuit of a purpose. 'But no man can in fact evolve such a purpose out of himself, nor can any human society supply such a goal for his energy and service."[20] This rather vague assertion is given greater clarity a few years later, in an article in The Pilgrim called "The Kingdom and the King". Temple elucidates his assertion that people want the Kingdom of God without the King. The first necessity for man's well-being is some unification of his nature, and this is the task of education. He may choose some purpose for himself, but this will probably give too great a scope for his lower or animal desires. "It is only when education is complete (which never happens in this life) that the Man within man is entirely dominant over the Lion of pride and the many-headed Monster of desire. Besides, limitations of knowledge will prevent a man from fashioning a purpose compatible with even the good purposes of all other men. As for society, no society is perfectly wise; every actual society fails to produce harmony of

purpose in its own citizens, and the various societies are in conflict. "In fact, inasmuch as the principles of any society have their origin in the characters of the component members, it is clearly futile to turn to the society for the power that is to mould these characters to perfection." Only the God of Christianity, who seeks willing obedience, with a suffering and waiting which is not passive or futile, but active and regal, can provide what is required.[21]

Similarly, if one of the goals of education is freedom, we must beware the common view that freedom means chiefly being left to do what one chooses, whereupon society is "a welter of competing selfishness, held together in some kind of order because chaos means misery for all". True freedom is "freedom to fulfil our steady and constant purpose. The main business of education is to strengthen our capacity to form and follow an adequate purpose throughout life". Therefore "in the pressures of the modern world the freedom of man in his human right alone cannot stand; nor does it deserve to stand ... It is a sham because it poses as real freedom when, in fact, it is nothing of the kind. 'Doing what I like' is what St. Paul accurately describes as 'the body of this death'; for my likes and dislikes are not free; they are fixed by my heredity, training and circumstance. As I pursue my self-chosen way I come, inevitably, into collision with others pursuing theirs, and in the conflict both lose all satisfaction." Temple calls for a return to God, so that we may re-learn that the only true freedom is His service. "It is my conviction that only a freedom rooted in faith is able to survive, or deserves to survive."[22]

At one point Temple castigated the optimism of the rationalistic philosophy of his day for thinking that there was no more amiss with human nature than increase of knowledge and spread of education could put right.[23] This probably goes some way to explain why he insisted on education which was "effectively Christian"[24] - and why he never became so enthusiastic about education as to lose sight of the necessity for conversion.[25]

Temple's position is both summarised and clarified still further in a brief paragraph in Christianity and Social Order. Nazi schools, he says, have an intensely strong corporate life, which is known and felt to be dedicated to something beyond themselves; and nowhere is individuality so ruthlessly suppressed. The proper object which a school should serve must be of such a kind as "to foster individual development on the one hand and world-fellowship on the other; it must offer an allegiance which calls forth instead of suppressing individuality and creates bonds of union with all fellow-citizens and with citizens of all other nations. There is only one candidate for this double function: it is Christianity. We must then take steps to secure that the corporate life of the schools is Christian." This must mean not only the inclusion of Christian doctrine, but also regular corporate worship and a Christian atmosphere.[26]

Temple's general position was shared by many during the Second World War. We have only to look at Spencer Leeson's Christian Education or T. S. Eliot's paper for the 1941 Malvern Conference.[27] The phenomenon of Nazi Germany drove Christians to think in terms of stark alternatives. The problem however is that British society had in fact been moving away from an explicitly Christian base for a very long time. Later in this chapter we shall see how far Temple faced up to this circumstance as he helped to shape the 1944 Education Act; and in Chapter VI I shall consider more closely the relationship between Christian and secular morality, returning to the question of education at the end.

3. Strategy

Temple once acknowledged that the three great written influences on his life were St. John's Gospel, Plato, and Browning.[28] The influence of Plato is particularly evident in his handling of the topic of education. He is congenial

to Temple in many ways. Partly it is because Plato believes in immortality. It is completely untrue, in Temple's view, to say that Plato sacrifices the individual to society. "That false impression has arisen partly because people have taken his sketch of the Ideal City as a political programme, partly because they have not risen to the height of his austere morality ... The City after all is for Plato in the last resort a school, educating us for the life to which we pass when school-days are over, and to which the entrance is death. We may disagree with the methods which he advocates for our discipline; we cannot, if we are Christians, quarrel with the perspective in which he sets the issue."[29] It is in the same vein that Temple boldly claims that teachers are training their pupils for service not only here but hereafter.[30] This also helps us to understand why education for Temple was a life-long process.[31] When Temple said with youthful exaggeration that modern psychology had done nothing but confirm the theory put forward about 380 B.C., he had Plato's Republic in mind,[32] and if we turn to the second lecture in Plato and Christianity (1916) we can see which passages carried weight with him and how he understood them.[33]

(a) First comes Plato's analysis of the soul (Rep. 434d - 443e). The first element here is the life of desire, which is purely self-regarding, "and the function of the desires is simply to maintain the basis of life. But the separate desires are not only entirely void of relation to other persons, but they are atomistic in themselves. The desire for food may be quite isolated from the real nature of the whole self ... They are self-regarding but do not attain to the level of self-respect." Then comes θυμός, which always sees a man in distinction from, and in competition with, other men. "Above this stands reason, whose function it is to realise the self as a member of the community, and therefore to perform those tasks which fall to it as such a member; in other words, it is co-operative." Temple stresses that there is

a real function for each of the elements of the soul in the perfect life. "If the desires are not satisfied, life will cease altogether; θυμός will play its part in protecting reason against any attempt of desires to go beyond their true province or against such oppression by other men as might deprive the man of scope for the service he is qualified to render; for the man who has once learned that he is essentially a member of a community will only satisfy his self-respect, will only gain such honour as he cares to have, by living up to his membership. Consequently, if reason is supreme there is a place found for the other elements; but if θυμός is supreme, reason is given no place; and if desire is supreme then neither reason nor θυμός can find a place." Correspondingly there are three types of society: the anarchic, the individualistic, and the socialistic "in its true and philosophical sense". Temple draws particular attention, here and elsewhere, to Republic 443e, which he interprets to mean that the task of moral training is ἕνα (γενέσθαι) ἐκ πολλῶν: that a man should become a unified person out of many conflicting elements.[34]

(b) The second passage is Republic 376e - 403e, which Temple interprets as follows: "The governing principle in Plato's educational scheme is that character must be moulded before the intellect is trained. The primary business of elementary education is so to mould the impulses and instincts that the child will spontaneously love and hate the right things. The child is to be brought up in such surroundings as will make goodness attractive. It must have no personal experience of evil at all. When it meets with evil in later life, it will recognise it by the jarring discord between it and the character that its early environment has moulded. Morality here differs from science. It may be a good thing that a doctor should have had experience of disease, for he heals body with mind, and the bodily disease may not damage his mind. But the judge must not have experienced moral evil in his own soul,

for he has to heal soul with soul. We cannot make moral experiments, for to introduce moral evil into the soul vitiates the very faculty by which we afterwards pronounce judgment (408d - 409d) ... To train the intellect if the character is unsound may only enable a man to be successful in his villainy; this willbe bad for society but also for himself, for it will make him content with vice."[35]

(c) Thirdly, Temple assures us that Plato was under no illusions with regard to the greatness of the moral task. Plato knows that virtue is only attained at great cost and effort, and his apparent sacrifice of the individual to the State in Book V of the Republic is a measure of his apprehension of the difficulties. Hence, too, the graphic way in which Plato re-presents the tripartite nature of the soul in Book IX: the vast many-headed monster of desire; the lion representing θυμός ; and man, far smaller, representing the rational principle (588c - e).[36]

Temple never saw any reason to abandon this understanding of Plato. His own conviction that education was fundamentally a moral and religious exercise, concerned with the development of persons in community, precluded that.[37] We can profitably note some contexts in which he developed his thought, following the same sequence of points.

(a) Temple's conviction that freedom for a purpose is more fundamental than freedom from constraint is linked with Plato's doctrine of the soul. Thus there is a double defence against any romantic notions about young children. The chaos of impulses in a child cannot possibly organise itself. For the child can have no purpose in the light of which to control and organise its various interests and impulses.[38] In Christus Veritas Temple again starts from the distinction between two kinds of freedom. True freedom is found when a man not only recognises that an action is his own, but when he feels that he has truly expressed his whole nature in it and can whole-heartedly rejoice in it. If the individual is 'out of many to become one', then we

must train the child's capacity for selective attention, which is the foundation of what is called Will. Will is not a separate faculty; rather "it is the co-ordination of his whole psychic nature for action". To the end the Will is incomplete; for there is also the fact of the subconscious. Will and Personality cannot therefore be identified. "Will is so much of a Personality as is consciously co-ordinated for action."[39]

It is in Nature, Man and God that Plato's analysis of the soul is most closely related to the notion of will, and thereby explicitly with St. Augustine. Freedom of thought, says Temple, has its source in the appetitive and conative part of nature. But each desire is directed to its own satisfaction, and though it has reference to the survival of the organism, it becomes active, especially as the power of imagination develops, without regard to the economy of organic life. 'Thus the same element in nature supplies the starting-point of the reasoning process which seeks order, and of the riot of appetite which destroys order." Experience can create an incipient purpose to hold the several desires in check, and this can be strengthened by the discipline supplied by family and society, "until, so far as education is complete, there is a wholly unified or integrated nature, controlling all its own elements to the fulfilment of its purpose. Of course education never is complete, and the process of integration extends throughout life; but that is its fundamental purpose - that out of the chaos which we are at birth order may be fashioned, and from being many we may become one: ἕνα γενέσθαι ἐκ πολλῶν." The schoolboy may behave quite differently before the headmaster and among rowdy companions - a sign of an incompletely formed will. "Will, as the agent in truly moral action is the whole organised nature of the person concerned; it is his personality as a whole; and so far is it from being an initial endowment of our nature, that the main function of education is to fashion it - a process which is only

complete when the entire personality is fully integrated in a harmony of all its constituent elements." Temple attributes to St. Augustine the first perception of this truth. For he noted the difference between willing to move the hand, and willing to will the good. "He asks why it is that when I will to move my hand, the hand immediately moves, whereas when I will to will the good, my will remains in the same state as before; and his answer is that in the second instance I do not completely will; for if I already willed the good I need not will to will it; and if I will to will it, that proves that I do not completely will this." In other words, there is no real or effective will.[40]

(b) Temple follows Plato very closely in his belief that character must be moulded before intellect is trained, and that the environment is crucial in this enterprise. In Mens Creatrix he repeats his warning about moral experiments, and then writes, still in Platonic vein, "So the true judgment is formed before the emergence of reason, and when reason comes the child greets it as a friend with whom its education has long made it familiar."[41] Temple particularly stresses the importance of the environment in Christus Veritas. Uniqueness of individuality does not imply even a relative independence of the environment. "The mind quite as much as the body depends on supplies from without. The main part of education is always the work of direct experience, and the part of the educator is to select and, in some degree, to mould the sort of experience by which the growing mind is to be influenced." The mind grows, not by isolation, but by receiving and assimilating perpetually greater wealth of experience. "Greatness of mind is therefore primarily a matter of receptivity ... The great individual is the man who is reacting to the greatest number of the elements in Reality, the greatest variety of its aspects."[42]

Obviously all depends here on true apprehensions. Temple puts the issue, again in Platonic terms, in

Nature, Man and God. A man's conduct is determined by his apparent good, and his apparent good by his character. The self-centred man judges to be good what is not truly good. He suffers from "the ignorance which Socrates truly said was the essence of vice. But it is not a process of false argument; nor can it be removed, except in very small degree, by true argument. It is the judgment, not of intellect but of the whole personality - as every value judgment always is. But this does not mean that 'character' and 'apparent good', because mutually determining each other, are for ever unalterable. One main aim of education is to alter them." The key here for Temple is "the intercourse of the less with the more matured mind or spirit". For the development of true standards we need to try out the advice of the more mature. As we contemplate better art or better characters our apparent good changes. This process depends not only on others, but on the use we make of our better moments. If at these times we give our attention and affection to the true good, the less good will lose its attractiveness, and we shall become increasingly detached from self-centredness, and acquire a more objective habit of mind.[43]

Intellectual training is for Temple a secondary, though necessary, requirement. "It is definitely undesirable to develop the intellectual powers of a man who has not learned how to be a member of society. If a man is going to be a villain, in heaven's name let him remain a fool. But if the social purpose is to be formed in him, then he needs intellectual training to make that purpose effective. As a matter of fact, we suffer far more from stupidity than from deliberate wickedness, and tend to forget that alert-ness of mind is a necessary part of moral goodness ... It is here that we have especially failed in England. We have, as a nation, practically no regard for Truth ... Intellec-tually, education must aim chiefly at imparting a desire for the truth, or, in other words, a desire to understand."[44] But it was a sheer error, Temple believed, to try to control the whole of life through the highly developed conscious

intellect. This he considered in 1915 to be one root of the great sin of Germany; whereas education was bound to be a largely subconscious process.[45] The child unconsciously imitates the habits and standards accepted in its environment. Not only is it uncritical at the time; the unconscious nature of the imitation makes it immune from criticism even when the critical powers come into play. So is formed a great body of prejudices which seem to be "self-evident certainties". "Education, if it is effective, forces the critical mind to examine some of these prejudices; but their influence in actual life is hardly ever eradicated."[46]

(c) If the child is so defenceless and the moral stakes so high, then it follows that discipline is a vital element in education. The picture of the many-headed Monster, the Lion and the puny Man is a favourite of Temple.[47] The child should find this discipline both in the home and the school.[48] But discipline was not something simply to be imposed by adults on children. A country which wanted to secure peace had to demand discipline not only in the young but also in adults.[49] It would be a mistake to suppose that Temple was authoritarian. The general verdict on his time as Headmaster of Repton was that he was not a good disciplinarian.[50] Both temperament and conviction were responsible here. "He loved them all," writes Iremonger, "the clever and the stupid, the good and the bad; not because it was his Christian duty to do so, but because his affectionate nature allowed him no other approach to them. Least of all did he regard them as persons to be disciplined; and herein lay the weakness of one of his virtues. He made no secret of it: 'the better one likes the purely personal relation with the boys,' he wrote to his brother about a year after he left Repton, 'the more one shrinks from the disciplinary'." Iremonger suggests as an explanation Temple's disinclination to inflict pain and misery on any human being, and his breadth of vision which prevented him from adopting the constricted and local view essential to a good disciplinarian.[51] Without in any way rejecting

this view, we may add that frequently in this period Temple draws attention to Jesus' own rejection of force in the story of the temptations: only so can free allegiance be won.[52] The appeal to freedom entails risk: in the case of Jesus it led to the Cross.[53] But the obverse is that Christianity is a glorious adventure of faith, verified in the experiment of life.[54] Thus whilst recognising the legitimacy of force in educating the young,[55] Temple's whole inclination is to inspire through the presentation of worthy example, rather than to impose. When he warned of the danger of Prussianism in the educational system, he based himself on respect for personality, "the foundation of all true freedom", and went on: "Freedom is always dangerous; unless we believe that in every human life God is as really present as sin, it will seem too dangerous to be tolerated." There is always the temptation to use education, and the higher our ideals are, the more obvious it seems that we ought to impose them on the children we teach. Yet this may, after all, be only a higher Prussianism.[56] The only justification for any imposition upon children is that it shall foster eventual self-discipline and self-determination.[57] The teacher should through discipline and lessons create habits to the point where external pressure can be relaxed. He can then say, "I have forced you into freedom; now go and exercise that freedom".[58] Furthermore, this disciplining process in itself must not seek to evade risk. Pupils must not be Gamaliel-like, playing safe, but rather be willing to show Pauline vigour, even at the risk of making mistakes,[59] for one side of education consists in submitting us steadily to widening temptations. We must learn to stand on our own feet and live our own lives. For one cannot learn to live first and only begin to live afterwards. We must learn to use liberty stage by stage.[60] Finally, Temple always views education as a disciplined preparation for Christian democracy. And of democracy he writes: Democracy is always an adventure; it trusts those who at the moment seem not to deserve trust, in the hope that by trusting

them it may make them trustworthy. It is therefore akin to Christianity, "which rests upon the conviction that if you long enough treat people as unselfish they will become so. Plainly our Lord's method of founding the Divine Kingdom is always to wait until he calls out the free allegiance of the soul. He will never impose the law of that Kingdom upon anyone. This is the innermost nature of democracy."[61] It is for Temple the innermost nature of education too, and ideas of discipline have to be seen within that context. Thus Temple's preference for "the purely personal relation" is not a matter merely of temperament but of conviction.

Temple once described education as the total influence of social surroundings upon the formation of character. "So long therefore as society is even imperfect, perfect education is unattainable. We are involved in a circle partly vicious, partly virtuous. The corrupt society corrupts the rising generation, who constitute the society of the ensuing period, passing on to their successors the corruption which they contracted from their predecessors. The same sequence also preserves the virtues and excellence of society."[62] Home, school, the educational system, the economic system and particularly society itself are all seen as influencing character.[63] There is no possibility of educating people in detachment from all surroundings and all objectives: that is the road to futility and chaos. The Nazis and Communists have definite concepts and fire people to die for them. For Temple Aristotle's dictum is still the key to the whole problem: τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν- we should train people who would be worthy of and supporters of the type of quality we desire.[64] Given the inescapable fact of our dependence upon our environment, a great aim of education must be that the pupil brings his life under the right influences so that he is not a moral weather-cock or plaything of circumstance. But that presupposes opportunity. 'This is part of the horror of what we call the social problem - that so many

divine gifts are simply wasted and come to nothing through lack of opportunity."[65] The call for equality of educational opportunity is repeated for thirty years. "As long as there are great numbers of citizens whose faculties are undeveloped it is impossible for society to be justly ordered ... The only real solution is to be found in a complete educational system which will raise the actual worth of every man to the level of his potential worth precisely by enabling him to realise his potentialities."[66] That was in 1915. Within months of the Education Act of 1944, and of Temple's own death, he was telling a conference of educationists and trade unionists that until every child had not only a legal but an effective opportunity "open for education to full maturity our social structure would be radically unjust at the very point where it mattered most".[67] A "complete educational system" meant educational provision for people of all ages, and we must now look at Temple's more specific remarks, first on home and school, and then on Adult Education.

4. Home and School

Temple believes the formative power of the family to be incalculable. The child is receptive, and in a good home will learn unconsciously the principles of membership. In the home "if the love is natural and direct it will make the child loving, and love will call out, not selfishness, but love". For the most part the child can learn by easy and pleasant experiences. But Temple stresses that we should primarily think not in terms of kindness or sternness, but in terms of love or selfishness. There is the danger of spoiling the child by indulgence. Love is itself a discipline. "But the child will feel the love behind the severity, however unconsciously, and soon, if not at once, will understand and assent."[68] Temple declares that "the most influential of all educational factors is the conversation in a child's home". Differences

in home training "are not chiefly a matter of social class or of income, though poverty is a dire hindrance to culture. There are plenty of aristocratic and of wealthy homes in which the children very seldom hear any intelligent conversation; and there are plenty of poor and of working-class homes where they hear a great deal".[69] No doubt behind such remarks was Temple's recollection of his own upbringing and the debt he owed to his father and mother.[70] It is surprising therefore to be told by Carmichael and Goodwin "There is no greater offender among ecclesiastics who have neglected the Family than William Temple. The word rarely appears in any of his writings."[71] Probably their very selective attention to Temple's writings, coupled with a general hostility to State welfare, explains their curious verdict; but their assessments will require lengthier consideration later.[72]

Temple's view of schools naturally reflects his own experience of Rugby and Repton, and he frequently compares the Public Schools with the modern State school. Temple neither blinded himself to the problem of class nor took it as a sufficient reason for the abolition of Public Schools. When asked whether he would accept the Headship of Repton if offered it, Temple replied setting out his views and hopes concerning English Education. He told the Head in a letter: "I said that the Public Schools seemed to me to reproduce our class-divisions in accentuated form, and that I should hope, after learning the ropes, to find ways of moving to a system which would tend to diminish them. If they take me, knowing this, I come."[73] In Mens Creatrix he is in favour of all classes being trained together, so that they understand each other.[74] Optimism of vision reaches its height in July 1921: "We should work towards a real fellowship of all classes in the control of the education of all classes. Hitherto the 'upper' and 'middle' classes have controlled the education both of their own class and of the 'working' class. It is natural that a demand should arise for 'working-class control of working-class education'. And

to achieve that would be a step forward - but a false step nonetheless. To adopt that motto is to abandon the ideal, which is fellowship of all in the education ... of all."[75] Temple looked for a development "by which it should be possible for children from every kind of home to come into any kind of school provided that they are qualified by mental, physical, and personal talents". Temple thinks there is some force in the criticism that Public Schools suppress individuality. "These schools do impart a genuinely public spirit, but do this with something of that class-reference which is inherent in their present character as based on financial privilege. If they are felt to be rooted in the whole nation rather than in one section of it, this criticism will lose its relevance."[76]

The mildness of this projected reform stems from Temple's conviction that Public Schools "are amongst the greatest treasures we possess," and he wanted to make the values enshrined in them more widely accessible.[77] He also realised from his time at Repton, as D. C. Somervell recalled, that institutions had to be run on their own lines or else scrapped; one could not turn an old institution into a wholly new direction and expect to be able to use its running powers as before.[78] (In any case he himself was in no position to experiment organisationally at Repton in the wake of Ford and under his hawkish eye, and the only way to reform was to carry the whole Headmasters' Conference.[79]) Temple's Hegelian cast of mind led him to try to find a synthesis of the best in Public and State schools.

In 1915[80] he defined the aim of education as "the attempt to train men and women to understand the world they live in, so that they may be able to assist or resist the tendencies of their time in the light of ideals and standards resting on the widest possible foundation of knowledge and experience". He believed that in England at that time two educational types were in collision. The

traditional type was represented by the Public Schools and the two older Universities. This type, he said, is in practice corporate. Boys are thrown (at considerable risk) into a society of boys which largely governs itself. The exaltation of games, however disastrous in its exaggeration, is morally sound; for the boy feels that in his games he plays for his house and school, while his work is done for himself. The traditional type, Temple elaborates, has believed in educating people rather through influence than through instruction, and in direct relation to their social context and setting - which, in a country of aristocratic organisation, inevitably involved an exclusive and aristocratic type of education. Instruction is not ignored, but Temple happily reports hearing a very distinguished lady, on being asked whether a certain school was a public school, reply, 'Oh yes, it is a real public school. I mean they don't learn anything there.' (The same year Temple was to write of his own mother 'There was a spaciousness of mind about her and others of her generation which I don't think modern methods and girls' colleges tend to produce. She was never <u>taught</u> anything"![81]) The instruments of this education have been the great literatures of all ages, especially of Greece and Rome; for they are closely related to our own civilisation, and can be studied in their entirety. The aim has been to bring the student's mind into closest possible contact with the greatest minds of the human race in all ages, in the fields of history, science, philosophy and poetry. This provides standards of judgment and criticism, which enable men to stand apart from the tendencies of the moment. A major fault of the system, Temple acknowledges, is that it is liable "to shut up people within the limits of their own class so that they are unable to acquire any living acquaintance with the great movements going on in the world around them." At the end of the process, Temple claims, most may not have any large amount of knowledge, but have acquired the instinct to act wisely in almost any emergency with which they may be confronted. "Very often they could not give

any theoretical grounds for acting as they do, for their wisdom is largely subconscious or instinctive; but the action is right all the same."

The other system "may be said to begin with Rousseau; it is predominantly individual rather than corporate, intellectual rather than spiritual, democratic rather than aristocratic; it supplies people with knowledge of facts rather than with standards of judgment". It took a hold in an age when men demanded the abolition of privileges and class restrictions; "its tendency has been to suggest to people that the aim of education is that they may get on in the world. The instrument which it has used has been for the most part instruction, and its appeal has been, not as in the traditional system to sympathy and imagination, but to intelligence and memory. This, it seems to me, is precisely because it believes in the career open to talent, and so far cuts across all social divisions." But as long as there are social strata, there is the danger that the man who climbs on the educational ladder will despise his own people, and that we shall have produced a race of self-seekers. Another defect of the modern view for Temple is ignorance of history and the supposition that whatever is modern is therefore good. 'But the modern type has great advantages. It is alive and in touch with the world at the moment; and people who receive education of this kind will probably be very vitally aware of most of the living interests of their own time."

Most parents, says Temple, like the faults of both types - the aristocratic tone of the first and the push-fulness of the second. His own preferred combination is that "while we have got to incorporate all, or at any rate, nearly all, that the modern type of education has given us, it has got to be used in such a way as to leave the great marks of the traditional type predominant": corporate rather than individual; effective through influence and

appeal to sympathy and imagination rather than through appeal to intelligence and memory; concerned to give standards of judgment rather than just facts; co-operative rather than competitive.[83]

In complete consistency with this position Temple for thirty years stressed the importance of the school primarily as a living community. Two examples, widely spaced in time, will suffice. In 1921 Temple remarked that Englishmen are very individualistic, especially boys of 14-18 years of age. But a school has a real collective life, and its chief educational influence is given through pupils' sharing in such a life.[84] In 1940 he wrote: "When the State began to interest itself in education ... it almost inevitably worked by the principle of an irreducible minimum - a point to which all children must be brought ... Moreover, what was envisaged was schooling rather than education. The first board schools, which, as Charles Masterman said, 'proclaimed by the very audacity of their ferocious ugliness, the advantages of State-given education', were no more than vast boxes of classrooms. There was no corporate life of the school, and no attempt to make its architecture the expression of a communal life. The entire conception was purely individualistic; the children were taught in droves because it was too expensive to teach them separately. The fact that the school itself can and should be the great educator of its pupils, apart from all instruction given by teachers, was almost completely ignored ... The vital point is this. The community of young people is itself the great educator, and care must be taken that all young people up to the age of eighteen are members of such a community or fellowship, enjoying its support and braced by consciousness of responsibility for its tradition and welfare."[85]

Temple's views on the curriculum reflect his pre-occupation with personality. He wanted greater recognition for science.[86] He honoured it along with literature, history and art, as a true social good of which possession

by one enriches all.[87] He points to the humility of the true scientist who sets no store by his own theory because it is his own, but is ready to be guided by the facts.[88] He urges men to prize the world fellowship of science.[89] His reservations come into play only at the point where science is elevated above all other disciplines as a mode of knowing and of curing the ills of the world. In understanding human nature the humanities have priority over the sciences.[90] This is particularly true in relation to applied science. 'There can be no greater mistake than to depreciate the importance of technical training and the efficiency to which it ministers; but education ... is concerned not with this, that or the other particular capacity, but with the whole personality."[91] Temple made an extended comment in 1932 in an article called 'The Perils of a Purely Scientific Education". The menace was of scientifically trained people who were undeveloped in imagination, sympathy, social and political instinct, and moral discrimination. Many well-qualified scientists exhibited mental puerility. Mathematics and science were useful and noble disciplines, but their exclusive study "creates a type of mind which is clumsy and blundering in relation to all questions of Value ... It creates a tendency to deal with men in the mass, by generalisations, rather than as individuals. Marxianism is, I believe, bad science; but half its viciousness consists in its attempt to treat the problems of human life on purely scientific lines." To have no books or school education was a real loss. But illiterate men "by observation, by conversation, by the experience of life, may become truly wise. And even if they remain simple, they are open to appeal on the various sides of their nature". A one-sided education may destroy this natural balance. Kepler's exclusive use of scientific method to choose his second wife (so the story went) was a disaster. Temple's belief that Christianity required experience of life, not scientific experiment, for its verification, disposed him to see a close affinity between

religion and human relationships. The scientific understanding is contrasted with the understanding which every man has who falls in love. Faith in God is "confident loyalty towards the Maker and Ruler of the Universe, before whom we are always as children before their father. The child does not practise scientific experiments on his father's love; but he understands it, and relies on it, and day by day more completely verifies it."[92]

In 1940 Temple complained of "minds well trained in the handling of all that can be weighed or measured, but undisciplined and often insensitive in relation to all that is not susceptible of that treatment". Temple sketches a consequence of this attitude. It 'tends towards a determinism such as undermines the sense of responsibility and leads to a view of all moral subjects as diseases to be cured, if at all, by the application of external remedies like change of material conditions, or internal but still not fully personal adjustments like those of psycho-analysis." Temple does welcome the demise of facile optimism about automatic progress. But here again, the false mentality trips men up in another way. There is a widespread sense of frustration which is strangely similar to St. Paul's sense of the grip of sin in Romans 7. "Substitute 'complex' for 'sin' and you have a very modern statement! Moreover the modern generation readily accepts the view that a man cannot cure himself; indeed it acquiesces in it a great deal too easily. For it accepts this as an objective fact without suffering any distress of mind. It adopts the scientific attitude towards its own disabilities, recognising them as facts but not feeling obliged to seek the cure."[93]

A similar consequence is what Temple calls the "spectator attitude". This is proper and necessary in the laboratory. The student thereby acquires "an admirable intellectual integrity". However, "he may acquire it at the cost of ethical vacuity", for the attitude is "quite

inappropriate in human relationships and in religion. Our education is in a fair way to hand over human relationships to passion divorced from thought, and to make religion a mere matter of personal opinion or feeling or both, but not the total self-committal of a man to God which alone is true religion". The political repercussions could be seen in Hitler's Germany. A friend of Temple despaired of the situation there precisely because the intellectuals adopted the spectator attitude. "These men," says Temple "hated what they observed; but they did no more than observe what they hated; they did not attack it. Hitler represents an insurgence of the emotional element in Nature against a detached and ineffectual intellectualism which could offer no resistance when attacked." This attitude of detachment is reinforced by the complexity of political life: the ordinary citizen is bewildered by the number of questions requiring decision and by the way they interlock; he sees politicians producing results exactly opposite to those at which they aim. He feels overshadowed and controlled by impersonal forces. For Temple, the only answer to the sense of frustration is to deliver men from the spectator attitude. That means restoring a sense of purpose in life; and no purpose is adequate except the purpose of God. Hence the prime need is for confrontation with the living God, which could well come through experience and reflection upon human relationships.[94]

The religious perspective dominates Temple's thinking about history teaching. His starting point is that Christianity is true, and that Truth is one. "If you teach history ... without any reference to a Divine Ruler, you are forming a habit of mind which never thinks of God in connection with the destiny of nations. Neutrality is in fact impossible because in this field to omit is to deny. Truth is one; and the human mind by its very nature aspires to unity of apprehension; it cannot be religious about Israel and non-religious about England; ... either the religious or the non-religious attitude will tend to oust the other."[95] Posit a Divine Ruler and the key to

history is a moral one. In the nineteenth century, says Temple, historians worked under the tacitly accepted hypothesis that the development of democratic self-government was progress. Temple is quite explicit about his sole criterion of progress: God is Love, so that progress consists in the increasing preponderance of goodwill and love over self-interest and ill-will.[96] History teaching therefore subserves moral training in citizenship. 'History, for this purpose, should be written and studied with direct reference to present conditions ... The boys should be urged to exercise their judgment, especially their moral judgment, on the actions taken, in order that they may form the habit and train the faculty of applying ethical principles to political questions."[97] It is true that Temple says he wants history teaching to be scientific, but by this he chiefly means free from chauvinism.[98] Temple's handling of history teaching is an interesting window on his approach to social issues. He rightly wishes God's sovereignty to cover the whole of life, but he has so intensely moral an approach that a subject which can highlight the amoral factors in human existence, notably power, is given insufficient autonomy for its purposes. I shall return to this point in Part II.[99]

Other subjects too were particularly valued for their relevance to human well-being. Temple was keen to stimulate love of music, painting and literature.[100] He used to read English poetry, especially Browning and Shakespeare, with his Repton boys.[101] He looked on art and literature as able to bind men of different races together, enabling us to appreciate the peculiarities of cultures other than our own.[102] Study of foreign literature could help us to understand movements and forces in the world and offer wise service internationally, as well as helping us to cultivate aesthetic sensibility.[103]

In Classics, though Temple could appreciate a place for prose and verse composition, he rated a study of the

classical outlook on life even more highly. We drive too many boys into Latin, he writes, and treat it as mental gymnastics. Far more important were the philosophical and political problems they tackled, and the work of the tragedians and Thucydides.[104] It is typical of Temple that he recommends to an enquirer Sir Richard Livingstone's The Greek Genius and its Meaning for Us and, of course, his beloved Plato.[105]

Just as Temple thought we should delight in variety of artistic contribution and accept people in their differences, so he welcomed variety in curriculum as a way to develop individual potential.[106] In particular he recognised the special needs of adolescents, and in pressing for a higher school leaving age and the retention of adolescents under some form of education till eighteen years of age, he hoped for collaboration between local authorities, industrialists and trade unionists, so that there could be training schemes linked to continuing education, perhaps under local authority supervision.[107] He also could see that in a more varied type of education a great many pupils, probably the majority, should be given much more opportunity for manual activity with less extraction of information from printed books.[108] Following the lead of Dr. Albert Mansbridge he said: 'There are a great many children whose brains are better developed by setting their fingers to work than by calling upon them to read books. The number of children who can absorb freely out of the printed page is really limited. The very same ideas, to a large extent, can be imparted by setting children to do things, and when what they attempt to do goes wrong, to find out the reason why."[109]

However, whilst Temple welcomed variety, and wanted teachers to have freedom in devising the curriculum,[110] he saw a problem: "We have extended the curriculum beyond all hope of integrating it in the service of a clearly conceived purpose."[111] The purpose Temple proposes in that

context is peace, construed in the light of Christianity. He looked to the whole Christian atmosphere of the school to inculcate such a purpose. But it is also true that he saw religious education - this was his preferred term[112] - as playing a vital role.

Temple's understanding of purpose, content and method in religious education rests on his understanding both of Plato and of Christianity. His writing sometimes lacks the precision which recent debate has necessitated, but we can say that fundamentally religious education meant for Temple Christian education, and the aim was to convey Christianity as a way of life based on a faith.[113] What more precisely did that highly ambiguous formula mean?

First, Temple was in sharp reaction against late Victorian and Edwardian Liberalism. Writing to the Head-master of Rugby in 1934 in response to his request for advice on three books he said: 'The books give an account of opinions held about God and Christ - not an account of the 'power of God unto salvation' ... The whole movement connected with Barth might never have happened ... What I personally miss throughout is all sense of a great historical movement characterised by a sense of divine mission ... Of course my comment is as 'tendencious' as the books. I only claim that my 'tendency' is that of the Old and New Testaments ... It is not legitimate to write about the Old and New Testaments without explaining that these present themselves, not primarily as a record of men's thoughts about God, but of God's acts in dealing with men ..." So the prime distinction in Temple's mind was between teaching about religion and teaching religion. For him teaching about religion militated against the imparting of a living Christian-ity.[114]

Secondly, Temple followed Plato in insisting that it was not only useless but positively harmful to appeal to the logical understanding of a child when it was still undeveloped: 'The logical element in religion must be developed out of the emotional element, and not before it,

because it would stifle inquiry and paralyse imagination."[115] What comes first in logic comes last in instruction. If a child is to come to appreciate the great doctrines of the Church, which are the logical bases of Christianity, it must be given the experience which will show them to be necessary. Otherwise they are merely unintelligible and valueless forms. Temple always had a strong belief in the unity of faith and life, and here at the early age of twenty-five he writes that the inefficacy of our Christian belief - its total inability really to govern our lives - is partly due to the forms of words which lay no hold on our emotions and wills.[116] Temple's other guide was Christ Himself, who had taught, at least in the early days, a type of character to be cultivated, a type of life to be lived, a relation to God to be realised; this was expressed not in abstract logical form, but in paradoxical precepts and living pictures, which derived their power from the personality and life of the Teacher.[117] This is Temple's unwavering position. If religious dogmas become ends in themselves, they become intellectual lumber, and obstruct true freedom.[118] Rote learning of the catechism was an "uneducated and pernicious" method. "Nothing is so disastrous as to become accustomed to think of religion in phrases learned by heart but not understood."[119] The substance must be conveyed before any formulation is committed to memory.[120] This position is held by Temple on the basis partly of his child psychology of learning, partly of his understanding of Christianity. For Christianity is a way of life rooted in faith.[121] Religious education cannot be the imparting of certainties, but the giving of direction to the adventurous spirit in the child. Temple's hope is that, as it grows, the child will come to stake its life and the employment of its powers on the goodness of God and the ultimate value of goodness and beauty and truth. Instruction and the dogmatic formula will find their place as a skeleton to aid understanding or as a summary of a view of life with its ideals and hopes, much as scientific generalisations follow experiments.[122]

Temple was on this point consciously opposed in 1907 to the "Church Party", whose ideas on method he thought to lack Christ's own authority. He made it clear that he was not pleading for undenominationalism as a religion for adults: he was pleading for it as the fit and proper religion for children.[123] So, ten years later, he wrote that the demand for "definite religious instruction" easily stood in the way of real religious education, "by the suggestion that religion consists in a scheme of ideas, sometimes a scheme only of words, which have no relation to the history of mankind and the general concerns which occupy our thoughts from day to day."[124] Temple's position was partly influenced by the belief that it was possible to differentiate the denominational from the doctrinal issue. This he made explicit in 1944. He warned the Lords not to believe those who spoke as if it were impossible for an agreed syllabus to contain any reference to the real substance of the Christian faith. Partly this was because of a confusion of the denominational question and the doctrinal question. An agreed syllabus must not contain anything specifically distinctive of one denomination, but of course it could contain the whole of common Christian doctrine.[125] Insofar, then, as anyone in the heat of controversy stressed instruction in dogmatic tenets, he was unlikely to win Temple's support. As we shall see, however, Temple's views on Church Schools, at least from 1925, reflect a decidedly "catholic" stance.

An implication which Temple could see was that the demands on teachers would be very high. It was lack of skill which induced recourse to the method of the catechism. Clergy in particular could be a disaster: they were hardly taught how to teach at all, and often had no firm intellectual grasp of the faith.[126] Since the public mind was not well informed about the content of the Christian religion, the recovery of effective teaching was impossible without specialists, as the Spens Report recommended.[127] Temple looked for better training in the colleges. This was not just a matter of better training in methods. The

training colleges should be "full of religious influence". If religion in the schools was to be undenominational, at least the undenominationalism had better be religious![128] If the dogmas were to become living truths, then the power which gave them life had to be called into exercise both in learner and in teacher. "The ideal of education that recognises freedom as its goal makes much greater demands on the teacher than the education that 'gendereth unto bondage'." For it is only he whose soul is free who can lift other souls into freedom. For the question of religious education is whether the highest conception of God shall be used to give form and significance to the deepest intuitions of the human heart.[129] Temple's hope therefore is that all teachers, of whatever subject, will have a living faith in God. It was preferable that they should be orthodox, but correctness of theological interpretation was far less important than genuine zeal for God and Christ.[130] Character rather than word was the key.[131] This was, however, a hope which Temple was not prepared to make a legal requirement.[132]

Temple predictably deployed alongside the notion of freedom in God's service his other notion of freedom from constraint. He did want pupils to exercise their own judgment.[133] One function of education was to force the critical mind to examine its prejudices.[134] Iremonger tells us that at Repton Temple never talked down to his pupils, but treated them as his intellectual equals.[135] His attitude is best conveyed in an editorial in The Challenge three years after he left Repton. If education was essential for the realisation of liberty, then it followed that in school there had to be liberty if there was to be education. "No doubt our minds grow through intercourse with other minds, but they must themselves be active in this intercourse, and that not only by way of pure reception." There was no question of the teacher imposing upon the pupils. We should desire the learner to make up his own mind on as complete a

presentation of the facts as can be produced. It was not a matter of everyone starting de novo, but it did mean that all were learners together. This was the means to the (now familiar) aim of "the building up into its fulness of the real personality of the student".[136]

This relative openness of approach would almost certainly have been matched by an openness in content. We have seen how Temple's concern is for a living Christianity in relation to daily concerns.[137] Though he wanted Christian doctrines to be taught,[138] including teaching on sin and redemption,[139] he would surely have been willing to start with pupils' own concerns, perhaps for example with the sense of frustration - an "eye", as he put it, into which the "hook" of the Gospel could fit.[140] In spite of this relative openness the same difficulty arises as with Temple's view of the foundations of education. I shall make some positive suggestions about a base for Religious Education after the discussion of Christian and secular morality in Part II.[141]

5. Adult Education

"There is something pathetic in the eagerness with which idealists look to educational reform for the realisation of their hopes. If only we could mould the coming generation to our liking, we feel the thing were done - whatever the thing we desire may be. Our enthusiasm for education is often the measure of our despair of ourselves. The modern cult of the child is not altogether healthy, especially in so far as it leads us to underrate alike the claims and the responsibilities of the mature."[142]

Temple did respond to the claims of the mature. On the universities he did not say a great deal, though what he said is characteristic. He valued the older universities for the same reason as the public schools.[143] He took a

high view of their responsibilities to truth and to teaching.[144] At Oxford he himself usually lectured without notes, but always had his notes fully written out.[145] The idea he picked up from his stay in Germany was that of making most of a lecture very general indeed (though cleansed of turgid rhetoric) and trying to stimulate interest even in the dull man. "I feel sure that most Oxford lectures are too dreary ..."[146] Temple was a strong believer in personal, informal contact between dons and undergraduates. Iremonger tells us he much regretted later the demise of the tradition of pastoral concern which he had helped to establish.[147] A particular interest at the end of his life was the role of the university in the recovery of an integrated view of life. "A University was once a real totality of studies, each of which had its place in an intellectual economy of which the guiding principles were supplied by theology, the queen of sciences. Now it is a place where a multitude of studies are conducted with no relationship between them except those of simultaneity and juxtaposition." He looked to Christian members of universities so to represent in thought and life the principles of their faith that men would find in it the integrating power which gave to all studies and activities their proper place and delimitations. This would be a matter of Christian influence in a context of freedom, not influenced by the statute book. Christians needed confidently to practise the motto credo ut intelligam; to witness by attendance at the College chapel on pain of being "a fraudulent trustee for the treasure committed to him in his own faith"; and to put allegiance to Christ first.[148]

However, far more important to Temple was the cause of workers' education. His dedication can be gauged from the fact that he served as President of the Workers' Educational Association from 1908-1924, some of the busiest years of his life, and ever afterwards continued to spare what time he could.[149] He saw it as a great spiritual movement, and

airily used the religious language of faith, hope and love as he wrote about it.[150] His permanent conviction was that in the name of justice the working class should effectively have the same educational facilities as the other classes. This was essential for the development of free personality.[151] And, as ever with Temple, free personality was construed with a social reference. Education was necessary if Labour was to join in responsible control.[152] "It is by education that the working classes can most effectively assert their true personality. If a man is a little inarticulate, rather halting and clumsy in expression, he is easily set down, if not defeated, by someone whose faculty may in itself be less but has been more highly trained."[153] "The poor will never gain their rights until they have both the knowledge and the mental discipline that will enable them to confront other interests on equal terms."[154] Two points should be noticed here. First, Temple did not idolise the populace: "Vox populi, vox dei: what nonsense!" The majority was not always right. Temple starts from his social principles of personality in his support both of education and of democracy. Men need to be educated for a democracy, and democracy itself has its educational effect. By calling on people to exercise responsible judgment you develop personal qualities; you make them feel they belong to one another in a corporate society; you are leading people forward from the relationship of the herd to that of real fellowship. Through democracy "you get a more alert, a more disciplined intelligence in the citizens ... less likely to be victims of propaganda, one of the subtle perils of democracy at all times ..."[155] Secondly, Temple was not concerned to prime the working class with the tactics of warfare. He was particularly concerned, as we have seen earlier, with the danger that the sense of fellowship which he found in the ranks of labour could degenerate through frustration into a

pugnacious herd mentality, which sought short-term material gains: "It is bound to be among the working class that Democracy is put to its supreme test ... Two conditions must be fulfilled: first there must be a great development of working-class education - so great as to make the working classes zealous for individuality; secondly, it must find its strength in spiritual power, not in concern for material benefits."[156]

Temple's more precise meaning can be gathered from his many pronouncements about the W.E.A. In fact, he showed remarkable facility in varying the presentation of his concepts; but the basic concepts are those which have already been expounded. At risk, therefore, of appearing to underestimate the significance of his W.E.A. work (his experience with the W.E.A. did indeed powerfully affect his thinking), we can fasten on a limited number of specific points.

First, Temple believed the work of the W.E.A. showed the need for the traditional type of education to predominate. It was the W.E.A. which supremely grasped the priority of the spirit of a place over instruction.[157] Temple was also delighted to find a strong corporate sense of brotherhood among the members. In an article in 1914 he writes: "I do not hesitate to say that the spirit of real Brotherhood, which the New Testament teaches one to expect in the Church, but which the Church on the whole keeps studiously away, is to be found more abundantly in the W.E.A. than anywhere else in my experience." Temple claimed that the W.E.A. was a wholly working-class body alike in origin and government. It was therefore free of individualism. Labour had retained the medieval sense of the corporate life, and viewed climbing up the educational ladder with disfavour. Whatever the advantages and the justice of the ladder, the danger was that in the stratified society we experienced - which would probably last for some centuries - a man lifted out of one stratum would look down on his own people, and in default of the growth

of new sympathies, be a self-seeker all his life. The W.E.A., therefore, educated people in their own class, so that they could use their trained faculties for the benefit of their own fellows.[158]

The attitude of Labour (or at least of some of those Temple met) was congenial in another way. Most regarded education as an instrument of social emancipation, but were idealistic enough to wish to pursue subjects which would not necessarily help them as individuals to 'rise in life'. Indeed, Iremonger's verdict is that "the fact that the Association did not appeal to economic motives, but provided a humane education for those whose opportunities of obtaining it had been slight, was the secret of its power ... Temple knew that a revolutionary movement will not at first be inclined to 'respect the stored wisdom of the ages', and he warned his audiences that to cultivate this disrespect would be by so much to forgo their spiritual birthright."[159]

The earlier University Extension Movement had been imposed from above: it was the lecturers who had decided on both subject and treatment.[160] In the W.E.A., however, "the classes choose their own subjects, and as a general rule, they choose those subjects about which nobody knows the truth. Those are always the best instruments of education; for if anyone knows the truth, he has only to say what it is and his hearers believe him. That may be instruction, but it is not education. Real education is always best conducted as a joint search for truth; and in these Tutorial Classes we have, not one teacher and thirty hearers, but thirty-one fellow students, one of whom has commenced the study earlier than the rest and can therefore act as guide."[161] All this fitted admirably with Temple's preference for the humanities, and for open methods of learning.

Temple laid great stress on discussion in tutorial classes. This was "vital, partly because working-men are

not going to be talked to unless they are allowed to talk back (which is one reason why they don't go to Church), and partly because it is there that various members of the Class begin to get their teeth into the subject and the best part of the education begins".[162] He was fascinated by his own experience of discussing a sermon he gave at an Oxford Summer School. The discussion became a regular fixture. At first he noted the general hostility to religion and the tendency to wander. But gradually, he says, men learnt to criticise phrases, and to think more accurately, they became impatient of wide generalisations such as materialism and determinism. "They learn the complexity of things. They are less self-confident." What struck Temple was that neither the classes nor the discussion of his sermons had a theological or religious intention. "These classes have no religious aim, in the accepted sense of the term; and if they had they could not produce the particular religious effect which I have described. But inasmuch as education is the development of everything about a man which distinguishes him from an animal or a machine, inasmuch as it disciplines his intelligence, quickens his imagination and widens his sympathy, - in so far it is breaking down barriers between the man and God. As we labour for the coming of the Kingdom, we must expect to see it come largely as a by-product of processes not consciously concerned with it; or rather, we must be ready to work in the ways adapted to the circumstances and claim all methods for Christ, even if they are employed at present mainly by agnostics and atheists, if only they tend to produce a fuller manhood."[163]

The success of the W.E.A. tutorial methods led to the creation of the Church Tutorial Classes Association, founded to apply those methods to Religious Education. Temple wrote an introduction to a book compiled by a group he convened to think out further the problems of Adult Religious Education.[164] He was alarmed that Religious

Education had not kept pace with general education. There was a danger of a man developing intellectually in other fields, but holding a crude theology which would put his own faith in danger and alienate others from it. The growth of knowledge and its infringement on the traditional framework of Christian belief could be met only by increasing intellectual grasp of religion. It was not enough to deny that scientific study had disproved the Bible; "and to deny it with unreasoned vehemence, which is the natural reaction of an uninstructed but deeply rooted conviction, will do more harm than good by the suggestion that it makes of uncertainty and insecurity ..." We needed to know what were the essential interests of Religion; where new knowledge affected it; and how far this was dangerous or helpful to Religion. The issue of Religion and science was an obvious point of contact. Here a danger lay in the clash of the religious habit of mind and that produced by a purely scientific education. "The modern religious teacher often has to foster ... an apprehension of aesthetic and ethical values his predecessor could take for granted." The method of discussion was vital. "It is only in discussion that most people actively exercise their own minds on the subject of their study. The number of those who can read or listen at once attentively and critically is very small ... Few people, again, make plain to themselves their judgment on what they hear unless they have occasion to express it, such as discussion provides ... Without discussion most people never master even their own thought. They are, therefore, not only powerless to take up the defence of their faith if it is assailed, but they miss part of its meaning and value for themselves." Discussion was vital in religion because of the intensity of our feelings and the value we set on our convictions, which affected our perceptions, especially of what we heard. "We cannot all be experts ... but we can all make ourselves competent to form an intelligent judgment upon questions in which we are really interested." This in turn meant study and mental discipline.

"That study need not be anything beyond (people's) capacity, and it may start from wherever their interest suggests; but before it has gone far it must discover and then follow the right order; which is the order that corresponds to the logical structure of the subject." Religious Education had therefore to be adapted psychologically to the maturity of the adult mind, and logically to the inherent structure of the Christian faith. "It cannot be said that in the Church generally we have got very far in apprehension of the ways of doing it." I shall pick up these remarks on the method of adult education in the Conclusion to this thesis, for I believe they are of great importance for the future of Christian social ethics.

6. Church Schools and State Schools

"Arnold was not the only pilot of Temple's early life to be dropped."[165] Iremonger is quite right to stress the youthful enthusiasm of Temple for Thomas Arnold; and there is indeed a major departure from Arnold. But his influence remained a good deal more pervasive than Iremonger implies, and we need to see clearly the precise nature and limits of the change.

In the Oxford Union in 1906 Temple declared devotion to the Church of England according to the conception of Parker, Tillotson, Tait, and especially Arnold: that the Church of England is the whole people of England in its religious capacity. This was in explicit opposition to Charles Gore, champion of the "denomination ideal" which, Temple mischievously said, rested the Church not on nationality, which <u>must</u> be living, but on tradition, which <u>may</u> be dead. The "most tremendous blunder" had been committed in 1839. In that year the Government had offered the Church control of the whole education of the country, provided the Church allowed children whose parents wished it to be withdrawn during hours of religious instruction.

By saying they could not give education to any children who did not receive their whole teaching, the Church of England had made it inevitable that other schools would be founded alongside her own, and had therefore renounced her position as a national Church. Temple claimed that his chief reason for supporting Birrell's Bill in 1906 was that he believed the real alternative was whole secularism. It was not true that the Bill itself virtually provided secularism. The point was that if the contending parties could not agree, the State would be bound to say 'Out you must all go'. "Of course Church leaders do not desire this-but they are blinded to the true facts of the case by an exaggerated conception of the importance of dogma in the education of little children. If the Church agrees, she could be a truly national Church, testifying that the State is no mere secular machine concerned only with the levying of taxes and the administration of police, but that in the uttermost depths of its being the State is a religious body, and that the State's highest obligation lies in the exercise of its religious functions."[166]

Later that same year Temple was again following Arnold. The Church of England, as a national Church, was responsible for the education of all English children. Both Church and State exist for godly living. The Church is the organ of the Christian nation's specifically religious life, the State is the organ of the Christian nation's civil life. If, therefore, religious teaching ought to be associated with some definite society, that society is the Christian nation.[167] The following year Temple was urging the Church of England not to distinguish itself from other Christian bodies over the education of children, but rather to rejoice at being able to emphasise the fundamental identity of all Christian belief. The real issue was not sects or their several doctrines but "how we were to educate our children to be Christian citizens in a State which some of us are visionary enough to hope may one day be a Christian state".[168]

How precisely did Temple's views change? He soon abandoned Arnold's notion of a single Christian nation in

two aspects, religious and civil, and more sharply differentiated Church from nation or State. No longer did he speak of the State as a religious body. Certainly he always abhorred the idea of a secular State.[169] The State had a moral and spiritual function.[170] Education was the most important department of the State.[171] But he could see that England could not be treated simply as a Christian nation, and he adopted the view that Church and State were separate spheres which had ultimately the same goal but travelled by different methods. The two should support each other, the State acknowledging the ultimate authority of God (though not taking orders from Lambeth),[172] the Church of England exercising a responsibility not just to its own members but to all the nation's children. Thus in 1917, when H. A. L. Fisher was formulating his comprehensive Education Bill, Temple posed the Church the cardinal question; "Is the Church going to devote all its energy to securing some minute facilities for denominational instruction, or is it going to give itself whole-heartedly to the effort to support the Education Minister in his desire for a real development of our whole system ...?" Religious instruction, though necessary, would accomplish next to nothing if attached to a niggardly and cramped education, which set out to be generally neutral.[173] Several years later Temple was still underlining the Church's responsibility to do all it could to give the rising generation the fullest possible opportunity to grow up as God-fearing and useful citizens. This could not mean controlling all education itself, but rather inspiring those who exercised control with the right ideals and teaching the community "to take with full seriousness the responsibilities which, through the State, it has undertaken."[174]

Furthermore, although Temple continued to discount dogma in educating children and stressed the extent of common Christian belief across the denominations,[175] he did come to a fuller Catholic view of the Church as the Body of Christ, not so much as a dogma, but as the ultimate living corporate reality. This implied that the factor of

denominations could not be by-passed even in the case of children's education. By 1925 at the latest Temple was a strong supporter of Church schools. Two articles in The Pilgrim proclaimed this change. It is in April 1925 that Temple first produces the definite formula that the development of personality in fellowship is the aim of education. The idea was already long implicit, but it may be that its crystallisation prompted, or at any rate hastened, his new position. Society itself is, he writes, the chief educator. But school provides a social atmosphere, being a field for the exercise of equal citizenship and responsibility. "It is a real and living society with a character of its own, which at once springs from, and reproduces itself in, the characters of all, both teachers and pupils, who are members of the school ... It is this which constitutes the strength of the case for denominational schools." Temple deplored the division of Christendom. This tempted the administrator to shut organised Christianity out of schools altogether. General Bible teaching, he said, was better than nothing. "But if religion is taught without reference to Church membership and worship with the whole Body of Christ, the suggestion will be very strong that these are extras to be added or not according to individual taste." The Christian life is life as the member of a body, "and the small society of the school ought to be felt (rather than thought) as a part of the great society of the Church as well as of the nation". The Church of England could not be content with undenominational teaching.[176]

In 1926 Temple claimed that the recognition of the corporate character of any school was a widespread change of attitude. The State system was the product of a reforming movement which was individualist through and through. The school was a fellowship of past, present and future. Furthermore, any form of living truth was more and other than an accumulation of propositions. You cannot give undenominational religious teaching and then add the distinctive teaching any more than you can give religiously neutral education and then add denominational tenets. The

'distinctive' aspects were all pervasive. So there was a new appreciation of denominational schools. Their defence was on educational grounds: that truth is one and indiscerptible, that the school is a society, and that personality is social. The denominational schools were more deeply moulded by these truths than others. Education should be the work both of State and Church. The ideal was that the teaching and management of schools should be in the hands of religious bodies, whilst the State paid for buildings and salaries and inspected the results. This, however, had to be an ideal, as neither Free Churchmen nor atheists wanted it, and the distribution of the population was not governed by denominational principles. The simple method of "secularisation" was equally tyrannous to all. The way of liberty was very difficult, but the denominations and the Education Authorities were ready to unite in search of an agreement.[177]

From that time onwards Temple never wavered in his defence of Church schools. His conviction was only sharpened by the advent of war with the Nazi State. He saw the dual system as a bastion not only against bureaucratic control and mechanical uniformity but also against totalitarianism. "There is a merit in the very duality of the dual system." The Church schools were generally able to give more sense of corporate unity to the school and to bring into the schools elements of special interest from outside, through the links between Church and community. "Moreover, when the children reach the age for leaving school, they do not feel that they have gone out of that building for ever, for the building ... is used for many functions in which they take a part. There is a bridge between the school and the wider life outside, which is very hard to produce where there is no society besides the State to which the school belongs."[178]

So Temple looks for co-operation between statutory and voluntary bodies. He welcomes the growth in the part played by the State in education and in welfare work of

all kinds, but it does tend to diminish the influence exercised by voluntary bodies; and now that the State does not confine itself to coercive activities, there is the danger that it will absorb into itself cultural activities, and "who is to rectify errors or disproportions in the minds of those who manipulate its enormous powers?"[179] We need the State to secure universality of provision; we need voluntary enterprise because of the greater elasticity it could bring into play, and because it provides more expectation of, and opportunity for, the spirit of dedication. "In the end the work is personal."[180]

Temple therefore held together two objectives: first, concentration on the Church schools with a view to demonstrating what religious education (in the broad sense) according to the principles of the Church of England should and could be; secondly, recognition of the special responsibility of the Church for the children of all Church parents.[181] In terms of religious instruction Temple favoured retaining Church schools wherever possible, and securing the fullest religious instruction for children in council schools. It was foolish to complain that Church of England policy was less direct and simple than that of Roman Catholics; for Anglicans recognised a far wider range of responsibility than they did.[182]

A careful study of Temple's preoccupations where legislation was necessary reveals that he was just as concerned with securing educational opportunities for all children as he was with the defence of Church schools and religious education. Nursery schools,[183] smaller classes,[184] teachers with sufficient leisure to develop interests together with their pupils,[185] less emphasis on competitive and largely intellectual examinations[186] - all these he supported. But his most persistent demands were for the sake of adolescents. In 1917 he suggested to H. A. L. Fisher, the Education Minister, the principle that until the age of eighteen every person should be regarded as primarily a subject of education, and not primarily a

factor in industry.[187] When Fisher not only proposed there should be no exemptions from school up to the age of fourteen but also went so far as to accept the suggested principle, Temple at once asked for a forecast of the timing of future measures to implement it.[188] The measures were not forthcoming. By 1925 Temple was pleading for the retention of all boys and girls under educational influence till the age of sixteen, and all who did not find employment till eighteen.[189] The principle he was still advancing to the end of his life.[190]

Correspondingly Temple's ambitions over the raising of the school leaving age constantly outran Government action. In 1934 he supported a proposal for raising it to fifteen. Children were not ready at fourteen for the rough and tumble of the industrial world. They needed the medical care a school afforded, and especially the further moral experience of living in a school community. The time was ripe, because the post-war bulge in the population was now about to pass into the labour market, and there would be the "ridiculous spectacle" of an increase in unemployed juveniles and at the same time many empty places in the schools. Keeping pupils at school would be far more healthy than maintaining the unemployed juvenile schools, where young people were herded together to complain to one another that society had no niche for them.[191] The school leaving age was still fourteen when in 1943 Temple said 'The first necessity is to raise the school leaving age to sixteen". The rise to fifteen should certainly come at the earliest practical moment; it was possible however that reduction in the size of classes should take precedence over the further rise to sixteen.[192] And so in the 1944 House of Lords Debate Temple welcomed the rise to fifteen, stressing again the same need on medical, moral and intellectual grounds (whatever was learnt by fourteen tended to be lost by twenty if not practised).[193] He was not blind to the problem of tactics: buildings and teachers would both have to be provided and equipped; the

curriculum would have to become more varied.[194] But the essential was to make a start. To make continued education beyond fourteen purely voluntary would never persuade ratepayers to provide the curriculum; the children had to be there first.[195]

If statute was required to drum up adequate financial resources, so the politician or civil servant who proposed cuts in education received the rough side of Temple's tongue. The classic occasion is the attack on the Geddes proposals in April 1922. Where could the cuts be made? Temple asked. Not by raising the starting age to six years. The first six years exercised a profound influence on character, and conditions of housing were often so bad that character formation largely depended on the schools. To economise here was to prepare the way for a vast increase in expenditure on the police and pauperism, and for a great reduction in industrial efficiency. Nor could we reduce the salaries of teachers: that would deter many suitable persons from entering the profession; besides, it would involve breaking a government pledge - and that to people who had been seriously underpaid. To reduce the number of free secondary school places was also intolerable: this period was equally important in the formation of character; return on elementary education would be lost, together with sheer commercial advantage. Such a course was therefore hopelessly uneconomic. Finally, to allow larger classes was unacceptable.[196]

As early as 1924 Temple had commented that because of the better climate of opinion there was hope for agreement (a) that there should be religious instruction in all schools subject to the conscience clause; (b) that the denominational principle had a perfect right to recognition in a national system; (c) that local education authorities should have the responsibility of deciding which schools should be denominational and which non-denominational. This, Temple said, would require sacrifice all round. The

Church would have to give up its absolute property in its schools; Non-conformists would have to give up their objection to the provision of denominational education out of public money; the State its desire for simplicity.[197] The next twenty years were a search for agreement which culminated in the Education Act of 1944. For Temple this meant the search for a compromise not too injurious to his principles.[198] First, with national and local government he sought co-operation, but never at the cost of Church schools.[199] Butler and Temple worked closely together, and the upshot was the Government's offer to find 50% of the cost of readjusting and maintaining the Church schools. This no doubt delighted Temple, not merely because of its recognition of the partnership of Church schools, but because it meant better education for more children.[200] Secondly, with the Non-conformists Temple worked hard for agreement. The whole climate was far removed from that of 1906. He found agreement over the major non-religious provisions of the Bill, and over the basic content of religious education. But he stuck firmly to the idea that Church schools should receive State money; and efforts failed to resolve the grievance which arose when a Church of England school was the only one in an area. In the Lords he was adamant that, though the acid test of true democracy was to be found in the rights of the minority, it would be oligarchy of a new type if the majority could not have what it wanted so long as any minority objected.[201] Thirdly, he strongly supported the corporate act of worship in school. As early as 1921 he said that the chief educational influence of a school came through sharing in a collective life, and this must include worship if the school is religious. Ideally attendance would be universal and voluntary. But in an age of criticism this was impossible. Temple came down on the side of compulsion. The reason was the importance he attached to collective worship, which, he declared, was not the same at all as the individuals worshipping together, but an act of the society as such. Temple's doctrine of the Holy Communion

made it right in principle that this should be the service attended by the school as such. However, the danger of profane attendance weighed with him more than the calamity of giving up the principle.[202] It is this sense of worship as the focus of the corporate life which accounts for his support of the corporate act of worship in the Education Bill of 1944.[203] Towards the teachers he was careful to avoid the charge that tests were being invoked, but he remarked firmly: "I think teachers are a little liable to ignore the fact that while it is objectionable to force the teachers to conduct prayers against their consciences it is also objectionable to force the children to omit prayers for the sake of their teachers' consciences."[204] It was the public which through Parliament should determine what it wanted; Parliament should not be swayed too much by the wishes of public servants. To placate the teachers he dissuaded the Earl of Stanhope from pressing for the specification that worship be "religious" and "shall be conducted by a teacher professing that religion".[205] Finally, Temple held in mind those who feared for the Christian content of religious education. Bishop Bell spoke for them in the Lords Debate when he asked for instruction in accordance with the principles of the Christian faith. He observed that the Bill gave no positive description of the religion in which instruction was to be given, and reminded the House of the first of the Archbishops' Five Points: that in all schools a Christian education should be given to all scholars, except where parents wished to withdraw them. Lord Selborne replied for the government: "I can assure the right reverend Prelate that it is the intention of the government and of the Bill that the religious instruction required to be given shall be Christian instruction, and that the corporate act of worship shall be an act of Christian worship." And why, then, not say so? Because it would then be open to any subject to bring before the secular courts the question of whether a particular

syllabus was in accordance with the Christian faith or not. Temple was glad to hear the government's assurance, and no doubt appreciated the wish to avoid any legal wrangling. He was also happy to know that no syllabus could be passed without acceptance by the Church of England, and that there was no bar to standing religious advisory committees at local level which could receive and make suggestions and so prevent syllabuses from being regarded as final.[206]

Temple's performance over Church schools and State schools well illustrates his method of setting up principles and seeking the best means to uphold them in the circumstances. I believe he had a good prima facie case for maintaining Church schools. However, he was on very shaky ground in seeking a religious base for State schools. The inevitable consequence of the 1944 Act was that the task there was conceived as teaching children to believe as true a non-existent version of sectarian Protestantism known as undenominational Christianity. The justification for this view must await my discussion of the relation of general and Christian morality in Chapter VI.[207]

PART TWO

CHAPTER IV

LOVE AND JUSTICE

In this chapter three principal questions will be considered. First, what was Temple's position over the relationship between love and justice? Since he never wrote a systematic exposition of this, we must construct an answer out of a large number of scattered references, many of which we have already met, especially in the section on International Relations. I shall do this for the period 1934-1944; for it was only in these years that Temple gave persistent explicit attention to this topic, and it is on the relatively stable and coherent position he then held that he can most fairly be judged.

Secondly, Temple himself claimed in 1939 that he had changed his mind: in some earlier period of his life he had preached corporate self-sacrifice; now he recommends concentration on justice between groups as a more realistic, though probably still unattainable, aim. I shall ask, How accurate is Temple's depiction of his change of mind? And if it is not wholly accurate, how are we to interpret this fact?

Thirdly, it is obvious that Temple was considerably influenced in his thinking on love and justice by Reinhold Niebuhr, "the troubler of my peace".[1] In comparing the two I shall concentrate on the question, At what points does Temple diverge from Niebuhr? I shall try then to determine the significance of the divergence, especially by reference to Temple's background of Anglican social ethics.

1. Temple on Love and Justice

What was Temple's position over the relationship between love and justice? We have already seen instances of his use of the terms 'love' and 'justice', especially in the sections on Pacifism and Peace. It is also apparent that he employed parallel pairs of concepts, such as Gospel and Law, Church and State. I shall concentrate on instances of the actual use of 'love' and 'justice', whilst bringing in the other pairs to provide further illumination. Cross-references to the earlier exposition are to be found in the notes.

(i) The basic relationship of love and justice

Justice is not identical with love: it does not exhaust the meaning of love.[2] Love transcends justice. For justice is a virtue relevant to the realm of claim and counter-claim; but where love is established these claims simply do not arise.[3] This does not mean that justice is something contrary to, or alien from, love, which love mitigates or softens.[4] Nor does it mean that love can leave justice behind.[5] For love pre-supposes justice as a virtue applicable to the relations between groups.[6] Similarly, the Gospel does not negate or leave behind the Law, but rather presupposes it. This is the basis of Temple's complaint of Marcionism in the pacifist position.[7]

(ii) The problem of group relations

Groups have acquired a novel prominence through the development of man's control of nature. Men are now bound together in units which are both larger and more closely knit.[8] It is precisely in the mutual relations of groups that the chief problems of modern life are found.[9] Love in the hearts of individuals would ease group relationships, but it could not settle them.[10] Can the law of love be directly applied to groups? Temple cites the case of Christian ratepayers who created goodwill by asking for an increase in the rates in the interests of slum-clearance.

Such an application of the law of love is, however, all too rare, and this prompts Temple to ask whether this rarity is because of a remediable selfishness in individuals, or whether there is some obstacle in the very nature of corporate relations, and, if so, whether this is an ordinance of God or a product of man's corrupt nature.[11] As an answer to these questions Temple first holds that, quite apart from complications due to sin, social relationships do modify the content of duty. Thus it might be noble for a bachelor but blameworthy for a father to undertake a risky form of social service.[12] But Temple devotes most space, in various places, to the factor of man's entanglement in sin.[13] Neither individuals nor groups are able to fulfil the law of love.[14] In nearly every social institution, policy, or action, we find evidence of the two foundations of society of which Plato writes in the second book of the Republic: the positive principle of mutual need and help, and the negative principle of competing selfishness.[15] On the one hand man's membership of groups, such as his citizenship, is part of God's purpose for him.[16] On the other hand, groups are prone to an egoism far more intense than that of an individual.[17] Voluntary associations may exhibit self-concern;[18] but it is especially a danger with natural communities, from family to nation. All these are inevitably self-regarding. They generate a devotion which has no object outside of them. This is particularly true of a nation. It is able to appeal both to the altruism and to the egoism of its citizens. The effects of this exorbitant egoism can be mitigated only if the members of the community feel they have a loyalty to a wider group. Family egoism is effectively checked by national loyalty. But there is no effective check on national egoism, and it can be demoniac.[19]

Groups, therefore, and especially nations, are far less amenable to the law of love than individuals.[20] To call on nations to act by love only is likely to produce no actual result, when large numbers of citizens are wholly

or partly unconverted, and when nations as nations do not seek God's grace.[21] The way of redemptive suffering, whilst ideally best, would in the conditions of Europe in 1939, be completely impracticable and ineffectual.[22]

A further complication is that groups function through representatives, who act as trustees for the interests of the members.[23] It would be ridiculous for a Trade Union committee to prefer the employers' interest to that of the workers.[24] It would be wrong for a businessman to jeopardise by a quixotic pursuit of ideals the interests of his work-force - or even of his shareholders.[25] Similarly, the Government acts as a trustee for the nation. A nation is neither a mere aggregate of its citizens, nor is it an entity apart from them; it is themselves acting collectively in an experienced fellowship which includes past and future generations. Those who make decisions in its name are not like the will of a single individual; rather they resemble trustees administering an estate which is not their own.[26]

(iii) <u>Justice as the way of love in group relations</u>

Temple poses the question, Does the law of love in its fulness, including the claim of self-sacrifice, apply to groups? His answer is: "In an ultimate sense - yes." That Law is the expression of the Nature of God, and therefore universal in its scope.[27] The ideal of mutual love holds for all men and women and for all human groups.[28] The Christian statesman and the Christian citizen should have before their minds the Kingdom of God and His Justice as the only standard of their conduct.[29] However, the claims of love can be urged irrelevantly and ineffectively.[30] The application of the law of love is indirect and limited. It is indirect in the sense that a group like a Trade Union has no obligation, and as a rule no right, to be generous. Rather, its duty is to promote the interests of the workers justly. 'But both employers and employed are rightly called upon to act as servants of the community, and to be

guided in relation to the community by the spirit of love."[31] Temple elucidates by offering an interpretation of the Two Great Commandments. The first is absolute: towards God the demand is for an absolute surrender. But love to our neighbour is relative and limited: we are to love him as ourselves. "In no case is the agent called upon to prefer the interest of his neighbour to his own; he is required to put them on a level, and this will include the assertion of his own interest if this is not being put on a level with the neighbour's. But for the community which includes alike the man and his neighbour, both may be required to sacrifice their private interest, while for God, His Truth, and His Kingdom, an absolute and unlimited sacrifice may be demanded."[32] Temple thus incorporates into his interpretation the concept of wider loyalties checking narrower loyalties. The whole irresistibly leads to the idea of the impartial tribunal, which will listen to the claims of rival groups and adjudicate between them in the light of the community's interest.[33] The way of love thus lies not through altruism, but through reasonable claim and just award, in short, through justice.[34] Justice is the true form of love at the level of groups.[35] So long as men are organised in groups with diverging interests, so long must love express itself first in justice.[36] We cannot leave the influence of the Gospel without effect on the vast area of human groups until almost all men are devout Christians. The Christian citizen has to dedicate himself in the power of love to the establishment of justice.[37] An axiom here is that the Gospel fulfils and does not destroy the Law: we must not so respond to the Gospel as to fail to discharge elementary obligations.[38]

(iv) <u>Two different priorities; the necessity of approximation and compromise</u>

Temple's position here involves two kinds of priority. The first is a priority in terms of value. The Christian is a man always eager to rise to the full height of the vision he has been granted in his most exalted spiritual moments. He will judge all he does or attempts by the

highest standards. However, he must reckon with the fact of sin and "work with the material in hand. Men do not love the highest when they see it; they are much more likely to repudiate it with disgust and to crucify or otherwise rid themselves of anyone who proclaims and embodies it."[39] This leads to the second priority, one in terms of indispensability. The most fundamental requirement of a Government is not the expression of love, or even of justice, but that it should supply some reasonable measure of security against murder, robbery and starvation.[40] Internationally a balance of power is indispensable if nations are to co-operate in the tasks of peace.[41] Here, then, the priority is that of securing certain minima. Furthermore, any advance from there will rest on a clear recognition of the factor of sin.[42] The feasible task of governments is to establish a measure of external justice, that is, so to order life that self-interest prompts what justice demands.[43]

All this is plainly a policy of gradual approximation to justice; our task is to mould society so that the nearest practicable approximation to justice is actually established.[44] It is a view which allows of a positive approach to that which falls short of the ideal. For instance, healthy business and commerce are in complete accord with the Christian principle of life. But in fact they are infected with egoism. The Christian businessman is right to compromise. He must have his principles or ideals. In the face of sin, he must neither abandon the ideal, nor compromise to the point where witness to the ideal becomes ineffectual. He must work steadily for the gradual purification of commerce, remaining in the business world. He must not so follow an ideal as to allow himself to be driven from the market; nor must he simply withdraw from business, thus leaving business a prey to men of no ideals.[45]

This view is grounded in an understanding of how nature and grace are related and how God deals with fallen nature. Temple's sacramental Christian philosophy[46] forbade any

bifurcation of nature and grace, as if Church and State rested on totally different principles. It is this which prompts him to detect Manichaeism in the pacifist position, and leads him to use the phrase 'the consecration of force'.[47] Grace is manifest in the order of nature; the Church's principles do have political effects. And even if we say that nature is so fallen as in no way to manifest its maker, the Gospel forbids us to say that God has abandoned it. In fact, we have to distinguish between God's will <u>simpliciter</u> and God's will <u>secundum quid</u>. The world is of God's creation. His will for it, considered absolutely, is that it should correspond to his own nature of holiness and love. In fact the world is corrupted, though not wholly. But we cannot say that where love fails God has no care for what happens except that men should live in a fallen world as if it were not fallen, or behave as if they were not fallen themselves. Rather, God has a purpose with which men who know themselves fallen may co-operate, using their fallen nature as in part the instrument for its own recovery.[48] In other words, in the circumstances God wills compromise, and to refuse to compromise is to fail His cause.[49]

In sum, it is not those who compromise, but those who pursue ideal courses, who are most likely to pay only lip-service to Christian principles. "It is often to be observed that those who in their practice make most progress towards (an ideal) end are those who in speeches or resolutions advocate moderate courses."[50] "Its assertion of Original Sin should make the Church intensely realistic, and conspicuously free from Utopianism."[51]

(v) <u>The two different priorities in Corrective Justice</u>

The tension between the two kinds of priority is evident in Temple's thinking about Corrective Justice, notably in the Clarke Hall Lecture, <u>The Ethics of Penal Action</u> (1934). The essence of punishment, according to Temple, is that it is the reaction of a community against a constituent member. The community has three interests to consider. Priority must go first to the maintenance of

the community's own life and order.[52] To this end retribution and deterrence are the chief means employed by the State. Deterrent penal action is necessary to social well-being. However, it acts on an infra-moral plane. It interferes with the liberty of some citizens in order that the general liberty of all citizens may be the more secure. But it ignores the personal quality of the offender, treating him as a means to the good of others. It does however, whether threatened or actual, have a moral influence. 'To say that you cannot make folk good by Act of Parliament is to utter a dangerous half-truth. You cannot by Act of Parliament make men morally good; but you can by Act of Parliament supply conditions which facilitate the growth of moral goodness and remove conditions which obstruct it." Moreover, deterrence plays on men's sense of shame, which, being rooted in regard for others, has positive moral value. Deterrence is thus indispensable; but it is morally justifiable only if it is subordinate to other forms of penal action.[53]

Retribution is superior to deterrence, because it is more truly moral. It stands for the truth that it is "the first moral duty of the community ... to reassert the broken moral law against the offender who has broken it". It treats the offender as a moral agent (and "to deny individual responsibility is to deny personality"). In the interests both of the community and of the offender "the community must assert its antagonism towards his evil will. Refusal to condone must have priority over forgiveness.[54]

However, the criminal is never only a criminal and nothing else. He is also a human being, and here we reach the need for reformative processes, which are "less indispensable but more positively valuable". Here Temple invokes his Platonic view of human development towards maturity of character, linking it with Christianity: "Every man truly is that which God's eternal knowledge apprehends, and this includes the effects upon him of all

the work of grace. We are not what we appear, but what we are becoming; and if this is what we truly are, no penal system is fully just which treats us as anything else."[55]

Thus on the one hand the interest of the offending member comes last in the community's priorities in terms of indispenability; on the other hand, the priority in terms of value is for the development of the potentiality of the offender within the context of restored relationships with the community.

These ideas on Corrective Justice are, as we have seen, applied by Temple to international relations. Checking the aggressor, setting free the oppressed, underlining the failure of Prussian militarism, establishing checks and balances of power - these are primary tasks.[56] Yet a balance of power is not an end in itself; it is an indispensable foundation for building peace.[57]

Similarly, there is a real place for retributive justice. Towards Hitler and the German people the international community must express its repudiation of their actions.[58] There must be no overlooking of wrong. God, in Christ, does not overlook wrongs. But whereas He takes them into Himself, we do not have the spiritual power to do that. "If we dream of that we deceive ourselves, and the result ... will be a condoning of evil, and that is worse than all".[59] We must lean in the direction of refusal to condone, rather than grant cheap forgiveness.[60] There are, however, two <u>caveats</u>. The first is that retributive justice can easily lapse into vengeance. Hence Temple's criticism of the Versailles Treaty, and his fear of reprisals in the Second World War or a vindictive peace after it.[61] The second <u>caveat</u> is that retribution is not enough. We must look beyond to reformative and to distributive justice.[62] Temple hopes that, in the case of Hitler, restraint and retribution might lead him to a new way of thinking about life and the

claims of others;[63] in the case of the German nation the hope is for conversion and re-education internally, and for a full place in the family of nations.[64] The retributive element must give way to the distributive. This does not mean that past actions would be forgotten in the estimation of justice, though defeat itself would probably be sufficient punishment for Germany;[65] and in any case individuals have long since realised that it is worth forgoing "abstract justice" in order to obtain the benefits of an ordered community.[66] The aim would be a good neighbour policy amongst all; hence Germany must take part on equal terms in negotiations for a permanent settlement.[67] Thus, just as the ultimate priority with the individual offender is his restoration to the community's life and the development of his potential, so the international offender is to be restored to its rightful place in the community of nations, and share in organising the common life for the common good.[68]

(vi) Justice according to need: Temple's personalism

In his book Agape: An Ethical Analysis G. Outka points out that, though everyone agrees that justice is in some sense the rendering to each man of his due, Christian writers on agape and justice do not distinguish very carefully between possible conceptions of justice.[69] Temple never discusses these distinctions. It is, however, clear that his sensitivity to the factor of circumstances would debar him from the purely egalitarian position of "to each the same thing".[70] "Similar treatment for similar cases," on the other hand, with its in-built questioning of privilege, is implicit in Temple's thought. More strikingly, Temple treats "to each according to his deserts" as a lower form of justice than "to each according to his needs".[71] He would no doubt agree with Honoré's dictum: "all men considered merely as men and apart from their conduct or choice have a claim to an equal share in all those things, here called advantages, which are generally desired and are in fact conducive to their well-being."[72]

Here we touch on Temple's personalism. Justice is to be understood in terms of personal life rather than of purely economic wealth.[73] Hence Temple's views on the profit motive and the just price.[74] Hence too the accent on individual freedom, on worker participation in the running of industry,[75] and on more equal educational opportunity,[76] which would include the development of a critical ability to raise questions about the justice of any prevailing social order.[77] Correspondingly paternalism and charity are to be avoided, since they militate against the achievement of justice in this sense.[78]

(vii) <u>The limitations of the quest for justice</u>

Temple's repudiation of utopianism[79] can be elucidated further by asking whether perfect justice could ever be attained. The answer is, of course not.[80] (By perfect justice Temple presumably means a situation where all receive their due according to their needs, without any thought of advancing claims.) We are a very long way from the stage of justice where men are willing to put their claims, arising from their divergent interests, on a level. Beyond that there is the need for groups to be drawn together in an organisation based on their common interest.[81] Even this state should not be confused with the love of which the Gospel speaks. Co-operative justice is in full accord with love, but love is the highest and only quite adequate manifestation of spiritual unity.[82] What is more, perfect justice is a <u>product</u> of perfect love, not a stage on the way to it.[83] "There is little hope that a man will in fact be consistently just, unless he is inspired and upheld by a love which has its source in the love of God."[84] Nothing short of conversion, spiritual discipline and worship of God are required if love and peace are to be secure.[85] Nothing short of an effective universal Church can really cure the egotism of nations.[86] The Christian must therefore be a real Churchman if he is to be an effective citizen.[87] His first concern in relation to others will be conversion, but he will also do what he can to remedy

a defective social system so that the task of conversion may be eased rather than hindered.[88] And, without relenting in his efforts, he must rid himself of "the Pelagian notion that we can 'build' or 'extend' the Kingdom of God, except so far as the proclamation of the Gospel may be the occasion of its extension through the opening of the hearts of men to the manifested love of God ... When the Lord Christ comes it is not to crown our efforts by the establishment of the perfect co-operative commonwealth; it is to 'put down all rule and authority and power', and so, having vanquished all enemies (the last is death), to become subject to the Father, 'that God may be all in all'. In other words, the goal of Christian hope is not any kind of social or political achievement, and its realisation depends on the cancellation of that bond of mortality which is the prime condition of all our endeavours here."[89]

2. Temple's 'change of mind'

In the Guardian of 24 November, 1939 Temple wrote as follows: "I think that it is an open question whether an actual preference by one of the interests of the other over its own is ethically right; but, even if the question is open, it is purely academic; when we reach the stage of justice in the relations between capital and labour or between one nation and another, we shall have moved a very long way. We had better aim at this before we preach corporate self-sacrifice. I used to preach it once; I thereby gained much applause, which I very much enjoyed; but I have long been convinced that such talk is only 'uplift'; it does not affect anything which actually happens. It is a superhuman thing when an individual is lifted above his self-centredness; but the egotism of any corporation except a genuine 'fellowship of the Spirit', is something far more intense than that of an individual, because it enlists in its service alike the idealism and the selfishness of its members. To establish justice here

is an achievement far beyond our present attainment, perhaps beyond our resources."[90]

This looks like the confession of a radical change from ineffectual idealism to dour realism. But the penitent has a twinkle of humour about him. Moreover, enquirers have been unable to detect radical breaks in Temple's philosophical or social thought. J. F. Padgett prefers to speak of shifts of emphasis within the framework of Temple's Christian philosophy.[91] W. G. Peck is able to detect stages in the development of Temple's social thought, but "in moving towards a new position, he seldom lost all contact with the old one. It was the settled, philosophical habit of his mind ever to seek reconciliation between apparently opposed ideas, and this he did with the stages of his own thinking".[92] Peck does not allude to the issue of love and justice; his interpretation of Temple's development reflects his own predilection for the concept of Natural Order. I shall enquire into the accuracy of Temple's depiction of his change of mind. I shall consider this question in three stages.

First, it can easily be shown from the evidence in the first part of this thesis that Temple's position in 1934-1944 was a straight continuation of earlier thought in many respects:

(i) He early recognises the factor of a sinful human order. We are involved in the entanglement of sin, which precludes simple imitation of Christ.[93]

(ii) Narrower loyalties are to be checked by wider loyalties,[94] yet the immense difficulty of citizens in recognising any loyalty wider than the nation is acknowledged.[95]

(iii) Compromise is a necessity. Men must remain involved in sinful society, working out the best course of action in the circumstances.[96]

(iv) The danger of easy-going forgiveness is stressed.[97]

(v) The danger of vindictiveness is a repeated theme: stern retribution after World War I can only lead to another war.[98]

(vi) The hope is for the restoration of Germany after the First World War to the community of nations, and for the pursuit of the highest welfare of all.[99]

(vii) We should deal with men not according to deserts but according to needs, conceived primarily as personal or spiritual and only secondarily as material.[100]

Secondly, although Temple does not write about the relationship of love and justice in the earlier period, what he says about Church and Nation or State reveals that he thought of the former as transcending yet presupposing the latter. This can be illustrated from Church and Nation.[101] The Bible, claims Temple, insists that nations exist by divine appointment, and it looks forward to the inclusion of all nations in the family of nations. Of the nation we can say:

(i) It is a natural growth; it emerges to meet the elementary needs of man, but having emerged it has a spiritual value far beyond this (Temple has in mind here the function of the nation in the growth of culture and of human personality). (ii) The nation's organ of action is the State. Being natural, it appeals to men on that side of their nature which is lower but is not in itself bad. "Justice is its highest aim and force its typical instrument, though force is progressively less employed as the moral sense of the community developments: mercy can find an entrance only on strict conditions". (iii) The State's action is for the most part in the form of restraint; it "is concerned to maintain the highest standard of life that can be generally realised by its citizens".

By contrast, (i) the Church is "a spiritual creation working through a natural medium. Its informing principle is the Holy Spirit of God in Christ, but its members are men and women who are partly animal in nature as well as children of God". (ii) The Church's primary quality is holiness; "mercy will be the chief characteristic of its judgments ..." (iii) The Church's action is mostly in the

form of appeal. It is concerned with upholding an ideal to which not even the best will fully attain.

"Both State and Church are instruments of God for establishing His Kingdom; both have the same goal; but they have different functions in relation to that goal." "Neither State nor Church is itself the Kingdom of God, though the specific life of the Church is the very spirit and power of that Kingdom. Each plays its part in building the Kingdom, in which, when it comes, force will have disappeared, while justice and mercy will coalesce in the perfect love which will treat every individual according to his need."

Here it is plain that in Temple's view the Church has a role transcending that of the State; yet the State is accorded a positive place in the purposes of God. Consistently with this Temple's hope is for a "truly international Church, which shall fully respect the rights of nations and recognise the spiritual function of the State, thereby obtaining the right to direct the national States along the path which leads to the Kingdom of God". The language is rather vague and exalted, but the important point is that all this clearly paves the way for Temple's later formulation of the idea of love as transcending yet presupposing justice. However, we are still left with the third stage, that of seeing whether there are any passages explicitly advocating corporate self-sacrifice. If so, we could say that Temple was inconsistent in his earlier days. His most idealistic period is about 1918-1926, and he uses the terms 'sacrifice' and 'self-sacrifice' in a number of passages concerned with society.

(i) <u>"The Moral Foundation of Peace"</u> (July 1920)[102]

Here it is true Temple calls for forgiveness and self-sacrifice. It is not true, however, that he calls for the preference by Labour of the interests of Capital. He is pleading that men should not fix their thoughts on "abstract justice" based on a spurious notion of absolute moral claims; for this is the level of retribution, and it is

liable to degenerate into vindictiveness. He calls on men to look to the future and to promote the highest general welfare - a policy which involves consideration of consequences ("moral opportunism"). 'Self-sacrifice' and 'forgiveness' here have the peculiar meaning of declining to even scores. 'Judge not' in industrial politics is quite compatible with judgment of consequences! The real trouble with the article is that it fudges the issue of how directly applicable Christian language is to social issues. For it appears to use Christian phrases directly, but actually transcribes their meaning. This probably arises from Temple's proneness to envisage social problems according to the simplistic antithesis of selfishness against selflessness: on the one side the evening of scores and vindictiveness, on the other side co-operation for the common good, with self-sacrifice as the means of transition. This masks the realist strain in Temple. Loose talk of "suffering voluntarily accepted by the innocent" only reinforces the impression that Capital consists of 'baddies', Labour of 'goodies'. Temple had yet to conceive at all sharply the relationship of love and justice and to recognise the strength of group egoism.[103] He had yet to see that between retribution and co-operation there are many gradations in the sphere of claim and counter-claim, and that even co-operation must not be confused with Christian love.

(ii) <u>"Christian Social Principles" (The Pilgrim, April 1923)</u>[104]

is thoroughly confused over self-sacrifice. It is explicitly associated with the Cross, and in exalted rhetoric groups are asked to suffer rather than risk unjust gain. Yet the very same paragraph not only acknowledges a place for force but also cites the heroism of endurance in a strike as an instance of the power of sacrifice. The ambivalent use of Christian language again obscures the fact that there is a world of difference between declining to advance any claim and enduring in the support of a claim. This is true, however just the claim.

(iii) Personal Religion, 12-13. Temple's argument is that a God who was only Creator and Judge might make men just, but this would not be enough to save the world. For the pursuit of justice becomes a vice in disputants, making them defend their self-interest with the passion of a moral crusade. Now the "spirit of ultimate reality" is a God who does not stand above the conflict, awarding to all their due, but is within it, receiving without recrimination what is not his due. His credentials are his pierced hands and side. We must choose between the way of pride and the way of self-sacrifice. The civilisation of Christendom hangs in the balance. Again Temple naively antithesises. He makes no clear distinction between individuals and groups. He is clear about the frequency with which pursuit of justice degenerates into pursuit of self-interest, and about the ultimate antidote. But it is quite obscure whether in the interim we are to eschew all claims, or rather pursue claims, but accept arbitration. At one point the call is for nations to renounce their pride through sacrifice; yet he speaks highly of justice as "the virtue of the judge who stands outside the quarrel and decides between the disputants".

(iv) Personal Religion, 64-65. Temple here spells out the Christian remedy for the ills of society, taking as his point of departure Jesus' reply to a disputant, 'Take heed, and beware of covetousness". The Church cannot provide a ready-made solution to problems which arise between people in an unchristian temper. If disputants say that they do not want to love one another, that they want their rights and then to have no more to do with one another, the Gospel will not help them except by telling them that they are pursuing a false hope. 'They will never be satisfied with any award; and even if they could be assured that what they receive is just, it would bring no lasting satisfaction; for what men's souls really desire is not justice as between people who are indifferent to one another, but love which ends that indifference and unites them in fellowship."

The distinction in Temple's thinking between love and justice is here quite marked. Yet again whether he is advocating the immediate forgoing of rights is not clear. His concern is with the ultimate solution, and he does in the same paragraph write again in a positive way about the qualities of a judge. It is a case of the spotlight being turned on a fundamental solution, not a simple advocacy of corporate self-sacrifice.

(v) Personal Religion, 68. Temple contrasts the victory of pride won by force over beaten enemies, and the victory of love, won by sacrifice over enemies who are thereby converted into friends. The latter is the only sort of victory God cares to win, and progress can only come in His way. Here Temple does advocate corporate self-sacrifice. For he makes the contrast in an exposition of the principle of sacrifice, which is offered along with the other three social principles, as "capable of, and demanding, application to the.structure of society".

Our answer to the question, Did Temple change his mind in the way he claims? is therefore Yes, but a very qualified Yes. (i) It is rare to find unambiguous advocacy of corporate self-sacrifice in the sense of a policy of heedless altruism as against the pursuit of justice. (ii) He does, however, write as if Christianity were directly applicable to social issues, whilst altering the meaning of Christian phrases in the process, and he operates with a vague antithesis between selfishness and selflessness. This obscures necessary distinctions, especially between sacrifice within the sphere of claims and sacrifice as heedlessness of one's rights. When Temple did draw the distinctions later, he rightly realised he had shifted his position, but the nature of that shift is rather misleadingly depicted. The transition is actually an emancipation from the opaqueness of the Anglican social ethics in which Temple was reared[105] into the more bracing atmosphere of Reinhold Niebuhr. Niebuhr's onslaught on

American liberals who thought love a simple possibility in a sinful world drove Temple to confess to a crime of which he was not unambiguously guilty. His incautious employment of Christian phrases creates the impression that he too is a naive liberal. Yet his alteration of their meaning reveals the pull of the realist strain in his thinking which we have seen to be present, in varying degrees, at all stages of his thought, most obviously in his handling of the questions of pacifism and peace.

Two points remain to be noted in the social ethics of the late period: first, that Temple deleted the principle of sacrifice from the four social principles;[106] and secondly that he went on using the word sacrifice in the clear sense of 'endurance in the cause of justice', i.e. in the sphere of claims.[107]

3. Temple and Niebuhr

We are thus brought to the question of the relationship of Temple to Niebuhr over the issue of love and justice. I shall concentrate on the points of divergence, and go on to consider their significance, especially in terms of Temple's background. There are two closely related points which deserve detailed attention. Naturally I quote only from works of Niebuhr written before 1944.

(a) Niebuhr construes <u>agape</u> essentially as <u>self-sacrifice</u> in contrast to mutual love (<u>eros</u>) which always has the root of selfishness in it.[108] It is true that he does speak of love in terms of mutuality: "the law of (man's) nature is love, a harmonious relation of life to life in obedience to the divine centre and source of his life".[109] But that is an ultimate state, and Niebuhr's preoccupation is with the confrontation of that law of love with this fallen world. Heedless, uncalculating love must entail self-sacrifice in this life. 'The perfect disinterestedness

of the divine love can have a counterpart in history only in a life which ends tragically because it refuses to participate in the claims and counterclaims of historical existence. It portrays a love 'which seeketh not its own'. But a love which seeketh not its own is not able to maintain itself in historical society."[110]

(b) This means that it is impossible to construct a social ethic out of the ideal of love in its pure form. Yet if Niebuhr denies direct applicability of the law of love to the world of contending claims he also denies its irrelevance. The law of love has a transcendent eschatological reference which is related <u>dialectically</u> to this life.[111] First, love and justice are plainly not identical; for love is heedless and sacrificial, whereas justice is discriminating and concerned with balancing interests and claims.[112] Love <u>fulfils</u> justice: it goes beyond the general provision for need prompted by a sense of justice to meet the other man's particular needs.[113] "Love is the end term of any system of morals. It is the moral requirement in which all schemes of justice are fulfilled ... because the obligation of life to life is more fully met in love than is possible in any scheme of equity and justice".[114] Secondly, love <u>requires</u> the pursuit of justice. Justice is not alien to love; it is the way in which love must find expression in complex human relations.[115] But thirdly, love <u>negates</u> justice because "love makes an end of the nicely calculated less and more of structures of justice. It does not carefully arbitrate between the needs of the self and of the other, since it meets the needs of the other without concern for the self".[116] Whatever our achievements in the realm of justice, they always stand under the judgment of love. The laws of justice, since they take sinful self-interest for granted, "are therefore always in danger of throwing the aura of moral sanctity" upon that sinful self-interest. "They must consequently stand under the criticism of the law of love."[117] "There is no justice, even in a sinful world, which can be regarded as finally normative. The higher possibilities of love, which at once

is the fulfilment and the negation of justice, always hover over every system of justice."[118] Love is not only "the source of the norms of justice" but also the "ultimate perspective by which their limitations are discovered".[119] Yet love also redeems what remains incomplete and distorted by sin. It is in this sense too that love fulfils justice.[120] Now there is obviously much overlap between Temple and Niebuhr here. But on the central questions of whether agape is essentially self-sacrifice and whether the relation between love and justice is dialectical, there is a divergence. Unfortunately Temple does not discuss either issue or exhibit a position as co-ordinated as Niebuhr's.

In his social ethics the dominant note in Temple's understanding of love is mutuality.[121] This is evident in his preoccupation with fellowship. The goal for Temple is a world completely in fellowship with God and completely at harmony with itself. The restoration of the offender to the fellowship of his society, the resolution of conflict between Capital and Labour, the creation of a true community of nations under the guidance of a truly ecumenical Church - at every point mutuality is the goal, and also the criterion for each step along the road.

It should not be supposed that this reflects Temple's neglect of the idea of sacrifice in his theology. We could say with some accuracy that he belongs to those who look on sacrifice as subordinate to God's will for mutuality. But it would be truer to say that Temple's understanding of sacrifice is so wide as virtually to merge with mutuality. "Sacrifice is not always painful; that depends on the response. The form of sacrifice is that one chooses for love's sake to do or to suffer what apart from love one would not have chosen to do or to suffer ... Sacrifice expressing a love that is returned can be such joy as is not otherwise known to men."[122] Underlying this language are Temple's doctrines of God and of the Eucharist. First, there is the complete mutuality of self-giving within the

Godhead: "God loves; God answers with love; and the love wherewith God loves and answers is God: Three Persons, One God".[123] Secondly, he insists on the importance of the doctrine of the Eucharistic Sacrifice. Drawing on Bishop Hicks's The Fullness of Sacrifice, he stresses that the essence of animal sacrifice was not the killing of the victim but the offering of the life, which in its acceptance by God is lifted from its earthly limitations into full association with God in Heaven. 'But full self-giving is precisely that of which we are least capable ... What I cannot do in and for myself, Christ has done for me and will do in me. He offers his life - the life of perfect love expressed in the uttermost self-sacrifice - that I may receive it as my own, and in its power I become able to give myself more completely to God."[124] Thus if agape is construed primarily as mutuality, it must also be construed essentially as sacrifice. For any expression of mutuality is sacrifice. Indeed, precisely what is new in the Christian doctrine of God is the idea that self-sacrifice is integral to the Godhead, revealed to man in the agony of the Cross. Temple admits that even his beloved Plato could not rise to a vision of the excellence of sacrifice.[125]

It is very questionable whether this view, whatever its intention, can really do justice, as Niebuhr does, to the centrality of the Cross as revealing both the costly love of God and the depth of man's rebellion. Niebuhr sees the Cross as permanently relevant to the affairs of men, exposing their contradiction to the law of love and their limitations. Temple creates the impression that the Cross is only intermittently relevant, when mutuality breaks down. This is accentuated in the social ethics. For in response to Niebuhr, so far from putting agape as heedless and sacrificial at the centre, Temple expunges sacrifice from his social principles, presumably because it did not properly apply to groups (though he does go on using the term in appeals for self-discipline in prosecution of war).[126] Fellowship then dominates even

more as a social principle, acting in the realm of justice as a counterpart and anticipation of complete mutuality in the realm of love. Indeed, his interpretation of 'Love your neighbour as yourself' appears almost to accommodate love to the world of claims.[127] Put another way, Temple's eschatology is too much a realised one, whereas Niebuhr's preserves a far better sense of the Interim.[128]

A direct consequence of this is that Temple does not see love and justice in a fully dialectical relationship. True, there are instances of a radical negation of our attempts at justice: all our efforts stand condemned as sinful; concern for justice may be no more than self-interest in decent habiliments.[129] As early as 1914 he stresses the inability of men and nations to live by the law of Christ, and quotes the text of Paul which was later a favourite of Niebuhr: "Wretched man that I am, who will deliver me from the body of this death?"[130] But these are insufficient to overcome the prevailing impression of a smooth upward movement of infinite gradations, starting from total selfishness and working up to a point where perfect love and perfect justice coincide. In the last period of his life Temple more and more alludes to the distance we are from perfection, but that only makes the road longer. He does tell the famous tale of the Irishman's reply to the question about the way to Roscommon, but this does not mean Temple sees love as the negation of justice.[131] Robert Craig is quite right in his penetrating remarks on the views of Temple, Brunner, and Niebuhr about love and justice. Temple and Niebuhr are right against Brunner in insisting that though love transcends justice, justice is never obsolete. Brunner is too ready to effect a bi-furcation of love and justice - though this is not a consistent position.[132] Craig thinks "Niebuhr succeeds where both Temple and Brunner fail in his insistence on the dialectical relationship of love to justice".[133] Temple, he thinks, sees "smooth continuity between justice and love, between state and Church".[134] He asks, "Can the

problem of the 'Two Cities' really be solved by saying that there is a simple convergence of duties for the Christian citizen in his dual capacity (as a citizen and a Churchman)?" Temple speaks too easily of the way of love lying through justice, too little of the tension in the soul of the Christian citizen.[135] It is Brunner's merit that he stresses the paradoxical nature of the State: it stands for and realises the Creator's purpose of community; it creates through coercion a disciplinary order; it is "an illegitimate, unjust, merely factual, selfish, grasping, almost daemonic exercise of power".[136] Craig rightly believes that Temple failed "to insist sufficiently on the sin and contradiction of love inherent in political organisation".[137] His phrase "the consecration of force" is an indication of his deficiency at this point.[138] So too is his talk of a "line of true adjustment" over pacifism. The power of pacifism's claim on all men is a good deal stronger than the phrase "personal pacifism" implies, because of the ambiguous nature of political institutions.[139]

Once again, in Temple's own theological thinking there is much which he could have advanced towards remedying the deficiency. In Nature, Man and God he does write of the radical nature of sin. "It is truly said that 'our righteousnesses are filthy rags'. We totally misconceive alike the philosophic and the practical problem of evil if we picture it as the winning of control over lawless and therefore evil passions by a righteous but insufficiently powerful reason or spirit. It is the spirit which is evil; it is the reason which is perverted; it is aspiration itself which is corrupt." [140] Man becomes "the centre and criterion of his own system of values, which he is quite unfit to be".[141] Man is self-assertive against the light; and because imagination is so potent to stimulate desire, there is an additional impulse to self-assertive acts.[142] The cure is for men to become God-centred - and only the grace of God can achieve this.[143]

Temple's view on sin may have its weakness, but there are signs of a radical position which could have been given greater articulation within his social ethics, thus stressing love's judgmental 'No' to man's justice and so providing a dialectical understanding of the relationship of love and justice. It is also important to notice another feature of Temple's doctrine of God which would also have the same effect. For Temple the heart of the Gospel lies in John 3.16, "God so loved the world that He gave ..."[145]

> Yet he is well aware that if we let the term love, as we naturally understand it, supply the whole meaning of the term God, we are in danger of thinking of love as mere amiability. The note of God's Majesty and Holiness is vital. The omission of that note defeats its own object, "for it belittles the Love it seeks to enhance". If our first thought of God is that He always has a welcome for us, there is less thrill of wonder in that welcome than if we first remember His Eternity and Holiness, and then pass to the confident conviction, which remains a mystery commanding silent awe - 'Our fellowship is with the Father'.[146]

I cannot find within Temple's social ethics, in spite of his repeated insistence on fellowship with God (and with man), any idea of its preposterousness or inconceivability. Yet it is profoundly biblical. Vriezen's <u>An Outline of Old Testament Theology</u> rests on the twin data of the Majesty of God, and yet His mysterious will to enter into communion with Man.[147] St. Paul's talk of union with Christ is inseparable from the amazement that God should decline to annihilate mankind 'shut up in disobedience' and should justify the ungodly.[148] The St. John who stresses union with Christ portrays a Christ of Majesty.[149] It is not that Temple is blind to this - far from it. My query is whether any adequate <u>social ethic</u> can afford to leave it out.[150] In addition it is important to notice how selectively Temple deploys his thinking on love and justice. The application is almost entirely restricted to the field of international relations. By far the weakest account of love and justice in Temple is in <u>Christianity</u>

and Social Order, written with British society in mind as a counterpart to Bishop Bell's Christianity and World Order. Here Temple takes the critical decision not to employ a basic framework of love and justice, but to work up what he had been saying since 1923 about social principles and policies. Love and justice are very vaguely related to that as regulative principles.[151] In my judgment Temple's social ethics would have been stronger had he done the reverse, i.e. built on the insights I have mentioned to place a dialectical understanding of love and justice at its foundation and then set the social principles of Christianity and Social Order in relation to that. I shall pick up this point in my Conclusion (Chapter VIII).

In order to understand Temple here, it is necessary to look historically at his place in Anglican social ethics. First, there is the tradition of Anglican moral theology going back to Hooker and Aquinas. The standard treatment is to take love as a theological virtue, justice as a cardinal virtue. The assumption is that they are separate, but quite compatible. The requirements of justice are determinable by reason. Love is a supernatural virtue, which is added to the work of reason.[152] This is far removed from Niebuhr. As G. Harland points out, Niebuhr never defines justice, precisely because it is to be understood only as it stands in a dialectical relationship to love.[153] Temple draws very little explicitly on traditional Anglican moral theology;[154] but he too assumes that love and justice are quite compatible, and although he never defines justice, except cursorily, he implies that the meaning of justice is determinable without reference to love.[155]

Secondly, although Temple plainly recognises the dislocation of a sinful order, his philosophical training creates the impression that there is nothing problematical about determining our duty bar the calculation of consequences. He tells us that the rightness of most acts is

relative and not absolute; but if an act is right in the circumstances it is absolutely right.[156] This is a sign of mental agility, but it lacks the profundity of Niebuhr's dialectics. It is a symptom of the fact that he grew up in the British Hegelian tradition. He was educated at Balliol, T. H. Green's College, and revered the Master, Edward Caird. Herein lies the key to his response to Niebuhr. Henry Scott Holland once said of T. H. Green, 'He gave us back the language of self-sacrifice and taught us how we belonged to one another in the one life of organic humanity. He filled us again with the breath of high idealism".[157] Temple met Scott Holland when he was still a boy and they become close associates in many activities, including their work for the Christian Social Union.[158] In fact the atmosphere of the C.S.U. was heavily dependent on the inspiration of Green, although he died several years before it was conceived.[159] Green restored the ideas of self-denial and self-sacrifice through his criticism of utilitarianism. He believed that all forms of utilitarianism involved their adherents in a conflict between their logical premises and their philanthropic motives. Practically, it was vain to suppose that egoistic hedonism could be transmuted into altruistic hedonism. Green substituted a doctrine of self-sacrifice in the interest of altruism. He was passionately concerned for social reform, and he was highly sensitive to the needs of his contemporaries who found their faith crumbling and looked for a secular outlet for their impulses to altruism and disciplined sacrifice which their believing parents had inculcated into them. His own conviction seemed to resolve the conflicts of faith and of utilitarianism, and provide new certainty.[160] We need to see the call for sacrifice within the framework of his philosophy. I shall drawn on M. Richter to pick out those features which are relevant to our enquiry.

(i) Green believed that he had incorporated all that was valid in Christianity into his philosophy. Belief involved no sacrifice of reason. Philosophy was to be the

arbiter between science and religion, showing there was no inherent conflict or even competition between them. Richter writes, "Green deliberately chose to seek the rationale of religious belief in philosophy. He believed that he had found in Philosophical Idealism a profound method which enabled him to translate the language of Christianity without losing its true meaning".[161]

(ii) He abandoned the doctrine of God's transcendence for a doctrine of God's immanence, i.e. God as the constitutive principle of the universe. In men God is immanent in the sense of being the principle of reason and morality. Green notes men's consciousness of the difference between their actual self and their higher or possible self (or conscience). The latter he identified with God. God is also immanent in the institutions, aspirations and customs of men. Thus the formative principle of society too is divine.[162]

(iii) Green intends his understanding of the self and God to be taken in a teleological sense. His is a philosophy of realisation. As Green himself put it: "God is identical with the self of every man in the sense of being the realisation of its determinate possibilities, the completion of that which, as merely in it, is incomplete and therefore unreal; that in being conscious of himself man is conscious of God, and thus knows that God is ..."[163] This must mean, as Richter says, that man realises himself by being conscious of his higher or 'better' self and by the effort to make that self real, i.e. to make his actual character identical with the idea he has of his 'better' self. Similarly there is a social realisation; Green has a theory of progress. He links man and society by saying that man's consciousness of God "has in manifold forms been the moralising agent in human society, nay, the formative principle of that society itself. The existence of specific duties and the recognition of them, the spirit of self-sacrifice, the moral law ... all no doubt presuppose society; but society, of a kind to render them possible, ... implies

the action in man of a principle in virtue of which he projects himself into the future ... as some more perfect being than he actually is, and thus seeks not merely to satisfy momentary wants but to become 'another man', to become more nearly as this more perfect being."[164]

(iv) Since God is identical with the higher self of individual men, it is not surprising that Green claims that God realises Himself progressively in men and society. God's revelation is understood as taking place in human consciousness and issuing in "the institutions by which our elementary moralisation is brought about". God realises Himself in the world by making real his spirit in human institutions, customs and laws. And the realisation takes place through the idea of human perfection.[165]

(v) This philosophy thus focuses on the development of character to its perfection. In Green the accent goes more on the struggle of mankind to perfection than on the fulfilment of the process. As asceticism, self-sacrifice, devotion to the cause, are the virtues, so the essence of sin is selfishness. He seems to have thought there was nothing problematical about the source of the difficulties of the spiritual life. He particularly castigates "refined self-indulgence, from habits of luxury and indolence, and from nameless desires after all things sweet and pleasant". The eradication of these sins "may be the work of years: but once let the higher resolve be in force and the discipline of life will gradually neutralise or transmute the passions which thwart the single mind".[166]

(vi) It is hardly surprising that Green had difficulty with the concept of sin once he had equated God and the higher self. He found the notion of original sin barbaric, and once remarked of a man feeling an acute sense of being wicked, "Poor fellow, the sense of Sin is very much an illusion. People are not as bad as they fancy themselves". Equally Green, like Hegel, sees evil as necessary to good. Indeed Richter claims that in effect Green's answer to the problem of evil is to deny its existence.[167]

(vii) Green thus shares Hegel's belief that reality is spiritual, systematic and rational. His philosophy has no room for paradoxes. Green accepted Hegel's view that the purpose of philosophy is to synthesise and reconcile all aspects of human life by showing its ultimate purpose and goal.[168] If he criticised utilitarianism, he wanted to incorporate its partial truth into a higher synthesis.[169] His method was always to comprehend rather than to exclude.[170] Of Christianity itself he wrote that its glory "is not that it excludes but that it comprehends; not that it came of a sudden into the world, or that it is given complete in a particular institution, or can be stated complete in a particular form of words, but that it is the expression of a common spirit, which is gathering together all things in one".[171] The mentality of Green is caught by his brother-in-law J. A. Symonds who had read his lay sermon on faith: "The first thing that struck me ... was what M. Arnold would call the urbanity of your tone - the ἐπιείκεια with which you enter into divers points of view, setting Reason, Faith, Science, Religion, Ethics, and even passionate revolt, in their right relations, shedding light upon them in their several places, and bringing out their contours and their harmony."[172]

In his Ethics Green says he can find "no such thing really as a conflict of duties". Social progress consists in a widening and deepening of the range of moral responsibility - from a narrow circle to all men qua men, and from lesser obligations to an obligation to seek a richer and fuller good. "Given the idea of a common good and of self-determined participators in it ... the tendency of the idea in the minds of all capable of it must be to include, as participators of the good, all who have dealings with each other and who can communicate as 'I' and 'Thou'. It is rather the retardation of the acceptance of the theory that the historian has to explain; its retardation by those private interests which have made it inconvenient for powerful men and classes to act upon it."

The obstacles to a universal society are again identified as selfishness, remediable by an act of will. 'Where the selfishness of man has proposed his better reason has disposed."[173] The fact that the same principles of reason operate in man and in society means that ultimate conflict is impossible. 'Thus in the conscientious citizen of modern Christendom reason without and reason within, reason as objective and reason as subjective, reason as the better spirit of the social order in which he lives and reason as his loyal recognition and interpretation of that spirit - these being but different aspects of one and the same reality, which is the operation of the divine mind in man - combine to yield both the judgment, and obedience to the judgment, which we variously express by saying that every person has an absolute value; that humanity in the person of every one is always to be treated as an end, never merely as a means; that in the estimate of that well-being which forms the true good every one is to count for one, and no one for more than one; that every one has a 'suum' which every one else is bound to render him."[174]

Green died young in 1882. His influence, already great, was at its height in the period between his death and the outbreak of the First World War - the very period when Temple, born in 1881, grew to manhood.[175] This was especially so at Balliol through the eminent Caird, to whom Temple acknowledged his great debt.[176] No one merely accepted Green's philosophy. The metaphysics, the ethics and the political theory were all reinterpreted in very divergent ways. Most Christian admirers insisted on the transcendence of God.[177] Temple saw his prime task in Nature, Man and God to argue for the 'transcendence of the immanent'.[178] In social ethics he did not simply repeat Green, but he had certain permanent dispositions which reflected his cast of mind. First, he tended to assume that reality could be rationally comprehended. Even after 1939, when he recognised the difficulty of making sense of the world, he still sought for a map of life and looked for

the eventual resumption of the metaphysical task.[179] This is in sharp contrast to Niebuhr, who stresses man's capacity for self-transcendence, which means that he cannot be fitted into any wholly rational scheme, but can be understood only by reference to the transcendent agape of God. It is this agape which through the revelation in Christ clarifies for the man of faith the meaning of history, which is otherwise opaque.[180] Secondly, Richter writes of the Lux Mundi group that they believed that the great forces operating in modern culture were beneficent and ought to be regarded as the fulfilment of Christianity - especially democracy and the new kind of citizenship it made possible in a State moralised by the values immanent in Christian teaching.[181] Temple, as their heir, tended towards this benign view of Britain. He also understood sin as essentially selfishness, to which the antidote was self-sacrifice in the pursuit of a cause. He found it difficult to give adequate weight to Niebuhr's point that man's capacity for relationship with God is one and the same as his capacity for corruption; that love is not a strategy of success but enters history to be crucified; that love will always stand in partial contradiction to man's achievements of justice.[182] The net result is that Temple is inclined to overrate the importance of ideas and underplay the recalcitrant facts of power and interest. His practice of Hegelian dialectics[183] led him prematurely to ease moral ambiguities and conflicts and to assume that the interests of the fndividual and society are capable of harmony. By contrast Niebuhr's dialectics highlight the continuous tensions. He is strongly aware of the inadequacy of rational suasion, since men so readily subordinate reason to interest, and of the corresponding need for power to be opposed by countervailing power for the furtherance of justice.[184]

In short, Temple could only partially accommodate Niebuhr, given that his own social ethics was shaped in a highly liberal optimistic framework which made no clear differentiation between the sphere of love and the sphere

of claims. It is not at all surprising that he found the greatest difficulty with the idea that love negates justice. His writing on love and justice is impressive, but it still falls short of Niebuhr.

CHAPTER V

PRINCIPLES AND NATURAL LAW

Temple's most characteristic approach to social issues is set out in Christianity and Social Order. Professor Ronald Preston says it is a summary of views he had held in general for most of his working life, and the present study amply bears that out.[1] In it he defends the Church's right and duty to 'interfere' or 'intervene' in social issues: the supposition of completely separate spheres of religion and politics, economics and so on, is a modern aberration. He states clearly the limits of the Church's competence: 'The Church must announce Christian principles and point out where the existing social order at any time is in conflict with them. It must then pass on to Christian citizens, acting in their civic capacity, the task of re-shaping the existing order in closer conformity to the principles. For at this point technical knowledge may be required and judgments of practical expediency are always required."[2] The book is thus an answer to critics (who included Christians) and an encouragement to Christians to tackle social issues, by showing them how this can be done, how far they can expect the guidance of the Church and agreement among Christians, and where they must expect doubt and disagreement as they necessarily press on towards specific policies and action. Temple here offers a method, which moves from (i) Primary Christian social principles (the sub-headings 'God and His Purpose', 'Man: His Dignity, Tragedy and Destiny', indicate these are summary Christian doctrine) to (ii) three derivative

Christian social principles (the dignity and freedom of the individual, social fellowship, service). On this basis (iii) a critique is then made of contemporary British society and six broad objectives (middle axioms) are outlined which Christians should urge upon the Government. This is as far as the Church can go. (iv) The Appendix, so named to mark that we are now beyond the boundary of the Church's competence, explores a programme that a Christian might possibly support to attain those objectives. On the way Temple offers us content of various kinds; he appeals to specific texts of scripture; to broad Christian doctrine; to Christian reflection in history, including Natural Law; and he draws on several non-theological writers from Plato to Peter Drucker for views on man, the state, politics and economics. A more complete view of Temple's ideas can be acquired by reading Citizen and Churchman, Christianity and the State, and his earlier Church and Nation. Descriptions of these general views can be found in the work of J. F. Fletcher, Robert Craig, Jack F. Padgett, and W. R. Rinne.[3]

My own concern is to set out the fundamentals of Temple's approach within an exercise which will relate it to the international tradition of Christian social ethics. Temple's immediate Anglican context is that tradition of social concern, incarnational and sacramental, which goes back through Gore and Westcott to Maurice and Ludlow, and they in turn were recovering ground lost since the 16th and 17th centuries. Temple's debt to liberal catholicism, and especially to Charles Gore, was immense.[4] It is therefore not surprising that he was influenced by the predominantly Anglo-Catholic Christendom Group to show an interest in Natural Law and Natural Order. Rather than pursue an insular exercise, I shall compare Temple directly with the Roman Catholic tradition of Natural Law as it stood in his day. This fits with Temple's own (and the present-day) ecumenical outlook. He was well read in Aquinas,[5] and also spoke approvingly of Leo XIII's

encyclical Rerum Novarum.[6] Iremonger tells us of a joint committee of the Anglican and Free Church 'Religion and Life Movement' and the Roman Catholic 'Sword of the Spirit' which was set up in Temple's last years to unite Christians in common social action on the basis of Natural Law and moral theology.[7] Temple himself, in spite of his keen sense of the differences between the Roman and Anglican Churches, planned a personal approach to the Vatican, hoping that Roman and Anglican theologians might undertake a joint study of Natural Law as the basis for Christian living. The idea had to be abandoned.[8] I shall compare Temple with two contemporaries. First there is Heinrich Rommen. He offers us, in The Natural Law, a thorough study in a traditional mould, reminding us that classically Natural Law involves an epistemology, and concepts about fact and value, man, the state and law, as well as the more specific content which gives us guidance over social issues.[9] The book has the imprimatur, and is highly regarded by no less an authority than Professor A. P. d'Entrèves.[10] Rommen is of additional interest because, as a Roman Catholic layman trained in law and involved in social action, he fell foul of Hitler.[11] His position was therefore no mere academic one, but was put to the test. The other contemporary is the eminent Frenchman Jacques Maritain, to whom Temple himself refers approvingly.[12] I shall draw on Maritain where he offers a perspective distinct from Rommen's. We shall find that there are considerable resonances between Temple and these two men, especially Maritain. This does not, of course, mean that Temple's position was derived from theirs. The affinity is readily intelligible when we reflect that the Anglican Church has a strong sense of continuity with the pre-Reformation Western Church.

As a preliminary I shall look at Temple's own handling of Natural Law - what he drew from it and what value he saw in it. This will be short, since it only played a small part in Temple's thinking. Finally, arising out of the

comparison, I shall offer three sets of reflections of an evaluative kind in the light of more recent Christian social thought.

A. Temple's handling of Natural Law

It was only in the last five years of his life that Temple was noticeably interested in the long-standing Catholic tradition of Natural Law. His own (unexplained) preference is for the term Natural Order, which corresponds to the scholastic concept of ordo rerum.[13] Where the term Natural Law appears it is always with that of Natural Order.[14] Temple makes no distinction between them and they are obviously treated as interchangeable.

Temple tells us that earlier Christian thinkers "did not mean by (Natural Law) a generalisation from a large number of observed phenomena, which is what a modern scientist means; they meant the proper function of a human activity as apprehended by a consideration of its own nature".[15] This is the view he follows. To consider the Natural Order is to consider "the various departments of life in the light of the essential function of each".[16] He is presumably using the word 'essential' here in the scholastic sense of 'true' or 'proper' with its teleological associations.[17] There is a proper place for the various activities of men and a proper relationship between them "according to the best service which can be given to the life of the whole". Temple associates this with Plato's principle of Justice.[18] For the Christian this Natural Order is God's order;[19] the Natural Law is God's law.[20] This is so because God is the Creator.[21] More precisely, when we truly perceive the Natural Order we see it as it exists in the mind of God.[22]

The Natural Order "can be in very large measure ascertained without any conscious reference to God".[23] Its discovery is "a task for human reason," which involves

"observing the generally accepted standards of judgment" and "consideration of the proper functions of whatever is the subject of enquiry".[24] It is totally obscure how Temple sees the relationship of these two exercises. It is tempting to see a contrast: one as inductive or experiential, the other as deductive or a priori. Two pages later he praises Natural Law for combining the ideal and the practical, on the grounds it helps us to frame a conception of the proper status of an activity in the light of its social function.[25] I think Temple intends no more than this: first, that there is a general wisdom to be presupposed in the actual social standards of one's day;[26] and secondly, that these cannot be assumed to be entirely right, and need to be scrutinised by a higher standard. It would be rash to assume from the little Temple says that this higher standard is to be known a priori. He probably thought there was a rough fit between the process of discovering Natural Law and the dialectical process he adopted from Edward Caird of arguing in a circle, that is, of moving, not purely inductively or deductively, but by the construction of an ever-growing systematic apprehension of the world, wherein theory and fact illuminate each other.[27] That it was only a rough fit will become apparent later when we come to the question of essences or universals.[28]

What more specific ideas did Temple draw from Natural Law? First, he considered Natural Law socially important because it focussed on the question of means and ends. "Many of the troubles of the modern world come from the confusion of means and ends. St. Thomas vindicates the saying of St. Augustine that omnis humana perversitas est uti fruendis et frui utendis by pointing out that lex aeterna primo et principaliter ordinat hominem ad finem".[29] The true ends of human life for Temple are "religion, art, science, and above all, happy human relationships".[30] The only real progress "is the development of personality in fellowship".[31] A man is both individual and social - hence Temple's concern with social function[32] and service to the life of the whole.[33] Furthermore, man is a part of

the system of nature, whatever else he may be beside. It is "fundamental to sanity" to co-operate with the natural process, not to exploit it.[34]

Temple also draws from Natural Law certain applications (most of which we have met earlier) of these fundamentals to spheres of human life. (i) Production exists primarily for consumption, i.e. it exists to meet human needs; it is not to be regulated by the profit obtainable for the producer.[35] (ii) The rights of property are defended yet set within limits, "a most wholesome doctrine much needed in our day, avoiding as it does the unsocial outlook of the individualist and the socialist's check upon initiative".[36] (iii) Landowners should administer their land for the common good, not for their own profit.[37] (iv) Money exists to facilitate the exchange of goods, and is not to be manipulated for gain.[38] (v) The doctrines of the Just Price and the Prohibition of Usury forbid the exploitation of another's need.[39] (vi) Man must co-operate with the natural processes, not exploit them or destroy natural beauty for his own immediate advantage.[40]

Temple makes it plain that St. Thomas Aquinas cannot simply be reproduced in the changed conditions of the modern world. Nonetheless, "in his conception of property and in the principles which underlie the doctrine of the Just Price and the Prohibition of Usury, I am convinced that St. Thomas offers exactly what the modern world needs".[41] Obviously he thought that St. Thomas' principles corresponded very closely with his own.

The significance of Natural Law for Temple is that "it holds together two aspects of truth which it is not easy to hold in combination - the ideal and the practical".[42] This point is inseparable from the issue of ends and means. Negatively Temple is ruling out two positions: first, Utopianism ("either we start from a purely ideal conception, and then we bleat fatuously about love"); secondly, pure pragmatism ("or else we start from the world as it is with

the hope of remedying an abuse here or there, and then we have no general direction or criterion of progress"). Natural Law, by contrast, demands attention both to ends and to means. It requires that personal life, family life, cultural development, human fellowship, be seen as the true ends; that production exists for consumption. But it is also true that "a conditio sine qua non is more indispensable to an undertaking than its goal". The economic is more indispensable than the cultural: if men starve they can neither write poetry nor enjoy it; if there is no profit, production will cease. In a similar way freedom is a finer thing than order, but order is more indispensable than freedom. Because it insists that we see the actual activities of men in concrete societies in the light of their proper social function, Temple believes Natural Law offers a wise via media between the conservative temperament which tends to dwell on what is indispensable and the radical which dwells on the higher ends of life. It enables men "to grasp the vital importance of safeguarding what is indispensable while we fulfil the obligation of reaching out towards the higher ends as yet imperfectly attained". Again Temple sees a correspondence between fundamentals of Natural Law and his own position.

B. Temple, Rommen and Maritain

1. Temple shares with Thomism a realist epistemology. According to Rommen[43] Thomistic philosophy asserts that man perceives individual things by means of the intellect and the senses.[44] The world exists independently of its being apprehended.[45] Apprehension is of the world. Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu: the senses are the gateway through which reality passes. Sense perception is transformed into knowledge by the operation of the intellect. It is the object which is the measure of truth: "true cognition is the agreement of the thing as known with the object of knowledge, the thing itself". The priority of the object over the subject is

thus maintained. This fundamental position is asserted by Rommen against, for example, Kant who, in default of a realist epistemology, had to resort to postulates which have their foundation subjectively in the mind.[46]

Temple also has a realist epistemology. For him the irreducible basis of all thought is the subject-object relationship.[47] He registers agreement with von Hügel on this point.[48] The context is his lecture on "The Cartesian Faux-pas". For centuries before Descartes it was not disputed that, broadly speaking, we have knowledge of real objects.[49] Descartes' starting point could logically issue only in solipsism.[50] Kant's attempt to reconcile the two resulting streams of thought, the rationalist (Spinoza and Leibniz) and the empiricist (Locke, Berkeley, and Hume), could not succeed; "for he never discarded the fatal Cartesian hypothesis that the mind deals directly not with objects known throughout as objects, but with its own ideas which have to be related to the real world by a special act".[51] Apprehension of the external world is not by way of construction and inference.[52] Temple draws on philosophy inspired by science to support the view that the world antedates apprehension of it.[53] Our apprehension is of process.[54] Science can tell us how this apprehension develops in the growing human mind from rudimentary consciousness to that full consciousness which includes cognition.[55] Temple believes this picture makes a nonsense of the idea that we first know sensations and then build them up into a system. "I must regard as completely fallacious all theories of Perception which start with a so-called <u>sensum</u> as the object of immediate apprehension ... The initial and permanent fact is the organism in interaction with the environment ... What it apprehends is the real world."[56] He recognises the problem of misinterpretation, but declines to dwell on it.[57]

Temple develops in his own way the view that in true cognition there is a correlation of mind with the world it apprehends. He believes this to be fundamental to science.[58]

"Mind and the world are found to be akin in such a sense that valid mental processes lead to verifiable results."[59] This notion of the kinship of Mind and Reality is a vital plank in the argument of Part I of Nature, Man and God.[60] Further, in the subject-object relation priority must go to the objective in the pursuit of truth. The joy of the mind lies not in its own discovery but in what it discovers. "Moreover, those in whom this experience is deepest and keenest are unwilling to speak of enjoyment or satisfaction. Truth to them appears as something august, making claim to their allegiance even while they do not as yet know what it is. The recognition by the finite mind of that which is akin to it in its world, is also a recognition that this which is akin is yet remote, to be served rather than possessed."[61] Temple is obliged on this point to part company with English Hegelians who gave an epistemological priority to the subject in the subject-object relation; for in that case man would have priority over God in his knowledge of God.[62]

Temple and Rommen are therefore basically at one. There is however a marked difference of atmosphere: whereas Rommen is doggedly defending a tradition in traditional language, Temple is open to fresh evidence from contemporary science and philosophy and fresh forms of expression.

2. On Essences or Universals Rommen offers us the traditional Thomistic view that man through the intellect knows the essences of things. The senses grasp only particulars. From the mental image of the sense impressions the intellect attains by abstraction to the concept of the universal, whose content is the essence. The universals are not substances in the Platonic sense; nor are they arbitrary human products; nor are they derived by induction from particulars, or known intuitively by immediate contemplation of being. Rather, in the Aristotelian manner, a given essence is present objectively in all concrete objects of the same kind as their immutable form or nature.[63]

It is at this point that the differences between Temple and the Scholastics become more striking than the similarities. The crux for Temple is how the relationship of universal and particular is to be conceived. He notes that the line of thought in Aristotle which the Scholastics took up was that of Real Kinds, conceived not, it is true, as self-existent ideas, but nonetheless as unchanging constituents of eternal reality.[64] The corollary of the supposition that there are static Real Kinds, of which the Form or Essence can be defined, was that from the definition valid inferences could be drawn by deduction and the volume of ascertained truth be thus increased.[65]

In Temple's view it is the procedure set out in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics which is of greater value. For it is "not a cut-and-dried procedure according to rule, but the activity of living thought with all the elasticity and delicate adjustment of response which is characteristic of life".[66] It is the method of five stages to knowledge: Sensation, Memory, Experience, Induction and Reason.[67] It is because Reason, according to this method, comprehends the Essences and so secures knowledge, that the next step is taken of defining the Essence as a basis for demonstration, whereupon the "merry game of the Prior Analytics and of Scholastic logic is set agoing".[68] Temple criticises Aristotle for failing to make clear the relation of the essence to the initial data of sense-perception. What can be inferred is that Aristotle took a depressed view of matter. So far from supposing that the perfect intelligence of God could apprehend the sensible world in all its manifold particulars, he believed that the world, because it would not perfectly fit into intellectual forms, could not be the proper object of God's knowledge.[69]

This brings us to the heart of Temple's reservations about Aristotelian and Scholastic philosophy. It cannot do justice to that conception of the world as perpetually changing which the development of science has impressed

upon us.[70] Our experience is of process, and "the unfortunate modern philosopher can never for a moment ignore the problem of Time or Process".[71] The norm of the Scholastic approach is the mathematical.[72] The same criticism is made of Descartes. Though his method was very fruitful for the development of science, his starting point of the individual consciousness dictated reliance on "clear and distinct ideas", and this in turn made mathematical thinking attractive as a paradigm for thought. Whatever the intellectual satisfaction of the mathematical ideal of knowledge, it has fatal defects: its indifference to Time and its precision. The facts of experience cannot be set aside simply because they will not fit the ideal.[73] To-day, under the influence of the notion of evolution all our thought is historical in method.[74] We must not sharply separate Being from Becoming. "We must realise that the end of our (mental) discipline is the escape from our temporal and personal contingency, not into a timeless realm of static Truth, Beauty and Goodness, but into the full historic process wherein both we and those sublimities have actual being."[75]

It is especially with the problem of giving an adequate account of man that Temple is concerned: men embedded in process, men as individuals. The doctrine of Real Kinds is unable to do justice to such a Kind as mankind.[76] "To me it often seems as if St. Thomas is speaking of the human genus without due recognition of the fact that one characteristic of this genus, differentiating it from all others, is the high degree of individuality discoverable in the specimens - a degree so high as to make the particularity of each as fully constitutive of his essence as the generic quality. This, if true, is a principle of supreme importance for applied ethics."[77]

Constructively Temple himself advances the idea of the concrete universal, taking his cue from Hegel's dictum 'the individual is the universal'.[78] Science and philosophy

presuppose, and experience confirms, that the universe is a single inter-connected system.[79] Knowledge of the one principle of the universe and knowledge of all its parts are one and the same.[80] The one principle can never be fully knowable to us; our whole intellectual life is inevitably experimental.[81] Temple insists on the importance of staying in close touch with experience. What we basically apprehend is unity in difference. Our task is to build up systems of this apprehension, following the mind's impulse to totality.[82] A universal is not an abstract quality but a concrete principle or whole.[83] The wider our grasp and the closer the correlation of the facts of experience, the fuller is our apprehension of the concrete universal.[84] Thus Athens is the concrete unity of Pericles, Phidias, Aeschylus and Plato, and all its host of citizens; a man's Self is the concrete unity or universal of his actions and his varying forms of property which are united in a system by their relations to him.[85] Temple is attracted to this way of thinking by its practical value. A Royal Commission may begin with endless facts on the one hand, and an abstract universal on the other, perhaps Unemployment. If it does its job properly it will correlate the facts and thereby make the universal concrete, so that unemployment is seen "as a whole system of conditions which is itself part of the larger system called the Industrial Organisation of the country". As the recommendations of the Commission "certain elements in this concrete whole are singled out as capable of improvement by practicable means".[86] Temple's method is that of his revered master Caird, to whom his Gifford Lectures are dedicated. It is sketched in 1914 as a way of overcoming the chief inadequacy both of the deductive and the inductive method, namely that they never represent the reality of living thought. "All actual thinking proceeds in circles or pendulum-swings. We approach a group of facts; they suggest a theory; in the light of the theory we get a fuller grasp of the facts; this fuller grasp suggests modifications of the theory; and so we proceed until we reach a systematic apprehension

of the facts where each fits into its place. In the end we have not one universal and unquestioned proposition with other propositions deductively established from it, but a whole system - a concrete universal - in which each element is guaranteed by the rest, and all together constitute the whole which determines each ..." Temple approvingly cites Caird's dictum that there is no harm in arguing in a circle if the circle is large enough.[87] This is the dialectical method, similar to the Hegelian approach, but "closer to the critical method of Kant and Plato".[88]

There are, I believe, two factors which particularly predisposed Temple to think along these lines. The first was his love of the arts. In science, he believed, the intellect attends primarily to the universal rather than particular aspect of reality in its quest for hypotheses. Art however has a logic more subtle and minute. It is complementary to science in attempting to understand objects from within rather than through their external relations. "The infinite delicacy of the logical structure of the real world is only grasped by imagination when it apprehends the real in its concreteness with all that minute articulation which can never be artifically constructed by the intellect."[89] Every artist knows that a universal only finds expression in what is perfectly individual.[90] The whole object of Art is to give perfect individual embodiment of a universal truth or value.[91] In this way it illuminates reality to a degree that science cannot.[92]

The second factor is his belief in the particularity of the Incarnation. We have seen Temple speak of the self as a concrete universal. If philosophically we can speak of perfect individuality as the perfect synthesis of universal and particular, then the way is open to see in one man, born at a particular time or place, the adequate embodiment of universal spirit. It also opens the way to seeing how love is the master key to the universe; for love must express itself in service to individuals.[93]

3. Fact and value. We have already seen that Thomism takes a strongly objectivist view of truth. The same is true of value. In fact Thomism asserts that the ontological and deontological orders are ultimately one.[94] The basis for this is a teleological conception, grounded in the metaphysics of being.[95] The essences which the intellect apprehends are not only the form but also the end or goal of existent creatures.[96] Every real thing moves towards its essence.[97] The peculiarity of man is that in his freedom he is able by his intellect to apprehend the essences - and to apprehend them is to see that they present a demand for their fulfilment upon his will.[98] "Knowable being is the principle of oughtness. The supreme principle of oughtness is simply this: Become your essential being. For the rational, free nature of man this signifies: Act in accordance with reason; bring your essential being to completion; fulfil the order of being which you confront as a free creature."[99]

The essences are grounded in God. They are ideas creatively conceived in the intellect of God, immutable because He is immutable.[100] The essential nature of the world is thus rooted in the wisdom of God. Viewed from the standpoint of oughtness, it is the eternal law, which is the governance of the world through God's will in accordance with His wisdom.[101] God Himself is pure Being, perfect Goodness and ultimate Norm, and highest End. He is therefore the goal of all created Being.[102] For rational creatures the highest end is the eternal glory of God[103] and the eternal union of men with God.[104]

Temple's theory of value has been very well set out and criticised for its ambiguity by Jack F. Padgett.[105] For our purposes we should note (i) that Temple, like Rommen, backs the fundamental objectivity of value;[106] (ii) that he gives far more recognition than Rommen to its subjective aspects; (iii) that he flatly rejects a purely subjective account of value. Thus beauty is objective; but its good

needs to be actualised in the subjective act of appreciation.[107] Temple denies that beauty is purely subjective, though he does not see how any doubter can be persuaded by argument. His bedrock is the actual experience of any one with aesthetic sensibility.[108] In ethics Temple starts from the experiential datum of our sense of uncompromising obligation.[109] He does not connect this with essences, but rather with the total moral situation in which we find ourselves. There is a right thing for me to do in any situation and it is my duty to find it out.[110] But the right thing is not found by apprehending essences; rather I must ask what I in my particular station[111] am called upon to do which will be the best in the circumstances.[112] Value is thus objectively real, but subjectively conditioned. Furthermore Temple stresses that, more fully than Truth or Beauty, Goodness is not merely appreciated but created. The moral goodness of mankind is "an original contribution to the scheme of things".[113] Each man has his part to play in realising the Commonwealth of Value.[114] Again Temple knows of no argument which will refute the idea that obligation can be analysed without remainder into a tendency to act in conformity with the customs of one's social context. He merely points to the evidence that some men do defy their social context in the name of conscience.[115]

Temple also asserts the unity of fact and value, and advances a teleological understanding of the universe grounded in God. However, since, as we have seen, he starts from our experience of process and declines to speak in terms of immutable essences, the philosophical articulation is markedly different. In our actual experience of process says Temple, Fact and Value are given together. From the outset Mind not only apprehends facts about the world, it apprehends value. In the early stages of growth it is aware of things as welcome or unwelcome, and it calculates the means to the attainment of ends apprehended as good. Later comes the choice between ends as greater and lesser goods. 'But at no point is it other than awareness of Value - positive or negative - in its environment ..."

The ground of value is the discovery by Mind of what is akin to itself. "If the object is apprehended as good - whether noble, beautiful or true, according to its own nature - that means that Mind finds there an expression, such as the nature of the object permits, of itself as it is or as it would wish to be."[116] The only way in which we can frame a conception of the world adequate to our experience of fact and value as given together is to suppose that the process is pervaded by Mind.

Furthermore, when Mind expresses itself through process, its activity is called Purpose. "We are therefore led to enquire whether Purpose can be the governing principle of the world-process." The great advantage of this view is that Purpose is "a principle of explanation which itself requires no further explanation".[117] It therefore does provide an adequate theory which will render intelligible the world process within which Mind arises. Temple's position stands in conscious opposition both to Idealism which starts with Mind and makes the world adjectival to it, and to Materialism which makes Mind epiphenomenal.[118] It starts from the picture of the world given by Science, but refuses to treat as non-existent those aspects of reality which scientific method ignores for its own purposes. If one starts with mindless, valueless fact, we cannot give any place to Mind or Value without breaking up the unity of the scheme itself.[119] Temple also finds Whitehead's scheme unsatisfactory; for by contenting himself with the category of organism, Whitehead leaves the complex totality of God + World completely unexplained. Whitehead's optimism could be justified only if he introduced the category of Personality; and Temple notes that Whitehead allows himself to speak of God having patience.[120] What is required to warrant such language is not just an impersonal principle of logical coherence, but Personality, as the key category.

Temple approaches the question of how we are adequately to account for the data of experience by another route. He draws out the implications of our convictions about Truth,

Beauty and Goodness. "There is a sense in which Truth is august and compelling. Willingly to believe what is suspected to be false is felt to be not only a degradation of the credulous believer's personality, but an offence against the order of reality. This feeling is quite unreasonable if the order of reality is a brute fact and nothing else; it is only justifiable if the order of reality is the expression of a personal mind, for the sense of moral obligation towards Truth is of that quality which is only appropriate in connexion with personal claims."[121] Similarly, the reverence which men feel in the presence of Beauty is reasonable only on the supposition that we are in communion with a master-mind; indeed the apprehension of Beauty is such communion.[122] "There is more in Beauty than Beauty alone. There is communication from, and communion with, personal spirit."[123] Thirdly, consideration of Moral Goodness leads to the same conclusion. If we fail in our duty we feel that this is not only an injury to a neighbour, not only a degradation of self, not only "a breach of that Moral Law on conformity to which all the welfare of man depends, but as the flouting of what justly claims our reverence". This is felt both by those "who believe that the Moral Law is the content of the Mind of God", and by those without theistic belief, "and it manifestly points to Theism as its only justification. For no Law, apart from a Lawgiver, is a proper object of reverence. It is mere brute fact; and every living thing, still more every person exercising intelligent choice, is its superior. The reverence of persons can be appropriately given only to that which itself is at least personal."[124]

When we consider human purposive action we realise that it entails self-determination of the agent.[125] This determination occurs through Mind's apprehension of the Good, whether apparent or real. If we are to conceive of a Personal God, then he too will have an analogous freedom. Temple suggests that the best analogy for God's relation to the world is that of a man in relation to his

conduct, rather than that of an artist in relation to his work.[126] Least satisfactory is a deistic or interventionist concept, whereby the immanence of God is seen in the mechanical regularity of the universe, His transcendence in occasional miraculous interventions.[127] A person is properly described as transcendent of his acts. He is expressed in these, but he has an existence apart from them. When a mature man acts he reveals constancy of character which finds varying expression in accordance with the circumstances.[128] So too if the World-Process is the medium of God's personal action,[129] we shall speak of God Transcendent as eternally self-subsistent and self-identical as the ground of His unchanging purpose,[130] God Immanent as adapting to circumstances. "Constancy of purpose is a noble characteristic, but it shows itself, not in unalterable uniformity of conduct, but in perpetual self-adaptation, with an infinite delicacy of graduation, to different circumstances, so that, however these may vary, the one unchanging purpose is always served."[131]

When Temple uses the term "wisdom of God" it is used in this dynamic providential sense,[132] in contrast to Rommen, who thinks of immutable essences and sharply separates reason and revelation.[133] All this helps us to see the significance of Temple's persistent practice of writing Truth, Beauty and Goodness with capital letters. He does not imply static essences. He is safeguarding their objective character, as exercising a claim upon us, and grounding them in a living God. To apprehend Truth, Beauty and Goodness is to encounter God's thought, His glory, His character,[134] expressed as is appropriate to the circumstances.

4. <u>Man, individual and communal</u>. Man, says Rommen, on the one hand belongs to the corporeal world, and is therefore an object of the physical sciences. But he is also a rational, free, social being. In this respect he is an object of the human sciences, including the moral sciences.[135] Rommen glosses "the rational, social, essential nature of man" as

"his personal, essential being immanently determined through the concepts of individual and community".[136]

The freedom and dignity of the individual is a presupposition in the spheres both of love and of law.[137] In love the uniqueness of individual personality is to the fore, whereas law embraces the individual in his universal nature as a person, i.e. it presupposes a certain equality of individuals, and provides and guarantees prerequisites for free activity.[138]

"But individual personality does not exhaust the essential nature of man ... Sociality is just as constitutive of the essential nature of man as is his rationality. Sociality, indeed, so pertains to man's nature that a definition which omits this constitutive element must be considered incomplete. It is therefore nothing superadded; it is equally original. The individual person and the community are ontologically so related to each other that they can have no existence independently of each other. Even though the individual person may always have genuine self-subsistence and hence a unique kind of being, he has at the same time a limited existence that does not yet realise perfectly the idea of man. For man is perfected only in the community."[139] Rommen insists that the social nature of man is "a reality which in ever increasing human experience shows itself as 'given' ... Social being is <u>in</u> reality. Therefore continual contact with reality and observation of social life are needed in order to be able to make assertions and form judgments about the nature of social being. Only then can we discern what is permanent amid the changing situations, amid the alterations of outward forms in the course of history".[140]

The social units which Rommen has in mind are: the family, nationality, occupational groups, and the state. These he calls necessary societies, because they are derived from the idea of man. They are always present, if only in rudimentary form. They are therefore in a different

category from the societies men form for various particular purposes.[141]

Rommen refuses to speak either of a primacy of the individual or of a primacy of the community. None of the social units mentioned, nor the international community, is in an absolute sense an end-community, in which the individual would be merged.[142] The different spheres of social life each have their particular ends, their own perfection,[143] which are all related to the end of the common good. Reason directs the actions of free men to the common good, not a private or particular good. In this sense communities are prior to individuals in the sphere of ends. However, because the individual's goal lies in the beatific vision and in the union of love with God, this gives him an ultimate transcendence over any society.[144]

Maritain sees the human being as a single entity under two aspects: individuality and personality.[145] Individuality has its primary root in matter, understood in the Aristotelian sense.[146] Personality in turn is treated from two standpoints. First, man has a capacity for knowledge and love; he "holds himself in hand by his intelligence and will".[147] He therefore has an independence, a dignity anterior to society.[148] In this sense each person can be said to be a whole, a universe unto himself, rather than a part of the universe. This is a mystery to which talk of the human person as in the image of God points. The dignity of man moreover is absolute because he is in direct relation with the Absolute, and it is his destiny to find complete fulfilment in God.[149]

Secondly, this person who is a whole is an <u>open whole</u>.[150] It tends naturally towards society and communion.[151] It does so primarily because of its capacity for knowledge and love "because of the radical generosity inscribed within the very being of the person, because of that openness to the communications of intelligence and love which is the nature of the spirit, and which demands an entrance into

relationship with other persons".[152] Secondarily, the human being has basic needs which can only be fulfilled in a society; needs which are not only material but cultural and moral.[153]

In respect of the satisfaction of these basic needs man is part of the political community and inferior to it as a part to a whole. He exists with a view to its common good.[154] However, because each man is an open whole in the sense indicated, the common good must be common both to the whole of society and to the parts who are in themselves wholes. The common good involves as its chief value the highest possible attainment, compatible with the good of the whole, of persons to their lives as persons.[155] Two characteristics of the common good must therefore be (i) that it flows back to persons and aids their development;[156] (ii) that it is an intrinsic good and that justice and moral righteousness are essential to it.[157]

Maritain thus characterises a society of free men as being both 'personalist' and communal.[158] Both he and Rommen write in conscious opposition to two extremes. First, Rommen and Maritain reject the view which sees the common good as the mere aggregate of individual goods.[159] Not only is open anarchy repudiated, but so is what Maritain calls 'bourgeois materialism' "according to which the entire duty of society consists in seeing that the freedom of each one be respected, thereby enabling the strong freely to oppress the weak".[160] The other position is the one which would treat the common good as proper only to the whole, so that persons are treated as solely political or as only parts.[161]

We have already seen how Temple holds the sciences in high regard yet draws attention to their limitations in the study of man.[162] Men Without Work is thoroughly scientific, yet concentrates on the unemployed as persons.[163] Philosophically, efficient causation is subordinate in importance to the category of purpose.[164]

The twin concepts of individual and community are central to Temple's understanding of man. Man's dignity as an individual rests in his being a child of God capable of communion with Him.[165] Philosophically that dignity rests on the capacity of mind to apprehend value and perfectly to discover itself in other minds, so that "Fellowship is the true norm of Value, and Love its perfect realisation".[166] Individuals are rational in this sense (even if it is a capacity which is neglected or abused), and should be recognised as rational.[167] Temple consistently repudiates determinism and presupposes at least a minimal freedom of the individual. This is rightly a presupposition of the law for any notion of answerability and equality.[168] It is a freedom which is to be both recognised and fostered.[169] The goal is the freedom of a man who is self-determining in framing and pursuing a true purpose.[170] Plainly in Temple's view, dependent as it is on Plato, this is a rational activity.

In his heavy insistence on individuality Temple is repudiating those in his own Hegelian tradition who would so emphasise the Absolute as to make it impossible to give a proper account of personality.[171] He also believes, as we have seen, that St. Thomas Aquinas' philosophical categories can easily underplay individuality.[172] He strongly believes that we should cherish the stress on the duty of private judgment, the autonomy of the individual conscience and the integrity of the individual mind which the modern age, following the implications of Descartes, insists upon.[173]

"Man is essentially social." That is Temple's perpetual claim from his earliest writings through to his call in 1944 for a decision for sociality as a basic truth of human life.[174] He commends the Catholic insistence on the corporate nature of religious life.[175] The very qualities which make a man individual mark him as inherently social too.[176] The individual and the community are mutually dependent. Man depends on his environment for

the very development of the uniqueness of individuality.[177] Temple's equivalent statement to Rommen's is this: "Personality only comes to itself, only becomes what it is capable of being, through its development in the reciprocal relationships of society ... I am only I in my relationships with You, and You are only You, or capable of being called an I, in your relationships with me. It is positively in the interaction of embryonic personalities with one another that the resultant personality is developed."[178] This is the basis of Temple's critical comments on industry and society[179] and on unemployment,[180] and of his view of education as corporate.[181] It is in line with his interpretation of Plato - the function of reason is to realise the self as a member of the community and so perform one's tasks as a member.[182] Temple plainly has more sympathy with those who take society as an actual fact of human nature, than with those who adopt a theory of Social Contract.[183] He proposes at the outset of Christianity and the State to understand his subject by reference not only to Christian principles but to "the experience of which History is the record".[184] What we find throughout history is that man has no existence outside community.[185]

The principal social units in Temple's mind are these: (i) The Family: a man is not an independent being who might have been born of other parents; he is his parent's child in the heart of his being.[186] The family is the primary social unit,[187] the root from which civilisation grows.[188] Its preservation and security is the first principle of social welfare.[189] Even if it has a duty to wider social units, it exists to be itself.[190] (ii) The other natural unit is the nation, existing by God's providence.[191] To conceive of unity in terms of class rather than of nation is retrograde, because the basis is narrower.[192] 'The 'class' is united by common economic interest only; the nation is a fellowship of many divers types in a common heritage of tradition, sentiment, and purpose covering every phase of human existence ... Those

who advocate (class), and still more those who, by maintaining an unjust social order, cause many to tend in that direction, are the worst enemies of true progress."[193]
(iii) The State, as the necessary organ of the national community.[194] As I shall show in the next section, Temple is much more careful than Rommen to distinguish the State from the community or nation.

Temple does not accord primacy either to the individual or the social aspect of Man. His phrase 'persons in community' is a favourite,[195] and the first two social principles frequently appear together.[196] Temple says we must aim at a balance between them;[197] that is the whole problem of politics.[198] His search is for a synthesis of the middle ages and the post-Cartesian period.[199]

Temple does not speak much of the common good. Yet his principle of service and his stress on citizenship cover the same ground.[200] The common good is to take precedence over any private good - hence Temple's comments on the true nature of industry,[201] and on private ownership and the banks.[202] He does not clarify as well as Maritain the senses in which society is prior to its members,[203] though I do not think he would dissent from Maritain's analysis.[204] The book Competition indicates that where we are dependent on the community for the development of our powers, so we should feel obliged to use them for the good of the community.[205] He certainly did not see any society as an end in itself,[206] and the dignity of the individual in virtue of his having God's image and an eternal destiny, over against any human society, is just as marked as in Rommen.[207] In fact Temple's position is substantially that which Maritain outlines in terms of 'wholes'. He himself refers approvingly to Maritain's distinction between individuality and personality.[208]

Temple naturally repudiates any position which so emphasises the individual that the common good is obscured. The hapless Descartes' deliverance was disastrous.

"Individual self-consciousness became central. Each man looks out on a world which he sees essentially as related to himself. (This is the very quality of original sin, and it seems a pity to take it as the constitutive principle of our philosophy)."[209] We have already seen Temple's antipathy to the supposed individualism of the upper classes[210] and especially to <u>laissez-faire</u> political economy.[211] The opposite position, equally unacceptable, is the loss of the individual in the society. Germany is, of course, the stock example both in the First and Second World War.[212] He also shows a distaste for the idea of Society as an organism and the idea of the Corporative State since this obscures the fact that its component parts are persons.[213] In sum, Temple has many fundamental points of contact with Rommen and Maritain. Temple and Maritain stand together in that they are much more sensitive than Rommen to the modern accent on individual freedom and individual rights.[214] What Temple says as he searches for a Hegelian synthesis of the outlook of the middle ages and post-Cartesian thought should be taken with Maritain's stress on individual rights - a point taken up by Professor d'Entrèves in his warning against an organic theory of society.[215]

5. <u>The State</u>. We have already seen that Rommen includes the state among the list of necessary societies. He sets out both the status and the limits of the state. By 'state' he means either a society viewed politically or (primarily) the political organ of that society.[216] This ambivalence reflects dependence on Aristotle and is rather unfortunate in an age of large-scale political units where the distinction of society and state is of great importance. The necessity of the state arises from the idea of man not only as an individual but as a social being.[217] The individual and the family need political life for the perfecting of their social nature. This is the basis of the authority and the function of the state. The <u>suum</u> which public

authority is entitled to demand rests on the idea of the state as this necessary society. The essential function of the state is the establishment, maintenance, and promotion of the common good.[218] The state thus has an ethical character.[219] As Maritain puts it, the political task is the good human life of the multitude, the betterment of the conditions of human life, both material and (principally) moral and spiritual.[220] The goal of authority must be the freedom and friendship of persons.[221] Rommen follows St. Thomas, and before him Plato and Aristotle, in believing that the state is a pedagogue.[222] "All true politics is education of the people."[223]

This sounds ominously totalitarian: but Rommen's whole position is seen by him as a defence against totalitarianism. For the state must be understood in the context of man's individuality and of the other necessary societies. The eternal destiny of the individual gives him natural rights in relation to the state.[224] The family and marriage arise from the idea of man, and are prior to the state.[225] They are autonomous spheres of right.[226] The national community, which is built up through common blood, language and culture out of families, is also prior to the state. The distinction between natural community and state is particularly evident where a state includes national minorities. These too have their own natural rights to the preservation of their culture.[227] None of these rights is <u>created</u> by the state. Its first duty is to <u>recognise</u> them.[228] Maritain demands that the state respect truth, enquiry after truth[229] and conscience by refraining from imposing its own judgment of good and evil or a religious faith.[230] Nor can the state, according to Rommen, <u>create</u> economic, occupational or cultural welfare.[231] This outlook is enshrined in the principle of subsidiarity, for instance in <u>Quadragesimo Anno</u> of 1931. "Just as it is wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to the community at large what private enterprise and industry can accomplish, so too it is an injustice, a grave evil, and a disturbance of

right order for a larger and higher organisation to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed by smaller and lower bodies."[232]

What the state should do is promote the welfare of individuals and the necessary societies so that they all contribute to the common good, with which really coincide their particular goods.[233] Thus "the state may never take over entirely the end and functions of the family, even though it may have the duty, in virtue of its right of guardianship, to intervene in case this or that family is delinquent in its own duty. It is likewise competent and obligated to re-establish, wherever necessary, the natural foundation of the family in economic life and in legislation through such measures as housing projects, a family wage, tax exemption or alleviation, reform of marriage legislation, protection of parental rights. Such necessity is present whenever a general failure in their essential functions on the part of concrete families is due to a faulty economic or juridico-ethical evolution (e.g. in the case of the propertyless, proletarian family of modern capitalist society)."[234]

The widest society to which man belongs is mankind itself. The individual state is not the final form of community. Nation-states form the international community, "whose supernatural counterpart is the world Church, the Church of the nations". By analogy states and nations possess natural rights: "to their existence, to freedom (i.e. the right to self-determination for the concrete realisation of the common good) and to their honour as the basis of their legal partnership in the international community, whose object is order and peace". Conflicts are to be "settled on the basis of justice, on the basis of the common good of the international community".[235]

Rommen writes in conscious opposition to two streams of thought which, for all their differences, both falsely antithesise individual and state.[236] His greatest bête

noire is individualist liberalism, with its contractual view of the state.[237] He sees it as sabotaging the idea of the state because it assumes that the community lives solely by law.[238] Rommen traces this back to the Greek Sophists. But it became prominent in the seventeenth century. Its individualism is seen in the accent on the doctrine of the state of nature.[239] Gone was the essentially social nature of man, the necessary societies and principle of subsidiarity.[240] One started from the individual in his pre-political state with natural rights. The catalyst for the creation of society was a feature of man's empirical nature.[241] For example, Hobbes was pessimistic: his key feature was selfishness.[242] Men came together to avoid mutual destruction; individual rights in the state of nature were totally and forever surrendered in the political contract.[243] His recommendation of an omnipotent state is consciously directed against Church and guilds.[244] For Locke, the state is the utilitarian product of individual self-interest. The inalienable individual rights in the state of nature are brought over into the status civilis. Any order of law is the result of the contractual will of the individuals concerned, and its function is to protect and promote individual self-interest. 'The hidden root of this position is, of course, an overconfidence, born of optimism, in the typically individualist presumption that the common good is nothing real, that it is merely the sum of the particular goods or interests of individuals. If this is true, the free pursuit of self-interest on the part of individuals who are restricted only by the like freedom of others must work like the 'invisible hand' of Adam Smith and produce, as it were automatically, a sort of social harmony."[245] For Rousseau the state of nature is in effect the garden of Eden; the status civilis is the world after man's fall. Civilisation is tolerable only if the original natural rights of liberty and equality form the essential reservations of the social contract.[246]

Rommen's other bête noire is totalitarianism of a Fascist or Communist kind, since it disregards the principle of subsidiarity and the rights of individuals and sub-groups and subordinates all community life to state control.[247] Maritain distinguishes the Fascist and the Communist types. In the first, when in the name of the State or of the Volksgeist the entire man is absorbed into the social whole, there emerges the master who absorbs the multitude into himself.[248] And since the passion for communion is not directed to any proper common task, the vacuum is filled by an enemy against whom political communion will build itself. The master can then lead the community to limitless conquests.[249] In the case of Communism, we find the reaction to the individualism of bourgeois liberalism. There is indeed a goal, but it is the economic one of the domination of nature. The common task is therefore misconceived: instead of the pursuit of a common good essentially human, we find the chief work of civil society is the administration of things to which human beings are subordinate.[250] Rommen remarks that "the defence against totalitarianism cannot plead greater efficiency, more economic productivity, which are the categories in which the 'social engineer' thinks. Such a defence must appeal to justice, to the rule of reason; it must plead in the name of the natural law and of the natural rights of human persons and their free associations".[251] Against individual selfishness and the bureaucratic state we must assert the creative action of the person and the national community, within which context the state, as fashioner of a true human order is to be accorded "dignity, honour and a high degree of sovereignty".[252]

Temple's thought about the state is heavily in debt to MacIver and Unwin. Modifying MacIver, he roughly defines the state as "a necessary organ of the national community maintaining through Law as promulgated by a government endowed to this end with coercive power the universal external conditions of social order".[253] Put more

theologically, 'The social life of man is part of the Divine purpose in Creation, and what is requisite for its maintenance is part of the Divine activity in preserving what Creation has called into being. This is the theological justification of the State and all its apparatus.'"[254] In fact, Temple does not see the state simply as maintaining external conditions of social life. The function of the state is to promote the common good. He agrees with Aristotle that, if the state emerged for the preservation of life itself, it continues in order to promote the good life.[255] The state is not just concerned with material goods but with the highest and fullest life of its citizens.[256] Temple agrees with Plato that the state has an educative function. It is concerned with the fashioning of character.[257] It rightly trains us for citizenship.[258] Here particularly the concerns of the Church and the concerns of the state overlap.[259] Temple repudiates the idea that the Church can be concerned purely with the individual or spiritual sphere, and the state with the communal or material sphere.[260] The state is rightly concerned to promote freedom and fellowship of its citizens.[261] He obviously thinks as Rommen about the competence and obligation of the state to promote and if necessary re-establish the foundations of natural social units, in the interests of persons in community: witness his desire for state help over the family,[262] the unemployed,[263] education,[264] the minimum wage;[265] and state involvement to secure the community's interest and partnership as against sectional interest and feuds.[266]

The positive role which Temple ascribes to the state must, however, be seen in conjunction with the limits he would impose. In his twenties he was Arnoldian to the point of seeing the state as a religious body - which looks like potential theocracy.[267] In his mature years the limitations he outlines are these: (i) The state exists for man, not man for the state.[268] Man has an eternal destiny; he is therefore superior to the state, which does not.[269] Man is more than social and political: he

seeks knowledge, creates and loves beauty, forms friendships, worships God. The state must not forbid or prescribe the manner of these pursuits.[270] Free speech and thought is a priceless spiritual value and the state should be chary of the repression of even self-assertive liberty.[271] The state may have legitimate claims on a man's property and body, but not on his character.[272] It is this view of a positive yet limited role of the state which underlies Temple's attitude to conscientious objection. On the one hand the state, since it has a duty to promote the common good, must make the moral judgment whether to go to war; and this is a sphere where the whole has rights over the part. On the other hand even though conscientious objection is misguided, it is right for the State not to press its suum to the limit but to recognise conscientious objection as an expression of personal liberty.[273]

(ii) Temple is a strong advocate of subsidiarity, without his using the name. Following Maritain and Papal Encyclicals he stresses that "personality achieves itself in the lesser groupings within the State - in the family, the school, the guild, the trade union, the village, the city and the county. These are no enemies of the State, and that State will in fact be stable which deliberately fosters these lesser objects of loyalty as contributors to its own wealth of tradition and inheritance."[274] The state's job is to secure the liberty and order on which these associations can build, and by which they seek more intimate or more particular ends.[275] Hence Temple's concern for voluntary as well as statutory involvement in education;[276] for Industrial or Educational Parliaments.[277] Bound up with this is Temple's belief that law cannot but operate in general terms, and thus fails to take account of individual considerations.[278] Further, there is the danger in the immense extension of the state's activity in promoting welfare otherwise than by coercion. If the state should absorb into itself cultural activities where individuality and spontaneity are of the

essence, "who is to rectify errors or disproportions in the minds of those who manipulate its enormous powers?"[279] Similarly the state can ensure material requisites for families, but it cannot do much to secure happy family life.[280] In short the state can provide indispensable foundations for personal and social life. But it cannot inspire.[281] It cannot bring about a fellowship of free persons bound in mutual love.[282]

(iii) Temple also stresses explicitly what Rommen leaves implicit - that the state is the servant of the community. If it is necessary, it is only a necessary instrument of a necessary community. Society and state are not coextensive;[283] society has a life largely independent of the state.[284] The right of the state to use force is derived from the fact that it acts for the community.[285] In fact the kingdoms of this world "rest in part upon falsehood - most conspicuously upon the necessary but false, false but necessary, supposition that the State really acts in the interest of the whole community, whereas in fact it always acts primarily in the interest of that section of the community which is able in practice to work its machinery".[286] The state must beware of becoming an alien force, for that strikes at the root of corporate life.[287] The ultimate object of political loyalty is to the community, and the point may be reached where as a last resort it is necessary to destroy the existing state.[288]

(iv) Finally, the authority of the state is subject to the authority of God. "Pilate's authority comes, like all real authority, from God. The State has the authority of God in its own sphere; but this is a check as well as a sanction; for the State is confined within its own sphere by the very source of its authority; and even inside that sphere its authority is to execute justice, not to serve the interest of the rulers. If it steps outside its sphere, or uses its power to commit injustice, it becomes at once a usurper."[289]

Thus the state, being concerned with law, cannot be a spiritual pioneer; it must consolidate moral gains, and save us from falling below a minimum standard. It must be firm and even stern in its action. "Its way of manifesting love is to be just, and there are other and higher ways. But the State which has learnt its true function has, none the less, the highest of earthly dignities; it is an indispensable servant of the common life of men. Its form of service is to rule; but it should rule only that it may serve."[290]

Temple believes we are passing from a nationalist to an international phase of history.[291] He deplores the fact that states in fact behave as if they were in the Hobbesian state of nature, acknowledging no superior.[292] He recognises the right of individual states to their independence. Indeed, it is a supreme wickedness for one nation to be subject to another, for it interferes with the proper relation of the individual to his society.[293] But a League of Nations is, he believes, no derogation from the sovereign rights of the national state, but the fulfilment of the state's essential principle. "For the essence of the State is the subordination of all force to the authority of Law, and it is only through the League and the Court (of International Justice), or some strictly analogous organisation, that this subordination can be effected in international affairs."[294] Just as the function of the individual state is to promote freedom and fellowship, so the aim of the world as a whole must be to create a harmony of independent nations,[295] seeking the justice and common good of the international community.[296] So too, as the Church is to the nation, so the world Church would be to the international community.[297]

Temple is strongly antipathetic, as we have already seen in his remarks on the Political Economy, towards individualistic liberalism.[298] The contractual view of government rightly reflects a dissatisfaction over the state in actual experience, but is seriously defective

as a theory.[299] At the root is its defective view of human nature. In his Hegelian exercise of synthesis Temple gives preponderance to the thesis of society as a natural growth.[300] Individualism has caused economic anarchy.[301] Temple is particularly caustic about the inability of democrats of an individualistic outlook to appreciate the associations intermediate between individual and state. 'The limitless individualism of revolutionary thought which aims at setting the individual on his own feet that he may, with his fellows, direct the State, defeats its own object and becomes the fount of totalitarianism."[302]

Temple's chief complaint against Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau is that they found their views on a shallow view of personality. Hobbes grounded the state on man's selfishness,[303] ignoring the possibility of his altruism.[304] Rousseau "invested with a halo of romance the political expression of human selfishness".[305] Locke correctly grounded the right of property in the nature of Personality; but he did not see the state as the fosterer of growth of Personality and its consequent duty to uphold the right <u>to</u> property of the propertyless.[306]

The opposite error is of course totalitarianism. We have seen Temple's vigorous repudiation of state absolutism, most evident in Germany, with its militant nationalism.[307] At the root is again a defective view of personality.[308] Communism is rejected because (i) it tries to unite on the basis of economics and class, not nation;[309] (ii) it sets value on the whole society alone;[310] (iii) it mistakenly conceives the environment to consist chiefly of institutions and social organisations, whereas centrally it consists of individual men and women with creative capacities; ("To trust to organisation only for the reform of character is a fearful error");[311] (iv) in its preoccupation with economic man it (along with State Socialism) ignores that man is still a human being who ought to have free play for his personality.[312] The

economic approach to life atomizes society, treating individuals as so much labour power to be used where he most conduces to efficiency of output, irrespective of all his social ties and traditional roots.[313] Most fundamentally both Fascism and Communism show the Machiavellian view that politics does not have any superior.[314] It was Machiavelli's severance of politics from religion which set political thought moving on the lines made familiar by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, lines which led through the total secularisation of politics to the deification of the state by Hegel and his school.[315]

6. Law. The critical question, How can law bind conscience?[316] is answered by Rommen as follows. On the basis of a realistic epistemology men by virtue of their reason can apprehend essences as both form and goal. What they apprehend with the intellect is proposed to their practical reason as oughtness.[317] From what has been said about the place of the State, it is easy to see that law will be a general norm of reason which directs the actions of free men to the common good.[318] That common good is a matter of rational apprehension. Law therefore pertains to reason.[319]

A distinction has now to be made between Natural Law and existing laws (positive law). The Natural Law is the natural moral law so far as it applies to the regulation of social relations.[320] It is of divine origin, revealed in the order of being, and is the rule of reason founded upon the rational and social nature of man.[321] It acts as the critical norm of all positive i.e. human law (and of all proposals to alter the positive law).[322] (Maritain reminds us that Sophocles' Antigone is a classic treatment of the clash of the unwritten Natural Law and the positive law).[323]

Now, since law is a rational norm for the free activity of man, it must have the object of making men good. "All law wishes to educate the members of the community."[324] A second corollary is that coercion cannot enter into the

definition of law. It is true that enforceability is proper to the positive law of the state. But law is "an ordinance of reason for the common good" and on this its dignity depends.[325]

This position has an ancestry going right back to Plato and Aristotle.[326] The contrary position is rooted, in Rommen's view, in a rejection of metaphysics. In antiquity this left Epicurus doubting whether anything can be objectively and naturally right. Taking utility and pleasure as the sole principles of ethics and law, he inferred that justice exists only in agreements entered into for the prevention of mutual injuries, that is, only in positive laws. The Epicureans anticipated Hobbes in their pessimistic view of the state of nature, and their consequently conservative attitude towards positive law.[327] William of Occam denied the existence of universalia in re - universals are merely vocal utterances - and with it the unity of being, truth and goodness, and the possibility of knowing the teleological orientation towards God inherent in all creation and especially in man. Whereas St. Thomas had spoken of essences conceived by the divine intellect and then brought into existence by the divine will - the very basis of the possibility of the Natural Law, Occam saw moral goodness consist in mere external agreement with God's absolute will. Will is seen as a nobler faculty than intellect. The consequence in the domain of law is that there is no Natural Law which can act as a criterion for positive law.[328]

Kant parallels Occam insofar as he declares that speculative reason cannot know the essences of things, and finds certitude only in the practical reason; for this is in effect to say that the will is higher than the intellect and that supernatural faith and positive divine law are the positive rule of knowledge and action. Further, the individualism of Kant, with its great stress on autonomous freedom, resulted in the legal order being deprived of moral character. Ethics and law are not merely distinguished

but severed. Legislation is enacted merely to secure external freedom. As a consequence external physical force is necessarily included in the concept of law.[329]

Rommen's strongest comments are directed against the positivism of the last two centuries. One cause of it was scientific empiricism, whose success in the physical sciences led to the supposition that it was the right method in other disciplines. In the field of law, true knowledge was believed to come only from an exact analysis of positive law. The philosophy of law should be restricted to external experience; all else is metaphysics. The question of why this or that law is right, or binding in conscience, is by-passed. The net result is relativism and scepticism. It is the will of the state which is the source and criterion of law. "Sociology thereupon explains by the mechanism of environment, by the struggle of interests, the further question of why this particular norm is chosen by the will." Where positivism was embraced as a philosophy, law was seen, for example, as a mere reflex of the modes of production and the class struggles, or a line of demarcation between classes. But even where positivism was embraced only as a methodology, it contained an implicitly materialist world-view, or "a self-denying scepticism which, with an almost ascetical self-restraint, merely gathered, compared and verified. Or positivism simply referred to the newly emergent science of sociology what had hitherto been assigned to ethics; it tried thereby to rid itself of responsibility for answering the fateful question of the foundation of law."[330] Law is simply the will of the state that is expressly declared to be such, is enacted in conformity with constitutional provisions and is then duly promulgated.[331] Such an attitude can stem from a tired agnosticism that admits no metaphysical foundation of law; or from a revulsion against highly rationalistic deductions common in modern forms of Natural Law; from conservatism; or from the typical attitude of the modern scientific mind which

worships the factual.[332] Even where the validity of ethical norms is granted, these are simply decisions for individuals in their own conscience.[333] The idea of Natural Law superior to positive law is repudiated.[334] This means that the state has an absolute sovereignty. It also means that each state is in a pure state of nature with the single rule of self-preservation. International law depends at every moment upon its actual acceptance or rejection by states. "Law is consequently no true norm or something pertaining to reason, but mere actual will in the psychological sense."[335]

In short, it is a question of a clash between <u>veritas facit legem</u> (law is truth)and <u>voluntas facit legem</u> (law is will).[336] In Rommen's view, "Politics is and remains a part of the moral universe. For it is inexcusable to view politics merely as the technique or art of achieving and retaining social power for some selfish end through the skilful exploitation of human weaknesses, by deceit or by terrorist methods. Politics is rather the great architectonic art by which men build the institutions and protective forms of their individual and communal life for a more perfect realisation of the good life. Its main function is to establish an order and unity of co-operation among free persons and free associations of persons in such a way that these, while they freely pursue their individual and group interests, are nevertheless so coordinated that they realise at the same time the common good under the rule of law. But the rule of law is the natural law which justifies the use of political power and before which power itself as well as resistance to arbitrary acts of those in authority must establish its legitimacy ... Thus the rule of law, the paramount law binding both the ruler and the ruled, necessarily implies the idea of natural law as the critical norm for the existing positive legal order and for the demand to change it ..." And the natural law is based on natural reason in which all men participate. <u>Veritas facit legem</u>: Law is truth.[337]

Temple says far less about law than Rommen, but it is quite safe to say that he occupies the same basic ground. If the state's function is the promotion of the good of the community and of individuals, law is its chief means of so doing. It is implicit in Temple that the framing of law is a rational activity, and that the dignity of law depends on the state fulfilling its function. This can be seen in several ways.. (1) As early as 1915 Temple commented on government compulsion to secure full use of national resources by warning against a false opposition of freedom and control.[338] If freedom is fundamentally freedom to follow a purpose,[339] then laws can help us to remain true to that purpose. "Laws in ideal, and frequently in fact, are the instruments of freedom."[340] Furthermore good legislation is to be found where the community through the state resolves that some act is not to be done, each member in effect invoking on his own head the penalty for disobedience.[341] (2) Temple contrasts lawless force and force subordinate to law.[342] The latter is his continual quest, especially internationally.[343] Here he sometimes refers to the existing framework of international laws or to its establishment, maintenance or extension;[344] but he also implies the unwritten law (ius gentium); and when he speaks of subjecting force to "the law which should be the highest welfare of mankind at large, and must be continually revised to that end" he plainly means something like Natural Law acting as a critical norm of positive law.[345] (3) In a broadcast just before his death Temple said that the ultimate authority of a law was not the State which enacted it but its own justice, and the source of that was the righteousness of God. Normally we should obey the law even when defective in justice, because normally the whole system of law expressed justice in some degree, and the aim of civilised states was that it should express justice ever more fully. The State therefore which formulated the law must recognise itself as owing allegiance to justice. This would occur only if the citizens themselves regarded justice as supreme over the State, and did not

regard the State as itself the origin of justice - in other words, if the State was subject to the judgment of the citizens' conscience.[346] (4) Coercion is entrusted to the state so that law may have force at its disposal, and so that force may be used only for the maintenance of law.[347] This is poles apart from the doctrine that the state rests on force, which Temple believes disastrous.[348] Similarly the relation between government and governed is a matter of spiritual principle, not a matter of administrative expediency.[349] Temple recognises the interference of class reference in the framing of legislation,[350] but equally warns that the individual, before he conscientiously opposes a law, must make sure his action is for the welfare of society, and must not expect exemption from penalty if he breaks the law. It is the duty of the state and individual to remember that freedom rests upon law. We must have free order and ordered freedom.[351] Law has its limitations, but its very limitation of universality, involving as it does a certain crudeness and even callousness in the treatment of many individuals, is its glory. "An all-wise despot could deal with individuals more justly than the Law ... Yet the reign of Law is better than such a despotism. For we, who are not all-wise, would not be able to predict the actions of the all-wise despot; to us they would seem capricious ... (The value of the laws) entirely depends on their having the quality of Law, which is absolute universality ... (This) is the indispensable condition of much that is most delicately intimate in human life."[352] (5) Temple is definitely on the side of Veritas facit legem. True, he does say that the state in the last resort rests on will.[353] But he is contrasting that with the idea that the State rests on force. We should also remember that will in Temple is "so much of personality as is consciously co-ordinated for action" - and that means action in pursuit of a true purpose rationally apprehended.[354]

Temple has no discussion of positivism but we may guess his attitude from his despairing remark about German intellectuals who adopted a spectator attitude.[355]

7. The Content of Natural Law. In the narrow sense there are only two norms belonging to Natural Law: "What is just is to be done, and injustice is to be avoided" and "Give to everyone his own". These Rommen calls "self-evident principles".[356] They would be purely formal rules devoid of content were it not for the fact that what is just is what corresponds to nature. From what is known of the nature of man it is possible to see that certain further principles are valid, and equally self-evident.[357] They are expressed in the second table of the Decalogue. These principles are immutable, provided that they are interpreted correctly. 'Thou shalt not kill' means: 'Thou shalt not kill an innocent person'. 'Thou shalt not steal' means: 'Do not take the goods of others against their reasonable will'.[358] When these principles are "fully and precisely formulated, it is impossible to conceive of any situation or circumstance in which they do not bind".[359] Maritain prefers to say that "We must do good and avoid evil" is the preamble and the principle of Natural Law, not the law itself. "Natural law is the ensemble of things to do and not to do which follow therefrom in necessary fashion, and from the simple fact that man is man, nothing else being taken into account.[360] That content is universal and invariable.[361] There is no essential difference here between Rommen and Maritain.

From the nature of man there also can be inferred certain rights, says Rommen, which are part of the content of Natural Law. (Maritain stresses that the dignity of the human person means nothing if it does not signify that by virtue of Natural Law the human person is the subject of rights. 'There are things which are owed to man because of the very fact that he is man. The notion of right, and the notion of moral obligation are correlative."[362]) The first suum of the individual person is the right to live, with its corollary the right to self-defence.[363] Secondly, the fact that personality carries with it personal liberty means that in the legal order a man has a right to liberty.[364]

Thirdly, from the fact that man has a body-spirit nature there follows the right to property.[365] Ownership of property guarantees security of material conditions, and is a defence of personal freedom. For he who has no property easily becomes property himself, a mere means in the hands of the propertied.[366] Property is also essential for the sake of the family: the father must have the means of providing the necessities of life for his family. The right of inheritance is also a part of the Natural Law.[367] Maritain, after covering much the same ground, summarises: "the fundamental rights, like the right to existence and life; the right to personal freedom or to conduct one's own life as master of oneself and of one's acts, responsible forthem before God and the law of the community; the right to the pursuit of the perfection of moral and rational human life; the right to the pursuit of eternal good (without this pursuit there is no true pursuit of happiness); the right to keep one's body whole; the right to private ownership of material goods, which is a safeguard of the liberties of the individual; the right to marry according to one's choice and to raise a family which will be assured of the liberties due to it; the right of association, the respect for human dignity in each individual, whether or not he represents an economic value for society - all these rights are rooted in the vocation of the person (a spiritual and free agent) to the order of absolute values and to a destiny superior to time".[368]

Since man is also essentially social, the necessary structural laws of society are also part of the Natural Law: the necessary communities of family, occupation, nation and state, together with the principle of subsidiarity.[369]

We are now fast reaching the limits of the content of the Natural Law. Rommen lays much stress on the positive importance of these limits. For instance, the right to freedom does not imply the right to absolute freedom.

Historically there are found greater and lesser degrees of freedom. The notion of the right to liberty is primarily a defence of the individual against the removal of all freedom. "In such a case human personality would cease effectively to exist."[370] Similarly Natural Law insists that there be private ownership and the right of inheritance, but it does not demand any particular form, whether of feudalism, or of liberalist capitalism, or of a mixture of private, corporate, and public ownership. The form depends on historical circumstances.[371] In politics, Natural Law does not hold democracy as the only admissible form of political organisation;[372] it neither supports nor rejects dictatorship <u>per se</u>.[373] What it does say is that "any form of government, even one decked out in the trappings of democracy, which does not recognise the fundamental rights of the person and of the family is tyrannical, and may, therefore, rightly be resisted".[374] Natural Law does suggest a political ideal: "the reign of the principle of subsidiarity and a sharing in the formation of the collective will that stresses the dignity of the person as well as of the sub-political communities which have proper ends of their own". This political ideal "includes a preference for the mixed form of government, and a repudiation of the attempt to turn the organised people into mere material for rulers or managers of absolutist states".[375]

Rommen continually stresses the fundamental importance of experience for the normative sciences. He reminds us of St. Thomas' dictum that here we need "practical experience in the customs of human life and in all just and civil matters, such as are laws and precepts of political life".[376] "One should not wish to construct a system of natural law by methods proper to geometry; one must, on the contrary, continually consult experience and comparative law."[377] It is through experience of life in society, particularly its "growing complexity and maladjustments", that we are able to see more precisely what are the implications of the

basic content of the Natural Law. Rommen believes Leo XIII's encyclical Rerum Novarum represented a notable advance in Natural Law thinking about private property.[378] When Rommen speaks here of "a development in the doctrine of natural law"[379] being possible, he appears to have in mind the deepening understanding of man which experience brings. Yet he rejects the idea of "natural law with a changing or progressive content", in favour of "natural law with changing and progressive applications".[380] It is the doctrine of immutable essences which dictates this wording. Development is not in the content but in our understanding. The dynamic aspect of Natural Law lies in the fact that the essence of man is also his goal. This means that the Natural Law "indicates, prescribes, and governs man's basic individual and social duty to make progress, progress that is at once material, intellectual, and moral, and that has no visible earthly limits".[381] But what progress is required at any moment lies outside the scope of Natural Law.

Rommen would readily admit that there will usually be far more uncertainty about the application of Natural Law at any moment in history, than about the content of Natural Law itself. This is particularly true in complex and extremely contingent cases and relationships. He quotes St. Thomas, "to suitably introduce justice into business transactions and personal relations is more laborious and difficult to understand than the remedies in which consists the whole art of medicine".[382] What Natural Law can do in such cases is to provide a yardstick by which men can detect where the existing system is failing.[383] For example, the Natural Law assertion of the right to property requires the lawgiver to fashion the actual order of ownership so that property may perform its proper function with regard to the national character and stage of economic development. "The property system of private capitalism with its unrestrained freedom of ownership, with its mobilisation of all real property, with its tendency toward giant corporations and

trusts, and with its division of each people into relatively few 'haves' and a great many 'have-nots', has been for a long time in no position to perform this function." Rommen cites the work of Bishop von Ketteler (1811-1877) in opposing economic liberalism, showing that liberty for the propertyless is largely a fiction, and pressing the need for families to have adequate property for their biological and moral existence. There is nothing sacrosanct about positive institutions of property. The common good requires the lawmaker prudently to introduce changes into the system of property suitable to new economic conditions.[384] This kind of exercise manifestly requires close attention to circumstances, to the peculiarities of individual peoples or their legal tradition, to their historical and economic development.[385] 'The farther deductive reasoning descends from first principles and universal norms ... a keener and more penetrating consideration of all the circumstances is needed for the correct application of the conclusions to facts which become ever more contingent. From this, too, the necessity of positive law becomes evident. Consideration of these circumstances requires in addition a great deal of experience and wisdom."[386] 'The more the practical reason descends from the principles to the further conclusions and comes to apply them to increasingly more concrete situations of fact, its knowledge becomes increasingly more uncertain, variable, and questionable in application."[387] There is no escape from this. It is the business of the positive law to attend to Natural Law and to circumstances and to frame the best laws under those circumstances.[388]

As will already be apparent, Natural Law points in the direction of moderation. This comes about from various considerations. The close attention to existing laws rests on the supposition that at very least they cannot be totally contrary to reason.[389] The demand for experience puts a premium on giving the older members of society power to frame legislation.[390] Then there is the recognition that errors can easily occur because passions, diverse interests, and selfish appetites can bring about a blotting out of

knowledge of the Natural Law.[391] This throws the accent on the need for clear positive law and for order. It is true Natural Law itself provides an indirect sanction in that every people that disregards the laws of moral living is doomed to destruction: "World history continues to be world judgment". But positive immediate sanctions are needed. 'The propensity to disorder which is found in man and his associations is just as strong as, nay even stronger than, the rational longing for ordo. All this calls for a positive ordering and safeguarding of human existence and welfare at the hands of a concrete power. The philosophia perennis does not subscribe to the unfounded optimism of Rousseau's idea of natural law. It is aware of the demonic element in man's nature, of the dark forces which produce disorder and destruction."[392] Similarly Maritain notes how revolutionaries will deliberately unleash irrational forces to command sufficient collective energy for their purposes, and he stresses man's "latent barbarism" in opposition to Rousseau's optimism.[393] A secure and reliable order is seen by Rommen as a most essential element of the common good.[394] Any order is better than no order.[395] As a consequence, though positive law is subject to the norm of Natural Law, only that positive law is non-law which falls foul of the negative norms of Natural Law (e.g. no law may command adultery or stealing).[396] One is not necessarily entitled to disobey an unjust tax law; for it may be a case where individual interest should give precedence to the common good.[397] Natural Law is revolutionary only where the law has become materially immoral. "Its attitude toward the imperfections of the positive law is merely reformist."[398]

Rommen's exposition of the content and limits of Thomist Natural Law is in conscious opposition particularly to rationalists and positivists. The accusation so often made against Catholic Natural Law is not only rejected by Rommen but levelled against those who promoted a secular Natural Law from the 17th century onwards. 'The natural law is not in the least some sort of rationalistically deduced, norm-

abounding code of immediately evident or logically derived detailed rules that fits every concrete historical situation."[399] It is rather the version of Natural Law which cut loose from metaphysics that indulged its passion for deductions uncontrolled either by being or a doctrine of history as the domain of God's providential activity.[400] The Sophists,[401] Grotius,[402] Pufendorf,[403] and Kant[404] are all culprits. Rommen's complaint is not only that these thinkers deduced an extensive content of Natural Law, often from certain empirical features of man, and transferred it all to the state of nature prior to the status civilis.[405] What poses as valid rational deduction readily stands exposed as historically conditioned political preferences and class reference.[406]

Rommen also rejects the positivists who reacted to the rationalists excesses. Against them he asserts that there is a content to Natural Law. He opposes all who would treat Natural Law as a mere ideal, regulative norm which leaves the field of law entirely to the positive law.[407] In fact even the avowed positivist, when he becomes interested in economic, social or political reform, deserts his sceptical agnosticism and acts as if Natural Law and objective justice existed, thus following the common sense of ordinary men and women. Again there is a class reference: anti-metaphysical positivism is a reflection of "a solidly established, economically secure, and politically un-endangered ruling class".[408] Classical Natural Law re-asserts itself, showing that the truth "lies midway between the excess of deductive rationalism and the self-denying defect of a practicalness that is held prisoner by purely external facts".[409] Maritain is also concerned with the nemesis upon a brash rationalistic Natural Law. The trumpeting of rights in the Rousseauist tradition led to the notion of an "absolute right ... to unfold one's cherished possibilities at the expense of all other being". This illusion squandered men's real rights and led to a belief in the bankruptcy of the rights of the human person.

"Some have turned against these rights with an enslaver's fury; some have continued to invoke them, while in their inmost conscience they are weighed down by a temptation to scepticism which is one of the most alarming symptoms of the present crisis."[410]

Temple does not at any point set out the content of Natural Law as Rommen does. A careful look at his work, however, reveals many basic similarities. The chief difference is that whereas Rommen reproduces a long-standing tradition, Temple's approach seems to be a product of his study of ethics as a philosopher, checked out against his understanding of Christianity. His chief philosophical debt seems to be to Plato and the Utilitarians, and in Nature, Man and God he favours what he calls Ideal Utilitarianism. No doubt his preferences among philosophers reflect his permanent commitment to the classical Christian tradition, of which Natural Law and moral theology are a part, though it is impossible to trace the interplay of philosophy and theology here. Certainly Temple would have seen eye to eye with upholders of Natural Law at many points.

We may begin with Temple's statement: "I do not myself believe that there is any rule of conduct, strictly so called, that is of absolute obligation ... But though there is no universal rule of action, there are universal principles to be applied in action".[411] Two formal principles are (i) that the distinction between right and wrong does not depend on circumstances;[412] (ii) that an absolute obligation rests upon us to do what is right (i.e. we are absolutely obliged to be conscientious).[413] It is because absolute obligation attaches not to act but to agent that Temple lays such heavy stress on the development of character.[414]

Now to will the good of other people is to love them.[415] A further universal principle is Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative 'Treat humanity in yourself and others always as an end withal and never only as a means'. Its Biblical form is 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as

thyself'.[416] This is the supreme principle of morality,[417] the only absolute moral law.[418]

Temple does not leave the matter at this very high level. He follows Plato in declaring that the true end of human life is Righteousness. Moral value resides supremely in the righteous character. 'This is the character which subordinates all other considerations to the claims of the community of persons. But because it is of persons, the highest interest of the community and of its members is a personal interest, the fulfilment of their being as Persons; and this is Righteousness."[419] Clearly Temple's understanding of man is giving content to the notion of love. In Christianity and Social Order love as a regulative principle is filled out in the equally universal primary and derivative social principles.[420]

The ethical provisions of the Decalogue are the early negative expression of the positive principle of love.[421] Temple continually reminds us (sometimes with pacifism in mind[422]) that "Thou shalt not kill" cannot function as an exceptionless rule.[423] When taken as "Thou shalt do no murder" it is exceptionless, but only by definition. That does not, however, make it a mere tautology. If we really grasp the meaning of Personality, we can see that to inflict injustice in the form of suffering or death on innocence "is an outrage on the sanctity of personality, while voluntarily to inflict it is to repudiate that sanctity and the obligations which it imposes".[424]

The rules about paying debts, keeping promises, and telling the truth, cannot be exceptionless; some "elasticity" is rightly recognised as desirable.[425] Yet Temple's immense stress on the sanctity of Personality prevents any preoccupation with exceptions. "It is this recognition of the ultimate value of Persons which clothes with so austere a sanctity those duties that arise out of special personal relationships ... A promise creates a personal claim, and to break it for any reason which the

man to whom it was made cannot be expected to regard as compelling, is to ignore his claim and so to flout the sanctity of his personality."[426]

I do not think Temple would have dissented from the list of rights advanced by Rommen and Maritain. In the numerous instances I have given in Part I of Temple's criticisms of existing society and proposals for its improvement there is implied the right to liberty, property and the like - rights which are rooted in his conception of personality.[427] If Temple uses the word 'rights' little, it is primarily because he thought in terms of duties - a term no doubt correlative with rights, but better calculated to underline man's social nature and the need for service to the community.[428] It is striking how in his critique of Thomism Temple links the modern emergence of personality not with rights but with responsible citizenship.[429]

From this point on we move further and further away from certainty in the application of the high-level principles. Temple nowhere deduces a particular political or economic system from his principles. For instance he does not give unqualified support to democracy.[430] He prefers democracy because it is best suited to educate citizens in responsible citizenship.[431] But he recognises that whether democracy should be introduced or not in a particular country depends on circumstances.[432] What Temple has is a political ideal akin to Rommen's. His preference too is for mixed forms of government and a mixed economy.[433]

The importance to Temple of taking circumstances into account is writ large across Part I of this thesis. The principles are used as a yardstick to criticise existing society and so to determine broad objectives (middle axioms).[434] This the Church can do. It is the function of Christians to move to programmes, which require experience, knowledge of the circumstances and perhaps technical expertise.[435] Temple is explicit about the utilitarian

component of his thinking in Nature, Man and God. The right thing to do is the thing that is the best on the whole.[436] Temple believes that, with reference to the estimate of acts, he is virtually commending Ideal Utilitarianism. Where he differs from the historic school of Utilitarianism is in his choice of Righteousness as the supreme good.[437]

Now a man's act is the whole difference that he makes.[438] In many cases the ramifications are immense,[439] or we are unsure about our scale of values.[440] There is therefore an irreducible element of uncertainty.[441] The moral life, says Temple with relish, is an adventure.[442] (It might have been better if he had left the matter there, rather than supposing that the notion of vocation could provide the missing certainty).[443]

In spite of the furore Temple created by his pronouncements on social affairs, he was reformist, not revolutionary. He is a man of moderation, in fact the epitome of the tradition of aurea mediocritas, bringing to it Caird's dialectic. It is his unquestioned assumption that the legal system and the conventions of Britain are fundamentally good. He may be critical of some departments of life, but at least "our established order of life recognises the sanctity of Personality in many ways. We have freedom of thought and speech in England, at least in the sense of absence of legal restrictions upon them, such as has seldom been achieved in any nation. We have freedom within the law and equality before the law - except so far as the cost of litigation may interfere with this equality."[444] Ordinary moral conventions have an immense authority simply because they embody the experience of so many generations. They "represent an immense inductive process too vast to be adequately traced out ... It is the collective reason of innumerable individuals, who all agree (though it may be unconsciously) in the major premise that it is desirable to maintain social life". We

must neither accept them without question nor reject them by looking for their rational grounds in a crude manner. Particularly in an age when conventions are breaking down we should criticise them by asking what principle is supposed to underline them, and then decide whether to uphold or defy them.[445] "We are bound to defy conventional moral judgments when we see that they are wrong; but we are bound to obey them, so long as we fail to see that they are right; and our standard must be the principle of those judgments themselves."[446]

Temple's views on child development outlined in the earlier section on Education have revealed the constant need for discipline and training through intercourse of less mature with more mature minds, if apparent and true good are to coincide. His strong conviction about the basic self-centredness of man forbids any facile view that conscience is a reliable index of what is right, even though it is conscience that a man must obey. His prior duty is to make sure that what his conscience tells him <u>is</u> right.[447]

Even if God's moral law constantly operates in judgment,[448] we need the positive law to keep us true to our purpose.[449] Temple stresses the necessity of stable order as indispensable for freedom.[450] Revolution can be justified only in extreme cases where state and law militate against the common good.[451] Again however, Temple wishes to do greater justice to individual freedom than Rommen, and as a consequence he poses a dilemma in the guise of a balanced solution, for what he really wants is free order or ordered freedom.[452] As well as necessary stability he advocates democracy for the development of personality, which is bound to take the risk of trusting with freedom men who do not seem to deserve trust.[453]

Finally, it is very important to notice that in advancing his version of Ideal Utilitarianism, Temple is

consciously in opposition both to a Biblical fundamentalism which would take texts as absolute rules, and to Kant. Kant's formalism ignores the fact that circumstances are relevant to moral choices,[454] and his logical rejection of lying "parts company with common sense and common conscience".[455] This fits with Temple's rejection of pacifism as an absolute position.[456]

C. Reflections

The comparison of Temple with Rommen and Maritain is now complete. The resonances are striking, particularly with Maritain. We have also seen how Temple diverges from traditional Natural Law. In my judgment he had very little to learn from it, and a good deal to lose if he gave it too much play in his own thought. For he was far more responsive to modern thought than those who were tied to a Thomist schema. I now offer three sets of reflections, prompted by the comparison, which utilise more recent thinking in order to see more clearly Temple's value and limitations.

1. Metaphysics and Man. There are two points we should note here about Temple: first, that he rejected the Thomist conception of essences in favour of a more empirical approach; secondly, that though he eventually felt driven to move away from Hegelian syntheses, he remained convinced of the importance of the metaphysical task.

We have seen how Temple reacted against the Thomist conception of essences in response to the modern accent on process, and particularly in the interests of an adequate account of man.[457] In this he was certainly right. Even if Victor White is correct to say that St. Thomas does not depreciate personality, the notion of immutable essences and its corollary, the rejection of the idea of Natural Law with a changing or progressive content, does invite a deductive approach, notwithstanding Rommen's disclaimer, thus freezing out empirical considerations, as the

encyclical Humanae Vitae amply demonstrates.[458] Temple's own Hegelian concept of the concrete universal does build in the empirical at the outset, even if this approach runs the risk of premature completions of a system.[459]

Near the end of his life, as we shall see in the next chapter, Temple himself recognized the necessity to move away from syntheses towards a stronger accent on redemption.[460] However, though he spoke of less imposing structures, he looked for the resumption of constructive metaphysics in calmer days. Similarly we find members of the Christendom Group struggling to respond to Barth and yet hold on to the idea of Natural Order. Mackinnon's obscure paper at the Malvern Conference of 1941 is a striking example of this. He greatly admired Maritain and wished to be a Barthian-scholastic.[461] If I understand him correctly, he upholds, in a useful though heavy-handed way, the importance of metaphysical thinking for the sake of social ethics. For he points out the unsatisfactory implications of non-metaphysical Kantian thinking widespread among Anglicans. For instance, (i) exclusive emphasis on motives can easily lead to the idea that the sphere of means is entirely technical and therefore morally and religiously irrelevant;[462] (ii) sin becomes defined as transgression of the moral law, which obscures the more profound idea of rebellion against God by which man has forfeited communion with God and so his true nature;[463] (iii) Kantian "moralists" cannot see that God's revelation in Christ brings any renewed aware-ness of our earthly life. "Even the Church of God ... we will tend to regard as fulfilling its social function in the encouragement of a 'moral' approach to our station and its duties, rather than in the attempt to inspire novel social aims proportionate to its estimate of man's nature and dignity, and to the character of the existing situation."[464] I suspect that several of Temple's critics are unconsciously Kantian in their stress on Jesus's moral teaching as providing the basis of Christian social morality, over against Temple's anchorage in doctrines and a whole Christian philosophy.[465]

Whatever their differences, Temple and Mackinnon were agreed, and rightly so, on the importance of metaphysical thinking for social ethics.

It is interesting that in recent discussion there has been in effect some confirmation of Temple's insights. On the one hand, Roman Catholics have been showing much more flexibility over their attitude to Thomism. For instance, A. P. d'Entrèves strongly asserts the necessity of ontological foundations for justice, but in the interests of widening the area of agreement he does not insist on a Thomist articulation.[466] On the other hand, after a long period of anti-metaphysical philosophizing, there has been an increasing recognition that we cannot dispense with metaphysical thinking. This has often taken the form of exposing the hidden premises of others. Thus d'Entrèves and I. T. Ramsey both show how H. L. A. Hart's attempt to isolate a purely empirical 'core of good sense' in Natural Law contains the suppressed metaphysical premiss that survival is a moral duty.[467] In a similar way K. Ward is quite correct to insist <u>via</u> an examination of the prescriptivist account of morality that Christians must insist on the objectivity of Christian ethics and its metaphysical foundations.[468]

The thinking of J. Macquarrie about man and Natural Law is both empirical and ontological, without any commitment to a full-blown ontology. As he points out, what strikes us today is man's capacity as an agent of change in a changing universe. Man is not only embedded in the universe and so subject to change himself; he is able to transcend any given state of himself.[469] Inwardly he is capable of self-knowledge[470] and of creating ever new images and ideals of himself.[471] Outwardly the natural and social sciences, together with technology, have given man enormous power to modify himself and society.[472] Even so Macquarrie does not reject but reformulates Natural Law, insisting that both man and justice must have

an ontological ground,[473] i.e. that both include yet also transcend observables.

This position bears a marked resemblance to that of Reinhold Niebuhr, who was well aware that he had an ontology, but deliberately kept it implicit because of his understanding of reality. For Niebuhr the essence of man contains two elements: his character as a creature embedded in the natural order, and the freedom of his spirit, seen in his transcendence over the natural process and in his own self-transcendence.[474] This view on the one hand draws sharp attention to man's empirical aspects and limitations, and on the other stresses the indeterminate possibilities of man, both for good and evil. This means that the self in the unity of its freedom and finiteness has a bewildering degree of mixture of spiritual freedom and natural necessity, so that we cannot speak of a fixed essence. His suspicion of ontology is compactly expressed in a reply to Paul Tillich: "I do not believe that ontological categories can do justice to the freedom either of the divine or of the human person, or to the unity of the person in his involvement in and transcendence over the temporal flux, or that the sin of man and the forgiveness by God of man's sin or the dramatic variety of man's history can be comprehended in ontological categories."[475] Now if we are to prefer a dialectical understanding of love and justice to the smoother contours of Temple, then to be consistent we must here leave our ontology implicit. For Niebuhr's understanding of love and justice is intimately correlated with his understanding of man. Because man has a radical freedom, he can only be known from beyond himself, and the true norm for him cannot be a rationally conceived law, but only the law of love - that radical love shown by the Very Man, Jesus Christ, on the Cross. And because man's freedom is radically corrupted, it is only that self-giving love which is adequate to heal that radical corruption.[476]

This suggests two things about Temple's social principles, which fundamentally embody a doctrine of man..

First, they must be clearly seen as regulative, not definitive; for we are not dealing with static concepts. Secondly, it is noticeable that in both Temple and Natural Law the accent goes on man as individual and communal. What Temple says about this is fundamentally correct; the problem lies in the fact that freedom and fellowship occupy the central place in the account of man. Although Temple mentions the tragic side of man in his primary principles, the factor of sin comes in later as one of the considerations in working out what is practically to be done. It was only in the last years of his life, when Temple gave greater weight to man's corruption, that he elevated sin to the status of a principle.[477] There is no doubt that Temple did have a lively sense of sin; the issue is the way he handled the factor of sin in his conceptualisation of Christian social ethics. I believe it is inferior to Niebuhr's. He could see the superiority of Niebuhr to the Natural Law tradition, even to Maritain, yet could not respond adequately to him.[478]

2. <u>The Application of Principles</u>. Few doubt the importance of attention both to principles and also to facts and consequences in arriving at decisions in social morality. The critical question, however, is the best procedure for doing so. Although Temple once criticized an encyclical of Pius XI for merely reiterating noble statements of the fundamental principles of Christianity and failing to get to grips with the analysis of social problems,[479] I have repeatedly suggested in Part I that his own handling of the application of principles was defective. He tended to be too intensively and exclusively moral, sometimes simplistically so; to be deficient in analysis, letting a phrase or a slogan do duty in lieu; to be slow to face the hard facts of the historical situation, such as motivations, interests and power.[480] A major part of the trouble is evident in the previous section (1): the Hegelian impulse to a total system, together with his granting central place to the principles of freedom and fellowship (which reflected a liberal catholic stance with

its accent on the Incarnation and sacraments). The net result was that the distinction Temple made between principles and ideals did not operate as sharply in practice as it might.[481] One factor here was that Temple was struggling to cancel the supposed divorce between religion and social affairs, and tended therefore to over-emphasise the place of moral considerations. Undoubtedly too there was his upper-class background. Family and education combined to impress on him an intensely moral bent, boundless assurance, and a certain model of leader-ship - the kind which plunges ahead through personal initiative and fires others to follow in the leader's footsteps. Unfortunately in social ethics this can easily involve the adoption of the wrong procedure and so lessen the impact of specific recommendations and give a handle to opponents who are even more wrong. Since churchmen habitually hanker after the sort of lead Temple often gave, it is important to clarify this matter, and this can best be done by focussing on the topic of middle axioms.

Middle axioms have been a feature especially of ecumenical social ethics for over forty years. They came into their own at the Oxford Conference on Church, Community and State in 1937. They are seen as being of special value in mediating between principles and concrete policies. R. H. Preston describes them as "an attempt to proceed from the basic ethical stance deriving from a theological or philosophical world-view to the realm of the empirical by seeing if there is a consensus among those with <u>relevant experience</u> of the matter under discussion (both 'experts' and 'lay' folk) as to the broad moral issues raised and the <u>general direction</u> in which social change should be worked for, without getting as far as <u>detailed</u> policies".[482] In an important article in <u>Crucible</u>[483] Preston stresses that "middle axioms are arrived at by bringing alongside one another the total Christian understanding of life and an analysis of the empirical situation". Having made the analysis, we ask where the Christian understanding of life

is being disregarded and on the basis of that negative judgment on the status quo formulate a middle axiom. This process has the advantage of helping the Church to take some purchase over events rather than uttering vacuous generalities; but it also avoids the endorsing of particular, and often disputable policies. Middle axioms are provisional; yet they can carry much weight, the more so the more they reflect ecumenical consensus, and they can help the individual Christian in making his own decisions.

The underlining here of "relevant experience" is completely justified. If the Church is really to bite on social issues, they must be tackled in a corporate way, each member contributing from his own relevant experience and expertise. As Preston puts it, "middle axioms are useful in breaking down the clerical-lay division in the Church. They cannot be arrived at by clergy or by theologians alone. Relevant lay experience is absolutely essential". Among churchmen there is, I believe, a noticeable enthusiasm for signs of personal charisma and a disdain for committees. In the sphere of social ethics the kind of leadership which is required within the Church is that which encourages and enables those with relevant experience and expertise to come together on quite specific issues and help to build up the quality of thinking in the Church for the sake of its mission to society.

The weakness of Temple's middle axioms (and more detailed suggestions) is that they come across as solo efforts of a Church leader which are direct inferences from principles and do not spring out of sufficient experience. It is true that they are presentations of widely held views, often part of the consensus registered at COPEC in 1924 and Malvern in 1941. But here again the method was defective. Although the Christian Social Union and the preparers of COPEC saw the need for analysis and research, COPEC's conclusions were highly moral and based on too little empirical study. It reiterated the need for more analysis and research, and Henry Mess's studies on

Tyneside were an excellent example of what could be done.[484] But the Malvern Conference was dominated by the Christendom Group, which in its enthusiasm for Natural Law failed to take seriously the relatively autonomous discipline of economics.[485] Although Temple sat somewhat loose to them, and was determined that the follow-up to Malvern should not fall into the hands of Anglo-Catholics,[486] he was clearly influenced by them in his adoption of Natural Law and Natural Order late in life and believed they were experts.[487] Whatever one makes of the suggestions Temple offers at the level of middle axioms and practical ideas (e.g. chapter 7 and the Appendix of Christianity and Social Order), the main trouble is that they reflect the kind of leadership which could not achieve what Temple himself wanted - the formation of the mind of the Church for its social mission. The suggestions, and particularly the economic mistakes, gave a handle to ignorant critics, who, as we shall see, under the cover of some valid complaints could peddle theological incompetence and generate heat but no light.[488] Temple was on much surer ground when he approved of the aims of the Yorkshire Institute of Industrial Affairs, and his finest achievement in his social concern was the inspiring of Men Without Work, where the kind of enabling leadership he provided was exactly what was required.[489] It is perhaps surprising that he did not follow more closely the approach of his great friend R. H. Tawney, who shared Temple's moral passion but was much more appreciative of the necessity of painstaking empirical research.[490]

Given the proper approach to the construction of middle axioms, they can carry much weight. As Preston rightly says, they are superior to any deductive use of the maxims of Natural Law, to a sharp (Lutheran) distinction of the two Kingdoms, and to the Calvinist attempt to derive specific conclusions directly from the Bible (both Preston and John Bowden point out the arbitrariness of Karl Barth's attempts to do this).[491] Preston's whole article is a strong endorsement of Temple's concern for middle axioms, even if not of his manner of arriving at

them. His closing words put the matter very concisely. "The method of the middle axiom ... is critical of the status quo, but it keeps contingent political and social judgements in their proper and necessary but secondary place. It requires Christian social action and will not sanction a private pietism, but it differentiates between God's causes and our causes. It takes the religious overtones out of politics while insisting that it is a necessary area of Christian obedience." It will be worth bearing these remarks in mind when we come to Temple's critics. For they make simplistic connections between Christian faith and social affairs. Preston says middle axioms place the onus of proof on those who disagree to make out a good case for their disagreement. Most of Temple's critics cannot distinguish a middle axiom from a political programme, and cannot see that there is the least onus on them, so certain are they that theirs is the obvious way in Christian social ethics. I shall also pick up ideas from this section in my Conclusion.

3. Situation ethics. I have two reasons for commenting on the situation ethics debate of the last 15 years. First I believe it confirms, by the revealed inadequacies of situation ethics, the necessity of a properly thought out method of Christian social ethics, embracing a complex view of love and justice together with principles and middle axioms, if we are to come to responsible decisions. Secondly Joseph Fletcher produced a study of William Temple and his book Situation Ethics within a short space of time.[492] Whilst one has to bear in mind that that former is intended as a portrait and not a critical study, the impression one receives is that Fletcher believes he and Temple are in basic accord in their ethical thinking. In fact, this is by no means so.

The upshot of the debate on situation ethics is that Christian social ethics cannot get by simply with the notion of agape. We need principles (or call them what you

will) which express in shorthand our basic understanding of man. There is some point in J. F. Fletcher's attack on legalism. It is a distortion of Christian morals,[493] and it has been found in Catholic and Protestant moral theology.[494] But Macquarrie is right to say that the attack on legalism has often been on a straw man: Catholic moral theology has its flexibility in probabilism.[495] Certainly there is no reason why Rommen or Temple's view of Natural Law should be operated in a legalistic way.

Critics of situation ethics have above all shown the instability of its own base. It operates with a sharp antithesis between love and law. The result is that it neglects the fact that love does not simply transcend law, it fulfils it. Love must operate through conscience in order that it can have some moral content or direction.[496] As Häring puts it, "Fletcher's concept of love is structure-less".[497] To simplify ethics by taking love as the sole key is to run into antinomianism: its openness actually leads indifferently to sentimentalism or to hard utilitarian calculation.[498]

Further, the accent on the existential moment of decision tends to obscure certain continuities of life. (i) Man comes across as simply functional man. Yet, "man is more than what he does; out of his acts he builds up the unity of a personal self".[499] (ii) In a sense each situation or act is unique, but there are also characteristics common with other situations or acts.[500] (iii) Situation ethics tends to limit the situation to the immediate principal actors; but it is hard to know where the boundaries of any particular situation are. Situations merge into one another.[501] (iv) Situation ethics is "subversive of any idea of a moral community ... it is a fundamentally and incurably individualistic type of ethic".[502] As Paul Ramsey put it, "No social morality ever was founded, or ever will be founded, upon a situational ethic".[503] Fletcher's version is strikingly nominalistic in its under-standing of value,[504] voluntaristic in its decision-making,[505]

and contractual in its understanding of social bonds. The claim of Fletcher to be on the side of persons is question-begging and ultimately spurious. What Fletcher and others seriously underestimate is the importance of the relational norms of life[506] - continuing moral relationships where loyalty is central,[507] such as marriage,[508] and promise-keeping,[509] which are indispensable for social living.
(v) So far from the Christian ethic being contained in concrete encounters, the Christian must "embrace the ongoing life of the world in its entirety". He cannot avoid difficult questions of social policy.[510] He should think not of isolated acts, but of action between the Incarnation and Consummation;[511] there must be room for prophetic vision of God's purpose for humanity.[512] The eschatological dimension is lacking in situationism.

A further complaint against situation ethics is that it presents moral decisions as if there were nothing perplexing or problematical about them. Either we simply see what we are to do in the moment of decision or the only problem is that of knowing facts and calculating consequences. Yet surely the perplexity is genuinely deeper.[513] There are cases where what we have to do in a pluralistic and anti-authoritarian society in the name of social justice leaves us intensely dissatisfied when compared with the full demands of Christian love. We are confronted with conflicting claims and may not be sure about priorities. Moral tragedy is a possibility.[514] The situationist assumes a very high degree of moral sensitivity and perceptiveness. He is unrealistic about the weakness of human nature.[515] In fact, rules may actually save us from our worst selves.[516] Kolnai marvels at the radiant optimism of situationism in the face of man's predicaments - a piece of Utopian <u>hubris</u>.[517]

Macquarrie complains that the discussion of situation ethics is pitiably irrelevant to the major ethical problems of our time.[518] It has also cut itself off from dialogue with adherents of non-Christian morals. Actually Fletcher

himself oscillates confusingly between the idea of the Christian ethic as radically agapeic in distinction from other ethics and the idea that even the Viet Cong terrorist can be guided by an "altruistic ethic (agapeic)".[519] Fletcher does not explore the meaning of the Cross or the idea of the sovereign redemptive grace of God; his position looks distinctly Pelagian.

The simplistic antithesis of situationism and legalism is therefore productive of a "misplaced debate", as Gustafson has called it.[520] There are moral principles; there are intrinsically evil acts[521] - acts which no set of circumstances could conceivably justify, for they lie at the very heart of societal life. Some moral principles are "so stable as to be virtually sacrosanct as long as human beings remain broadly what they now are".[522] Further, we do need rules: quite apart from our moral weakness, life is too short to start each decision from scratch; rules "save time and effort by capitalising on experience".[523] Ian Ramsey rejects the charge of legalism by indicating how our moral principles arise and where the situationists help us to understand the origin and functions of principles better. 'The charge of 'legalism' vanishes when it is realised that our whole array of moral 'principles' arises from exploring moral obligations on countless occasions, each of them reminding us of decisions taken in situations of the widest empirical variety and diversity, so that together they provide us with the best map and moral guide-book which we have to date. We need moral principles and there are moral principles. But they are not copy-book principles any more than morality is a slavish following of rules. They each point back to an obligation revealed through and around the empirical facts of countless situations, an obligation matched only by a decision in which we realise ourselves characteristically as persons. This is the core of truth, I would suggest, in the claims of those who sponsor 'situational ethics' and talk of an 'existentialist' approach."[524] Actually we find situationists do embrace

a rule-agapism, not pure act-agapism. "Love alone ... can allow itself to be directed completely by the situation." "I would of course be the first to agree that there is a whole class of actions, - like stealing, lying, killing, committing adultery, - which are so fundamentally destructive of human relationships that no difference of century or society can change their character." Both those quotations are from J. A. T. Robinson.[525] Fletcher's tendency is surreptitiously to introduce moral rules which do not self-evidently flow from the notion of love. In discussing abortion[526] he wanders away from the particular case to propound, or at least lend support to, the general idea that no unwanted or unintended baby should ever be born. He also tries to refute metaphysics by hidden metaphysics: human embryos are not human beings.

Finally, it is worth noting how Fletcher uncritically reflects the Zeitgeist. At the centre lies the contention that situation ethics is a method not a substantive ethic.[527] It is "not particularly Catholic or Protestant or Orthodox or humanist".[528] Fletcher's critics rightly believe that this distinction cannot be carried through, and that the penalty is that Christianity is sold short. Then we have the pervasive atomic individualism of secular thought; nominalism ('The whole mind-set of the modern man, our mind-set is on the nominalists' side," says the uncritical Fletcher);[529] reason seen as technical reason; the pragmatism of Peirce, James and Dewey: "its idiom expresses the genius and ethos or style of life of American culture and of the techno-scientific era";[530] relativism;[531] questioning rather than answering.[532] It all amounts to an ideology. Better "to recognise the ideology one has and submit it critically to the test of reason and experience," writes Basil Mitchell.[533]

Now if we compare Fletcher and Temple we see that there are important differences between them. There is hardly one of the criticisms made of Fletcher which can fairly be made of Temple. Temple does not antithesize Gospel and Law;

he does not base his ethics on directionless love - in fact his Christianity and Social Order starts out from man and principles, not from love; he stresses building up character or personal unity; an act is not to be abstracted from the whole train of consequences and contexts; he is not individualistic, nominalistic, voluntaristic; he does not take a purely contractual view of society; he is strong on the relational norms of life (his views on marriage are very strict);[534] he has a lofty vision which sets the least human act in the context of the Divine purpose for the created order; he can see the perplexity of modern life; he is not an unrealistic optimist (he quotes A. L. Smith's saying that though we may be reasonably honest folk who prefer to pay for our seats 'when we travel by train, there are occasions when the existence of the ticket-collector clinches the matter);[535] Pelagianism for Temple is the only inherently damnable heresy; he values the past moral experience of men, without being enslaved to their judgements; reason for him is far more than technical reason.

It is, I think, Fletcher's simplistic antithesizing which leads him to overlook these differences or (as happens in places) so to select and elucidate Temple's thought that we see Temple through the spectacles of Fletcher's own situationism.[536] In fact I believe that Temple (and this is true of Niebuhr too) has in principles and middle axioms a more profound and stable base and method for coming to responsible decisions in social affairs.[537]

CHAPTER VI

THE CHRISTIAN FAITH AND NATURAL MORALITY

In 1912 Temple argued strongly that in its nature, though probably not in its history, the moral judgment is quite absolutely independent of religion.[1] Nearly thirty years later, as we noticed above, he claimed that the Natural Order "can be in very large measure ascertained without any conscious reference to God"; its discovery is "a task for human reason".[2] Anyone within the Catholic Natural Law tradition would be familiar with the high regard paid to reason, and with a fairly sharp distinction between reason and revelation. The whole point of Natural Law is that it can act as a bridge between believer and unbeliever solely on the basis of reason. The only slight surprise might be the phrase "in very large measure". A greater surprise lies in store in Citizen and Churchman. Temple urges that at the end of the Second World War the Church must be ready with its system of principles to guide the inevitable social transformation. He proposes to sketch what he calls a "Christian analysis" of some aspects of the situation, but immediately says of it, "There will be in this nothing distinctively Christian, in the sense of being directly deducible from the Gospel or incapable of apprehension apart from the Gospel; it results from a consideration of the 'natural order'..."[3] There seems here to be the concept of an overlap of reason and Gospel which is not a characteristic of the Natural Law tradition. This is found again in Christianity and Social Order where a paraphrase of the

Epistle to the Ephesians is closely linked with a reference to the Natural Order.[4]

Most surprising of all would be Temple's remarks in the same set of broadcast talks in which he praises Natural Order. He castigates neglect of God and His laws by the British public, and especially the attitude which treats religion as a private affair between a man and his Maker. "The prevalence of this childishly superficial attitude has been possible only because we have inherited a civilisation largely permeated by principles which derive all their validity from faith in God, and indeed in God as Christians have learnt to understand Him, yet have not troubled to know on what those principles rest."[5]

This sort of vacillation is also evident in the Christendom Group.[6] In Temple's case the explanation lies, as I shall try to show, partly in the ambiguities of the Christian philosophy he developed up to the Gifford Lectures, partly in his own groping after a more satisfactory position with the advent of war. The issue is not only important in any attempt to understand Temple. The changing circumstances after the Second World War have sharpened the question of the relationship of natural morality and the Christian faith, and Temple's value to us depends on the kind of answer we can give.

There are three factors at least which shaped Temple's brand of Christian philosophising. First, he was a professional philosopher, trained in the heyday of British Hegelianism. He conceived the philosophic task as a meta-physical one: philosophy is "a determined attempt to think clearly and comprehensively about the problems of life and existence".[7] For much of his life Temple was engaged in the search for a coherent account of the universe. He followed British Hegelians in his belief that the world has a spiritual, not a materialistic interpretation, and in his interest in the category of personality. The world's principle of unity must not be a purely intellectual one

but embrace imagination and conscience too; aesthetics, morality and religion, all the facts of experience must be included in the search.[8] We have already seen Temple's debt to Caird for the dialectical method.[9] A basic assumption here, of course, is that the universe is a rational whole and that the human mind can in principle grasp it. "Philosophy assumes the competence of reason ... to grasp the world as a whole."[10] It was only in the last few years of his life that Temple moved away from the idea that the universe made sense.[11]

Secondly, and closely related, Temple thoroughly imbibed the atmosphere of Lux Mundi and the Christian Social Union, both of which dated from the same year, 1889. If Lux Mundi was subtitled "A series of studies in the Religion of the Incarnation", the Christian Social Union attempted to draw out the social implications of the Incarnation. From here came Temple's strong sense of sacrament and Incarnation. He too saw the Logos as operative in every facet of the created world,[12] and was disposed to look on contemporary trends in a positive manner, seeking for fresh illumination and for a right relation of Catholic faith and modern intellectual and moral problems. His understanding of Revelation is of a piece: unless all existence is a medium of Revelation no particular Revelation is possible.[13] We do find in Temple, alongside an affirmation of general Revelation, an insistence on the uniqueness of the Incarnation and the particularity of the Revelation in Jesus Christ.[14] Indeed, Temple spent much time elaborating a metaphysics of the Incarnation, trying in idealism's own terms to vindicate the rationality of a particular Incarnation and Revelation against other idealists, who, whilst hospitable to a spiritual interpretation of the universe, found particularity a scandal.[15] It was in pursuit of this that Temple developed his personalism. In company with those who produced Lux Mundi and with the Christian Social Union Temple passionately pursued the moral implications of Christian doctrines.[16] The Victorian Age as a

whole was one of moral ardour. It is the concern with man as a social being and with social phenomena like politics and economics that is a particular feature of Lux Mundi, the Christian Social Union and Temple.[17]

The third factor is Temple's intense personal commitment to Christianity. A. M. Ramsey remarks that "intellectually, Temple took some time before he could be sure of orthodoxy; but, religiously, it is probable he had never doubted God or Christ".[18] The best evidence for this is Temple's admission, after a fumbling speech on 'Why I believe in God', that he had never known what it was to doubt God's existence.[19] It is worth recalling Professor Leonard Hodgson's observation that in the midst of controversy Temple's conduct could lift men to "the realm where he habitually dwelt".[20] Presumably this confidence in and closeness to his God was the source of his power as an evangelist also. His notable missions on Blackpool sands,[21] and the Oxford Mission talks, Christian Faith and Life, reveal his forte as an expositor of the Christian faith. By temperament he was indeed "the very opposite of a sceptic".[22] He was never gripped by problems of New Testament criticism like the quest of the historical Jesus "probably because he believed that he had found the historical Jesus". He was untroubled by questions about the historical value of the Fourth Gospel.[23] His frequent advice to Christians afflicted by intellectual uncertainty was, "Get about among Christian believers as much as ever you can".[24]

In Mens Creatrix, Christus Veritas and Nature, Man and God Temple is trying to show that if we reflect upon the world the Christian hypothesis is the only one which is adequate, and that Christian faith is best capable of illuminating every aspect of human experience. His method is set out in Mens Creatrix. He conceives of himself as first working from the world, through knowledge, art, morality and religion (which is part of the evidence and should not be omitted), showing how they converge yet do not themselves meet in an all-inclusive system of Truth.

Then the Christian hypothesis is adopted and he shows how its central fact, the Incarnation, supplies the missing unity. The first movement is philosophical, from the circumference to the centre, the second theological from the centre out towards the circumference.[25]

Critics of Temple have generally agreed that he has an inconsistent view over the issue of natural theology and Christian faith, and that his Christian commitment undermines the declared method of proceeding initially strictly by reason. Thus, Dorothy Emmet agrees with the comments Emil Brunner sent to Temple: Brunner considered Temple's conception of natural theology (i) approached Christian philosophy, i.e. started from the Christian faith, which then regulated the course of thought; (ii) was intended as thought resting solely on logical argument and facts open to anyone; (iii) seemed to be striving towards a synthesis of Christian faith with reason.[26]

J. F. Padgett, O. C. Thomas, and W. G. Peck all describe Temple as constructing a Christian philosophy.[27] Padgett's is the most thorough-going study, and he means by the term that Temple "begins his quest for a comprehension of reality from the perspective of the Christian faith".[28] So too O. C. Thomas: though Temple professes to engage in Natural Theology ("that philosophical discipline which pursues enquiries into the true nature and general validity of Religion ...") he does not do so very thoroughly, and his prime concern is with Christian philosophy, i.e. the interpretation of the various realms of experience, including religion, on the basis of Christian theology.[29] Thus Padgett notes that on the journeys from the circumference to the centre, Temple is prone to equate the God he arrives at philosophically with the God of Christianity.[30] There tends to be an undisclosed ideal assumed which alone can satisfy the mind, and that ideal is equated with traditional Christianity.[31] So

too philosophical ethics is found wanting by reference to an undisclosed ideal for man.[32] Further, Thomas points out that Temple does not seriously consider any other religion than Christianity.[33] As Brunner remarked, Temple's conception of religion is determined *a priori* by Christian faith, as are his concepts of sin, love and personality.[34] So sure is Temple of his faith that the dialectical method is not really allowed to function;[35] nor does Temple face up to the problems of doubt and error which Descartes raised.[36] It is significant that it was Descartes who was most severely handled by "the very opposite of a sceptic".[37]

Padgett also rightly notes that Temple tends to put before us a choice between Christian faith and scepticism.[38] Whatever his support for the pursuit by reason of the metaphysical task, Temple goes out of his way in *Nature, Man and God* to subsume such disciplines as Physics, Epistemology and Ethics under the heading of Scientific Philosophy and contrast it with Theological Philosophy.[39] The former can offer no complete intellectual satisfaction.[40] It is impossible to transcend cultural limitations[41] or gather all the relevant facts.[42] The most that the theoretical will to know can yield is a society of Intellects united together to correct and supplement each other's apprehension of reality. There is no assurance that the knowledge is fully accurate; no principle of unity is attained.[43] As with all induction, theoretical certainty is impossible.[44] Indeed, in the face of evil, scepticism is more plausible than philosophical theism. We are left without assurance.[45] We are also without ethical guidance; for philosophical ethics is correspondingly limited. It can tell a man that he should be conscientious in what he wills, that the right is what produces the greatest good, and that duties are determined by one's place in society. But it cannot provide sufficient practical guidance.[46] Temple believes that the only solution is for the philosopher to place his tools at the service of religion, and that for Temple means Christianity.[47] This is the way of Theological Philosophy.

Christianity cannot offer theoretical certainty. The basis of assurance is faith. Reason can see the failure of Scientific Philosophy. The philosophy of the Incarnation is the only tenable metaphysics. Posit that and reason will welcome it as the completion of its own work. It renders the universe intelligible as no other metaphysics can.[48] What is more, since it is related much more closely to life than philosophy, it can offer the assurance of God's love experienced in fellowship with Him and practical help for living.[49] The solutions to the problems left by philosophical ethics lie in devoted religious practice, that is, in vocation.[50] As Padgett puts it: "Though the principles of the Christian faith are not completely vindicated, all problems yield to its insights, and this justifies employing the Christian faith and following it wherever it leads".[51]

Underlying this view of the limitations of Scientific Philosophy seems to be the conviction that it is bound to try to offer an explanation of the universe using the lowest categories, and either must end up denying the higher, or turn to Christianity. This choice arises because Temple habitually makes the Hegelian contrast of spiritual and materialistic interpretations of the universe, and equates the higher or spiritual with Christianity. What he neglects is his dialectical method, which would remind him of the existence of non-Christian spiritual interpretations of the world and of persons.

In advocating Theological Philosophy Temple acknowledges that it must be "constantly checked by a purely critical Philosophy which makes its approach from the other end".[52] Padgett's complaint is that Temple never actually carries out this checking. "While <u>arguing</u> cogently for the dialectical method in which fact and theory emerge jointly in the process of interpreting the data of experience and in which conclusions are constantly checked by the facts, Temple actually <u>employs</u> ... an analytical method in which he starts with a specific conception of reality and proceeds to interpret the data of

experience by reference to it without checking his assumptions against the facts."[53] He is in this respect not so much a Christian philosopher as a Christian apologist.[54] Padgett includes among examples of this failure Temple's handling of the concept of personality[55] and the problem of evil.[56] In short, "Temple simply accepts his own religious experience and the orthodox doctrines of the Christian faith as offering definitive interpretations of the nature of reality without subjecting these interpretations to critical scrutiny".[57] The penalty is that practical guidance and theoretical understanding become severed. For if there is inadequate check against reality, is not the value of the practical guidance diminished?[58]

We are faced, therefore, in Temple's Christian philosophising with the fact that he oscillates between different views of the relation between Christian faith and natural theology or morality, and tends to veer away from a truly philosophical task towards Christian apologetics. Padgett rightly thinks that Temple does not succeed in being sufficiently empirical. It must also, and for that very reason, be doubted whether he was sufficiently theological. For the setting of the Cross is highly empirical and calls in question the synthesis of faith and reason. As we shall see, Temple came to realise this, though he did not travel far towards adjusting his philosophy.

We are now in a position to understand better the hallmarks of Temple's most characteristic approach to social ethics, for it is part and parcel of his Christian philosophising. Padgett believes that it is in his social ethics that Temple came nearest to letting his ideal conceptions be modified to cope with the empirical situation. It is noticeable, however, that when he gives examples he most readily turns to Temple's handling of love and justice.[59] We have already seen reason to believe that even here Temple leaned towards a smooth upward continuum through justice to love, and failed to face up as adequately as Niebuhr to the harshness of empirical situations and to the necessity of

love's judgmental 'no' to our pursuit of justice.[60] In the period up to about 1935 Temple's characteristic approach, starting from Christian social principles, always shows evidence of realism, which modifies a fundamentally idealistic approach. In particular we have seen how, in propounding principles, Temple disassociates himself from the notion that Christianity can supply an ideal blueprint for society. He does have a strong sense of the need to work out the consequences of actions, and not simply implement a Christian ethical ideal (such as pacifism) regardless of circumstances. We noted in the section on love and justice in what ways Temple already held views like Niebuhr's before the 1930's. It is therefore only with caution that one should describe Temple as an ethico-social idealist in his early days, as Peck does.[61]

Nevertheless, as we look across the evidence of Part I, we can see certain pervasive features in the material dating from before 1935 or so which reflect his stance as a Christian philosopher. At the root is an unshakeable belief in the sufficiency of his Christian framework. First, he invariably starts from his Christian framework, never finding it necessary to consider any possible non-Christian position, except in the most fleeting way. Internationally his horizons are largely limited to Western Europe, where he hopes for a revitalisation of what he assumes to be still a Christian civilisation, with the Church playing a key role. Domestically he assumes Britain is fundamentally a Christian country.[62] Whilst this outlook was far more understandable then than it could be now, Temple did decline to read the signs of the times as they were evident in surveys from 1851 onwards. It is true that articulate opposition to Christianity was small, but Henson had a much better appreciation of the extent to which the country had moved away from clear allegiance to Christian faith and values.[63] There is therefore an air of unreality about Temple's approach. It reflects no doubt the limits of the circles in which he moved, and also his

own confident belief in his synthesis of faith and reason, the belief that he had convincingly argued whereas he had really analysed.

Equally we do not find Temple seriously troubled by any alternative Christian perspectives except Niebuhr's. P. T. Forsyth is virtually ignored. Henson was undoubtedly Temple's sternest critic, yet I have found no evidence that the two men ever met to give serious consideration to each other's position. The picture is more of salvoes of Dunelm darts peppering a relentless whale - which perhaps was a situation which suited both men temperamentally. I cannot feel, for all his generosity towards pacifists, that Temple ever quite felt the force of their case. The impression one has is of a man sure of his own religious experiences, the orthodox doctrines of Christianity and the classical Western tradition of Christianity. Pacifism was ultimately a position to be intellectually incorporated into that.

Above all, Temple is confident that Christianity can offer clear ethical guidelines of practical value, and make clear assessments of attitudes or conduct as Christian or otherwise. He repudiates a deductive approach, but offers something akin which purports to give almost the same degree of certainty. The movement is always from high-level principles derived from Christian faith towards practicalities. His tendency is to make direct inferences from his ideas. He looks for a counterpart to his idea in society and then declares this as Christian. Thus we find him praising working class behaviour as fundamentally Christian because their solidarity is the counterpart of his principle of fellowship.[64] Another example occurs during the Miners' Strike. The Standing Conference infers that arbitration in industrial disputes is the industrial counterpart of the New Testament ethic of goodwill.[65] It also favours the miners' leaders because it is they who make the conciliatory gesture. We have already seen how ambiguously Temple used the term 'sacrifice'. COPEC in 1924 was the summit of the search in

the pre-war period for direct inferences from Christian faith. It bears the hall-marks of the British Hegelian/ Christian Social Union attempt at the synthesis of sacred and secular; it moves rather academically in the realm of ideas and on their basis makes its fervent moral pronouncements.

Coupled with this one-way approach is the impression Temple gives that once the principles have been made clear the solution to a problem is in sight. There is no evidence that Temple saw his principles as highlighting intolerable dilemmas, e.g. between individual or community interests. The problem lay only in discovering the best means to uphold a principle. There is also a tendency for Temple to pay too much attention to whether he is right in principle and too little to whether he is right in practice. Thus, in his letter to the Times, 21 August, 1926, he defends the principles of the Standing Conference, but leaves it to others to judge the practicalities. Yet Temple himself believes that the right act is that which is right in the circumstances, so the circumstances are just as important as the principles.[66] Part of the explanation lies in the fact that Temple was much concerned with the question of what guidance the Church itself was competent to offer Christians. He correctly recognised there were limits, and that Christians must go on to work out policies and action. However from my experience of trying over a number of years to do this, he appears to have had only a limited sense of the difficulties inherent in doing this. His strong belief that Christianity did offer practical guidance and his doctrine of vocation as the solution to problems of practical ethics probably account for this. There is also the fact that he did not actually move much in controversial areas, where the decisions are most difficult to make. Also Temple's lifelong concern was to rouse the Church to action, and perhaps he was afraid that Christians, once roused, would drop into ethical paralysis.[67] In fact, the very impression Temple gives about the accessibility of solutions is the best guarantee that his fears will be realised. Hopes are roused only to be dashed in a

welter of complexities. In short, there is both an empirical and a theological inadequacy in the ethical out-working of Temple's Christian philosophy.

One of Temple's greatest achievements was his recognition of the inadequacy of his Christian philosophy. In late 1937 he wrote in his Chairman's Introduction to the Report Doctrine in the Church of England: "As I review in thought the result of our fourteen years of labour, I am conscious of a certain transition of interest in our minds, as in the minds of theologians all over the world. We were appointed at a time (1922) when theologians were taking up the prosecution of the task which the war had compelled them to lay aside. Their problems were still predominantly set by the interest of 'pre-war' thought. In our country the influence of Westcott reinforced by that of the Lux Mundi school had led to the development of a theology of the Incarnation rather than a theology of Redemption. The distinction is, of course, not absolute or clean-cut, but the tip of the balance makes a vast difference not only in presentation but in direction of attention and estimate of relative values. A theology of the Incarnation tends to be a Christocentric Metaphysic. And in all ages there is need for the fresh elaboration of such a scheme of thought or map of life as seen in the light of the revelation in Christ. A theology of Redemption (though, of course, Redemption has its place in the former) tends rather to sound the prophetic note; it is more ready to admit that much in this evil world is irrational and strictly unintelligible; and it looks to the coming of the Kingdom as a necessary preliminary to the full comprehension of much that now is.

"If the security of the nineteenth century, already shattered in Europe, finally crumbles away in our country, we shall be pressed more and more towards a theology of Redemption. In this we shall be coming closer to the New Testament. We have been learning again how impotent man is to save himself, how deep and pervasive is that corruption

which theologians call Original Sin. Man needs above all to be saved from himself. This must be the work of Divine Grace."[68]

Temple developed this thinking much further in his article 'Theology To-day' (1939), which called for the digging of deeper foundations. The relevant features are these. First, Temple recognizes the difference in outlook of the world in which he grew up from that in which the younger theologians have formed their habits of thought. In the Victorian and Edwardian age men had at least sincerely professed Christianity in the sense "that it was troubled at any suggestion that it ignored Christian standards of conduct".[69] Now Christian standards are challenged as radically as Christian doctrine, and men feel there are no ascertainable principles on which Christianity rests. The Christian view of life is either relegated to the background or openly repudiated by Communism or Fascism.[70] Temple sees that the younger generation cannot start from the same point in their theology, and are rightly quite unimpressed by being offered a Christian map of the world.[71] Perhaps even in 1924 it was over-optimistic to believe that a "very slight touch to the intellectual balance" might "make the scales incline" towards a metaphysics of the Incarnation.[72] Certainly it was no use in 1939 saying to men 'You will find that all your experience fits together in a harmonious system if you will only look at it in the illumination of the Gospel'.[73] "The world of to-day is one of which no Christian map can be made. It must be changed by Christ into something very unlike itself before a Christian map of it is possible ... Our task with this world is not to explain it but to convert it. Its need can be met, not by the discovery of its own immanent principle in signal manifestation through Jesus Christ, but only by the shattering impact upon its self-sufficiency and arrogance of the Son of God crucified, risen and ascended ... In order to fashion true fellowship in such a world as this, and out of such men and women as we are, He must first break up sham fellowships with which we have been deluding ourselves."[74]

Temple, rightly I think, claims that Mens Creatrix and Christus Veritas did formally allow for this line. He had never claimed that evil was justified before it was overcome. Nevertheless the emphasis now seemed all wrong.[75] "Facile generalisations are an affront. We must start from the fearful tension between the doctrine of the love of God and the actual facts of daily experience. When we have eliminated war, it will be time to discuss whether its monstrous evil can then be seen as a 'constituent element of the absolute good' (Christus Veritas p.254). Till then we had better get on with the job of eliminating it by the power of the Gospel, which we must present, not as the clue to a universal synthesis, but as the source of world-transformation."[76]

In a similar way Temple gently reminds the younger theologians that the older ones had not been blind to a doctrine of redemption. They had sought to persuade their contemporaries, who wanted Christian ethics without Christian doctrine and held a belief in automatic progress, that they needed a Saviour. The root fault had been the complacent sense of security.[77] The evidence of Part I of this thesis shows that for all his idealism, Temple never believed in automatic progress or equated social progress with the Kingdom of God. His realism is rooted in his sense of sin and the need for redemption. A. M. Ramsey confirms Temple's basic point here about the older generations, when he writes on the period 1889-1939.[78]

Finally, we should note in the article what tasks Temple envisages for theology in the light of his reflections. Not surprisingly there is the accent on the proclamation of the Gospel of Salvation to those who believe - which raises the question, What is that Gospel?[79] But significantly Temple starts by saying that there is the task of "thinking out afresh what are the standards of life to which society must aim at conforming if it is to be in any sense a Christian society".[80] He feels that in the face of the

Communist and Fascist challenge, which tells a man plainly what to think and do, the Church has been leaving men with nothing but principles so general as to offer no actual guidance.[81] Temple particularly stresses the need for an ethic of collective action; for half the decisions that modern men have to take are on behalf of some collective unit.[82] He then goes on, "In all this field, effective action is possible only if Christians (a) are ready to co-operate with non-Christians who share their aim, (b) are able to present what they believe on Christian grounds to be right as commendable also on general grounds of reason. Here is a field for the utmost co-operative effort in thought and action. The two great Papal Encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno, and such writings as those of Maritain, set us an example from the Roman Catholic side. Those of us who, in comparison, are handicapped by inability to accept the Thomist scheme as an assured starting-point, though having nothing which is nearly so complete and thorough to put in its place, must do our best, even if for a time it makes poor showing beside the achievement of our colleagues. Perhaps one main task is to become clear precisely where and why we dissent from the Thomist basis, and see whether the whole structure may not be susceptible of modification in the light of our different or additional principles. But whether in that way or in some other, we must labour for the rebirth of Christendom."[83] Temple puts his finger on the major problems by asking "What is the relation between that Order of Redemption which the Christian enters by faith and the Order of Creation to which he belongs as a man? Here is the pacifist problem again. Is there a Natural Order which is from God, as Catholic tradition holds? Or is there only Natural Disorder, the fruit of sin, from which Christ delivers us, as continental Protestantism has held? And if the latter view be adopted, does the deliverance take effect in this life or only in the life to come?"[84]

What effect did these perceptions have on Temple's own social ethics? The pity is that he died only five years

later, so we can only hope to find certain signs of the direction in which he might have moved. First, we can say that the direct influence of continental Protestantism is minimal. In 1942 Barth was writing that ethics has its basis in the knowledge of Jesus Christ.[85] The proper use of the term 'ethics' is "to describe the special task of dogmatics which the Law as the form of the Gospel has imposed upon us".[86] Ethics is therefore integral to dogmatics. The Christian doctrine of God is itself ethics, it is the answer to the ethical question.[87] "The good of human action consists in the fact that it is determined by the divine command." [88] What Barth is concerned to uphold above all else is an ethics of the sovereignty of grace. Inseparable from this position is Barth's conviction of the devastating consequences of the fall.[89] He sees human ethics as a result and prolongation of the fall. The grace of God brings the "refutation, conquest and destruction of all human answers" to the ethical problem. The divine ethics is the "antithesis and contrast to all human ethics".[90] I can find no record of Temple's comment on this section in Barth's Church Dogmatics. Perhaps he did not manage to read it. We can easily guess his reply from remarks he made on Barth in the 'thirties. In Nature, Man and God he approves of Barth's insistence on the impassable distinction of Creator and creature, Redeemer and redeemed - that "is the heart of metaphysical and religious sanity". But he regards as wanton the denial of moral progress, and as fanatical the denial that "revelation can, and in the long run must, on pain of becoming manifest as superstition, vindicate its claim by satisfying reason and conscience".[91] In 1935 he noted Barth's justifiable reaction against immanentist tendencies, but he could not accept his rejection of the possibility that on the basis of revelation one could construct a philosophy of experience.[92] He could not have anything to do with the notion of revelation as completely ab extra.[93] Temple could not see by what power such a revelation could be recognised, nor how the theologian could carry out his task of rendering Christian truth intelligible.[94]

There is not the slightest evidence that Temple changed his mind on this after 1939. He never renounced the capacity of reason; when he spoke of principles deriving all their validity from Christian faith this is probably reflective of his belief that the ultimate choice is between Christian faith and scepticism, a belief sharpened in an era of crisis;[95] and he always looked forward to the resumption of the metaphysical task which crisis had rendered impossible.[96]

The second noticeable feature of Temple's social ethics in the last five years is the continuing interest in the approach through love and justice and his growing appreciation of the realities of power, following Niebuhr's lead. We do not need to add to the earlier remarks.

Thirdly, what is the significance of his use of Natural Law and Natural Order? I think there were three fundamental attractions. First we should take at face value Temple's belief that Natural Law mediated between the theoretical and the practical. We should never underestimate his continual attempt to give as much practical guidance as possible. The sort of guidance Natural Law offered over the Just Price and Usury corresponded to his own "middle axioms". Secondly, Temple saw the empirical value of Natural Law in another way, in that he came more and more to see the importance of man's life as rooted in nature. This culminates in two perceptive pages in "What Christians stand for in the Secular World", where he contrasts this view with ethical idealism "which assumes men to be so free spiritually that aims alone are decisive".[97] Temple was here in debt to the reflections of men like V. A. Demant. Whatever the limitations of the Christendom Group, they did offer this antidote. Thirdly, the Natural Law tradition endorsed reason and rooted itself in a theistic metaphysics. This was highly congenial to Temple. If he himself had to retreat from a metaphysics of the Incarnation, the Natural Law tradition was a happy hospice. My impression is that it was the theism which mattered more to Temple than the reason. In common with many of his contemporaries, Nazi nihilism drove Temple to

think in stark terms. There was, I think, a strong upsurge of the underlying conviction that ultimately the choice was between Christian faith and scepticism. So there is a search for the rebirth of Christendom,[98] and we have the repeated insistence that education should be effectively Christian[99] in spite of the low degree of religious practice in the country and in spite of Temple's recognition that the forces operative before the war would continue to operate after, so that any resurgence of religion during the war would be misleading. This did not prevent him thinking it possible to shift the nation back towards a Christian centre and perspective for all its activities. It was left to the group for whom Vidler and Whitehouse write to raise the question in 1946 whether Natural Law rather than 'undenominational Christianity' should be the basis for moral teaching in state schools, and whether it provided a body of assumptions which could underpin the whole educational system in a non-Christian state.[100]

I cannot find evidence that Temple took seriously the idea that Natural Law is a bridge between Christian and non-Christian. Temple's aims were always overtly Christian, and we do not in fact find him inclined to commend positions on the general grounds of reason. His position in his last years, for which he acknowledged a debt to T. S. Eliot,[101] appears to be this: (i) Faith in God is the only basis in theory and in practice on which the value of the human person can be maintained.[102] (ii) The Christian tradition is in danger of being undermined by secular humanists trying to have Christian values without Christian faith.[103] (iii) This is impossible, and the result is entanglement in 'mechanism',[104] or hedonism destructive of self-discipline,[105] or a mild haze of convictions which can offer no resistance to the totalitarianism of the day.[106] (iv) Christians should always remember that their perspective is different from humanists, and expect that this difference will sooner or later appear in practice.[107] They must band together to think out and act upon the implications of the Christian

faith for personal and public life.[108] Thus, Christian industrialists and businessmen should get together with economists and theologians for study and thought about the implications for them of the convictions "which must lie at the root of any enterprise on behalf of a Christian civilisation".[109] By this Temple does not mean a perfect system worked by perfect citizens, for that is unattainable. "We mean a civilisation in which the Christian standards of value are accepted as those by which both persons and policies are to be judged, and in which there is a steady effort to guide policy by Christian principles."[110]

(v) Temple does indeed urge Christians to co-operate with all who share their convictions with regard to policy and action, even if they do not share the Christian faith.[111] But at the centre of his thoughts is the community of Christians who should band together interdenominationally and draw in those who adhere to Stoic theism with a strongly Christian tinge. He thinks there are large numbers of Britons who are not yet committed to the Christian faith but are ready to join in seeking the Christian solution of problems. Temple sees the need for a statement of the basis on which the Christian core would invite people to join together. This must be specifically Christian, but should insist only on those parts of the Christian faith (unspecified) which are essential for the interpretation of the times. Temple does not demand assent to such a statement by all who joined; what would be asked for would be a desire to explore the Christian way as indicated by the statement and to act when possible on their conclusions. His hope is for a large number of people, mostly young, of all denominations or none, meeting in cells and groups, drawing others in, learning more and more to hear the Gospel in its fulness, overlapping all divisions till there is a Christian fellowship aflame with faith and ready to turn the world upside-down.[112]

We lastly return to Temple's most characteristic approach to social ethics, the one which is integral to his Christian philosophy. How is this affected by his remarks

about the shift to a theology of redemption? The answer is, Very little. It is an approach continuously in use in the last years. Moreover, he chose to make it the core of Christianity and Social Order. There is a greater degree of realism. This is partly given expression through increased comment on sin. Thus Temple's primary principles have a sub-heading 'Man: his Tragedy and Destiny',[113] and there is a first-class popular sketch of the meaning of original sin.[114] In The Hope of a New World (Fortnightly, May 1940) we find two ideas added to the usual social principles: sin and nation.[115] I have drawn attention in various places in Part I to the greater realism of the last years.[116]

What Christianity and Social Order (and so much else of his writing at this time) does reflect is his preoccupation with giving as much guidance as possible to committed Christians so that they can make the most effective contribution in the drive for the re-birth of Christendom. He combines the passion of F. D. Maurice to socialise Christians with that of J. M. Ludlow to Christianize the civilisation of his day. His search was for a way out of the dilemma he had outlined to his brother in 1932.[117] Effectiveness depended on a clear line from Christians with as much practical incisiveness as possible. Christianity and Social Order is as much concerned with performing this service to Christians at that juncture of time, as it is to provide a clear lead on permanently valid principles. I think we should accept W. G. Peck's view that some of his proposed solutions (I would include the suggestions in the Appendix) are no more than ballons d'essai.[118] They invite Christians with greater knowledge of the issues to grapple with them and do better. But there were wiser ways of making the invitation.[119]

Christianity and Social Order was Temple's personal sequel to the Malvern Conference. The objects of the Conference are significant. They were "to consider from the Anglican point of view what are the fundamental facts which are directly relevant to the ordering of the new

society that is quite evidently emerging, and how Christian thought can be shaped to play a leading part in the reconstruction after the war is over".[120] Not only is the focus upon the Christian perspective; there is even a narrowing of Christian representation compared with COPEC. Temple was to write later in the Spectator that the Conference had been concerned with two major convictions, (i) that there is a divinely appointed order or hierarchy of human activities and functions; (ii) that human sin has led to the desertion of this order, and to the establishment of an order at variance with it, which perpetuates and intensifies the sin from which it sprang. Thus the question of Natural Order was a central one, but it was set very firmly within a theological framework, at least in intent. Temple wrote that theology "determined the presuppositions which were to govern the more political and economic discussion". The Conference was "a conscious and deliberate effort to cancel the divorce betweentheology and economics which was silently decreed in the latter part of the fifteenth century shortly before the upheaval of the Reformation". We should also observe that in Temple's view the Conference was held "for the ascertainment and registration of the amount of agreement reached among a number of people who have given thought, perhaps for many years, to the themes discussed".[121] The whole enterprise of Malvern and its subsequent activities is therefore entirely of a piece with the aims of Temple in Christianity and Social Order: to provide a clear, firm Christian basis on which Christians can play an effective part in post-war reconstruction.

The question, however, has to be asked, whether Temple was theological enough.[122] We must also ask whether the question of the relation of natural morality and Christian faith was properly faced. For on the one hand one wonders whether the shift of emphasis towards a doctrine of redemption is adequately allowed for in Temple's adjustments in social ethics after 1939; on the other, the recognition of natural morality is only grudgingly conceded, and

virtually restricted to the sphere of Natural Law and Natural Order, which is then located within a theological framework so that it has less independence than had classically been given to it. What indeed are the implications for social ethics of a religion which speaks both of creation and of redemption?

I wish to attempt an answer to that question which, holding in view the different strands in Temple's thinking and his declared intent in 1939, will resolve his ambiguities in some coherent position, whilst recognizing the problematical features of Christian social ethics. To do this I shall consider first J. F. Padgett and O. C. Thomas, then N. H. G. Robinson, and finally D. M. Mackinnon. In my judgment Robinson and Mackinnon deserve very close attention for their attempts to face up to the question.

We have seen that Padgett criticises Temple for failing to be sufficiently critical in his philosophising. He does not at all criticise him for taking Christianity as his starting point.[123] Thomas rightly suggests that Temple misconceives the relationship between philosopher and theologian. In fact both have to combine the attitudes of assurance and inquiry.[124] Temple is misleading when he says that "philosophy starts from the detailed experience of men and seeks to build up its understanding of that experience by reference to that experience alone".[125] The truth is rather that every philosopher is bound to build round a key-category or guiding image or organising principle.[126] 'The Christian revelation is Temple's organising principle, and it is not something which can or should be suppressed in his philosophy of religion. It is the unavoidable and indispensable means of accomplishing anything in philosophy."[127] Temple himself is near to seeing this when he writes: "Whatever a man starts by believing, it appears that experience is likely to confirm him in that belief."[128]

When we start out from the actual world we find that everyone has some sort of pattern of a life-style, however incoherent, focussed by some key-idea or ideas, however

dimly recognised. It is perfectly possible to have reasoned discussion about different patterns, examining their coherence and their adequacy to illuminate the facts of experience. In the area of morality there is bound to be overlap between the Christian and other positions, which can form a basis for co-operation; but the common ground will never be entirely common, because of the divergence and ultimate rivalry of the patterns.

I believe that the first task of Christians is to give frank recognition to natural morality. It will not do either to take Barth's attitude of outright rejection or to do what many Protestants have done more recently, simply elaborate a Christian ethic without troubling about its relationship to general ethics. The arguments of N. H. G. Robinson in favour of Christian recognition of natural morality seem to me very strong.

First, in reply to Barth and Bultmann and also to other Christian writers who by-pass general ethics, Robinson makes the following points:

(i) "Men are moral beings apart from Church and Scripture, and when Christian thought takes the form of Christian ethics it ... enters a field already occupied."[129]

(ii) Scripture itself firmly holds us to our reality as moral beings.[130] The prophets of Israel affirm Israel's law within the moral order of all mankind;[131] St. Paul speaks of the law written in the hearts of Gentiles;[132] Jesus conducts moral arguments.[133] Furthermore even though the Christian is in some sense a new creature, he is basically "a man transformed or renewed, whose transformation and renewal cannot be articulated apart from some understanding of his existence as a creature independently of that renewal".[134] If man were totally depraved, then there would be no point of contact for the redeeming work of grace; what we should have would be a second instalment of creation.[135]

(iii) Robinson furthermore conducts a long investigation of Neo-Protestantism to show the consequences of the attempt to dispense with natural morality: the dilemma is revealed, either a descent into naturalism (life without law) or into formalism (law without content). The dilemma can be resolved only if natural morality is affirmed.[136]

(iv) If, then, the claim of morality is a genuine claim upon human life, "so too the ethical enquiry is a legitimate enquiry within which there is a real possibility of valid and invalid argument and the discussion may or may not succeed in making sense".[137]

(v) Robinson proposes that whilst goodness is indeed ultimately entirely dependent on God's will, we should think in terms of a general knowledge of goodness given through a general and universal knowledge of God's will which is constitutive of human nature as such. "It is at least conceivable that the doctrine that man is made in the image of God means that, whether he likes it or not and whether he recognises it or not, man stands in the presence of his Creator and that the symptom of this condition is the elusive challenge of his moral consciousness. It is thus conceivable - to say the least - that there should be this general knowledge of goodness, of right and wrong apart from Christ, which is the moral consciousness of natural morality and which can survive without any explicitly religious conviction or profession."[138] There is no question indeed of our consciences dictating to God. But there is equally no reason why their law should not be fulfilled in His.[139] Our very confidence that God could not command hate and remain <u>our</u> God is based in part on what we already know of the difference between right and wrong.[140] In sum "in the order of being goodness is entirely dependent upon and derivative from the will of God; but in the order of knowledge goodness may come before the will of God, in the sense that men may have some knowledge of goodness before they know that it is the content of

God's will, and certainly apart from the remedial revelation of that will which is denoted by the name 'Jesus Christ'."[141] There is therefore a natural morality which forms a basis on which believer and unbeliever can make moral contact with each other and even work together, can communicate and co-operate.[142]

Robinson's recognition of natural morality prompts the question, Does this involve the recognition of Natural Law? In our consideration of Padgett and Thomas we have in effect rejected the idea that there is a self-contained area determinable purely by reason within which Natural Law is located, and to which the Christian faith would be a supplement. Temple's way of Christian philosophising is a procedure much more in tune with the actual world. It also has the merit of opening up the way (though Temple did not go completely along it) for the full resources of the Christian faith to be brought to bear on social issues, and so counteracts any tendency to restrict the bearing of revelation to some private sphere. Actually, on inspection I think Natural Law is a good deal more coloured by Christianity than its champions have cared to admit. Even Rommen from time to time uses the term 'Christian Natural Law' against those modern forms of Natural Law which sit loose to Christian faith. I do not think he is using the term 'Christian' in a purely historical sense. He really means that his version of Natural Law is checked out against Christian understanding, especially of man.[143] For these reasons (and quite apart from the well-worn accusations of legalism and authoritarianism) it is difficult for Natural Law to act as a bridge between Christians and others. Nevertheless, I think it should be valued as offering an invitation to unbelievers to join in the search for common ground - all the more so in these days of greater flexibility among Roman Catholics.[144] However, we have yet to grasp the problem of the Christian faith and natural morality, and I return to N. H. G. Robinson.

In my previous reference to common ground I alluded also to the divergence and ultimate rivalry of the patterns of life-style. The burden of Robinson's book The Groundwork of Christian Ethics is to spell out the fundamentally problematical character of Christian ethics.[145] Whilst recognising natural morality, against Barth, he nevertheless wants to give full weight to Barth's clear view of the sovereignty of God, manifested centrally in Jesus Christ in free redemptive grace.[146] Robinson believes that earlier treatments in Christian history have failed to grapple satisfactorily with the problematical character of theological ethics.
(i) Augustine "superimpressed his Christian insight upon the ethical outlook of Platonism, identifying virtue with 'the perfect love of God'";[147] (ii) St. Thomas Aquinas juxtaposed them,[148] trying to add together dissimilar things[149] (Robinson sees the Catholic position as making a rigid dichotomy between revelation and reason). Among Protestants, (iii) some like Mill and Kant treat morality in complete divorce from religious beliefs;[150] (iv) others like Butler and Henson have suggested that morality can be studied by itself, that it is best studied in the form of Christian morality (for Christian morality is morality at its most completely natural and at its best), and that Christian morality is most clearly seen in the teaching and example of Jesus of Nazareth;[151] (v) others like A. B. D. Alexander, start out from the Christian faith, taking certain ideas from dogmatics, but then tend to immobilise the revelation upon which the Christian ethics is supposed to depend,[152] and treat Christian ethics as a branch of general ethics.[153]

Each of these positions in Robinson's view commits at least one of the following errors: (a) It acquiesces in the idea of two independent moral claims on the same life, and "the suggestion of a plurality of moralities is intolerable, because if we understand the uniqueness of the moral claim in its character as absolutely categorical and categorically absolute, that is, as brooking no argument and so no alternative, we can see that it would not be the peculiar

claim that it is if it were not single and self-consistent".[154] Either the claim of the Christian revelation and the claim of morality must coalesce, or we have to entertain "the intolerable supposition that there are two diverse but absolute claims upon the same life".[155] The student of theology cannot simply turn his back upon the thesis that morality is self-contained, "unless indeed, either explicitly or unwittingly, he takes it that ordinary morality and Christian morality are two wholly separate and independent things; but that is to reckon seriously with neither, for morality is one and self-consistent or else it is not morality; and there is a finality about the insight that I ought which in the last resort brooks no plurality of claims".[156] This is why Robinson criticises Paul Ramsey: "The systematic inquiry into the nature of the Christian life cannot rest content with the pragmatic outlook which holds that the Christian way is an alternative or rival to other possible ways of life. It must rather pursue the 'ought' which overflows Christian morality precisely in so far as the latter enters upon a ground already occupied; and it must seek to understand the ethical dimension of human life common to believer and unbeliever alike. Christian ethics, accordingly, is (in the singular) a science which cannot possibly rest in a descriptive account of the contrasting features of different ethics (in the plural). Contrariwise, to add one ethic to another in terms of similarities or of dissimilarities is still to fall short of ethics as a science; and the student of Christian ethics must be prepared to rise above the pragmatic level to the reflective and wrestle with what I have called the mathematics of the subject."[157]

(b) It fails to do justice to the idea of Jesus as the final authority.[158] If we are to be faithful to the biblical claim, we must reckon with the transcendence, sovereignty and finality of Jesus Christ.[159] Talk of Jesus of Nazareth as an example cannot cover this point. It leaves us with a limited authority, in the sense either (i) that Jesus must not be too far ahead of us on the same moral road;[160] or

(ii) that he may one day be dispensed with altogether as we reach independent moral judgment;[161] or (iii) superseded by another authority.[162] But Christian ethics cannot contemplate any such limits. (i) Christ requires of men his own limitless love towards neighbour; "he requires what actually offends their ordinary moral common sense";[163] (ii) the Bible speaks of men's development in grace and in the knowledge of God - and that entails the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ and knowledge of God in his revelation in Jesus Christ. "He himself is not a mere instrument or servant of men's growth in a reality quite other than, and external to, himself. He is the central content of that in which they grow. He is not leader only but Lord."[164] (iii) Christ's supremacy "is not just an empirical supremacy, ... but an inherent inalienable supremacy, a genuinely final supremacy, ... for time and eternity".[165]

(c) If we say that morality is the human apprehension of the will of God, "then revelation, one would think, may quite properly exhibit that apprehension as not only inadequate but as radically distorted, that is, as sinful in a strict theological sense of that word".[166] Christian ethics does enter upon ground already occupied by general ethics; general ethics is a legitimate enquiry; but that does not mean that the Christian simply accepts whatever he finds there.[167] Robinson suggests various ways in which natural morality can be distorted. (Correspondingly ethics as reflection on natural morality presupposes and reflects this distortion.)[168] Fundamental is its man-centredness: it is divorced from its origin in God; "this is the fundamental all-pervading defect of natural morality".[169] It may be distorted in respect of detailed content of moral law, or in respect of our articulation of it in the form of <u>law</u>.[170] Furthermore ethics tends to concentrate attention upon the individual moral agent, "yet the human situation to which morality belongs is a social situation; and it is difficult to believe that this situation is not oversimplified when it is treated as if it were nothing more

than the sum-total of atomic situations in which individual agents may by their actions affect other individual agents".[171] If there is an ethical goal of fellowship (and Christianity regards the summum bonum as fellowship[172]), general ethics is ill-adapted to contain it.[173] This individualism tends to remove general ethics to a degree from the reality of the concrete historical process; it also tends to abstract the moment of moral choice from the complex of human experience and historical process, as if it were an element of the eternal.[174] On the other hand, when general ethics does take account of movement and change in history, "it seems to move irresistibly towards a doctrine of moral progress, and indeed in some moral theories the idea of moral progress is an integral and indispensable part of the whole. Thus it is so in the ethical philosophy of T. H. Green, where the moral life of the individual is understood as the work of the eternal consciousness incessantly and progressively seeking complete satisfaction. Certainly, the thesis could not be sustained that some such doctrine of moral progress is integral to ethics as such; and doubtless it was easier for Green to propound his particular theory when he did than it would have been today. It seems, however, that ethics does not understand seriously enough the fact and the effect of evil."[175] What general ethics needs is to be supplemented by a doctrine of history - and by a doctrine of divine remedial activity whereby the total 'moral' sphere is restored in its integrity.[176]

To believe in the Lordship of Christ entails the recognition of natural morality, not its dismissal as a perversion of the truth. But there is no self-contained doctrine of ethics which theology is bound simply to accept.[177] The man who comes under the Lordship of Christ properly finds that this Christo-reference pervades and transforms his moral acts. It is not simply a supplement to the moral outlook of ordinary men; it produces "a total and integrated moral outlook".[178] Christ fulfils and re-orients natural morality,[179] healing its distortions, overcoming its fragmentariness and

centring it on its source in God the Creator,[180] thus insisting upon the radically personal nature of the moral order, - that the summum bonum is a divinely purposed and established fellowship.[181]

The solution Robinson propounds is therefore as follows: "Mutual recognition as between the claim of morality and the claim of divine revelation and mutual integration in a manner consonant with the remedial character of the revelation."[182] To say that man is made in the image of God means that he is a free rational being standing ever in the presence of his Creator. "The law of man's being is not his own but God's, and as law and task is yet a gift of grace constitutive of man'svery nature, so that, as St. Augustine saw, God has indeed made him for himself alone and his heart is restless till it rests in God."[183] "Thus autonomy is part of the truth about man but not the whole truth, for his autonomy is a responsive autonomy or a secondary autonomy, responsive to God his Creator of whom alone may be predicated complete autonomy."[184]

Robinson's account of the relationship of Christian ethics and natural morality seems to me to have the enormous merit not only of facing the issue squarely and offering a coherent and convincing presentation, but also of showing a way beyond the ambiguities of Temple. It is not a question of a separate sphere of reason divorced from revelation; nor of a synthesis of faith and reason; nor of a Christian faith which ignores or denigrates natural morality. Of course, what Robinson offers does not in the least relieve the Christian of the difficulties in making moral decisions. On the contrary, the Christian must walk a tightrope. He must look positively on natural morality and welcome every opportunity for co-operation. But he must also be on his guard against distortion, and let the divine revelation exercise its sovereign demands on the situation. He must be neither gullible nor stand-offish.

The most telling of Robinson's suggestions about forms of distortion in general ethics is, I believe, the one which speaks of the need for supplementation and correction by a doctrine of history which includes divine remedial activity. It has some point against Temple insofar as his optimism derives from T. H. Green and the Victorian Age. To-day I find there is a welter of professed concern in Western society for the individual, which is attractive to Christian ears, but on inspection, whether in its optimistic or pessimistic or ambivalent forms, is profoundly defective. The influence of understandings of man derived from the natural sciences has been compounded by the rapid rise of the social sciences. It is by no means uncommon for professional findings to be used as a springboard for the elaboration of a whole world-view and the covert or open intrusion of values. I have in mind especially B. F. Skinner and Carl Rogers.[185] What Niebuhr said about Freud many years ago seems very pertinent.[186] Freud construed man as totally embedded in nature, whereas man is primarily to be understood as a historical creature. His glory is his freedom to shape his historical existence constructively; his tragedy is his propensity towards destruction. The doctrine of original sin, claims Niebuhr, illuminates the reality of our existence far more than the 'realism' of Freud. It is significant, I think, that modern offers of salvation usually dispense with notions of guilt and forgiveness, whereas for Christianity the road to deliverance lies precisely through our receipt of divine forgiveness operative focally in history in Jesus Christ. There is also the fact that many modern purveyors of panaceas, like the more pessimistic Freud, deal only in internal or inter-personal adjustment, and by abstracting man from his full social context are socially irrelevant.

It might easily be supposed from Robinson's account that in the complex relationship of natural morality and Christian ethics the problems lie mainly with the former. Yet we have only to pick up again Mackinnon's paper read to the Malvern Conference in 1941 to encounter a forceful assertion of the problematical position of man and the Church in the

light of basic Christian doctrines focussed in the Cross. The whole is a valiant attempt to face exactly the problem of the relation of the dogmas of creation and redemption. Yet the context of the Conference precluded any serious consideration of it. For the aim of the Conference was to register agreement for practical purposes; therefore disagreement or questioning had to be suppressed - even Temple found it "very exacting" to pen the Conference's "common mind"; the parlour was not entirely tricked.[187] Malvern demonstrated even more than COPEC that Henson had a point when he remarked in 1923 that he could not imagine a worse way of arriving at the truth.[188] Mackinnon's long and rather rambling essay still deserves attention. Its gist can for our purposes be set out under two heads, and several of his points are in effect partial criticisms of Temple.

(i) Basic doctrines. Mackinnon reminds us that the doctrines of Creation and Incarnation do not give us a straightforward basis for Christian sociology. Creation is a mystery: there is no necessity that God should have brought us into being.[189] The Incarnation "is not the disclosing of certain universal cosmical principles; it is the manifestation of the divine word in the harsh particularities of an individual human existence. Between that Platonism which ... exercised so great an influence on English theological thought and the mystery of the Incarnation there is a great gulf.[190] The coming of Christ in St. Mark's Gospel does not perfect the process of history but rejects the very assumption of its movement.[191] The harsh particularities reach their climax on the Cross. "Soteriology is the very nerve centre of specifically Christian theology. The Cross reveals the final secret of the relation of man and God."[192] There Christ "passes ineluctably to nothingness, and therein is his Father glorified."[193] God's action "is wrought out in silence, in desolation, in obscurity ... His act is a question, an Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani uttered in darkness with only criminals for whom there is no room in society and his

executioners to hear him. But that is the victory of God, the strategy of the house of darkness."[194]

Now Temple was not at all oblivious to the mystery of divine creation and incarnation. It is he who produced the equations: The World - God = O; God - World = God.[195] He also wrote, "If any man says that he understands the relation of Deity to Humanity in Christ, he only makes it clear that he does not understand what is meant by an Incarnation".[196] Yet in his social ethics we do not sense that he sees anything problematical in his use of these doctrines as a basis for sociological inferences. He derives his first two social principles in a straightforward manner. As for the Cross, Temple allows formally for thinking like Mackinnon's, but I do not think he ever rises to it. It has more affinity with Niebuhr's view of sacrificial agape confronting this fallen world.[197]

(ii) Man and the Church. In the light of these basic doctrines man's existence is questionable. We should not suppose that grace perfects nature simply by adding to it.[198] We must think of man not only as spoliatus gratuitis by the fall; he is inevitably vulneratus in naturalibus.[199] His nature is wounded almost beyond recognition, and Mackinnon suggests a definition of it "as an unrealised capacity of normalcy rather than an existing actualisation".[200] "Man must either respond to the invitation of God to communion with himself, or else lose himself in the abyss ... It is not for man as man to stand on firm ground; it is for him to know his existence as utterly questionable, and to adhere to the grace of God."[201] The sin of man is his Titanism. He repudiates the questionableness and seeks security in the abyss. Thinking he has found secure ground there he tends to use God as the sanction and guarantee of the achievements of the world he has created for himself, as the satisfaction of its longings.[202] "The character of sin resides in the blurring of the line which divides God from man, in the treatment of God as object or even as tool, rather than as the subject on whose good pleasure we must always wait."[203]

From this base Mackinnon repeatedly attacks the "lust after synthesis, such as philosophers in the last century engendered in theologians".[204] If we grasp God's act in Christ's cross, we see that the very possibility of synthesis is to be rejected.[205] "It is a most tragical confusion," he writes, "that some elder theologians find in the mistrust of synthesis, characteristic of so many of the younger men, a repudiation, implicit rather than explicit, of the doctrine of Creation. Whereas in point of fact it is precisely the depth of their insight into the fact of divine creation that compels the younger men to look askance at the synthetic enthusiasms of their elders."[206]

It is no surprise that Mackinnon is also hostile to any glib talk of reconstruction after the war.[207] "We look on ourselves as men, who will, at some future date, have an opportunity of reconstituting the social order in accordance with a natural pattern. We are fundamentally utopians. May I be very daring? I want to suggest to you that those who are striving to speak the language of a theology of crisis, perhaps possess a deeper insight into the saving truth that Christ was and is both God and man than those who make much of the 'sociological implications' of the Incarnation?"[208] The material for reconstruction after the war will be provided by individuals whose lives have been changed by the necessity of waging it.[209] The foundations for successful implementation of our projects can only be laid if there is created in each individual soul "an almost unendurable tension"[210] - a "tension between the Kingdom of Grace and the kingdom of the world",[211] a tension which involves embracing the "suffering which a vision of our predicament as citizens in an apostate society, for whose apostasy we are in part responsible, will bring".[212] We must here and now espouse Christ's hiddenness, endure his nothingness.[213] We must recognise our impotence, know that our only certainty is the likelihood and complete justice of our own damnation.[214] If we must pray for victory, the Miserere seems admirably suited.[215] In short, integration of man's complex nature is achieved only about

a centre that is supplied by his own awareness of his contingency;[216] history, its burden and tragedy, can become intelligible only through being made unendurable.[217]

Now it is quite easy to point out that Temple recognised the impossibility of total synthesis, was aware of fearful tension,[218] and did repeatedly stress the reality of sin and the need for penitence.[219] Yet the mood is very different, reflected in the contrast between the smooth flow of Temple's prose and the rough-hewn, almost fragmentary style of Mackinnon.[220] Temple is certain he stands on secure ground; Mackinnon questions this theologically. Temple is never seriously puzzled over his understanding of man;[221] Mackinnon's greater empiricism and greater theological grasp exposed the difficulties. Temple bounds on to give guidance over reconstruction; Mackinnon asks whether we have a leg to stand on.

Mackinnon's view of the Church is correspondingly very different from Temple's. Temple seems to see nothing problematical about the Church, except its divisions, which are contrary to God's will and prevent it fulfilling its national and international role. He thinks the Malvern Conference "'put the Church on the map' again".[222] Mackinnon wonders whether Anglican apologists are brave enough to see that the only hope for apologetics is one which openly admits that the Church is a question and a scandal. The Church is no refuge from insecurities and questionings, yet we strive to make it just such a refuge. This is the supreme betrayal.[223] Mackinnon's call for the heightening of tension is directed against complacency and inertia.[224]

'The Church is an eschatological society. It is a society which is concerned primarily with the bearing witness to the triumphant Passion of the Son of God, to the victorious nothingness of Christ, wherein the tragedy of human history is finally overcome. This witness the Church bears in virtue of her character as the mystical Body of Christ, the bearer of his scandal and his secret ... Within her fellowship natural human security is destroyed,

for death and resurrection are the rhythm of her life."[225] It is in this sense that the Church is the extension of the Incarnation. "In the Church of Christ every ultimate tension of human life, that the Incarnation actualised and made manifest, is continually renewed." Here is the continuation of the eschatological conflict once played out between Caiaphas, Pilate, Iscariot and Christ, between the power of God and the power of Satan.[226] Thus it is only by God's grace that the Christian social critic is allowed continually to discuss and to criticise. "The defence of man against the systems he creates is the highest social task of the Church."[227] The Church must do all in its power to counteract the dehumanising process of total war.[228]

It is these reflections which lead Mackinnon to pick up the issue of pacifism. He is at pains to reject any inference that his position leads to pietism or escapism. The refusal to compromise with total war will lead to "a spiritual agony probably greater than we have ever known". What it will lead us to do he leaves open.[229] His basic point is that the case for pacifism is greater than many will admit, not simply by the standards of moral theology but because pacifists are driving us to spiritual tension. His implicit criticism of Temple is found in the words:

'To some of you the apparent repudiation of the obligations of Christian citizenship implicit in their action, may seem very shocking, but whether in our present world the obligations of Christian citizenship can be regarded as in the light of the idealistic theology of Lux Mundi and/or Foundations they are regarded, seems to me highly questionable. 'Muckers-out', who have found their desert in the shelters of East London, are, it seems to me, making a great contribution towards the creation, within the Church, of that interior spiritual tension wherein her first victory lies."[230] Temple's own inadequacy in this matter, whatever the regard he was held in by pacifists, is nowhere seen more clearly than in his replies to Mr. Derek Fane.[231] His recognition only of personal pacifism shows how the matter had to be comfortably accommodated within his own unshakeable framework.

Finally we should note Mackinnon's questioning of the idea of an Established Church. Indeed in a note he claims it is the burden of his paper: 'The idea of a national Church is now perhaps more hopelessly discredited than ever before, except of course among those who have a vested interest in the preservation of the Anglican status quo. That there is a fundamental opposition between the Church as such on the one side, and the modern nation state as such on the other, is a fact underlying the whole conflict of our time which we are fools if we seek to disguise."[232] Temple never saw the Church in this position. So too, whereas Temple thinks of the Church giving a clear lead and groups of Christians acting as a spearhead, giving only grudging recognition to the role of unbelievers, Mackinnon speaks of the Church needing to "be purged in the fire before it can serve as of course it alone can serve, as the sure rallying point" of a united pact with all men of good will.[233]

The obscurity and plainly polemical character of Mackinnon's paper should not hide the seriousness of the points he makes as he explores the foundations. The fate of his paper shows how difficult it was for Temple, given his style of leadership, to dig the foundations deeper.[234]

In the conclusion to this thesis I shall relate the line taken by Robinson and Mackinnon to the evaluation of Temple in chapters IV and V, as I try to specify some of the characteristics of a more adequate method in Christian social ethics. To close this chapter I return very briefly to the question of education; for we noted how the issue of the relation of general and Christian morality underlay Temple's views on the foundations of education and on Church schools and State schools.[235] I shall not enter here into particular cases, save to say that Temple misjudged the Christian base of British society, and this had serious implications for the practicability of founding all education on Christianity. His own Christian philosophy no doubt was a strong influence in predisposing him to accept what appeared to be the mood of the country at that point of the

war; the result was that schools were supposed to be religious and affected to be mildly so, and Religious Education half-heartedly sought to produce mildly religious pupils. Acceptance, however, of a position like Robinson's creates a presumption that state schools will have at their root, not religion, but a number of convictions about the well-being of man. These may not be very precise or have a key-category or guiding image, but Christians should accept them as far as they can, and should not suppose that because there is no evident Christian (or any other) unity of purpose disaster is bound to follow. The stark antithesis which seized the minds of many Churchmen in time of war is not a good basis for evaluating secular education. It is however important for Christians to retain the ultimate hope of a fully Christian education - as the impossible possibility. They should keep a critical eye on the notions of man current in educational thought and practice, and particularly resist attempts to base education on premisses which positively exclude religious perspectives. In a similar way, Religious Education cannot rightly promote a commitment to Christianity; but it should encourage a sympathetic and intelligent consideration of Christianity within its programme, and resist the kind of integration with other subjects which is synonymous with annihilation. We should therefore expect and indeed welcome a fairly broad pluralism in education. Temple's desire to be open to criticism is laudable, but it cannot stop short before the foundations of education. Criticism is far too important both for the world and for the purification of the Church's own life and thought.

Robinson's position would also suggest a prima facie case for Church schools, in that, as part of a pluralistic educational scene, those who acknowledge the sovereignty of God over the whole of life should endeavour to express that perspective in the field of education. But it is only a prima facie case, and there are many questions to be faced before a specific decision can be made. A crucial test is whether such schools can distinguish themselves by their

sensitivity and response to society's questions, needs and opportunities, and whether they heed Mackinnon's warning that judgment begins with the Church and its institutions and renders them permanently problematical.

CHAPTER VII

TEMPLE'S CRITICS

Our investigation of Temple's approaches to Christian social ethics is now virtually complete. In locating and evaluating them I have drawn on work of international standing. It remains to consider some English criticisms. They are many and noisy, but monotonous and insubstantial. Their importance is that they enable us to pinpoint some critical choices which face English Christianity to-day over its future direction in social ethics. No credit is thereby due to the critics: most of them cannot see what the issues are, or even that there is any issue. I shall consider four cases: the critics of Temple and the Standing Conference in 1926; the critics of Temple's Albert Hall speech in September 1942; J. D. Carmichael and H. S. Goodwin; and E. R. Norman. My general view of the critics is this: whilst they do make some valid points against Temple, they are vastly less theological than Temple, and in the end, for that very reason, less empirical.

1. Temple and the Standing Conference of 1926

In all the welter of criticism of Temple and the Standing Conference of 1926 there were some telling points.

(i) The Dean of Durham, who in many respects agreed with the Conference, cast doubt on the calculation that a further subsidy (albeit this time in the form of a loan) would succeed where previous subsidies had failed. He also noted that it might be hard for the parties to agree on an independent chairman to arbitrate over outstanding differences.[1]

(ii) To a certain degree (though less than most critics believed[2]) the Standing Conference was biased towards the miners. Temple was rather misleading in saying that the Conference took their stand on the Report. Though they apparently urged "the frank adoption of the Report as a basis of settlement",[3] the wording of the Memorandum to the Government in paragraphs (iii) and (vi) seems to leave open the possibility that the detailed working out of the reference to wages by the Commissioners might not be binding but rather a subject for arbitration by an independent chairman.[4] In other words the withdrawal of the slogan did not necessarily imply acceptance of the cut in wages recommended by the Commission. If this is so, it is a shift towards the miners. It was one thing for the Government to press ahead with reorganisation pari passu with implementation of the rest of the Report; another thing for reorganisation to take place irrespective of the results of reference to arbitration. Similarly, the Government's offer of a £3M subsidy was to cushion the effects of the implementation of the Report,[5] whereas the financial assistance suggested in the Memorandum does not seem to presuppose "frank adoption". The Report recommended that the coal-owners and miners should sort out among themselves the question of national and district agreements.[6] It is noticeable that the Standing Conference Memorandum speaks only of a national agreement (perhaps influenced by Sir Herbert Samuel's personal memorandum[7]) and seems therefore to ignore part of the owners' case. I suspect in all this the Conference members, though they strove to be impartial, were too heavily influenced by the apparent concession made by the miners. This probably arose from their moral passion for fellowship and its counterpart, arbitration; from a belief that cuts in wages would deprive the miners of that living wage which figured in middle axioms produced by Church Conferences at the time,[8] and from a belief that the majority view of the Sankey Report in favour of nationalization should have been accepted.[9]

(iii) The Dean of Durham correctly remarked that it was a pity if the representatives had encouraged the miners to assume that the Church had definitely taken their side.[10] In fact Temple maintained his usual position over the limits of the competence of the Church, and could see the possibility of a rift with Cook.[11] It was fair for him to claim in August that the Conference had not intended to speak for any but the members.[12] However, what principally encouraged the miners was the fact that the Conference had so many bishops on it. Evidence came to light after the event, that unknown to the Conference, Cook had broken off negotiations with a group consisting of B. S. Rowntree, W. T. Layton and Frank Stuart, in order to meet the Standing Conference. Rowntree was later to tell Temple in a letter, "The miners thought they had the whole of the Christian Churches behind them ..."[13] No doubt it was principally the presence of bishops gave them this idea, and it shows naïveté on the part of the Conference. We should also note Temple's confession to Rowntree in 1942 of a tendency in 1926 "to try to make capital for the Church ... by publicity when the thing ought, if done at all, to have been kept entirely private".[14]

However, even when these points are granted, we are not yet in sight of the real gulf between Temple and his critics in 1926. It is misleading for E. R. Norman to write as if Temple and his colleagues were Christians isolated from realities, whereas Henson was the voice of sensible Christian realism.[15] The real issue is as follows.

Many of the critics in 1926 start out from the assumption of a separation of morals and economics. Thus the Archdeacon of Chester (W. Paige Cox) claimed against Bishops Woods and Garbett that there could be no opposition between moral and economic law.[16] Henson's rhetorical letter in The Times of 13 August claims that religion and morality can have their effects only within the limits prescribed by economic law, which is final and inexorable. St. Paul's words have an application to social life: Not that which

is first is spiritual, but that which is natural - and afterwards that which is spiritual.[17] So too A. C. Headlam, Bishop of Gloucester, says the Church must accept and understand economic conditions.[18]

At the root of this thinking is the belief that Christian morality is applicable solely to individuals in their personal relations. N. H. G. Robinson reminds us that Henson wrote in his Gifford Lectures that "Christian morality ... is the morality inculcated by Jesus Christ, and illustrated by His example",[19] and that "the authority of Jesus is final because it is limited to the sphere of personal morality".[20] One way in which this belief works itself out is that economic problems are treated in a purely mechanical fashion. Thus W. Smithers, M.P., writing in support of the Bishop of Gloucester, claims that there is only one solution to the coal crisis - increased production - and spells out the mechanism of cause and effect.[21]

However, most of the critics, having made the divorce between religion and economics, instantly apply their Christian morality in a perfectly direct, simple way to social affairs. It never seems to occur to them that there could be any other way of making the connection.[22] Certain attitudes are absolutely required; certain acts are therefore obviously sins. On 9 May Cardinal Bourne had condemned the General Strike as "a sin against the obedience which we owe to God ... and against the charity and brotherly love which are due to our brethren".[23] Henson thought it grotesque that it should be left to the Cardinal to act as the "mouthpiece of national sentiment and civic duty".[24] Henson did not only claim that Davidson's appeal from the Churches[25] was bad economics. It gave impetus to the tendency "to substitute for religious teaching a declamatory sentimental socialism as far removed from sound economics as from Christian morality".[26] This enables us to understand how Henson could accuse those who favoured the miners of meddling in economics and politics, and yet himself condemn strikes of miners and railwaymen from the pulpit;[27] how he

could condemn Temple and the bishops for boldly adventuring in political and economic controversy under their official episcopal titles without mandate from their dioceses, and yet sign his own letter 'Herbert Dunelm (Herbert Hensley Henson)".[28]

A hallmark of this simplistic approach is the straightforward application of biblical texts to the situation in hand. Apart from Henson's use of St. Paul, we find the Archdeacon of Chester using the Mosaic precept "Thou shalt not favour a poor man in his cause", as his argument for not taxing other industries for the sake of one.[29] The worst aspect of this habit is that the situation is totally abstracted from the flow of history. It is presupposed that we can, as it were, start with a clean sheet at any moment in history, and consider a situation according to a simple moral maxim.

These vast simplifications have other unsavoury effects. So confident is Inge and so besotted with the question of motives, that he presumes to speak of supporters of the Standing Conference as "obvious time-servers, who will have their reward when the Socialists come into power" and "the new type of parson, sprung from the ranks and soured by poverty and thwarted social ambition".[30] Further, men are often judged simply by whether they are Christian or not. Baldwin is "an eminent example of what the true Christian spirit means"[31] whereas Cook is a self-styled humble disciple of Lenin,[32] and the miners' leadership aims to "smash up society".[33] Moreover, the absence of social critique leaves the door wide open for totally uncritical patriotism. We have seen Henson speak of Cardinal Bourne as the mouthpiece of national sentiment and civic duty. Inge castigated the bishops for "bleating for a compromise when the nation was fighting for its life".[34] The Vicar of Grimsby said that a letter from the Continuation Committee of COPEC, calling for spiritual pressure on the contending parties and the Government, was very "mischievous and unpatriotic".[35] It is worth noting here the Bishop of

Gloucester's later belief in the compatibility of National Socialism and Christianity,[36] and his own forthright but incompetent sallies into economics in Convocation.[37]

It is obvious that Temple's view of the relation of Christianity to social affairs is decisively different. He consistently demanded that the structure of society must be subjected to moral critique.[38] That critique was quite different from the simplistic application of moral maxims. It involved a Christian ethic of groups, with all the problems which Niebuhr enabled him to see. He could also see that there was no escape from the calculation of consequences in determining what at any moment a Christian ought to do. Calculations were integral to moral decisions, and not confined to purely technical means. Thus, whereas several of Temple's critics fulminated about the sins of others in 1926, Temple himself argued that the General Strike was a mistake because it was bound to do more harm than good.[39]

Temple, I concede, is prone to drift towards the same mistake as his critics. He can be too preoccupied with moral principles like fellowship, so that the difference between the two sides appears to be one between two sets of moral attitudes both derived from Christian faith. He does sometimes seem to treat the middle axiom (e.g. the one about the living wage) more as an absolute requirement than as creating a presumption in that direction. Perhaps as Iremonger remarks, Temple "exposed himself to the question whether, in discussing the method by which the broad principles of the Royal Commission's Report should be carried out, it was possible to evade technical issues in which specialist knowledge was essential".[40] There is, I think, an unresolved ambiguity in Temple's moral reasoning: sometimes he comes near to saying action is justified merely if it is right in principle;[41] elsewhere the action is right only if it is right in the circumstances.[42]

But fundamentally Temple is far more theological and more empirical than his critics of 1926. It is he who has

the profounder view of sin; for he has a far greater grasp of the complex network of changing human relationships, individual and institutional, which are the fabric of history, and where sin and fact, oppression and brute conditions are interwoven. By the same token there is a note of warmth and hopefulness about Temple which I totally miss in his critics. Without lapsing into a foolish doctrine of progress he is determined to face up to sin in its corporate as well as its individual forms and to try to bring about, bit by bit, a more just, humane and compassionate society. It is Temple's critics who exhibit those distorted features of general ethics of which Robinson speaks: concentration on the individual moral agent and abstraction from the complex of human experience and historical process. Henson's initial mistake is seen in Robinson's depiction of his view of the relation of Christian and natural morality: Christian morality is natural morality at its best and is seen most clearly in the teaching and example of Jesus of Nazareth.[43] Pace E. R. Norman,[44] it is finally Henson who is academic and unrealistic. The Guardian rightly welcomed the move by the Standing Conference and contrasted Bishop Talbot's "broad, human and kindly sympathy" with Henson's "hard, acrid and academic tone".[45]

2. Temple's Albert Hall Speech, 1942[46]

The same fundamental clash is predictably repeated in 1942. Amid the mass of comment on Temple's Albert Hall Speech, the best was on the quality of his reasoning on the very empirical matter of banking. Several experts thought the banks did not represent a monopoly.[47] The best is from the Editor of the Financial News,[48] for he reminds everyone that there are no simple interpretations in economics and puts his finger on Temple's tendency to obscure hard dilemmas by an excessive preoccupation with moral principles. 'He is not the first who has pricked his fingers in that particularly briary field (the techniques of banking). Nor, when bankers themselves can never agree whether banks make loans or loans make banks, will he be the last ... It

has been said, not wholly without reason, that the Archbishop seems to have in his mind's eye the picture of a tradeless, capital-less community, where the main preoccupation is not so much to maximise the product of human endeavour as to prevent the bananas getting into the wrong hands ... It cannot be right to throw all the emphasis on one kind of scarcity" (caused by selfish engrossing of products) "and to ignore completely the other kind of scarcity which has been standing in the way of man's material betterment since our emergence from the mud". When Temple talks of balance, it is really the question of the antithesis of economic costs and social costs. 'The difficulty is that to express the kind of problems with which Dr. Temple is grappling entirely in moral terms is to oversimplify them. Reconciliation of the two sets of considerations, which human welfare and restored fellowship obviously require ... has always been the most difficult task which those responsible for the ordering of society's institutions have had to face."' The Economist regretted that Temple tended to weaken the force of his general arguments by making economic mistakes, so giving his critics a handle for their rebukes. It also asked Temple to ponder the fact that the mainspring of the free and competitive economy is not the greediness of individuals for profit but their readiness to risk losses.[49] Both the Financial News and the Economist are here implicitly warning against conducting sterile debates in Christian ethics where each side simply accuses the other of greediness, or some other personal failing.

Most of Temple's critics in 1942 repeat the position of 1926. A clear separation is made between religion and social affairs. Inge belches ancient rhetoric: 'The Court Chaplains to King Demos would be well to remember the words of Burke: 'Politics and the pulpit are terms that have little agreement ...'".[50] For Charles Taylor, M.P., the social order is material, the spiritual relates to the heart.[51] Lt. Col. C. G. Fagan excels with the words "State legislation is a mundane affair. The welfare of the community is the business of the Government of the day. The Christian

religion is on another plane and is concerned with other matters ..." Needless to say, this is followed by a direct application of the Christian ethic to politics: "Socialism, which these prelates are now advocating, is a policy born of envy and covetousness, and as such is distinctly anti-Christian".[52] It is assumed by E. F. Johnson that Christian ethics is "the maxims and morals to be found in the Ten Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount"; if these had been propounded with greater energy the world would not be in such a deplorable state.[53] It is assumed also that the Church's job is solely with the conversion of individuals and that social reconstruction can then be left to take care of itself. At least that in practice is what Charles Taylor suggests: "Surely the primary duty of the Church is first to promote within the hearts of the people a spiritual awareness of God as revealed by Christ, before any attempt is made by the Church to reconstruct our social order in a material direction".[54]

These positions are admirably answered by other correspondents of the day. In a balanced editorial The Times declared that Temple was wisely cautious in not committing himself to specific remedies. "No reservations of detail can ... detract from the recognition of the Church's right and duty to probe the roots of the evils which afflict our society to-day or to enunciate the principles on which a better ordered society must rest. The value of political institutions and political reforms depends in the last resort upon the moral quality of the individuals by whom, and for whom, they are framed. But the recognition of this essential truth cannot lead to the false doctrine of a divorce between morality, conceived as the proper sphere of the Church, and politics, conceived as morally neutral territory appertaining exclusively to the secular arm. It leads rather to the conception of a continuing concern for the place of moral principles as the foundation of political life."[55] More pungently E. Hulton wrote in Picture Post: "'We have merely made a clear cut

division between politics, that has to do with the affairs of this world, and religion, that is concerned with the affairs of another world'. These are the words of Hitler".[56]

Geoffrey le M. Mander, M. P., made the point that Temple's critics were just as political as Temple: "It seems to be assumed by critics of the Archbishops that to acquiesce in existing political conditions is to take no part in politics, but surely sins of omission rank equally with sins of commission, and Pilate played no less guilty a part in the Crucifixion by washing his hands of it?".[57] This is a very important point against the contradiction and self-delusion of those who separate Christianity and politics and then directly apply Christian ethics to politics.

The best reply to the critics is given by D. Bowen in reply to a Dr. Birch. Like so many of Temple's critics Dr. Birch had complete confidence in his interpretation of economics, politics and religion. Bowen actually succeeds in seeing the issue: "Dr. Birch seems to accept as axiomatic the postulates of liberal thought (economic, political and religious), which regards man as a self-contained being, completely intelligible in himself, and needing no reference to things or persons outside himself for an understanding of his nature. Dr. Temple, on the other hand, seems to regard man in the light of classical political theory as 'by nature a social animal' whose being is intelligible only in its social setting. In Dr. Temple's view man's field of social action is an integral part of man's being ... If Dr. Temple's conception of man's being is a valid one, it follows logically that the conversion of any human being involves action in the social sphere. This is not quite so obvious in a Christian social atmosphere such as envelops us in this country, as it is in a pagan social atmosphere where, according to the testimony of missionaries, the transformation of the social environment is an essential part of evangelisation".[58]

It is a relief to find Temple actually understood. Most critics seem to have no inkling of Temple's overall

position. J. Sturges claims Temple "assumes that among all corporations only the largest - namely, the State itself - can be trusted to be Christian.[59] This ignores Temple's position on the State. The reason for Temple's call for State action was that that was the only way at that point in time in which the defects of society could be alleviated and his middle axioms implemented. Others seem to have thought he was producing Christian social programmes and using his episcopal authority to give them weight.[60] This is to ignore what he says in Christianity and Social Order. The worst criticism that can justly be made is that he was a little naïve to suppose his disclaimers would be accepted. At bottom it is a sad comment on lay Christians that Temple felt he needed to produce his ballons d'essai. The job of framing programmes and policies is indeed most properly done by laymen. But I cannot see why there should be a total embargo on bishops speaking their mind simply because they might be misunderstood or mistaken. By the very terms of their consecration there must be occasions when it is right for them to speak out. The proviso is that they work out clearly the relation of Christianity to social order and take great pains over the facts of the case.[61]

3. J. D. Carmichael and H. S. Goodwin's book William Temple's Political Legacy is basically very unsatisfactory, as I shall try to show. In fairness I start with a number of their criticisms of Temple which do merit thought, though not always complete acceptance. (i) On his specific suggestions they too correct the belief that banks create unlimited credit by book-entry and lend at vast monopoly profits.[62] They also criticise his suggestion for withering capital on the grounds that it is imprecise, unreal, and looks very like confiscation.[63] (ii) More general criticisms all relate to the problems of planning. Temple over-estimates the capacity of man to foretell requirements.[64] He underplays the risks inherent in life.[65] His passion for giving the workers security blinds him to

the necessity of competition.[66] So far from his schemes abolishing the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty, they would destroy the incentive to take the risks whereby those very schemes could be financed.[67] Too much security can induce management and work-force to be inefficient and to demand more and more from the state.[68] The administration of Temple's schemes would in themselves require a vast expansion of bureaucracy.[69] Carmichael and Goodwin do recognise the need for some state intervention.[70] Adam Smith was perfectly well aware of the capacity of men in business to conspire against the public; the coincidence of private and public interest would exist only in the conditions designed to ensure it.[71] But the grave danger in Temple's schemes is that of the omnicompetent state.[72] The independent arbitrator favoured so often by Temple is to Carmichael and Goodwin the commissar of the totalitarian regime.[73] Furthermore, the condition, indeed the aim, of increased planning must be isolation from international trade.[74] 'Not only is economic independence through isolation impossible, even for great powers; a country which attempts it invites aggression and subjection. It is the attempt to seek prosperity through exclusiveness, not competition, that inevitably creates the international jealousy and conflict that William Temple feared. The particular danger against which we must be on our guard is isolation and economic nationalism masquerading as internationalism."[75](iii) The most general criticism is that Temple should have known that, by virtue of his reputation as a theologian and a philosopher and by virtue of his office, his pronouncements in other fields would carry considerable weight, and that therefore he should have refrained from speaking until he had achieved the mastery in those fields which he expected in his own.[76]

The trouble with Carmichael and Goodwin's book is that it has major deficiencies of its own, which make it impossible simply to accept the criticisms of Temple. Their book is based on only four works of Temple:

Christianity and Social Order, The Hope of a New World, Christianity in Thought and Practice, and The Preacher's Theme To-day.[77] Their criticisms would have been far less alarmist if they had set Temple's social comment in a wider theological context, or even if they had read the four books with more care. They are primarily concerned with politics and economics, and obviously find it very difficult to grasp Temple's theological groundwork. Temple's aims are said to be "1. To persuade the wage-earning masses that the Church is on their side, and, on the whole, against the 'capitalist' employer and 'exploiter'; 2. To expand greatly the services of the State to the citizen ... all the apparatus of the 'Welfare State'".[78] This should be contrasted with what I have said earlier about Temple's aims in Christianity and Social Order.[79] Carmichael and Goodwin interpret Temple's phrase, the "trend of Christian social teaching", to mean a trend to socialism, i.e. they think in political terms and falsely lump Temple with political socialists.[80] They refer to Temple having principles, but never tell us what they are.[81] They appear not to have the faintest idea of the structure of Christianity and Social Order. They plainly think Temple is heavily politicised. They accuse him of believing in panaceas;[82] of seeing the State as omni-competent and the Welfare State as the highroad to the Kingdom of God;[83] of giving first place to the question, What is the duty of society to the individual?[84] These are all ridiculous exaggerations stemming from ignorance and misapprehension. They also criticise Natural Law for failing to do what it never sets out to do, namely, to deduce answers from principles.[85]

But why these wild accusations? It is here that the gravest weakness of the book comes into view. In their Preface Carmichael and Goodwin accuse Temple of failing to produce a systematic political philosophy or coherent programme of social reform.[86] This is amazing in view of Temple's constant claim that the Church could not produce a programme and his own consequently deliberate tentativeness

in the Appendix to Christianity and Social Order. The explanation comes later in their book. 'William Temple and his fellow-trenders ... do not begin with principles and then derive their policies from those principles. Between the principles, Christian or humanistic, of William Temple and his policies there is often no logical relationship. Most strangely he seems entirely unembarrassed by policies that flatly contradict even his political principles, and almost all his policies are ad hoc improvisations and expressions of emotional reaction. One result is that he and his associates have been so busy barking up wrong trees that they seem not to have noticed that there were other trees where their barking would have been appropriate.

"Perhaps,without presumption, we may suggest characteristics of an enlightened Christian approach to the social problems of our day by doing what they so strangely fail to do, namely, deducing policies from clear and distinctive Christian standpoints."[87]

The first deduction[88] is from the standpoint that man's chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy Him for ever: 'The clear duty of the Church is to teach man how to use the severities, hazards and pains of life for the promotion of the 'chief end' of his existence; how to 'Rise on stepping-stones of our dead selves to higher things'." It is not at all clear how this deduction is made, or whether it is the only possible deduction. It seems to make a very sharp distinction between this life and the next. The suggestion looks Pelagian and pitiless, though the rider is added that "Christian charity will certainly be moved to do all it can to get rid, for instance, of grinding poverty, and of threats to physical health". Temple is misrepresented as trying to abolish life's hazards by the Welfare State. When the correction is made, the gap between the two parties narrows; but there is undoubtedly "a very different kind of climate".

The second deduction[89] is also bogus: since the family has its sanction from God and is basic to social life, its problems must be tackled at the level of the family unit itself. "The best the State or Community can do amounts to no more than crude first aid. Such first aid is not only hopelessly inadequate, it is mischievous because it can cover up the problem." Temple is falsely accused of neglecting the family as much as any ecclesiastic because he wants some State intervention.

Thirdly,[90] human relationships in industry are deduced from the relation of master and slave in the New Testament. It is recognised that "in due course, the spirit of Christ was to destroy the institution of slavery" and that the significance of the bearing of the Bible "ought not to be exaggerated". What is deduced is that "it puts squarely on the shoulders of the slave, servant, employee, the duty that belongs there and cannot be discharged by anybody else: the duty to bring goodwill and Christian charity into his share of the human relationship that must exist between himself and the man he serves. This is a bracing doctrine and may be properly taken as a condemnation of that sentimental, indulgent attitude to the 'worker' that would suggest to him that his suspicions may be nursed and his ill-will indulged until such time as socialist reformers have succeeded in taking the 'profit motive' out of industry. The corollary is also true that a Christian approach to the wage-earners, as individuals or collectively in trade unions, must put at least as much emphasis on duties as on rights." This approach thus completely by-passes the problems involved in drawing on New Testament ethics and applying it to modern times. In particular the distinction between personal and collective relations - the whole question of the relation of love and justice - is entirely lost to view.

Lastly[91] Carmichael and Goodwin urge the Church to welcome the fact that we are economically 'One World', since it corresponds to the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of all mankind exemplified by

I.Cor.12, on men being brought into one body by baptism; it is therefore not the isolationist Temple but some liberal economists who are fulfilling the role of prophecy. Quite apart from obscuring here the distinction between the Church and the world in their use of St. Paul, there is a remarkable simplicity in the deduction of a liberal economic outlook from Christian doctrine.

In fact, the four deductions of Carmichael and Goodwin are crude pieces of pseudo-theological justification for their initial political and economic assumption: "We make no apology ... for the fact that our commentary is from a liberal point of view".[92] They are far more heavily politicised than Temple, and in the process bear out the truth of Rommen's strictures on the modern deductive type of natural law. The only difference is that the deductions are made from scripture without the least recognition of the difficulties involved.

The lesson to be learned from this consideration of Carmichael and Goodwin's book are these. (i) It is folly to try to deduce policies directly from Scripture. To pick up the remarks by D. Bowen on Dr. Birch, Carmichael and Goodwin's man is basically liberal man. If he is not plainly atomic man, there is a heavy emphasis on personal responsibility but no real sense of man's corporate nature. Carmichael and Goodwin claim Temple was liberal at heart, but stifled his liberal instincts in order to protect his humbler brethren from the severities of life that he had escaped, and to excuse their faults and follies.[93] What is missing here is the recognition of the second as well as the first of Temple's social principles and the strong note in the Bible of compassion for the poor. The repeated accusation of sentimentality[94] levelled at Temple is primarily an index of Carmichael and Goodwin's intense preoccupation with the problem of the irresponsible individual, into which the problem of the irresponsible society is resolved.[95] (ii) The weakness of Carmichael and Goodwin's position should not blind us to the validity,

up to a point, of their criticisms of Temple. Temple did not and could not go into the facts and the consequences of his ideas in sufficient detail. I noted in Part I how vague Temple was about the causes of war or unemployment. The vaguer he is, the more he relies on general moral judgments and at worst hints at a conspiracy theory over high finance. Carmichael and Goodwin are strong against purely moral approaches to economic problems, and they match the earlier reference to bananas by the Editor of the Financial News by saying that "there can be neither moral nor economic virtue in a redistribution of wealth by decree, which is not concerned with the size of the cake but only that it must be equally divided".[96] Carmichael and Goodwin are at their best when they stress the complexities, the uncertainties and the dilemmas of economic and political affairs.[97] Temple rightly insisted that there must be no separation between religion and other spheres of life, and that human well-being was of cardinal importance in social affairs. The trouble is that, having committed himself to the view that the right thing to do is what is right in the circumstances, he tended to under-estimate the complexities of economics and focus too much on moral principles. He was too confident, through his idea of vocation, about the availability of answers, and he did not see very clearly that his first two social principles lead to dilemmas more than balanced solutions. Carmichael and Goodwin's own counterproposals, whatever their weakness, do help us to see there are no simple answers. The surprise about Carmichael and Goodwin is that they should champion the liberal view as if it were the obvious one for a Christian to hold. I suspect that the main cause is their simplistic view of Christianity. They tell us that "the fundamental problems of our day are religious problems".[98] Their moral interpretation of Christianity amounts to little more than a demand for personal discipline and responsibility. They have no sense of the corporate dimension, and no inkling of the depth of sin. Sin for them is failure to be responsible, and the workers are the chief culprits.[99] The shallowness

of this is plain even when set against Temple; how much more so when we recall Niebuhr and Mackinnon. (iii) There must be a presumption (though not a total embargo) against an Archbishop making even tentative proposals for a social programme. Even if Temple's suggestions were only ballons d'essai, even if at the time Christians did need stimulation to think about social issues, it is better wherever possible to avoid the risk of abusing one's office and weakening the force of what one is entitled to say. Equally, it must be said, an Archbishop should avoid commenting on social issues by the simple application of standards of personal morality. It is, for instance, dangerous to interpret social conflict in terms of greed, and in any case it usually leads to selective application of the criticism. The way for the future, as many have seen, is through joint approaches by those with relevant experience, where everyone brings his own expertise to bear. Men Without Work is an excellent example. The kind of leadership which is needed in the Church is one which encourages the formation of groups such as these to work on specific issues in the light of the Gospel.[100]

4. E. R. Norman

The chief difficulty with E. R. Norman's Church and Society in England 1770-1970 is that though it is sub-titled 'A Historical Study' it is pervasively and elusively normative as well. His Reith Lectures, Christianity and the World Order, are also a mixture of analysis and norm, and I shall draw on these to clarify the issues raised insofar as they are relevant to the present study.

Norman's remarks on Temple come largely in two sets. The first, applicable mainly up to 1924, is uncomplimentary. I draw out two kinds of criticism, closely related.
(a) Temple is an instance of one general conclusion of Norman's study: "that the social attitudes of the Church have derived from the surrounding intellectual and political culture and not, as Churchmen themselves seem to assume,

from theological learning".[101] For Temple's "vision can in the end be stripped down to an educational one: everyone was to be given the opportunity of attaining the standards, material and cultural, then usual within the intelligentsia, to which he looked for his own values".[102] Norman plainly thinks he has uncovered not simply a historical but a disreputable phenomenon. True, in places he is neutral about this. He expects Churchmen to borrow from secular culture and Christian ethics to be shaped by contemporary non-Christian influence. He even says that "this is, no doubt, the way of all truth; it takes on the form and the idealism of the intellectual preoccupations of each generation".[103] But he is certainly writing pejoratively when he notes the almost exact fit of current values with theological interpretation.[104] In Temple's case his social ideas, says Norman, came not from his philosophical (or, it is implied, his theological) thinking, but from the C.S.U. tradition,[105] which was a faithful reflection of the values of the intelligentsia. (b) What Temple shared with the Westcott tradition was a strong sense of social guilt[106] and academic moralism out of touch with reality.[107] He was "far too impressed by ideas; he tended not to ask perceptive questions, or any questions at all, about the emotional impulsions which lead to the adoption of ideas". Indeed, his passion for social justice "was all ideas, resting upon an innocent awareness of the real nature and expectations of working-class life in England".[108] Norman quotes Raven's remark in 1926, that Temple spoke of industrial problems "as if all you had to do was to speak of them as vocation and the whole spirit in which they were undertaken was changed".[109] One manifestation of this academic moralism was his indictment of competition and his recourse to "more systematic collectivist politics" to secure a society resting primarily on co-operation.[110] It was only after 1924 that Temple began to realise that social questions did not have easy solutions.[111]

The second group of remarks tells us that after his translation to York in 1929 Temple "continued to sober up".[112]

The contrast with the earlier remarks makes that a considerable under-statement. (a) Temple, says Norman, made some impressive contributions to 'Christian Sociology'. One example is given: his initiative in convening the group which produced Men Without Work.[113] Norman is not greatly impressed with Christian sociology of the 'thirties, because it was not really sociology but "normative, propagandist, not descriptive", and because it produced, for the most part, well-worn moralistic social criticism. However, "it was a serious attempt to define distinctly Christian principles of society, derived from Christian doctrine, and not just an attempt to conflate Christianity with secular social ideas".[114] (b) Temple "became of markedly better judgement, his social thought was touched by a degree of realism it had not demonstrated before".115 The signs are these. He became more cautious about diagnosing the causes of economic crisis,[116] and about applying political solutions to social problems.[117] There was no such thing as a Christian social ideal,[118] no illumination from the Gospel about technicalities such as social credit.[119] Even by October 1926 Temple was warning that the Labour movement, with its watchwords of brotherhood and fellowship, was an attempt, which could never succeed, to have the fruits of the spirit without any conscious or deliberate reference to the spirit Himself.[120] By the same year Temple took a sober view of democracy as a political device[121] (Norman later attributes Temple's realisation that democracy was not the ideal form of government to 1944[122]). Temple stressed more emphatically the priority of the individual over the State:[123] here was an instance of Churchmen diverging from secular humanism.[124] Norman also detects in Christianity and Social Order an added note of realism even over Citizen and Churchman, in Temple's statement that the first job of the State is to give security against murder, robbery and starvation.[125] Temple is "at his best", according to Norman, "in pointing to the educative influence of social arrangements and environment, and their importance in the assistance or hindrance of Christian character in the individual".[126] Finally there is the increasing prominence

given to the Church's "real and legitimate function as a source of general principles, rather than as an institution suited to be concerned with applications in economic and political questions",[127] and increasing emphasis on the "priority of Christian conversion, before the solution of the world's evils should be attempted".[128] And so comes the accolade we would scarcely have expected initially: Temple represented "the most balanced and intelligent thought of the moderate Left".[129] Even Temple's attitude to the family is commended as traditional - no support here for Carmichael and Goodwin.[130] Temple's weaknesses are reduced to: his lapses over banking and questionable utterance of private opinions as Archbishop;[131] his persistence in advocating causes in The Church Looks Forward, in spite of his own canons in Christianity and Social Order[132] (does Norman, I wonder, ever grasp the idea of the middle axiom?); (apparently) his belief that society was redeemable; (apparently) his assumption that the National Church would be the basis of reformed social morality in England and his failure to grapple with the problem of a post-Christian society.[133]

The contrast between the earlier and later Temple is certainly overdrawn. Norman's own evidence shows this. For instance, although Norman likes to classify radicals as collectivists, he admits that even in 1917 Temple's 'Collegium' was condemning full state socialism and syndicalism, and stating that "no artificial changing of the framework of society would succeed if the members of that society remained unchanged".[134] COPEC saw the tension between prior individual conversion and prior reformation of social structures.[135] Again, even in 1921 Temple was spelling out to Davidson how fallible were social inferences from the Gospel, and how the Church had to avoid a political programme.[136] Norman admits Temple always did maintain the traditional distinction between the functions of the Church and the Christian as citizen,[137] and perhaps we see this reflected in his resignation from the Labour Party on his elevation to the episcopate in 1921[138] and in his speech

at COPEC.[139] At the other end of Temple's life Norman so states the accent on individual conversion as to underplay the importance of social witness for Temple as a preparation for, as well as a consequence of, the Gospel.[140] He is certainly wrong to contrast Temple's two remarks in 1941 on the basic function of a political system. As I have shown in the section on Love and Justice, Temple operated simultaneously with two kinds of priority - that of indispensability and that of value.[141] So the shift during Temple's lifetime is very much a matter of degree - which is indeed what this thesis indicates. In particular, our study of Temple's views on international relations indicates that they are very far from being all unrealistic ideas and academic moralism.

Norman's uneven remarks on Temple prompt me to challenge him in the interests of greater clarity over method in Christian social ethics. I suggest that the unevenness reflects two incompatible views in Norman's mind about the relation of Christianity and social affairs. I reason as follows. (a) The first view makes a very sharp distinction between spiritual and material, absolute and relative, personal and social, religion and politics. I find it very surprising that Norman is so sure about the mechanics of churchmen's social outlook. How does he know that their social ideas are purely drawn from the culture of the intelligentsia and then clothed with theological reinterpretations compatible with them,[142] i.e. that it is the complete reverse of straight intellectual calculation?[143] How does he know that Temple's social ideas came from the C.S.U. tradition and not from his philosophical studies?[144] Although he himself recognises the "complicated and mixed world of ideas and moral postures characteristic of the intelligentsia as a whole",[145] he seems to reject even the idea of interplay between theology and current social ideas, in favour of a one-way process. Granted churchmens' propensity for rather uncritical acceptance of prevailing fashions, nevertheless it scarcely seems plausible historically that the process is one-way, and that a historian

can say definitely that it is. What seems to underlie Norman's view is a theological position which is the deliberate denial of A. M. Ramsey's belief (which Norman quotes) that it is in theology that sociology has its creative springs.[146] Now where Norman is really critical of Temple he sharply separates his spirituality, theology, churchmanship and personal qualities from his social thought.[147] No wonder Temple's vision can in the end be stripped down to an educational one! Naturally if there is this sharp distinction, then there is no passage from theology to social affairs. This easily goes with the view that politics is not a matter of justice but a matter of order, which we have seen Norman approve, mistaking Temple.[148] It also partially explains Norman's evident sympathy for Henson, whose view of Christian morality we have already noted.[149] I cannot make out Norman's position here but a reading of the Reith Lectures confirms me in my belief that there is some such view present. In his fierce antagonism to the supposed politicization of Christianity he associates the spiritual primarily with transcendence,[150] the unearthly[151] and the timeless;[152] there is a corresponding tendency to dub secular values as material.[153] Of the Incarnation it is surprisingly said that the visible and the unseen worlds were briefly joined.[154] Norman harps on the relativities of this life to the point where he rejects Christian espousal of social principles[155] and even speaks of the worthlessness of all human expectations.[156] He also drives home the contrast between the personal and the social. True religion is to do with the inward soul of man;[157] the teachings of the Saviour clearly describe a personal rather than a social morality.[158] And so, "The wise aspirant to eternity will recognise no hope of a better social order in his endeavours, for he knows that the expectations of men are incapable of satisfaction".[159] Similarly Norman seems to want politics to be a calculation to balance interests, or a convenience for satisfying the need for basic order, not a moral enterprise aiming at justice.[160] Thus when the Catholic Bishop Donal Lamont refuses to report guerrillas on moral rather than political

criteria, Norman sees this as an instance of a man in reality deriving his thinking exclusively from politics, yet representing it as fundamental Christian morality.[161] Further evidence of the separation of religion and politics is in Norman's statement that there are no distinctly Christian reasons for regarding the principles of political liberalism as more compatible with the teachings of Christ than other political outlooks.[162] Thus, when he is in this frame of mind, Norman separates sacred and secular, either by rejecting the secular or by treating it as autonomous. (b) On the other hand Norman agrees in the Reith Lectures that Biblical teachings do have social consequences;[163] God does speak through the created order of the material world;[164] Christians will engage not merely in charitable palliatives but in corporate and political action; they will co-operate with others to promote the eradication of agreed injustices (though apparently co-operation with the world is always on the world's terms).[165] It is here that the distinction between politicization ("the internal transformation of the faith itself, so that it comes to be defined in terms of political values"[166]) and engagement in politics comes into play. There must be no politicization, but Christians should work out the social implications of their faith. Norman's attack here is chiefly on Church leaders (i) for being politicized, (ii) for not leaving the social application of Christianity to individual Christians. In Church and Society in England Norman approves of those aspects of Temple's social thought which indicate that he was not politicized; a major criticism is that he could not resist venturing into applications, contrary to his views about the competence of the Church, of which he was an official representative.

The compatibility of these two different approaches is achieved by one device. If we ask how the Christian faith bears directly upon social issues, there is only ever one clear answer: through its realistic doctrine of sin.[167] As the sole answer this is totally implausible, but no further guidance is given. Presumably there are other

"Christian principles of society, derived from Christian doctrine".[168] I suspect the limitation is attributable to two factors: (i) the doctrine of sin dominates Norman's mind because for him it has been a neglected first principle of the traditional theological view of man[169] (the only place in Church and Society in England where his theological position is quite evident is over original sin);[170] (ii) he hankers after distinctly Christian principles and it is the doctrine of sin which for him marks the distinction between Christianity and secular humanism. Yet surely it is the full doctrine of God that we must bring to bear on social order, and as we have seen in the previous chapter, this will mean a 'yes' as well as a 'no' to secular ideals. To isolate the doctrine of sin is to invite a false realism. For it can easily blind men to the legitimacy of aspirations for a more human social order, and relieve those in power of the duty of remedying injustice. At bottom it reflects a false doctrine of God; for it obscures that hope which lies in God's activity as creator and redeemer of the historical process. As D. E. Jenkins puts it, 'Doctrinally and spiritually speaking it would seem that Norman will not allow God to get close enough to history and does not allow himself to get close enough to human beings as they struggle, hope and fail to-day. He seems to want to go back to an imagined past of detachment and remote transcendence. Christians can surely, in faith, only go on".[171]

I suggest therefore that Norman owes us a clear statement of where he does stand on the question of the relationship of Christianity to social order. This is the critical question and it is a profoundly theological one. It is made unclear not only by Norman's ambiguity but also by his location of the issue in the wrong place. To claim that the issue is between politicization and engaging in politics is only to create confusion. For the number in the first category is infinitesimal.[172] Certainly very few churchmen would wish to deny the dimension of transcendence or the other-worldly, or the relativities and ambiguities

of historical existence. The distinction may have the salutary effect of warning us against drifting into the equation of Christian faith with political values. The enormous disadvantage is that it leads ordinary churchmen into complacent self-reinforcement in whatever view they care to adopt short of politicization. The great popularity of Norman's lectures is no doubt partly to be accounted for by this fact. Hearers have heard what they wanted to hear, and indeed, it can be found somewhere in the lectures.

There is clearly a critical choice to be made between positions visible in 1926 or 1942. On the one hand we have a view which focusses on individual Christian morality, treating social and political affairs as belonging to a disreputable or autonomous sphere, where politics is primarily a technical means of guaranteeing order. This view usually focusses on the explicit ethical teaching of the Bible, especially of Jesus Christ Himself,[173] and often tries to judge politics directly by that yardstick. The other view treats man as individual and social, and insists that all spheres of human life must be subject to moral scrutiny. Politics is properly about justice. This view draws general social principles from Christian faith and applies them with a keen eye to the circumstances of the case. Norman is quite right to criticise Temple for talking as if the Church had not applied Christian teaching to social and economic questions from the Reformation to F. D. Maurice.[174] There were indeed two contrasting ways in which the application was made. As Norman says, the premisses were different.[175] Pace Norman, the premisses were not simply political, but also and more particularly theological. I have made it clear where my sympathies lie, and in the Conclusion I shall attempt to co-ordinate my findings by proposing a number of characteristics of a framework of Christian social ethics, which would be more adequate than that produced either by Temple or his critics.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

A grave weakness of the Church of England has been its complacent insularity. This thesis has deliberately looked outside England for its evaluation of Temple, and if Englishmen are to carry weight in their social thinking they must think ecumenically. We live at an exciting time when there is much fruitful interchange of view between Catholic and Protestant. James Gustafson's book Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics finely surveys the prospects for rapprochement.[1] It also reveals by silence how meagre has been the contribution from the church which claims a medial position. In fact there is some very fine work, which deserves support.[2] We desperately need to achieve two things: (i) a more adequate theoretical method in Christian social ethics; (ii) the stimulation of large numbers of ordinary Christians to work at the relation of their faith to their daily lives. This conclusion is therefore cast in the form of two sets of proposals which arise out of the earlier chapters.

1. There can be no question of producing a definitive method in Christian social ethics. H. Richard Niebuhr's Christ and Culture gives us five types of answer to the question of the relation of those two terms, and shows that all five have roots in the New Testament.[3] He suggests that any attempt to construct the answer would be an act of usurpation of the Lordship of Christ. We can however propose a number of characteristics of a method which are important on any reckoning and could especially correct and

strengthen Anglican social ethics as we have found it in this study. In terms of Niebuhr's five types we can say that Temple basically fits into the fifth (Christ the transformer of culture). He felt the pull of the second (Christ of culture), and tried in his latter years to respond to the third (Christ above culture, as found in Natural Law) and to the fourth (Christ and culture in paradox, as roughly represented by Reinhold Niebuhr). I believe that the future should lie principally with methods which emerge from an interplay of the fourth and fifth types. More specifically I put forward the following proposals:

(a) We should place at the centre of social ethics a view of the relation of love and justice which springs from a basic understanding of the Christian faith, symbolised centrally by the doctrines of the nature of God, Creation, Incarnation and Redemption. In framing this view we must allow adequately for the eschatological fact that the created order, though redeemed, is still subject to sin and death, and thus distinguish clearly between an ultimate state, where there is a coalescence of love and justice in perfect mutuality, and our present state, where perfect love is seen in the sacrifice of the Cross and love and justice are in constant tension with each other. Niebuhr's dialectical understanding is not <u>the</u> answer, but it is stronger than Temple's, and he has a greater grasp of the sheer fact of collectivities and of their limitations. His Lutheran background makes him hard for Englishmen to digest, but he is compulsory reading, both for those who are tempted to facile optimism, and also for many of their critics, who will find that there are more profound (and hopeful) forms of realism than their own.[4]

(b) We should have as clear and coherent a view of man as possible, how he relates to God, to man, and to nature and history. Three aspects should bear a primary stress:
(i) Man is a creature standing before God, capable of response to Him and intended for eternal communion with

Him. He has indeterminate possibilities of envisaging goals and shaping nature and history as part of his response to God. (ii) Man is finite, embedded by God in nature and history and subject to hazard and uncertainty. This means that his vision will always be limited, exhibiting a degree of cultural relativity. It also means that our understanding of man and our moral decisions will depend in part on much ordinary experience of life and much empirical study. We must attend sufficiently to the autonomous perspectives of, for example, the historian and the social scientist. (iii) Man is a sinner. All men, even the redeemed, stand under the judgment of God; their thoughts and actions are always liable to be infected by self-interest. These three factors taken together serve to warn us of the complexity of any account of man and the difficulty of arriving at clear-cut moral decisions. They act as a permanent warning against syntheses. If we commend Temple's dialectical method, it must be a dialectics which avoids premature resolution in synthesis and allows a permanent interplay between these aspects of man.

We must also reckon with the individual and communal aspects of man. Pace Temple's critics they are both inescapable; pace Temple they cannot be readily harmonised. J. P. Wogaman usefully speaks of them as one polar presumption among several.[5] Once again, this points to the complexity of arriving at moral decisions. Furthermore, on the basis of the earlier distinction between love and justice, it is best to call the principles 'the dignity of the individual' and 'fellowship' in the sphere of love and 'liberty' and 'equality' in the sphere of justice.[6]

Closely associated is the need to have a clear view of man in relation to the state. Again, the citizen and churchman is not likely to escape dilemmas, for instance over questions of freedom and order or the treatment of prisoners.

(c) It is important to develop a clear understanding of the relation of general and Christian morality. Anglican thought has tended to roost in juxtaposition of gambits.

Because of its history Anglicanism is well placed to see the elements that are to be forged. Robinson's view is not the last word, but it is an impressive attempt to do justice both to the sovereignty of God and the relative autonomy of ordinary morality in a coherent and constructive way, facing up to the complexities and pursuing dialogue with international discussion.

Whatever methods do emerge, it is important to aim for a relative coherence between the three areas. I noted earlier some points of coherence in the evaluative stance across chapters IV and V.[7] In chapter VI Robinson's position is more of the 'Christ the transformer of culture' type, whereas Reinhold Niebuhr's fits better into the 'Christ and culture in paradox' type. But we should remind ourselves that these types are not descriptive of actual thinkers and are not mutually exclusive. There is in fact a close proximity between Robinson and Niebuhr over the issue in chapter VI. For Niebuhr, whilst setting the sovereignty of God and the Cross at the centre of his thought, operates with a concept of common grace; and on the basis of his view that love is the law of life and Christ is Very Man, believes that validation of the Christian claim is in large measure possible through rational reflection on human experience.[8] Niebuhr and Mackinnon stand close in that their stress on the Cross gives them a strong sense of God's judgment not only on the sin of man universally but also and particularly on the sin of the Church.[9]

2. The second set of proposals reflects considerable personal experience and relates to Temple's remarks on adult education and to my observations on his application of principles.[10] The World Council of Churches and the several churches have done much to sponsor the study of social questions, especially at the level of middle axioms. Many reports are of a high quality and provide valuable guidelines for individual Christians. It is, however, an unfortunate fact that they are widely unknown. They are likely to remain so until there is more stimulus to

Christians to work corporately at their specific problems and opportunities. I propose that the kind of leadership the Church should provide today is that of encouraging the formation of groups in which ordinary men and women help each other to bring the resources of the Christian faith to bear upon the problems and opportunities of their daily lives. In particular there are many Christians who are very puzzled as they try to make connections between their faith and their daily life in institutions. If such groups are to function well, I propose they should have the following hallmarks:

(a) they will be ecumenical, thus allowing for several Christian perspectives;

(b) they will consist of clergy and (predominantly) laity;

(c) they will draw in non-Christians with their world-views and ethical outlook;

(d) they will draw in people of varied expertise and experience of life, among them the theologian;

(e) in order to be sufficiently empirical they will usually start out from the specific problems and opportunities currently concerning members, and stay with those to make sure that the complexities are brought to light and appreciated - the group members will be concerned to listen and ask elucidatory questions, not to indulge in superficial moralising;

(f) they will study, as far as time allows, the experience of Christians in facing ethical questions - the biblical witness and the continuing tradition-and the reflection of non-Christians, to see how they can be of help in current situations;

(g) they will help the members to make their own connections between faith and life, and encourage them to work out the next practical steps;

(h) they will look on this process as one which is never complete, because situations are always changing, and God's revelation to man is not something fixed from the past, but is in and through changing situations and so calls for continuing response.

The defects of Temple's Christian social ethics are considerable. Reinhold Niebuhr's estimate of Temple in November 1944 understandably shows an excessive kindness in the hour of loss.[11] But it is far nearer the truth than the sour rhetoric which Hensley Henson committed to his diary on Temple's death, reflecting on "the Archbishop's good fortune on being called away precisely at the juncture when popular hopes were fresh and full, before the chill of reaction had chastened enthusiasm, and the exasperation of disillusionment had replaced the exultation of success".[12] In his last few years Temple's thought was much less tidy. He did not have much time to carry out the transition he saw necessary in 1939. It is quite possible that he could have responded further to Niebuhr, and that he could have brought to Natural Law thinking some of that loosening in the light of modern knowledge which has been so welcome a feature of the era of Vatican II. Practically he had already shown a capacity for initiating corporate study of specific issues. As I read Gustafson, I believe Temple would, given an active near-centenarian mind, have understood the characterisations, and welcomed the possibilities and lines of rapprochement. And if he could really have set about digging the foundations deeper, rather than registering supposed agreement, he might have relished the tasks which the book spells out: How are we to deal with persistent polarities like being and becoming, structure and process, continuity and change, nature and grace? What is to be our fundamental understanding of God, and how are we to establish hermeneutical principles for using the Bible in theological ethics? How can we philosophically do justice both to the aspects of historicism and existentialism and

to the need for general moral principles and values? What kind of authority are we to ascribe to the Church as a corporate body and to the theologian and the laity? How are we to achieve a coherent and an adequate theological ethics, responsive to current problems and responsible not only for the consequences of acts but also to the moral values and principles grounded on the one hand in the faith and life of the Christian community and on the other in our common humanity?[13] However, it is not for us to speculate, but to take up those tasks as our own.

NOTES

The following abbreviations are used for works partly or wholly by Temple:

BC	Basic Convictions (1937)
C	Competition (1917)
CC	Citizen and Churchman (1941)
CD	Christian Democracy (1937)
CFCL	Christian Faith and the Common Life (1937)
CFL	Christian Faith and Life (1931)
CLF	The Church Looks Forward (1944)
CN	Church and Nation (1915)
CRG	Christ's Revelation of God (1925)[x]
CS	Christianity and the State (1928)
CSO	Christianity and Social Order (1942)*
CTP	Christianity in Thought and Practice (1936)
CTT	The Church and Its Teaching Today (1936)
CV	Christus Veritas (1924)
ECP	Essays in Christian Politics and Kindred Subjects (1927)
EPA	The Ethics of Penal Action (1934)
F	Foundations (1912)
FG	Fellowship with God (1920)
HNW	The Hope of a New World (1940)
IF	Issues of Faith (1917)
J	Readings in St. John's Gospel (1939-1940)
KG	The Kingdom of God (1912)
LL	Some Lambeth Letters (ed. F. S. Temple) (1963)
MC	Mens Creatrix (1917)
MWW	Men Without Work (1938)
NMG	Nature, Man and God (1934)
NP	The Nature of Personality (1911)
PC	Plato and Christianity (1916)
PR	Personal Religion and the Life of Fellowship (1926)
PTT	The Preacher's Theme Today (1936)
RE	Religious Experience and other essays (1958)
RSS	Repton School Sermons (1913)
SSTC	Studies in the Spirit and Truth of Christianity (1914)
TSPD	Thoughts on Some Problems of the Day (1931)
TWT	Thoughts in War-Time (1940)
UC	The Universality of Christ (1921)
XC	Christ in His Church (1925)

x Page references are those in About Christ, which contains UC and CRG

* Page references are to this edition except where stated

The following abbreviations are used for works by others:

Maritain RM:	J. Maritain, The Rights of Man
Maritain SP:	J. Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics
Norman C. and S.:	E. R. Norman, Church and Society in England 1770-1970
Norman CWO:	E. R. Norman, Christianity and the World Order

Chapter I: Industry

1 F. A. Iremonger, William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, 328-329

2 For the details see Iremonger, chapters I-III

3 Iremonger, 329

4 RSS 174-177 (1 October, 1911); cf. National Assembly Report of Proceedings for 22 June, 1934

5 CN 80-85; on 'hands' cf. SSTC 71 (5 July, 1914); MC 222; for 'the smarting sense of injustice in our manual workers' see RSS 307 (30 June, 1912)

6 John Oliver, The Church and Social Order, 40

7 Oliver, 40-41

8 Oliver, 43 n.9

9 H. L. Deb., 1917, Vol.26, cols 914-926; Oliver, 45

10 See Oliver, 48-55 for further description and comment

11 The Challenge, 8 September, 1916

12 The Challenge, 15 September, 1916

13 Chronicle of Convocation, 1918, 344, 349-353

14 The Challenge, 11 January, 1918

15 MC 213-215

16 The Challenge, 10 August, 1917

17 MC 223

18 Chronicle of Convocation, 1918, 349-353

19 The Challenge, 8 September, 1916

20 The Challenge, 8 September, 1916; 10 August, 1917

21 The Challenge, 8 February, 1918

22 The Challenge, 10 May, 1918

23 Chronicle of Convocation, 1918, 349-353

24 The Challenge, 20 September, 1918

25 The Challenge, 10 May, 1918; cf. FG 7 (3 August, 1919), 42 (17 August, 1919)

26 MC 222

27 The Challenge, 8 September, 1916; cf. Chronicle of Convocation, 1918, 349-353

28 The Challenge, 10 May, 1918

29 The Challenge, 9 November, 1917

30 The Challenge, 10 August, 1917

31 FG 211-212 (sermon at Repton, 10 June, 1918)

32 The Daily News, 14 May, 1918, in an article entitled 'The Church and Labour'

33 The Daily Herald, 26 March, 1921

34 The Challenge, 11 January, 1918

35 Chronicle of Convocation, 1918, 349-353

36 FG 216-217 (10 June, 1918)

37 The Highway, December 1918, 22

38 The Challenge, 15 September, 1916

39 The Challenge, 11 January, 1918

40 The Challenge, 9 November, 1917

41 Chronicle of Convocation, 1918, 349-353

42 See Politics and Citizenship, being the report presented to COPEC, Vol.XI, 94

43 See esp. 253-257

44 Contemporary Review, July 1920, 65-70

45 v.i. Chapter IV, esp. 178-179

46 The Challenge, 8 September, 1916

47 Board of Trade Figures, quoted by Oliver, 44, n.11

48 v.i. Chapter VII

49 Oliver, 42-43; Cole and Postgate, The Common People, 1746-1946, 548-551

50 The Pilgrim, January 1921, 127-128; cf. Cole and Postgate, 557

51 The Pilgrim, July 1921, 365-366

52 ECP 5-8, in The Pilgrim, July 1921

53 Oliver, 57-58; Cole and Postgate, 562

54 Oliver, 78

55 The Pilgrim, January 1923, 218-225

56 The four principles are to be found in the Report of the Lambeth Conference Committee on Industrial and Social Problems (1920), 59-77, esp. 68-70

57 ECP 9-18, in The Pilgrim, April 1923

58 ECP 18; cf. CV 206: endurance has called out sympathy and recognition of the justice of the cause

59 See esp. 175-182

60 ECP 15-16

61 Cole and Postgate, 554-555

62 H. L. Deb., 1925, Vol.62, cols 230-233 (25 July, 1925); for his introduction see vol.61 col.1096 (8 July, 1925)

63 Oliver, 79; Cole and Postgate, 577-578

64 The Pilgrim, October 1925, 1-7

65 Oliver, 80

66 The Pilgrim, July 1926, 362-372

67 For the dictum, cf. earlier ECP 13, CV 204; repeated in 1943, CLF 152

68 cf. Temple's comment on the delaying tactics of the Dock employers in The Pilgrim, April 1924, 248-249

69 For Temple on the justification of the strike, including the legal aspects, see ECP 48-57, in The Pilgrim, October 1926; CS 129-132; CSO 22-23. On the judgements of Simon and Astbury see M. Morris, The General Strike, 254-255

70 Iremonger 337; for his account of the strike, see 337-344

71 These are the words at the head of the letter from the Standing Conference published in The Times 24 July, 1926. Temple regretted the truncation to 'The Standing Conference of the Churches' because it suggested the members had a right to speak for others (The Times, 21 August, 1926)

72 The Times, 24 July, 1926; 21 August, 1926; cf. The Pilgrim, October 1926, 5-7

73 v.i. 302-308

74 The Pilgrim, October 1926, 1-7

75 The Pilgrim, January 1927, 123-125; repeated PTT 85-86; cf. his comments made at the Southport Church Congress, October 1926, quoted by E. R. Norman, Church and Society in England 1770-1970, 324

76 CS 132-134; cf. CSO 81

77 G. W. McDonald, 'The Role of Industry', in M. Morris, The General Strike, esp. 300-306

78 S. Mews, 'The Churches', in M. Morris, The General Strike, esp. 335-336

79 The Times, 12 April, 1933

80 v.i. 49

81 The Fortnightly, May 1940, 460-461 = HNW 104

82 e.g. CSO 64-65, 70-71, 79; CLF 123

83 HNW 54-55; cf. CSO 79

84 HNW 60-61

85 CSO 79

86 CSO 79-80

87 HNW 55; The Christian Century, 9 October, 1940, 1242-1244

88 HNW 111

89 v.s. 26. By CSO (1942) the fourth principle has been dropped

90 CSO 71-72, 74. cf. The Highway, October 1934, 3 on the need to "humanise mechanism"

91 HNW 61

92 The phrase is taken from the Christian Century, 7 October, 1942; cf. CLF 105-114, esp. 107 (speech of 26 September, 1942)

93 The Christian Century, 7 October, 1942; CLF 110

94 HNW 61-62

95 CLF 158-162

96 HNW 62

97 HNW 55; cf. CSO 79, 84

98 v.i. 253-257

99 Foreword to The Annual Report of the Community Service Council for County Durham, 1936, as reported in The Times, 9 March 1936

100 Iremonger 329-331

101 The Pilgrim, April 1923, 248-249

102 PR 84

103 MC 64

104 PR 84

105 PR 60-61

106 Chronicle of Convocation, 1918, 349-353; cf. later on security: HNW 50; CLF 121, in speech of 14 November, 1942; Lecture at St. Paul's, quoted in The Times, 14 January, 1943; H. L. Deb., Vol.126, cols 316-317 (25 February, 1943); LL 95 (letter of 9 July, 1943)

107 CV 223

108 The Pilgrim, January 1925, 122

109 The Challenge, 10 May, 1918; cf. The Challenge, 8 February, 1918

110 Chronicle of Convocation, 1918, 349-353

111 CS 98

112 The Pilgrim, April 1924, 249

113 See J. Oliver 151-160 for churchmen's thoughts and action in the 1930s. Temple was particularly moved by V. A. Demant's This Unemployment

114 The Contemporary Review, April 1932, 409-414, 'The New Problem in Economics' (J. F. Fletcher, William Temple, 360 gives the title slightly inaccurately)

115 Professor D. P. O'Brien of Durham University advises me that the one economist whose work best fits the aim of the new school as stated by Temple is J. A. Hobson. J. F. Fletcher thinks that the critique of the economic order offered by the Malvern Declaration in 1941 reflects Hobson's thinking: Christendom (U.S.) Summer 1941, 343-344

116 Iremonger, 442-443

117 v.s. 38

118 The Times, 23 January, 1934

119 MWW ix; Iremonger 441 omits Dr. Jones's name; see also the Bell Papers on unemployment, Lambeth Palace Library

120 MWW xii, and see the whole Introduction, ix-xii

121 MWW 1

122 MWW 1-2

123 MWW 2, 28-29

124 MWW 26ff.

125 MWW 414-415

126 MWW Parts II, III and IV

127 MWW x-xi; cf. H. L. Deb., Vol.113, col.638 (21 June, 1939); also Memorandum of September 1935, in the Bell Papers, box on unemployment, Lambeth Palace Library

128 MWW 31

129 MWW 3

130 MWW 4-5

131 Letter in The Times, 5 March, 1934

132 Iremonger, 440-441

133 PTT 81-82

134 MWW 354ff., 371ff.

135 Iremonger, 442

136 CSO 12-13; cf. 72

137 v.s. 10-11, 14-15. See CSO 44-45 on freedom and responsibility

138 CSO 78

139 H. L. Deb., Vol.123, cols.274-280 (10 June, 1942); cf. MWW 201ff.

140 H. L. Deb., Vol.113, cols.638-640 (21 June, 1939)

141 H. L. Deb., Vol.123, cols.274-280 (10 June, 1942); cf. HNW 56: allowances to begin perhaps with the third child

142 HNW 111

143 The Christian Century, 9 October, 1940, 1242-1244

144 CLF 108, in speech of 26 September, 1942

145 Pan-Anglican Congress Report (1908) Vol.II, 100-101

146 The Spectator, 24 January, 1941, 83-84; cf. CTP 41-42; CLF 117-118, in speech of 14 November, 1942

147 The Pilgrim, January 1924, 128; cf. the priorities of MWW x-xi

148 RE 206-207 (February 1943); cf. ECP 43, in The Pilgrim, October 1926; CLF 118-119, in speech of 14 November, 1942

149 The Spectator, 24 January, 1941, 83-84

150 CLF 128, in speech of 27 February, 1943

151 The Pilgrim, October 1926, 2

152 ECP 47, in The Pilgrim, October 1926

153 CSO 58-59

154 ECP 24-29, in The Pilgrim, April 1924; cf. PR 59-64: the Law of Supply and Demand is not immutable

155 PR 60; cf. CSO 13-14, where it is linked with Plato's Republic, Books IX and X

156 The Challenge, 10 May, 1918

157 CSO 15-16

158 On the competitive system v.s. 10, 46

159 KG 95-98; cf. PTT 32-33

160 UC 95-96

161 The Pilgrim, July 1921, 365-366

162 CSO 13

163 CLF 132-133, in speech of 4 June, 1943

164 The Pilgrim, January 1922, 129

165 The Fortnightly, May 1940, 460; The Christian Century, 9 October, 1940, 1242-1244; HNW 16-17, 51, 57; CLF 109, in speech of 26 September, 1942; CC 74

166 CSO 57

167 HNW 42-43; cf. letter to G. F. Bradby as early as 27 January, 1932, quoted by Iremonger, 375-376; and letter to his brother, 5 October, 1932 (MS 1765, Lambeth Palace Library)

168 The Christian Century, 9 October, 1940, 1242-1244; cf. letter to his brother, 10 December, 1932 (MS 1765, Lambeth Palace Library)

169 HNW 50-51; cf. 17, 102-103; cf. Christian Century, 9 October, 1940, 1242-1244; CC 74

170 CLF 153, in speech of 4 February, 1943

171 HNW 43-44; cf. earlier ECP 29, in The Pilgrim, April 1924; Broadcast reported in The Times, 3 July, 1941, on fair exchange

172 The Fortnightly, May 1940, 460

173 CSO 84-85

174 Letter to his brother, 1902; letter to G. F. Bradby, 26 July, 1933, both quoted Iremonger, 45-46; cf. The Pilgrim, January 1924, 128

175 The Challenge, 8 September, 1916

176 Broadcast of 30 May, 1935 = TWT 111-130

177 CLF 127-128, in speech of 27 February, 1943; cf. LL 95 on ordered freedom

178 The Christian Century, 9 October, 1940, 1242-1244; cf. CLF 113 (speech of 26 September, 1942), HNW 103

179 HNW 51-52

180 The Christian Century, 7 October, 1942; CLF 111, in speech of 26 September, 1942

181 CLF 111, in speech of 26 September, 1942

182 CLF 122, in speech of 14 November, 1942

183 CLF 128, in speech of 27 February, 1943; cf. CLF 112

184 HNW 56-57

185 CLF 122, in speech of 14 November, 1942; cf. The Fortnightly, May 1940, 461 = HNW 104

186 CSO 75; cf. 81, 89

187 Iremonger, 438-440

188 HNW 52-53, 57-60; cf. CLF 110-111, in speech of 26 September, 1942; CSO 87-88

189 The Christian Century, 7 October, 1942, 1209-1211; CSO 88-89

190 HNW 53-54; cf. The Christian Century, 9 October, 1940, 1242-1244, and a Broadcast as reported in The Times, 3 July, 1941; cf. CSO 82 on the principle of 'withering capital'

191 The Christian Century, 9 October, 1940, 1242-1244

192 Broadcast as reported in The Times, 3 July, 1941

193 HNW 55, 62; The Christian Century, 9 October, 1940, 1242-1244; cf. HNW 104; The Fortnightly, May 1940, 460-461; CSO 81-82

194 LL 22-23

195 HNW 56; cf. 63, where he commends Sir Reginald Rowe's The Root of All Evil; cf. CLF, in speech of 14 November, 1942; The Christian Century, 7 October, 1942: the lending power of the banks should be limited to the amount deposited by their clients

196 CLF 112, in speech of 26 September, 1942

197 The Fortnightly, May 1940, 461; CSO 86-87

198 CLF 155, in speech of 4 February, 1943

199 CLF 147-148, in speech of 4 February, 1943

200 CLF 154, in speech of 4 February, 1943

201 LL 57-61; cf. CSO 88

202 CSO 31

203 CLF 150-152, in speech of 4 February, 1943; cf.RE 231, in speech to the Aquinas Society, printed in Blackfriars, March 1944

Chapter II: International Relations

1 Christianity and War, 3-4

2 Letters in The Times, 14, 16 April, 1924

3 The Challenge, 4 February, 1916

4 Letter written November 1939, quoted by Iremonger, 542-543

5 Christianity and War, 2; cf. Christianity and War: A Word to Teachers, 14

6 The Challenge, 4 February, 1916

7 In a broadcast of 27 August, 1939, quoted Iremonger, 540, and published in TWT 3-10; cf. RE 175-176

8 CTP 69-71

9 LL 159

10 TWT 32

11 LL 178

12 York Diocesan Leaflet, November 1935, quoted by The Times, 29 October, 1935

13 'A Conditional Justification for War' in RE 171-178, esp. 172-177

14 v.s. 68-69

15 Quoted by Iremonger, 542-543

16 KG 86-87, 91

17 The Challenge, 4 February, 1916

18 TWT 28-29

19 RE 177

20 e.g. KG 38; SSTC 110-111 (sermon of 9 February, 1913); Christianity and War, 12

21 National Assembly Report of Proceedings for 4 February, 1932

22 'Education for Peace' at Birkbeck College, 18 June, 1941, 8; Letter in The Times, 25 March, 1933; CLF 39, in speech of 21 June, 1942; cf. TSPD 34

23 Christianity and War, 10-13

24 LL 131-138; cf. PTT 78-79

25 Temple maintains here that his position on pacifism is entirely consistent with Article 37 of the Church of England; see also LL 178-180 on pacifism and ordination

26 CTP 74-75; MC 188-189; TWT 20

27 Quoted by Iremonger 544 (letter dates from the Second World War); cf. Broadcast of 26 May, 1940: we are fighting to keep open the possibility of a civilisation governed by Christian principles (quoted in The Times, 27 May, 1940); RE 176; LL 102-103 (letter of 14 August, 1943)

28 CLF 3 (sermon preached 23 April, 1942)

29 RE 178; cf. TSPD 38

30 TWT 9 (Broadcast of 27 August, 1939) and quoted by Iremonger, 540

31 Quoted in The Times, 4 November, 1935; Raven's letter appeared 31 October

32 TWT 29

33 TWT 31-35

34 TWT 55, in broadcast of 2 October, 1939 (Iremonger, 540, mistakenly says 3 October: this was the date on which it was reported in The Times); cf. H. L. Deb., vol. 114, cols. 1309-1310 (4 October, 1939)

35 CLF 46, in address to the National Society, 3 June, 1942

36 Sermon preached at the Annual Service of the Church of England Peace League, 20 January, 1915, and quoted in The Challenge, 29 January, 1915

37 The Challenge, 4 February, 1916

38 Speech at Birkbeck College, 18 June, 1941, 7-8

39 See Iremonger, 543

40 Letter in The Times, 4 September, 1939; see also LL 134 on 'personal pacifism'

41 The Challenge, 4 February, 1916

42 PTT 78

43 RE 177

44 PTT 78; LL 136

45 J 322-323

46 Is Christ Divided? 28; and see the whole section 24-31

47 v.i. Chapter 4 esp. 186-187. See also 298 for D. M. Mackinnon's comments

48 The Challenge, 14 April, 1916

49 The Challenge, 30 November, 1917

50 Quoted by Iremonger, 173-174

51 Quoted by Iremonger, 175-176; cf. The Challenge, 6 August, 1915 and 21 April, 1916

52 The Challenge, 15 November, 1918; The Constructive Quarterly, March 1919, 8; UC 96-98

53 CFL 48-50

54 TWT 3, in Broadcast of 27 August, 1939

55 TWT 11-14; cf. Iremonger 541-542

56 CC 74; v.s. 60

57 Christianity and War, 9

58 The Challenge, 26 November, 1915; cf. MC 183-184; CS 168; RE 99-102, in Broadcast of 10 February, 1930

59 The Contemporary Review, July 1920, 65-66

60 CLF 81, in Broadcast recorded on 12 July, 1943

61 The Challenge, 6 August, 1915; cf. FG 52

62 SSTC 93, in sermon of 6 October, 1912

63 J 260

64 The Contemporary Review, July 1920, 66

65 Christianity and War: A Word to Teachers, 14; Sermon of 20 January, 1915, reproduced in The Challenge, 29 January, 1915; Letter in The Times, 24 May, 1935; cf. NMG 187, 393-394

66 HNW 10-13, 27

67 The Challenge, 15 November, 1918; CLF 88-89, in Broadcast of 27 December, 1942; cf. Christianity and War, 9; The Challenge, 6 April, 1917; Letter of November, 1939, quoted by Iremonger, 542-543

68 TWT 9, in Broadcast of 27 August, 1939

69 LL 102 (letter of 9 August, 1943); LL 178 (letter of 31 July, 1944); LL 73-74 (letter of 24 May, 1943); CLF 180, in sermon of 13 June, 1943

70 The Challenge, 22 October, 1915; cf. Christianity and War, 8 and Iremonger, 187; also Broadcast of 7 January, 1942, reported next day in The Times

71 LL 73 (letter of 21 May, 1943) and LL 102-103 (letter of 14 August, 1943); cf. Iremonger 546 on reprisals for flying bombs, called for by an Anglican priest

72 e.g. TWT 84-90 = Broadcast of 22 January, 1940; CLF 88-92 = Broadcast of 27 December, 1942

73 Christianity and War, 7-10; cf. e.g. Christianity and War: A Word to Teachers, 14; The Challenge, 4 February, 1916; TWT 9 in Broadcast of 27 August, 1939; HNW 81

74 LL 20-21 (letter of 27 June, 1942); cf. LL178 (letter of 31 July, 1944)

75 LL 145-146 (letter to Garbett, February 1944); PR 41; cf. more extensively TWT 36-44

76 LL 11-14 (letters in May 1942)

77 H. L. Deb., Vol. 131, cols. 29-57 (15 March, 1944)

78 17 May, 1944: 'Freedom of Nations and of Men' at a reception given by the Anglo-Polish Christian Circle

79 Iremonger, 383-384. Ribbentrop's letter and further details can be found in the Temple Papers in Lambeth Palace Library

80 Reported in The Times, 19 December, 1938

81 Reports in The Times, 9 December, 1943, and 15 June, 1944

82 H. L. Deb., Vol. 125, cols. 21-24, 35 (11 November, 1942); cf. letter in The Times, 5 December, 1942

83 H. L. Deb., Vol.126, cols. 811-821, 858-860 (23 March, 1943)

84 Sermon of 14 January, 1943, as reported in The Times, 15 January; Iremonger 558

85 Iremonger, 413

86 CLF 171, in address of 18 October, 1942

87 Sermon of 20 January, 1915, reproduced in The Challenge, 29 January; cf. The Challenge, 8 December, 1916, on negative views of peace

88 v.i. 297-301

89 Christianity and War, 14-16; cf. 'Our Need of a Catholic Church', and 'The Witness of the Church in the Present Crisis', for more on Temple's hopes for a truly international Church

90 The Challenge, 30 June, 1916

91 The Challenge, 16 February, 1917

92 The Challenge, 27 September, 1918

93 The Challenge, 21 September, 1917

94 The Challenge, 18 October, 1918

95 The Challenge, 25 October, 1918

96 J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, quoted by Oliver, 24

97 v.s. 20

98 The Contemporary Review, July 1920, 69-70; cf. his attitude to the 'solemn oath', Iremonger, 187

99 The Pilgrim, January 1921, 126

100 The Pilgrim, April 1921, 241

101 The Pilgrim, July 1922, 463-464

102 Iremonger, 375-377

103 v.s. 85-86; XC 101-103, 117; cf. PR 74-75; RE 87 (1928)

104 BC 71

105 ECP 37-39, in The Pilgrim, October 1924

106 The Contemporary Review, July 1920, 66

107 ECP 36-37, in The Pilgrim, October 1924

108 The Pilgrim, January 1922, 127; XC 115

109 The Pilgrim, July 1922, 466

110 The Constructive Quarterly, March 1919; 7

111 CS 164

112 TSPD 34-36

113 Reported in The Times, 12 October, 1934; cf. TSPD 37, and later The Fortnightly, May 1940, 457-458

114 'Christ and the Way to Peace', RE 124-135

115 CTP 91, 94

116 National Assembly, Report of Proceedings, 1932, 118-134 (4 February, 1932)

117 Letter in The Times, 14 June, 1932

118 Letter in The Times, 24 May, 1935

119 Letter in The Times, 25 March, 1933

120 Letter in The Times, 20 August, 1935

121 Implied in the report in The Times, 17 January, 1936

122 Letter in The Times, 23 March, 1937

123 York Diocesan Leaflet, October 1936, reported in The Times, 1 October, 1936

124 Statements reported in The Times, 30 April, 8 May, 8 September, 1937

125 In a typewritten letter to be found in the Temple Papers in Lambeth Palace Library

126 Letter in The Times, 4 October, 1938

127 TWT 60, 68-69; RE 175

128 TWT 68, in The Spectator, 3 November, 1939

129 The Daily Telegraph, 4 and 6 December, 1939; see too the leader of 4 December

130 e.g. TWT 57; Transatlantic broadcast, 7 January, 1942, as reported in The Times the next day; The Fortnightly, November 1941, 409 (v.i. 109-110)

131 TWT 57; H. L. Deb., Vol.114, cols.1306-1310 (4 October, 1939); cf. on the need for unconditional surrender, LL 156-157 (Letter to Smuts, 21 April, 1944)

132 Iremonger, 560 (he does not say which points); letter in The Times, 8 January, 1940

133 See Dr. Kurt Hahn's letter in the Temple Papers in Lambeth Palace Library

134 HNW 35-45

135 On forgiving Germany, cf. The Fortnightly, November 1941, 412-413, v.i.110; LL20-21 (letter of 27 June, 1942); Intensification of the allied bombing led Temple to drop the suggestion of a penal element in the treatment of Germany immediately after the war: see his Introduction to S. Hobhouse, Christ and Our Enemies, 2-4

136 HNW 40-41; cf. TWT 84-90, esp. 88-89, in Broadcast of 22 January,1940

137 TWT 65-72 = article in The Spectator, 3 November, 1939

138 LL 25-26 (letter of 2 July, 1942)

139 The Fortnightly, November 1941, 405-413

140 On the Germans as affected by doctrine, cf. Letter to The Times, 14 June, 1944; on the re-education of Germany, cf. CLF 170-173, in address of 18 October, 1942

141 The Fortnightly, May 1940, 453-461 = HNW 91-104

142 On a federal union of Europe, cf. TWT 63

143 HNW 41

144 The Fortnightly, May 1940, 458-459; this article and HNW 35-45 both end by drawing in the question of fierce economic competition, v.s. 59-60

145 H. L. Deb., Vol.130, cols. 400-410 (16 December, 1943). On the problem of power see also The Listener, 2 November, 1944, 489, 492

146 Temple was an enthusiast for the British Empire, or, as he preferred to call it, the British Commonwealth. See The Challenge 19 May, 1916, 8 June, 1917; MC 248-252; The Pilgrim, July 1926, 447-455; HNW 85-87, 119-125; Address at Birkbeck College, 18 June, 1941, 13

147 v.s. 75

148 e.g. CLF 172-173, in address of 18 October, 1942; v.s. 79 also

Chapter III: Education

1 The Pilgrim, April 1925, 330

2 CLF 134, in speech of 4 June, 1943

3 CV 203; CSO 64-66; The Challenge, 20 September, 1918; CC 10; CLF 81, in broadcast recorded on 12 July, 1943

4 CD 19-20

5 The Constructive Quarterly, March 1914, 195-196

6 The Challenge, 12 January, 1917

7 J 121; on greatness, v.i. 126

8 MC 227

9 C 201-202

10 CLF 47, in address of 3 June, 1942

11 HNW 49

12 As reported in The Times, 13 February, 1941

13 PR 66-67; on parents, see also CLF 38

14 H. L. Deb., Vol.128, col. 1000 (4 August, 1943); cf. The Highway, November 1932, 2-3

15 The Challenge, 2 March, 1917; cf. The Highway, December 1916, 45-46; Times Educational Supplement, 7 September, 1916; A Challenge to the Church 38

16 HNW 12; cf. 'The Teaching of Religion and Morals' in The Modern Teacher, ed. A. W. Bain, 262; H. L. Deb., Vol.128, col.1003 (4 August, 1943)

17 CLF 81-82, in broadcast recorded 12 July, 1943

18 CC 10

19 CLF 46-48, in address of 3 June, 1942; cf. Canterbury Diocesan Gazette as quoted in The Times, 26 May, 1942; on the three environments, cf. CSO 69

20 MC 242

21 The Pilgrim, October 1923, 103-105

22 HNW 20-26; cf. CLF 37,44, in sermon of 21 June, 1942

23 CFCL 48

24 HNW 65; statement quoted in The Times, 13 February, 1941

25 CV 88; RE 211-212 (1943)

26 CSO 68-69; cf. 77

27 Spencer Leeson, Christian Education (1944 Bampton Lectures); T. S. Eliot, 'The Christian Conception of Education' in Malvern, 1941, 201-213

28 MC vii-viii

29 CS 8-9; cf. PC 37

30 The Pilgrim, January 1926, 220

31 The Pilgrim, October 1923, 103; see further section 4 below as a whole

32 Speech at the Church Congress, 4 October, 1906 (see Iremonger 92); cf. The Highway, October 1910,14 where he describes Plato's Republic as "the greatest of all books about education"

33 PC 31-74

34 PC 42-47; cf. NMG 232-233 (v.i. 125)

35 PC 66-67

36 PC 67-68

37 cf. the uniting of Temple's principle of fellowship and Plato's Republic in CSO 67

38 MC 216-217, 227; cf. C 192

39 CV 57-61; cf. 78-88 on desire, pride and reason

40 NMG 232-234; on the fashioning of unity, cf. Bain, 265; The Pilgrim, October 1923, 103; RE 100, in broadcast of 10 February, 1930

41 MC 227-228

42 CV 53-55

43 NMG 514-516; for the more and less mature mind, cf. FG 82

44 MC 237-238

45 CN 182

46 ECP 94, in The Pilgrim, January 1922

47 Bain, 266; The Pilgrim, October 1923, 103-104 (v.s. 119)

48 C 192-194; MC 227-230; CV 53-54

49 Speech at Birkbeck College, 18 June, 1941, 9; CLF 39, in sermon of 21 June, 1942

50 See Iremonger, 146-147. Hooliganism off the school premises was reported in the local Daily News on 15 December, 1910

51 Iremonger, 145-146

52 F 260-261; KG 21-24; SSTC 104-115; CN 6-21; IF 4-6

53 CN 6-14

54 SSTC 47; cf. IF 62-63

55 CN 16-17

56 The Challenge, 12 January, 1917

57 On self-discipline, see e.g. The Challenge, 12 January, 1917; on self-determination, see esp. NMG 236-240

58 NP 27-29; cf. later J 280-281, commenting on Jn.16.7

59 SSTC 162-170

60 SSTC 199-200

61 The Challenge, 6 July, 1917; on democracy in education, cf. The Challenge, 10 August, 1917; cf. later 145-146

62 C 188-189

63 On the influence of the educational system: National Assembly Report of Proceedings for 9 February, 1922; on society as the chief educator: The Pilgrim, April 1925, 330; on the influence of the social and economic system: CSO 10; of home, school and society: HNW 46-49; CLF 133-134, in speech of 4 June, 1943; RE 206 (1943); on the limits of school influence: RE 206; CLF 134

64 Speech at Birkbeck College, 18 June, 1941

65 RSS 268-270

66 CN 181-182 (reading 'potential worth' for 'potential work')

67 Report in The Times, 14 February, 1944; on lack of opportunity, cf. SSTC 71; FG 7; The Pilgrim, April 1922, 337; ECP 9, in The Pilgrim, April 1923; XC 82; PR 85; HNW 48; CSO 77-78; H. L. Deb., Vol.128, cols.996-1007 (4 August, 1943), where he hailed the White Paper as offering a complete national system for the first time (col. 997)

68 C 190-191; MC 228-229

69 HNW 48

70 Iremonger, 2-3 and passim

71 J. D. Carmichael and H. S. Goodwin, William Temple's Political Legacy, 143-144

72 v.i. 312-319

73 Quoted by Iremonger, 134- 147

74 MC 235-236

75 ECP 7, in The Pilgrim, July 1921

76 CSO 67-68

77 H. L. Deb., Vol.128, cols.996-1007 (4 August, 1943)

78 Quoted by Iremonger, 148

79 Letter to his brother, 25 June 1914 (MS 1765, Lambeth Palace Library); The Reptonian, July 1912, 158 gives a glimpse of Ford's frigidity and hostility to Temple

80 CN 182-191; cf. C 195-202

81 Iremonger, 2-3

82 cf. SSTC 91-93

83 The Challenge, 16 March, 1917 is similar

84 Bain, 257

85 HNW 47-49; cf. MC 230-233; C 194; The Challenge, 16 March, 1917; CV 54; The Pilgrim, April 1925, 331; H. L. Deb., Vol.128, cols.1000-1001 (4 August, 1943)

86 MC 238

87 CN 193

88 SSTC 209

89 Address at Birkbeck College, 18 June, 1941, 10

90 MC 238

91 The Challenge, 16 March, 1917

92 RE 166-170, from the York Quarterly, 1932

93 HNW 107-109

94 RE 199-203, 213-216 (1943); cf. CLF 39, in sermon of 21 June, 1942

95 The Pilgrim, January 1926, 212; cf. The Highway, December 1916, 46; A Challenge to the Church, 38; Bain, 262

96 CLF 40, in sermon of 21 June, 1942

97 Bain, 269

98 CS 178-180

99 v.i. 330; cf. 255-256, 308-309 for the need to take the autonomy of the disciplines seriously

100 Bain, 270

101 Iremonger, 143

102 Address at Birkbeck College, 18 June, 1941, 11; he also considered that Africans in the British Empire should be educated to be Africans, The Pilgrim, July 1926, 452-453

103 CLF 40, in sermon of 21 June, 1942

104 MC 239-240; Bain 268; The Highway, December 1916, 43-45

105 LL 62-64 (letter of 11 March, 1943)

106 HNW 48

107 H. L. Deb., Vol.79, cols. 1075-1083 (17 February, 1931); National Assembly Report of Proceedings for 22 June, 1934; CSO 66; RE 209 (1943); H. L. Deb., Vol.128, cols.1001-1002 (4 August, 1943)

108 CSO 66; cf. MC 234; PR 85

109 CLF 51, in address of 3 June, 1942. Temple also valued manual work because it could be done co-operatively The Highway, November 1916, 21

110 MC 235; CS 136; the idea of providing subjects only when pupils requested them was, however, "lunacy"! - Bain 267

111 CLF 38, in sermon of 21 June, 1942

112 The Challenge, 16 March, 1917

113 The Pilgrim, April 1925, 332

114 Iremonger, 138-140. The books were by Elliott Binns, Hunkin and Bethune Baker, but the titles are not given. Temple recommended The Study of the Gospels by Armitage Robinson; the Shining Mystery of Jesus and Christianity by Edwyn Bevan

115 Speech at Church Congress, 4 October, 1906, quoted by Iremonger, 92

116 Economic Review, January 1907, 1-2

117 Economic Review, January 1907, 3; cf. Speech at Church Congress, 4 October, 1906, quoted Iremonger, 92

118 The Challenge, 12 January, 1917

119 The Challenge, 20 April, 1917

120 The Pilgrim, January 1926, 215-216

121 v.s. n.113

122 The Challenge, 16 March, 1917

123 Economic Review, January 1907, 3

124 The Challenge, 16 March, 1917

125 H. L. Deb., Vol.132, col.41 (6 June, 1944)

126 The Challenge, 20 April, 1917

127 Letter in The Times, 12 March, 1940

128 Speech at Church Congress, 4 October, 1906, quoted by Iremonger, 92-93; cf. The Highway, December 1916, 46

129 The Challenge, 12 January, 1917

130 Bain, 263

131 Economic Review, January 1907, 3; cf. The Pilgrim, January 1926, 220

132 See section 6 below, 162

133 Bain, 269

134 ECP 94, in The Pilgrim, January 1922

135 Iremonger, 144

136 The Challenge, 10 August, 1917; cf. education as necessary for sane judgment in a democracy, CD 26

137 v.s. 144

138 CSO 69

139 Bain, 271

140 RE 213 (1943); cf. infra 151-153. For the question of worship, v.i. section 6

141 v.i. 299-301

142 C 204

143 CN 183-186; C 195-196

144 SSTC 3-4; The Challenge, 20 April, 1917

145 Iremonger, 62

146 Quoted by Iremonger, 71

147 Iremonger, 63-64

148 CLF 37, 42-43, in sermon at Oxford, 21 June, 1942

149 For an account of Temple's work for the W.E.A. see Iremonger, esp. 74-88

150 Presidential address delivered 16 October, 1909 and printed as a supplement to The Highway, December 1909; cf. The Highway, September 1912, 179: the W.E.A. is sacramental; April 1915, 105; Out of Death into Life

151 e.g. Presidential Address to W.E.A., 16 October, 1909 printed as supplement in The Highway, December 1909); cf. Presidential Address of 1913, printed in The Highway, January 1914; cf. CN 181

152 MC 224

153 The Challenge, 10 August, 1917

154 The Challenge, 12 November, 1915

155 CLF 142-143, in lecture of 4 February, 1943

156 ECP 75-76 (part of Present Day Papers, No. 2, published under the auspices of COPEC); v.s. 24

157 Presidential Address, 1912, quoted by Iremonger, 83; CN 191-192

158 The Constructive Quarterly, March 1914, 188-190; cf. The Highway, October 1910, 13-14; cf. November 1916, 22 for the contrast between the educational ladder and the educational highway

159 Iremonger, 81-82; cf. 75 for Tawney's comment; cf. The Highway, October 1910, 13

160 Iremonger, 74

161 CN 192-193; cf. The Highway, Summer 1924, 129-132

162 The Constructive Quarterly, March 1914, 190-191

163 The Constructive Quarterly, March 1914, 191-196; cf. Iremonger, 84

164 Introduction to The Teaching Church, ed. A. L. Woodard, v, 3-11; cf. The Pilgrim, April 1925, 337-338; letter with 14 other signatories in The Times of 4 February, 1933, advertising The Association for Adult Religious Education

165 Iremonger, 93

166 Speech at the Oxford Union, 26 April, 1906, as recollected by Temple himself

167 Speech at Church Congress, 4 October, 1906; see Iremonger, 92-93

168 The Economic Review, January 1907, 10-12

169 v.s. 117-121

170 The Pilgrim, April 1922, 334-335

171 MC 226

172 See e.g. CC, esp. 63

173 The Challenge, 2 March, 1917

174 ECP 20, in The Pilgrim, April 1924

175 v.s. 142-144

176 The Pilgrim, April 1925, 330-335

177 The Pilgrim, January 1926, 210-214, 219-220

178 CLF 52-53, in address of 3 June, 1942; cf. H. L. Deb., Vol.132, col. 39 (6 June, 1944)

179 RE 128 (1935); letter in The Times, 12 March, 1940

180 RE 210 (1943); cf. his ideas for an educational council or Parliament, The Challenge, 23 November, 1917; CS 135-137

181 Address to the Consultative Committee of the National Society, reported in The Times, 13 January, 1938

182 York Diocesan Gazette, April 1929, reported in The Times of 15 April, 1929

183 The Challenge, 23 November, 1917; cf. H. L. Deb., Vol.128, col. 998 (4 August, 1943)

184 C 198; CSO 65; RE 209 (1943); H. L. Deb., Vol.132, col.34 (6 June, 1944)

185 C 198

186 C 202; CSO 68; cf. H. L. Deb., Vol.128, col.999 (4 August, 1943) on the Norwood Report

187 The Challenge, 27 April, 1917; cf. RE 208 (1943)

188 The Challenge, 24 August, 1917

189 The Pilgrim, January 1925, 122

190 H. L. Deb., Vol.79, cols.1077-1078 (17 February, 1931); CLF 123, in speech of 14 November, 1942; RE 208 (1943)

191 National Assembly, Report of Proceedings for 22 June, 13 November, 1934; cf. C 202

192 RE 209 (1943)

193 H. L. Deb., Vol.132, cols. 35-36 (6 June,1944)

194 RE 209 (1943); CSO 66; National Assembly, Report of Proceedings for 22 June, 1934

195 CSO 66; National Assembly, Report of Proceedings for 22 June, 1934

196 The Pilgrim, April 1922, 338-341; cf. The Challenge, 12 November, 1915; Letter of Temple and 35 others published in The Times, 14 September, 1932; speech at a conference of educationists and trade unionists, as reported in The Times, 14 February, 1944: no expenditure was so economical as expenditure on true education, said Temple

197 The Pilgrim, October 1924, 5-6

198 See this especially in the address to the National Society on 3 June, 1942 = CLF 45-59

199 The Pilgrim, April 1925, 336; York Diocesan Gazette, April and May 1929, as reported in The Times, 15 April, 18 May, 1929; Letter in The Times, 29 January, 1931

200 Iremonger, 570-573

201 Iremonger, 575-576; H. L. Deb., Vol.132, col.40 (6 June, 1944); cf. earlier H. L. Deb., Vol.79, col.1081 (17 February, 1931); CLF 56-57, in address of 3 June, 1942; letter in The Times, 25 November, 1943

202 Bain, 257-258; cf. The Pilgrim, April 1926, 331

203 H. L. Deb., Vol.132, cols.33-43 (6 June, 1944); cf. joint statement of the Archbishops of Canterbury, York and Wales, in full agreement with Free Church leaders, reported in The Times, 13 February, 1941; CSO 69,77; RE 207 (1943)

204 Iremonger, 575

205 H. L. Deb., Vol.132, col.37 (6 June, 1944); cols.348ff (21 June, 1944)

206 H. L. Deb., Vol.132, cols.368-369 (21 June, 1944); col.599 (29 June, 1944); on his hope for ever greater agreement on syllabuses, cf. Joint Statement reported in The Times, 13 February, 1941; CLF 54, in speech of 3 June, 1942; on his opposition to a national syllabus, cf. CLF 58-59, in same speech

207 v.i. esp. 299-301

Chapter IV: Love and Justice

1 Temple's own alleged comment on Niebuhr in 1937, quoted by Nathan Scott, Reinhold Niebuhr, 30

2 TWT 29

3 TWT 15; for justice as a virtue see report in The Times, 4 November, 1935 (v.s.80); for the distinction of the kingdoms of this world and the Kingdom of God see RE 176 (v.s. 70,74); on Christianity and civilization, see Iremonger, 544 (v.s.78-79), Temple's letter of 26 April, 1944 (v.s.70), CLF 46 (v.s.81)

4 CLF 167-168

5 CC 68

6 TWT 15

7 York Diocesan Leaflet, quoted in The Times, 29 October, 1935 (v.s. 71-72), RE 175-176 (v.s. 73-74); cf. CC 32

8 CFCL 48

9 CC 68

10 CC 68

11 CFCL 49

12 CFCL 50

13 The phrase 'entanglement in sin' occurs at HNW 45; cf. Iremonger, 543, quoting a letter of November 1939

14 CFCL 50-51; Report in The Times, 4 November, 1935 (v.s. 79-80)

15 CFCL 52-53

16 CFCL 55; cf. The Fortnightly, May 1940, 453

17 CTP 81; cf. RE 130 (v.s. 101), The Fortnightly, November 1941(v.s.108)

18 CTP 80-81

19 CTP 81-83, HNW 95-96, TWT 26-27

20 TWT 26-27; Report in The Times, 4 November, 1935 (v.s. 80)

21 Report in The Times, 4 November, 1935 (v.s. 79-80); cf. York Diocesan Leaflet, reported in The Times, 29 October, 1935 (v.s.72); cf. CTP 86-87

22 Iremonger, 542-543 (v.s. 74); TWT 28-29 (v.s. 76)

23 TWT 16

24 CTP 77-78

25 CFCL 59

26 CTP 76; cf. CTP 84-85, TWT 23-24

27 CTP 85

28 Report in The Times, 4 November, 1935 (v.s. 79)

29 CFCL 60

30 CC 69; Report in The Times, 4 November, 1935; cf. TWT 17

31 CTP 85-86; cf. CLF 168

32 CTP 86-87

33 CTP 78, CLF 168, CC 70, TWT 18

34 CTP 78, CLF 168

35 CFCL 53

36 TWT 18; cf. 29

37 CC 70

38 RE 176-177 (v.s. 74)

39 CFCL 59-61

40 CSO 38

41 H. L. Deb., 16 December, 1943 (v.s.112)

42 CFCL 59-61

43 CTP 89, 91 (v.s. 102), HNW 92-93 = The Fortnightly, May 1940, 453-454 (v.s.110-111), The Christian Century, 7 October, 1942, 1209-1211, CSO 42, CC 32, RE 131-134 (v.s. 101)

44 HNW 46, TWT 27

45 CFCL 57-58, cf. CTP 84; cf. also Temple's criticism of pacifism that it would remove the Christian impulse behind the civic enterprise of justice, TWT 29 (v.s.76)

46 See e.g. NMG chapter XIX, and v.i. 264ff

47 v.s. 71-77

48 CFCL 52-54

49 CFCL 58; it is probably in this sense that we are to construe Temple's claim in 1940 that it can be obligatory to kill, RE 173 (v.s. 73)

50 CFCL 59

51 CSO 38. This point is developed in section (vii)

52 EPA 22-23

53 EPA 23-27

54 EPA 27-31

55 EPA 31-32, 34-35, 38-39; on Temple's Platonic view of human development, v.s. 121ff

56 RE 176 (v.s. 74); The Fortnightly, November 1941, 409, 413 (v.s. 108-109); The Fortnightly, May 1940, 456 (v.s. 111); TWT 9 (v.s. 79)

57 H. L. Deb., 16 December, 1943 , 401-405 (v.s. 112)

58 LL 25-26 (v.s. 108)

59 CLF 168; on our being disqualified from straight-forward imitation of Christ, see Christianity and War, 10-13 (v.s. 77) and CFCL 50-51

60 HNW 40, 44-45 (v.s.106-107); cf. The Fortnightly, November 1941, 413 (v.s. 109-110 and n.135); cf. CFCL 50-51 on individuals being disqualified

61 TWT 57 (v.s. 105), 69 (v.s. 104), 71; RE 175; Broadcast of 7 January, 1942; The Fortnightly, November 1941, 413 (v.s. 109)

62 TWT 66, 69

63 LL 25-26 (v.s. 108)

64 The Fortnightly, November 1941, 409 (v.s. 108-109); HNW 39 (v.s. 106-107), CLF 170-171 (v.s. 92); cf. RE 175 on the allies' refusal between the wars to welcome Germany into the fellowship of nations

65 TWT 69-70

66 RE 132

67 H. L. Deb. 16 December, 1943 (v.s.112), HNW 41 (v.s. 107)

68 HNW 41 (v.s. 107); cf. CLF 172, Broadcast of 7 January, 1942; cf. his pre-war remarks, 24 May, 1935, (v.s. 102)

69 G. Outka, Agape, 75, 88

70 Outka, 90

71 Outka, 89-91

72 Quoted by Outka, 91 n.38

73 HNW 46

74 v.s. 59-60, 66-67 for example

75 v.s. 39 and n.82 for example

76 HNW 46ff

77 v.s. 133, 140

78 CSO 14; cf. 28 where he quotes St. Ambrose: alms is an act of justice; v.s. 11

79 v.s. 170

80 CC 70

81 TWT 18-19

82 CFCL 53

83 CC 70; cf. TWT 29, 72 (v.s. 108), HNW 46

84 CFCL 53

85 CTP 94 (v.s.102); cf. report in The Times, 29 October, 1935 (v.s. 72) and 4 November, 1935 (v.s.79-80)

86 HNW 46; The Fortnightly, May 1940, 456

87 TWT 29-30

88 RE 205

89 CFCL 61-62

90 TWT 26-27

91 J. F. Padgett, The Christian Philosophy of William Temple, 3-7

92 W. G. Peck in William Temple: an Estimate and an Appreciation, 60; cf. J. S. Bezzant in The Modern Churchman, March 1949, 22, J. F. Fletcher, William Temple, 231

93 The Challenge, 4 February, 1916 (v.s. 68), Christianity and War 10-13 (v.s. 77). The phrase 'entanglement of sin' is found on pp.7 and 13

94 Christianity and War: a Word to Teachers, 14 (v.s.86)

95 Christianity and War, 14-16 (v.s. 93-94)

96 KG 86-87, 91 (v.s. 75)

97 The Challenge, 30 June, 1916 (v.s. 94-95); cf. 25 October, 1918 (v.s. 96-97); but see The Pilgrim, April 1921, 241 (v.s.98) for a more positive welcome of forgiveness

98 The Challenge, 18 October, 1918 (v.s. 96); The Contemporary Review, July 1920, 69-70 (v.s. 97); cf.SSTC 212-213 on our vindictiveness

99 The Pilgrim, April 1921, 241 (v.s. 98)

100 SSTC213; cf. CN 70

101 CN 51-55, 57

102 v.s. 19-20

103 It is instructive to compare this article with The Fortnightly, November 1941 (v.s. 108-110)

104 v.s. 27

105 cf. as an example of vague antithesising B. F. Westcott in the Official Report of the Church Congress held at Hull (1890) 320, quoted by E. R. Norman, Church and Society in England 1770-1970, 182. On Temple's background v.i. 189ff

106 It is absent in CSO

107 For example HNW 44, CLF 182, in Broadcast of 3 September, 1943

108 See esp. G. Outka, 24-34; G. Harland, The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr 4-13; esp. R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, II, 86, quoted by Harland 10, and the Christian Century, 15 March, 1933, 364, quoted by Harland, 5; also R. Veldhuis, Realism versus Utopianism? 113-115

109 R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, I,17, quoted by Harland, 4; cf. G. Outka, 26

110 R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, II,75, quoted Outka, 24-25; cf. Nature and Destiny of Man II,86, where sacrificial love is agape, mutual love eros

111 See Harland, 22-29

112 Harland, 23

113 Harland, 25

114 R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, I, 313, quoted Harland, 24

115 Harland, 24

116 R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, I, 313, quoted Harland, 24

117 R. Niebuhr, The Christian Faith and the Common Life, 72, quoted by Harland, 25

118 R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, I, 302, quoted by Harland, 24

119 R. Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, 150, quoted by Harland, 24

120 Harland, 25

121 cf. Harland on D. D. Williams, 6-9

122 CV 273, cf. IF 6, UC 72, PTT 56, J xxix-xxx, 196

123 CV 284

124 TSPD 149-151

125 e.g. CS 30-31; cf. J 195-196

126 v.s. 182

127 v.s. 168

128 See Harland, 114-116

129 Letter quoted by Iremonger, 542-543 (v.s. 74), CFCL 59 (v.s. 169), ECP 36-37 (v.s. 99); cf. 'The Christian and the World Situation' (broadcast address of 1 September, 1935, 9) for the compounding of concern for justice with political self-interest

130 Christianity and War, 13

131 CSO 38; cf. his Introduction to H. Martin (ed.) Christian Social Reformers of the Nineteenth Century, 8

132 R. Craig, Social Concern in the Thought of William Temple, 101

133 Craig, 103

134 Craig, 101

135 Craig, 99

136 Craig, 100: E. Brunner, The Divine Imperative, 446

137 Craig, 101

138 v.s. 77

139 v.s. 81-82; cf. D. M. MacKinnon in Malvern 1941, 111

140 NMG 368

141 NMG 365

142 NMG 365

143 NMG 367,377

144 cf. A. M. Ramsey, From Gore to Temple, 150

145 J 48

146 CV 284-285

147 Th. C. Vriezen, An Outline of Old Testament Theology (2nd edition, 1970), 153ff

148 St. Paul's Letter to the Romans, 12.5; 4.5

149 St. John's Gospel, 17.11 and 20-21; 18.6

150 cf. the later remarks on the bearing of the sovereignty of God on social ethics, v.i. 288ff

151 CSO chapter VI

152 See e.g. R. C. Mortimer, Elements of Moral Theology, esp. chapters VI, IX, XII

153 Harland, 23; cf. J. C. Bennett, in R. W. Bretall and C. W. Kegley (eds.), Reinhold Niebuhr, 59, quoted by Harland, 28

154 In CTP 72: "We have a tolerably complete ethical and casuistical system which is generally accepted." Temple here approves of the method of casuistry over against Kant. See also LL 169, where Temple writes to K. E. Kirk, Bishop of Oxford "as a casuist" on the question of whether an ordinand can remain a combatant in war

155 CTP 90

156 RE 173 (v.s. 73); cf. Iremonger, 542-543 (v.s. 68) and 540 (v.s. 69)

157 Quoted by M. Richter, The Politics of Conscience, 35

158 Iremonger, 10, 331, and see the index for references to their work for the National Mission of Repentance and Hope and for the Life and Liberty Movement

159 M. Richter, 122-129

160 Richter, 131; cf. 220-221

161 Richter, 102-103, 106-107

162 Richter, 102, 104-105

163 Quoted by Richter, 104

164 Richter, 104-105, quoting Green on 105

165 Richter, 104-106, 114; quoting Green on 104

166 Richter, 112-113, 109; quoting Green on 109

167 Richter, 108-109, 112-113

168 Richter, 36, 108

169 Richter, 170

170 Richter, 38

171 Richter, 101

172 Quoted Richter, 172

173 Richter, 216-217, quoting Green

174 Richter, 217-218, quoting Green

175 R. G. Collingwood, quoted by Iremonger, 38-39; cf. Richter, 345

176 NMG x

177 cf. Richter on Aubrey Moore, 125

178 NMG Part I

179 TWT 101-102; v.i. chapter 6, 275

180 See Harland, 67-69, 14, 111ff

181 Richter, 124

182 See Harland, 67, 11, 24, 27

183 v.i. 208-209

184 See Harland, 51ff

Chapter V: Principles and Natural Law

1 In CSO (1976 edition) 5

2 CSO 35

3 J. F. Fletcher, William Temple: Twentieth Century Christian; Robert Craig, Social Concern in the Thought of William Temple; Jack F. Padgett, The Christian Philosophy of William Temple; W. R. Rinne, The Kingdom of God in the Thought of William Temple

4 See the dedication to Gore of SSTC. See also CTP 60 and XC 38ff for explicit references to the Catholic tradition

5 RE 229

6 PR 76; cf. TWT 105, The Listener, 10 July, 1941, 56-57

7 Iremonger, 423. See also Temple's Introduction to A Christian Basis for the Post-War World for another instance of co-operation

8 Iremonger, 423-424; see also The Tablet, 17 July, 1948 34

9 The Natural Law (1947) is a translation of Die Ewige Wiederkehr des Naturrechts (Leipzig: Verlag Jakob Hegner, 1936)

10 A. P. d'Entrèves, Natural Law, 122

11 See T. N. Hanley's Preface to H. Rommen's The Natural Law, iii-iv

12 Malvern, 1941, 13-14; CSO 48, 80

13 E.g. The Christian Century, 9 October, 1940, for the term Natural Order. It is spelt with lower case letters at HNW 17, 51, 57, 66, 68, CC 74. It is found in inverted commas at CC 73, 74; CSO 16. Temple probably preferred the term Natural Order to Natural Law because of his concern with the right relationships between various human activities. I have consistently written the terms with capital letters, except in direct quotations, where I follow what is printed.

14 CC 73; CSO 57-61; RE 231

15 CSO 57

16 CC 73

17 For 'essence' see also CSO 57

18 HNW 66, CSO 59

19 HNW 17, CC 73

20 CC 73

21 HNW 66, CSO 57

22 CSO 57, CC 74

23 HNW 66-67

24 CSO 57

Pages missing in the original

25 CSO 59

26 See what he says about ordinary human conventions, v.i. 247-248

27 E.g.SSTC 40-43

28 v.i. 205ff

29 RE 231 (correcting the misprint); cf. CSO 16

30 CSO 60

31 HNW 57

32 CSO 59

33 HNW 66

34 HNW 67

35 CSO 57; cf. The Christian Century, 9 October, 1940; HNW 51, 57, 16-17; CC 74

36 RE 231 and v.s. 62

37 HNW 67 and v.s. 63-64

38 HNW 68

39 RE 231 and v.s. 66-67

40 HNW 67-68

41 RE 231

42 CSO 59-61

43 Rommen, The Natural Law, 164-165

44 Rommen, 168, cf. 186

45 cf. Rommen, 175

46 Rommen, 163, cf. 175, 87-88

47 NMG 66, cf. 126

48 NMG 79

49 NMG 60

50 NMG 66, 68

51 NMG 70-71

52 NMG 73

53 NMG 111, cf. 124

54 NMG 118

55 NMG 122ff

56 NMG 125-126; cf. 146, 150

57 NMG 77-78, 126, 146

58 NMG 129

59 NMG 130

60 Temple tells us this is so at NMG 165

61 NMG 152-153

62 NMG 71-72

63 Rommen, 166-169

64 NMG 92, 96; cf. 101

65 NMG 102

66 NMG 94

67 NMG 93

68 NMG 95

69 NMG 95; cf. MC 48-49

70 NMG 97

71 NMG 96

72 NMG 97; RE 232

73 NMG 82-88; cf. MC 48

74 NMG 101

75 NMG 104

76 NMG 96

77 RE 232; cf. as early as 1911 in NP 17-18 on personality and individuality

78 MC 52, 59

79 MC 49, 55, 59-60

80 MC 49

81 MC 49

82 MC 58-60

83 MC 62

84 MC 65

85 MC 59; cf. UC 50

86 MC 64; cf. 15-17

87 SSTC 42-43; cf. above, n.27

88 Padgett, 26; CTP 18-20. On Temple and his dialectical method see also below, 268-270

89 MC 39-40

90 UC 59

91 UC 49

92 MC 42

93 UC 59-60; cf. J 48

94 Rommen, 163

95 Rommen, 171

96 Rommen, 169-170, 172, 45; cf. 15, 17 on Plato and Aristotle

97 Rommen, 172

98 Rommen, 175; cf. 178

99 Rommen, 178; cf. 49

100 Rommen, 178

101 Rommen, 45

102 Rommen, 173

103 Rommen, 174

104 Rommen, 237

105 Padgett, 151ff., 274f

106 NMG 215 for the phrase

107 NMG 154, 214-215

108 NMG 155

109 NMG 168-169

110 NMG 182

111 NMG 189

112 NMG 180, 182; v.i. 246-247

113 CV 32; cf. Padgett, 155

114 NMG chapter XVI

115 NMG 169

116 NMG 218; cf. 130, 148-149, 152

117 NMG 219

118 NMG 198

119 NMG 215-216

120 NMG 260

121 NMG 250

122 NMG 252

123 NMG 253

124 NMG 254

125 NMG 261

126 NMG 266, 284-285

127 NMG 266-267, 286-287

128 NMG 289

129 NMG 267

130 NMG 269

131 NMG 267; cf. 284, 289-290, 299

132 NMG 290

133 On reason and revelation see the next chapter

134 NMG 270

135 Rommen, 186; cf. 190, 221

136 Rommen, 229-230

137 Rommen, 208f., 230

138 Rommen, 209; cf. 220 on the dignity of the person

139 Rommen, 236

140 Rommen, 187

141 Rommen, 238

142 Rommen, 242

143 Rommen, 202

144 Rommen, 237, 242

145 Maritain, Scholasticism and Politics (SP) 65; he rejects Descartes on p.60

146 Maritain, SP 60-61

147 Maritain, Rights of Man (RM) 6

148 Maritain, RM 14

149 Maritain, RM 6; cf. SP 62-64 on personality

150 Maritain, RM 7; SP, 64

151 Maritain, RM 7, 14

152 Maritain, RM 7; SP 68

153 Maritain, SP 68, RM 7

154 Maritain, RM 12

155 Maritain, RM 9; cf. RM 8 - the Commonwealth as a society of persons; cf. SP 70

156 Maritain, RM 9; cf. RM 8; SP 69, 72, 83, 100

157 Maritain, RM 9; SP 70

158 Maritain, RM 14

159 Rommen, 245; Maritain, SP 70

160 Maritain, RM 8; cf. RM 12; SP 78-79, 82

161 Maritain, RM 8; cf. SP 69, 78-82 on Communism and Fascism, v.i.225; cf. Rommen, 245

162 HNW 108 (v.s. 138); RE 214 (v.s. 139); RE 169 (v.s.137); cf. RE 247-250

163 v.s. 49-50

164 NMG 45ff

165 CSO 40

166 CV 33; cf. The Challenge, 2 March, 1917 (v.s.117) on the intelligence and imagination of children; RE 104 on reason and conscience

167 MC 223 (v.s. 15); cf. NMG 189-190

168 NMG 238

169 The Constructive Quarterly, March 1914 (v.s. 115); The Challenge, 12 January, 1917 (v.s. 115, 145) are examples from the section on education

170 v.s. 119-120, 125-126. Hence his concern for the unemployed, especially their freedom to give, v.s. 52

171 KG 106ff; MC 275-276

172 v.s. 207

173 CTP 43

174 NP 62, F 253, CS 100, CD 38, CSO 46, CLF 105, RE 225, 246-250

175 XC 39; cf. CTP 60

176 CV 53

177 CV 53-55 (v.s. 126), J 121 (v.s. 115), MC 80; cf. MC 227 (v.s. 115-116), PC 66-67 (v.s. 123-124) for the influence of environment on character; cf. speech of 17 May, 1944, 7: the freedom of man depends on the freedom of the whole nation

178 CTP 59-60; cf. CN 145; Theology, January 1936, 10

179 v.s. 40-41

180 v.s. 46, 48, 52

181 v.s. 136

182 PC 42-47 (v.s. 122)

183 CS 84-85; CC 27-28; cf. CSO 41 on the nation as the product of historical development, not a manufactured structure

184 CS 3

185 CS 100

186 CC 30

187 CSO 62

188 CS 101

189 CSO 40

190 CTP 81; CC 78

191 CC 78; The Fortnightly, May 1940 (v.s. 110); RSS 136, HNW 92, CFCL 55

192 CV 84, CS 157-158; cf. ECP 65

193 CV 84-85 (v.i. 230)

194 CS 123; cf. CS 161, CC 28-29

195 RE 206 (v.s. 57), 211-212; cf. 'personality in fellowship' RE 85, The Pilgrim, April 1925 (v.s. 114, 156) Catholicism and Property: The Report of the Third Anglo-Catholic Summer School of Sociology, 1927, 30-31

196 The Pilgrim, January 1923 (v.s. 26); April 1923 (v.s. 27); The Fortnightly, May 1940 (v.s. 110); CSO 64ff.; v.s. also 148

197 CLF 131-133 (v.s. 59)

198 CS 89

199 CTP 39ff

200 e.g. The Pilgrim, April 1923 (v.s. 26); C 201-202 (v.s. 116); CS 139

201 v.s. 13

202 v.s. 63-66

203 F 350 for the phrase

204 v.s. 136, 140; cf. CC 28 for the idea of the whole and the parts

205 C 201-202 (v.s. 116)

206 CC 26, 29; cf. CSO 40 on the state

207 RE 104, 204; ECP 22; CLF 126; CSO 40

208 RE 247; CSO 48, 80; cf. CD 19-20 and CV 203 (v.s.114)

209 RE 247

210 The Challenge, 11 January, 1918 (v.s. 14); The Pilgrim, January 1921 (v.s. 23)

211 MC 213-215 (v.s. 14); ECP 24-29 (v.s. 58)

212 The Challenge, 12 January, 1917; CSO 68-69 (v.s. 121); cf. RE 259, where Temple opposes rigid collectivization

213 CSO 80; CS 86-88; Hibbert Journal, October 1937, 5

214 See Temple's comments on Maritain in Malvern, 1941, 13-14. CV 219 gives priority to the first social principle over the second

215 CTP 43, Maritain, RM, esp. 37-60; A. P. d'Entrèves, Natural Law 157; on rights v.i. 237-238

216 Rommen, 240

217 cf. Maritain, SP 97-98 on the necessity of the state

218 Rommen, 240-241

219 Rommen, 196; cf. Maritain, RM 43

220 Maritain, RM 26

221 Maritain, SP 109

222 Rommen, 16; cf. 19, 32, 54

223 Rommen, 196; cf. Maritain, RM 10, 32, 43

224 Rommen, 242-243; cf. 34

225 Rommen, 238

226 Rommen, 239; cf. Maritain, RM 44 on the family

227 Rommen, 238, 240

228 Rommen, 239, 240, 243; cf. Maritain, RM 9

229 Maritain, RM 12, 43; cf. 49

230 Maritain, RM 43

231 Rommen, 241

232 Para. 79 of the edition of O. von Nell-Breuning, quoted by Rommen 220; cf. Rommen, 81-82, 244 n.51 which quotes Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum, para. 38; cf. Maritain, RM 55, SP 110, 113; True Humanism, 157

233 Rommen, 241

234 Rommen, 238-239

235 Rommen, 241-242; cf. Maritain, RM 55-56 for the idea of a federation of free peoples and the abandonment of absolute national sovereignty of individual states

236 Rommen, 245

237 cf. Maritain, RM 26: the divinizing of the individual is only the prelude to his loss

238 Rommen, 210, 245

239 Rommen, 76

240 Rommen, 77, 81

241 Rommen, 77

242 Rommen, 77

243 Rommen, 81

244 Rommen, 84

245 Rommen, 88-90

246 Rommen, 91-92

247 Rommen, 244-245

248 Maritain, SP 80

249 Maritain, RM 25, SP 80

250 Maritain, RM 26, SP 79; cf. 53-54 on bureaucratic machinery and totalitarianism with a technocratic base

251 Rommen, 264

252 Rommen, 245-246

253 CS 123-124; cf. RE 127

254 CD 38-39

255 CC 18

256 The Contemporary Review, August 1928, 158

257 CS 8 (v.s. 122); ECP 39-40

258 C 201-202 (v.s. 116)

259 ECP 21-22

260 CC, esp. 17-18

261 CLF 127 (v.s. 62); cf. CN 80-85 (v.s. 11-12); ECP 38; speech of 17 May, 1944, 8

262 v.s. 53-54

263 v.s. 51-53 for example

264 v.s. 159-160 for example

265 v.s. 16 for example

266 HNW 55 (v.s. 43); The Challenge, 8 September, 1916 (v.s. 13); cf. CS 97 on the redistribution of property

267 Speech of 26 April, 1906 (v.s. 154)

268 CC 29

269 CC 26, 29; CLF 46, 126; RE 259; cf. TWT 125; CS 7-8 and CTP 27, both referring to Plato

270 CS 124-126; TWT 125; cf. The Contemporary Review, August 1928, 157 on science and art

271 TWT 115, 123

272 CS 176; cf. 162

273 v.s. 78, 83; cf. MC 224-225

274 RE 247; cf. CSO 47, 48

275 cf. RE 134 on the state securing order for liberty

276 v.s. 157-158

277 CS 132-134 (v.s. 38)

278 CS 113-114; The Contemporary Review, August 1928, 155

279 RE 127-128; cf. CC 37, TWT 114

280 RE 207

281 CN 88

282 MC 212; cf. CN 88 n.1

283 The Contemporary Review, August 1928, 157

284 CS 109

285 CS 112

286 J 355; cf. MC 213-215 (v.s. 14)

287 MC 218-219

288 CS 124, CC 31

289 J 361-362

290 CS 185

291 CS 157-158; cf. 171

292 CS 144, 162-163; Letter to The Times, 24 May, 1935 (v.s. 102)

293 MC 211

294 TSPD 34; cf. speech of 17 May, 1944, 8; ECP 37-39 (v.s. 99)

295 CSO 41

296 v.s. 102 and 112 for examples of this sort of sentiment

297 v.s. 93-94 for example

298 v.s. 58 for his remarks on the Political Economy

299 CS 86; The Contemporary Review, August 1928, 155; CC 26ff

300 CS 84ff., and see the whole chapter for Temple's account of different theories of society

301 CLF 132-133 (v.s. 59); cf. speech of 17 May, 1944, 6-7 on J. S. Mill and the opposition of Cobden and Bright to Shaftesbury

302 RE 247, CSO 47-48, XC 82

303 CS 25

304 CS 62

305 CS 69

306 CS 96-97

307 CS 168; v.s. 85-86

308 CC 10; CLF 81-82 (v.s. 117-118); CLF 52-53 (v.s. 157)

309 v.s. n.193

310 CLF 132-133 (v.s. 59)

311 CV 75 n.1

312 HNW 51-52 (v.s. 62)

313 CLF 128; cf. CC 10 (v.s. 118) on degradation into robots

314 CC 10; CS 128

315 CS 14

316 Rommen, 4

317 Rommen, e.g. 177

318 Rommen, 194

319 Rommen, 168, 55

320 Rommen, 229 n.26

321 Rommen, 266

322 Rommen, 264-266; cf. 189, 262

323 Maritain, RM 35

324 Rommen, 195-196; cf. 192, 54; cf. also Maritain SP 102, True Humanism 175

325 Rommen, 200; cf. 208; cf. Maritain, RM 43 for a similar but brief view of why law binds in conscience, and RM 10: an unjust law is not law if it betrays the common good; cf. SP 101: obedience to true authority is an act of reason;
103: one obeys a law because it is just to obey

326 Rommen, 15-16, 32

327 Rommen, 10-11

328 Rommen, 58-59

329 Rommen, 100-102; cf. 205-206

330 Rommen, 124-126

331 Rommen, 128

332 Rommen, 129

333 Rommen, 129-130

334 Rommen, 130

335 Rommen, 128-129

336 Rommen, 195

337 Rommen, 265-266

338 The Challenge, 24 September, 1915

339 cf. MC 216, CSO 45

340 The Challenge, 24 September, 1915; cf. RE 133-134, XC 69-70, CC 32

341 MC 217-218; cf. CN 67, XC 69-70

342 v.s. 71-72, 76-77

343 E.g. TSPD 34 (v.s. 100)

344 Iremonger, 376 (v.s. 98); TWT 31; The Challenge, 22 October, 1915 (v.s. 88), 18 October, 1918 (v.s. 96); RE 131-134 (v.s. 100)

345 Speech of 18 June, 1941 (v.s. 77)

346 The Listener, 2 November, 1944, 489, 492

347 The Contemporary Review, August 1928, 157; cf. CS 112, 123-124

348 CS 158

349 MC 220-221

350 MC 215 (v.s. 14)

351 MC 224-225

352 CS 122-123

353 CS 88

354 NMG 232ff. (v.s. 125-126)

355 RE 214 (v.s. 139)

356 Rommen, 220; cf. Maritain, RM 36

357 Rommen, 221; cf. 217

358 Rommen, 221-222

359 Rommen, 224

360 Maritain, RM 36

361 Maritain, RM 39

362 Maritain, RM 37

363 Rommen, 231

364 Rommen, 232

365 Rommen, 233

366 Rommen, 234

367 Rommen, 235, drawing on Leo XIII's Rerum Novarum

368 Maritain, RM 44-45; cf. SP 111-112, quoting Pius XI's Divini Redemptoris

369 Rommen, 244, 220; Maritain, RM 39 see the ius gentium as intermediate between Natural Law and positive law

370 Rommen, 232

371 Rommen, 235-236

372 Rommen, 265

373 Rommen, 251

374 Rommen, 265

375 Rommen, 219-200; cf. 259; cf. Maritain, SP 85-86; The Christian religion is compatible with all forms of legitimate government. Personalist democracy is wholly compatible with the common doctrine of the Catholic Church, but must not be imposed in the name of the Christian creed

376 Rommen, 216 n.2, 218

377 Rommen, 228

378 Rommen, 218-219

379 Rommen, 218

380 Rommen, 229 n.25

381 Rommen, 229 n.25

382 Rommen, 252, and n.2

383 Rommen, 265

384 Rommen, 257-258; cf. 239

385 Rommen, 259

386 Rommen, 226; cf. 217, 228, 250, 257

387 Rommen, 252

388 Rommen, 255

389 Rommen, 228

390 Rommen, 226

391 Rommen, 228; cf. 53; Maritain, RM 36

392 Rommen, 253-254

393 Maritain, RM 33

394 Rommen, 251

395 Rommen, 200

396 Rommen, 251

397 Rommen, 55, 256; cf. Maritain, SP 102-103

398 Rommen, 251

399 Rommen, 216

400 Rommen, 87, 215, 64; cf. Maritain, RM 45 for similar criticism

401 Rommen, 19-20

402 Rommen, 73

403 Rommen, 94-95

404 Rommen, 102

405 e.g. Pufendorf, Rommen, 94-95

406 Rommen, 20, 78, 90, 103, 106, 163, 219

407 Rommen, 216, 229

408 Rommen, 133-134

409 Rommen, 216; cf. 228

410 Maritain, RM 38; cf. SP 93-94 on Rousseau

411 CTP 56-57; cf. CS 4-5 on the distinction between principles and ideals

412 CTP 57, CFL 52

413 CTP 57

414 NMG 179-180, 183, 405; cf. 167: good especially of character

415 NP 74

416 CTP 59, 61

417 NP 74

418 CN 134-135; cf. too MC 206, NMG 190-191, 254

419 NMG 193

420 cf. CS 5-6

421 KG 48-50, CFL 51

422 v.s. 71

423 NP 73, MC 200, CTP 56, CFL 50-51

424 NMG 194

425 NMG 177

426 NMG 190-191; v.i. on the 'relational norms of life', 259,262

427 e.g. CS 96-98 (v.s. 47); CFL 55

428 CS 69, 83-84; XC 98; ECP 80

429 RE 232-233

430 XC 99, RE 247, HNW 21-22; ECP 68ff, esp. 70-71, 74-75; The Challenge, 6 July, 1917

431 e.g. CLF 142-143 (v.s. 148); ECP 73-74; The Challenge, 6 July, 1917

432 HNW 93-94

433 e.g. CSO 80ff (& v.s. 43); HNW 51-52 (v.s. 62)

434 v.s. 42-43, 63, for example for critique and CSO 73-74 for broad objectives

435 v.s. 20, 25-26, 89 for example; v.i. 253-257

436 e.g. NMG 180

437 NMG 192-193

438 e.g. NMG 177

439 NMG 177-178

440 NMG 183

441 NMG 178; cf. KG 96

442 NMG 183, 411

443 NMG 407; cf. CFL 57-60

444 CSO 64

445 MC 195-198; cf. 10-11, CN 175, CFL 50,54

446 NP 60; cf. J 306, CN 178-179,SSTC 201-204, CFL 61, on the danger of moral experiments

447 FG 94-95, CFL 68-71, J 274, 283-285; cf. J 67-68, MC 287-288, NMG 179

448 v.s. 84, 85, 99-100 for example

449 RE 133-134

450 CS 122-123, CC 18, 32; cf. HNW 91-93

451 MC 212, CS 124, CC 31. Further comments on revolution by Temple can be found at ECP 65, CS 29 (quoting St. Thomas) CFCL 60, CSO 47, RE 247, Iremonger, 81, 510

452 MC 224-225; cf. RE 134

453 v.s. 129-130, 148

454 NMG 168

455 NMG 173; cf. MC 200-202

456 v.s. 69-74

457 v.s. 205-209

458 V. White, 'Tasks for Thomists' in Blackfrairs, March 1944, 102; on Rommen, v.s. 239-243; Encyclical Letter of Pope Paul VI Humanae Vitae (1968)

459 v.s. 207-209

460 v.i. 274-277

461 In a letter to M. B. Reckitt, 18 January, 1940, quoted by Paul G. Wignall, D. M. Mackinnon as a Christian Theologian, ch. 1

462 Malvern, 1941, 84-85

463 Malvern, 1941, 90-91

464 Malvern, 1941, 88

465 v.i. Chapter VII

466 A. P. d'Entrèves, Natural Law, 153-154, 159, 189-191; see also J. Gustafson, Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics, 80-94

467 A. P. d'Entrèves, Natural Law, 185ff.; I. T. Ramsey, 'Towards a Rehabilitation of Natural Law' in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, (ed. I. T. Ramsey), 382-396

468 K. Ward, Ethics and Christianity, Chapter III (discussing the work of R. M. Hare), Chapters IV and V, and see 34-36)

469 J. Macquarrie, Three Issues in Ethics, 106

470 Macquarrie, 44-45

471 Macquarrie, 46

472 Macquarrie, 107; cf. I. T. Ramsey in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, 383-384

473 Macquarrie, 97-98; cf. the position of I. T. Ramsey in the book he edited, Prospect for Metaphysics, 153-177 Gustafson, Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics, 83-94, gives several examples of reformulation on the Roman Catholic side, some close to Temple in their personalism, reflecting the pilgrim ethos (p.127) of Vatican II

474 See Harland, 16

475 Harland, 74

476 Harland, 75

477 HNW 92

478 Malvern, 1941, 14-15

479 The Pilgrim, April 1923, 249-250

480 v.s. e.g. 19, 37, 140

481 v.s. 26

482 R. H. Preston, in the Introduction to CSO (1976 edition), 8. I have earlier referred to middle axioms at 19, 198, 246

483 Crucible, January 1971, 9-15

484 H. A. Mess, Industrial Tyneside

485 cf. R. H. Preston, 'The Malvern Conference' in The Modern Churchman, April 1942, 19-20; cf. the strictures of D. L. Munby on Demant in Christianity and Economic Problems, 275-287, and on the Church of England generally in 'The Disordered Economic Thinking of the National Church' in Theology, March 1957, 92-99

486 Iremonger, 433

487 Malvern, 1941, 11, 216

488 v.i. Chapter VII

489 v.s. 43, 49

490 See J. R. Atherton, R. H. Tawney as a Christian Moralist (Manchester Ph.D., 1979)

491 R. H. Preston, Crucible, January 1971, 14; J. Bowden, Karl Barth, Chapter 4

492 J. F. Fletcher, William Temple, Twentieth-Century Christian (1963), Situation Ethics (1966)

493 Macquarrie, 30

494 Macquarrie, 29; D. Evans in Norm and Context in Christian Ethics ed. G. Outka and P. Ramsey, 367; Herbert McCabe in Situationism and the New Morality, ed. R. L. Cunningham, 67

495 Macquarrie, 30-32

496 N. H. G. Robinson, The Groundwork of Christian Ethics, 273-274

497 Quoted by Macquarrie, 39; cf. the remark of J. Bennett, quoted ibid.

498 Macquarrie, 39

499 Macquarrie, 33

500 Macquarrie, 32-33

501 Macquarrie, 35; cf. 39; cf. the criticism of Fletcher's handling of sexual issues by McCabe in Cunningham, 86

502 Macquarrie, 33-34

503 Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics, 20; quoted by Macquarrie, 34

504 J. F. Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 57-60

505 Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 47

506 Outka, in Outka and Ramsey, 54-55

507 P. Ramsey, in Outka and Ramsey, 70, 127

508 B. Mitchell, in Outka and Ramsey, 363

509 D. Evans, in Outka and Ramsey, 383-389

510 Robinson, 274; cf. McCabe scenting bourgeois underwriting of the status quo in Cunningham, 75, 86

511 Robinson, 275

512 Robinson, 278

513 Macquarrie, 34

514 McCabe in Cunningham, 75-76

515 Macquarrie, 34-35

516 Macquarrie, 35

517 A. Kolnai, in Cunningham, 255

518 Macquarrie, 13, 30, 34

519 Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 107-110

520 Quoted by Macquarrie, 30

521 McCabe, in Cunningham, 69; cf. P. Ramsey, in Outka and Ramsey, 127

522 I. T. Ramsey, in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, 394

523 Macquarrie, 33

524 I. T. Ramsey, in Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, 394

525 Quoted by Macquarrie, 37

526 Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 37-39

527 Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 34

528 Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 13

529 Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 58

530 Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 42

531 Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 43; cf. 147

532 Fletcher, Situation Ethics, 29

533 B. Mitchell, in Outka and Ramsey, 365

534 See e.g. RE 242 on the abdication of King Edward VIII; ECP 105-120, and see above 245-246

535 RE 133

536 J. F. Fletcher, William Temple, Twentieth-Century Christian, 148-163

537 On this section see further J. P. Wogaman, A Christian Method of Moral Judgment, 14-32

Chapter VI: The Christian Faith and Natural Morality

1 KG 42 and see the whole of Chapter II; v.s. 69 for an example of this position

2 v.s. 200

3 CC 73

4 CSO 15-16; cf. HNW 17 for similar overlap

5 HNW 10; cf. Malvern, 1941, 12

6 cf. R. H. Preston, 'The Malvern Conference' in The Modern Churchman, April 1942, 16-17

7 MC 7

8 J. F. Padgett, The Christian Philosophy of William Temple, 28-29

9 v.s. 208-209

10 MC 2; cf. Padgett, 22; O. C. Thomas, William Temple's Philosophy of Religion, 21-22

11 v.i. 275-276

12 MC 1 quoted John 1.14

13 NMG 306

14 cf. A. M. Ramsey, From Gore to Temple, 148

15 CV Preface; see Ramsey 148

16 cf. Ramsey 2 on the Tractarians and Lux Mundi

17 In Lux Mundi we find Gore remarking on man as a social being in his essay on Biblical criticism, and there are the essays by Ottley and Campion; see Ramsey 5-7

18 Ramsey, 147

19 Iremonger, 379

20 Iremonger, 417-418

21 Iremonger, 313ff.

22 W. R. Matthews, in William Temple: an Estimate and an Appreciation, 9

23 Matthews, 10

24 Iremonger, 123

25 MC 1-4; cf. Thomas 15

26 Iremonger, 530-532; cf. Thomas. 148-149

27 Padgett, 1; Thomas, 4; W. G. Peck in William Temple: an Estimate and an Appreciation, 59; cf. C. W. Lowry, 'William Temple - Thinker and Theologian', Christendom (US), Vol. X, No. 1, Winter 1945, 7

28 Padgett, 61; cf. 112-113

29 Thomas, 4; cf. 168: the quotation is from NMG 28

30 Padgett, 76, 117

31 Padgett, 121; cf. 141

32 Padgett, 164

33 Thomas, 146

34 Quoted Iremonger, 531

35 Padgett, 62

36 Padgett, 37, 238-239

37 v.s. n.22

38 Padgett, 75-76, 139, 142-143; Padgett is right in spite of CV 9

39 NMG 44, n.1; Padgett, 56; cf. Thomas 144 on the variation in terminology. Compare this with Temple's view of scientific education, v.s. 136-139

40 Padgett, 56-57

41 Padgett, 61

42 Padgett, 51

43 Padgett, 57

44 Padgett, 58

45 Padgett, 59

46 Padgett, 170

47 Padgett, 59

48 NP 96; MC 292; CV 7-8; NMG 266, 520; cf. Padgett, 60

49 Padgett, 60

50 Padgett, 170-173

51 Padgett, 61

52 NMG 44

53 Padgett, 235; cf. 61, 261, 268; v.s. 208-209 on Caird and the dialectical method

54 Padgett, 244; cf. 62; cf. Thomas, 139

55 Padgett, 273

56 Padgett, 139, 261-262

57 Padgett, 272

58 Padgett, 143, 245

59 Padgett, 273, 281-284

60 v.s. 183-184

61 v.s. 176-177; W. G. Peck in William Temple: an Estimate and an Appreciation, 60

62 v.s. for example 121

63 H. H. Henson, Quo Tendimus? 87

64 v.s. 13-14

65 v.s. 34

66 v.s. for example, 68. See also below 307

67 cf. Padgett, 280

68 Doctrine in the Church of England, 16-17

69 TWT 95. The article first appeared in Theology, November 1939, 326-333

70 TWT 100

71 TWT 94, 101

72 TWT 98-99

73 TWT 101

74 TWT 101-102

75 TWT 102

76 TWT 103

77 TWT 95-97

78 A. M. Ramsey, 12-15, 18, Chapter 4

79 TWT 105-107

80 TWT 104

81 TWT 100

82 TWT 104

83 TWT 105. These remarks reveal the influence of the Christendom Group

84 TWT 106

85 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, II.2, 509; cf. 536

86 Barth, 513

87 Barth, 515

88 Barth, 547

89 Barth, 530, 532

90 Barth, 517

91 NMG 396

92 PTT 10; cf. CTT 48-49

93 CTT 48

94 PTT 10-11

95 v.s. 264; cf. RE 245 for the contrast between vague theism and the cutting edge of faith

96 TWT 107; cf. J. C. Bennett, Anglican Theological Review, July 1943, 262; cf. CLF 140 (4 February, 1943) for Temple's continuing interest in a 'general Christian map of life'

97 RE 251-253; the quotation is on 252

98 v.s. 277

99 v.s. 117 ff.

100 A. R. Vidler and W. A. Whitehouse, Natural Law, 17-18

101 The Christian Century, 9 October, 1940, 1243f.

102 CLF 126; RE 259; cf. HNW 63 on faith in God as the basis for hope for a new world

103 CLF 9, 82 (v.s. 118); v.s. 276 for the self-same problem Temple consciously faced a generation before

104 The Christian Century, 9 October, 1940, 1243

105 HNW 64

106 HNW 27; CLF 44, 82

107 RE 245-246; cf. 211

108 HNW 66; cf. The Christian Century, 9 October, 1940

109 HNW 66

110 HNW 65

111 HNW 66

112 The Christian Century, 9 October, 1940. This idea was taken up at the Malvern Conference

113 CSO 40-43

114 CSO 36-37

115 v.s. 110

116 v.s. for example 105-113

117 v.s. 98-99

118 W. G. Peck, in William Temple: an Estimate and an Appreciation, 67

119 v.s. 256

120 Quoted Iremonger, 429

121 The Spectator, 24 January, 1941, 83f

122 cf. D. R. Davies, London Quarterly Review, October 1948, 311

123 Padgett, 62

124 Thomas 156

125 NMG 45; Thomas 157-158

126 Thomas, 154

127 Thomas, 158

128 NMG 278, quoted Thomas 158

129 N. H. G. Robinson, The Groundwork of Christian Ethics, 16; cf. 73, 147

130 Robinson, 42, 131; cf. 100

131 Robinson, 31

132 Robinson, 31-32

133 Robinson, 32; cf. 136 on the confused and incomplete knowledge of goodness presupposed in the Bible, and 32 on morality as the indispensable presupposition of the Christian revelation and the Christian gospel

134 Robinson, 16

135 Robinson, 47, 210

136 Robinson, 210-211

137 Robinson, 122

138 Robinson, 134

139 Robinson, 135-136

140 Robinson, 135; cf. 137

141 Robinson, 137

142 Robinson, 210

143 Rommen, 191, 200; cf. 34-35; J. M. Gustafson, Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics, 97 points out that there is a German Catholic tradition where Scripture has been more central. See also E. McDonagh 'The Natural Law and the Law of Christ' in G. R. Dunstan (ed.) Duty and Discernment 51-63 for an example of how Natural Law is related much more closely to the Gospel

144 v.s. 251

145 Robinson, 16 and passim

146 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics II.2, 511; cf. 510, 512

147 Robinson, 18

148 Robinson, 19

149 Robinson, 127

150 Robinson, 22

151 Robinson, 25

152 Robinson, 26-27, 157, 168-169

153 Robinson, 27

154 Robinson, 32; cf. 43-44, 228

155 Robinson, 97

156 Robinson, 23-24

157 Robinson, 147; cf. 98

158 Robinson, 108; Robinson uses Rashdall as the example, but also refers to Henson

159 Robinson, 109

160 Robinson, 106-107

161 Robinson, 107

162 Robinson, 107-108

163 Robinson, 110; cf. 114, 280 on the radical nature of Christian ethics

164 Robinson, 111

165 Robinson, 115

166 Robinson, 96-97

167 Robinson, 97-98, 122, 138, 266-267

168 Robinson, 123, 138

169 Robinson, 100; cf. 95, 270; cf. 123 for general ethics as concerned with an abstraction, natural morality, from the total 'moral' sphere

170 Robinson, 94

171 Robinson, 139

172 Robinson, 119

173 Robinson, 140

174 Robinson, 141

175 Robinson, 141

176 Robinson, 144

177 Robinson, 122

178 Robinson, 128-129

179 Robinson, 96, 122

180 Robinson, 272; cf. 268

181 Robinson, 278. It is interesting that some Roman Catholic thinking comes near to Robinson's position - see E. McDonagh 'The Natural Law and the Law of Christ' in G. R. Dunstan (ed.) Duty and Discernment, 59-60

182 Robinson, 98-99

183 Robinson, 222

184 Robinson, 170; cf. 268, 282

185 B. F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity and Carl Rogers' On Becoming a Person are good illustrations of the trend I have in mind

186 Reinhold Niebuhr in B. Nelson (Ed.) Freud and the Twentieth Century, 255-272

187 Iremonger, 431; on the 'parlour trick' Iremonger, 416

188 Henson's letter to Miss Lucy Gardner, 6 December, 1923, quoted by Norman, Church and Society in England, 309

189 D. M. Mackinnon, in Malvern, 1941, 87-88

190 Mackinnon, 105

191 Mackinnon, 96

192 Mackinnon, 114

193 Mackinnon, 97

194 Mackinnon, 104-105

195 NMG 435

196 CV 139

197 cf. the remarks of A. R. Vidler in 'The Limitations of William Temple', Theology, January 1976, 37-39

198 Mackinnon, 89

199 Mackinnon 90-91

200 Mackinnon, 89

201 Mackinnon, 91-92

202 Mackinnon, 90-92

203 Mackinnon, 91

204 Mackinnon, 92

205 Mackinnon, 97

206 Mackinnon, 93

207 Mackinnon, 102

208 Mackinnon, 105

209 Mackinnon, 102

210 Mackinnon, 103

211 Mackinnon, 109

212 Mackinnon, 107

213 Mackinnon, 115

214 Mackinnon, 103; cf. 106

215 Mackinnon, 110

216 Mackinnon, 96

217 Mackinnon, 104; cf. 102

218 v.s. 276

219 v.s. 74

220 cf. A. R.Vidler , Theology, January 1976, 37

221 Padgett claims it is incoherent: chapter 17

222 Malvern 1941, 224

223 Mackinnon, in Malvern 1941, 99

224 Mackinnon, 108

225 Mackinnon, 102

226 Mackinnon, 99-100

227 Mackinnon, 97-98

228 Mackinnon, 106; cf. 102-103

229 Mackinnon, 103

230 Mackinnon, 111

231 v.s. 78

232 Mackinnon, in Malvern 1941, 116

233 Mackinnon, 115-116; cf. 104, 107-109 on the Established Church

234 For a more recent treatment of the problematical position of the Church see D. E. Jenkins, The Contradiction of Christianity

235 v.s. 121, 163

Chapter VII: Temple's Critics

1 Letter in The Times, 5 August, 1926; cf. Sir Ernest Benn, Letter in The Times, 27 July, 1926

2 E. R. Norman, Church and Society in England 1770-1970, 340 speaks of "the Industrial Christian Fellowship Standing Committee" in spite of Bishop Kempthorne's denial at the time that the I.C.F. organised it; and he then misleadingly says it was openly supporting the miners' claims

3 Letter in The Times, 21 August, 1926

4 v.s. 35

5 J. Oliver, The Church and Social Order, 81

6 v.s. 30

7 cf. Oliver, 87

8 cf. Oliver, 81

9 v.s. 30

10 Letter in The Times, 5 August, 1926

11 Iremonger, 340

12 Letter in The Times, 21 August, 1926

13 Iremonger, 341, cf. 338

14 Quoted by Iremonger, 342

15 E. R. Norman, Church and Society in England, 1770-1970, (henceforth C and S) 340

16 Letter in The Times, 7 May, 1926, quoted by Oliver, 84

17 Letter in The Times, 13 August, 1926

18 Letter in The Times, 27 July, 1926

19 H. H. Henson, Christian Morality, 32

20 Henson, Christian Morality, 305; N. H. G. Robinson, The Groundwork of Christian Ethics, 101, 26

21 Letter in The Times, 29 July, 1926

22 v.s. 250,257

23 Quoted by Oliver, 86

24 G. K. A. Bell, Randall Davidson, Vol.II, 1316, quoted by Oliver, 86

25 v.s. 32

26 G. K. A. Bell, Randall Davidson, Vol.II, 1316, quoted by Oliver, 86

27 Norman, C and S, 258; cf. 339 for his attitude in 1926

28 Letter in The Times, 13 August, 1926

29 Letter in The Times, 27 July, 1926

30 Sunday Express, 1 August, 1926, quoted by Oliver, 91

31 Letter from Canon Bateman in The Times, 7 May, 1926, quoted Oliver, 84

32 Letter in The Times, 13 August, 1926; cf. Norman, C and S, 258 for Henson's remarks in 1919

33 Letter from Sir Ernest Benn in The Times, 27 July, 1926

34 W. R. Inge, The Diary of a Dean, 111, quoted Oliver, 86

35 Quoted Oliver, 86, 87 n.23

36 Quoted Oliver, 197-198

37 Oliver, 155-156

38 v.s. for example 58

39 v.s. 31

40 Iremonger, 342-343

41 e.g. Letter in The Times, 21 August, 1926

42 v.s. for example 68, and also the remarks on 273

43 v.s. 288

44 Norman, C and S, 340

45 The Guardian, 20 August, 1926, quoted by Oliver, 92

46 CLF 105-114

47 The Economist, quoted by Public Opinion, 9 October, 1942; News Chronicle, 29 September, 1942; Glasgow Herald, 5 October, 1942

48 Financial News, 5 October, 1942

49 Quoted by Public Opinion, 9 October, 1942

50 Letter in The Times, 1 October, 1942

51 Letter in The Times, 29 September, 1942

52 The Patriot, 5 October, 1942

53 Western Mail, Cardiff, 1 October, 1942; similarly H. Withers, Archiepiscopal Economics, 3

54 Letter in The Times, 29 September, 1942

55 The Times, 14 October, 1942

56 Picture Post, 31 October, 1942

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58 Letter in Western Mail, Cardiff, 14 October, 1942

59 Letter in the Daily Telegraph, 30 September, 1942

60 The Christian World and the Church of England Newspaper, quoted by Public Opinion, 9 October, 1942

61 cf. the defence of Temple by a Professor of Economics, A. C. Pigou, in a letter in The Times, 6 October, 1942; cf. also M. Dummett, Catholicism and the World Order, 17-20, 23-25

62 Carmichael and Goodwin, 29

63 Carmichael & Goodwin, 31-32

64 Carmichael and Goodwin, 38, 98; cf. 113

65 Carmichael and Goodwin, 30-31

66 Carmichael and Goodwin, 41-42, 88

67 Carmichael and Goodwin, 49-50

68 Carmichael and Goodwin, 55, 71-73

69 Carmichael and Goodwin, 33

70 Carmichael and Goodwin, 112

71 Carmichael and Goodwin, 80-81; cf. 89

72 Carmichael and Goodwin, 8-9; cf. 97

73 Carmichael and Goodwin, 85

74 Carmichael and Goodwin, 35

75 Carmichael and Goodwin, 36; cf. 50, 94

76 Carmichael and Goodwin, esp. 9-10

77 Carmichael and Goodwin, ix; the title The Hope of a New World is given inaccurately

78 Carmichael and Goodwin, 137

79 v.s. 197, 282

80 Carmichael and Goodwin, vi, 6; CSO 6

81 Carmichael and Goodwin, e.g. 7-8

82 Carmichael and Goodwin, 8

83 Carmichael and Goodwin, 137-138, 141

84 Carmichael and Goodwin, 138-139

85 Carmichael and Goodwin, 83

86 Carmichael and Goodwin, viii

87 Carmichael and Goodwin, 138

88 Carmichael and Goodwin, 138-141

89 Carmichael and Goodwin, 141-145

90 Carmichael and Goodwin, 145-149

91 Carmichael and Goodwin, 149-151

92 Carmichael and Goodwin, vi-vii

93 Carmichael and Goodwin, 6

94 Carmichael and Goodwin, e.g. 6, 149

95 Carmichael and Goodwin, 97

96 Carmichael and Goodwin, 69-70

97 On the complexities and uncertainties, Carmichael and Goodwin, 26, 88, 91; on the dilemmas, 8, 84

98 Carmichael and Goodwin, viii

99 Carmichael and Goodwin, 147-149; cf. 74-77 on worker participation in running industry

100 v.i. 331-333
101 E. R. Norman, C and S, 10
102 Norman, C and S, 283
103 Norman, C and S, 11
104 Norman, C and S, 10-11; cf. 371-372
105 Norman, C and S, 282-283
106 Norman, C and S, 282; cf. 230
107 Norman, C and S, 282, cf. 183
108 Norman, C and S, 282-283
109 Norman, C and S, 282
110 Norman, C and S, 228
111 Norman, C and S, 313
112 Norman, C and S, 323
113 Norman, C and S, 323
114 Norman, C and S, 320
115 Norman, C and S, 323
116 Norman, C and S, 341
117 Norman, C and S, 323
118 Norman, C and S, 324
119 Norman, C and S, 325
120 Norman, C and S, 324
121 Norman, C and S, 324-325; cf. 330
122 Norman, C and S, 392
123 Norman, C and S, 374
124 Norman, C and S, 377-378
125 Norman, C and S, 368-369
126 Norman, C and S, 368
127 Norman, C and S, 324; cf. 368
128 Norman, C and S, 323; cf. 337, 370, 384
129 Norman, C and S, 391
130 Norman, C and S, 409; v.s. 132, 316
131 Norman, C and S, 370; cf. 323
132 Norman, C and S, 370
133 Norman, C and S, 371; cf. 304, 368
134 Norman, C and S, 249; quoting C 146
135 Norman, C and S, 285
136 Norman, C and S, 288
137 Norman, C and S, 324

138 Norman, C and S, 281-282; the date is given correctly here, but wrongly on 227, where Norman presumably follows the misprint in Iremonger, 282. Iremonger (509) himself, however, dates Temple's resignation to 1925

139 Norman, C and S, 301-302; cf. 366 on Malvern, and Iremonger, 433

140 See RE 205 for Temple's clear statement of his own position, which stresses just that influence of environment on character which Norman praises Temple for pointing to

141 Norman, C and S, 382-383; v.s. 168ff

142 Norman, C and S, 371-372

143 Norman, C and S, 11 for "straight intellectual calculation"

144 Norman, C and S, 282

145 Norman, C and S, 11

146 Norman, C and S, 372

147 Norman, C and S, 283, 371

148 Norman, C and S, 368-369

149 v.s. 288, 308

150 E. R. Norman, Christianity and the World Order (henceforth CWO), 13, 36

151 Norman, CWO, 79; cf. "ethereal" 78; "celestial" 36, 80; cf. 15 for the accent on the next life

152 Norman, CWO, 73; cf. The Listener, 2 November, 1978, 564, col. 2 for the contrast of the temporal and the spiritual

153 Norman, CWO, 70-71

154 Norman, CWO, 77

155 Norman, CWO, 77; cf. 79 and his comment on the arbitrariness of Natural Law (amazing in the light of our study of Rommen) 30-31

156 Norman, CWO, 14, 19-20, 82-85

157 Norman, CWO, 76

158 Norman, CWO, 80

159 Norman, CWO, 79

160 Norman, CWO, 58-59

161 Norman, CWO, 60

162 Norman, CWO, 7-8

163 Norman, CWO, 74

164 Norman, CWO, 74-75

165 Norman, CWO, 79

166 Norman, CWO, 2

167 Norman, C and S, 380

168 Norman, C and S, 320

169 Norman, C and S, 380

170 Norman, C and S, 380ff

171 David E. Jenkins in the collection of essays Christian Faith and Political Hopes, by Charles Elliott and others

172 cf. M. Dummett, Catholicism and the World Order, 17. In a broadcast discussion of the Reith Lectures on 18 March, 1979, E. R. Norman was challenged to name those who politicized the Gospel and could not produce one name which the other participants were prepared to allow

173 This is also a feature of Norman, e.g. CWO, 74, 80

174 Norman, C and S, 183

175 Norman, C and S, 229

Chapter VIII: Conclusion

1 J. M. Gustafson, Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics

2 I have in mind, for instance, the work of David E. Jenkins as Director of Humanum Studies at the World Council of Churches from 1969, and of Ronald H. Preston in editing and contributing to symposia on industrial conflicts and on technology and social justice

3 H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture

4 See also the German Lutheran H. Thielicke's Theological Ethics, esp. Vol. I, 39-47 for his fundamental eschatological stance

5 J. Philip Wogaman, A Christian Method of Moral Judgment

6 G. Harland, The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr, 54-56; R. Veldhuis, Realism versus Utopianism? 114

7 v.s. 252

8 See Harland, 14-20, 118; Veldhuis, 8, 110. Harland points to the integrated nature of Niebuhr's thinking particularly at 75, 89, 127

9 See Harland, 106-107, 119-120, 133, 150

10 The personal experience has been acquired in Co. Durham, and I owe a great debt to the members of the groups and especially to Miss Margaret Kane, Theological Consultant on Industrial and Social Affairs to the Bishop of Durham and in the North-East. It is not therefore surprising that my proposals reflect ideas of Bishop Ian Ramsey. v.s. 151-153, 253-257; see also 280-281

11 v.s. 7-8

12 H. H. Henson, Retrospect of an Unimportant Life, vol. 3, 276, quoted by Norman, C and S, 371

13 Gustafson, esp. 31-33, 60-62 and Chapter 5

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<u>The Challenge</u>. Temple was editor of this weekly from 1915 to 1918, and many of his editorials are relevant to this thesis

<u>The Pilgrim</u>. Temple was editor of this quarterly for its duration, 1920 to 1927, and many of his editorial notes are relevant. Several of the articles he wrote for it are gathered in Essays in Christian Politics; others relevant to this thesis are listed below

<u>The Highway</u>. The monthly journal of the Workers' Educational Association. Temple was President from 1908 to 1924, and there are numerous short articles in this period by him (see also November 1932 and October 1934) and reports of his Presidential Addresses

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