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**ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS – THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OF THE
MIDDLE EAST? A CASE STUDY OF TURKEY PHD, 2003**

This thesis attempts to provide an explanation for the emergence of Islamist movements in the Middle East. The main argument is that Islamist movements are a response to an imposed version of modernity and join the New Social Movements of the West in their critique of modernisation and homogenous national culture defined by élites.

The thesis rejects mutually exclusive, single causal arguments in understanding Islamist movements. It proposes that studying élite-imposed modernisation processes in the Middle East, including their economic, political and cultural aspects, can provide a better understanding of the phenomenon. The thesis draws on theories of New Social Movements and post-modernity, as well as alternative understandings of the public space, in order to understand the nature of collective action in response to modernisation processes in the Middle East. These processes have been characterised by state-led capitalist industrialisation, imposed conceptions of homogenous national cultures and the consolidation of the nation-state. This thesis identifies Islamist movements as being responses to these alien and imposed experiences of modernisation.

The thesis uses Islamist political parties in Turkey as a case study. It argues that the nature of the political system and public space in Turkey have been such that Islamist political parties have been one, and arguably the most important manifestation of the Islamist movement in that country. The thesis demonstrates that Islamist political parties have evolved in Turkey as a response to the republican modernisation project. Their credentials as Islamist movements have nonetheless at times been compromised by their function as parties competing for political power. While the thesis focuses on the Turkish case, its central argument has a clear relevance for the general understanding of Islamic revivalism in the Middle East.

**ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS – THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OF
THE MIDDLE EAST? A CASE STUDY OF TURKEY**

**Submitted by
ÖZLEM TÜR KAVLI**

**In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirement for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

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**University of Durham
Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies**

2003



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Chapter 1	
Modernisation, Globalisation and New Social Movements	14
New Social Movements	14
Theories of Modernity, Social Change and Social Movements	16
The Advent of the Nation-State	19
‘Class’ as the Central Theme in Collective Action	20
Changes in Political Economy and Decline in Class Identity	23
Globalisation	25
Post-modern Culture and Identity	29
Collective Action and the New Social Movements Debate	31
The Middle Eastern Experience	34
The Building up of State-Led Capitalist Industrialisation	36
Colonial Legacy and the Nation-State	39
Collective Action and Class	42
Economic Liberalisation and the Call for Reform in the Middle East	47
Collective Action in the Middle East – Islamist Movements	51
Chapter 2	
Islamist Movements	57
Islamic Revivalism as a Response to the Failure of Socio-Economic Development	61
Islamic Revivalism as a Response to State	72
Islamic Revivalism as a Cultural Response	77
The Neo-Orientalist Approach	78
Cultural Response to Colonialism	79
Culture and the Modernising State	82
A Need for a New Approach – Modernisation Process	87

Chapter 3

Turkey 1908-1946 – The Years of the Kemalist Modernisation Project	92
From the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic	93
The War of Independence	100
The Kemalist Modernisation Project	103
The Republican Politics	105
The Economic Policy of the Early Republic	108
The Short Multiparty Experience of 1930	111
Corporatist Structure of Collective Action and Populism	114
State-led Capitalism – the Etatist Years	117
1940-45: War Economics	119
An Early ‘Islamist’ Response	122
Summary	124

Chapter 4

Turkey 1946-1980:

Multi-partyism and Class Based Social Movements?	128
The Introduction of Multi-party Politics – A Turning Point in Turkish Politics	128
1950-1960: The Democrat Party Years	134
The Growing Power of Islamist Politics under the Democrat Party	137
Economy Under the Democratic Party	140
The 1960 Military Coup	144
1961-1971: The Justice Party Years	147
Economic Development and Class in the post-1960 Period	152
Islamist Politics in the post-1960 Period	157
The National Order Party (<i>Milli Nizam Partisi</i>)	158
Military Intervention of 1971	161
The National Salvation Party (<i>Milli Selamet Partisi</i>)	163
1973 Elections	165
Late 1970s – The Building Up of the Crisis	168
From ISI to Export Oriented Growth Strategy – the 24 January Decisions	171
Summary	174

Chapter 5	
Turkey During 1980-2001: Challenges to the Kemalist Modernisation Project and the Heterogenisation of Identities	180
1980 Coup, Post-1983 Developments and the Motherland Party	181
The Civilian Politics in the post-Coup Era	187
1983 Election Results	188
Economic Policy Under Özal – Growth of the Market Economy	192
Emerging New Identities in the Turkish Political Arena	196
The Welfare Party in the 1980s	201
The 1991 Elections and Change in the Government	202
1994 municipal Elections and the Victory of the Welfare Party	208
The 1995 Elections – The Road to Erbakan’s Premiership	210
The Welfare – True Path Coalition Government	210
The 28 th February Process	216
Appeal to the Constitutional Court for the Closure of the Welfare Party	220
The Virtue Party Years	222
The 1999 Elections and Beyond	224
Summary	227
 Chapter 6	
Discourse of the National Opinion Parties	234
The National Order Party	235
<i>Hak versus Batıl</i>	237
The National Salvation Party	241
The Welfare Party	247
The Just Order	250
The Virtue Party	261
 Conclusion	272
 Bibliography	276

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1 Basic Economic Indicators, 1923-46	121
Table 4.1 Result of the 1950 General Elections	134
Table 4.2 Manufacturing Industry	141
Table 4.3 Result of the 1961 General Elections	148
Table 4.4 Result of the 1965 General Elections	150
Table 4.5 Result of the 1973 General Elections	166
Table 4.6 Basic Economic Indicators, 1950-1980	169
Table 5.1 Result of the 1983 General Elections	188
Table 5.2 External Orientation of the Economy	193
Table 5.3 Functional Distribution of Income of Turkey, 1967-1988	194
Table 5.4 Result of the 1987 General Elections	198
Table 5.5 Result of the 1991 General Elections	202
Table 5.6 Result of the 1995 General Elections	210
Table 5.7 Result of the 1999 General Elections	224

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INTRODUCTION

The main argument of this thesis is that Islamist movements are a response to an imposed version of modernity and join the New Social Movements of the West in their critique of modernity and homogenous national culture as defined by élites. The thesis examines the rise of Islamist political parties in Turkey as a case study.

The term “Islamist” is defined here as the organisational ideologisation of Islamic revivalism, with an explicit or implicit political agenda. This agenda may be either the pursuit of power or the desire to influence the political arena in such a way as to promote Islamic norms and values, sometimes but not necessarily including the desire to implement Shari’a law.

Islamist movements represent the main opposition to the authoritarian establishments of the Middle Eastern state and gather support from a large group of citizens who are alienated from their regimes on economic, political and cultural grounds. Studying Islamist movements is important in understanding what constitutes the major political debate in this part of the world. As well as their dimensions within the individual nation-states and against the nation-states, Islamist movements have trans-national characteristics that go beyond the scope of the state. Some analysts see them not only as a threat to the future of the Middle Eastern regimes but also to Western society and modernity, increasing the urge to understand what the Islamist movements really are.

This thesis understands such movements as political expressions of the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism, or the revival or reassertion of the Islamic identity in the public space. Islamic revivalism itself has so far generally been

explained by mutually exclusive single causal arguments focusing on responses to either socio-economic conditions or political factors or an élite-imposed culture. This thesis understands Islamic revivalism as a response to the combined economic, political and cultural impacts of an elite-imposed modernity. In doing so, the thesis draws on New Social Movements theories, which locate the emergence of new social movements in 'the West' in a response to the "crises of modernity". New Social Movements introduce a strong critical approach to the prevailing politics and political cultures in the countries where they develop.

The basic features of the New Social Movements (NSMs), are that they advocate a new social paradigm, which contrasts with the dominant goal structure of Western industrial societies. They generally question the emphasis on economic growth and materialism prevalent in industrial societies. Instead, they advocate greater attention to the cultural and 'quality of life' issues that have received less attention in the post-War rush to affluence. They strongly challenge the nature of the corporatist-bureaucratic state, and are highly suspicious about the established élite and the state apparatus. The legitimacy of this élite is challenged by the claim that it does not represent the population as a whole. They further reject its claim of integrity, morality and ability to address the critical issues that the societies are facing. They advocate universalistic moral concerns, away from using institutionalised politics for instrumentalist concerns. They are able to refrain from formal political structures and organise and mobilise in other forms in liberal, democratic countries of the West, where political activities are only constrained by democratic legal processes and procedures.

In the Middle East there has also been a comparable "crisis of modernity", which I argue, accounts for Islamic revivalism. However, responses to these crises of modernity take divergent forms from those of the West. The Islamist movements are

different from the NSMs due to differences in the prevailing political structures in the two regions. As in the Middle East there is a greater or lesser degree of absence of a legal environment outside of formal political structures within which movements responding to this crisis of modernity can operate, the ideologisation and organisation of these movements are different. The ways in which they develop their ideology and seek to organise are constrained by the non-liberal, non-democratic political environments within which they operate. This must be taken into account when studying the Islamist movements in any given country. Despite such a difference in the political environments, the thesis underlines that New Social Movements theories can be used to understand how Islamist movements as social movements arise as a response to modernity.

This thesis refers to this alternative political environment in terms of the concept of “public space”. Habermas defines ‘public space’ as “a realm of our social life within which something approaching to public opinion could be formed.”¹ Thus, “a portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body.”² Citizens are noted to behave as a “public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion – that is with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions – about matters of general interest.”³ The restrictions on the citizens’ rights to assemble and express themselves mark the differences between the Middle Eastern and the Western public spaces.

However, for this work, such a distinction does not decrease the importance of the recent discussion about the changing nature of the public space. The bourgeois nature of the public space, as it was formed by the end of the 18th century in the West, discussed in the works of Habermas, has in the last decades been subject to serious challenges from a new group of elites with their own concerns, thanks to the

media and the mass education. This concept of a new élite, or a counter-élite, that challenges the definitions of the public space by the traditional elites becomes an important debate in the Middle East. In the Turkish case, the counter-élite challenges and questions the military-bureaucratic élite and the imposed modernisation project that laid down the rules and laws within the public space.

This is closely related with a second challenge to the nature of the public space: The erosion of the distinction between the public and the private space. What was considered as belonging to the private space like the religious and moral conscience and intimate matters has for the last decades become issues of public concern. In the Middle East, like in the Western countries, religious and ethnic identities, which were regarded as belonging to the private space, are emerging and challenging the distinction of public-private separation. This makes the public space a field for the competition of private interests. In Turkey, religion was confined to the private space with the Republican reforms in early 1920s. The rise of the Islamist political parties in Turkey, can be understood as one of the primary identities, religious (Islamic) identity, that was a matter of private space, emerging in a “crisis of modernity” and becoming a common concern in the public space.

As the Turkish case shows, efforts to advance a political agenda by Islamist movements have largely, but not exclusively, taken place within the sphere of electoral competition. Unlike many Middle Eastern countries, electoral competition plays a significant role in the political scene of the country, although the military-bureaucratic élite, from time to time, intervened in party politics. Apart from political parties, other forms of Islamist movements (e.g. religious orders like Nur Tarikatı, Nakşibendi Tarikatı, Iskenderpaşa Cemaati, etc.) also exist, but the most important manifestation of Islamist movements is by this thesis considered to be the political parties. The opportunity for politics to take place through a genuine electoral

competition is the main reason for this emphasis of political parties. Habermasian public space conditions the kind of activities that Islamist movements would take and the form that they would assume, depending on the political culture of a given country. Thus, in the Turkish case the public space is characterised by electoral politics. Given the limitations set upon civil society activity, by constraints on rights of expression and association, political parties play the dominant role in the political scene. Even religious orders advance their political agendas through links with the political parties in the country.

Since its transition to multiparty politics in 1946, competitive elections and peaceful transfer of power following national electoral contests have been the principal characteristic of Turkish politics. Unlike their counterparts in many other developing countries, including those of the Middle East, political parties in Turkey have displayed a relatively high degree of organisational strength, complexity and continuity.⁴

Identifying Turkish politics as party politics is widespread in scholarly literature.⁵ Frey commented as early as 1965, "Within the power structure of Turkish society, the political party is the main unofficial link between the government and the larger extra-governmental groups of people [...]."⁶ Özbudun recently wrote that "Turkish politics are still by and large party politics. Most people realise that there is no alternative to political parties [...]."⁷ Thus, this thesis will study Turkish Islamist political parties as a manifestation of an Islamic revival, and try to locate them within a discourse on responses to modernity.

It is necessary to acknowledge, however, that despite being the main mechanism through which interest articulation is materialised and being the main actors in the political scene of the country, political parties, remained largely autonomous from the social groups that they represent, both because of being élite

centred and constrained by the function of power-seeking itself. This enhanced their instrumentalist nature, different from the social movements of the West. Most scholars of Turkish politics would agree that the origins of the party system in the country rest on a centre-periphery cleavage: a nationalist and secularist state élite (military-bureaucracy) pitted against the “culturally heterogeneous, complex and even hostile periphery with religious and anti-statist overtones.”⁸ As Kalaycıoğlu writes, the choice of voters among parties had in part reflected their identification with the belief system and interests of the centre or of the periphery.⁹ In order to gain the electoral support of the periphery, that constituted a greater segment of the population and held the key for gaining electoral victory, most political parties used discourses that would appeal to this “religious and anti-statist” periphery.

At the same time, these political parties, in most cases, retained their autonomy from these social groups by shifting from one electoral base to another and abandoning the interests of their supporters once elected to office.¹⁰ This is closely related with the political party formations in the country. Most political parties of Republican Turkey were formed by the élite, and the multi-party politics came into existence rather “abruptly and in the absence of organised movements actively seeking to procure political citizenship rights for the masses.”¹¹ Unlike Western Europe, where the extension of suffrage to lower classes came about gradually and at times involved resorting to violence, the transition to multiparty politics was a political decision made at the top, more or less independently of the demands of the social groups. New parties were generally founded not through new channels and demands from the society but rather by factional splits from the already existing parties. This led Turkish political parties to retain their autonomy from the society at large and adopt clientalistic structures and patronage distribution in return for political support for their élite formations. The nature of the political parties, being

autonomous if not detached from the social groups that they represent, led to an instrumentalisation of policy. To use Heper's analysis, the "extreme instrumentalism" of political parties became an important characteristic of party politics, which is attributed to "the absence [...] of a civil society with political influence." Islamist political parties have, so far, been no exception to the general characteristics of Turkish political parties with their instrumentalism and autonomy from the society.

This thesis will demonstrate that Islamist political parties in Turkey have made a clear instrumentalist use of Islamist objectives to advance the parties' opportunities for winning power. Thereby, the Islamist political parties are also themselves constrained by the function of power seeking. Similarly, their links with other forms of Islamist movements bear marks of instrumentalism. Therefore, the thesis argues that Islamist political parties are not simply manifestations of Islamic revivalism but have an additional and at times contradictory dimension that must also be acknowledged.

In its analysis of Islamist political parties in Turkey, this thesis will follow a chronological narrative. The modernisation process, with its economic, political and cultural components is studied in this narrative. The Islamist political parties as responses to this modernisation, which is fundamentally elite-imposed, are located in this framework.

Up until 1980, the modernisation project of Turkey was composed of a combination of state-led capitalist industrialisation, nation-state and homogenous national culture. Turkey is an interesting case in studying Islamist movements in the sense that the modernisation project has been based on excessive emphasis of Westernisation and secularisation, and an attempted re-definition of the role of religion in society – regulating and confining its role in the public sphere. In the

newly formed Republic, the homogenous national culture was formed around the themes of Turkishness and secularism and there was no room for independent Islamist groups in the political sphere.

Opposition to the modernisation project of the military-bureaucratic élite emerged as early as the 1920s. This was a natural reaction to the secularist reforms by traditionalist circles. Such reactions were suppressed during the consolidation of the Republic and single party rule. Populism and corporatism were also incorporated into state discourse at this time and thus left little room for the development of independent collective action in general, collective action being defined here as individuals acting collectively, gathering with purposeful orientations and organising a common behaviour.¹² Various parties, some of which demonstrated Islamist dimensions, were founded as multi-party politics was introduced in 1946. However, they remained as minor actors in the political scene. The major centre right parties, the Democrat Party during the 1950s and the Justice Party during the 1960s, successfully used Islamist discourse in an attempt to gather the support of the periphery.

The 1970s are important in the country for Islamist political parties. The most significant Islamist parties during this period were the 'National Opinion parties' founded by Necmettin Erbakan in 1970, which has played an important role in representing the majority of the Islamist groups until 2002. Erbakan's parties, repeatedly closed for being against the Constitution and subsequently re-opened under different names, increasingly challenged the components of the modernisation project.

By the late 1970s, the modernisation project had become highly fragile due to the failure of the state to deliver economic prosperity to the citizens as well as decreasing legitimacy of the hegemonic ideology. As a remedy to such failure, the

country opened up its economy by implementing liberalisation measures and decreasing the economic role of the state. Economic liberalisation brought with it a more liberal political environment in the 1980s. This in turn resulted in drastic changes in politics and collective action, most significant of which was the proliferation of identities that challenged the modernisation project in general. Islamic identity posed one of the main challenges to the Kemalist modernisation project, generating support for the Islamist political party of the time.

Support for the Islamist movements, which had previously been generated from the lower-middle classes and the petit-bourgeoisie during the 1970s, was increasingly coming from the university students, businessmen, journalists and intellectuals. These were themselves the products of modernity and the modernising reforms like mass education and equal rights of citizenship. Now, however, they were advocating an alternative interpretation of modernity and created an 'Islamic' version of the key elements in the national identity. Concepts such as Islamic dress, Islamist businesses, an Islamist bourgeoisie, Islamist intellectuals, Islamist feminists challenged the definition of modernity and the role and power of the traditional élite – the military bureaucracy – in defining the public sphere and what modernity meant. The Turkish case is significant in the sense that the Islamist movement's 'symbolic revolution', to use Bourdieu's words, against the centre, has taken place openly in the public space from the 1980s onwards. An increase in the votes for the political parties that proposed such a 'revolution' as a political project became a significant source of debate during the 1990s. The 1995 elections carried the (Islamist) Welfare Party of Erbakan to power in a coalition government with the centre-right True Path Party. Upon coming to power, Erbakan began to give speeches referring to an approaching 'transformation' to an Islamist order that would take place 'with or without blood' in Turkey. Despite such a discourse, the party did not make any

policy moves towards this direction in government. This contradiction is a sign of the instrumentalist features mentioned earlier. Such speeches were nonetheless enough to increase the tension between the secular circles – notably the military-bureaucratic élite – and the Islamist groups. This tension peaked in a soft coup in 1997.

This thesis is composed of six chapters. The first chapter draws the theoretical framework of the NSMs. It analyses the main arguments regarding the New Social Movements within the changing patterns of collective action in the West from class to cross-class, cultural, issue-based movements within post-industrialism and post-modernity. It underlines how the NSMs are a response to modernity. Further, the chapter explains how modernity came to the Middle East with the élite imposed modernisation projects and the differences in the theme of collective action in the region from that of the Western world. The chapter also points to the assumptions within NSM theory concerning the nature of the public space, which may not be relevant in other (non-democratic) contexts.

The second chapter examines the main approaches to the Islamist movements. It explains the socio-economic, political and cultural approaches to the growth of Islamist movements in the Middle East and underlines the necessity of an approach bringing all these three perspectives together. It proposes analysing the Islamist movements within a modernisation process that brings economic, political and collective action themes together by drawing at the themes raised by the discussion of New Social Movements while acknowledging the varying nature of the public space in Middle Eastern countries. It proposes as an alternative a non-reductionist approach to the study of Islamist movements.

The third, fourth and fifth chapters focus on the case study of Turkey and the examination of the Islamist movement in the country emerging within and as a response to the modernisation process. The chapters focus on the Islamist political

parties as the case study. The third chapter analyses the modernisation project between 1908-1946. It discusses the process of reforms that started as early as mid-19th century and resulted in the efforts of the military-bureaucratic élite, led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, to engage in a Western-inspired nation-building process after the formation of the Republic in 1923. It also studies how the modernisation project was formulated and which reforms were implemented to accomplish the project. The chapter examines the emergence of an Islamist reaction against the reforms that was manifested within the two short-lived multi-party periods. Further, it analyses the impact of single party rule, populism and corporatism preventing any expression of an explicit Islamist opposition.

The fourth chapter focuses on the period of multi-party politics and the emerging class structure and class identities between 1946-1980. The collective action during this period revolved both around the newly developing class identities and the continuing duality, between the military-bureaucratic élite and the political periphery. The chapter analyses the representation of the Islamist groups in the centre right parties until 1970, and later within Necmettin Erbakan's Islamist political parties. It also notes the collective action shaping around class as well as ideological lines, similar to that of the old social movements.

The fifth chapter analyses the post-1980 political developments. It focuses on the redefinition of the modernisation project with liberal, free market policies and the increasing emphasis on a Turkish-Islamic synthesis taking over the Westernisation framework. Further, it studies the proliferation of different identities in the society, one of which is Islamic. The chapter analyses the rise of Islamist political parties in relation to this re-defined version of modernisation.

Throughout these three chapters, the thesis will point to the developing nature of the public space, the character of collective action, (in order to illustrate the

- political environment and constraints on Islamist movements), as well as examining the nature of the Islamist political parties themselves, assessing how they represented Islamist projects on the one hand, but compromised themselves with instrumentalist approaches to attaining power on the other.

The sixth chapter analyses the discourse of the Islamist political parties from 1970s onwards and locates the evolution of the discourse in relation to the changes in the modernisation process. The chapter reflects how the Islamists saw themselves as responding to modernity as well as how they used Islamic discourse in order to appeal to the periphery. Again, this serves to emphasise the tension between their function as Islamist movements and their utilitarian approach towards seeking power.

The thesis concludes that a process comparable to the emergence of New Social Movements can be identified in Turkey with the Islamist political parties as the most significant elements of the Islamist movements, articulating a response to modernity. This response has been compromised, however, by the prevailing political structures which determine that Islamist movements should most effectively take the form of political parties but which are then themselves compromised by their power-seeking function.

This case study offers a useful framework within which comparable Islamist movements in other Middle Eastern countries may be studied. However, this response will take different forms as a result of the processes by which modernity is pursued as well as the differences in the political structures. Political parties may not always be the most relevant form of Islamist movement to be studied, but the notion of Islamism as an organisational and ideologised response to elite-imposed versions of modernity remains valid. Equally, the choice of Islamist movements to be studied

in any given case should be made with due reference to the nature of the public space in that country, or the prevailing political structures.

The most common forms of transliteration are used in the text. Turkish names are written in their original form. They are written in italic letters and are put into parenthesis when they had been translated in the text. I have made all the translations of the texts when necessary. Thus, it is my responsibility should there be any ambiguities in the translation.

¹ Jürgen Habermas, "The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article" (1964), New German Critique 3 (Fall 1974), p. 50

² *ibid*

³ Jürgen Habermas, "The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article" (1964), p. 52

⁴ Sabri Sayari, "Political Parties, Party Systems, and Economic Reforms: The Turkish Case", Studies in Comparative International Development, Winter 96/97, Vol.31, Issue 4, p.30

⁵ See Metin Heper, State Tradition in Turkey, (North Humberstone: The Eothen Press, 1985); Frederick Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1965); Sabri Sayari, Party Politics in Turkey: Dimensions of Competition and Organisation. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 1972; Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics – Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000); Ergun Özbudun, "Turkey: Crisis, Interruptions, and Reequilibrations" in Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset (eds.) Politics in Developing Countries, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1990).

⁶ Frederick Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1965), p.301

⁷ Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics – Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p. 81

⁸ *ibid*

⁹ Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey – Changes and Continuities in the 1990s", Comparative Political Studies, Vol.27, No.3, October 1994, p. 406

¹⁰ Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics – Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, p. 82-83

¹¹ Sabri Sayari, Party Politics in Turkey: Dimensions of Competition and Organisation. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 1972, p. 10

¹² In line with this definition social movements are seen as a form of collective action which involves solidarity, actors' mutual recognition that they are a part of a social unit. For similar perspective see Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the Present, p. 29

CHAPTER 1

MODERNISATION, GLOBALISATION AND NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the concept and theory of New Social Movements. This provides us with a framework for understanding the political responses to modernity that have been experienced in the West. The chapter will explain how the processes and problems of modernity generated a new form of collective action – New Social Movements. The chapter then examines the comparable process of modernisation in the Middle East, although it will be argued that modernity in that context has been an elite-imposed phenomenon (unlike the experience in the West). While this form of modernisation initially took the form of nation-state-led capitalist development and corporatism – undermining the opportunities for social classes to develop as they had in the West – more recent experiments with economic liberalisation have unleashed new problems and social forces that challenge this élite-imposed version of modernity.

NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The main feature of the New Social Movements lies in their challenge to the Enlightenment process and the underlying components of Western modernity. They challenge the nation-state and the official state ideology and bring culture and identity issues into the heart of politics. The evolution of the literature on New Social Movements coincides with the debate on globalisation, post-industrialism, the information/network society and the widely accepted view that Western societies

have left modernity behind and entered a new phase of history generally referred to as post-modernity.

It is a widely held view that the term “movement” is closely related with modernity: “either social movements constitute modernity, or at least make a very large contribution to its appearance”.¹ Ron Eyerman supports this idea by saying that “modernity connotes movement”² in line with the writings of Alain Touraine, stating that “modern society is the first type of society to reproduce itself and the social movements are the decisive force in this process”.³

During the “modern” period, the capitalist industrialisation process was the underlying mechanism determining the dynamics of society and class struggle was seen as the main collective action. With the transition from the industrial to post-industrial society and from modernity to post-modernity, independent of the class struggle, New Social Movements are the main collective action in the West today.

As told in the beginning of the chapter, while the Western societies are occupied with demands for change being voiced through the New Social Movements, societies of the Middle East are experiencing strong Islamist movements demanding social change along the lines of Quran and the Shari’ a law. The question to be asked in this chapter is “can the study of the New Social Movements, with their understanding of collective social responses to modernity, provide a useful framework for understanding the Islamist movements in the Middle East?”

In an attempt to find an answer to this question, I will in this chapter firstly be looking at the debate on modernity, social change and social movements. I will then discuss what some people term as the ‘old’ social movements that are based on class identity. Further, I will talk about the debate on the process named alternatively ‘new modernity’, ‘the second modernity’, or ‘post-modernity’ and the development of the New Social Movements (NSM). Then I will discuss the

relevance of this framework in the Middle Eastern case, and look at how social movements of the region were shaped in comparison with, and contrast to Western social movements.⁴

THEORIES OF MODERNITY, SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

According to Jürgen Habermas, modernity is the name for a partial but nonetheless quite significant historical realisation of key proposals from the progressive, humanist agenda of the European Enlightenment – the project of modernity – developed by the “horizon of Reason”.⁵ With the onset of modernity, all subsequent developments – of the self, society and nature – would be under the aegis of reason.⁶

There is a general agreement in literature that modernity involves a rapid and all-encompassing change despite disagreement over where to place the turning point and the beginning of this modernity. Dahrendorf sees its beginnings between the “autumn of the Middle Ages and the first traces of the protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, that is, the turning point of the 15th and 16th centuries, the key period of the modern world”⁷ in line with the views of Parsons who sees Renaissance and Reformation as the beginning of modernity, adding the importance of industrial and democratic revolutions and the education revolution that followed. There is another group of scholars that locate the beginnings of modernity in the social change that came with the impact of industrialisation, urbanisation and political democracy much later in the 19th century. Whichever approach is taken, modernity carries with it connotations of a new experience of the world, a world that is re-invented “through the active and conscious intervention of actors and the new sense of self that such active intervention and responsibility entailed”.⁸

Within modernity, capitalism played a vital role as the basic component of the new system. As Weber says, capitalism became the “most fateful power of

modern life". Not subscribing to the reductionist claim that capitalism played the central role in the transformation to modernity, the idea here is that modernity of the economy (capitalism) represented a prototype for the modernisation of other institutional spheres like law and governance. While the control of the means of production constitutes the core of the capitalist economy, seeing this as the decisive factor in the structure of modernity might be misleading. Rather it could be seen as one of the central forces in an overall change paving the way for modernisation. The separation of economic action from politics is a basic characteristic of the capitalist system, and it was accompanied by the separation of state, law and science from politics.⁹ However, the role played by capitalism should be analysed carefully in this process as it contributed greatly to the passage from the traditional to modern societies.

Polanyi notes that in traditional societies, "the economic system was submerged in general social relations... the self-regulating market was unknown; indeed the emergence of the idea of self-regulation was a complete reversal of the trend of development".¹⁰ With the advent of capitalist industrialisation, industrial plants were established, heavy industry was given special emphasis making the steel industries and single industry localities central to the system. Manufacturing the basic commodities for the modern society became the primary goal of the capitalist production. The society that came with capitalism was "free" in the sense that economic activities were not dominated by the political motives and concerns; production decisions were based "on the norms of economic rationality".¹¹

With the advent of capitalism, the move of the individual from rural communities and farm labour to centralised urban work places resulted in a physical and mental break with the traditional community life. The individual was set free from the communal ties, while at the same time the community itself was changing

with the forces of modernisation. There was no longer a social bond in the modern community that kept the parts together; it was not an all-embracing process that left little room for individuality. Rather the restrictive role of tradition decreased while room for individual liberation increased. As a result of these developments, the traditional social networks that formed the basis of social identity no longer had direct control over the individual, making him subject to new influences, making possible the formation of new social networks and political identities. The idea that the individual was freed from the “established identity-giving mechanism”¹² and was now free to reconstruct his world is a widely held view, but this is not really the case. It would be wrong to assume that the individual was set free to choose his world with the advent of modernity. The process of modernisation gave the individual his new role in the society, defined by his place in the industrial capitalist production. He would be “the consumer” of the system rather than its producer. Thus, the ‘liberating nature’ of modernity is questionable and this issue came to constitute the main arguments of post-modern discourse. One might think that the individual is “free” as a consumer after all, as he has the freedom to choose in the market among various goods that are produced for his choice. Freedom in the sense of contribution to the consumer culture is not what is meant here by freedom. Khuri defines freedom as “how fully a human being is able to flourish as a whole. The larger the ‘circle’ within a human being is covered by freedom, the more truly free one is.”¹³ With the capitalist economy, the occupational status of the individual, his class position, was seen as determining almost all aspects of his life: how and where the person lives, what kind of consumption habits he will have, what kind of political opinions could be expected from him. Thus, the individual was now ‘depending’ on his class position determining his “life-world”, far away from being “free”. In addition to

these constraints drawn by the class, the nation-state ideology and how it impedes difference and thus freedom will be discussed below.

THE ADVENT OF THE NATION-STATE

Ian Roxborough writes that to each form of economic development, a particular form of politics and form of state apparatus would correspond.¹⁴ Following his argument, we can say that for the capitalist industrialization and mode of production, nation-state became the political apparatus.

Although the beginnings of the international system based on nation-states go back to the 1648 Westphalia Treaty, the modern contemporary nation-state came much later. Habermas notes that the nation-state came as a response to the necessity firstly for new legitimacy for the political authority that is “stripped of its religious grounding in ‘divine right’” and secondly for social integration of the geographically mobilised and isolated citizens.¹⁵ With a quest to solve these challenges of industrial capitalism/modernity, a new form of community – the nation – was introduced.

Habermas proposes that

only a national consciousness crystallised around the notion of a common ancestry, language and history, only the consciousness of belonging to “the same” people, makes subjects into citizens of a single political community – into members who can feel responsible *for one another*. The nation – the first truly *modern* form of collective identity – provided the cultural basis for the constitutional state. As drawn out by historians, this thoroughly artificial fusion of older loyalties into a new national consciousness which was also steered by bureaucratic imperatives is a long, drawn-out process.¹⁶

This “artificial fusion of old loyalties into national consciousness” is of significant importance here as the nation-state rested on the assumption of a culturally homogenous population. Within this assumed cultural homogeneity – the nation – all the differences regarding the individuals and groups of culture, ethnicity, religion and sometimes language were overlooked and were replaced by the “national culture”, that is generally the hegemonic majority culture implemented by the élite. In many cases, this majority culture became the dominant political culture

of the country that claimed to be recognised by all citizens regardless of their cultural background.¹⁷ The role of the state and the intellectuals were seen as decreasing any impediments for the advent of reason and creating the environment where its utmost realisation could be attained. While doing this, the modern nation-state propagated some patterns and was set to eliminate others, promoting similarity and uniformity. By applying a uniform law for all the people residing in the territories of the nation-state and giving the status of citizenship to the members, all the members of the nation-state were proclaimed to be indistinguishable from each other. Whatever distinctive qualities they might have had, were seen as illegitimate. Bauman names this quest of the state to form uniformity as “cultural crusades” aimed at “destruction of autonomous, communal mechanisms of reproduction of cultural unity”.¹⁸ In time, citizenship and cultural conformity seemed to merge, where the latter was seen as a condition for the former. Politics in general is identified with the functioning of the capitalist system. Rather than focusing on the management of change or reforms, the political system of the nation-state was concentrated on ‘order’, in which modernity and capitalist-industrial production could flourish.

‘CLASS’ AS THE CENTRAL THEME IN COLLECTIVE ACTION

As presented above, following Roxborough’s claim that to each form of economic development, a particular form of politics and form of state apparatus would correspond; for capitalist industrialization, the nation-state became the political apparatus. We can extend the argument of Roxborough here by saying that to every political system a form of collective action and social movement corresponds. Thus, the social movements, in the period under consideration here, revolved around class structure and class antagonism. During the period of “modernity”, capitalist industrialization and the nation-state were accompanied by class and class based

social movements as the main mechanism for collective action in society. Workplace and employment were seen as the key to the position of the individual in the society and the production process was the main focus of attention; therefore social antagonism and demand for social change revolved around the class struggle. Demands for better working conditions, better payment and social benefits constituted the main source of mobilization for these movements.

The homogenous culture of the nation-state was not questioned at this time. However, this did not mean that the national culture remained unchanged or static. It was renewed as it became subject to class struggle. Originally, upper middle class establishment had defined the contents of this national culture. As labour movements came to power, they adjusted the national culture to bring it in line with labour identity. This did not mean challenging the national culture or the unity of the society but rather reproducing it with labour values.

The beginnings of the modern age, its impact on society and the absorption of the individual into the new, modern structures received widespread scholarly attention. The works of Karl Marx constitute an important place in this literature. The development of the modern capitalist order, the formation of a class society and basically the route to social change through class action are central in the works of Marx. According to the Marxist analysis, the capitalist mode of production resulted in a group of individuals owning and controlling the means of production (the bourgeoisie) and another group that used their labour for survival (the proletariat). Thus, this was the beginning of a new form of oppression, oppression based on economic power, for the masses. As Perry Anderson notes,

Capitalism is the first mode of production in history in which the means whereby the surplus which is pumped out of the direct producer is purely 'economic' in form - the wage contract: the equal exchange between free agents reproducers, hourly and daily, inequality and oppression. All the previous modes of exploitation operate through extra economic sanctions - kin, customary, religious, legal and political.¹⁹

The dynamics of the society were seen as revolving around this antagonistic relationship of class struggle, the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This was also seen as the main mechanism for social change – the driving force of the social movements. Social movements can be viewed as collective enterprises to establish a new order of life.²⁰ Marxist thought has foreseen this “new order of life” to be formed by the collective action of the workers against the exploitation of the bourgeoisie capital. Mapping history as the history of class struggle, Marx emphasises the struggle between the two major classes - the bourgeois, which owns the means of production as well as the political power, and the proletariat, who have only their labour force to serve the capital.

One of the main points in Marx’s work is the idea that the “mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life... It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness”.²¹ The point made above regarding the linkage between an individual’s place in the production system and his life-world is directly linked to this point in Marxist analysis.

The Marxist approach to collective action was shaped by a three-step approach: structure – consciousness – action. According to this approach, the consciousness of the individual that was shaped by his place in the structure has not only determined his interests, but also his action in the society. The main class that would take the revolutionary role in changing the system was the proletariat. The capitalist order would be changed with the collective action of the proletariat, against the oppression of the bourgeoisie, and a socialist order would be formed as a consequence, which is a higher stage of evolution.

Up until the world economic crisis of 1929 the predominant economic structure of Western Europe was undoubtedly one of industrial capitalism. The

political agent was the nation-state, playing a minimal role in the economy. During the post- World War II period, the Keynesian economic system was adopted by the European states. Consequently, the state took on a major role in the economy, and the conditions of the workers improved considerably. The Keynesian economic model rested on state regulation of the economy where a policy of full employment was adopted and maintained basically by controlling demand through taxation and other fiscal policies. Increased levels of state provision in education, health and welfare became the characteristics of the period. This was the establishment of the European welfare state.

In the production scene, Fordism became a common practice: the large scale mass production of cheap, uniform commodities, the detailed division of labour and extensive hierarchical organisation of productive activity. Mass production was associated with mass consumption, maintained by the state's support of the economy during this period. The capacity to plan and regulate national economies rationally seemed to be achieved in the West during the period after the Second World War as economic expansion was witnessed in this part of the world. Up until the 1970s, the components of "modernity", industrial capitalism, nation-state and class identity continued to dominate the Western societies.

CHANGES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND DECLINE IN CLASS IDENTITY

The system induced by "modernity" began to show signs of change as the 1970s arrived. During the post-war period of economic expansion, manufacturing industries increased their production significantly to meet the demand for consumer goods, until the competition and the saturation of the domestic market led to a decline in these industries. The post-war economic boom was already declining when the oil price crisis of early 1970s hit the Western economies, leading to a

further collapse of the manufacturing industries. This gave way for a new “post-industrialisation” period.

The Fordist production pattern of mass industries of the post-war period began to be replaced by the ‘flexible production patterns’ on smaller, dispersed sites in contrast to the huge industrial plants, with production being designed according to consumer demand, in small quantities. The neo-liberal policies that proposed liberalisation of economy and primacy of market forces was gradually adopted by Western governments. State monopolies were passed into private hands and the state withdrew to a regulating role of the economic sector. The decline in the manufacturing industries led to periodical increases in the number of unemployed in the Western countries. These newly unemployed individuals were mainly absorbed by the growing service sector. Thus, the concept of working class became less relevant as a result of these developments.

The decreasing importance of industrial production led to the loosening of class positions and identity defined by employment and class. This is closely related with the welfare state system in the post-Second World War period and the success of the working class in managing to influence the state towards implementing a system of equality. The social change to overcome this inequality was not coming through revolution led by the proletariat but rather via the incorporation of the working classes into the corporatist and distributional networks of the welfare state. According to Schmitter corporatism can be defined

as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supporters.²²

Organising in corporatist groups, the working class in time became a client of the state occupied in distributional competition with others. Workers parties, in their bids to the state, were successful in providing their members with better

working conditions, better payment and decent salaries for decent life standards. Thus, under 'organised capitalism', with an active state role in economy, the significant relationship of the individual to the means of production seemed to be overridden, if not replaced, by his relationship to the means of distribution, to the state.²³ This was one of the main factors that led to the loosening of class structure. It was not the failure, but rather the success of the labour movements in getting their demands and changing their positions in society that was now opening new avenues for identity and collective action.

GLOBALISATION

Globalisation is a widely used, fashionable concept regarding the changes of our time. There are different definitions of this concept. Although Wallerstein says that the world has been going through a social compression since the beginning of the sixteenth century, with the advent of the international capitalist market, the theorists of globalisation contend that since the 1970s we have been living in an entirely new era:

It is widely asserted that we live in an era in which the greater part of social life is determined by global processes, in which national cultures, national economies and national borders are dissolving. Central to this perception is the notion of a rapid and recent process of economic globalisation... The world economy has been internationalised in its basic dynamics, it is dominated by uncontrollable market forces ... the principal economic actors and major agents of change are truly transnational corporations, that owe allegiance to no nation state and locate wherever in the globe market advantage dictates.²⁴

The global economy is often contrasted with the post-War Keynesian economics. In the post-War economic system, the main actors were the nation states that were linked by trade, but which nonetheless produced primarily for domestic consumption. Production process took place in national territories and the states often controlled, protected and supported these industries. This process was underlined with the policies of Import Substitution Industrialisation in most of the Third World, making the state not only the main employer but also the main

producer. The changes in the post-War economic order came with many different processes, the most important of which was the technology and information revolution. This led to drastic changes in the production processes, altering the logistics, structures and relationships of the previous structure and facilitating the internationalisation of capital markets. Trade started to be replaced by foreign direct investment as the connection between states made the trans-national companies the main actors in the international market. In the face of these developments, the appropriateness of the nation-state as a unit of analysis in international relations started to be questioned, as well as the term's definition regarding the institution where important governing decisions are made. Rather than the nation-states, the supra-national and sub-national became the focus of contemporary concern.

Hirst and Thompson underline four characteristics of globalisation: The first one is a truly globalised economy where national economic actors, governments and firms find themselves "confronting an international economic system which has become autonomised and socially disembedded".²⁵ The second element is that the trans-national corporations became the major players in the world economy, willing to locate anywhere for the most secure or the highest returns. The third element is the decline in the political influence and economic bargaining power of organised labour. This also includes the erosion of class struggle and consequently the decreasing validity of social analysis based on class. The fourth characteristic is the growth of multipolarity in the international political system.²⁶ The nation-states lose their centrality in world politics as non-political actors, like transnational firms and multinational corporations gain power, at the expense of political actors.

Another important aspect of globalisation is the way that it links local events with those at the global level. When defining globalisation, Giddens notes that,

Globalisation can be defined as an intensification of world wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. This is a dialectical process because such local happenings may move in an obverse direction from the very distanced relations that shape them. Local transformation is as much a part of globalisation as the lateral extension of social connections across time and space.²⁷

The localization and relativization of culture against the Western 'norms' and 'value system' is a continuing debate in the non-Western parts of the world. Rather than the homogenous culture of each nation-state, there is debate going on regarding the global culture that shapes the individuals all around the world. However, this concept of a global culture is regarded with suspicion by many, as it is seen as a justification for further spread of Western ideas, values and culture. Giddens notes that globalisation is a consequence of the spread of Western culture throughout the world by "settlement, colonization and cultural replication".²⁸

Even if globalisation is a consequence of centuries long process, it does not mean that the culture it brings will be accepted in every corner of the world. Rather, globalisation activates localisation; the residents of a local community would want to make conscious decisions about which values and facilities they would like to implement in their communities. In fact, globalisation is complementary with fragmentation. This is a factor distinguishing modernity from globalisation. Modernisation theory suggested that the world was moving from particularism to universalism and that it was converging on a consensus. In contrast, globalisation is a "complex interaction between globalizing and localising tendencies - so-called 'glocalisation'; a synthesis of particularistic and universalistic values".²⁹

As pointed out above, there are different aspects of globalisation; it encompasses a totality of different processes and change taking place in different spheres all at the same time. The main difficulty in dealing with the concept of globalisation is that it is a process that we are still going through and we don't know at what stage of this process we really are and how far we can/if we can proceed further down this line. Despite differences in the level of "globalising", the countries

of the West are considered to have entered a post-industrialist, post-modern period with the advent of the globalisation process. The research of Englehart shows that the entire world is far from entering the post-modern period.³⁰ While some parts of the world are still struggling to enter the modernisation period, most of the countries of the West are cited as being well into post-modernisation, with the Nordic countries and the Netherlands being considered as the most post-modern countries in the world at the present time.³¹

Despite differences in the present level of passage to the post-modern condition among states, one thing must be made clear: that once the transition starts, the forces are unleashed that challenge the old order – the modernity in its nation-state and homogenous culture components. The transition to a new form of economic production will be accompanied by changes in the political apparatus and the nature of collective action. Economic liberalisation and the impact of globalisation open new venues for political establishments, for the shaping of individual needs and identities and the organisation of collective action. As the role of the state declines and the state ceases to be the sole power in the political arena, it is met by multinational, supranational and subnational forces and class ceases to represent the demands of the society for social change.

To summarize, we can say that the old, organised capitalist system characterised by the heavy industrial core of the motor, chemicals, electronic and steel industries is being challenged and significantly undermined by the growth of finance, property, service, knowledge and Research and Development functions. Thus, a new core is replacing the old industrial core, which gathers around information, communications and other services like telecommunications, tourism and leisure. Daniel Bell characterises the post-industrial society as “knowledge and

innovation serving as the strategic and transforming resources of the society, just as capital and labour had been in earlier industrial society".³²

POST-MODERN CULTURE AND IDENTITY

In the post-modern stage, the unifying ideology of the nation-state with its focus on economic growth and prosperity is being questioned. This questioning involves dissolution of the hegemonic culture of the modern period, leading to the proliferation of culture and identity issues.

The post-modern environment locates the individual at its centre while in modernity, individuals were seen as members of an entity, of a whole. As a result of the achievements of modernity itself, such as mass culture, increasing educational levels and generalisation of citizens' rights, individuals in post-modernity are the main components or subjects of society. Inglehart links the spread of post-modern culture and values emphasising individual self-expression and quality of life concerns to the economic development achieved in the modern period.³³ The main concern of the industrial era – that of existential security and survival - is attained in the contemporary Western societies and people take their survival for granted. This leads to the post-modern shift from emphasis on coping with survival to maximizing subjective well-being.³⁴

One of the main characteristics of the post-industrial society is not only the change in production pattern, but also the change about what is actually produced. Some writers go as far as to suggest that what is now produced is not material products anymore but rather signs – either those of informational goods like know-how or post-modern goods like music, cinema, leisure, magazines, and videos.³⁵ This seems like an exaggerated and rather a utopic idea as industrial production still continues and material goods are still produced. However, there is some truth in this

approach in the sense that non-industrial goods are widely produced and consumed and they are produced to fit more specifically into individual development and personal needs. Melucci names the basic antagonism of the post-modern context, as concerning “the way development is conceived and identities and needs are defined... Production is no longer making goods, instead it has come to mean controlling complex systems of information, symbols and social relations”.³⁶

The rise of identity politics, the increasing discourse in culture and identity, is one of the main features of this developing new global order. Castells characterises this closely with technological development:

In a world of global flows of wealth, power and images the search for identity, collective or individual ascribed or constructed becomes the fundamental source of social meaning. This is not a new trend, since identity has been at the roots of meaning since the dawn of human society. Yet, identity is becoming the main and sometimes the only source of meaning in a historical period characterised by destructuring of organisations, delegitimation of institutions, fading away of major social movements and ephemeral cultural expressions. People increasingly organise their meaning not around what they do but on the basis of what they are or believe they are. Meanwhile, on the other hand, global networks of instrumental exchanges selectively switch on and off individuals, groups, regions and even countries according to their relevance in fulfilling the goals processed in the network, in a relentless flow of strategic decisions. It follows a fundamental split between abstract, universal instrumentalism and historically rooted particularistic identities.³⁷

A definition of identity and what is meant by identity politics should be provided here. Calhoun writes that:

We know of no people without names, no languages or cultures in which some manner of distinctions between self and other, we and they are not made... Self-knowledge – always a construction no matter how much it feels like a discovery – is never altogether separable from claims to be known in specific ways by others.³⁸

As identity is formed in a continuous interaction with others; many factors in the society have an impact on how we and others define ourselves/us. With the advent of post-modernity how we categorize ourselves and others is no longer focused on employment and work, but rather on the production of symbols and meanings of social interaction. The main antagonism has therefore shifted to how this meaning and social codes are produced and by whom. Thus, the social movements of the contemporary period, the New Social Movements, strive to transform the dominant political cultures, the meanings and norms that are developed

outside their control and challenge the dominant groups that determine these codes in the society.

COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS DEBATE

If class movements are associated with modernity, the New Social Movements (NSMs) are associated with post-modernity.³⁹ This is a widely held but also widely contested issue. The popular movements that are taken into the scope of the NSMs, like the peace, environmentalist and women's movements, have generally rather long histories, with the possible exception of the ecology movements, and they all carry a strong continuity with earlier civilization-critical movements.⁴⁰ However, the 'newness' of these movements can be seen in their focus on new individualities and cultural proliferation as well as in their cross-class membership profile. In the sense that they are addressing the post-materialist themes, like the "new risks" such as environmental pollution and the threat of nuclear war⁴¹ as well as the rights of women and homosexuals, these movements introduce a "new" aspect to the social movement context. But going beyond that, the NSMs introduce a strong critical approach to the politics and the political culture of the countries in which they operate. Koopmans has argued that the essence of NSMs "does not lie so much in the new *way* of conducting politics but rather in the fact that they reflect the rise of new *themes* and new *actors* on the political stage".⁴² In addition to bringing new themes (based on a critique of modernity) and new actors (the new middle classes and the counter élite) the challenge NSMs pose to the political culture and the political system in which they operate also signify elements where their main novelty resides. It is true that NSMs raise new themes with the incorporation of the new work force into the economy with mass education policies, mass employment opportunities and the high levels of social mobilisation this brought in the post-

World War II period. In addition to this, they are significant because they bring the “conduct of politics” into question. They challenge the modernity that constitutes the basis of the present political order and the role of the élite in defining the homogenous culture and modernity. In this sense they are generally considered as the products of “post-modernity”.

To summarize the basic features of the NSMs, we can say that they advocate a new social paradigm, which contrasts with the dominant goal structure of Western industrial societies. They generally question the emphasis on economic growth and materialism that is prevalent in industrial societies. Instead they advocate greater attention to the cultural and ‘quality of life’ issues that have received less attention in the post-War rush to affluence. They are advocating universalistic moral concerns, away from using institutionalised politics for instrumentalist concerns. They strongly challenge the nature of the corporatist-bureaucratic state, and are highly suspicious about the established élite and state apparatus. The legitimacy of this élite is challenged by the claim that it does not represent the population as a whole. They further reject its claim of integrity, morality and ability to address the critical issues the societies are facing. NSMs generally use alternative methods in their campaigns, rather than the conventional forms of party politics and they usually combine their activities with leisure activities and present a real ‘counter-cultural context’ to that of the established politics.

Until the 1970s social movements were simply seen to be the side effects of modernity. They were either rejected as not having a valid claim on governance or they were perceived as anomalies and simple rejections of a modern life.⁴³ Commonly, a socio-psychological line of reasoning was applied: uprooted and lonely, economically vulnerable individuals, were seen as the members and main supporters of these movements.

- The changing nature of the social movements from being based on production and employment to culture and identity has been reflected in the changing approach to discourse. In the recent literature, NSMs attract popular attention. The recent and the now widespread approach to the study of the NSMs is the 'identity-formation' argument.⁴⁴ Although the argument varies from author to author, the basic premise of this approach is that we never view events directly as they are but through our intellectual prisms (our lenses) composed of our presumptions about our society and ourselves. The prisms give our observations meaning, shape our emotions and determine our political approaches to events. However tolerant and open minded we might think ourselves, we can never escape our cultural prisms when reviewing social happenings. Thus, cultural assumptions are constantly influencing our understanding of things and our exercise of power. The ability of the non-élites to redefine their identities and free themselves from the limitations of an élite designed homogenous nation-state culture and identity is the starting point in the study of the NSMs. People coming together in the movement structures contribute to the movement with their different opinions and reshape its structure in a continuous fashion in cases where intra-movement democracy exists. Most of these movements create extensive 'communication networks'⁴⁵ like bookstores, radio programmes, workshops, and magazines. Through the media, movements often successfully radiate their ideas throughout the society and encourage new ideas, different from those of the élite. Thus, social movements not only reflect popular culture but also produce and shape it.

The NSMs focus on the inevitability of inequalities in every society and the attempt of élites to legitimise these inequalities by talking about the advantages of the status quo and the dangers of the alternatives. According to the identity-formation theorists, despite an élite's efforts to shape the thinking of the society – the

non-élite – through the educational curricula and government's influence, repeatedly questions the élite's definition of reality in both daily expressions of popular culture, in cafés and teahouses, as well as in the organised social movement. This is what Terry Eagleton terms the "culture wars", going on in contemporary societies that are "no longer simply a battle of definitions but a global conflict."⁴⁶

To summarize the developments since 1970s, what we see in the economic sphere has been the breaking down of the industrial capitalist production based on Fordist production scheme with the globalisation of markets and the spread of transnational capital. Politically this has mainly resulted in the increasing questioning of the role of the nation-state, and its decreasing role in the economic sphere, despite its persistence as the main political actor in the arena. Class identity has ceased to be the main hegemonic identity. Particularly with the decreasing hegemonic identity, proliferation of different identities has been an important factor. New Social Movements have replaced class movements as a new type of collective action in this post-modern period.

THE MIDDLE EASTERN EXPERIENCE

In the above section, the developments in the West regarding the collective action in the light of the modernity - post-modernity debate have been discussed. The basic economic and political structures as well as the basic identity and collective action features have been drawn for both the modern and the post-modern periods. The aim of this section is to look at this debate in relation to the Middle East⁴⁷ and try to find out how, if at all, this theoretical framework that has grown out of the Western socio-political experience works within the Middle East. This is a non-Western region that has economic, political and cultural dynamics distinct from those of the West. At the same time it also embarked upon the modernisation process and policies of state-led

capitalist industrialisation and later economic liberalisation. Rather than the NSMs, it witnessed the growth of Islamist movements as the main representative of collective action in the region since the 1970s.

Modernity arrived in the Middle East as an 'imported project' and was often applied by the élite of the country in a top-down fashion in a drive to catch up with the growing power of the Western countries. "Social engineering" became the main task of the new regimes – the modernising élite of the countries – that saw the state as composed of different agencies that would help to build the societies that they had designed.⁴⁸ This intended "modernization project" has often taken a form where the basic institutions mimicking the Western experience were established without having the historical, economic and social roots. With the advent of these modern Western type institutions, the élites of the Middle Eastern countries thought that traditional ties would weaken, the role of religion would decrease and the countries of the region would embrace modernity despite the late incorporation to the modern world.⁴⁹ The ethnic and cultural issues were generally neglected and seen as a part of the traditional society that would 'pass away', with the modernization of society.

For the Middle Eastern countries, like others that implemented modernisation from above, the modernization meant the combination of the three important processes of capitalist industrialisation, consolidation of the nation-state structure and the homogenisation of cultural identities. How modernity has been 'implemented', rather than 'imposed', on the societies of the region and what political identity and collective action results it conveyed will be the main subject of the next section.

THE BUILDING UP OF STATE-LED CAPITALIST INDUSTRIALISATION

The Middle East entered the world capitalist economic system quite late, mainly as an exporter of raw materials. By the beginning of the 19th century most of the Middle Eastern territory was under Ottoman control, at least nominally. As the power of the Ottoman Empire began to decline during the 19th century, the French and the British intensified their competition for influence and colonies in the region. It was also mainly by the 19th century that most of the Middle Eastern markets were penetrated by European industrial goods, especially textiles and iron goods. Soon, producing raw materials for the factories of Europe, especially cotton, became the main economic activity in the region, which served to sustain the flow of these new imports. Transformation of the agriculturally dominated economy from subsistence to export-oriented cash crops integrated the Middle Eastern economies in a peripheral status to the world economic system. This led to the emergence of a new class of commercial mediators, as well as political groups acting as agents of colonial powers in these territories. Thus, during the period of 1920-1948, European colonialism reigned in the whole of the Arab world, generally through protectorates and the mandate system, while Turkey had become an independent Republic from 1923 onwards.

As the territories of the Middle East gained independence as nation-states,⁵⁰ the nation-building process kept the rulers of these countries preoccupied. The colonial powers left behind political structures that were based on the European models controlled by monarchical and traditional élites. The main concern of these élites was to maintain their positions and current relations with the former colonial powers. The anti-colonialist/nationalist movements challenged the power of this élite by using the existing structures. However, when this failed to dislodge the élite, impatient young officers in various Arab armies seized power,⁵¹ and thus “ending the

brief existence of semi-liberal parliamentary institutions in some countries and destroying traditional despotic monarchies in others".⁵²

Most of these new regimes embarked upon ambitious modernization projects that aimed at gaining economic independence and catching up with the European powers. One of the main points of reference of these new populist regimes was that the state was economically backward. It was predominantly producing agricultural commodities, and its integration into the world markets as an agrarian economy was the main factor in keeping it underdeveloped.⁵³ The private sector, or what was left out of it after the foreign connection declined, was seen as financially weak and unable to take on the role as a motor in the economic development necessary for the modernization project to succeed. This sector was involved in commerce rather than industrial investment and tended to seek short-term profits rather than the long-term commitments needed for the overall development effort. The domestic commercial and the business bourgeoisie were closely linked to the landowning class and were seen to lack the independent, entrepreneurial perspective. They were caught in two pre-capitalist relations; one was "the paternalistic relations associated with nomadism, pastoralism, subsistence agriculture and semi-feudal relations [...] the other one was the dependence of the Arab bourgeoisie on the protection of the foreign bourgeoisie".⁵⁴

Lack of entrepreneurship as well as the lack of middle classes is commonly cited as one of the main peculiarities of the region. However, these are characteristics that come with late development. In cases where the bourgeoisie was weak and the need for rapid accumulation of capital and subsequent development was high, it was the state that took on the tasks of industrialising the country, raising productivity and redistributing wealth. The aim of the economic sector in these countries was not merely the making of profits. Rather it was concerned with job

creation, production of cheap goods for immediate needs, development of poor and rural areas and achievement of self-sufficiency in production of goods.⁵⁵ The Middle Eastern policies of this period seem to follow the basic premises of the Keynesian economy and the Fordist production pattern in line with the Western practice of the time.

Ayubi writes with reference to Gerschenkron that the later a country is in its economic development, the larger the role of the state is likely to be in trying to promote development.⁵⁶ The differences between the countries that gained their independence before the Second World War and the ones that gained it after the War supports this argument. While the former countries seem to have developed a national bourgeoisie and to some extent have accumulated capital, the latter put the state apparatus more directly into the centre of the production and accumulation process as well as the dependence of the national bourgeoisie and the work force on the state.

Within the capitalist industrialisation effort, the main strategy used for the development of the national economies of the Middle East was import substitution industrialisation (ISI). The main aim behind this policy was to substitute the formerly imported goods with goods manufactured domestically. By this way the countries that had previously been dependent on single cash crops could break away the dependence on the international markets and the unfair terms of trade. In time, they could develop domestic industries to a level of international competitiveness. Diversification of the economies could be attained and profits could be re-invested to sustain economic development. During the first phase or the “easy” stage of ISI, the state starts with the domestic manufacture of non-durable consumer goods such as clothing, shoes and household goods and of their inputs, such as textile fabrics, leather and wood. These products are believed to suit the conditions existing in

developing countries at the initial stage of the industrialisation process, since they are intensive in unskilled labour, and costs do not rise substantially at lower output levels. Production does not involve the use of sophisticated technology and a network of suppliers of parts, components and accessories are not required for efficient operations.⁵⁷ By setting up new factories and mass production of goods, the state was providing employment for the population and building long-term employment patterns for the newly rising workforce. The reason for this phase of ISI being called as the “easy phase” is because of the relative advantages of the developing countries in the production of these commodities and the availability of resources to produce these goods.⁵⁸ It is thought that as production of these goods increases, the initially infant industries will develop and in time will help to create the backward linkages that will lead to the creation of new enterprises and production diversification. However, before the economies of scale and competitiveness are attained, those industries had to be protected from international competition. Therefore, high tariff walls and quotas were set up around the national economies to protect the national industry.

Economically, the capitalist industrialisation component of modernity was being formed through the ISI policies. The difference of the Middle Eastern case from that of the West is that capitalist industrialisation here came as a project initiated by the state from above, without having indigenous roots in the political economy of the societies. Thus, indigenous capitalism began in the region with the state ownership of the means of production and the workers being state employees.

THE COLONIAL LEGACY AND THE NATION-STATE

In the West, the advent of capitalism and modernity was accompanied by the nation-state as its political institution while in the Middle East; nation-states were formed as

these territories gained independence. As seen above regarding capitalism, the Middle Eastern nation-state did not evolve as a natural outcome of socio-economic and political developments or cultural and intellectual debate in the society as it did in the West; again it was imported, if not directly installed by the colonial powers of the West. The borders of most of these countries were drawn by the colonial powers, which made the nation-state a further contested and artificial phenomenon in the region.

In most Middle Eastern examples, being an imported project, the nation-state generally lacked both the infrastructural power that would help it to penetrate into the society effectively, for example through taxation, and the ideological hegemony that would help it form a strong bloc of alliances that legitimised its rule.⁵⁹ Its lack of infrastructural power and ideological hegemony led some to name it as the 'quasi-state',⁶⁰ or the 'hybrid creature'.⁶¹ The availability of excessive rent in the region contributed to the 'lack of infrastructural power', as the state did not need any taxation revenues from its citizens. For example, the rent from oil, tourism and the Suez Canal in the case of Egypt accrued directly to the state budget, and generally to the hands of the rulers, and most of the time enabled the regime to distribute some of this rent as subsidies to its citizens, helping to legitimise the role of the nation-state in the society. The economic benefits provided by the state became one of the most important tools in 'gaining' legitimacy for the regime. In addition to the lack of taxation and the provision of subsidies, state employment also played an important role in the building up of support for the regime, as well as creating a new group of supporters upon which the state itself rested.

One of the most important impacts of the modernisation process on the state mechanism has been the growth of the bureaucracy and the creation of a "bureaucratic-bourgeois" state.⁶² Bureaucratisation has been a tendency of all

modernizing countries and the Middle East proved to be no exception here. Ayubi identifies two dimensions to this bureaucratisation: first he refers to bureaucratic growth; the increase in the numbers of administrative units and personnel, and the increase in public spending especially on wages and salaries. The second aspect is “the orientation whereby the technical and the administrative dominate over the social. [...] It is a tendency that goes very much in the direction of centralisation, hierarchy and control”.⁶³ The public sector became the main source of employment in the region as large numbers of people were employed by the state as labourers, civil servants and managers of public industrial plants and firms. In Egypt the number of people employed by the state constituted almost half of the non-agricultural workforce by the 1980s.⁶⁴ This second aspect can be seen as contributing to the authoritarian character of the state, which will be discussed below. While the state on the one hand was trying to prevent any struggle of classes, by incorporating a populist discourse and corporatist policies, it was on the other hand “creating” a bureaucracy that would not only be “fulfilling the conventional law and order functions but also to be involved in industry, trade, education, culture and so on”.⁶⁵ In time the bureaucracy developed vested interests and became a class in itself, accumulating wealth through the “control” of the means of production and the power that it had in the state apparatus. It soon became the leading socio-economic force in these countries.

Despite the nationalisation policies and the related replacement of the pre-populist period wealthy groups like land-owners and trading élite, the private sector was never abolished in the region. It rather adapted to the new situation, made use of new opportunities for cooperation with the state and grew under its protection. The link between the state and the bourgeois sections of the society worked for the betterment of both parts. While the industrial projects were encouraged and

supported with state credits and favourable terms for tax evasions, the state élite was getting the support of these sectors, building a constituency for itself. The industrialists became a support base for the state, especially in times when the state was not able to fulfil its distributive and welfare functions. Despite the efforts to build up a strong constituency in support of the regime, the role and the power of the leader of the state is enormous in the Middle East. Generally, the leaders of the countries enjoy long terms in office, if not life-time tenure and the relationship between the leader and the people forms the “backbone of the political system in a situation where political organisations are no more than tools for the mobilisation and recruitment for the sake of [...] populist democracy”.⁶⁶ Asked about the nature of the political system in his country, Bourguiba of Tunisia answered, “What system? I *am* the system”.⁶⁷

The nation-state in the Middle East was an imposed one, creating a homogenous identity around the themes of economic development and progress. This economic development via ISI constituted the basic source of legitimacy of the state. Despite its imposed and artificial nature, it managed to keep the elements of the society together, towards the target of reaching the level of Western development.

To summarise, the political structure that took form under this economic system of state-led capitalist industrialisation was the nation-state, despite its artificial and imposed nature and the clientalist and paternalistic structure that became dominant.

COLLECTIVE ACTION AND CLASS

‘Modernity’ in the Middle East followed the capitalist industrialisation and the nation-state components of Western experience. The collective action model within

this context could be expected to revolve around class. However, this was not in fact how identity and collective action developed in the Middle East. The main reason for this lies in the imposed version of modernity and the late-developer characteristic of the region.

In understanding why class is not the main determinant of collective action during the period of modernization in the Middle East, we can turn firstly to the articulation of modes of production. Although state-led capitalist industrialisation was the main economic pattern in the region, most of the former production patterns were retained as well. This made the horizontal class structure unclear as vertical stratification patterns persisted with it side by side. As discussed above, one of the characteristics of modernity was to bring the individual to the urban labour market, decreasing the importance of rural networks and of the loyalties in the countryside. Suffering from its location within a late-modernizing region, individuals were still embedded in different traditional networks in the Middle East, as well as becoming part of the modern ones.

As Bill and Leiden write:

Middle Eastern societies contain a kaleidoscopic array of overlapping and interlocking groups of constant flux. Individuals maintain membership in a large number of groups. In doing so, they build webs of personal connections that constitute the basic sinews of the social system... The social and political system resembles mosaics composed of a limitless criss-cross of groups.⁶⁸

In the Middle East the formal groups - associational and institutional groups - have not played the significant role that they played in the European system. One exception to this could be the Turkish case, where political parties played a dominant role and electoral politics became the centre of political activity, especially since the introduction of multi-party politics in 1946. However, even in the Turkish case formal groups other than political parties remained rather weak in the political structure. Informal groups dominate the main group structure of the region.

Personal ties based upon kinship, friendship, religious and regional affiliations have been among the best means of insuring effective individual effort.⁶⁹

Structure after structure - family, village, clan, class, sect, army, party, élite, state – turns out when narrowly looked at to be an ad hoc constellation of miniature systems of power, a cloud of unstable micro-politics, which compete, ally, gather strength and very soon overextended, fragmented again.⁷⁰

These informal ties are further reinforced by the incorporation of vertical corporatist structures. Corporatism was the main channel through which individuals were incorporated into the system. Populism and corporatism were the two significant features of the Middle Eastern state. Whereas the corporatist structure was more related to the politics of production and the interest representation related with production, populism was more related to politics of consumption, and the distributive character of the state. This combined function of the state, both as a producer and distributor at the same time, led some to name the Middle Eastern state as the “patron state”⁷¹ that managed to gather two distinct features during the post-independence period. As mentioned earlier corporatism rests on the assumption that society is not composed of individuals or groups that operate independently and in relation with each other according to a social contract but rather of a society composed of bodies of people that share distinct tasks and an internal solidarity. Vertical and functional are two key words regarding the corporatist system. The populist regimes in the Middle East were not content with mobilising a social base for their support but they also wanted to control this base and structure the relationship of support of different groups to the state. As the populist regimes were providing material and symbolic benefits for their citizens they also wanted to

fashion centrally controlled organisational structures to link their support groups directly into the state structures. The bulk of these organisations were formed on a sectoral and functional criteria, thereby fragmenting support groups into parallel primary organisational structures joined at the top by interlocking sectoral élites.⁷²

The modernisers of the countries generally worked to assimilate politics into economics and “call on the energies of the workers and the expertise of

technocrats while keeping the potential political demands of such classes and groups in check".⁷³ As O'Donnell writes, the aim of this corporatism was not the creation of a new society but rather 'organising' the popular sector by "means of its subordinate association with the populist state".⁷⁴

The experience of many European countries with corporatism in their post-War political systems was mentioned above. The main difference between the European and Middle Eastern exercise of corporatism is that horizontal stratifications were already present in Europe and the corporatist structures were incorporated by the élites that were accountable to their populations through a democratic system. It was mainly used as a tool for working classes to affect the policy-making in these countries and this was often resented by the counter forces – notably the business organisations and the centre-right parties. In the Middle East, the horizontal structures were overridden by vertical ones, if they were not missing altogether, and the rulers' accountability was highly questionable. In the drive to industrialise and modernise, the élite in the Middle East was aware of the importance of incorporating different segments of the society vertically, subordinating them to the state. Corporatism became an important tool for the control of different groups and interests in the society. In such a corporative system, "class" as the means for collective action could not develop.

In the corporatist Middle East order, the Party of the state, either a single or the dominant party, was acting as an intermediary between the state and the people organised around 'functional lines', like the civil servants, agricultural producers, industrial producers, women. In this corporatist system, people with different socio-economic backgrounds were gathered under these functional organisations, thus making the class struggle more impracticable. In a system where the poor rural tenant and the big land owner were incorporated on an equal basis in their relationship to the

state, talking about a class struggle as in the European sense seems more impossible. It was the main party that mediated between these functional groups and the state. The functional groups had representatives in the party that worked for the interests of their group. Thus, in this system any opposition to this mechanism of the mediation of the Party and the working of the system was perceived as an opposition against the state that had based its legitimacy on nationalist motifs. Opposition was considered as harmful for the fulfilling of the interests of the state and as something that should not be tolerated. The national struggle had provided a temporary respite from class antagonisms and provided the state with the opportunity to delegitimize class identity. Also, because the population knew that they were trying to develop from behind, lacking the advantages that the Europeans had had in the matter, national unity became more important for them.

Under the populist discourse, class struggle was made rather irrelevant as the state was claiming that it was representing all the socio-economic groups in the country. Class struggle was seen as harmful and the necessity of a unified nation, with no internal struggle, was emphasized for the effort to increase the wealth of the nation. Historical elements that underlined unity were included in the rhetoric of the rulers and unifying myths around patriotism were "created". As the state was representing all the citizens of the country, around the collective interest of progress and development, there was no need for other parties or political associations. Political mobilisation was limited to the state party mechanisms and all other ways were sacrificed for the common good of the people.

State capitalism and in some cases, state socialism made the individual dependent on the state, which offered him security and guaranteed his basic welfare needs. Employment in the industrial sector did not severe the working conditions of the individual against the accumulated wealth of the capitalist class. The antagonism

in the society was not clearly defined as between the bourgeoisie and proletariat in this case where both groups were dependent on the state mechanism, and where the bourgeoisie group was the state itself in most of the cases.

To summarise, we can say that until the 1970s, when the period of economic liberalisation started in the region, the modernisation process continued uninterrupted revolving around the goal of development and progress and the principles of state-led capitalist industrialisation, nation-state and vertical corporatist organisation revolving around the national unity theme were emphasized. The state played the main role in the economy, and collective action took place along corporatist lines.

ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION AND THE CALL FOR REFORM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Most of the Middle Eastern countries began facing difficulties in the capitalist industrialisation project as the 'easy phase' of the ISI gave way to the 'second stage' of producing consumer durables from late 1960s onwards. Economic growth declined coupled with high inflation and huge budget deficits. Unemployment became an important problem as the technologies employed in industry were increasingly capital intensive and could not answer the employment needs of the society. As Ayubi writes, facing the increasing inefficiency in their economies, the developing countries were faced with the dilemma of choosing between development and welfare. However, the rent in the region from hydrocarbon industries, especially after the oil price increase in the 1970s led to availability of funds, and eased the urgency of this dilemma. Most of the governments have had the opportunity to pursue both development and welfare, with varying degrees of credibility, up until the present. As the legitimacy of the regimes depended to a great extent on the economic power and the distributional capabilities of the states, cutting down on the welfare would have threatened the survival of the regime. The economic crisis

stemming from the inability of the state to successfully industrialise the country, brought a need to open the economy for an increased commercial activity that could make up for losses in the state-dominated industrial sector. As the state had ceased to be an engine of growth, and the state élite were looking for a solution to broaden their base of support, early attempts of selective liberalisations in the region started to take shape.⁷⁵ Thus, the calls for changing the system came as a remedy to the failures of the economic development as well as the desire of the élite to broaden their support base in the face of an economic decline. Rather than a response to the technological revolution and the new stage of economic production that this had necessitated, as in the European case, reforms were made in the Middle East mainly to make up for the losses that the economies faced. From mid-1970s onwards, selective liberalisations began in the economies of the region, despite the differences in the timing and the extent of these reforms.

The attempt to change the economy as a remedy to the losses coincided with an emerging consensus on liberal economic principles in the Western world. Re-establishing the free market mechanisms became the prescribed remedy for getting the state-dominated economies back on track. According to this new approach, the so-called Washington consensus, the government intervention in the economy should be gradually reduced in order to make the productive private sector the main actor in the economy.⁷⁶ The aim was to transform the protected and increasingly inefficient economies into Western style market economy, incorporated into the global market. The statement: "in settling matters of resource allocation, imperfect markets are better than the imperfect states",⁷⁷ sums up the fundamental message of economic liberalism. Programmes either under IMF supervision or independent of but nonetheless inspired by it were implemented in the economies of the region to get them in balance.

As the countries of the region started to embark on liberalisation policies, economic forces of globalisation had been penetrating into the region. Transnational companies, foreign direct investment, as well as information and technological developments were arriving in the Middle East, despite at a slower pace than in the rest of the world. The 1980s witnessed not only liberalisation measures in the Middle Eastern economies, but also the globalisation process penetrating the region.

With the impact of the selective liberalisation policies, the already contested nation-state was becoming less relevant as a political organisation and losing its legitimacy. This is because it was denying the responsibility of providing benefits and welfare for its citizens, the two themes that it had built its legitimacy on during the 1950s and 60s. Faced with the inability of the state to provide, the citizens were now looking for new reassurances and new institutions as well as new ideologies and political discourses to represent themselves and deliver the wealth and progress that the state failed to fulfil. The idea was widely held that economic liberalization would lead to political liberalization and the chances of the Middle Eastern states to open themselves to liberal democracy, at a time when the citizens started to look for alternatives to the existing political system was growing. Economic liberalization leading to a political liberalization proved to be an optimistic and misleading idea for the Middle Eastern region as the economic liberalization itself remained as a cosmetic measure. The real problems and the urgent need for a genuine restructuring of the economic system were not addressed. This was also closely related with the increasing urge on the side of the élites to protect their interests in the domestic market under current conditions. On the contrary to political liberalisation, the change came towards further growth of authoritarianism and repression in the region. Rather than the weakening of the state apparatus and the increasing platforms for challenging the state

authority, as happened in the Western context, the state was becoming more and more repressive, ruling “through a sustained pattern of force and fear: by the infliction of bodily harm and through immobilising threat of violence”⁷⁸ in the Middle East. Despite limited political liberalisation that gave positive signals of opening up and democracy hopes in the region in late 80s and early 90s, these experiences were rather short-lived. By initially opening the channels of participation partially for a short period of time, the state managed to silence the opposition and further its interests in the economic aspects of liberalisation.

The reasons for the growing authoritarianism in the region are several. But most significant of all within the context drawn here relates to the consequences of the selective measures of economic liberalisation. The ruling élite saw the potential of instability that the economic liberalisation policies might lead to. Despite a small group of winners – mainly the new bourgeoisie – that benefited from the liberalisations, large segments of the population were negatively affected from the cuts in subsidies, the lift of guaranteed state jobs and the increasing competition in an open market economy. In the West, the development of market based capitalism rested on the separation of politics from economics; the state served the market by providing the necessary framework through regulations, while limiting its involvement in the working of the market forces. In the Middle East the state mainly served itself, both in its own reproduction and the interests of the bureaucrats – as a state class. The selective economic liberalisation created new opportunities for the bureaucratic state class, but it also threatened the state’s capacity to reproduce itself by diminishing its economic power and reach. For the regime to benefit, it had to reinforce coercive aspects of political power to compensate for the loss of economic reach as well as the loss of legitimacy.⁷⁹ The selective economic liberalisation had thus contributed to increasing rather than decreasing the authoritarianism in the

- Middle East and proved the assumption of economic liberalisation leading to political liberalisation wrong for the region.

COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST – ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS

As the states of the region began to implement their rather selective economic liberalisation policies, corporatist structures were already making collective action through them difficult. This period of selective economic liberalisation would be expected to lead to changes in the political and collective action themes. As the state-led capitalist industrialisation and its social benefits have been brought to an end, without a successful heir, a strong challenge to the existing system could be expected as a collective action theme. However, it could also be expected that the collective action to replace the corporatist structures in the Middle East would be different from those of the West as the region had been trying to find a remedy to the failure of the developmentalist project, lagging behind the post-modern stage, in which the NSMs of the West emerged. Also the political environment within which this collective action would take place is different compared to the West. Therefore, the form of organisation, type of activity and how the social movements contribute to the political developments would be different than the NSMs.

As culture and identity were the basis around which NSMs were formed in the West, it would seem reasonable to look at the prevailing cultural identity – Islam – as a potential source for a comparable phenomenon to that of the NSMs in the Middle East. Islam provides large portions of the populations of the Middle Eastern nation-states with a primary identity. It has traditionally been not just a cultural but also a political identity (e.g. the Caliphate) and thus might have an advantage over other less widespread and less politically-friendly identities in the Middle East.

From 1970s onwards, it was the Islamist movements that had taken over the collective action in the region. This is not to say that there are no NSMs in the Middle East. Surely, there are New Social Movements in these countries; however, they remain confined to a limited segment of these societies. The Islamist movements make up the main collective action in the region.

There seems to be a correspondence between the growth of New Social Movements in the West as a response to globalisation and transformation to a post-industrial stage on one hand, and the Islamist movements as a response to the collapse of the developmentalist project of the modernising state and the subsequent economic liberalisation on the other hand.

What kind of evidence exists whether Islamist movements could be understood from the New Social Movements perspective, as a response to modernity and the dominant élite will be analysed in the following chapters through the Turkish case in line with the theoretical framework drawn in this chapter. Islamist political parties as the most significant of the Islamist movements in the country will be analysed.

¹ Hans Haferkamp and Neil J. Smelser (eds.), Social Change and Modernity, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 15

² Ron Eyerman, "Modernity and Social Movements" in Hans Haferkamp and Neil J. Smelser (eds.), Social Change and Modernity, p. 37

³ Alain Touraine, "Two Interpretations of Contemporary Social Change" in Hans Haferkamp and Neil J. Smelser (eds.), Social Change and Modernity, p. 58

⁴ It should be mentioned here that what will be presented below is just one version of understanding historical developments belonging to a body of theory within the established literature. Historical developments could be seen from many perspectives and the approach that will be taken here is just one among many in understanding history.

⁵ Direct quote from Habermas, taken from Lucius Outlaw, "Lifeworlds, Modernity and Philosophical Praxis: Race, Ethnicity and Critical Social Theory" in Eliot Deutsch (ed.), Culture and Modernity – East-West Philosophical Perspectives, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), p. 22

⁶ Lucius Outlaw, "Lifeworlds, Modernity and Philosophical Praxis: Race, Ethnicity and Critical Social Theory", p. 22

⁷ Hans Haferkamp and Neil J. Smelser (eds.), Social Change and Modernity, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 8

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- ⁸ Ron Eyerman, "Modernity and Social Movements" in Hans Haferkamp and Neil J. Smelser (eds.), Social Change and Modernity p. 37
- ⁹ Johannes Berger, "The Future of Capitalism" in Haferkamp and Smelser (eds.), Social Change and Modernity, p. 243
- ¹⁰ Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 67
- ¹¹ Johannes Berger, "The Future of Capitalism", p. 243
- ¹² Ron Eyerman, "Modernity and Social Movements" in Hans Haferkamp and Neil J. Smelser (eds.), Social Change and Modernity p. 37
- ¹³ Richard Khuri, Freedom, Modernity and Islam – Toward a Creative Synthesis, (Syracuse University Press, 1998), p. xix
- ¹⁴ Ian Roxborough, Theories of Underdevelopment, (London: Macmillan, 1979).
- ¹⁵ Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other- Studies in Political Theory, (edited by Ciaron Cronin and Pablo De Greif), (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1998), p. 111
- ¹⁶ *ibid*, p. 113
- ¹⁷ *ibid*, p. 117
- ¹⁸ Zygmunt Bauman, "Modernity and Ambivalence", in Mike Featherstone (ed.), Global Culture, (London: Sage Publishing, 1990), p. 161
- ¹⁹ Direct quote taken from Ralph Miliband, Divided Societies – Class Struggle in Contemporary Capitalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 8
- ²⁰ Herbert Blumer, "Social Movements" in Alfred M. Lee (ed.), New Outline for the Principles of Sociology, (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1951), p. 199
- ²¹ Marx, "Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" in Marx and Engels Selected Works, Vol.1, Moscow, 1962, p.362-363
- ²² Philippe Schmitter, "Still a Century of Corporatism?" in Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds.), Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, (London: Sage, 1979), p. 13
- ²³ Stephen Crook, Jan Pakulski and Malcolm Waters, Post-modernization – Change in Advanced Society, (London: Sage Publishers, 1992), p. 119
- ²⁴ Paul Hirst and Graham Thomson Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 1
- ²⁵ *ibid*, p. 10-11
- ²⁶ *ibid*
- ²⁷ Direct quote of Anthony Giddens taken from Malcolm Waters, Globalisation, (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 4
- ²⁸ Malcolm Waters, Globalisation, p. 6
- ²⁹ Alan Scott, "Introduction – Globalization: Social Process or Political Rhetoric", in Alan Scott (ed.), Limits of Globalization, (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 7
- ³⁰ Ronal Inglehart, Modernization and Post-Modernization - Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Countries, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 22

³¹ ibid

³² Direct quote from William J Martin, The Global Information Society (Aldershot: Aslib Gower, 1995)

³³ Ronal Inglehart, Modernization and Post-modernization – Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Countries, p. 36

³⁴ ibid

³⁵ Scott Lash and John Urry, Economies of Signs and Space (London: Sage Publications, 1994), p. 4

³⁶ Alberto Melucci, Challenging Codes – Collective Action in the Information Age, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 100

³⁷ Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p.3

³⁸ Craig Calhoun, Social Theory and Politics of Identity, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 9-10

³⁹ Ron Eyerman, , “Modernity and Social Movements” in Hans Haferkamp and Neil J. Smelser (eds.), Social Change and Modernity, p. 40

⁴⁰ Ruud Koopmans, Democracy From Below- NSMs and the Political System in West Germany, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 11

⁴¹ See Ulrich Beck and his World Risk Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999).

⁴² Ruud Koopmans, Democracy From Below- NSMs and the Political System in West Germany, p. 12

⁴³ William Kornhauser emphasizes how certain types of movements unravel the social fabric and destroy desirable social arrangements. See Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, (New York: Free Press, 1959). Some of the other influential works stressing the possible negative effects of social movements include Hannah Arendt, On Totalitarianism, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951), Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements, (New York: Harper & Row, 1951).

⁴⁴ The identity formation argument is developed by a group of researchers from diverse disciplines including history, sociology, anthropology and political science. Some of the influential works include Sara Evans, Personal Politics: The Roots of Women’s Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left, (New York: Knopf, 1979), Alberto Melucci, The Nomads of the Present – Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society, (London: Hutchison Radius, 1989), Ernesto Laclau, “New Social Movements and the Plurality of the Social” in David Slater (ed.), New Social Movements and the State in Latin America, (Amsterdam: CEDLA, 1985), Alain Touraine, The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

⁴⁵ Alberto Melucci, “The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements”, Social Research, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1985, p. 798-800

⁴⁶ Terry Eagleton, The Idea of Culture, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p. 51

⁴⁷ When talking about the Middle East and the modernisation process, despite differences in the forms of state structures, I will be talking both about the monarchies and the Republics of the region.

⁴⁸ Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, 2nd. Edition, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), p. 174

⁴⁹ See Daniel Lerner’s The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernising the Middle East, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958) which is a classical analysis of modernisation theory.

⁵⁰ France withdrew from Syria and Lebanon in 1946. Britain withdrew from Palestine in 1948, in circumstances which led to the creation of Israel, amalgamation of the most of the remainder of Transjordan in the state of Jordan. In Egypt and Iraq the withdrawal of the British forces took place under treaty agreements; the treaty with Egypt led to the independence of Sudan. With these treaty agreements Britain gave Egypt and Iraq limited form of independence that provided them with freedom to conduct political affairs in return for the presence of British military bases in both countries and a foreign policy acceptable to Britain.

⁵¹ This was the case for Syria in 1949, Egypt in 1952, Iraq in 1958, Sudan in 1958, Yemen in 1962, Libya in 1969.

⁵² Nicholas S. Hopkins and Saad Eddin Ibrahim (eds.), Arab Society – Social Science Perspectives, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1985), p. 360

⁵³ Alan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, p. 174

⁵⁴ Nazih Ayubi directly quotes from Kazim Habib in Overstating the Arab State – Politics and Society in the Middle East, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), p. 180

⁵⁵ Richards and Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, p. 181

⁵⁶ *ibid*, p. 13

⁵⁷ Bela Balassa (ed.), The Newly Industrialised Countries in the World, (New York and Oxford: Pergamon, 1981), p. 6

⁵⁸ *ibid*

⁵⁹ Ayubi, Over-Stating the Arab State, p. 3

⁶⁰ *ibid*, p. 12

⁶¹ Charles Tripp, "Islam and the Secular Logic of State in the Middle East", in Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Anoushiravan. Ehteshami (eds.), Islamic Fundamentalism, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), p. 54

⁶² Emma Murphy, Economic and Political Change in Tunisia – From Bourguiba to Ben Ali, (Basingstone: Macmillan in Association with University of Durham, 1999), p. 21

⁶³ Nazih Ayubi, "Arab Bureaucracies: Expanding Size, Changing Roles", in Giacomo Luciani (ed.), The Arab State, (California: University of California Press, 1990), p. 129

⁶⁴ Richards and Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, p. 173

⁶⁵ *ibid*, p. 139

⁶⁶ Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, p. 204

⁶⁷ *ibid*

⁶⁸ James A. Bill, Carl Leiden, Politics in the Middle East, (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1984), p.74

⁶⁹ *ibid*, p. 80

⁷⁰ *ibid*, p. 78

⁷¹ Iliya Harik, "Privatisation: The Issue, the Prospects and the Fears" in Iliya Harik and Denis Sullivan (eds.), Privatisation and Liberalisation in the Middle East, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992)

⁷² Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, p. 207

⁷³ Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State, p. 207

⁷⁴ *ibid*

⁷⁵ Henri Barkey, "Introduction" in Henri Barkey (ed.), The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1992), p. 6

⁷⁶ Rodney Wilson, Economic Development in the Middle East, (London: Routledge, 1995)

⁷⁷ Christopher Colclough, "Structuralism vs. neo-Liberalism: An Introduction in States or Markets?" in Christopher Colclough and James Manor (eds.), Neo-Liberalism and the Development Policy Debate, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991)

⁷⁸ Jill Crystal, "Authoritarianism and Its Adversaries in the Arab World", World Politics 46, (January 1994), p. 267

⁷⁹ For a study on Egypt discussing how the state simply adopted itself to the new condition of free market in an authoritarian fashion see Eberhard Kienle, A Grand Delusion – Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt, (London: I.B Tauris, 2001).

CHAPTER 2

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS

This chapter is a survey of existing approaches to the study of Islamist movements, identifying the causal factors for revived popular support for political Islam in the second half of the 20th century. The existing body of literature draws attention to a number of possible causal factors which some might argue are mutually exclusive. The main idea here is to show that all the different causal factors can be linked within one explanatory narrative: that of the modernity and the emergence of the New Social Movements. Such an approach will avoid reductionist materialist explanations while incorporating the various aspects of socio-economic, political and cultural alienation from the post-independence modernising Middle Eastern state.

The common underlying ideology of the Islamist movements is their belief in establishing an Islamic state or order, where the Shari' a law can be implemented as the main guidance of society. The model designed by these movements is shaped around the 'sacred history' of the original community of believers established in Medina in the seventh century by Prophet Muhammad and his rightly guided caliphs. The followers of Islamist movements today strive to bring what they see as the basic characteristics of this original community into the contemporary societies. In this sense, all Islamist movements are modern as they try to reconstruct a system in the modern society "in accordance with political and ideological positions taken in relation to current issues and discourses".¹

When talking about Islamist movements, it is important to keep in mind that they are not a monolithic entity. Each group has its own structures, strategies,

policies and-discourse formed according to the socio-political conditions in which they operate. Keeping this divergence in mind, the aim of this chapter is to present a general analysis of the Islamist movements and draw the framework within which the Islamist political parties in Turkey will be studied in the following chapters.

Within the Islamist movements' discourse, man was created for a purpose - to embody the will of God by leading a righteous life and following the correct path. As man cannot live alone and cannot exist individually, building and maintaining a righteous community of the faithful and struggling to bring this order into society is the duty of every true Muslim. Islamist movements seem to alter Aristotle's concept of "man is a political animal" into "man is a religious animal";² seeing religion as encompassing all aspects of life, in the contemporary Middle Eastern context.

In order to understand the roots of Islamist movements, one has to go back to the 19th century reformist Muslim thinkers and their ideas that had a significant impact on contemporary movements. Reformist Muslim thinking was formed in the wake of European supremacy and expansion. It was during this period that Muslim religious leaders and politicians began to perceive their state of affairs as inferior to that of Europe and in a steady decline. Although the Muslim world suffered many defeats in its history against Europeans, it was in the 19th century that for the first time it was feeling weak and in decline and the need to borrow from its 'enemy' – the West. It was this painful awareness that made the Muslim world to think about the defects and the weaknesses that it was suffering from and search for ways for a remedy. Thus, on the one hand, reformist Muslim thinkers embarked on a policy of studying the pre-industrial phase of European civilisation, in order to trace ways of building a strong state and economy, while, on the other, they were searching for a viable cultural paradigm capable of checking the power of Europe. One of the first

reformists – the first Muslim scholar from the Middle East to visit France and study in Paris, Rifa ‘a al-Tahtawi, is noteworthy to mention here, mainly because he recognised the conflict between Islam as a pre-industrial culture and the demands placed upon it by the technological-scientific age.

The frustration of the early reformists with the status quo did not entail a – demonising of the West or even a rejection of modernisation per se. In their quest for progress, important Muslim reformists of the time like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Mohammad Abduh looked upon the West both as a model and as a rival. They perceived the challenge that the Umma or the Muslim community was facing, as embodied in a need to readjust their worldview to the realities of the approaching new age. Both al-Afghani and Abduh, with their ‘school of thought’ grew against a background of institutional changes and European expansionism and addressed themselves to the problems faced by the Muslims as a political community.³ Islam was given the role of a defensive weapon upon which an order to stop the deterioration and check the decline of the societies could be built upon. Demonising the ‘other’ and the theories of conspiracy were initiated by Rashid Rida and were affirmed later in the century by the Muslim Brotherhood. It was Rashid Rida that had more radical views about society as being corrupt and the heads of the states in the Arab world as apostates of Islam and shared the view about the implementation of Quranic punishments against these people. These three reformists desired to bring back the glory of Islam by embracing *ijtihad* (independent reasoning), rejecting the superstitions of popular religion and the stagnant thinking of the *ulama* (the learned men of religion). They aimed at “creating a synthesis of Islam and the modern West rather than a purified society constructed primarily along Islamist lines”.⁴

How to develop and get the strength back against the Western world seem to be the main focus of the 19th century reformists. Although they differ in their

proposals, either via militancy or internal reform within the system, the aim was to stand against intrusions of the West. Getting developed to the level of the West and borrowing from the West to fight against it became the main target; while to which degree to borrow and how much to 'modernise' became the major question. Adapting the Western technology and science and leaving behind the cultural factors became the main strategy of the Muslim reformist thinkers and ideologues in different countries. At the same time, another group – that of Westernised intellectuals – was emerging in these countries that sought to adapt all elements of Western 'modernity', including cultural aspects, in an attempt to develop their countries. As the countries started to gain independence, it was generally these two conflicting tendencies – the Muslim reformism and secular modernism – that struggled to give shape to the future of the countries.

The Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928 in Egypt is given as one of the first examples of Islamist movements in modern sense. The Egyptian case is widely studied within the Islamist movements' research not only because of its long history, but also because of the influential ideology it developed and its changing relations with the state authority in different phases of the modernisation process. One of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, was especially influential in affecting the discourse both in Egypt and in other countries with his writings. According to Qutb, the countries of the region that claim to be Muslim, are not really Muslim and they do not stem from Islam, but from the *jahiliyya* – the state of ignorance or barbarity which was seen in pre-Muslim Arabia, before Prophet Mohammed in the seventh century. To get rid of the *jahiliyya*, one must stop governance by man and return to the governance of God. Only after that, a man can reach real Islam.⁵ These became one of the main discourses of the Islamist⁴

groups in the following years, especially of those that resorted to militant means to get rid of the 'corrupt' societies of their countries.

The 1970s witnessed an Islamic revival in terms of national politics throughout the region after a prolonged period during which secular modernist nationalisms had dominated the agendas of the modernising states. The Iranian Revolution of 1979, the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981 by members of a militant Islamist group and a decade later in 1991, the general elections in Algeria – the annulment of the election results by the military and the following civil war – increased both the public and the scholarly interest in Islamist movements. Many studies focused on the topic, searching for answers to the growth of Islamist movements. As Baker notes, "political realities have no ultimate causes nor deep structured keys that unlock their secrets"⁶ but the quest to study Islamist movements, especially the underlying reasons of their growth attracted the attention of many. Most studies recognised the multiplicity of the factors in the growth of the Islamist movements but generally they differed in the importance given to some of the factors against others in the analysis.

In the next sections, different approaches provided for analysing the reasons of Islamist movements is presented with their shortcomings. The inadequacies of existing understandings of Islamist movements will be shown by positing an alternative view that draws on the theories of the New Social Movements outlined in chapter one. In order to do this, firstly attention will be drawn to the range of analyses of Islamist movements.

ISLAMIC REVIVALISM AS A RESPONSE TO THE FAILURE OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

A significant number of scholars explain Islamist movements as a response to socio-economic developments. Economic development projects, which were generally

implemented with state-led capitalist industrialisation drives in the region, were mentioned in the previous chapter. The collapse of this economic order and the consequent mismanagement, poverty, large scale migration to cities, unemployment and the decline in the subsidies are studied in this approach as well as how different groups were affected from such a collapse. The failure of the state to provide economic prosperity to its citizens despite all the hope given in the post-independence regimes is shown as the main reason for the growth of Islamist movements. Within this framework, a significant amount of research has been conducted.

Looking at the members of Islamist groups and their socio-economic backgrounds constitutes a significant element of research within this analysis. The main conclusion of the research indicates that the lower and the lower middle classes were the main supporters of these movements as they were the worst affected segments from the failure of state developmentalist projects.

Saad Eddin Ibrahim is one of the prominent scholars who studied the background and class positions of the Islamist movement members. In an interview held with him in Cairo, he repeated his well-written position that Islamic revivalism is a lower and lower middle class phenomenon and is directly related with income and class positions.⁷ In his work written in 1980, Ibrahim gives the conclusions of a research conducted on two militant Islamist groups, their recruitment policies and the profiles of their members: Islamic Liberation Organisation (*Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Islami*), known in the Arab media as the *Jam 'at al-Fanniyya al-'askariyya*, (Technical Military Academy group), referred here as MA and the *Jama 'at al-Muslimin* (the Muslim Group), known in the Arab media as Repentance and Holy Flight (*al-Takfir w 'al Hijra*), referred here as RHF.⁸ The MA group had been involved in a failed attempt to take over the Military Technical Academy in 1974.

The RHF had kidnapped the former minister of religious affairs and demanded the release of its imprisoned members. As this demand was refused, the organisation killed the minister that led to a bloody confrontation between its members and the police, which left many people dead and wounded around the country.

The first point made in this study was regarding the recruitment mechanisms for these Islamist groups. Accordingly, both groups recruited followers from among students or recent university graduates. Three recruitment mechanisms were employed: kinship, friendship and worship. While the RHF relied heavily on kinship and friendship mechanisms, beginning to recruit members like the brothers and nephews, then enlisting their close friends and relatives, the MA group relied more on friendship and worship. Typically, the old members would observe the young worshippers in the college or neighbourhood mosque. If these young people appear highly religious, like the observance of the dawn prayer, they would be approached to attend the religious discussion after the regular prayers. It would be during these discussions that the potential members would be discovered, who was or could be politically conscious.⁹

The second point in the analysis focuses on the age of the members. Accordingly, the age of the 'militants' ranged from 17 to 26 at the time of joining the groups as a fully-fledged member. The average age for MA was 22, for RHF it was 24. Looking at their rural/urban background, the militants were noted as sharing rural and small town backgrounds and at the time of joining the organisation they were recent arrivals to the cities. Most of them came to big cities after their secondary education. Half of them were living by themselves or with roommates, but not with their parents. Ibrahim states that it is difficult to determine the class backgrounds of the militants. When the occupations of the fathers were considered, there was not much difference between the members of the two groups. About two

thirds of the fathers were government employees, mostly in the middle grades of civil service. Four members had fathers from high-level professional occupations: two university professors, one engineer and one pharmacist. Four had fathers who were small merchants, three had fathers who were small farmers and two had working class fathers. With regard to the education of the fathers, only seven (20 percent) had university education. 19 of them (59 percent) had intermediate education while seven fathers were illiterate. Considering the occupational and educational positions of the militants, 29 out of 34 were either university graduates or still students enrolled in the university. The remaining five were secondary school graduates. Occupationally, 16 of them (47 percent) were classifiable, the rest were students. 12 out of the working 16 were professionals employed by the government: five teachers, three engineers, two doctors and two agronomists. Three were self-employed: a pharmacist, a doctor and an accountant. One was working as a conductor for a bus company.

Commonly, a point made for the members of Islamist movement is that they are mostly students from science fields that are mainly concentrated on subjects dealing with or seeking for an absolute truth and not critical thinking as would be the case in social sciences. About the student members of the group, Ibrahim shows the science background of the members by saying that from the 18 members (53 percent), who are examined, all except one was studying in science departments of the universities that require very high grades to be admitted in Egypt. Accordingly, six were studying engineering, four medicine, three agricultural science, two pharmacy, two technical military science and one literature. Ibrahim concludes that the members of both groups were decidedly high in motivation and achievement. In another article, Ibrahim underlines the point that "contrary to the common stereotypes about the radical groups that they attract a number of 'misfits',

'marginals' and 'abnormals', our research has shown that Egyptian Islamists are model citizens, modern young representatives of the Egyptian population".¹⁰

From the above information, Ibrahim concludes, "It is not unsafe to conclude that most members of these groups are from middle or lower middle class backgrounds".¹¹ The class factor in all cases is emphasized as having something to do with the collective status incongruity like strong achievement motivation, with justified high aspiration, yet little economic and political opportunity. Accordingly, it is the middle and the lower middle classes that felt this incongruity most sharply. It is interesting to note that the characteristic features of the Islamist militants (i.e. those members of Islamist movements who play an active political or even paramilitary role) are quite similar to those that have joined the leftist movements in the earlier decades. The only difference of the Islamists from the leftists is their rural backgrounds, compared to the urban background of the leftists.

Writing about Tunisian Islamists, Susan Waltz reaches similar conclusions saying that cadres of the Islamist movements are filled up with young, highly educated people. According to Waltz, these people share common class backgrounds: they are young, having rural backgrounds and/or coming from petite bourgeoisie. The paternal occupations of the members are generally carpenters, mechanics and day labourers. An average Islamist militant's features are given as "young person, more than 20 years of age, born in one of the country's small communities, from the working class, or 'lower middle class', and having received a higher education "without his rising mobility having led him to repudiate his origins".¹² It is also noted as an important point that most of the members are recent comers to the cities, they are first generation immigrants.

Nazih Ayubi is a strong advocate of the socio-economic reasons for the rise of Islamist movements in the Middle East, especially the militant Islamist

movements of the 1970s and 80s. He made a detailed study of the al-Jihad group of Egypt that killed the President Sadat in 1981 and the socio-economic background of the members. Ayubi got similar results as Ibrahim, as the average age of the members was 28, most of them were born in the countryside but they were active in the cities, where they had come for university education.¹³ He writes that the Islamist movements are:

all manifestations of and a reaction to a development crisis in the Muslim part of the Third world [...] and they are almost all movements of the upwardly mobile, formally educated and recent urbanised youth [...] whose sense of 'relative deprivation' may explain much about their general anxiety and about the adaptation of religion as a goal-replacement mechanism.¹⁴

Tessler, while taking the socio-economic factors, as the main determinant of Islamist movements, concentrates on the 'alienation of the youth' in the Middle East with unfulfilled promises of the states.¹⁵ Accordingly, what came out of these unfulfilled promises are a web of disappointments and a crisis of frustration. As much as the expectations of youth from the state for upward mobility – jobs and increased social status – existed, the state had high expectations from the youth as well. The modernising élite thought of the youth as the future who constituted a critical mass that would reach adulthood within a few years and then by the virtue of its demographic, intellectual and political weight would provide a new centre of gravity and a foundation for progressive social engineering – the modernisation project – in the society. In the late 1950s and early 60s, the high proportion of young people in the society was seen as offering the opportunity to bring about rapid social and political change. However, the state started to face problems to absorb this 'critical mass' into the ranks of the political and economic system as the developmentalist policies started to show signs of accumulated problems.

Both employment and education became major problems in the region affecting the youth. Unemployment became a problem, as the countries of the region were not able to create jobs on a scale that was needed by the expanding population.

Poor economic performance and rapid population growth, culminating in large numbers of unemployed is seen as creating a suitable environment for the growth of Islamist movements. Among the urban poor, legions of young men, unable to find regular employment, spent most days on street corners or in coffee houses. In Algeria they are called "homeboys", boys from the neighbourhood, or "wall boys", unemployed youth having nothing to do and so "hang out" leaning against the walls that line many city streets – becoming ever more disillusioned and embittered.¹⁶ It was reported that by 1984, urban employment in Morocco was 18.4 percent with 44.9 percent of those having jobs being either unskilled or semiskilled labourers. The state was becoming more incapable of creating jobs for the population increasing rapidly – at a rate of 2.5 percent per year in Tunisia. The study also shows that there is as much as downward mobility in the jobs of the youth as there is upward mobility in comparing the jobs of fathers and sons. It was reported that 41 percent of the men between 16 and 19, who grew up and took primary education after independence, had jobs with lower status than their fathers, while 16 percent held better jobs. The point that most of the fathers did not have any education at all makes the results look worse. Although it can be argued against this view that the young people considered are still in the beginning of their careers and will have better positions in time, it is argued that Tunisian economy has not expanded rapidly to provide jobs that would provide upward mobility.¹⁷

The second disappointment of the youth, according to Tessler, was in the field of education. Although there was an increase in the number of students attending primary school, the growth at the higher levels was limited.¹⁸ Thus, the youth's "formidable desire for change has been overtaken by a profound dissatisfaction, a deep disappointment".¹⁹

Björn Olav Utvik also gives socio-economic factors an emphasis in the rise of the Islamist movements. Focusing on the economic opening policies and how it sharpens the already existing economic inequality in the Middle East, Utvik says that while the majority of the population saw their situation deteriorating for the last decades, they saw the increasing wealth of a small group in the upper echelons of the society. These groups had adhered to Islamist movements that were seen as the least corrupt and the least alienated to their societies and values. It was this sudden increase of economic disparities and poverty as a result of *infisah* (economic opening) that is seen as the main reason for the growth of the Islamist movements.²⁰

In the vast literature on the Iranian Revolution, the role of socio-economic development and its consequences for the Iranian society are mostly emphasized. Both Nikki Keddie and Henry Munson show rapid economic development followed by severe economic worsening as the main reason for the Iranian Revolution.²¹ The oil boom and the following bust, its impact on the Iranian economy and the wide spread grievances of various social groups are noted within this study. Abrahamian, in his study on Iran, looks at “the interaction between the political organisations and the social forces” and looks at the role of the social classes in the Revolution. He presents how the traditional middle class, the bazaaris and the clergy, as the only sectors of the society independent from the state became the focal point of the Revolution with their generous financial support and nation-wide organisational network.²² Fred Halliday in looking at the Iranian Revolution, in addition to citing other factors contributing to the revolution, notes, “The main reason why the revolution occurred was that conflicts generated in capitalist development intersected with resilient institutions and popular attitudes which resisted the transformation process”.²³

Nemat Guenena, while arguing about the rise of the Islamist movements, emphasises the concept of “social Islam” and its increasing role in the society.²⁴ As the state increasingly becomes inefficient in fulfilling basic functions, more room is left for the Islamist organisations to operate in the society. He says that together with the increase of violence, the 1990s witness an increase in social Islam – the birth of what Dennis Sullivan called the Private Voluntary Organisations.²⁵ Their birth goes back to the 1980s, but their proliferation is generally in the 1990s. Social Islam consists of a web of welfare services and developmental activities that have sprouted to fill the void caused by the government’s absence from the development process. On this issue, Ghassan Salamé argues that Islamist activism feeds on the government’s failure to live up to people’s expectations and the success of Islamist movements lies in their endeavour to deliver on the promises of the nationalist regimes.²⁶ Guenena argues that in Egypt, Islamist alternative is not popular because it is spiritually gratifying but because it offers concrete solutions to concrete problems. The beneficiaries of the services of the Islamist organisations perceive these services superior to not only the public ones but the private ones as well.

Emmanuel Sivan names these Islamist organizations as the backbone of the Islamist movements. They carry out the work of *da’wa* (cause), spreading the word and establishing a counter-society to propagate the movement's ideas, create support networks for members, and show that Islamic values can be fully implemented in the contemporary world.²⁷ Emphasizing the socio-economic conditions in facilitating Islamist movements and giving them the room to perform public jobs, Sivan notes that “the continued vigour of the Islamist associations is a consequence, above all, of the budgetary woes of most Middle Eastern countries following the decline in oil prices after 1985, a decline that had implications not just

for oil exporters but also for the poor countries, as Arab foreign aid dried up and employment for expatriate 'guest workers' dwindled".²⁸ He notes that

the revenue crisis helped the Islamists in two ways. First, regimes responded to this problem by breaking the unwritten covenant agreed to with their subjects in the 1950s and 1960s in which the subjects relinquished their claims to basic human and civil rights in return for the state undertaking to provide them with education and health care, employment, and subsidies for such necessities as [...] cooking gas, and transportation. The poorest and the young suffered these retrenchments the hardest.²⁹

Thus, the "retreating state" of the 1990s created disgruntled citizens in the region: university graduates are no longer assured of a government job; workers are barely able to make out a living, let alone save for a dowry and establish a family; or masses of recent rural migrants who lack such basics as shelter. All these groups provide a pool of possible recruits for the rapidly growing network of Islamist associations.³⁰

Related with this argument, Olivier Roy writes that the Islamists seem to be trapped in the society. They are seen as the by-products of economic development and modernisation. However, they "live precariously from menial jobs or remain unemployed in immigrant ghettos, with frustration inherent in an unattainable consumerist world".³¹ It is this frustration and 'rejection' that make Islamist discourse (i.e. the discourse of Islamist movements) more appealing for these masses.

This approach that looks at socio-economic factors as the main reason for the rise of the Islamist movements, shows well the collapse of the economic aspect of the modernisation project – the state-led capitalist industrialisation – and focuses on the economic mismanagement, poverty and the frustration resulting from the unfulfilled promises of progress and development. There is merit in this approach in the sense that it draws a correct picture of the Middle East: The developmentalist project collapsed and it collapsed to the detriment of a large majority, leaving them with a search for a new ideology, rather a "soul-searching", to replace the nationalist

project. However, this is a very "materialist" interpretation of causation. This approach does not take into account other factors, like the state ideology, legitimacy, lack of democracy and a working civil society as well as the growing political authoritarianism and cultural insecurity in the nation-state and the region in general. In addition to neglecting other factors that contribute to the growth of Islamist movements, this approach does not look at and question why the response to economic crisis is pronounced in Islamic terms but not in another discourse. Moreover, the modernisation project of the post-independence states was never just an economic project. It had the attributes of nation-building, which include cultural, spiritual and communitarian features. So, the failure of the modernisation project is more than simply the failure to come up with the economic goods. It is also about the failure to create strong relations between state and society and between the components of the society that would have created legitimacy and political stability.

Assuming that Islamist movements are becoming the most popular organizations with growing membership enrolment and the main opposition group in the countries they operate in because of increasing economic mismanagement and poverty brings with it the assumption that if the economy starts to develop and bring prosperity, then Islamist movements will fade away. However, as Johannes Jansen puts it, "Fundamentalism is not a protest against being poor. This approach does great honour to the intellectual influence of Marxism, but people do not turn fundamentalists because they are poor. Poverty cannot cause fundamentalism. Prosperity does not cure it."³²

Despite the shortcomings and limitations that this approach carries, socio-economic factors are still important that must be taken into account, contributing to the analysis of the movements. One still needs to question whether the Islamist movement would have been so strong in the region if the state had been successful in

its economic development project. In looking at the Islamist movements, socio-economic factors should constitute one of the components of the analysis, keeping its limitations in mind.

ISLAMIC REVIVALISM AS A RESPONSE TO STATE

Another approach to the study of Islamist movements focuses on the nature of the Middle Eastern state and the political system. Being closely related with the socio-economic approach told above, the political structures and shortcomings for a working democratic system constitute the main focus in this approach.

The artificiality of the nation-state in the Middle East and its imposed and imported nature was mentioned in the previous chapter. Ayubi's quote from Waddad Sharara reveal this point clearly:

There is nothing new about the state (i.e. the apparatus of domination) trying to confront social disintegration and to consolidate the society. What is historically specific in the case of the Arab state is that this state has not emerged as a result of an internal conflict that had divided the society and its blocs, enabling one of them to establish its dominance through a long process involving the actual condensation of contradictions in society [...] The State in our societies was, by contrast, born as an 'external' power, thus rendering it – together with its personnel, apparatuses and intellectuals – marginal in the literal sense. It has not succeeded in overcoming its marginality even at the peak of its dominance when it held the reins in government, political organisation, the means of production and official ideology. It has therefore faltered at the first shock, and the carefully erected façade has cracked open to reveal all manner of horrid monsters that many thought history had long since laid to rest.³³

Related with the arguments of failure of economic development, the fragile nature of the Middle Eastern state is mentioned in this context. The inability of the state to lay down a hegemonic ideology³⁴ to keep different segments of society together and get legitimate support is one of the explanations that is proposed by this approach for the growth of Islamist movements. As the legitimacy of the state rested on the economic progress in general, nation-state vastly lost its support base in the 1970s. Islamist movements increased their support base, in contrast to the state, during this period as they proposed to deliver what the state could not - not only economically but socially and ideologically as well. Islamist movements, or what

some might agree with Sharara to call them as the 'most horrid monsters', became the main opposition force against the state within this context.

The elements of the modernising state and the modernising élite are seen as contributing to the phenomena as they are resisted by the Islamist movements. Fred Halliday emphasises that "Islamism" is a response against the modernising state. He sees the core of the Islamist movements anchored in the quest to "resist the alien and the oppressive state, and through the tactics to maintain and obtain control of the state."³⁵

Islam was used as a source of legitimacy in the states' discourse during the nation-building process in the Middle East and this is shown as an important factor that contributes to the growth of the Islamist movements in this approach. In many cases in the Middle East, Islam was seen as a unifying ideology and a source of legitimacy by the state. The states chose to use Islamic symbols and rhetoric whenever it suited the conditions, and the unity of the society needed to be underlined. Nationalism and Islam went hand in hand in the state discourse in many cases. Even in secular countries like Turkey, Islam was used by the state to appeal to the masses and get the support of different groups, in addition to nationalism. Ironically, the Islamic rhetoric used by the state later became an independent source that challenged the state's power and understanding of Islam in the hands of the opposition. This is seen as a significant aspect of the growth of Islamist movements in the region in this perspective.

Charles Tripp writing within this approach argues that the main reason for the rise of Islamist movements and 'the social protest in the language of Islam' is the "dichotomy between the recent 'modern' state formation in Middle East, and its patrimonial state characteristics that are based on patron-client relations and the networks this creates."³⁶ Tripp emphasizes that the states of the Middle East are

“hybrid creatures” that are on the one hand largely modelled on the Western state tradition with territorially defined sovereignty, institutions to represent the sovereignty, constitutions, and bureaucracies and on the other hand shaped by the authoritarian structure that revolves around the personalisation of power. Accordingly, as a part of the nation-building process, the ruler and the ruling élite of the states will try to use some ideologies to maintain cohesion of the society and would deploy all ‘emotive’ themes to ‘authenticate’ and ‘indigenise’ their power. Islam generally took the role of this unifying ideology, according to Tripp. It was at this point of state definition and management of Islam that some of the conflicts began to manifest themselves. It was these conflicts that created a conducive environment for the Islamist movements to operate, both “ideationally and pragmatically”.³⁷ By using Islam for this purpose, they provide the opportunities for the ‘conscious’ Islamist groups to oppose its power and legitimacy and raise their voice in criticising its basics.³⁸

Aziz al-Azmeh notes that the states in the Middle East, especially Egypt and Algeria, made abundant use of populist demagoguery after the failure of the developmentalist efforts. In an attempt to win the popular support and increase government legitimacy, policies “allowing the media to be invaded by obscurantist language hostile to rationality and progress” were pursued. Thus, “just in a couple of years as it happened in Iraq, the nationalist discourse has been reformulated in the religious language”.³⁹ By allowing the Islamic discourse to occupy a central position in the public debate, the state itself created the conditions necessary for the triumph of the Islamist movements. Writing on the Egyptian case, Malika Zeghal presents how al-Azhar was used both by the Nasser and the Sadat governments to legitimise their actions.⁴⁰ Especially the support given to al-Azhar against the militant Islamist groups under Sadat increased the importance of this institution and contributed to

making it an important actor in social and political affairs. As al-Azhar began to cooperate with the state, the alternative preachers and religious figures that opposed the state's policies and therefore this cooperation activated the public debate with their sermons and preaching, Islamising the society from below. By letting the moderate Islamist institutions to operate freely as a countering force to militant groups, and legitimising them, the state itself contributed to the growth of Islamist movements in the country, according to Zeghal's analysis.

In contrast to the usage of Islam by the state, its lack from the state discourse is also noted as a factor in this phenomenon. Talking about the Turkish case, in contrast to the use of Islam by the state in increasing the Islamist movements, Şerif Mardin talks about the removal of Islam from the state discourse under the secularist policies of the reformers as a factor contributing to the Islamist movement in Turkey. Mardin writes that Turkish reforms by bringing secularism and carrying religion out of politics and the public space destroyed the unifying element among individuals and between the individuals and the state – Islam. This unifying element was again built with some religious orders (*tarikât*) and their networks, most important of which is the *Nur Tarikatı*. According to Mardin, *Nurculuk* (the ideas of the Nur Tarikat) is playing the role that the Republic could not accomplish in our time: linking the individual to the state, the unification of the individual with the state. According to Mardin, that is how we began to see the role of Islam in the society.⁴¹

The growing authoritarianism of the Middle Eastern state, as noted in the previous chapter, is also noted as an important factor contributing to the Islamist movements within the framework of this approach. Raymond William Baker notes, in line with this argument, that the authoritarian characteristic of the state lead to the creation of certain groups that see their future as different from that designed by the

state.⁴² Within this argument he looks at Islamist movement as one of the many organisations that strive to design a new future for Egypt, noting that it is the strongest one at the moment.⁴³ The limitations on organisational rights and lack of a working civil society as well as the increasing authoritarian nature of the state are noted as leaving little room for political opposition. As the state becomes authoritarian, the resentment against it increases but as the channels of opposition are limited and opposition in general is repressed, the only alternative is the Islamist movements. Islamist movements might not be the solution for everybody and its ideology not appealing for many people, but most of the time they are seen as the only party opposing the state and challenging its legitimacy. In Egypt, the leftist secular parties seem to ally with the state - the main threat for most of the citizens with its increasing authoritarianism - leaving the Islamist movements as the only opposition force.⁴⁴ Not only the decreasing power of the leftist ideology after the fall of the Soviet Union, but also the alliance with the state against the Islamists seem to decrease the power of the leftist parties, in Egypt.

In such an environment, it is argued that feeling alienated and having problems with socialising, the young people generally attended the mosques, on a regular basis where they met with the members of Islamist movements and were recruited into the ranks of these organisations. There is an agreement among scholars of this approach that the increase in the number of private mosques and independent preachers and imams contributes to the increase of members of Islamist organisations. Mosques are seen as an important component of the Islamist movements since they are serving as the meeting places of inclusive groups. Susan Waltz says that this is the result of lack of any other political participation channels. She argues that because political participation is blocked or limited the only channel

to discuss and form political opinions is through mosques that contribute to the increasing number of recruits.

Jansen also notes that in the “totalitarian societies of the Middle East, the only permitted social network, apart from family ties, is the mosque; the possibilities growing up of new intellectual, political or social movements that are not mosque related are extremely small. Hence the only movement with the capacity to grow is the Islamist movement.”⁴⁵

Talking about the social network formed by the Islamists in Algeria and how the newly arriving immigrants are integrated into the network, Rabia Bekkar is asked whether Islamist movements are becoming “a state within a state”.⁴⁶ As an individual arrived in the city, how the neighbourhood community helped in building a house, how the mosque network provided a community feeling is emphasized as well as the opportunity that this provides for FIS for coming in at this point and politicising these already existing networks. One of the successes of the Islamist groups is shown in their ability to form organisations and groups that emphasize solidarity and community and manage to provide for their members.⁴⁷

Despite pointing out an important aspect in understanding the growth of the Islamist movements, this approach analyses the Middle Eastern state independent of its economic and cultural aspects, neglecting the two important factors in the phenomenon.

ISLAMIC REVIVALISM AS A CULTURAL RESPONSE

Culture and identity became important factors in the analysis of the collective action and social movements, attracting wide scholarly attention in current literature as told in the previous chapter. This approach locates Islamist movements within this framework. In the study of Islamist movements, culture and identity issues come

into the analysis in two different ways. A group of scholars, that takes the 'clash of civilisations' as their main argument, focus on the rather unchanging 'characteristics of the Arab culture' and link the growth of the Islamist movements as the collective action in the region to the traits of an 'Arab mind'. The other group look at the Islamist phenomenon as shaped against the Western culture and values that were imposed on these societies first with the colonisation and later with the modernisation process. The second approach will be the main focus of this section; however, the first group and their ideas will also be shortly mentioned here.

THE NEO-ORIENTALIST APPROACH

The group that we can call here as the neo-Orientalists see the Islamist movements and their anti-Western discourse as stemming from the inherent characteristics of the society in the Middle East. Bernard Lewis sees in the core of these movements and their growth a mixture of "humiliation, envy and fear" against the growing power of the West. According to Lewis, the reaction of the Islamists go beyond any specific policies of their governments and is "no less than a clash of civilisations – perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present and the worldwide expansion of both."⁴⁸ Samuel Huntington writes that this clash occurs mainly because Islam is incompatible with the fundamental Western philosophical notions such as democracy and modernity.⁴⁹ Daniel Pipes writes that the combination of the attractiveness and the power of the Western culture with the historic rivalry between Islam and Christianity "lead the Muslims to fear it and fight it".⁵⁰

Cudsi and Dessouki seem to share the neo-Orientalist approach. They underline the theme of status quo in Muslims' understanding of history and analyse the Islamist movements through this theme. They write that for Muslims history

meant the struggle of building up a true Muslim society, which had culminated in the establishment of the first Muslim community under the Prophet Muhammad. After this was achieved, history had no more lessons to teach. If there was any change, it could only be for the worse and could be cured by renewing what had once existed. Whenever the Muslim society diverted – as with the introduction of modernity; secular leftist movements, and Western culture and values - struggle for renewing the old system would be needed. Thus, “the need for a renovator (*mujaddid*) has become the launching pad for revivalist movements.”⁵¹

I will not go into the details of this approach, as it is limited in understanding the dynamics of the Islamist movements. Rather than referring and trying to find answers in unchanging cultural characteristics positioned against the Western powers, studies that take into account the cultural response within the nation state shaped through the colonial experience, modernisation process and globalisation will be analysed below.

CULTURAL RESPONSE TO COLONIALISM

Colonialism is shown as one of the main factors whose legacy continues to affect the socio-political context of the Middle East and the contemporary Islamist movements. Cultural responses against colonialism, or what is perceived as its remnants in the post-colonial states, constitute an important aspect of this approach. Francois Burgat and William Dowell in their book on Islamist movements in North Africa present a good example of this approach. They see colonialism as the main factor in producing these movements and note that it is necessary to contextualise the Islamist movement not only in “the contradictions linked to post-independence’s rapid socio-economic development” but in the dialectical framework of colonisation/ decolonisation.⁵² They argue that

the South after having undertaken to disconnect its political future from the West (through independences) and then to win more autonomy in the management of its material sources (by nationalisations), it now turned towards the terrains of culture and ideology, domains previously conquered by the North and which now it seeks to reappropriate. Even if it is far from representing the outcome, Islamism, "the rocket of decolonisation's third stage" manifests the acceleration of the process by repositioning the South in relation to the North. And it is an essential step.⁵³

Burgat and Dowell note that the economic domination by the colonial powers of Northern Africa meant social destruction for these territories in the sense that when the economic logic of a society is disturbed, the social balance is affected as well. It was only when the economy and the social structures were profoundly damaged and the group's capacity to resist seriously weakened, that foreign penetration gradually took over the cultural sphere and extended its ability to dominate completely.⁵⁴ Now that these territories had built up an economic independence and their nation-state, it was time to declare their war of cultural independence and this is what the Islamist movements are doing in these territories.

Burgat and Dowell give the statement of Eddine Jouchi, one of the founders of the Islamist movement in Tunisia who reflects the position of the Islamist movements against colonialism and its continuity. Jouchi says that "there is nothing strange about one nation trying to take the other one. What is strange is the nation that is invaded accepts and blesses this occupation and puts all its energy into deepening it and helping it to take root."⁵⁵

Gilles Kepel writing within this approach in his analysis on Algeria notes that

France was denounced both for its pernicious influence which lasted beyond colonisation, the French occupation was seen above all as a policy of cultural Westernisation, marked by the spirit of the crusades, with the aim of destroying Islam and for the plots it was supposed to be continually hatching to combat the FIS as the incarnation of Islam. The legislative elections of 1991 were therefore presented as a battle between the party of the Arabic, Islamic civilisation which represents the majority of the people and the French Language party which had been in power since 1962.⁵⁶

In an attempt to show the position of the Islamist movement in Algeria against France and the Western culture that it symbolises, Kepel quotes from Ali Benhadj, the FIS's star preacher who says that "My father and my brothers may have

physically expelled the oppressor France from Algeria, but my struggle together with my brothers, using the weapons of faith is to banish France intellectually and ideologically and to have done with her supporters who drank her poisonous milk.”⁵⁷

Talking about the Algerian case, Marina Lazreg also emphasizes the decolonisation logic of the Islamist movements and link the phenomena into the colonisation/decolonisation context. Larzeg argues that the FIS (*Front Islamique du Salut*) intend to present itself with “the mission of relinking the society with its pre-colonial past, thus is forging a historical continuity that somehow bypasses the colonial era.”⁵⁸ The FIS is said to be ‘recolonising’ the cultural sphere of the society, just like the French did in the 19th century within their civilising mission, displacing local values and norms to suit their political purposes.⁵⁹ In trying to direct the socio-political evolution of Algeria through cultural recolonisation, the Islamist discourse centres on the colonial past, intends to erase it and promises a future that is not deemed colonial, according to Larzeg. The fact that Algeria is no longer a colony does not alter this view according to the author, since the present Algerian regime is seen as the continuation of the colonial rule. She argues that what is ironic in this case is that the Islamist discourse continues on the lines similar to those pursued by the colonial powers by privileging the cultural and the political over the social and the economic.⁶⁰ Lazreg argues that Islamism does not provide a solution to the issue of identity: It is less about identity and more about power politics, just like colonialism was less about ‘civilising mission’ than power.⁶¹ However, she still emphasises the attempts of FIS to try to create the feelings of “us” and “them” for the government, and create a sense of identity against its followers.

In this approach to Islamist movements, by emphasizing the legacy of the colonial rule, domestic developments, especially the process of the nation-state formation and how it failed, are rather not analysed. Why the Islamist movements

came to the political scene at the time that it did and not before is not answered. The colonial legacy is an important factor that is underlined by many analysts especially in the North Africa context where the impact of colonisation was much stronger when compared with the rest of the Middle East. It is a factor that should be taken into account when writing about the Islamist movements but other factors are necessary that help us explain why and how the Islamist movements were formed and strengthened at the certain period and not before that.

CULTURE AND THE MODERNISING STATE

The imposed nature of the modernising policies and the powerful modernising élite that adhere to “modern” principles and Western values are shown as elements that lead to the rise of Islamist movements in these countries.

Munir Shafiq underlines that there are two societies in the Arab world at the moment. The modernised, secular élite and the traditional or, what he calls, ‘original’ societies. Accordingly, the modernised segment of the society is installed by the West to divide the Arab unity and increase the dependence of the region on the West as a whole. Politically, systems of government are formed to imitate the Western powers and culturally, these modernised segments, in their lives imitate the West and are seen as being under the Western domination, in a relationship of subservience. It is the duality within the society that causes problems and the way to get rid of this dependence is to implement the values of the ‘original society’, the values of Islam.⁶²

Bassam Tibi argues that the reason behind the rise of the Islamist movements is “the structural integration of the Middle East into the global networks alien to domestic cultures”.⁶³ The imported project of modernity and especially its cultural and secular aspects that accompany the modernisation efforts lead some

groups to resent the Western ideas. Tibi talks about the dream of the 'fundamentalists' about Islamising modernity by means of an instrumental adoption of its material achievements while furiously rejecting its rational man-centred view of the world.⁶⁴ This "revolt against the West" is represented with positive attitudes regarding the modern science and technology while it is negative about the rational outlooks and cultural networks that stem from it.

In his book, *The Crisis of Modern Islam*, Tibi talks about a worldwide conflict between the "dominant scientific technological Western European culture and the pre-industrial non-Western cultures which enjoy only a very low degree of mastery over nature".⁶⁵ According to Tibi, the process of Westernisation in the pre-industrial societies, like the Middle East, produces people with "damaged identities".⁶⁶ Within this context, Western culture is seen as threatening, according to Tibi, and people turn to their "autochthonous culture", reactivating it as a social identity and arming themselves with it against the menacing dominant culture. It is noted that this is not a new phenomenon limited to 1970s and after, but this had been the case since the 19th century. However, what is new according to Tibi is that this turning away from the dominant culture is becoming a mass phenomenon and consequently a political force.⁶⁷ Thus, the Islamist movements and "modern Islam" are diagnosed as "defensive culture", against the Western modernity within the nation states of the region.

Bruce B. Lawrence, in his study "Defenders of God" says that 'fundamentalists' of all religions, Christians, Jews and Muslims, must be considered within the same context of modernisation. He argues that all the 'fundamentalists' are moderns. "They, like other moderns, recognise that the world in which they strive to locate their deepest identity is constantly shifting, that there is an unbridgeable gap between who they are and where they want to be."⁶⁸ Accordingly,

'fundamentalists' are moderns but they are not modernists. They oppose modernism and its proponents. They have been catalysed by "their unremitting opposition to all those who equate modernity as an index of material potentials with modernism as the sole value orientation appropriate to citizens of the modern world".⁶⁹ According to Lawrence, fundamentalists divide modern consciousness into two categories: objective givens and ideological variables. Accordingly, "modernisation may be epitomised as that complex of material structures, derived from technological innovations and abetted by capitalist initiatives that launches a process sustained by its own momentum. Modernism on the other hand connotes simply a species of pure spirit, evolving in its accord with its own autonomous artistic and intellectual imperatives."⁷⁰ Modernism foresees that with the advent of modernisation, the political significance of religion will decrease and individual attachments to religious values will weaken in time. It is also argued that with the spread of modernisation, traditional religious institutions will weaken and religious control over society and culture will diminish. It is assumed that religion, rather than being a source and a force of collective action for the society, would simply become a private issue for the individual. According to Lawrence, the 'fundamentalists' are at once the "consequence of modernity and the antithesis of modernism".⁷¹ He sees Islamist 'fundamentalism', just like Jewish 'fundamentalism' and 'fundamentalism' of the Protestant Christianity as a reaction to modernity. Thus, 'fundamentalism', within the larger context of the three religious belief systems, must be understood as a "series of parallel socio-religious movements in the modern world that accepts the instrumental belief of modernity but not its value reorientations. All over the world, the catalyst for the fundamentalist loyalty is the hatred of the modernist value agenda".⁷² The single and most consistent denominator of the 'fundamentalism' is the opposition to all those individuals or institutions that advocate Enlightenment

values and wave the banner of secularism or modernism. According to Lawrence, "Whatever the outcome of the fundamentalist challenge, its origins are inseparable from the spectre of its declared enemy: the Enlightenment."⁷³ Lawrence also emphasises the importance of scripture in the fundamentalist movements. He says that in the study of 'fundamentalism', scripture becomes a crucial, defining element. "Remove scripture, and you no longer have 'fundamentalism' but some other, nonreligious social movement."⁷⁴

Seeing the Islamist movement in Iran as presenting an alternative to Western modernity, Ali Mirsepassi writes that the Islamist movement in Iran

articulated an alternative discourse to overcome the Western-centric projects of modernisation, enabling Iran to try and accommodate modernity within the context of her own historical and cultural experiences and specificities [...] This was an ideal, real or imagined, that no other modern movements were able to achieve (or even able to offer). Therefore the hegemony of political Islam was made possible through capturing the "imaginary" of the Iranians in a way that presented itself as the only desirable answer to the country's dilemmas.⁷⁵

Ahmed and Donnan, writing about the Islamist movements and the impact of globalisation on Middle Eastern societies, underline rightly that post-modernity as a social, political and cultural configuration, is affecting everybody to varying degrees and Muslims are no exception to that.⁷⁶ They note that the post-modern culture had entered the houses of the majority in the Middle East with TVs and VCDs and it created different reactions, among different echelons of the society. Generally, stuck between the post-modern culture based on

youth, change and consumerism and the traditional religious culture emphasizing balance and discouraging change, one response comes from the Islamic fundamentalists : concerned about the pace of change and what this will do to the next generation, people genuinely worried that their culture and traditions that they held for a thousand years will now be changed and even be in the danger of being wiped out.⁷⁷

Globalisation is seen as influencing the traditional cultures in such a dramatic way that a response to deal with the new challenges has become necessary. This approach focuses on the intrusions of the global culture in everyday lives of the people and the ordinary men, who try to reconstruct and give meaning to their own world in this highly globalised technological age. This is seen as the central debate

at the moment in the Middle East as well as in the West, to reconstruct and give meaning to the individual lives. Thus, in the Middle East Islam is shown as the main anchor in giving meaning to the lives of the people in this rapidly changing environment in this perspective.

Anthropological studies conducted on women who started to wear the veil recently indicate the search for a meaning and identity in a highly globalising world. The study of Juliane Hammer on Palestinian women shows how the women see Islam as providing meaning, moral orientation, feeling of safety and emotional stability.⁷⁸ Arlene Elowe Macleod's work focuses on the women in Cairo and argues that "the women's experience with rapid change in Cairo is shaped by the search for an 'authentic identity' coherent with traditional culture, and a search for modernism that builds on traditional culture and traditional sources of women's power [...] in a world that is shaped by the dramatic confrontation of tradition with Western values".⁷⁹ Not only for the women, Islam is seen to provide meaning and a reference for businesses in the region as well. In a recent study on Islamist movements in Turkey, Ayşe Buğra writes about Islam as the new network provider for the small businesses of the peripheral areas in a highly competitive and changing economic environment.⁸⁰

Despite representing a strong argument and an important aspect of the growth of Islamism, neither modernisation nor globalisation is merely a cultural intrusion into societies and they carry significant economic and political aspects. Talking only about their cultural components would again lead to reductionism, this time in cultural terms.

A NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH – MODERNISATION PROCESS

Each of the approaches mentioned in the chapter takes one of the aspects of the Middle Eastern state and links the growth of the Islamist movements to this factor. Therefore, it remains short of explaining the whole picture and taking into account the multiple factors that affect the growth of Islamist movements in the region. What is needed is an approach linking the three important aspects of the Islamist movements explained above. Locating the Islamist movement in a modernisation process – a modernisation that takes the economic, political and cultural aspects together, can achieve this aim.

Within this perspective, and in looking at Islamist political parties in Turkey as a case study (the political parties being one, and arguably the most important manifestation of Islamist movements in Turkey), a historical framework of modernisation with its economic, political and cultural aspects will be drawn in the following chapters. Whether the Islamist movements could be understood as a response to modernity, in line with the NSMs perspective, will be analysed through the political parties in Turkey. The role of the Islamist political parties as the most important manifestation of the “peripheral culture” (Islamic culture) in the political arena as well as their instrumentalist approach in using Islamic discourse for power-seeking will both be discussed. How and if these political parties respond to modernity will be analysed within the modernisation process of the country in the following chapters.

¹ Sami Zubaida, Islam, The People and the State – Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), p. 38

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³ Youssef Choueiri, “The Political Discourse of Contemporary Islamic Movements”, p.31

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- ⁴ John Voll, "Fundamentalisms in the Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan", in Martin E. Marty and Scott Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalisms Observed, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 356.
- ⁵ Gilles Kepel, 'Islamists Versus the State in Egypt and Algeria', Daedalus, Vol. 124, Issue 3, p. 111.
- ⁶ Raymond William Baker, Sadat and After – Struggles for Egypt's Political Soul, (London: I.B.Tauris, 1990), p. 4
- ⁷ Interview held with Saad Eddin Ibrahim in American University in Cairo, 18 April 2001.
- ⁸ Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings", International Journal of Middle East Studies, 12, (1980), p. 439. The transliteration and the translation as well as the shortened version of eth Arabic words (MA and RHF) are adapted from Ibrahim's article.
- ⁹ Ibid
- ¹⁰ Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Activism in the 1980s", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No.2, April 1988, p. 654
- ¹¹ Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings", International Journal of Middle East Studies, 12, (1980), p. 439
- ¹² Susan Waltz, "Islamist Appeal in Tunisia", The Middle East Journal, Vol.40, No.4, Autumn 1986, p. 655
- ¹³ Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World, (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 79
- ¹⁴ *ibid*, p.177
- ¹⁵ Mark Tessler, "Alienation of the Urban Youth" in William Zartman & William Mark Habeeb (eds.), Polity and Society in Contemporary North Africa, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993) p. 84
- ¹⁶ Mark Tessler and Jolene Jesse, "Gender and Support for Islamist Movements: Evidence from Egypt, Kuwait and Palestine", The Muslim World, Vol.86, April 1996, p. 202
- ¹⁷ Mark Tessler, "Alienation of the Urban Youth", p. 83
- ¹⁸ Tessler notes a research conducted on the Algerian students' education, concluding that out of 100 pupils that enter the primary school, only four of them will have the chance of continuing university education. For details of the research conducted and written in Bennoune, 1988, based on the data of the academic year 1978-79, see Tessler, "Alienation of the Urban Youth", p. 84
- ¹⁹ *ibid*, p. 82
- ²⁰ Björn Olav Utvik, "Islamism: Digesting Modernity the Islamic Way", Forum for Development Studies, No. 2, 1993, p. 202
- ²¹ For details see Nikki Keddie, "Ideology, Society and the State in Post-Colonial Muslim Societies" in Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan, (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 306-311 and Henry Munson, Islam and Revolution in the Middle East, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 116-136
- ²² Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 533
- ²³ Fred Halliday, "The Iranian Revolution: Uneven Development and Religious Populism" in Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi (eds.), State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988), p. 39

- ²⁴ Nemat Guenena, "Islamic Activism in Egypt", Civil Society, June 1995, p. 7
- ²⁵ Dennis Sullivan, "Extra-State Actors and Privatization in Egypt", in Iliya Harik and Denis Sullivan (eds.), Privatisation and Liberalisation in the Middle East, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 24-45
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- ³⁰ *ibid*
- ³¹ Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), p. 4
- ³² Johannes Jansen, The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism, (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), p.5
- ³³ Direct quote from Waddad Sharara in Nazih Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State – Politics and Society in the Middle East, (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 1995), p. 447-448
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- ³⁶ Charles Tripp, "Islam and the Secular Logic of the State in the Middle East", Sidahmed and Ehteshami (eds.), Islamic Fundamentalism, p. 55
- ³⁷ *ibid*
- ³⁸ *ibid*
- ³⁹ Aziz al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities, (London: Verso, 1993), p. 55
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- ⁴¹ Şerif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: the Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989)
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- ⁴⁴ Interviews held with many political leaders, researchers and journalists in Cairo in March-April 2001 indicated to such a direction. Almost all the people interviewed repeated the same point about the authoritarianism of the state and the lack of any alternatives. The alliance of the leader of the Tagammu'a Party, Ri'fat Said with the state against the Islamists is resented by many former voters and is noted as a wrong strategy by the Party officials as well. Interview with Hussein Abdulraziq of Tagammu'a Party on 23 April 2001.
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CHAPTER 3

TURKEY 1908-1946 – THE YEARS OF THE KEMALIST MODERNISATION PROJECT

The “Eastern question” or the partition of the Ottoman Empire, had been settled by secret agreements between Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy during World War 1. After the War, being on the defeated side, the Ottoman state’s territories were opened for foreign occupation. In February 1919, French forces entered Istanbul and in May 1919 Greek forces supported by the British and the French entered Izmir, starting the partition of the Ottoman territory and leaving a small territory in Central Anatolia for the Turks. National resistance and the War of Independence fought against the occupying powers by Mustafa Kemal and his friends resulted in the independence of the current Turkish territories and the formation of a Turkish Republic in 1923 in Ankara. Between 1923 and 1946, the Republican People’s Party, founded by Mustafa Kemal, ruled the country as the single ruling party and carried out reforms that aimed at the “modernisation” of the Turkish Republic.

In order to understand how the modernisation process was initiated and how the society was shaped through a process of social engineering by the Kemalist modernising élite, it is imperative to understand the developments of the late Ottoman period. There is continuity both in the intellectual debate of modernisation and the state élites from the late Ottoman period to the Turkish Republic. In order to demonstrate this continuity and the background of the reform and modernisation project, this chapter will shortly examine the Ottoman structure later relating it to the economic, political and collective action themes of the Republican period. Drawing on the argument of the first chapter about the nature of modernity and its three

aspects (industrialisation, nation-state and the class structure) the aim here is to look at how modernity in Turkey, introduced through the ambitious modernisation project of a military-bureaucratic élite, was initiated, and later shaped the society.

FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO THE TURKISH REPUBLIC

Modernisation efforts in the Ottoman Empire started in the late-18th century with Selim the Third (1789-1807) and continued during the reign of Mahmut the Second (1808-1839) who initiated reforms in the military field with the abolition of the Janissary system. A medical school and a military academy were established in Istanbul and centralisation efforts that strengthened the role of the bureaucracy were carried out during the latter's rule. New policies that would enhance the 'modernisation' of the empire were implemented and were institutionalised with the administrative and legal reforms during the period of the New Order (*Tanzimat*) between 1839-1871. Seeing the economic and military supremacy of the West and having faced a series of defeats at the hands of the Western powers, the "genuine belief that the only way to save the Ottoman Empire was to introduce European style reforms"¹ had already started to take root in the ruling circles of the Empire. In an attempt "to save the country", significant reforms in the military, administrative and judicial fields were announced and implemented during this period. These reforms went parallel to those that improved the position of the Christian minorities in the Empire. It was generally under pressure from the European powers that the Sultan granted equality before the law to all his subjects, enhancing the 'second-class' status of the Christians to that of the Muslim majority, at least on paper.

Secularisation of laws became an important component of the Tanzimat reforms. The canon law of Islam, the Shari' a, despite never being abolished, was limited to cover only the sphere of the family law and it was codified along European

lines between 1865-88. The statesmen of the *Tanzimat* created new laws, especially those regarding the rights of the non-Muslims. A new commercial law was applied in 1850, copied from the French code; the maritime trade law was implemented in 1863 while in 1867 foreigners were given the right to own land in the empire.

The increasing trade of the Ottoman Empire, especially as a result of the agreements signed with Britain and France that gave these two countries capitulative rights in 1838, had made these new laws necessary. One of the consequences of the capitulations regime was the withdrawal of local merchants from the trade scene and their replacement with Greek, Armenian and other non-Muslim minority tradesmen who carried passports of the foreign countries and therefore were immune from the Ottoman tax and legal systems. They started to act as the intermediaries of the foreign firms conducting business in the Empire. As tobacco, cotton and fruit exportation started, Ottomans began to integrate with the world economy and became a part of the international division of labour.² There was a class of small and medium scale Turkish-Muslim traders mainly concentrated in domestic trade within the Empire, but compared to the wealthy and powerful minority merchants they were weak, unorganised, scattered and generally dependent on the latter's activities.³

As a part of the *Tanzimat*, significant reforms were carried on in the central bureaucracy in line with the principles of rationalisation and specialisation. A complete set of ministries and boards, as in the European system, were established in the capital Istanbul. In addition to the ministries, consultative assemblies and commissions were formed that aimed to help prepare the new measures and legislation in areas like building and trade.⁴ Secular education institutes were formed during this period to train the future bureaucrats and army members.

These reforms involved a major reorganisation of the society in the administrative, educational and judicial fields. They created a new élite from the

ranks of the military and the bureaucracy (that will henceforth be called “the military-bureaucratic élite”), who constituted the major actors in the late Ottoman and new Turkish Republic’s political life. While this new élite, educated in the secular institutions of Istanbul, was promoting constitutionalism and adhering to Western ideas and seeking the Westernisation of Ottoman political and social life, the remainder of the population continued to stick to traditionalist values. Thus, as Mardin notes, “the ensuing duality appears in a number of guises that sets a neat separation between the Ottoman political society and civil society”⁵ during this period. This duality was produced and “reproduced in the course of modernization of the Ottomans, representing the ‘high’ ‘palace’ culture or the culture of the élites and the ‘little’, ‘folk’ culture, respectively”.⁶

The Tanzimat Statesmen and their cohorts had established the upper spheres of officialdom in the capital a fair replica of the life style which one would find in greater European capitals. Istanbul had been invaded, not only by the imported cloth and printing presses but by cafes and dance halls. These new-fangled institutions were concentrated in Pera, the European quarter of the capital, where the royal Prussian orchestra gave concerts, Sarah Bernhardt performed and where Café Couronne had gathered pretty Austrian girls as serveuses. In Pera, one could receive mail through the uncensored postal services of foreign powers; one could also buy books and newspapers which would have placed their purveyors in greater jeopardy on the Turkish side of the town across the Galata bridge”⁷

Zürcher emphasises that the *Tanzimat* reforms were “never based on popular demand. They were imposed on Ottoman society because the leading bureaucrats deemed it necessary or because they were forced to act by the representatives of the great powers. Support for the reforms was therefore never broadly based”.⁸ During the 1870s, antagonism towards the reforms intensified on the part of the Ottoman Muslim community, who saw the reforms as subservience to European powers and non-Muslim communities whose power and wealth was increasing. Parallel to this antagonism in society, the main opposition to *Tanzimat* developed from within the reformers of the period. Gathering around Namık Kemal, the group later called as ‘Young Ottomans’, criticised the *Tanzimat* policies as “superficial imitations of Europe, without regard for traditional Ottoman and Islamic

values, and as subservient to European interests.”⁹ They claimed that the regime was becoming a bureaucratic despotism, destroying the former checks and balances, especially that of the *ulema*. They saw the solution to the ills of the *Tanzimat* system in a constitutional, representative and parliamentary system that would build up a true feeling of citizenship and loyalty to the state among all Ottoman subjects, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. The Young Ottoman attempts to install a patriotic, constitutional system that included all the groups in the Empire did not materialise as nationalism among different groups was already taking shape. However, they contributed to the building up of a constitutional system in 1876 and they can be regarded as the first ideological movement among the Ottoman élite to try to create and influence a politically conscious public with their writings.

The first Ottoman Constitution was enacted in 1876 and the first parliamentary elections were held in December 1876 and January 1877. However, the parliamentary regime was rather short lived as Sultan Abdulhamit closed down the Parliament in 1878 and started a period of repression in the Empire. Abdulhamit had gone so far as to form a group of spies and agents to alert him to any development that was going on among his subjects. Despite high level of repression, agitation was starting to develop among the students. The first opposition group against the rule of Abdulhamit was formed among the students of the Military Medical College in 1889 who formed themselves into the Ottoman Union Society (*Ittihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti*), aiming to reinstate the constitution and the Parliament.¹⁰ Against the repressive rule, other secret organisations like Independence (*Hürriyet*) and Motherland and Independence (*Vatan ve Hürriyet*) were founded around the Empire. In time some of the members of these groups were arrested and most fled abroad, mainly to Paris where they carried on their activities against the repression in the Empire. They founded a small committee, the Committee of Union and Progress

(*İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* - CUP), under which most of the secret organisations united. They started publishing a newspaper in Paris called *Meşveret* (Consultation) from 1895 and described themselves as the Young Turks (*Jeunes Turcs* – *Jön Türkler*) in France. The military-bureaucratic élite constituted the main group within the CUP organisations. Against the growing support and increasing strength of the CUP, and the failure of the Sultan's forces to crush the organisation, Abdulhamit was forced to accept the reimplementation of the Constitutional rule in 1908. The elections for the Second Parliament were held after a thirty-year break and resulted in the total victory of the CUP. The other party entering the elections, the Party of Ottoman Liberals (*Osmanlı Ahrar Firkası*), got only one seat in the 288 seat parliament.

Despite the role the CUP played in the termination of the repressive period, the victory of the CUP in the elections and the active role it started to play in the political life of the Empire was not without opposition. There was an opposition growing from the conservative religious circles to the reform minded, Western oriented cadres of the CUP. Various magazines that were published during this period advocated "Islam as the powerful ideology" as an alternative to the CUP ideology to save the Ottomans from declining relative to the West and to help return the empire to the glorious periods of the past. On 13 April 1909, some of these groups gathered in Istanbul against the Young Turks and the Committee of Union and Progress and revolts started with the slogan of "We want Shari'a rule!"¹¹ The reaction of the Union and Progress was harsh. They repressed the revolt, dethroned Abdulhamit and brought Mehmet V to the throne. Under Mehmet V, they came to power through the Parliament, forming the government and consolidating their rule.

During the rule of the CUP, three main ideological lines of thought continued to develop in the Empire: Ottomanism, (Pan)Islamism and (Pan)Turkism.

Ottomanists adhered to the Young Ottoman ideal of the unity of the different communities around the Ottoman throne, (pan)Islamism sought to regenerate the empire on the basis of Islamic practices and solidarity within the Muslim *umma* (Muslim society) and Turkism sought the unity of the Turkic peoples under the Ottoman flag. Within these ideological circles, the discussion as to how much to Westernise and what should form the basis of loyalty in the future Ottoman state constituted the main differences between groups. Ottomanism became the main ideology of the CUP after 1908 and remained as such until the 1913 Balkan wars. Turkish nationalism was a rather latecomer into the picture and was strengthened as different territories, one by one, declared their independence from the Empire. As leading the main opposition to the CUP, the (Pan)Islamists were deeply suspected by the regime after the 1909 demonstrations. However, thinking of the (Pan)Islamist group as being only composed of reactionary forces to the Westernised, reform-minded CUP members would be misleading. There were a significant number of Muslim reformers and modernists like Sait Halim Pasha and Mehmet Akif at this time, who saw the future of the Empire in an Islamic structure and advocated a return to Shari' a believing this would strengthen the Empire.

Especially after the rise of the nationalist movements all over the Empire, Turkish nationalism started to dominate more strongly over the ideas of Ottomanism and Islamism. A strong Turkish nationalism, with some Islamic overtones became the unifying ideology to be pursued by the reformers – the CUP that remained in power until the end of World War 1.

One of the main priorities of the CUP upon coming to power in 1908 was to develop a basis for national economy. Because Ottoman industry was very weak, the working class constituted only the very minority of the urban population at this time. The wage earners were generally the employees in the service sector,

especially of the railroad network (that was owned by foreign companies), municipality works, and construction or trading. State officials, in contrast, constituted a powerful stratum of Ottoman society and a large majority of the city population. However, their salaries would greatly decrease with the war, reducing their economic power. Within the agricultural sector, deliberate acts of the Committee of Union and Progress right after 1908 could be seen to implement some policies for middle and rich peasants, especially in places where agricultural production for the markets carried importance.

As the non-Muslim commercial class was mainly involved in foreign trade rather than developing local markets and investing in manufacturing, and as the Muslim business class was very weak, the bureaucrats of the new regime intended to take the initiative to “develop an indigenous industry”. The aim of creating a “national bourgeoisie” with the backing of the state became a priority in the development of the country. The 1914 Law for the Encouragement of Industry (*Teşvik-i Sanayi Kanunu*) was passed with the aim of developing national production. In 1915, Muslim businessmen founded the Tradesmen’s Association (*Esnaf Cemiyeti*), to take the internal market under their control.¹² In 1916, the Parliament (*Meclis-i Mebusan*) approved a new customs law saying that the government would apply between 30% and 100% customs duty on imported goods to encourage and protect local production.¹³ While the policies of encouraging industrialisation and the creation of a native bourgeoisie continued, World War I and the War of Independence changed and affected the whole of the peninsula, resulting in the abolition of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of the Turkish Republic.

THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

Entering the War on the side of the Axis powers, the Ottoman Empire was defeated in World War I, and its territories were divided among the Alliance powers. As foreign occupation took place, national resistance organised under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, announced the partition of the territories as unacceptable. Mustafa Kemal is often noted to have been an early member of the CUP, one of the inner circle activist officers who took part both in the events leading to the reinstatement of the Constitution in 1908 and suppressing the opposition in 1909. He had distanced himself from the CUP during the War and was no longer associated with the organisation as the war ended and national resistance started in 1919. He made a heroic name for himself during the War in the Dardanelles and had led the brigade in charge of all the troops on the Syrian front. In 19 May 1919 Mustafa Kemal travelled to Samsun, in a move, which is seen as the start of the National Resistance movement against the invading powers. It was decided in various congresses held in the Anatolian cities that in case the Istanbul government could not secure the independence of the country in its current borders, then a government that would be formed by a National Assembly would bring all the national resources together and fight for national independence. As the Alliance powers started to invade Istanbul in 1920, there was no need to wait for Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues to announce the formation of a National Assembly in Ankara and initiate the War of Independence against the invading powers that would result in victory.

The support of the (Pan)Islamists¹⁴ is considered to have been an important contribution to the victory in the War of Independence. The anti-Western, anti-imperialist discourse of the Kemalists during the War was especially appealing for the (Pan)Islamist-conservative circles in Anatolia and was supported as a part of the desire to live independent of Western influence. Mustafa Kemal and his friends

were well aware of the support of religious circles and they, rather than emphasising the nationalist drive behind the war, encouraged cooperation and alliances with these groups for independence. Thus, people of religion in the first Turkish national Assembly amounted to one fifth of the members – among them 14 mufti and eight leading members of different religious orders.¹⁵ They played an active role in the parliamentary meetings and eagerly participated in the debates - the bills that abolished the caliphate and the Shari' a ministry were both sponsored by clerics.¹⁶ But during the following years a radical decline in the numbers of the *ulema* within the ruling élite was to be seen.

In addition to collaboration with the *ulema*, the cooperation of the “intermediary classes” like the local notables is important to note at this point. The War of Independence was financed with the help of these groups. According to Arnold Leder, there was almost no support for the War of Independence from the peasants and if there was any support, “it was given reluctantly after much pressure”.¹⁷ Leder says:

For the most part, the villagers or peasants of Anatolia viewed the War of Independence with suspicion. They had for hundred of years been subject to military conscription and arbitrary taxation by one authority or another. When war came to Anatolia, the greatest concern of the villagers was to escape from military conscription – Ottoman or nationalist [...]. Thus, the peasants were in no mood to join the nationalist forces.¹⁸

In order to gather support against the occupation of the country the new regime sought the support of the local notables who could force the peasants to cooperate in their cause.

It is apparent that in the view of the historical fatigue of the peasants and their ties to traditional leaders the War of Independence could only be won by relying on the tribal chiefs, local notables and religious leaders who could exercise some influence on the peasants. And in this case it was only in the face of the Greek and Armenians that these elements began to resist.¹⁹ In that period, the local notables of Anatolia, that is the most prominent local leaders, were the spokesman of



the people. Granted, in almost every case, this resulted from the exercise of arbitrary power. Next to the local notables stood the local *ulema* (learned men of Muslim theology), muftis and the turbaned sheikhs (heads of religious orders) all of whom served as the spokesmen of the local notables who were the power behind them. Mustafa Kemal during the entire course of nationalist movement encountered local notables acting as the leaders of the people.²⁰

The class of local notables would constitute one of the main allies of the Kemalist regime after the war as well. There was willingness on the side of the notables to collaborate and be a part of the new élite – the modernizing military-bureaucratic élite – as this would give them the opportunity to be a part of the regime.²¹ The local notables delivered their support for the Kemalist élite, as long as they were allowed to retain their land, status and local influence. In return, the regime allowed the local notables to keep their influence as long as the countryside was peaceful and orderly.

The War of Independence resulted in the victory of the Turkish forces and the independence of the country from foreign occupation. The economic and social conditions of the country were very poor after long years of continuous warfare. What was left of the Ottoman Empire, the future Turkish Republic, was highly depopulated, impoverished and was in ruins in every sense. The emigration and the expatriation of the non-Muslim communities during and after the war led Anatolia to lose ten percent of its already much reduced population. This had two other major consequences: firstly, the migrations led to a highly homogenised Muslim community in the territories and secondly, they resulted in the loss of the most entrepreneurial and industrialist capital, that was owned and run by the non-Muslim communities. With them, the technological know-how and international links were

also lost to a great extent. Mustafa Kemal and his associates would soon embark on a project to develop the country and take it out of the ruins in which it found itself.

THE KEMALIST MODERNISATION PROJECT

After the victory of the War of Independence, energies were diverted towards the future of the country and what direction political and the social development would take. Mustafa Kemal had already started to consolidate his political position before the Peace Treaty of Lausanne was signed. The Sultanate was terminated in 1922. The People's Party was founded under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal in September 1923. By taking over the main organisation of the war time resistance to foreign occupation, the People's Party gained an already established network all over Anatolia. The first Parliament that carried out the War of Independence was dissolved and new elections were held that mainly carried People's Party members to the Parliament. The consolidation of power in the National Assembly and the Party, which were both under the control of Mustafa Kemal, continued as the main feature of the coming decades. Thus, the period between 1925-1945 is generally referred to as either the "consolidation period"²² of the new republican regime or as "the heyday of Kemalism".²³

Once power was secured, a reform package, more of a "modernisation project", was designed by Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues that would lay the foundations of Turkey's future. This "modernisation project" was formed with the goal of developing the country and "catching up with the developed countries of the West". To make the country a developed, modern and respectable nation in the international sphere had become the main aim of the new ruling circle of the country.²⁴

- It is important here to understand and clarify the basic components of the Kemalist modernisation project. The first pillar of the modernisation project consisted of capitalist industrialisation which the Kemalists saw as the key to replicating the success of Western European economies. Economically, the country was seen as weak and backward and efforts were canalised to industrialise the country and incorporate her economy to the capitalist international markets on an equal basis.

The second and third pillars that go hand in hand were nationalism and secularism. The new state was being formed around the notion of Turkish nationality and Turkishness. Religion was assigned a minimum role in public life and was seen as reserved for the private sphere, as a belief system only relevant to relations between the individual and the God. The unifying role that had until now been assigned to Islam was given to nationalism. Thus, 'Islam as the unifying ideology' was replaced with Turkish nationalism under the Kemalist rule.

The notion of a state based on the tenets of Islam was the anathema of the Republican élites, of Mustafa Kemal's People's Party.²⁵ They wanted Turkey to reach to the level of the contemporary civilization by emphasising notions such as science, modern education, rationality and secularism. The long discussions as to how to modernize were concluded at this point. The idea advocated by some groups of taking Western technology but leaving Western cultural influences was rejected and Westernisation with its technological, and socio-cultural aspects was determined as the policy that the Turkish Republic would implement as a tool in its modernisation project. However, to what extent this ideal was incorporated into society is still debatable today. Taking Western technology but holding on to Muslim values was to remain the main point of the opposition in Turkey, even 78 years after the formation of the Republic. Thus, the "enduring strength of the

conservative appeal” was to continue despite the changes in the economic and political map of the country.²⁶

To summarize, the Kemalist modernisation project consisted of capitalist industrial development, nationalism and secularism in a Westernization context. Reforms were initiated to realise this modernisation project and they were implemented under the single party rule of the People’s Party that was later re-named the Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* – RPP) after the announcement of the Republic on 29 October 1923.

THE REPUBLICAN POLITICS

The most suitable political structure within which the modernisation project could be realised was thought to be a Republic. The Republican regime was declared on 29 October 1923, with Mustafa Kemal becoming the President and İsmet İnönü the Prime Minister of the country. Despite these changes, the Caliph continued to retain his popularity and see himself as an autonomous centre of power in Istanbul.²⁷ As Ahmad says, during the long centuries of its rule, the Ottoman rulers had created a vast network of institutions and loyalties, especially religious loyalties almost among all social groups.²⁸ In the Kemalist modernisation project, there was no room for religious loyalties and alternative power centres that could hamper the development and Westernisation of the country. Thus, the caliphate was abolished in March 1924, leading to the growth of a political opposition. The first main organised opposition developed from within the ranks of the RPP in the Parliamentary group.

In November 1924, some members of the RPP separated themselves from the cadres of the party to form the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* – PRP). The PRP announced its basic aim as the protection of individual rights against the growing “oligarchic power of the rulers”.²⁹

Republicanism, liberalism and democracy were the other principles espoused by the PRP. Despite the principle of liberalism, the party basically aimed to protect religion and took a stand against the secularist principles of the government. Article six of the PRP's programme suggested that the religious beliefs of the people were under threat and in need of protection³⁰. This party organisation posed a challenge to the Kemalist modernisation project, especially to its secularism pillar. Prime Minister İnönü and the reforms were the main targets of the opposition.

Some months later, by the beginning of February 1925, the Kurdish population of East Anatolia started a rebellion against the Republic under Sheikh Sait with the aim of founding an independent Kurdish state and reinstating the caliphate. The abolition of the caliphate, an important religious symbol that bound the two communities – Turkish and Kurdish – together had inspired resentment against the RPP. In addition to that the nationalist ideology of regime, constructing a new national consciousness around Turkishness, had led to a repressive policy against the Kurdish identity.³¹ The public use of the Kurdish language and the teaching of Kurdish were prohibited under this policy. As the rebellion broke out, martial law was declared by the Ankara government and the Law for the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sukun*) was passed by the Parliament, giving the government absolute power to fight against opposition in an attempt to crush the rebellion. In addition to these measures, the Independence Tribunals that had been formed in 1920 to deal with cases regarding treason and offences against the regime and that had the right to carry out death sentences without the sanction of the Assembly were reinstated. The rebellion was easily suppressed with these policies and from that time onwards, a separate Kurdish identity was officially denied.

After the rebellion had been suppressed, the attention of the government turned to the political opposition coming from the newspapers and the PRP. Eight of

the important Istanbul newspapers – conservative, liberal, and Marxist – were closed down and some of the journalists of the eastern provinces were arrested and tried in the courts.³² Having taken control of the opposition media, the attention of the government now turned to the opposition party – the PRP. This party was closed down in June 1925. The multiparty experience was left behind as a short-lived one, strengthening the single party government that had by now extended its power to every region and corner of the country and curbed the political opposition against its project. After 1925, new reforms were implemented.

In 1925, all religious shrines and religious orders (*tarikats*) were closed down. In 1926, with the changes in the civil Law, Shari 'a laws regarding the family and individual were abolished. Besides, the regime stopped religious education activities under its supervision and adopted strict measures on "secret religious education activities" with the aim of "creating a new culture independent of Islam". Berkes notes that in the fight for "the freedom of conscience and the independence of the nation, every anachronism left as the heritage of the the *Tanzimat* – the medrese, the caliphate, the Shari' a courts and the sultanate – all of which proved to be nothing but burdens in the national struggle for survival or obsolete institutions creating nothing but waste and complications in a time of economy and rationalisation – had to be thrown overboard."³³ By the end of the decade, reforms like the disestablishment of the state religion (1928), adoption of the Latin alphabet (1928) and the use of the Turkish in the Islamic call prayer (1932) were passed.

In line with the goals of the modernisation project, the first reforms of the Republican period were directed towards secularism and the imposition of modernisation based on rationalisation of knowledge and science rather than on religious principles. The main aim was to create the modern nation state and the new free individual. In addition to the Kurdish identity being denied after the rebellion in

1925, a Muslim identity was also rejected for the future of the population with the reforms. Turkish identity was put forward as a “supreme identity” that the individuals would adhere to, subordinating all other identities to it.

While the urban centres and the intellectuals accepted the secular principles quickly, in the provinces and the rural areas the dominance of religion in daily life continued. Despite the consequent development of this “duality” in the society between the urban and the rural centres, these reforms that aimed at an overall change and creation of the “new Turks” in the society met with little public protest other than some minor disturbances. The glorious victory of the War of Independence and the heroic stories of the army and the new politicians, as well as the anti-imperialist discourses of the regime, worked to decrease the opposition to the regime from society.

THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC

The economic policy of the state was shaped around state-led capitalist industrial development. As mentioned earlier, under the Committee of Union and Progress measures to encourage the manufacturing sector and the development of the national bourgeoisie had already been implemented. Nationalism became one of the main pillars of the Kemalist modernisation project, not only in the political and ideological levels, but also in the economic field. The nationalist stand of the Kemalist regime can be seen in the economic congress of Izmir in February 1923, where the statement was made showing that the leadership was unified in wishing to establish a national economy in order to become completely sovereign. Now that political independence was gained, it was time for economic independence. Mustafa Kemal in his opening speech said that military victories alone could not secure the future of the nation without simultaneous economic victories.³⁴ The economic congress resulted in new

measures such as a protectionist tariff policy, the nationalisation of foreign trade, monopoly rights for foreign capital, the establishment of a national bank, and revived opposition to concessions. However, the economic implications of the Lausanne Treaty prevented the implementation of these policies. Lausanne was not only a Peace Treaty but also a framework that drew up the international economic relations of the new Turkish Republic. As the Lausanne Treaty was signed, three main economic guidelines for Turkey's relations with European powers were also designed. The first was the abolition of the capitulations that provided concessions to foreign powers during the Ottoman period. Secondly, the Ottoman external debt was renegotiated and apportioned between the successor states such that Turkey was due to pay 67 percent of the total in gold sterling beginning in 1929. Thirdly, the free-trade treaties that had been renewed periodically during the 19th century were discontinued. It was agreed that the existing structure of low tariff rates and restrictions against quotas would continue until 1929, when the new republic would be free to pursue its own commercial policies.³⁵

During the period between 1923-29, capitalist development took its place on the agenda of the government as the main pillar of the modernisation process. The main aim of "forming" a national bourgeoisie for development and modernisation continued. The state supported the "formation" of a bourgeoisie as the main actor in the process of industrialisation and an active policy of intervention was pursued to favour the private sector. State monopolies in areas such as matches, alcoholic beverages, gasoline importation and port management were transferred to private firms, under favourable terms. They were given over to be run by some "privileged" individuals and companies, who generally had political connections to the ruling Republican People's Party (if they were themselves not top level politicians).³⁶ It is important to keep in mind at this point that people having

connections to the political power were made the first capitalists of the country. During this period, foreign capital was also invited to the country and cooperation with local capital was especially encouraged. Generally while the foreign company would provide the capital for the business, the local partner would run it, with its connections to the political power.³⁷ Çağlar Keyder notes the important effect of the minorities that were “forced” to leave Turkish territories between 1923-29. He says that this process resulted in the expropriation by the state of the estates and property that the minorities left and that this resulted in a great accumulation of wealth in the hands of the state, helping the formation of capital holders in the country.³⁸

Although encouragement of the industrial sector was the main task of the ruling élite, agriculture still remained the leading economic sector in the country at the time. Industry was developing at a rate of 8.5 percent, per annum but agriculture still constituted the bulk of economic activity. Keyder notes the importance of the abolishment of the tithe (*öşür vergisi*) in 1925, which constituted the 1/8th of the total production that the peasants were forced to give to the central authority as tax. When this kind of tax collecting was terminated, peasants that were left with the amount of production to sustain themselves under tithe taxing, were now left with an excess of production that helped to integrate them to the market without any intermediaries.³⁹ The commercialisation of agriculture by the peasants themselves can be said to have materialised during this period and this helped to increase the income of the peasants and the villagers as a whole.⁴⁰ Owen and Pamuk make note of the opinions that the abolition of the tithe was a concession by the new regime to the big landowners for their support during the War of Independence. However, they later argue that it was also a policy to alleviate the poverty among the bulk of the peasants that suffered from the heavy burden of the war. In addition to that the abolition of the tithe led to the abolishing of the tax farming system in the countryside, where the “economically

powerful strata” like the large landowners, merchants, moneylenders and urban notables lost the mechanism to appropriate agricultural surplus”. So, in the long run, both the abolition of the tithe and of tax farming was to the benefit of small peasant ownership and production.⁴¹

The policies pursued since 1908, which focused on creating a national bourgeoisie and on “enriching” individuals through state intervention proved to have been successful to a certain extent by the end of 1929. The cooperation of Turkish-Muslim trading bourgeoisie, political cadres and high level bureaucrats helped in the formation of a “new wealthy” strata that managed to replace the traditional, non-Muslim bourgeoisie and in some cases acted as the intermediaries and partners of foreign companies in the country. However, it would be too optimistic to say that a real bourgeois class had evolved during this period. The members of this ‘group of the new wealthy’ could be considered as not more than a group making use of the benefits of the state policies and they were generally concentrated in trade capitalism rather than in industrial capitalism.⁴²

THE SHORT MULTIPARTY EXPERIENCE OF 1930

During the period of Republican People’s Party rule until 1946, reforms were carried out and the modernisation project was pursued without much opposition. The country was ruled by a single party regime of the RPP, except for a short-lived multi-party experience in 1930. By 1930, an opposition party was being encouraged by Mustafa Kemal as he thought that the “Cultural Revolution” was now completed with the reforms secularising the laws and the education system as well as the daily life and that it was time for Turkey to be a democratic republic in line with the ideal of Westernisation.⁴³ 1930 was also an important year as the impact of the 1929 economic crisis was being felt in the Turkish territories and the political circles of the

time were engaged in discussing what kind of an economic strategy to adopt for the coming years. The main impact of the 1929 economic crisis on the Turkish economy was the decline in agricultural commodity prices. Compared to 1925, prices of agricultural goods fell by one third in the beginning of the 1930s and, since Turkish exports were mainly agricultural goods, this had an enormous impact on the balance of trade of the country. The severity of the crisis forced the government to take some serious measures in moving towards protectionism and asserting greater control over foreign trade and foreign exchange. In June 1929, tariffs were implemented such that the average tariff rate on imports was increased from 13 to 46 percent.⁴⁴ In addition to the people that supported a more active state role in the economy and an increasing protectionism as a response to the crisis, there was another group that argued instead for a liberal economic policy with limited state intervention. As this debate was intensifying, in August 1930, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk announced that one of his closest colleagues, Fethi Okyar, was going to create an opposition party – the Free Party (*Serbest Fırka* – FP). Okyar had liberal ideas about the economic system and was basically opposed to the etatist stand of the RPP after the 1929 economic crisis. The main divergences between the RPP and the FP revolved around the abolition of monopolies and tax cuts and the importation of foreign capital. Weiker notes that, had the FP continued its existence in the political scene longer, it might have taken the representative role of the industrial-commercial bourgeoisie and contributed to the development of class politics in Turkey.⁴⁵

However, rather than attracting the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, the FP gathered under its umbrella the reactionary forces that were against the Kemalist modernisation project. The idea that the “cultural revolution” had been successful proved to be wrong and within weeks of its formation, the FP became the centre of the counter-revolutionary reaction. The number of applications for party

- membership reached 13,000 in the first two weeks.⁴⁶ This seems to approve the idea that some of the reforms that were implemented in line with the modernisation project were not accepted by a large group in the society. Thus, the FP as a party that was formed against the RPP was widely supported by these opposition groups.

The local elections that were held in October 1930 resulted in the FP gaining 30 out of 512 seats. Despite the low level of success in this election, it was enough to surprise and alarm the RPP. The FP members accused the RPP of fraud in the elections, leading to open and fierce attacks between the two parties. Mustafa Kemal, in this environment of tension, announced that it was impossible for him to be partial anymore as the President, siding with the RPP. Fethi Okyar was left with the only option of closing down the Party, as he was aware of the impossibility of conducting politics against Mustafa Kemal at the time. The FP closed itself down on 16 November 1930.

After 1930, the political scene was dominated by the suppressive and authoritarian tendencies of the regime. Becoming aware of the strength of the opposition to the reforms and the RPP, the ruling circle increased controls and measures against the opposition and started ruling more forcefully in advancing the reforms. New powers were given to the RPP to close down any organisation and newspapers that contradicted the general policy of the regime at this time. Both the press and the educational institutions were mobilised to spread the Kemalist message – the modernisation project. In 1931, the basic principles of the modernisation project, the Kemalist principles, were laid down officially in the RPP programme. They were listed as: republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism and revolutionism. These six principles, represented by arrows, constituted the RPP emblem after this date. Populism was incorporated into the principles as a means to

promote solidarity and cooperation in the society, which was seen as becoming more and more reactionary and fragmented against the reforms.

CORPORATIST STRUCTURE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND POPULISM

Despite the policy of creating industrialists and capital accumulation in the hands of a bourgeoisie, “class” was a concept that was highly disliked by the RPP élite. Kemalism as a set of ideas considered the interests of the nation as superior to those of any group or class and denied the existence of any classes in the European sense in Turkey as well as prohibiting any political activity based on class interests. Populism and the emphasis on national solidarity became one of the main principles of the Kemalist project. Ziya Gökalp is seen as the major ideologue of Turkish nationalism with his ideas about corporatism constituting the basis of the Kemalist populist principle. In his sociological works, which are highly influenced by the works of Durkheim, Gökalp’s primary purpose was to define the cultural basis of Turkish nationalism in order to show that modernisation was compatible with retaining a distinct Turkish identity. The main contribution of Gökalp that will be noted here is his idea about “solidarism” and corporatist organisational structure that became the basic characteristic of collective action in the early Republican ideology.

Gökalp emphasises subordination of occupational associations to the state. In the hierarchical classifications of nations that he analysed, the conclusion was that the “highest form of civilisation [...] is [...] the corporate nation, whose basic units are corporate bodies which have a national character”.⁴⁷ Within the policy of catching up with the West, corporatism was foreseen as a prerequisite for social organisation by Gökalp. “The most advanced nations of Europe are developing in this direction and the Turkish nation currently belongs to a communal type of nations

(those with an urban basis), that in the future will develop into a corporate nation” writes Gökalp regarding the necessity of developing a corporatist structure.⁴⁸

Gökalp’s writings about the need for corporatist structures in maintaining solidarity of the population were important in the formation of the populist ideas of the Republican regime. The ideas relating to populism were used within the context of solidarity by Mustafa Kemal before and within the early years of the Republic. New Turkey was characterised as “a society united in terms of race, religion and culture, filled with feelings of mutual respect and sacrifice and having a common fate and interest”.⁴⁹ Later as the economic policies were being discussed and economic development was pursued as the basic prerequisite for modernisation, populism was promoted to create a balance between the different classes. It was emphasized by the rulers of the country that the Turkish nation was not composed of different classes and class interests but was a corporatist framework composed of different occupations, coexisting within the same system peacefully, mutually cooperating, not in a struggle to pursue different interests. In a report published by the RPP in 1931, the aim of populism was given as being to “unify the nation by avoiding class struggle”. Populism was the rejection of class struggle in the society. At the Fourth Party Congress in May 1931, it was said:

It is one of our main principles to consider the people of Turkish Republic , not as composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professions according to the requirements of division of labour for the individual and social life of the Turkish people. The farmers, handicraftsmen, labourers and workmen, people exercising free professions, industrialists, merchants and public servants are the main groups of work constituting the Turkish community. The labour of each of these is indispensable to the life and well-being of the others and society in general. The goal at which our party aims with this principle is to obtain social order and solidarity instead of class conflict and to establish harmony of interests so that they will not injure one another. Interests will be balanced according to their degree of capability, knowledge and contribution.⁵⁰

It has been noted by many scholars that such an approach was used to justify the existence of a single party regime during the period. Since the Republican People’s Party was representing the totality of interests in the society, there was no need to form other parties that might threaten the unity. Accordingly, there were no

class struggles in the society because it was not composed of different classes but of occupational groups. Thus, interest articulation and collective action was seen along these lines, in a corporatist fashion, away from class interests. This understanding of populism was accompanied by a shift towards étatist economic policy and provided much of the ideological justification for Kemalist experiments with state corporatism during the 1930s. Between 1932-34, a nationalist corporatism was developed by a group of intellectuals gathering around the journal *Kadro*. The Kadro group portrayed the Kemalist modernisation project as a struggle against capitalism and imperialism, arguing that Turkey was representing an economic development without the social contradictions that this would bring. They were arguing that Turkey would be accumulating capital while avoiding the class struggle.⁵¹

The RPP started to use populism as a term to describe itself as “the synthesis of the people and as the sole authoritative interpreter of the national interest”.⁵² Representation of interests through alternative, non-party or non-bureaucratic channels was regarded as unnecessary and as encouraging the acquisition of illegitimate privilege. Despite the idea of using the party and bureaucratic channels for interest representation, the organisations within this line were also very limited until 1946. Populism and corporatism were understood more as the gathering of all ideas within the cadres of the RPP and there was no necessity for any other organisation as this party thought of all the interests even without their representation. Thus, between 1925 and 1946, Turkish associational life is noted as having been “virtually non-existent, with only a few modest attempts to sponsor corporatist professional organisations.”⁵³

For the workers, there was not even such sponsoring of corporatist organisations. The labour law of 1936, while bringing some safeguards to workers in industry (but which materialised only after 1946), prohibited the formation of trade

unions and the call for strikes. The outlawing of any form of organisation for the working class in this period led some to conclude that there was no corporatist structure in Turkey in this period.⁵⁴ It could be argued here that the corporatist idea was well integrated into the RPP discourse, but was hardly implemented in the society during the period under consideration.

STATE-LED CAPITALISM – THE ETATIST YEARS

As mentioned earlier, 1929 was an important year in Turkish economic development as it was both the year ending the economic implications of the Lausanne Treaty and the year of world economic crisis. With the ending of the provisions of Lausanne, the Turkish Republic was now free to determine the tariffs and quotas it would impose on foreign trade. But more important than this freedom was the impact of the world economic crisis on the Turkish economy, as noted above. The significant decrease in agricultural commodity prices hit the Turkish economy hard as an agriculture exporting country. Between 1929 and 1932, the export price of hazelnuts declined by 73 percent, wheat by 63 percent, dried figs by 52 percent, tobacco by 50 percent and cotton by 48 percent.⁵⁵

Having consolidated its powers and secured its position through the elimination of the opposition from the FP that advocated liberal policies, the RPP was now free to implement an active role for the state in the economy. In addition to high tariff rates, in 1931 a quota system started to be implemented towards foreign trade. It prohibited the importation of goods that could be produced at home. Imports of processed food, alcoholic beverages, perfumes, cloths, shoes and leather merchandise were completely prohibited.⁵⁶ Protectionist measures were all over the economy now. The necessity of creating an indigenous industry, independent of the foreign powers, was emphasized in the speech of government officials as well:

Despite the political and economic disagreements between them, the powerful industrial countries are in agreement in reducing agricultural countries to a status of primary producers and in dominating their internal markets. To this end, they will eventually use their political influence to prevent the present movement in the agricultural countries [...] this reality drives us to establish the industry we need without delay.⁵⁷

In addition to the international factors, Keyder notes domestic factors that contributed to the formation of the protectionist drive for industrialisation. The world economy had continued its enlargement all through the 1920s and within the enlarging economies, the merchant capital had been able to make use of the benefits of the system with least political limitation and when the political authorities were least interventionist. So, as long as the bourgeoisie was economically dominant and the merchants constituted either the political élite or the circles close to the regime, liberal policies were most demanded. However, as the economic growth started to decline due to the world economic crisis and the trade lost its most profitable condition, political authorities became relatively more autonomous and the suitable environment was “created” for the étatist policies of the 1930s. The 1930s became the years of the “state” and etatism that favoured policies for industrial capital rather than merchant capital.⁵⁸ The corporatist and populist discourse was already designing the legitimising ideological framework for this.

Especially from 1932 onwards, the state’s role in investment, management and production became the main feature of the period. It was during this period that the first serious steps were taken for industrialisation. The first five-year economic plan was concluded in 1933, aiming to establish the following industries: textiles (cotton, hemp, wool), mining (iron, semi-coke, coke, copper, sulphur), cellulose (paper and artificial silk), earthenware (ceramics, glass and bottles) and chemicals (chlorine, caustic soda and super-phosphates).⁵⁹ The basic goals of this plan were “self-sufficiency”; to produce the goods necessary for local consumption in peace and war and to establish industries that utilised local raw materials. The first five-

year plan was implemented to a large extent successfully and most of the basic industries were established by 1938.

Agriculture developed quite well during the period as well. The foreign trade deficit recovered and, except for 1938, the Turkish trade balance was positive during the period. During 1930-39, the trading bourgeoisie that had become strong during the previous-years lost its privileged position; especially those among them who were engaged in importing goods now subject to protectionist policies. On the other hand the elements of the bourgeoisie that had supplemented the state's investment rather than acted as its rival, and that acted in cooperation with the state in the industrialisation project, managed to benefit greatly from the étatist policies. Owen and Pamuk note that it would be difficult to say that the advent of the state sector had hurt and led to dramatic declines in the profits of the private productive capital. They say that the state, by investing in large, expensive projects in intermediate goods and providing them as inputs, helped the growth of private enterprise in the manufacturing of the final goods for the consumer. The private sector continued to be supported and subsidised all through the 1930s. Although the benefits to the bourgeoisie were significant, it should also be noted that there was a growing concern in the private sector about the increasing pace of state sector development and about how far the growth of the state sector would leave them room to operate in the market in the future.

1940-45: WAR ECONOMIES

With the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, on November 10th, 1938, İsmet İnönü became the President of the Republic and single party rule continued. Strict compliance with the Kemalist principles was pursued up until 1946, when multi-party politics became operational in the country. Then, some concessions, especially

in the religious education would be given, which would affect the developments in the coming decades.

During the 1939-45 period, the Turkish economy was affected by the war economics. Although Turkey did not enter the Second World War and remained neutral until the end, it was affected by shortages in the world market. It had to increase its army from 120,000 to 1.5 million and keeping and equipping this army brought great economic strains for the economy.⁶⁰ The government had to increase taxes and print money to finance these expenses. In 1940, a new wave of state intervention came with the implementation of the National Defence Law (*Milli Koruma Kanunu*) that gave the government full authority to fix prices, demand materials and impose forced labour.⁶¹ An important development was the initiation of the “wealth tax” that was put into force by the RPP during this period to increase the state budget. Although it was a tax imposed on all wealthy people, the national minorities were the most affected ones. The main implication of the “wealth tax” was that it led to the suppression and impoverishment of the minorities that had loose ties with the authorities. Most of the members of the minorities had to sell their property to pay the tax, generally to the “nouveau riche” of Anatolian roots. During this period there were stories about the newly urban conservative people (*hacıağa*) that bought the properties of the minorities for very low prices and then became richer by using these properties.

The war years also enriched the landowners and the merchants that depended on trading agricultural products. This period is significant in the sense that although some groups, like the high bureaucrats and the Anatolian merchants that had special ties to the ruling élite, had been enriched by the policies of the RPP, the rich bourgeoisie of Istanbul that had international links and was composed of minorities was estranged by the “wealth tax”; so were the big farmers and

landowners by the “soil products tax” (*toprak mahsulleri vergisi*) and the “Law for Village Institutes and Land- Giving Policy for Peasants” (*Köy Enstitüleri ve Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu*).

Table 3.1. Basic Economic Indicators, 1923-46

	1923	1929	1939	1946
Population in millions	13	14	17.5	19
Life expectancy at birth	35	35	35	38
Share of urban population (%)	16	17	18	18
Share of agriculture in labor force %	-	80	77	77
GNP in current US\$m	570	1000	1600	2450
GNP per capita in current US\$	43	70	90	130
Share of Agriculture in GNP %	40	52	39	46
Share of manufacturing in GNP %	12	9	17	13
Share of total industry including construction in GNP (%)	16	14	22	18

Source: Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, p. 244

By 1946, as can be seen from the table, the GNP of the country had increased greatly since 1923. The population increased since the war and mostly remained rural during this period. The share of industry and manufacturing increased during the first years of the étatist period, jumping from 9 percent to 17 percent, but with the beginning of the Second World War it began to decrease. The wealth tax that was implemented at this point, and the moving of minorities that were the main group of industrialists out of Turkey also had a significant impact on this. A decrease is seen in agriculture contribution between 1929-39 as the state had embarked on a state-led industrialisation drive, and agriculture was rather neglected. However, its increase is again seen with the war years. Within a few years, change was to come to the Turkish political and economic scene with transition to multi-party politics.

AN EARLY 'ISLAMIST' RESPONSE

As shown above, it is interesting to see that any time a political party as an opposition was founded all the conservative and anti-secular elements gathered around and supported this party. This shows the reactionary nature of the Islamic response in the initial years of the Republic. Reaction was generally voiced against the reforms and the definition of modernisation. The abolition of the caliphate and the implementation of secularism as a principle of the Republic particularly alienated the religiously conservative segments of the society and led to their opposition towards the regime and the ruling élite. However, the regime was successful in suppressing the reactionary opposition and was also successful in enlarging the circle of centre forces, making alliances with different groups. Bureaucrats, officers, teachers, doctors, lawyers and entrepreneurs of larger commercial enterprises became the backbone of the Kemalist regime and supported the modernisation project, while large segments of the rural population, small craftsmen and traders remained attached to the traditionalist culture in the country.

It should be kept in mind that the Kemalist secularism was not against religion and the religious practices within the society; however, it was against the use of Islam for political purposes, especially the mobilisation of the masses against the modernisation process. In time, the policies of the government that aimed to control religion led to even greater opposition in the society, being understood as measures against Islam itself. Despite restrictions, during this period, Muslim movements that we can identify as exhibiting an early 'Islamist' tendency continued their existence even if they were pushed into the underground organisations. The religious orders, especially that of Sait Nursi, known as *Nurculuk*, became an important movement that conducted activities via an underground organisation in the 1950s. Authenticating modernity, taking God's unity as the basis of the individual's life but

at the same time learning about technology and science and using them in the cause of Islam, was the basis of his ideas. While rejecting both secularism and nationalism, his reserved position from politics enabled him to survive political oppression. Although his writings were banned by the RPP regime, they were reproduced and distributed in hand-written forms by the members of the Nurcu order and its popularity grew in Turkey during this period.

Apart from the growing popularity of the religious orders, working from their underground organisations, there were critical opposing voices in the press. The journal called “Movement” (*Hareket*) started its publication in 1939 and is considered as the first legal Islamist opposition in the Republic.⁶² Şaylan notes that *Hareket* was able to gather the traditionalist and religious circles around its publication during these years. However, it did not constitute a major opposition and remained as a weak voice.

Until 1946 and the beginning of multi-party politics in Turkey, the issue of secularism and the role of Islam in the society were not openly debated in the public space. Expressions of identity based on ethnic and religious terms were suppressed and a nationalist, populist discourse dominated the public space. Turkish nationalism was seen as the melting point of all identities; Westernisation and secularism constituted the basic components of modernity in Turkey, and state-led capitalism was the key to economic development and prosperity. All these components of Turkish modernity were seen as unquestionable, as the only way to catch up with the Western powers. The demands for change in these principles and especially the calls for a more significant place for Islam in society were heard loudly after 1946, with the implementation of multi-party politics. Until that period, the reforms that started with the Tanzimat period and reached its peak with the Kemalist modernisation

project went rather unchallenged and if there was any challenge it was harshly suppressed.

SUMMARY

The period under consideration is characterised by a definition of modernity that is composed of capitalist industrialisation, nation-state structure and a homogenous national identity that rests on secularism and Westernisation. The nascent Islamist circles challenged the notion that modernity was necessarily equated with Westernisation and in particular they challenged the secularist pillar of the modernisation project during this period. At the same time, the regime's policy of industrialisation started the process leading to the evolution of new classes in the country. However, the combination of corporatist rhetoric and single party rule made collective action based on class difficult. The collective action during this period revolved around the theme of 'duality' in the society as the class based collective action was not possible at the time. However, all kinds of organised opposition were suppressed by the state – the military bureaucratic élite – to secure the continuation of the modernisation project.

¹ Erik Zürcher, Turkey - A Modern History, (London: I.B.Tauris, 1993), p. 59

² Çağlar Keyder, Dünya Ekonomisi İçinde Türkiye(1923-29) (*Turkey in World Economy, 1923-29*), 2nd Edition., (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1993), p.10

³ Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-1985 (*Turkish Economic History 1908-1985*), 5th Edition, (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınları, 1995), p.15

⁴ Zürcher, Turkey - A Modern History, p. 61

⁵ Şerif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey : the Case of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, (Albanu: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 182

⁶ ibid

⁷ ibid, p. 135

⁸ Zürcher, Turkey - A Modern History, p. 70

⁹ ibid, p. 71

¹⁰ *ibid*, p. 91

¹¹ This event is known as the 31 March Riots, as in the Ottoman calendar of the time, the date was 31st of March.

¹² Dilek Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey, (Leiden: Brill, 1998), p. 79

¹³ *ibid*

¹⁴ (Pan)Islamists can be identified as those who had the notion of an Islamic political structure based on the whole umma rather than the nation-states. They can be distinguished from modern 'Islamists' who have been defined before in the thesis as members to Islamist movements that are the organisational ideologisation of Islamic revivalism with an implicit or explicit political agenda.

¹⁵ Dankwart A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955" in Richard Frye (ed.), Islam and the West, (The Hague: Mouton&Co, 1957), p. 73

¹⁶ Dankwart A. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955", p.73

¹⁷ Arnold Leder, Kemalist Rule and Party Competition in Rural Turkey: Politics and Change in an Anatolian Community, PhD Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, Indiana University, 1974, p. 9

¹⁸ *ibid*

¹⁹ *ibid*

²⁰ *ibid*, p. 14

²¹ Emre Kongar, 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye (Turkey in the 21st Century), (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1998), p. 102

²² Ergun Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crisis, Interruptions and Reequilibrations" in Ergun Özbudun (ed.), Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey, (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1988), p. 12

²³ Zürcher, Turkey - A Modern History , p. 5

²⁴ There are two different arguments regarding the continuity of the elite, within the context of continuity of CUP and the Kemalists. While Zürcher argues that Mustafa Kemal and his close circle represent a continuation of the CUP; Feroz Ahmad denies the continuity, saying that the competition between the Kemalist circle and the former CUP leaders continued after the independence, ex-CUP members forming the first opposition party, Progressive Republican Party against Mustafa Kemal's People's Party in 1924. Details of this discussion will not be examined here. For the two different views see Zürcher, Turkey - A Modern History and Feroz Ahmad, "The Progressive Republican Party 1924-1925" in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, (London: I.B.Tauris, 1991), pp.65-82

²⁵ For a detailed study of the People's Party and its formation, see Frank Tachau, "The Republican People's Party 1945-1980", in Heper and Landau (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, p. 99-118

²⁶ Reşat Kasaba, "Populism and Democracy in Turkey – 1946-1961" in Ellis Goldberg, Reşat Kasaba & Joel Migdal (eds.), Rules and Rights in the Middle East, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993), p. 45

²⁷ Feroz Ahmad, "The Progressive Republican Party 1924-1925" in Heper and Landau, Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, p.70

²⁸ *ibid*

- ²⁹ Kemal Karpat, Türk Demokrasi Tarihi – Sosval, Ekonomik, Kültürel Temeller (History of Turkish Democracy – Social, Economic and Cultural Core), (Istanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1996), p. 59
- ³⁰ Feroz Ahmad, “The Progressive Republican Party 1924-1925” in Heper and Landau (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, p. 75
- ³¹ Zürcher, Turkey - A Modern History, p. 178
- ³² *ibid*, p. 180
- ³³ Niyazi Berkes, “Historical Background of Turkish Secularism”, in Richard Frye (ed.), Islam and the West, (The Hague: Mouton&Co, 1957), p. 67
- ³⁴ Dilek Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey, p. 80
- ³⁵ Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, (London: I.B.Tauris, 1998), p. 13
- ³⁶ See both Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-1985 and Roger Owen & Şevket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century for this point.
- ³⁷ Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-1985, p.31
- ³⁸ Çağlar Keyder, Dünya Ekonomisi İçinde Türkiye(1923-29), p.26
- ³⁹ *ibid*
- ⁴⁰ *ibid*, p.43
- ⁴¹ Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, p.15
- ⁴² Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-1985, p.47
- ⁴³ Walker F. Weiker, “The Free Party, 1930” in Heper and Landau, Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, p. 85
- ⁴⁴ Dilek Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey, p. 81
- ⁴⁵ Walker F. Weiker, “The Free Party, 1930” in Heper and Landau, Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, p. 87
- ⁴⁶ *ibid*, p. 88
- ⁴⁷ Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 96
- ⁴⁸ *ibid*
- ⁴⁹ *ibid*, p. 101
- ⁵⁰ Quoted in Ergun Özbudun, “State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey”, in Larry Diamond (ed.), Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries, (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1993), p.254
- ⁵¹ For details of the Kadro Movement see Mustafa Turkes, “The Ideology of the *Kadro* (Cadre) Movement: A Patriotic Leftist Movement in Turkey”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1998, pp. 92-119, Mustafa Turkes, Ideological Tendencies in the Republic of Turkey: The Case of Kadro (1932-1935), Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, University of Manchester, 1993
- ⁵² Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey, p. 103

⁵³ *ibid*, p. 104

⁵⁴ Galip Yalman, "The Turkish State and the Bourgeoisie in Historical Perspective – A Relativist Paradigm or a Panoply of Hegemonic Strategies?" in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), The Politics of Permanent Crisis – Class, Ideology and State in Turkey, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002), p. 31

⁵⁵ Dilek Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey, p. 81

⁵⁶ *ibid*, p.82

⁵⁷ *ibid*, p. 95

⁵⁸ Çağlar Keyder, Dünya Ekonomisi İçinde Türkiye(1923-29), p.4

⁵⁹ Dilek Barlas, Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey, p. 97

⁶⁰ Zürcher, Turkey - A Modern History, p. 207

⁶¹ Zürcher, Turkey - A Modern History, p. 207

⁶² Gencay Şaylan, Türkiye’de İslamcı Siyaset (*Islamic Politics in Turkey*), (Ankara: Verso, 1992), p. 92

CHAPTER 4

TURKEY 1946-1980: MULTI-PARTYISM AND CLASS BASED SOCIAL MOVEMENTS?

During the period under consideration in this chapter, multi-party politics and democratic elections were held regularly in the country, confirming the Kemalists' perception of the nature of the public space. In 1960, a coup d'état was carried out by the military and the role of the army in the Turkish political life became more explicitly evident although the country returned to democratic rule in 1961. Military intervention was repeated in 1971 with a memorandum sent to the government and in 1980 with another coup. Different class identities and collective action based on class were seen during this period. However, class was not the only source of collective action. Vertical stratification patterns and ideological cleavages also played roles in parallel to that of the class and the duality in the society shaped around the élite-mass gap occupied a major place in the political life of the country.

THE INTRODUCTION OF MULTI-PARTY POLITICS – A TURNING POINT IN TURKISH POLITICS

It is important to understand the factors that contributed to the introduction of multi-party politics at this stage. As the Second World War ended, the domestic forces in Turkey combined to demand political and economic changes from the government. Many social groups were already dissatisfied with single party rule by 1946. Wartime policies, especially the economic policies of the RPP, alienated a large group of the population. The dissatisfaction and differences of opinion within the RPP also intensified and turned into an intra-party opposition during the discussions

on the land reform in 1945. The Republican People's Party had been proposing a land reform law to improve the rapidly deteriorating conditions of the peasants. Despite increasing agricultural production, the peasants were the most badly affected segment of the society during the Second World War. This was due to some new regulations implemented as the war started such as the obligation to sell agricultural products to the state, which set the prices lower than the market price in order to keep the price of bread and cost of food at a low rate in the cities. The amount of production that was asked from the peasants was determined by the state before the product was actually produced and the amount except those left for the subsistence of the family and the seeds for next season were to be sold to the state at a low price.¹ In the face of the dissatisfaction of the peasants with these policies the government, in order to get their support, proposed a land reform bill in May 1945, which became a Law in June 1945. This bill led to open opposition to the RPP from the large landowners who had been the main allies of the regime in the countryside.² The Land Reform Law foresaw the redistribution of land and supplied the necessary equipment for those landless peasants or those that own very small amount of land. The lands to be distributed were firstly those that belonged to the state, the municipalities and the charitable organisations and those privately owned land that amounted to more than five hectares. In places where this distribution would not be enough, private land that was more than two hectares would be confiscated for distribution. The mostly debated item in the law was regarding the places where this distribution would not be enough either. Then the state would be able to confiscate land that was less than two hectares. This led to harsh criticisms in the Parliament as land ownership in Turkey was generally between 0.2-2 hectares and its confiscation effectively meant the abolishing of the landowning class all together. The support of the local notables with large land-holdings for the RPP in the countryside was

weakened with the discussion of the land reform in the Parliament. The reform in fact did not materialise as the debate intensified and opposition became more forceful. But it was significant in the sense that it alienated the landowners that were one of the main supporters of the RPP rule and strengthened the opposition to their rule.

After the debate on the Land reform started in Parliament, in June 1945 some prominent members of the RPP³ submitted a petition saying that the time had come for the democratisation of political life in Turkey. The petition called for more active parliamentary control over the government, increased individual liberties and especially more room for opposition. Despite the support of President İnönü for such a proposal, the party group of the RPP in the Parliament rejected the proposal leading to the resignation of the MPs that had supported the petition from the cadres of the RPP.

Facing such demands for democratisation, President İnönü was willing to open the political arena to democratic competition. He was well aware of the growing dissatisfaction with the RPP policies in society and knew that “heavy-handed autocracy would not be able to suppress it indefinitely”.⁴ Besides, İnönü himself is noted by many to have believed in a democratic experience for the betterment of the country, basing his argument on the view that “it has always been Atatürk’s aim to see the opposition party in the country”.⁵ Democratizing the political structure would also mean, according to İnönü, that another component to the Kemalist modernisation project formula - to make Turkey completely Western with a democratic political structure - would be manifested.

In addition to these domestic factors, external factors were also important for shaping this decision. The necessity for Turkey to “make friends in the West” against the growing aggression of Russia – seen especially in the latter’s increasing

demands on the Straits – drew Turkey closer to the West. Thus, the opposition and a working democratic competition in politics was an important component in this attempt. A new era was beginning in Turkey with the decision to embark on a transition to multi-party politics as “perhaps the most momentous decision affecting Turkish domestic politics in the post-Atatürk period”.⁶

Despite the reluctance of the RPP group in Parliament President İnönü declared in a speech on 1 November 1945, that the main shortcoming of the Turkish democracy was the lack of an opposition party and he announced the advent of general elections in a multi-party system scheduled for 1947. Shortly after the announcement, new parties were formed and most of them tried to reach the rural population by building party branches in all large communities as well as small towns and villages. 24 different parties were founded, most of which emphasised traditionalist values and the Islamic principles in their programmes. They were mainly challenging the secularisation and Westernisation pillars of Kemalist modernisation project. However, open attacks on secularism and Kemalist principles were not allowed according to the Constitution so the parties chose to attack the RPP as the vanguard of secularist principles, while calling for an increased emphasis on Islamic principles in political life.⁷ One of the newly founded parties, the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi* – NP), openly advocated an increased role for Islam in public affairs.

Among many parties that flourished at the time, the formation of the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti* – DP) on January 7, 1946 under the leadership of Celal Bayar and by the MPs opposing the Land Reform Law in Parliament and resigning from the RPP as a result of the discussion can be considered as an important development in Turkish politics. Shortly after its foundation, the DP leaders started to enjoy enormous support and were seen as the saviours of the people

from the 'elitist one-party rule' of the RPP. All the opposition forces to the RPP rule gathered around the DP as this new party had taken the mission of "mobilisation for freedom" or what the DP members termed "movement against despotism".⁸ This was manifested in their election slogan of "That's Enough!" (*Artık Yeter!*). DP candidates were met with great enthusiasm during their visits to different cities and became highly popular not as a result of the programme they were advocating, but mainly based on the credentials of being "against" the RPP rule. Their speeches revolved around issues like the high cost of living, lack of freedom and liberties and antidemocratic laws. Being alarmed with the increasing popularity of the opposition, the RPP government decided to hold the elections a year earlier, on 21 July 1946, trying to make use of the still unorganised party structure of the DP. Despite high support, having been formed just six months before, the DP could only put forward 273 candidates for the 465 seats in Parliament in the elections and surprisingly had only 62 of its candidates elected. This led to some rumours spreading about fraud and the RPP having manipulated the election results in its favour. The RPP received 395 of the seats, while six seats were taken by independents.⁹

Despite winning the elections with a large majority, the RPP was aware of the support that the DP gathered. By 1947, the Republican People's Party started to implement some policies advocated by the opposition, like the greater reliance on private capital and a new definition of etatism. The new five-year economic plan that was formulated by former *Kadro* members in 1946, with an emphasis on state control and etatism, had been amended in 1947 to suit the wishes of the Istanbul business 'Turkish Development Plan' of 1947, which emphasized free enterprise, the development of agriculture and agriculturally based industry instead of the heavy industry drive of the earlier periods.¹⁰ Economically, there was almost no difference between the programmes of the two parties – the RPP and the DP – after this

amendment. The only difference was that the DP wanted to sell state enterprises to the private sector, while the RPP wanted to keep them in parallel to the private sector. In the social rights sphere, in 1946 the RPP government lifted the ban on organizations with a class base, resulting in the formation of a number of trade unions. In 1947, with a new 'Law on Trade Unions', workers were given the right to organise in trade unions, but at the same time all political activity by trade unions as well as strikes were forbidden by this law. Despite the prohibition of politics in the trade unions, both the RPP and the DP tried to get the support of the trade unions for the coming elections. The DP promised to grant the workers the right to strike in return for their support in the next elections.¹¹ However, this promise was soon forgotten.

The main policy shift in the RPP after the 1946 elections came in response to the increasing opposition from other parties for a more liberal understanding in religious affairs. The DP joined the demands of the NP for a greater role for Islam in public affairs, "since Turkey was an Islamic country", and called for a moderate implementation of the principles of secularism without "damaging the religious feelings of the population".¹² Seeing the support such statements provide for the opposition, the RPP felt it necessary to implement some policies to enhance the role of religion in the society. During the RPP Congress in 1947, it was decided that policies about religion and secularism should be reconsidered and more moderate and tolerant policies against it should be developed. The main idea of this new policy was to see religion as a necessity in daily life and that people need religion like they need food for survival.¹³ Within this framework, religious education was introduced into primary schools, foreign currency was provided for people making *hajj* and a faculty of religions was founded in Ankara. From 1946 onwards, the Quranic courses were legalized and they spread all over the country in a very short

time. The religious orders that had been operating secretly after they were closed down by the reforms in 1924, had the chance of organising themselves within these Quranic courses with their legalisation. The graduates of these courses were appointed as imam and mufti and they started working as state officials, strengthening their position in the country. These groups would play a vital role in the “islamisation” of the country and the increasing religiosity in the following decades. By permitting and legalising these courses, the RPP gave the greatest support to its main opposition- the religious- traditional circles. So, we can say that the first liberalisations in religious affairs and a looser understanding of secularism started to be adopted during the multiparty years, between 1946-50 by the RPP government.¹⁴

1950-1960: THE DEMOCRAT PARTY YEARS

Despite adapting the policies advocated by the opposition, the RPP was not successful in winning the support of the majority of the population. The second multiparty elections held on 14 May 1950, resulted in the victory of the DP. The election results are shown below:

Table 4.1. Result of the 1950 General Elections

Total number of votes cast: 7 953 055

Participation rate in the elections: 89.3 percent

	Number of Votes	Number of Seats	Percent. of votes
Republican People's Party	3 176 561	69	39.5
Democrat Party	4 241 393	408	52.6
Nation Party	250 414	1	3.1
Independents	383 282	9	4.8

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 200

When the Democrat Party (DP) won the elections in 1950, a new era in the Turkish democratic experience began. The single party regime ended and the democratisation of the country had a chance to progress within this new

environment. After the elections, Celal Bayar became the President of the country and Adnan Menderes became the Prime Minister.

As noted above, the DP and the RPP were not very different from each other in the policies they proposed to pursue once they were in power. Their main difference stemmed from the composition of the party members and their origins. The RPP, in general, was composed of “elitist bureaucrats” – the military bureaucratic élite – that were removed from or never had local connections and roots. In the 1950 Parliament, the proportion of deputies representing their localities, places where they were born, increased to 60 percent¹⁵, in contrast to the figure of 34 percent in the 1935 Parliament. This supports the generally agreed idea that the DP was composed of members that had strong ties to local communities. This made them have a more traditionalist and conservative approach.¹⁶

The victory of the DP was often linked to its appealing policies for the masses. It was perceived as giving the ordinary citizens the chance to contribute to the political life. In the past, the only powerful people in the decision-making of the country were the élite – the military-bureaucratic élite. The peasants and the workers did not have any representatives in the decision-making process. The RPP found its supporters among the classes that would benefit not from mass mobilisation but from the expansion of state authority. Although the symbol of the peasant as a “fundamental Turk” came up very early in the Kemalist ideology, not much was done to alter the position of the peasants in the society.¹⁷ Although land reform was proposed, this came rather late and did not in fact materialise as it harmed the interests of the allies of the RPP in the countryside – the landowners.

The rural population was aware that it was paying for the prosperity of the cities, receiving very little in return. Despite providing for the urban population, their religious culture that constituted a significant factor in rural everyday life was

denied by the regime.¹⁸ Behice Boran in her work on Turkish villages in 1940s concluded that as the villages came into closer contact with the towns, the villager felt that his ways were inferior to those of the town and city.¹⁹ Just as these feelings of inferiority were escalating, the election campaigns started. By legitimising Islam and traditional rural values the DP was saying to the rural population that their ways were not inferior.²⁰ The politics of the RPP had already become fragile and its leaders could not manage to relate to the society they were living in, continuing their elitist approach. Thus, as state officials, the RPP adopted "an utopian vision of positivist social harmony".²¹ Against this utopia, the DP managed to formulate a programme that appealed to the masses and took over the power from the RPP.

The DP was the chance for the masses to be represented in the Parliament and it used the support of these groups to come to power. The DP was promising that it would bring services to the peasants; it would take the problems of his everyday life as a legitimate concern for politics; it would debureaucratise Turkey and liberalise religious practices. In C.H. Dodd's words,

The Democrat Party [...] fell foul of the bureaucracy [...] and began to mobilise people [...] in a populist fashion. They made a direct appeal through religion and other symbols, there being no classes or institutions through which to work as intermediaries.²²

Until the 1950, there was full agreement between the state élites and the political élite. Özbudun names this as the "unity of the élite", around the mission of transforming and modernising the Turkish society, defined by the Kemalist modernisation project. "Under the Kemalist rule, the élite is said to have become accustomed to unchallenged power and the prestige that accompanied it. Thus the RPP was bureaucratised and bureaucratic and political power was fused to create an apparatus to impose the officials' will on the public."²³ When the DP came to power, the "unity of the élite" was broken. Democrats mistrusted the military and the bureaucracy that they inherited from the old regime and devoted their efforts in controlling these circles.

THE GROWING POWER OF ISLAMIST POLITICS UNDER THE DEMOCRAT PARTY

When the Democrat Party came to power, its leader Adnan Menderes submitted the first government programme to the Parliament. It is important to note here that Menderes was making a separation between those Kemalist reforms that were accepted by the public as a whole and implemented and those that were not welcomed by the masses and were leading to resentment among major segments of the society. This distinction brought the questioning of secular reforms and opened the discussion of whether secularism was accepted in the society. By bringing the reforms into the realm of public discussion, the DP leadership was opening the “modernisation project” up for debate.

Although the evolving Islamist circles were supporting the Nation Party during the 1950 elections, the NP did not achieve the expected success in the elections, getting only one seat in the Parliament.²⁴ The Islamist media approached the victory of the DP with suspicion as the party did not make explicit claims or present a clear programme regarding their approach to the role of religion in the beginning. But with the issue of secularism starting to be discussed and the initial changes brought with it like the law enacted for the call for prayer to be done in Arabic (it had been done in Turkish under the Republican People’s Party), the reading of Quran and the programmes about Quran sent from the radio stations and the elective religion courses turning into must courses in high schools, these circles began to offer their support to the DP regime. The government made large amounts of funds available for religious education and *imam-hatip* schools during this period. Many new mosques were built – 15,000 between 1950 and 1960 – and Muslim tombs and shrines were reopened with the reasoning that they were “historical monuments”.²⁵ Intensive religious instruction to groups of children in many rural

localities was conducted.²⁶ Prime Minister Menderes made speeches in city congresses saying that Turkey was Muslim and would remain Muslim “regardless of the ideas of the staunch reformists”.²⁷ The Islamist media was applauding such speeches and were writing that the “Islamists are from now on willing to be the slaves of the DP regime”.²⁸ As the leaders of the DP made such speeches, demands for an Islamist society started to be heard from the city congresses of the party more loudly. There were discussions in party gatherings regarding the permission for religious clothing (*fes ve sarık*), the shifting of the weekend holiday from Sunday to Friday, restrictions on the working of women, demands for the expelling of female workers from workplaces, polygamy and multiple marriage, and the ending of girls’ education after primary school. Some of the MPs of the DP also started to give speeches regarding the Muslim nature of Turkish society and severely criticising the Kemalist period and the reforms.²⁹ Duman links the growing appeal of Islamic revivalism within party politics to the nature of the DP and its formation. Accordingly, the DP was composed of different groups of people gathering around the same aim: to abolish single party rule and to democratise the country. As a result of this general aim, it consisted of different people sharing different ideas. In addition to this, the Party was mainly based on local ties and local culture, compared to the universalist ideas of modernity of Republicans. This basis made the conservative elements more significant and the calls for an emphasized Islamic conduct more important in their discourses.

Despite such developments, the DP was not an Islamist party. It was rather trying to authenticate the modernisation project and make it more acceptable for the masses that until now had perceived it merely as an elitist, alien project. According to the leaders of the DP, by opening the secularisation pillar to debate, and giving more room for religion, the issues contested by the rural population could

be eased and the modernisation project with its capitalist development, nationalism and a loosened version of secularism and Westernisation could continue with increasing support. However, as the Islamist circles started to act more assertively within the DP, the party was forced to implement policies to curb their power.³⁰ The propaganda of the Islamist media against the Kemalists had intensified severely, beyond the limits of bringing authenticity to the modernization project. In the summer of 1951, some measures were taken against the Islamist media, *Büyük Doğu* and *Sebilürreşat*, members of the Tıcani tarikat who had filled the media with their attacks on Atatürk's statutes and Republican symbols, were arrested and the Law for the Protection of Atatürk was passed. The DP had to take some more measures when the writer of the newspaper *Vatan* was attacked and wounded in Malatya in 1952 and it was discovered that the Islamist media and groups had organised this crime. It was mainly after this event that the Menderes government started to make speeches to the effect that it would not let violence take root in the country. The city congresses of the party were also warned against allowing speeches against the secular order and some MPs were expelled from the ranks of the party. In 1953, a law was enacted prohibiting the use of Islam as a tool for seeking personal and political interest. These developments indicate the point made earlier that the DP rule was not against the modernisation project per se but rather aimed to authenticate it within a loosely defined secularism rather than the strict secularism of RPP. While doing this, although measures were taken against the Islamists at a later stage, the initial concessions given to these circles had encouraged the Islamist media and circles such that now they were ready to launch their independent movement and organise independently, without the protection of any other party.

The liberal environment that came with the DP in the early 1950s began to revert itself to 'authoritarian party' rule as the economy started to show signs of

stagnation and spiralling inflation by 1954.³¹ Measures against the opposition were increasing with amendments that tightened the Press Law, decreased the power of the opposition parties by amending the electoral law and curtailed the power of the bureaucracy by giving the executive powers the right to retire civil servants, including the university professors.³² The popular response against such measures was decisively negative. In the municipal elections of 1955, the RPP and the NP boycotted the elections and the electoral turnout remained only 37 percent. In the end, the DP had to make some adjustments in the amendments that it had made in the previous year and give assurances regarding the democratic nature of the country.

ECONOMY UNDER THE DEMOCRAT PARTY

The DP had advocated a liberal and anti-etatist economic policy since its foundation. Upon coming to power, it directed all its efforts at loosening the state controls on economy and encouraging the private sector. One of the first statements of the DP's Minister of Economy and Trade was that the government would take all basic economic decisions in collaboration with the business circles. Capitalist groups were strongly encouraged and the policy of creating a national bourgeoisie continued as the economic priority of the period. Manufacturing industry consequently increased as will be shown in the table below. The 1950s became important years for capital accumulation and the foundation of new private businesses. Most of the businesses that operate in Turkey today were formed in 1950s under the DP rule.³³ The number of private establishments more than doubled during this period, as well as the number of employees working in the private sector.

Table 4.2. Manufacturing Industry

Year	Number of Establishments (Total)	Number of Employees (Total)	Number of Establishments (Private Sector)	Number of Employees (Private Sector)
1950	2618	162 859	2515	86 826
1952	3026	181 856	2911	99 741
1954	3850	217 121	3704	139 160
1956	4610	241 578	4443	136 058
1958	5121	290 541	4926	172 689
1960	5503	295 989	5284	168 001

Source: *Statistical Indicators 1923-1998*, State Institute of Statistics, Republic of Turkey, p. 286-288

While the annual rate of growth for agriculture decreased from 11.5 percent between 1947-53 to 2.1 percent between 1954-62, the manufacturing industry's annual rate of growth increased from 6.5 percent to 7.6 percent for the same period.³⁴ One of the main mechanisms that encouraged the private sector was the credit provided by the state on favourable terms. The Industrial Development Bank (*Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi*), founded in 1950, played an important role in providing credit for the private industrial sector. The infrastructural projects that the DP government embarked upon provided an opportunity for the private businesses to prosper by working under state contracts. This kind of work proved to be most profitable for the private capital. In addition to that, foreign capital was encouraged and the integration of the indigenous bourgeoisie with Western capitalism and markets was supported.³⁵ The importation of necessary products and raw materials for the state sector industries was passed to the hands of the private sector during this period opening up another profitable area for the businesses. Unsurprisingly, the rumours of corruption in import documentation and the close relations between certain businessmen and politicians were widespread at this time. The cooperation between the bureaucrats, party officials and capitalists worked for the benefit of the capitalist class as state projects and credit opportunities were used to enrich the capitalist class further.³⁶ During this period, the inflationist means of financing the capitalist development led to increasingly unequal distribution of income and the concentration of capital in the hands of the privileged few: the big capitalists.

Besides a developing capitalist class, labour was also developing during this period. In 1952 the *Türk-İş* Workers Union was founded as an organisation to represent the interests of the labour class. However, the promised grant of 'right to strike' was forgotten by the DP regime and the position of the workers remained poor with low wages, long working hours and no bargaining power. Besides the increasing importance of the capitalist class and the working classes during this period, what is interesting to note here is the development of what Boratav calls a "buffer" group.³⁷ The growing number of people involved in small-scale production and services as well as the unstable lumpen-proletariat started to be seen during this period, increasing steadily in the following years.

The process of industrialisation was leading to the formation of class identities among the two main groups: capitalists and workers. However, the strong limitations on the formation of a class society have to be mentioned at this point. In addition to the recent nature of the industrialisation process, the profitability of investing in speculative areas for the private sector had obstructed a full-scale industrialisation. The opposition was challenging the DP's slogan of "a millionaire for each neighbourhood" (*her mahalleye bir milyoner*) as it was encouraging solely capital accumulation, not investment.³⁸ The dependence of private capital on the state and state credits and projects was on the other hand hampering an independent bourgeois class and the deepening of class identities. In addition to these factors, the duality in the society between the military-bureaucratic élite and the traditional-liberal circles also affected collective action. The horizontal stratification, developing with the classes, went hand in hand with the vertical ties and the duality that underlined the differences based on non-class factors. Therefore, it is difficult to talk of a class structure and identity at this period or of collective action that was based on class.

Within the economic policy of the DP, not only the private capitalist sector but also agriculture was given an important place. Drawing most of its support from the countryside, the DP rule contributed to the economic improvement of the agricultural sector. During this period, the high increases in the cultivated area – 55 percent – led to a doubling of the agricultural output. The government implemented the Land Distribution Law of 1946, not for the distribution of large private landholdings as it originally foresaw, but for the distribution of state owned lands. Under this law, communal pastures were transferred to peasants and village cooperatives. This also served to strengthen small land ownership across Anatolia. One of the important contributions was made with the mechanisation of agriculture. The Democrat Party used Marshall Plan aid to finance the import of agricultural machinery and especially tractors. Wealthy landowners purchased most of these tractors with favourable credits from the state banks. This helped to increase the cultivated area and productivity in the agricultural sector. Despite these policies, the weaknesses of the agricultural sector nonetheless became evident especially after 1953. Anatolia continued to rely on dry farming; irrigation was not one of the priorities of the government and with the ending of expansion of cultivated land, the stagnation in agriculture started to show itself.

After 1954, Turkish trade balance deficits became chronic and IMF policy advice regarding stability policies became the main issue in the political economy of the country. However, against all the “advice” of the IMF for devaluation, deflationist policies and liberalisation of foreign trade, the Democrat Party regime chose to implement the National Protection Law (*Milli Koruma Kanunu*), to control prices and markets, implement import substitution policies and pursue inflationist policies that were followed by the populist policies.³⁹ Constituting two thirds of its electoral power, the Democrat Party could not accept low incomes for the

agricultural sector. This was one of the reasons why it started to implement subsidies and protective measures for the agricultural sector, which would later cover most sectors of the economy.⁴⁰ It was only after the 1957 elections that the government agreed to implement IMF policy advice, introducing a major devaluation and implementing the stabilisation programme that included import liberalisation, changes in export regime, removal of price controls, increases in the prices of state economic enterprises and a rescheduling of external debt. While inflation was reduced and the balance of payments picture was improved as a result of these measures, the severe recession continued into the following decade.

As the economic situation of the country began to deteriorate by the late 1950s, again the use of Islamic symbols as propaganda increased in the ranks of DP, indicating an Instrumentalist use of Islamic discourse by this party. Even alliances with some religious orders were openly pursued in order to make up for the losses in the economic sense. Besides, attacks on the Republican People's Party and Kemalist principles were openly continuing in the Islamist media and the DP was seen as the party encouraging such attacks.

THE 1960 MILITARY COUP

The Turkish military initiated a coup on 27 May 1960. Although this coup had many reasons, the attacks on Islam and the Kemalist principles were offered as one of the main explanatory factors. There is agreement among many researchers that the 1960 coup demonstrated the quest of the military-bureaucratic élite to return to the centre, to revive their diminishing role in the nation's politics. William Hale notes that under the DP regime, which encouraged the individual citizen, rather than the state (primarily represented by the army and the civil bureaucracy-the military-bureaucracy), the army officers "felt robbed of the central role in Turkish political

culture that they had traditionally enjoyed".⁴¹ Since Ottoman times the army played a major role in the political life of the country and this had been sustained under the RPP. However, during the era of the DP rule, a policy of "debureaucratizing" the country was pursued and the official élites lost not only their representation in the parliament and their close links with the political élites but also much of their economic power, prestige and influence in the society. Özbudun says that this coup can be seen as a reaction of the official élites - both the military and the civilians - against the decline in their power, prestige and status in the society.⁴² Hale writes about the deteriorating conditions of the military economically. He quotes from Kenneth Fidel saying that

the army was not the only group that was hurt. The teachers and the government employees were also pushed aside by these people from the villages. They could no longer afford to live in the good quarters of the town [...]. They could not afford to buy clothing any more. All these people were stripped of the one thing that kept them proud throughout the years - the self-respect and their pride at being the most advanced sector of the population was taken away by the cost of living and the newly rich farmers and merchants.⁴³

Mardin notes the point that the 1960 coup once again underlined the "cleavage between the centre, now identified with the preservation of the static order and the periphery - the real 'party of movement'".⁴⁴ It seems that the mobilisational character of the rural populations that was achieved as a result of the reforms that were implemented during the RPP rule itself was not approved by the modernist-elitist cadres that initiated it.⁴⁵

No matter what the main motive of the officers was, they claimed to have intervened because "Atatürk's reforms were betrayed". When some of the interviews with the cadres that exercised the coup are considered, they were saying that "the 27 May Revolution (1960 coup) was a rising up of the present generation trained by the revolution of the great Atatürk from those who, during the past ten years, wanted to upset and destroy it out of a thirst for power".⁴⁶

The reaction of the Islamist circles during the coup period is interesting to note here. In the beginning, they were surprised and there was no reaction. But as the military leaders announced their respect for religion and did not ask for a return to prayers in Turkish, they started publishing articles supporting the army and the coup. They started to demand more religious freedom from the military leaders and asked for a complete retreat of the state from the religious affairs, leaving the ground for private institutions. Against such demands, the reaction of the army was very strict; it announced that it would "kill any kind of fundamentalist movement that would bring Turkey backwards."⁴⁷

Samuel Huntington notes that by the time the military in other countries of the Middle East started to play a reforming role; the Turkish army was intervening in politics "to curb the rise to power of a new business class supported by the peasants. The soldiers had not changed; they still supported the reforms of the Kemalist era. But now they were unwilling to admit to power social classes which might make changes in those reforms".⁴⁸ The case of Turkey is a proof, according to Huntington, that peasant support alone is not enough to sustain the regime of the masses; support of at least one of the major urban elements is needed: that of the intelligencia, workers or army.⁴⁹ The army had been an important part of the modernist-elitist project in Turkey. Yet, none of the other groups was strong enough at that time to create an alternative to the modernizing scheme. As the Islamist movement would start to produce its own intellectuals and "counter-élite", which is also a result of the Republican reforms, then the strength of the Islamist movement would grow in Turkey. This was to be the case especially after the post-1980 period.

The environment after the 1960 coup was relatively more liberal than the past.¹ The new constitution that was enacted by the military rulers in 1961 guaranteed basic rights and freedoms and adopted a more liberal approach to secularism, religion

and freedom of will. The main aim of the authors of the Constitution was to prevent a power monopoly of any political party and, therefore, counterbalancing institutions to the national assembly were founded. A second chamber called the Senate (*Senato*) was introduced and the regulation that all legislation had to pass through both chambers was brought into force. An independent constitutional court was introduced, which could check whether the laws were made according to the constitution or not and universities and media were guaranteed full autonomy under the new system. A full bill of civil liberties was attached to the constitution. Through the constitution, the military carved itself a special place within the politics of the country via the establishment of a National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu* – NSC); its constitutional duty was to advise the government on different policy issues. Composed of the leaders of different military forces and the head of the general staff as well as the related ministers – changing according to the subject under consideration – the role of the NSC increased in time, extending its influence in government policies.

According to the 1961 constitution, it was permitted to proselytise Islam and to spread its ideas, while it was forbidden to ask for an Islamic state and to try to change the basic principles of Republic in line with Islamist prescriptions. The controversial point here is that asking for an Islamist order was forbidden.⁵⁰

1961-1971: THE JUSTICE PARTY YEARS

On 13 January 1961, the ban on political activity was lifted and 29 October 1961 was set as the date of the return of power back to civilian forces after the elections that would be held on 15 October. The Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi* – JP) and the New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi* – NTP) were formed on the right¹ of the political spectrum to channel the votes of the now banned Democrat Party. The Justice Party

claimed that it was the continuation of the DP,⁵¹ but the NTP offered a similar political claim. Another party that entered the elections was the Republican Peasant's Nationalist Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi* – RPNP). This party was formed in 1948 as the representative of radical nationalist groups. They were entering the elections for the first time in 1961. They followed a “populist discourse and became the party of conservative, nationalist, rural middle classes”⁵² during the 1950s. The election results of 15 October 1961 are shown in the figure below.

Table 4.3. Result of the 1961 General Elections

Total number of votes: 10 522 716

Participation rate in the elections: 81 percent

	Number of Votes	Number of Seats	Percentage of Votes
Justice Party	3 527 435	158	34.8
Republican People's Party	3 724 752	173	36.7
Republican Peasant's Nationalist Party	1 415 390	54	14
New Turkey Party	1 391 934	65	13.7
Independents	81 732	-	0.8

Source: *Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 200*

Coming to power after eleven years in opposition, the RPP under the leadership of Ismet İnönü worked to form a coalition government. The first government was formed with the JP but this coalition did not work due to differences in party programmes and controversy regarding the amnesty of former DP members. İnönü initiated another coalition government in June 1962, this time with the NTP and RPNP. It was during this government that the first Five Year Development Program was put into effect and workers' rights were recognised. Details of the economic developments will be presented below. However, the differences between the parties of the coalition again rendered the working of the government inefficient. Issues regarding the five-year plan and the working of ministries caused great controversy between the parties. Thus, the RPP started negotiations for a third coalition government in December 1963, its partners in the second coalition having withdrawn from the government after one such disagreement. This time, the RPP

formed a minority government and managed to get support from the NTP in the Parliament, who saw that the Cyprus issue was escalating at the time and the necessity of a government to tackle with the issue was pressing more strongly in the Parliament.

In November 1964, Süleyman Demirel – a young and ambitious politician – had been elected to the leadership of the JP, after the death of the head of the party, Ragip Gümüşpala. Demirel aimed to prove the strength of his leadership and the new dynamism that came to the party with his election. It must be mentioned at this point that the leader of the party until that date - Gümüşpala - was a former chief of staff. The former DP supporters of the JP had resented the presence of a military figure as the leader of the new party. Under Demirel, they were integrated into the cadres, increasing the support for the JP in society.⁵³ In a bid to show his power in the parliament, Demirel carried out propaganda that resulted in the rejection of the 1965-year budget of the İnönü government. The government resigned as a response to this rejection and four rightist parties formed a temporary government that would last for eight months and carry the country to the new elections of 1965.

Like the DP, the JP under Demirel pursued populist policies. Demirel often repeated that the JP was a mass party “which represented the interests of all classes – city dwellers and villagers, workers and employers”.⁵⁴ The JP program gave significant importance to economic growth as a priority. This would require collaboration and harmony among different classes according to the JP; and such a harmony could be achieved by “melting particular interests into the nationalist one”.⁵⁵ Nationalism was seen as the guarantee for the unity of the country and class struggle was clearly rejected. However, class structure was emerging as capitalist industrialisation, despite being under state supervision, was taking root in the country. This would be seen in the coming years.

Just as the JP was enjoying the change with Demirel's dynamism, there was a change in the cadres and ideology of the RPP as well. As early as October 1964, the signs of this change were seen as the party adopted a declaration in its congress titled "Our Ideal of a Progressive Turkey" (written by Turhan Feyzioglu and Bülent Ecevit, "two intellectual leaders widely regarded as the rising stars of the party").⁵⁶ In this declaration emphasis was put on land reform, social justice, social security, economic development, 'democratic' etatism, education, secularism, the fine arts, nationalism, and youth.⁵⁷ In order to secure its position and increase its popularity, the RPP leadership had adopted a new slogan determining their place in the political spectrum: "left of centre". JP had attacked this new positioning of RPP by saying that the party was becoming leftist, on the "road to Moscow" (*ortanın solu, Moskova'nın yolu*).⁵⁸ The JP was emphasizing leftism as the basic threat to the unity of the country and was bringing an ideological aspect to politics that would lead to clashes along the right-left debate in the coming years. 1965 was the beginning of this dimension in Turkish politics.

The change of leadership in the JP and Demirel's populist discourse led to the victory of the JP under the leadership of Demirel in the 1965 elections. The election results were as follows:

Table 4.4. Result of the 1965 General Elections

Total number of votes: 9 748 678

Participation rate in the elections: 71.3 percent

	Number of Votes	Number of Seats	Percentage of Votes
Justice Party	4 921 235	240	52.9
Republican People's Party	2 675 785	134	28.6
Republican Peasant's Nationalist Party	208 696	11	2.3
Nation Party	582 704	31	6.3
Turkish Workers' Party	276 101	14	3.0
New Turkey Party	346 514	19	3.7
Independents	296 523	1	3.2

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 203

The 1965 elections are important firstly because of the transfer of power once again from the RPP that still represented the military-bureaucracy and the support for secularism and Westernisation in adherence to the Kemalist modernisation project, to the JP that represented the traditionalist-liberal forces. Another important aspect of the 1965 elections was the participation of a socialist party – Turkish Workers' Party (*Türk İşçi Partisi* – TWP). The 1961 constitution supported associational rights, providing leftists with the opportunity to develop their own organisations. The project of developing the capitalist class had been successful to some extent and started to bear its fruits by 1960s. The working class had been developing and increasing its power and collective action based on class had been emerging in the society. The TWP was formed as the representative of the leftist groups and the workers and working class identity in the country in February 1961 by a number of trade unionists. According to the party programme, except for the ownership of major means of production, private property would be supported and certain economic activities would be left to private initiative in a mixed economy framework. Despite its moderate stand, with no mention of socialism or a socialist economy, the party was questioning the capitalist development and state led capitalism in the modernisation project formula, rather aiming to form a “non-capitalist path to development”.⁵⁹ The TWP contributed to the ideological aspect of politics that developed after 1965, as mentioned above, by forcing other parties to define themselves more clearly in ideological terms.

Another party that entered the elections and got 31 seats in the Parliament was the Nation Party that represented the Islamist-conservative circles in the society. Founded in 1948, and having contested the 1950 elections before, the party programme asserted that the NP recognised the high importance of belief, morals, traditions in the formation of the social order.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CLASS IN THE POST-1960 PERIOD

The important point after 1962 is that the economy was regulated by 5-year plans. The main industrialisation strategy that was implemented after 1960 was the import-substitution industrialisation (ISI). The main industrial goods that had previously been imported were now to be produced by the domestic market, under the state's supervision. Until the 1970s, domestic markets produced basic consumption goods. With the 1970s, intermediary goods and investment goods started to be produced as well. ISI depended to a large extent on the growth and dynamism of the Turkish market. The state was supervising the process with precautions against external competition, production of basic goods and services, control mechanisms for distribution of resources, laws and regulations regarding the working conditions.⁶⁰ There was, in fact, a division of labour between the state sector and the private sector during this period. The state industries were directed to invest in large-scale intermediate goods industries, while the private firms took advantage of the opportunities in the heavily protected and more profitable consumer goods sector. From food processing and textiles in the 1950s, the emphasis in the private sector shifted towards radios, refrigerators, television sets, cars and other consumer durables.⁶¹ Within the "early" stages of ISI, as can be seen in the experiences of other developing countries, there were no problems in production and demand in the market since priority was given to consumer goods with a large market and easy technology.

During the 1960s, the private sector continued to enlarge and consolidate a foothold in the system. Some people have argued that the state and private capital collaborated during the 1960s.⁶² However, some others see this relationship as the dependence of private capital on the state and the former's vulnerability to policy

changes.⁶³ But whether as an equal partner or as a dependant on the state, the 1960s witnessed the significant growth of the big businesses. The role of the capitalist classes in the economic activity had been increasing since 1950 and the 1960s led to the further development of this class but in an unclear and insecure environment. The state was acting freely in intervening into the markets and issuing new investment plans whenever it thought appropriate regardless of the effects that these policies might cause for the private sector. In the 1960s, this arbitrary state intervention had become a common theme in the economy and the demand from the capitalist class for a more planned economy consequently increased in the belief that this would help them predict the actions and policies of the state. They demanded that the areas of operation of the state and the private sectors should be clarified so that businesses would know in which areas to invest and would be secure in such an investment. There were talks during this period about establishing holding firms and a new legal framework for family businesses, which would secure and institutionalise the business community.

In addition to the arbitrary interventions in the market, the system was criticised by small businesses for favouring the big Istanbul capitalists to their own detriment. Special incentives for businesses were granted during this period for the private sector but the eligibility criteria and the offices where the applications should be made were not clearly defined. In addition to that, low interest investment credits were provided by the state but the requirements that were necessary were again not specified. Both the bureaucrats and the politicians had a say in who could get the credits and apply for these special arrangements provided for businesses. This resulted in the big and established businesses having a greater chance in the competition for state credits than the smaller firms. The small businesses did not

have the same opportunities in this sense, struggling to survive and invest in areas in which the big industries were not interested.

The development of a capitalist class and the growth of capital accumulation in private hands were leading equally to the creation of a workers class and class-consciousness, an important aspect for the development of class politics. In the beginning of the 1960s, the workers' rights were seen as an important issue but nonetheless had a secondary importance to the place and rights of the businesses themselves on the agenda. Getting the right to strike with the 1961 Constitution, the workers were beginning to play an important role in the economic and political scene of the country. The secondary position of the workers started to change as their negotiating power against the employers increased and strikes were held in many instances.

Realising the increasing power of the classes, the JP regime tried to introduce corporatist structures to the rising classes – both the capitalists and the workers – in an attempt to control and incorporate both groups into the political life. The Justice Party was advocating a corporatist structure for the workers' union by saying that an independent and politically active labour union would promote class warfare and present new challenges to the authority of the state.⁶⁴ By the end of the 1960s, the *Türk-İş* leaders had brokered an agreement with the Justice Party leaders in which they were given the right to represent the workers and guaranteed access to policy-making, in return for continued moderation in exercising rights to strike and engage in collective bargaining. Thus, the “semi-official status and secure clientalism were to be exchanged for cooperation in reducing working-class demands and promoting social peace”.⁶⁵ However, this corporatist effort of the JP did not work. The factionalism inside the Turk-Is and the increasing power of the leftist ideology opposed a cooperation with the JP. The support of the workers was mainly

directed towards the RPP's new 'left of centre' discourse during this period and the support for the JP within the union was marginalized by the end of the 1960s.

The corporatist effort of the JP with the capitalist class was more successful as ideologically both sides shared common interests. The National Union of Chambers and Commerce, Chambers of Industry and Commodities Exchanges (*Türkiye Odalar Birliği* – TOB) represented simultaneously the interests of all merchants, industrialists and commodities brokers. The close cooperation of its members with the JP, most of whom had top positions in the JP provincial organisations, increased the importance of this board in the 1960s. However, within TOB the commercial interest groups were dominant and it was mainly with this group that the JP had close ties. The industrialists were not well represented in the organisation. Although they were cooperating closely with the JP in projects for investments, the industrialists also started to press the government for a change in the economic policy-making in their favour as against the commercial groups as the end of the 1960s was approaching. By the late 1960s, there was a growing demand on the side of the industrialists to transform the manufacturing sector into the fastest growing sector in the economy and they were making ambitious plans to accelerate expansion and compete in the foreign markets. As they were pressing for new arrangements from the government that favoured rapid industrialisation, they were facing resistance from the commercial circles. This conflict of interests was manifested in several occasions when the industrialists entered into confrontation with the commercial groups in the TOB: with the importers over foreign exchange rates and allocation of import licenses, with large retailers over price controls and distributorship rights, with agricultural exporters over taxation policy and land reform and with private bankers over interest rates and lending practices.⁶⁶ In an attempt to differentiate themselves from the commercial groups, in 1967, they

founded the Union of Chambers of Industry, but it was still under the directorate of TOB and the founding of an Industrial Committee with an independent budget and administration was not possible at this time. Therefore, efforts were channelled into the unofficial, voluntary organisations sphere and the industrialists founded the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (*Türkiye Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği* – TÜSIAD) in 1971. This association mainly represented the interests of the big industrialists, and aimed to promote capital accumulation in the hands of the industrialists at the expense of the merchant, banking and agricultural interests. Organised mainly by the Istanbul industrialists, the aim of forcing Turkish industry out of the protectionist shelter to make it competitive in the international markets was repeated as the strategy of TÜSIAD as against the calls for protectionism from the commercial sectors of the TOB. Calls to move away from producing high priced low quality consumer goods for domestic markets towards exporting competitive consumer items and earning foreign exchange from industrial as well as agricultural commodities were made in the meetings. This foreign exchange in return could be used to finance large scale importation of technology for the private industry to produce intermediate and capital goods.

The big industrialists managed to organise under TÜSIAD and became an important group in the interest representation of the Istanbul capitalists. Commercial capital was still represented in the TOB, in more of a corporatist fashion, in close relation to the ruling party – the JP. Within this context, the small industrialists that could not compete with the Istanbul capital in their drive for exports and were still in need of state protection were not represented and were faced with growing labour demands as cheap labour was becoming a thing of the past.

ISLAMIST POLITICS IN THE POST-1960 PERIOD

Until the 1970s, the Islamist circles continued their support for the JP, without realising that it was not the party of the masses but of capital. After the 1960 coup, the Islamists were seen by the rightist political parties not only as an electoral constituency but also as active members of the struggle to fight communism and the “dangerous leftist threat” in the country. They were incorporated in the Justice Party as a support against the “most evil threat of the time – communism”. Thus, during the JP rule in the country the number of *Imam-Hatip* schools increased from 4,548 in 1960-61 to 49,308 in 1970-71, with an increase in the number of teachers working in these schools from 337 to 1,547 for the same period.⁶⁷ The number of Islamist journals increased rapidly and the works of Islamist thinkers were translated into Turkish during the 1960s.⁶⁸ This was also the time when the influential work of Sayyid Qutb was translated. Turkish Islamist thinking was modernised, refined and shaped with the implementation of the new ideas of these thinkers. At the same time, the number of illegal Islamist organisations – in cell-like units – was increasing. Islamist associations among university students are important to mention here as well as the Associations for Establishing, Supporting and Maintaining Quran Courses in Turkey (*Türkiye Kuran Kurslari Kurma, Koruma ve Idame Ettirme Dernekleri*), the Federation for Assisting Men of Religion in Turkey (*Türkiye Din Adamlari Yardimlaşma Federasyonu*), and the Society for Distributing Knowledge (*Ilm Yayma Cemiyeti*). The number of these organisations reached 10,730 making up the 28.4 percent of all the associations of the country.⁶⁹

Just as the JP was cooperating with these groups to get their votes, Islamists were willing to be incorporated in the JP mainly because they thought the JP was representing their economic interests as well as their cultural and ideological positions. However, they would soon discover that the Justice party was not a

continuation of the DP as the party of the masses but rather served the interests of big capital. The interests of the small producers were neglected and policies were implemented to enrich the few big capitalists. The Islamists that supported the Justice Party soon felt the need to found another party that would represent their petit bourgeois and small handicraft interests. The National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi* – NOP) was founded by Necmettin Erbakan on 26 January 1970 within this context. Mardin notes that the formation of a party, representing the interests of the Alevi population of Turkey, within the liberal context of the 1960s, also encouraged the formation of a Sunni Islam party (NOP) by the beginning of 1970. The Alevi Party, Unity Party (*Birlik Partisi*) was not successful in the elections but it played an important role in the formation of a Sunni Islam party in the country.⁷⁰

THE NATIONAL ORDER PARTY

Necmettin Erbakan had been a professor of engineering at Istanbul Technical University, he worked in many industrial enterprises and, on 26 May 1969, he became the president of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. In politics, he was a prominent member of the Justice Party, where he represented the conservative-Islamist minded faction.⁷¹ He was an advocate of private initiative and he was trying to outbid Demirel and become the leader of the JP. Demirel was aware of the competition from the Erbakan side and played his cards to give the JP a younger and less conservative look. When Demirel was successful in this campaign, Erbakan decided to enter the Parliament as an independent MP and he was elected from the conservative city of Konya. Soon he formed the NOP, which the Islamist media welcomed. The daily *Bugün* assured its readers that the party would be the representative of the rightists and even announced the establishment of the party, before it was set up.⁷² The daily *Babı Ali'de Sabah* wrote that NOP was the party

“expected by every conservative (*mukaddesatci*) in Anatolia, the answer to all those who thought that the JP had veered leftwards, a right-of-centre party to protect the real interests of all rightists... and the proof of all these was that the party was anchored in Islam”.⁷³ In the party program, it was claimed that it was an ideological party with a forward look. The basic aims of the NOP were listed as:

realising the potential for the Turkish nation for morals and virtue, bringing order, freedom from anxiety and social justice to society, happiness and peace to all Turks, and moral recovery based on positive sciences and technology”. Call for “moral and material progress, a synthesis of Turkey’s great historical values and the democratic rule of law- to bring about prosperity and happiness, together with the civilisation that would serve as a model for the world.”⁷⁴

The NOP seems to represent the continuation of the pre-Republic ideas advocated by the conservative circles at the time, revolving around taking Western technology and leaving behind the cultural components. Thus, the positive sciences and technology would be taken but it would be combined with the “morals and virtue of the Turkish nation”, not Western culture. By emphasizing the ideological component in the programme, the NOP had placed itself safely into the rightist political spectrum, within the growing ideological politics of the 1960s.

By the end of the 1960s, class identities had developed to an extent that allowed the parties to base their policies on class. Being stuck between the big industrialists and the increasing power of the workers, the petit-bourgeoisie – the small traders, small producers and handicraftsman - felt the need to represent its interests within the traditionalist-Islamist politics. This point is seen in the party programme of NOP as well. Within the economic principles of the party, while it is against the concentration of capital in the hands of the few, it calls for more state support and help for the “industrialists” of provincial towns and the periphery (*taşra*). The NOP was not against capitalism per se, it was questioning the Kemalist modernisation project and presenting an alternative to it in an Islamic moral order.

NOP, which was born as a reaction of the small city bourgeoisie that could not compete with the bigger industry and trade bourgeoisie and could not get its share from the economic activity, has been perceived as the defender of Islam and by incorporating

economic discourses and means within its ideology, it gained an Islamist party character.⁷⁵

The petit-bourgeoisie thought that it would find in Islam what it had been losing under the capitalist system, and the NOP was successful in bringing the losers of the system together under the banner of Islamists politics.

However, it is not enough to explain the formation of the NOP only in terms of economic reasons. The ideological component, which stems from the duality of the society and goes hand in hand with the class identities, has to be considered here. The NOP represented the anti-Western, anti-secular reaction to the modernisation project of the Republic and the first independent representation of the "Islamists" that was until now being represented in the centre-right parties of the DP and JP. It is important to see during this period that class based social movements and action had been important but other cultural/identity dualities have to also be considered as a response to the Kemalist modernisation project. The NOP had represented the interests of the petit-bourgeoisie and appealed to their economic needs but it also presented an alternative ideology against the secular/Western conception of the modernisation project – a politicised version of Islam. But while doing this they did not challenge Turkish nationalism or modernisation per se.

According to the NOP ideology, Turkey's domestic problems could be divided into two: The first problem was economic: the dependence of the Turkish economy on foreign markets and capital and the low income per person with the unjust distribution of wealth posed a challenge to the nation. The second problem was what the NOP had been distinctively emphasising in its programme: the moral sphere. Accordingly, the Turkish educational system could not train the Turkish youth in line with the national targets because of the rejection of its history with the Kemalist reforms. The details of the NOP discourse will be presented in the following chapter on the discourse of Islamist parties in Turkey. The main point that

should be kept in mind at this point is that the NOP mainly adhered to the small businesses, which were excluded from the state – big capitalists cooperation and who were in the periphery with their anti-Western, anti-secular stand against the Kemalist modernisation project.

The military intervention of 1971 resulted in the closure of the NOP by the order of the Constitutional Court on 20 May 1971, on the grounds that it was against the basic principles of the Republic, especially those based on secularism.

MILITARY INTERVENTION OF 1971

Turkey was in turmoil during the 1960s. By the end of the decade, the struggles between the extremist movements on both the right and the left culminated almost in a civil war. The victory of the JP in both the 1965 and 1969 elections showed that there was no problem in gathering a majority in the Parliament and the government seemed to be successful with the seven percent annual growth rate of the GNP. However, the income was far from being evenly distributed. The radicalisation of the population, especially the university students, during the 1960s made a great contribution to the development of events. The Turkish Workers Party (TWP), in particular contributed to the radicalisation of the political scene. The disagreement within this party as to what kind of a strategy should be adopted to attain power led to confusion among party members and by the end of the decade the operations held by the leftist urban guerrilla groups became a part of everyday life in Turkey. The leftist formations and their radicalisation in turn led to a harsh response from the Turkish right and led to the formation of the “Society for the Struggle against Communism”. In addition to this organisation, which gathered the centre-right under its banner, the formation of the radical nationalist groups, gathered under the Nationalist Action Party (the former Republican Peasant’s Nationalist Party which

had radicalised its ideology during the 1960s and started to be known as the Grey Wolves) added another dimension to the whole picture. Details of these events will not be studied here, as this is not the main topic to be discussed. What must be kept in mind is the radicalisation of politics in Turkey especially by the end of 1960s when the nationalists and the leftists clashed with each other openly and when killings and attacks on each other almost led to a civil war in the country. This is what was named above as the "ideological clashes", struggles shaped around the different ideological positions taken by the left and the right since 1965.

In June 1970, industrial workers in the Istanbul-Izmit area joined in a massive march to protest a new law regulating union organisation and collective bargaining. The march soon erupted into a workers' riot involving over one hundred thousand demonstrators. This was the largest and most violent workers protest in Turkish history.⁷⁶ Nine months later, the government announced an austerity programme that led to further large political protests from every organised group in the society. Urban guerrilla groups launched a campaign of bank robberies and kidnappings to finance their activities. The Demirel government seemed to be paralysed in the face of all these developments. It was neither able to curb the terror in the streets and campuses, nor able to pass any legislation through the parliament. On 12 March 1971, the generals sent a memorandum to the Demirel government, demanding a strong and credible government "which will be able to end the anarchy and carry out reforms in a 'Kemalist spirit'".⁷⁷ The government was warned that if these demands were not met, the army would exercise its constitutional duty and intervene directly. The military was once more on the political scene of Turkish politics, this time not terminating civilian politics but intervening with a memorandum. Mardin underlines that whatever demands were made for a return to law and order in the country by different groups, the 1971 coup was again seen by

the periphery as a desire to “return to the rigidity of the old order.”⁷⁸ The Demirel government resigned after the memorandum and a board of technocrats was appointed as the new government of the country.

THE NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY

The Turkish Workers Party was closed down after the 1971 military memorandum and in March 1971, the NOP was closed down. On the Islamist scene, after the NOP was closed, it became necessary to form another party, with a similar agenda. On 11 October 1972, the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi* – NSP) was founded.⁷⁹ The NSP entered the general democratic elections in 1973 and got 11.8 percent of the votes, gaining 48 seats in the Parliament.

Following the basic ideas formulated in the NOP programme, the NSP adopted a more detailed and sophisticated programme with matured ideas. As the details of the discourse will be presented in the following chapters, only the main points in the NSP program will be mentioned here. According to the NSP, Turkey had a distinguished history in which it combined military power with the building of an Islamic civilisation. However,

the statesmen of *Tanzimat* had made an erroneous assumption in which the decline in the military power was seen as stemming from Islam and as a remedy decided to Westernise the country. It was rather this process of Westernisation that brought the glorious days to an end rather than Islam. In order to become a powerful world leader again, Turkey should abandon the Westernisation process and stop reliance on the Western countries.⁸⁰

According to NSP, there were three main opinions in the Turkish political life: the Republican People's Party represented the “leftist opinion”, the Justice Party represented the “liberal opinion” and the National Salvation Party represented the “national opinion” (*milli görüş*). Accordingly, ideas other than the national opinion are materialist: for the RPP, everything is material; for the JP, everything is money; while for NSP everything is morality. The RPP and the JP represented the two

infidel ideologies, which were doomed eventually to collapse, leaving the Islamist “national opinion” of the NSP dominant.⁸¹

The NSP’s economic ideology, just like that of the NOP, is dependent on the idea that the backwardness of the Turkish economy is due to its dependence on Western economies and capitalism. Turkey should use its own resources to develop its economy, rather than being dependent on Western capitalism. Developing the economy to the level of the industrialised countries is the main aim and the way to do it is to use the national resources. This approach was welcomed and supported especially by the small tradesmen and producers that were on the verge of becoming capitalists.

Regarding the question as to what kind of an electorate the NSP appeals, the results are similar to the supporters of NOP. Toprak writes that it receives its support mainly from the “marginal groups”, meaning both economic and social marginalisation. Mardin’s answer to the same question is revolving around the “centre-periphery” debate, as he says that

individuals who are unassimilated into the ‘modernist’ centre tend to support NSP in greater numbers than other groups in society. The prototype of a NSP supporter is a small merchant or an artisan; the man of the bazaar[...] It is precisely these social and economic failures with whom Kemalism has proved unable to cope, who in turn return to religion as an alternate reference point.⁸²

As with the experience of the NOP, although the supporters generally occupy lower-middle class backgrounds and local roots, the NSP candidates and parliament members are well educated, professionally successful, presumably from middle or upper middle class and relatively young. Thus the élite and mass culture has taken a new dimension during the 1970s and there no longer exists a monolithic élite culture, as existed after the formation of the Republic and which was represented by the military-bureaucratic élite. With the modernisations and reforms, a “counter-élite” had emerged, mainly from the countryside, bringing their conservative and traditional characteristics and different cultural orientation,

different than the Kemalist Westernists. Making use of the mass education opportunities and increasing mobility they became the "new élite" with "old values". Thus, within the context of the NSP in addition to the élite-mass gap that was explained above as the centre-periphery difference or as the duality we witness an "élite-élite gap",⁸³ with different cultural orientations.

THE 1973 ELECTIONS

The 1973 elections came at a time when class politics were at an intense stage in the country. This election is significant especially in the sense that it revealed the class structure, reflecting the different class positions in politics, making some to conclude that Turkish society was becoming a Western type of society divided in line with class differences.⁸⁴ This feature could, indeed, be seen clearly in the electoral campaign. The Justice party was advocating the interests of the bourgeoisie and the status quo. By pursuing populist policies, and claiming that they were the continuation of the DP, they were also giving the agricultural sector a place in their discourse, encouraging the support of the peasants. The RPP shifted more to the leftist discourse with its 'left of centre' slogan and was supporting the rights of the workers and the recent immigrants to the cities that generally filled the labour class positions and were politically conscious. The RPP designed its election campaign based on the concept of "change". The 'new' RPP was promising a 'new' order under its 'new' leader Bülent Ecevit. The NSP was attacking the present order, asking for votes to change the status quo in favour of the interests of the petit-bourgeoisie and the small business and tradesmen of Anatolian cities vis-a- vis the rivalry of the big capitalists of Istanbul and Ankara.⁸⁵

It must be emphasised once more here that, despite the class based political formations and the collective action, the duality in the society also

underlined some important aspect of political competition of the period. The disagreement between the reforming military-bureaucracy (following the Kemalist modernisation project) and the traditionalists (who called for an authenticised version of modernity, questioning the secularism and Westernisation pillars, or rejecting modernity altogether), developed side by side with class action. The analysis of the collective action of this period must take into account both the class dynamics and class based social movements as well as the duality and response to the Kemalist modernisation project. The development of political Islam in Turkey should be seen from this perspective.

Table 4.5. Result of the 1973 General Elections

Total number of votes: 11 223 843

Participation rate in the elections: 66.8 percent

	Number of Votes	Number of Seats	Percentage of votes
Justice Party	3 197 897	149	29.8
Republican Reliance Party	564 343	13	5.3
Republican People's Party	3 570 583	185	33.3
Democratic Party	1 275 502	45	11.9
Nationalist Action party	362 208	3	3.4
Nation Party	62 377	-	0.6
National Salvation party	1 265 771	48	11.8
Turkish Union Party	121 759	1	1.1
Independents	303 218	6	2.8

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 203

As shown in the figure, the RPP won 185, the JP won 149, and the NSP won 48 seats in the parliament. The 'left of centre' discourse was delivering positive results for the RPP in this election as it now started to represent the urban, working classes. There had been a significant shift in the RPP's voters' profile. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the main groups that voted for the RPP were the military, bureaucracy, state officials and the local notables in the small cities and provinces. Thus, the RPP used to get most of its votes from the least developed regions of the country where the local notables were cooperating with the party and channelling the votes of the area they influenced.⁸⁶ In the 1973 elections, the RPP got its greatest support from the most highly developed provinces; getting more than 50 percent of

the vote in the largest cities of the country (Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir). The leadership change for the first time since 1938 gave the party a dynamic outlook and the new 'left of centre stance' helped to gather the urban vote under its banner. While the JP was getting the support of the capitalists and the agricultural sector, through its populist policies, the NSP was now on the scene getting the support of the traditionalist, conservative petit-bourgeois groups.⁸⁷

It is interesting to see that as it entered the Parliament, the NSP built a coalition government with the RPP, which it had been opposing as anti-Islam, Western, immoral, infidel. It is interesting to see that the two groups that had been struggling within the political and societal arena for influence, and who personified the Western, anti-Western debate that had been going on for at least a century were now coalition partners destined to rule the country together. Despite all the differences in the ideology, Ahmad has said that the two parties shared a series of common points:

Both claimed to believe in democracy that guaranteed the fundamental freedoms, a mixed economy, and economic and social development with social justice [...] Both were committed to the protection of tradesmen and artisans and their small enterprises, which produced capitalist goods. Both sought working conditions that were humane and democratic, as well as social security and opposed to the exploitation of the people by 'big capital'.⁸⁸

As the NSP came to power with the RPP, it made great efforts to realize the "moral development" (*manevi gelişme*) that was noted as the number one priority in the party programme; it had built more than a thousand mosques, opened the secondary level of religious schools (*imam hatip okullarının orta kısmı*), giving the right to religious school graduates to enter any faculty after graduation like other high schools, and introducing courses on morality to secondary and high schools.

In line with the expectations, the coalition government of the RPP and the NSP did not last very long and in March 1975, a new coalition was formed, this time between the rightist parties of the period: the Justice Party, the NSP, the National Action Party and the Republican Trust Party. Being a part of the coalition

government for both terms, the NSP had the chance of filling up the state cadres with its supporters. It is noted that out of the additional 79085 cadres that were created, 20337 were filled by the institutions and organisations linked to NSP.⁸⁹

The 1977 elections resulted in the victory of the RPP. Now the 'left of the centre' discourse was bringing more supporters to the party under the leadership of Ecevit. This was also in line with the increasing immigration to the cities and the increase in the workforce. In the 1977 elections, the vote percentage of the NSP declined from 11.8 to 8.6 percent, decreasing the seats in the parliament from 48 to 24. Still, the votes of the NSP were coming mostly from the underdeveloped regions of the country. However, it lost some of its votes to the National Action party, which was linking strong nationalism with Islamism as its main ideology. As the percentage of its votes were declining (the number of votes had still increased from 1265771 in 1973 elections to 1271621 in 1977), the NSP was adapting a harsher tone, posing a more severe criticism against the government and asking for the implementation of Islamic laws more loudly in the post-1977 elections.

LATE 1970S – THE BUILDING UP OF THE CRISIS

As the end of the 1970s was approaching, Turkish socio-economic indicators showed a more populated country, with increasing urbanisation. The decrease in the share of agriculture in the GNP led to increasing migration to the cities, providing a workforce for the growing (albeit it gradually) industry.

Table 4.6. Basic Economic Indicators, 1950-1980

	1950	1960	1970	1980
Population in millions	21	28	36	45
Life Expectancy at Birth	44	50	58	62
Adult Literacy Rate (%)	33	38	52	69
Share of Urban Population (%)	25	32	39	44
Share of Agriculture in the Labour Force (%)	80	75	66	58
GNP in millions of US\$	3.4	10	19	70
GNP per capita in US\$	166	359	539	1539
Share of Agriculture in GNP (%)	42	38	36	25
Share of Manufacturing in GNP (%)	10	12	12	13
Share of Total Industry in GNP (%)	14	17	17	18

Source: Roger Owen and Sevket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century

Despite the huge increase in the GNP, economically the situation of the country was not good as the end of the 1970s was approaching. ISI had reached its second stage where the production started to demand more capital and high technology. With the increases in industrial production, importation for domestic production needed to be increased, leading to a foreign exchange crisis and a production crisis. The shrinking domestic market, decreasing productivity, world oil shocks and the increasing price costs for production and the lack of any formal mechanisms that could prevent the decreases in industrial profits as a result of populist policies that tend to increase the wages and salaries of working classes, all led to the crisis of the ISI regime. Within the context of world economic crisis in the late 1970s, Boratav and Türkcan name this small scale, low productive, high protection and increasing cost industrial structure as the “latest” phase of industrialisation where by production stagnated in Turkey by the late 1970s.⁹⁰

When the effects of industrial development of ISI are examined within the context of income distribution and income proportions we can say that until 1977, when signs of the crisis would be seen, economic growth continued to increase the

real incomes of the population in general. However, inflation rates started to rise steadily as well. Under ISI, industry developed faster than agriculture. However, populist policies towards the agricultural sector played a crucial role. Despite increases in industrial production, the agricultural support policies, subsidies and implementation of the lowest price rates for agricultural products made the balance of price relations on agriculture/industry basis turn in favour of agriculture during the period.

The rise in the inflation rate also eroded the value of salaries from the second half of the 1970s onwards. According to Kepenek, inflation was a result of the struggle between different groups for a higher share of the income distribution. Producers would increase the prices "as much as the market allows" to increase their profits. The market structure would also determine the amount by which the agricultural, industrial and service sectors could increase their income. In this situation the losers of the system would be those that could not increase their income according to the market conditions: wage and salary earners.⁹¹

By the end of 1979, crisis was affecting not only the wage-earning groups but the bourgeoisie as well. Unorganised state officials who were dependent on steady income of wages were the most affected group. Without the power to bargain and strike for increases in income, their position in society was deteriorating rapidly. Workers' syndicates were struggling to keep their bargaining power and keep the workers' wages as high as possible in this high inflation environment. The capital owners were seen as left with no other choice but to break the coalition with the workers as production was stagnating but the workers syndicates were pushing for higher wages. It was by 1979 that capitalists started calling openly for a change in the system, control of the workers' unions and syndicates and calling the government to create the "secure" conditions for capital and investment when the country was in

a deep political turmoil and instability, almost at the edge of a civil war. As the “coalition” between the capitalists and the workers collapsed we see the clash of interests and the class action developing as a result of the breaking up of this cooperation. However, the 1980 military coup would put an end to this class action.

Keyder calls the period until the late 1970s as the years of “national development” and the crisis of ISI by the end of the decade as the “bankruptcy of this national development process”.⁹² Since the formation of the Turkish Republic, the political élite – the military-bureaucracy – was trying to develop capitalist and bourgeoisie forces in society but rather than applying purely liberal policies, the state was always the major actor in determining the economic development. Despite some liberal periods, the main strategy was “national development” which was less dividing, less polarising and more populist, but at the same time “modernising” and “western”. The main aim of bourgeois creation would be materialised within this process as well but it would be encouraged to act in compliance with the state’s development policies. The working class would be kept satisfied with redistributive policies and a “classless” society was to be formulated within this process. As an ideal, national capitalism was to take a classless, corporatist form, under the control of the state élite.⁹³ With the collapse of the ISI policies, and the economic crisis that followed, this “national developmentalism” had disintegrated and what was witnessed was the “bankruptcy of this era”, to use Keyder’s terms.

FROM ISI TO EXPORT ORIENTED GROWTH STRATEGY – THE 24 JANUARY DECISIONS

It was in this environment that on 24 January 1980, the government announced a series of economic policies to remedy the economic deterioration of the country – known as the 24 January Decisions. Seeing the ‘bankruptcy’ of the ISI policies and

the deteriorating economy, a new set of policy measures was introduced that aimed to 'liberalise' the economy from state dominance, leaving the economic sphere to the market forces. The 'neo-liberal market economy' debate was introduced to Turkey with these measures. These economic policies aimed at controlling the inflation and stabilising the economy by encouraging exports and decreasing the state initiative and state estates in heavy industry and primary goods. Instead of the ISI policy, now the government was accepting a new strategy – export-oriented growth. The new economic programme included some major elements of reform in the economy such as replacing the overvalued currency policy with a 'real value currency' in order to increase the exports, market forces determining interest rates and prices rather than the state, ending subsidies on the goods produced by the state sector, which led to an increase in the prices of the goods. Further, it foresaw reforming the state economic enterprises and abolishing of the policy of unlimited employment in these establishments, limitations on state expenditure and a tax reform accompanying it, encouragements for foreign investment and the opening up of the state owned enterprises for private domestic and foreign investment.⁹⁴

The Prime Minister of the period, Demirel, was talking about the necessity of these measures saying, "Whichever of the countries in the world faced with economic problems like ours, they had to take these measures. That is why we had to implement these policies that we know are not very pleasant, but that will take us out from darkness to bright horizons."⁹⁵ 'The 24 January Decisions' were not solely the innovation of the government but included measures advocated by the IMF and World Bank's structural adjustment policies. The close relations with the international organisations, especially the IMF and the World Bank, played a crucial role in the implementation of the new policies. Owen and Pamuk note that these international bodies saw Turkey

as a shining example of the validity of the orthodox stabilisation and structural adjustment programs they promoted [...] Their support translated into better terms for rescheduling the external debt and the substantial amounts of new resource inflows. As a result foreign exchange constraint disappeared practically overnight and the public sector had less need for inflationary finance at home. These were undoubtedly vital ingredients for the success of the program.⁹⁶

During the 1980-84, Turkey received five successive structural adjustment loans from the World Bank, which was a record number. By the end of 1984, the cooperation with the World Bank continued with the 'sectoral adjustment loans'. The scale of resources that had been given to Turkey provided a freedom of action on the side of the policy-makers and secured the government's autonomy from the societal pressures. However, the programme was not immune to criticisms and protests. One of the most important problems of the economy was seen as the inward looking, small scale manufacturing sector that operated on high profit margins and, as a remedy, opening up to the competitive international markets was proposed. This policy had already been supported by TÜSIAD since 1971, its formation. However, except for the big industrialists of TÜSIAD the commercial sectors and large companies that operated safely under state protection during ISI had concerns about their future operations and how to adapt to the new system and opposed to the opening up of the market forces.

An important item in these policy measures is the limitations on the wages of the officials and the cuts on the agricultural subsidies. It must be kept in mind that the government chose to implement policies limiting the income, especially the salaries and the wages for decreasing the internal demand rather than "monetary" policies. The need to control the wage and salary increases became the call of the new programme that led to concern on the side of the wage/salary earners. Faced with a high inflation rate, the already deteriorating positions of the wage/salary earners would further decline faced with constant income, when everything else's price increases. This is why these policies are seen against the labour and salary

earners and as the "counter-attack of capital" after long years of populism. Against pressing opposition, had the military coup of 12 September 1980 not happened, the success of the programme would have been hampered to a great extent. Under the military regime, it was possible to pursue the policies and not consider the political outcome, as the military did not share the political concerns of losing votes or seats in the parliament for the next elections.

Along with the economic problems and severe economic measures, the political scene was not stable either. There was a dramatic increase in the level and scope of political violence that spread to most parts of the country and claimed more than 4,000 lives between 1976-1980. As Sayari notes "by 1980, the possibility of another military takeover had become a matter of public discussion as many Turks, including some segments of the civilian political élites, began to express their open or tacit support for a military solution to the escalating crisis".⁹⁷

SUMMARY

To summarise the developments during the period under consideration, emphasis could be placed on developing class politics in the country along with the theme of duality that underlined the collective action in the society. Against the military-bureaucratic élite, there was the development of a 'counter-élite' that began to challenge the definition of modernity during this period. While the element of Turkish nationalism was not challenged, the Westernisation, especially the secularisation pillar of the modernisation project, came under increasing attack. During this period, the public space was tightly controlled and contained by the military and it intervened every time the challenge to the Kemalist modernisation project became too strong. So, during the period under consideration, the tensions in the society, manifested both in class and duality terms, had been contained by the

political system within which they operated, especially by the military-bureaucratic élite.

¹ Kemal Karpaz, Türk Demokrasi Tarihi – Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kültürel Temeller (*History of Turkish Democracy – Social, Economic and Cultural Core*), (Istanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1996), p. 102

² Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, (London: I.B.Tauris, 1998), p.105

³ The include Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Fuat Köprülü, and Refik Koraltan. For the details of the issue see Emre Kongar, 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye (*Turkey in 21st Century*), (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1998) and Kemal Karpaz, Türk Demokrasi Tarihi – Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kültürel Temeller.

⁴ William Hale, Turkish Politics and Turkish Military, (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 90

⁵ *ibid*, p. 89

⁶ Jacob Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), p. 1

⁷ For the details of the political parties, their Islamic discourses and different characteristics, see Kemal Karpaz Türk Demokrasi Tarihi – Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kültürel Temeller, and Doğan Duman, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye’de İslamcılık (*Islamism in Turkey within the Process of Democracy*), (İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Yayınları, 1997)

⁸ For details of this argument see Kemal Karpaz, Türk Demokrasi Tarihi – Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kültürel Temeller, p. 141

⁹ Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999

¹⁰ Erik Zürcher, Turkey – A Modern History, (London: I.B.Tauris, 1993), p. 225-226

¹¹ *ibid*, p. 227

¹² Kemal Karpaz, Türk Demokrasi Tarihi – Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kültürel Temeller, p. 229

¹³ Gencay Şaylan, Türkiye’de İslamcı Siyaset (*Islamist Politics in Turkey*), (Ankara: Verso, 1992), p. 94

¹⁴ For the detailed discussion of the opinions during the period, see Karpaz, Türk Demokrasi Tarihi – Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kültürel Temeller, p. 224-239

¹⁵ Frank Tachau, “Political Leadership in Turkey: Continuity and Change” in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, State, Democracy and the Military – Turkey in the 1980s, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1988), p. 113

¹⁶ Gencay Şaylan, Türkiye’de İslamcı Siyaset, p. 94

¹⁷ Şerif Mardin, “Centre-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics”, Daedalus, Winter 1973, p. 183

¹⁸ *ibid*, p. 184.

¹⁹ Şerif Mardin, “Centre-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics”, Daedalus, Winter 1973, p. 184

²⁰ *ibid*, p. 185

²¹ Faruk Birttek, “Prospects for a New Centre or the Temporary Rise of the Peripheral Asabiyah?”, in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), Politics in the Third Turkish Republic, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 225

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- ²² Ali Yasar Saribay, "The Democrat Party, 1946-1960" in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), p. 128
- ²³ Ali Yasar Saribay, "The Democrat Party, 1946-1960" in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), p. 128
- ²⁴ Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1999, p. 203
- ²⁵ Jacob Landau,, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey, p. 174
- ²⁶ ibid
- ²⁷ Doğan Duman, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye'de İslamcılık (*Islamism in Turkey within the Process of Democracy*), (İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Yayınları, 1997), p. 40
- ²⁸ Speech published in magazine Büyük Doğu in 1951 by Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, quoted in Doğan Duman, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye'de İslamcılık, p. 41
- ²⁹ ibid
- ³⁰ Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grev Wolf and Crescent, (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), p. 171
- ³¹ There are studies that link this authoritarian tendency to the lack of a political culture to conduct democratic politics in Turkey. See the work of İlder Turan for such an approach. İlder Turan, "The Evolution of Political Culture in Turkey" in Ahmet Evin, (ed.), Modern Turkey – Continuity and Change, (Opladen: Leske Verlag, 1984), p. 94
- ³² Ali Yasar Saribay, "The Democrat Party, 1946-1960" in Heper and Landau (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, p. 129
- ³³ Ayşe Buğra, Devlet ve İşadamları (*State and the Businessmen*), 2nd Edition, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997), p. 177
- ³⁴ Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century p. 250
- ³⁵ Emre Kongar, İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı (*Turkish Societal Structure from Empire Un til Present*), 9th Edition, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1995), p.450
- ³⁶ ibid, p. 460
- ³⁷ Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-1985 (*Turkish Economic History 1908-1985*), (Ankara: Gerçek Yayinlari, 1985)
- ³⁸ Ayşe Buğra, Devlet ve İşadamları, pp. 174- 190
- ³⁹ Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, p. 78
- ⁴⁰ Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, p.108
- ⁴¹ William Hale, Turkish Politics and Turkish Military, (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 98-99
- ⁴² William Hale, Turkish Politics and Turkish Military, (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 98-99
- ⁴³ ibid, p. 99
- ⁴⁴ Serif Mardin, "Centre-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics", p. 186
- ⁴⁵ ibid

⁴⁶ Quoted in Ergun Özbudun, "State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey", in Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries by Larry Diamond (ed.), 1993, p.257

⁴⁷ For details see Doğan Duman, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye'de İslamcılık, p.60-61

⁴⁸ Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 221

⁴⁹ Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 332

⁵⁰ Gencay Şaylan, Türkiye'de İslamcı Siyaset, p. 99

⁵¹ Ergun Özbudun writes that JP was the continuation of the DP and had resurrected itself one year after the 1960 coup thanks to its very effective organization, all around the country. See Özbudun, The Role of Military in Recent Turkish Politics, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 7

⁵² Tanil Bora and Kemal Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergah – 12 Eylül'den 1990'lara Ülkücü Hareket, (*Nationalist Movement from 12 September to Present*), (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), p. 53

⁵³ Emre Kongar, 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye, p. 164

⁵⁴ Avner Levi, "The Justice Party, 1961-1980" in Heper and Landau (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, p. 140

⁵⁵ ibid

⁵⁶ Frank Tachau, "Political Leadership in Turkey: Continuity and Change", p. 107

⁵⁷ ibid

⁵⁸ Frank Tachau, "Political Leadership in Turkey: Continuity and Change", p. 108

⁵⁹ Kemal Karpat, Türk Demokrasi Tarihi – Sosyal, Ekonomik, Kültürel Temeller, p. 160.

⁶⁰ Korkut Boratav and Ergun Türkcan, Türkiye'de Sanayileşmenin Yeni Boyutları ve KİT'ler (*New Prospects of Industrialisation in Turkey and State Economic Enterprises*), (İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı, Yurt Yayınları, 1994), p.16

⁶¹ Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, p.112

⁶² Çağlar Keyder, Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası (*Bankruptcy of the National Development*), (Istanbul: Metis, 1993), p. 60

⁶³ Ayşe Bugra, Devlet ve İşadamları, p. 192

⁶⁴ Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 213

⁶⁵ ibid, p. 212

⁶⁶ Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 252

⁶⁷ Jacob Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey, p. 176

⁶⁸ For a detailed work of the prominent journals of the time and their contents, see Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey, p. 180-182

⁶⁹ Jacob Landau, Radical Politics in Modern Turkey, p. 183

⁷⁰ Şerif Mardin, Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset (*Religion and Politics in Turkey*), (İstanbul: İletisim, 1991), p. 125

⁷¹ Jacob Landau, , Radical Politics in Modern Turkey, p. 188

⁷² ibid, p.189

⁷³ ibid

⁷⁴ ibid, p. 190

⁷⁵ Doğan Duman, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye'de İslamcılık p. 77

⁷⁶ Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey, p. 202

⁷⁷ Erik Zürcher, Turkey – A Modern History, (London: I.B.Tauris, 1993), p. 271

⁷⁸ Serif Mardin, "Centre-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics", p. 186

⁷⁹ On the National Salvation Party see Jacob Landau, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey", Asian and African Studies 11, (1976), 1-57, Binnaz Toprak, "Politisisation of Islam in a Secular State: the National Salvation Party in Turkey" in From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, Said Arjomand (ed.), (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 119-133, Türker Alkan, "The National Salvation Party in Turkey", in Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East, Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli (eds.), (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 79-102 and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, Türkiye'de Modernleşme, Din ve Parti Politikası: MSP Örnek Olavi, (*Modernisation, Religion and Party Politics in Turkey – NSP as a Case Study*) (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1985).

⁸⁰ Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey" in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, State, Democracy and the Military – Turkey in the 1980s, p. 125

⁸¹ See the National Salvation Party Program.

⁸² Noted in Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey", p. 105

⁸³ Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey", p. 108

⁸⁴ This is a widely held view by many analysts of Turkish politics. For detailed studies see Emre Kongar, Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı (*The Social Structure of Turkey*), (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1995), p. 197, Ergun Özbudun and Frank Tachau, "Social Change and Electoral Behaviour in Turkey: Toward a 'Critical Realignment'?", International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 4, (1975), p. 467-8, Frank Tachau, Turkey: The Politics of Authority, Democracy and Development, (New York: Praeger, 1984).

⁸⁵ Emre Kongar, Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı, p. 245

⁸⁶ Frank Tachau, "Political Leadership in Turkey: Continuity and Change", p. 108

⁸⁷ Frank Tachau, "Political Leadership in Turkey: Continuity and Change", p. 108

⁸⁸ Feroz Ahmad, "The Republican People's Party, 1945-1980", in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), p. 111

⁸⁹ Doğan Duman, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye'de İslamcılık, p. 92

⁹⁰ Korkut Boratav and Ergun Türkcan, Türkiye'de Sanayileşmenin Yeni Boyutları ve KİT'ler, p. 25

⁹¹ Yakup Kepenek, Gelisimi, Üretim Yapısı ve Sorunlarıyla Türkiye Ekonomisi (*Development, Production patterns and Problems of Turkish Economy*). Ankara: Teori Yayınları, 1987, p. 567

⁹² Çağlar Keyder, Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası (*Bankruptcy of the National Development*), 1993

⁹³ Çağlar Keyder, Ulusal Kalkınmacılığın İflası (*Bankruptcy of the National Development*), 1993, p.12

⁹⁴ Osman Ulagay, 24 Ocak Deneyimi Üzerine (On the Experience of 24 January), (Istanbul, Hil Yayın, 1983), p. 15-16

⁹⁵ ibid, p. 14

⁹⁶ Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, p. 119

⁹⁷ Sabri Sayarı, "Politics and Economic Policy Making in Turkey, 1980-1988" in Tefik Nas and Mehmet Odekon (eds.), Economics and Politics of Turkish Liberalization, (London: Associated University Presses, 1992), p. 28

CHAPTER 5

TURKEY 1980-2001: CHALLENGES TO THE KEMALIST MODERNISATION PROJECT AND THE HETEROGENISATION OF IDENTITIES

The period under consideration starts with the 1980 military coup that not only shaped the future of the political but also the socio-economic life in Turkey. The military regime that lasted until 1983 initiated some changes to the Kemalist modernisation project and instituted a new constitution in 1982 that resulted in the “reconstruction of the state”.¹ Between 1980 and 2001, economic liberalisation policies continued with export oriented production policy. Within the sphere of collective action, we see the decreasing role of the trade unions and the representation of class interest, and the proliferation of different identities through which interests were defined, demands for change were declared and political action was followed. These identities were shaped around ethnic (Kurdish and ultra-nationalist Turkish) and religious (Muslim) bases. The growing influence of the nationalist and Islamist parties during this period, and the responses of the military-bureaucratic élite to these challenges to the modernisation project, became manifest in the 1997 “post-modern coup”, or what is commonly called the 28 February process. Within the Islamist politics, there was a growing distinction between the ‘old’ guard, represented by the Erbakan group and the ‘new’ Islamists that were mainly the products of the newly emerging identities in a global society by late 1990s. This difference within the Islamists led to a division in the party for the first time, in 2001. This chapter aims to look at these developments in a detailed way.

THE 1980 COUP, POST-1983 DEVELOPMENTS AND THE MOTHERLAND PARTY

Ahmet Evin in an article written some years after the coup asks whether the 1980 military intervention “would enter the annals of Turkish history as a fundamental turning point with regard to the role of the state in that polity or with the passage of time it would appear [...] as one of those periodic interventions [...] since the transition to multi-party system”.² More than two decades after the coup, it seems that the 1980 military intervention constituted one of the turning points in Turkish politics. A significant reason for this lies in the changes made during the subsequent military rule to the Kemalist modernisation project. A second reason could be noted as the changes in the constitution and the political system of the country following the military rule. The argument of the following section will focus on these points.

Islamist extremism was given as one of the main justifications for the coup. In May 1980, worshippers in Istanbul’s Fatih mosque jeered and booed at the mention of Atatürk in a service, which was broadcast. This was an open challenge to the secular order of the country. Erbakan, in an attempt to calm down the reactions, said that he was sorry for such ‘un-Muslim behaviour’ but made no attempt to defend Atatürk’s memory. On 6 September in a mass rally in Konya, the NSP supporters from all over the country refused to sing the national anthem and called for a “return to Shari’ a”.³ During the same period, the clashes between the leftist and the rightist groups and increasing polarisation of the society along ideological lines were intensifying. The growing instability at the time was seen as challenging the modernisation project and as emanating both from the Islamist forces⁴ and from the leftist ideological forces. Within the framework of the Cold War, the army was already conscious of the threat of a Soviet takeover and the leftist forces were seen as elements that could contribute to such a possible scenario. On 12 September 1980

the military, having enough of evidence that the country was sliding into political and social instability, decided to intervene to restore law and order and reinstate the undermined state authority.

It can be noted here that the main point of the military interventions, repeated in ten year intervals, seem to lie in the threat perception of the military and their concept of stability of the country. Political stability was the main prerequisite for the advent of the Kemalist modernisation project and the military's secure place as the élite of the country throughout this process. Thus, every time the country's stability appeared at risk the army intervened to secure the continuation of the modernisation project, and its own place as the definite arbiter of this modernisation.

After the coup, to maintain stability and order in the society, the military cadres tried to initiate a new framework that would decrease the power of the leftist groups, keep the society together and secure the continuation of the Kemalist project in unity. This new framework was designed in line with what some have termed the "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" (*Türk-İslam Sentezi* – TIS).⁵ The TIS was implemented as a policy to decrease the power of the left and glue the society together and by this way carry the modernisation ideal forward, with a slight modification in the modernisation formula. Accordingly, this new Turkish-Islamic ideology would provide the society with the understanding of a "national culture" and guide it according to this, basing its legitimacy on pursuing the "national cultural values and principles". Islam would constitute the main place in such an understanding. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis was thus an attempt to "bring supposedly shared values to the surface, peel away the 'false Western veneer' which was seen as responsible for the ills of the modern society and recognise a national synthesis of fundamental values under the labels of 'Turk' and 'Islam'."⁶ Tapper said that 'this synthesis aimed at an authoritarian but not an Islamic state where religion was seen as the

essence of culture and social control and should thus be fostered in the education system but not be politicised.⁷ The TIS was widely advocated after the coup, and the vital positions in the government, education and the cultural bodies were all given to people sharing this perception of the TIS.⁸

As the idea of the TIS took root, some policies were put into effect to increase its spread in the population. One important development was the implementation of compulsory religious courses, to secondary and high schools. Another visibility of the TIS was in the state discourse. The coup leader, Kenan Evren, in his speeches was often making quotations from the Quran and the *hadith*, underlining the concept of *ummah* and the Muslim unity in the society.⁹

Initiating the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as the state ideology was the main deviation from conventional Kemalist reforms and principles and the 1980 coup is important in placing Islam within the state ideology, from which it had been absent for decades. In time, without realizing the incompatibility of the concepts of Turkism as a national concept and Islam¹⁰ there was an evolution of the understanding from Turkish-Muslim to an Islamist-Turk. The military leaders initiated the former as a legitimate part of the new definition of modernisation in an attempt to secure its continuation, but in time it developed its own dynamics and Islam started to be seen in every aspect of life, beginning to create a real alternative to the existing system, and the redefined modernisation, especially from the second half of 1980s onwards. The role of the 1980 military coup is important in drawing and encouraging this policy.

To summarize, regarding the definition of the Kemalist modernisation project we can talk about the first changes made to the initial definition under the military rule during 1980-1983. Capitalist development still constituted the first pillar of the project. Following the pace of the 24 January Decisions and the

economic liberalisation policy, instead of a state-led capitalist industrialisation a market based, export oriented capitalist development constituted the economic element in the formula. Nationalism and secularism were kept as the official ideological components of the regime, but bringing Islam into the official discourse added an element of cultural authenticity to the picture. Instead of Westernisation as a cultural framework for modernisation, it was basically now limited to Western technology, as the cultural framework had now shifted to Islam. Karpat notes that what the West meant for the Turkish élites had changed at this time. He notes that

The cultural and political emulation of the West is no longer the axis of 'modernism'. It is rather economic development, technological advancement and material progress in all its forms [...] Reshaping of the national identity in the light of the Turk's own cultural and religious ethos has broadened the scope of modernisation in such a way as to relegate the West, without abandoning it, to a secondary position, while giving priority to a new historically rooted socio-cultural Turkish identity.¹¹

By redefining the modernisation project, the 1980 coup paved the way for other groups in the society to challenge and demand to reformulate the project as well. Since the state, the military-bureaucracy that initiated the Kemalist modernisation project, could change and reformulate it, other groups would soon line up with their challenges to all aspects of the modernisation project.

If one of the aims of the coup was to restore law and order the other one was to build a political infrastructure that would help the political system to become immune to turbulence.¹² During the three year period in power, the military leaders repeatedly attributed economic and political chaos of the 1970s to the political party system and the political leaders of the period in general.¹³ As early as 17 September 1980, 5 days after the coup, Kenan Evren, the coup leader was saying that

All my trust in the politicians had been rubbed away. If they are all asking their leaders what to do, it means that in practice they will go on doing the same thing. We need people who really believe in us and will stick with us. Let's give up the idea of forming a government made up of the JP and RPP moderates.¹⁴

On 21 September the cabinet of the military regime was formed under the leadership of Bülend Ulusu – a newly retired admiral. The Cabinet was established

composed of 27 members, six of which were retired generals and the remainder being neutral bureaucrats or academics. Thus, careful attention was paid to choosing people with no political background.

What to do with the old party leaders who had been detained after the coup and the fate of the party organisations were discussed under the military regime. Trials were held of the NSP's leader Erbakan and the NAP's leader Türkeş. Both leaders were placed on trial for breaking the law and the Constitution. Erbakan was charged and arrested for working against the principle of secularism. Türkeş was charged, along with 585 members of his party, with instigating civil war and murdering nearly 600 people between 1974-1980.¹⁵ Both were released in 1985. Regarding the JP leader Demirel and the RPP leader Ecevit, no evidence was proved for breaking any regulations or laws and they were released from custody on 11 October.

Although at the time of the coup all parties were banned from politics, they were not dissolved until October 1981. By 1982, the military had started to give signals that they would not allow the old politicians to re-enter into politics for some time as they were seen to be responsible for all the instability and if they came to power again they might lead the country along the same route, hampering the newly redefined modernisation efforts. In the new constitution enacted by the military regime, the framework necessary to keep the 'old' politicians away from post-coup politics was drawn up. According to the new constitution of 1982, the Chairman, general secretaries and other senior members of the former parties would not be able to form, join or hold any relationship with the future parties and would not be able to stand for elections as independent deputies for ten years. According to the constitution, General Evren would automatically become the president of the country for a period of seven years. As in the 1961 Constitution, the role of the military was

again guaranteed, as five chief commanders would serve as the members of the National Security Council, which advised the Council of Ministers on issues concerning internal and external security.

The underlying theme of the 1982 constitution was to decrease the "politicisation" of the masses and to limit the rights and freedoms that had been introduced by the 1961 constitution. State forces were given more power and the associational rights and freedom of organisation, strike and protest that were given under the 1961 constitution were decreased to the minimum. Socially and politically, the state moved back into the centre as the main source of power against the decreasing individual and organisational rights. The 1982 constitution was accepted with a 92 percent 'yes' vote in a referendum. The result of the referendum also made Kenan Evren the president of the country.

Economically, the military regime continued to pursue economic stability and austerity measures. The military showed its commitment to carrying the Turkish economy from an ISI, inward looking production pattern to export oriented growth strategies by appointing Turgut Özal, the architect of the January 1980 economic decisions, as deputy prime minister responsible for economic affairs. The major immediate aims of Özal in checking the three digit inflation rate, ending the shortages of basic consumer goods and improving the foreign trade deficit were relatively successful within the first year of the military rule when the annual inflation rate dropped from 140 to 35 percent.¹⁶ In addition to the austerity measures, the government carried out a policy of devaluing the Turkish Lira by 48 percent against the dollar, large price increases for the various products of the public sector, reduction in government subsidies and expenditures, and wage restraints for public sector employees and workers. Sabri Sayarı emphasizes the point that had it not been the military regime that was in power but a civilian one, groups whose interests

were adversely affected from these policies could have shown their opposition on various grounds. However, the military regime, by imposing strict controls over potential sources of opposition, ruled out such a possibility.¹⁷ The technocratic initiative to reform the economy benefited greatly from the absence of “public contestation and democratic liberties” but the redemocratization process that would follow led to considerable opposition in the longer term.

By 1983 and the beginning of renewed civilian political rule, the economic policies were already bringing positive results. The balance of payments improved as a result of doubled rates of exports in the first two years and the rate of inflation decreased from around one hundred percent in 1980 to thirty percent in 1983.¹⁸

THE CIVILIAN POLITICS IN THE POST-COUP ERA

Although the military decided to delegate power back to the civilian politicians in 1983, with free democratic elections, it still wanted to act as the main arbiter in politics, to secure the continuation of the redefined modernisation project. The election date was announced as 6 November 1983. The military regime imposed special rules to govern the elections. All the parties that were established went through a careful examination and most of them were vetoed by the military regime. The military, aiming to make a fresh start with politicians that adhered to no past party, vetoed the Social Democrat Party, established by Erdal İnönü, the son of the late İsmet İnönü, that basically represented the continuation of the RPP. The Great Turkey Party was also vetoed as it represented the continuation of the JP. Later, the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi* – TPP) was formed as a substitute for the Great Turkey Party but did not manage to have itself accepted into the elections of the 1983, either.

Within this framework, only three parties competed in the elections held on 6 November 1983. The candidate parties were the Nationalist Democracy Party (*Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi* – NDP) which the generals themselves had founded, the Populist Party (*Halkçı Parti* – PP) that again the generals had encouraged to channel the leftist votes, and the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi* – MP) that was given “permission” to enter the elections. According to Tachau, the plan that was envisioned by the military for the 1983 elections resembled a “sporting contest”.

The military’s plan envisioned

an antiseptic type of politics that ideally would resemble a gentlemanly sporting contest in which the two teams compete with one another and in which one can win and the other loses. Onlookers (in the form of interest groups and associations) may not even cheer their favoured team although individuals may cast votes periodically. Any team, fan or group of fans that violates the rules may be thrown out of the game.¹⁹

The MP was spoiling the two-party plan of the military that had hoped for a NDP victory in the elections and PP opposition. However, there were no grounds to veto the MP’s candidacy for the elections. So, a three party competition evolved.

1983 ELECTION RESULTS

The plans and hopes of the military were destroyed when the elections resulted in the victory of the MP. The military-backed NDP received only 23.3 percent of the votes in the elections, decreasing the power of the military to play an active and direct role in the Turkish politics in the post-1983 period.

Table 5.1. Result of the 1983 General Elections

Total number of votes: 18 238 362

Participation rate in the elections: 92.3 percent

	Number of Votes	Number of Seats	Percentage of Votes
Motherland Party	7 833 148	211	45.1
Populist Party	5 285 804	117	30.5
Nationalist Democracy Party	4 036 970	71	23.3
Independents	195 588	-	1.1

Source: *Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 204*

The MP was nicknamed the “brainchild of Özal”.²⁰ Özal often referred to the party as representing a new beginning in Turkish politics, with no antecedents and “definitely no roots that extended into the past struggles”.²¹ Özal picked every candidate before the 1983 elections “deliberately and almost alone, seeking a platform that would bring politicians of diverse ideological persuasions under the same roof.”²² Claiming to be representing the *Orta Direk* (the main pillar of the society, the middle classes), Özal repeated that his party was incorporating four different tendencies under its banner: the liberal right, the traditionalist right (*mukaddesatçı sağ*), the nationalist right and the democratic left. The party seemed like a coalition of these different tendencies that had met in the MP as they had nowhere else to go. Ergüder notes that in the 1980s, after a decade of political chaos and terrorism, the population was craving for a centrist position that would incorporate all the elements of the right and pull the anti-system tendencies like the Islamists and the nationalists into the centre.²³ The MP represented such an alternative. Özal in his election campaign was proposing faster integration with the international markets and rational policy making in the economic sphere.

When faced with a moderate option, disassociated from the tarnished politics of the past, the Turkish electorate seemed to respond positively. In the campaign of 1983, Turgut Özal ran on a platform stressing economic growth and fiscal caution. He advocated de-emphasis on state economic enterprises. He has described himself as a devotee of ‘supply-side economics’. His program would have placed him comfortably within the range of many Western right-of-centre parties. He also stressed the need to enhance Turkey’s place within the Middle Eastern economic network. Sometimes described as a ‘Muslim technocrat’ he seems to appeal to the traditional values without giving them ideological pre-eminence over the need to bring Turkey into the international competitive market.²⁴

Despite the claims of the MP not to be the continuation of any past parties, the above statement supports Göle’s point that the MP could be considered as both a “continuation of the Democrat Party tradition of the 1950s and also a renewal of the conservative liberal legacy, attempting to synthesize market modernism and Muslim identity”.²⁵

The MP was successful in getting the support of the Islamists and incorporating them into the party. The political environment had left this party as the only option for channelling Islamist support as neither the NDP nor the PP could be the representative of the Islamists. Özal and his brothers were already figures known by the Islamist circles. They were, according to many analysts, members of the İskenderpaşa Congregation of the Nakşibendi religious order.²⁶ Korkut Özal, the brother, had been a leading member of the NSP in the 1970s. Özal had taken the ideas of such circles into consideration while building his political cadres and gathered the politicians that were accepted by Islamists as leaders under his party organisation. With the MP coming to power, "political Islam" had finally "unified with the state".²⁷ All through his post, Özal continued his close relationship with the leaders of the religious orders and sheiks with a view to improving his image and credentials among the Islamists.²⁸

After coming to power, Özal was able to pursue virtually absolute rule in the country, without major opposition since most of the political parties were not represented in the parliament and the restrictions on the political activities of former party leaders still continued. Having charismatic leadership qualities, Özal managed to keep all the different tendencies in the party together and, having been the victor of the 1984 municipal elections as well, there was no power to stop his economic and political activities. The reign of the MP continued uninterrupted until the 1991 elections and during this period Islamist circles were given great opportunity to increase their power. Taking into consideration the 1982 Constitution's restrictions on the leftist organisations, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis continued as the main state ideology without any counter-ideology to challenge it and Özal's continuous discourse on the importance of religion in daily life dominated the political scene.

The counter-élite that started to play a role in the politics of the country during the 1970s had come to power in the 1980s. In general, the MP rule witnessed the transformation of society and the ruling élite

from the modernizing élites of the earlier decades that took as their basic mission the secularisation of Turkish politics and the transmission of Western values to that polity and society, to the technocratic élites of the 1980s who defined their goals less in terms of educating the people than of synthesizing Islamic values and pragmatic rationality.²⁹

The state élite of the post-1980s is placed in contrast to the military bureaucratic élite of the “post-Atatürk period as they do not presume that they are an inherently superior group in sole possession of the truth ... The Atatürkian thought is not regarded as a source of all public policies. It is rather taken as a technique, not a manifesto for all public policies”.³⁰ While talking about the 1980s in general, Göle emphasises the point that the MP rule had “begun dismantling the state by its policies of decentralisation of government, privatisation of the state economic enterprises and the reorientation towards the market economy”³¹ This in turn encouraged the very much used liberal discourse, developing with the advent of the market economy. This time, instead of the state or the political élites that were encouraging the pro-private sector policies, it was the entrepreneurs themselves that tried to carve out an economic space independent of the state. It was mainly this development that led to the emergence – on the political and cultural levels - of pragmatic values.³²

Many of the MP members are termed by Göle the “Islamicist engineers”, who personally hold traditional Muslim values regarding the individual, family and society, but because of their professional backgrounds adopt the norms of Western rationality.³³ Thus,

MP rule shows that the modernising élites (military –bureaucratic élite) began to lose their power to transform the society from above and were increasingly replaced by more representative élites. Paradoxically the latter were mostly technocrats who belonged to the centre-right political parties. Their prevalence resulted basically from their attempts to reconcile technological change with traditional values, an attempt that paved the way to politics of harmony, an essential ingredient for the consolidation of democracy.”³⁴
Parenthesis are mine.

Already in 1983, Islamist financial companies and banks had been incorporated into the economy. This was in line with the Muslim entrepreneur image of the MP rule, giving opportunities to this segment to invest the way they choose to do so.

ECONOMIC POLICY UNDER ÖZAL – GROWTH OF THE MARKET ECONOMY

During the period of MP rule, the transition from an ISI economy to the liberal, export oriented market economy continued and important steps were taken in this direction. Both the trade regime and the capital inflows and outflows were liberalised. The degree of tariff protection on imports was reduced by a considerable margin. A liberal regime was also established with regards to foreign direct investment.³⁵ Foreign investment in the pre-1980 period was very limited due to a host of restrictions and bureaucratic constraints. In the course of the 1980s, these restrictions were eliminated and a single agency was created in the form of the Foreign Investment Department in the State Planning Organisation to deal with the issue. Furthermore, the Foreign Investment Code was made consistent with the Organisation for Economic and Cultural Development (OECD), providing foreign investors with the same incentives and allowances as their domestic counterparts.³⁶ The issue of privatisation entered the agenda of the government in 1984. However, it followed a rather slow progress as the first major case of privatisation, involving the sale of the half of the public shares in the telecommunications company TELETAS via stock exchange, occurred as late as February 1988. By 1990, only a few companies had been privatised.³⁷

The response of the private sector to the import liberalisations was mixed. While the export oriented groups and sectors supported the move, like the big industrialists of Istanbul gathering under TÜSİAD, the ISI industries and the big

conglomerates had opposed it, still lobbying for protection. But the government repeated its determination to open the economy for international competition and integration of Turkish markets with the globalizing world economy by not making any concessions on the liberal economic policy.

One important area of success within this new liberalisation context had been the growth in the export rates. Exports rose sharply from \$2.3 million in 1979 to \$8 billion in 1985 and \$13 billion in 1990. During the decade Turkey ranked as the first in the rate of the export growth in the world.³⁸ Manufactured goods constituted 80 percent of the increase in this period. Among the manufactured products were textiles, clothing, iron and steel products.³⁹ As can be seen from the table below, exports had jumped from 2.9 percent of the GNP in 1978-79 when the ISI was the economic policy to 11.7 percent of the GNP in 1984-85. Manufacturing exports constituted the bulk of this increase.

Table 5.2. External Orientation of the Economy

Year	Imports/GNP	Exports/GNP	Manufacturing Exports / GNP
1970-71	5.5	3.3	0.7
1978-79	6.5	2.9	1.3
1984-85	17.6	11.7	7.7
1989-90	14.7	9.7	7.5

Source: Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, Statistical Indicators, 1923-92.

However, the unemployment and unequal distribution of income had become significant characteristics of the period. In the beginning of the 1980s, the decreasing power of the workers and the reductions in public sector employment had important effects. From 1985 onwards, the unemployment rate rose to become as high as 7 percent of the entire workforce, accounting for 1.2 million people; by 1987 the number of unemployed and underemployed not seeking work stood at double that figure.⁴⁰ The decline in real wages was very significant during this period as well. As a proportion of national income they declined from 33 percent in 1979 to 18 percent in 1985-86. Gross government salaries and wages dropped from 9 percent of

GNP in 1980 to 6 percent in 1985. Official figures show that the share of wages and salaries in the value of State Economic Enterprises (SEE) production declined from 47 percent in 1979, to 19 percent in 1986. However, Waterbury notes that in the public sector as a whole it is the civil service (*memur*) that suffered the greatest absolute and relative declines in salaries: 50 percent since 1979.⁴¹ There is agreement among Turkish economists that the anti-wage policies have not been this severe in any other country, the decreases in the purchasing power and real incomes of workers and state officials have not been as sharp as they were in Turkey during 1979-1988.⁴²

The agricultural sector also suffered from the new policies. In agriculture, subsidies were either terminated or decreased, price regulations were abolished and farmers and peasants were left unprotected against organised capital. Thus, as can be seen from the figure below, their share in income distribution had fallen from 23.8 percent in 1980 to 14 percent in 1988.

Table 5.3. Functional Distribution of Income of Turkey, 1967-1988 (%)

Year	Agricultural Incomes	Wages and Salaries	Incomes from Interest, Rent & Profit
1980	23.87	26.66	49.47
1981	23.06	24.57	52.36
1982	21.82	24.62	53.55
1983	20.52	24.78	54.69
1984	20.44	21.57	57.99
1985	19.08	18.84	62.08
1986	18.09	17.70	64.21
1987	17.10	17.00	65.00
1988	14.00	15.80	70.20

Source: John Waterbury, "Export-Led Growth and the Right-Right Coalition in Turkey", in Tevfik Nas and Mehmet Odekun (eds.), Economics and Politics of Turkish Liberalization, p.66

While the income of the agricultural sector employees and wage/salary earners declined dramatically, the income of the capitalist class increased greatly. As can be seen from the figures above, the capitalists seemed to win the victory over the wage-earners, getting back the power that they had lost due to the populist policies of the 1970s.

In addition to the big capitalists of Istanbul, towards the end of the decade there were small-scale family businesses in certain Anatolian cities that were developing, concentrating on the export of manufactured goods. They were well equipped to adapt to 'flexible production patterns' and were actively competing in the international markets in line with the changing production patterns that the global economy necessitated. They were hailed in the media as success stories and were labelled the "Anatolian Tigers", reflecting the "generally shared positive sentiments about their economic potential"⁴³. More discussion about this issue will be made below. However, it is important to note here that as the country was moving towards a market economy, competitive manufacturing industries that implemented small scale, flexible production were developing and the monopoly of the bourgeois class of Istanbul as the sole industrialists was starting to be challenged by these small Anatolian businesses. These businesses managed to adapt to the international market and they had advantages compared to the big industrialists as they did not have the burden of first having to abandon the old Fordist production patterns as the big industrialists had to do. Being dynamic, highly computerised, and newly equipped, they benefited most from the integration with the international markets with the economic liberalisation policies of the 1980s.

The economic liberalisation and export oriented growth strategies brought the Turkish economy into a new stage and by the end of the decade Turkey had gone a long way towards integrating with the world economy through trade and foreign investment. These developments had led to the rise of newly enriched strata, composed of not only the businessmen of Anatolia but also those "new groups of professionals now able to find highly lucrative employment opportunities especially in the service sector".⁴⁴

In addition to these groups, the illicit wealth of certain groups and charges of corruption became widely discussed issues in the media. Links with politicians, especially at the municipality level, worked as a way of accumulating wealth for the companies that entered into contracting-out work with the state. Conspicuous consumption and spending on luxurious imported goods and rather a showing off culture seemed to take root among the *nouveaux riches* of the period, with the Özal family in particular coming to represent the extravagant lifestyles, and excessive spending features of the rising groups.

EMERGING NEW IDENTITIES IN THE TURKISH POLITICAL ARENA

In line with the theoretical framework drawn in the first chapter, changes in the nature of the economic production would be expected to bring changes in the political and collective action themes. Within this line of argument, transition from state-led capitalist industrialisation to economic liberalisation and market economy would bring with it the questioning of the old order and the values associated with it. Thus, the unifying ideologies and myths that revolved around national identities will be highly challenged during this period. In the Turkish case, against the elitist, bureaucratic, classless, secular modernisation pattern of the pre-1980 period, now stood upwardly mobile Anatolian rooted entrepreneurs, engineers, and export-import company holders with identities rooted in Islam. Before the 1980s 'the imposed definition of modernisation – the Kemalist modernisation project' – had already started to lose its unifying mission. This was manifest in the clashes between different groups in the late 1970s. The military had tried to revamp Kemalism and prevent the total collapse of the modernisation project by incorporating the Turkish-Islamic synthesis to the modernisation project. However, the liberal economy, at least the beginnings of the transformation to flexible production and the market

economy, was posing a strong challenge to the monolithic 'national identity' and the continuation of an imposed modernisation. The new period of economic development meant that the given national identities were ready to be challenged and this new élite – the counter-élite in politics and economy, the new Islamist bourgeoisie – was the actor challenging these identities. They represented the rise of an alternative unifying mission that filled the gap created by the demise of Kemalism.

Özal by emphasizing that his party was representing all the tendencies of the population tried to keep the fragmentation of identities and different ethnic and religious groups that were developing during the period under control. However, as the ban on the former party leaders and members was lifted in 1987, this unity could no longer be kept under the MP. There were two factions developing within the MP itself. While the liberals were advocating a faster integration with the world economy and the markets, the conservatives in the party were advocating for a more emphasized role of Islamic principles.

The 1980s witnessed the formation of two significant parties. One of them was the illegal Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), founded in 1983, that adopted terrorist means, aiming at the formation of a separate Kurdish state in the south-east of Turkey. Describing itself as Marxist-Leninist from the beginning, it adopted an anti-imperialist rhetoric, "opposing the 'Turkish imperialism', which it argued was prevalent in 'Turkish Kurdistan'."⁴⁵ The second party was the Welfare Party, founded in the same year to be the continuation of the NSP. Özal tried to incorporate these two identities, Kurdish and Muslim, in himself and his party. He often made remarks saying that his aunt was Kurdish, although refraining from open remarks about his Kurdishness as that might endanger his 'uniting mission' and might raise some eyebrows in the military-bureaucratic élite. However, his acknowledgement of

the Kurdish reality was a big step in the politics of the country. Özal's close relationship with the Islamist circles and some religious orders has already been mentioned above. However, both movements – Kurdish and Islamist – were gaining their own dynamism and constituencies in a sense that they could no longer be confined to the centre-right discourse of the MP by the end of the 1980s.

As the MP rule continued in the mid-1980s, there was an increasing dissatisfaction developing in the society mainly because of the negative impact of the economic liberalisation on the majority of income groups. The lavish lifestyles of the newly rich strata were in sharp contrast with the decreasing purchasing power of the lower income groups who were faced with high inflation rates. Despite being officially illegal, the former party members started to make a number of political statements and run some parties behind the scenes. Özal, in a courageous move, decided to accept the challenge and announced a referendum for an amendment in the constitution that would allow the former politicians to take part in party politics. The results of the referendum were slightly in favour of seeing the old leaders on the political scene once again.⁴⁶ After the referendum, Özal announced that the next elections would be held in November 1987, which would surely underline once more the MP monopoly in the National Assembly.

Table 5.4. Result of the 1987 General Elections

Total number of votes used: 24 603 541

Participation rate in the elections: 93.3 percent

	Number of Votes	Number of Seats	Percentage of votes
Motherland Party	8 704 335	292	36.4
True Path Party	4 587 062	59	19.2
Social Democrat Populist Party	5 931 000	99	24.8
Democratic Left Party	2 044 576	-	8.6
Welfare Party	1 717 425	-	7.2

Source: *Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999*

As the restrictions on former politicians were lifted, the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi* – TPP) entered the elections under the leadership of Süleyman

Demirel, winning 19.2 percent of the votes. The Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti* – DLP) entered the elections under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit with a new party structure rather than the old structure of the RPP. The Populist Party that entered the 1983 elections and the Social Democracy Party under İnönü that was vetoed before, decided to unite and form the Social Democrat Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti* – SDPP), and Erdal İnönü continued as the leader of the new party. The SDPP under İnönü proved to be successful in launching an election campaign based on criticism of the economic policies of the regime. The election campaign was based on a ‘squeezed lemon’, symbolising how the majority of the population was suffering under the economic programme. As the inflation rates increased, and the purchasing power of the majority declined to a great extent under MP rule, the support for the SPP would increase more in the following years.

The monopoly of the MP rule terminated after the municipal elections held in March 1989. The 1989 election is important as the MP won only 21.9 percent of the votes, third in line after the SPP with 28.2 percent of the votes and Demirel’s TPP with 25.6 percent. It had become more difficult for the MP to claim to be the representative of the four tendencies from then on as the parties both on the left and the right started to challenge it strongly.

This all came at a time when the presidency was going to change hands. Kenan Evren who had been serving as the president of the country for seven years was leaving his post and Özal announced his intention to stand for the elections. Seeing the decrease in the votes in the local elections, Özal asserted that he would never serve in the Parliament as an opposition party leader, and had himself elected the President in 1989, leaving the task of leading his party to Yıldırım Akbulut, who mainly followed Özal’s orders given from behind the scene. Akbulut served for two years, after which his authority was challenged by Mesut Yılmaz, representing the

liberal, market oriented segment of the party. From 1991 until now, Mesut Yılmaz has served as the leader of the MP.

During his period in office as Prime Minister, Özal advocated political liberalism in addition to economic liberalism. Civil society occupied an important place in the discourse of his politics and was seen as a dynamic force in maintaining sustainable growth and enhancing the democratic structure of the country. Forces that might act as an impediment for the individual entrepreneur were lifted and what was substituted is termed by Göle as “anarchical liberalism”, “which destroyed the traditions, freed individuals, heightened aspirations, opened up new markets and dismantled all the obstacles in its way”.⁴⁷

This ‘anarchical liberal’ environment, saw the development of environmentalist, gay and lesbian and feminist movements around the country, and a proliferation of different organisations advocating these values. The proliferation of private TV channels, radios, publications, and different organisations that capitalised on these newly developing identities provided an environment conducive to free discussions and the creation of a public opinion. While the feminist, gay and lesbian and environmentalist groups and debate on these topics were rather seen as confined to the elitist circles, the Kurdish groups and their counter force, the ultra-nationalists, as well as the Islamist circles, incorporated peripheral forces into the debates in this liberal framework.

The increasing visibility of Islamic symbols in the public space continued all through the 1980s, accelerating in the 1990s. The Kemalist and the secularist élite repeatedly pointed out the danger of the increasing number of mosques, Quran courses, *İmam-Hatip* schools, whose graduates were now allowed to enter to any University department, and Islamist bookstores and publications. These were seen as the attempts of the conservative wing of the MP to diminish the secular nature of the

state further. Although these developments were initially in line with the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, as Islamist ideology deepened in society, they went beyond the idea of keeping the masses in unity behind the Kemalist modernisation project. Rather, especially in the 1990s, the Islamist ideology started to present a new version of modernity, representing an alternative to the system, rather than its continuation. This would be seen with the rise of the Welfare Party to power with its increasing electoral support and the Islamist alternative that it offered, capitalising on the Muslim identity of the state consolidated during the MP rule.

THE WELFARE PARTY IN THE 1980s

As explained in the last section, the 1980 coup had a significant impact on the political representation of Islamist ideas and establishing the framework for the advent of the counter-élite under the MP rule. The Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi* – WP), was founded on 19 July 1983, but was not able to enter the 1983 elections. The party emphasised moral development and heavy industry, giving the signal that it was the continuation of the NOP and the NSP.

The WP had the opportunity to enter the 1984 municipal elections but it received just 4.4 percent of all votes, with the support of 778,662 voters, thus decreasing its vote potential to half of what it had during the NSP time. The effort of Özal to incorporate the Islamists in his party and his success in doing so is an important factor contributing to this result. Nonetheless, the WP won control of 17 municipalities, including two provinces: Van and Urfa, in the east and south east of the country respectively. In the 1987 general elections, the WP received 7.16 percent of all votes but could not enter the parliament, as it couldn't pass the electoral threshold of 10 percent. But the 1987 elections are important in showing the increase in the votes of the WP, which would ultimately lead to its success in the 1989

municipal elections. In the 1989 elections, the party won 9.8 percent of all votes, gaining municipal rule in Konya, Sivas, Şanlıurfa, Van, Kahramanmaraş city centres and 15 other towns. This success has been interpreted by many as the WP winning back the votes that it lent to the MP by that time.⁴⁸ It is interesting that the south-eastern region where ethnically Kurdish voters were the majority saw the higher voting rate for the WP. The reason for this could be explained in the changing political context of the country. The WP, being the only party that offered politics questioning the Republican ideology, and represented different identities other than the monolithic state ideology, got the votes of those with similar concerns. The Welfare Party in effect represented the only radical alternative to the system.⁴⁹

THE 1991 ELECTIONS AND CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT

The year 1991 is important for Turkish politics both because the elections held in the year resulted in the termination of the MP rule in the government and because it marked the beginning of a new international environment with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the communist threat.

Table 5.5. Result of the 1991 General Elections

Total number of votes: 25 157 089

Participation rate in the elections: 83.9 percent

	Number of Votes	Number of Seats	Percentage of Votes
Motherland Party	5 862 623	115	24.0
Democratic Left Party	2 624 301	7	10.7
True Path Party	6 600 726	178	27.0
Social Democrat Populist Party	5 066 571	88	20.8
Welfare Party	4 121 355	62	16.9

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 204

As expected the decreasing power of the MP was seen in the elections held on 20 October 1991. Demirel’s True Path Party (TPP) was the victor of the elections. Since becoming the head of the party in 1987, after former party leaders won the right to return to politics, Demirel had been working on two strategies to

increase the support for the party. While the first strategy was designed to attack the MP's "economic policies' social dimensions, focusing on the economic hardships of 'the other Turkey',⁵⁰ the other strategy, in an attempt to appeal to 'the first nation', focused the market liberalism and greater democracy."⁵¹ Demirel had incorporated "new, young, dynamic forces into the party, including Tansu Çiller, who had ties to urban and business elements"⁵² before the elections and had been successful in having the party strategies heard in the society, as the election results show. The Social Democrat Populist Party of İnönü had rather a low rate of support mainly due to its election partner the Kurdish People's Labour Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi* – PLP). As the PLP could not participate in the elections due to a lack of candidates in every province, they entered the elections in a coalition with SDPP, alienating the Turkish nationalist elements among the SDPP supporters.

The WP entered the elections in a coalition with the nationalist forces. We can say that the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, with the election coalition of the WP and the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* -NAP) gained 16.9 percent of the votes. The WP entered the elections with a new strategy that emphasized a civilised, Western-looking, city-centred and freedom-seeker image in the country. On the way to becoming a mass party, it was trying to change its image of rural based, petit-bourgeoisie party organisation. The desire of the WP to change "from being the party of the countryside and the 'believers'" to being the "party of the masses" could be seen during this election campaign and the results. The Vice President Bahri Zengin said, "The WP got locked around the community of the mosque, just like the NSP before it. Yet, there are communities other than the community of the mosque. It is necessary to open the WP to these communities. For this reason change was necessary".⁵³

The party programme was based on the slogan of a 'Just Order' that would come with the rule of the WP. Despite different interpretations of this concept, it was not defined by the organizational cadres, making different understandings and manipulation of the term easier. The details of the 'Just Order' proposed by the WP will be analysed in the next chapter.

During the 1991 election campaign, the WP focused on the "man on the street", profiling the problems of the ordinary man and offering solutions for the daily life of the "oppressed" economically, politically and socially.⁵⁴ It based its election campaign on the theme of 'the discontent with the system'. All the problems that were raised in the campaign emphasized a kind of oppression and exclusion. The party offered to bring up a 'new order' that would liberate the oppressed and include the so called "excluded" with the Just Order discourse.⁵⁵ The WP tried to show that it understood the problems of the ordinary people and committed itself to a solution, without being "elitist". This was one of the important points that made the WP gain support of the masses, by showing that its leaders were one of them.

Despite the implementation of the campaign and its success for the WP, winning 16.9 percent of the votes and increasing the number of the voters from 1.717.425 in 1987 to 4.121.355 in 1991, there was a group in the WP which opposed change and the opening up of the party to the masses. While the group in favour of change was advocating the transformation of the WP into a mass party with minimum concessions from its Islamist character, the traditionalist group in the party was saying that any step for change and incorporation of 'others' within the party would mean a deviation from the Party's pure Islamist character and therefore should be stopped.⁵⁶ This discussion would mark the beginning of the division in the party between the 'modernists' and the 'traditionalists'.

The government was formed between Demirel's TPP and İnönü's SDPP after the elections and the two parties stayed in power during 1991-1995. The Parliament structure is interesting to note here as both Muslim and Kurdish identities now had political representation in the system through the Welfare and the People's Labour parties⁵⁷ respectively. The government started with a liberal programme "promising constitutional change and more academic freedom, freedom of the press, democratisation and respect for human rights".⁵⁸ However despite the intentions, only minor amendments could be made in the constitution due to lack of enough voting power of the two coalition parties. At the same period, the country was going through a phase in which the clashes between the PKK and the Turkish army had severely intensified and there was virtually a civil war in the south-east of the country. The sudden death of Özal in 1993 led to a change of leadership in the TPP, from Demirel to Çiller as the former had replaced Özal in the Presidential office. Erdal İnönü at the same point after Özal's death announced that he would be resigning from politics, leaving his place to Murat Karayalçın, as the head of the SDPP. From 1993 onwards, the coalition continued under the new leadership in both parties.

In July 1993 in Sivas, thirty seven individuals, who came to a festival in the city, among them many Alawite poets, intellectuals, and musicians, were burnt to death "mainly as a reaction to Aziz Nesin, a leading overtly atheist intellectual, who promised to translate Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses* into Turkish".⁵⁹ As the hotel these intellectuals were staying was burning down, a large group was chanting and demonstrating outside with slogans for the Shari' a rule in the country.⁶⁰ These events once again showed that the polarisation in the country was increasing as the Islamists were involved in acts against the secularists and the Kurds (PKK) against the Turks. More important than the militant manifestation of these two events were

the representation of the strife deepening in the society as these identities started to pose a serious challenge to what had now become more difficult to maintain – the Kemalist modernisation project.

The challenges to the modernisation project during the 1980s were already mentioned above. These challenges intensified during the 1990s. The businessmen of Anatolia founded the Independent Businessmen and Industrialist Association (*Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği* – MÜSİAD) as against the TÜSİAD of Istanbul capitalists to represent their interests in the sector in 1991.⁶¹ In addition to the Islamist bourgeoisie, during the 1990s, there was an increasing group of Islamist intellectuals⁶², academics, engineers and bureaucrats that were highly educated and were challenging the monopoly of the élite in the centre – the military bureaucracy – that still held the definition of the public space, the interpretation of rules and ways of conduct. What is more important here is the politicization of the demands of the “newcomers” against the unwillingness of the centre to change or to put it differently to share their monopoly with the rising groups, the counter-élite.

As shown above, for decades, since the introduction of the multi-party politics, the demands of the periphery had been reflected in the centre right and left parties, mainly the DP, the JP and later the Motherland Party. The political parties of the centre were often seen as taming institutions for the demands of the periphery, working as integration tools and filter mechanisms. Politics carried out with “cultural identities” instead of the official identity was seen as unacceptable by the central political parties and these demands were excluded and were often seen as pathologic, unimportant demands of the periphery, in line with the dominant trend of the time. Thus the centrist parties were not able to adapt their policies to the changes in the role of the periphery – its coming to the centre and trying to take part in the centre and even to be the centre sometimes - and their legitimate increasing demand

for a redefinition of their role in the society. During the 1990s, by creating a powerful financial base, the “newcomers” were able to develop their own institutions, from media to business organisations, from bookshops and coffee houses, from their intellectuals to the political party. They even built up special living quarters for their members, where an Islamic life-style and ways of conduct were strictly followed.⁶³ Buğra names these new developments as a developing societal culture “providing its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres.”⁶⁴

The Islamists were successful in gathering support through their organisations and in time developed strongholds in the society that helped to locate themselves firmly against the political centre, rejecting it with their own alternative organisations. The rise of the Welfare Party coincides with the period that the state ideology came under serious attack and the demands of the periphery were at their peak. The inability of the system to incorporate these new demands and the inability of the centre parties to overcome their closed rentier and clientalistic structures contributed greatly to the increasing votes of the WP.

Especially from the early 1990s onwards, the WP started to use a discourse and organisation that aimed to create an alternative system to the existing one, bringing together a divergent group of interests and working through the parameters of change in the society. It had been successful in becoming the representative of all those groups that were rejected by the official ideology and those that could not be incorporated into the prevailing social and economic structure. The WP started to represent the ‘political identity’ of all those groups that challenged the system by virtue of their cultural identities, and presented their economic and social demands through these identities. Despite its Islamist characteristics and discourse, the WP

did not homogenise different identities and demands in itself. Rather there was a conjectural unity of different cultures and identities, uniting under the banner of change and demand for inclusion in the beginning of the 1990s. Under the WP's umbrella different identities like Muslim, Kurdish, Anatolian, shantytown poor, shantytown moderates that demand incorporation, Anatolian merchants and businessmen that were excluded by the monopolist economic system and central lower middle classes came together.⁶⁵ In short, identities challenging the homogenous national culture and the official identity were represented under the WP, giving the party enough power to play an active political role in the country.

1994 MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS AND THE VICTORY OF WELFARE PARTY

The 27 March 1994 municipal elections opened another new era in Turkish politics. They opened up the control of most governorates to the WP, putting the stamp of the party on national politics. It also initiated a period in which Islamic symbols were still more openly visible in the public sphere, starting the years of confrontation and tension between the secular and Islamist circles in the society.

The TPP won the majority of the votes in the elections, with 21.4 percent of all the votes, followed by the MP of Mesut Yılmaz with 21 percent. The WP won 19.1 percent of all votes, ranking third. The SDPP was the fourth party, with only 13.6 percent of the votes.⁶⁶ During the TPP-SDPP coalition, the Republican People's Party was reopened, this time under the leadership of Deniz Baykal. Seeing that a merger between the SDPP and the RPP could potentially win more votes and could have increased their success in the municipal elections, these two parties decided to unite after the municipal elections. Under which party this merger should take place was discussed for long time and constituted the main debate in the leftist spectrum of

the political scene. It ultimately happened under the RPP and Baykal became the leader of the new RPP on 9 September 1995.

The main victor of the elections was the WP as it managed to hold the municipalities of 28 city centres, the most important of all being Istanbul and Ankara, as well as a total of 338 city and town local municipalities. The victory of the WP was a significant aspect of these elections. After this victory, there was a vast amount of literature trying to understand the reasons for their victory. Rather than seeing the changing structure in the society and the calls for change from different groups for a redefinition of the modernisation project and the centre as the cause, studies followed the classical fashion, mainly focusing on socio-economic factors, the lack of other alternatives and the falling power of the left – factors independent of the WP's discourse.

Bringing most of the municipalities under their control, the WP was now able to make use of the opportunity to create jobs and take new actions to gain continuous support of their members. The municipal leaders were successful in bringing services to the population and removing most of the corruption in the system. Erbakan was saying that they were “writing a legend” in the municipalities by removing bribery, corruption and unnecessary spending, opening *Imam-Hatip* schools and despite all the debt they had inherited from the former rulers the municipal leaders had worked “with the love of God to raise a huge budget and invest with the money they raised”.⁶⁷ Şevki Yılmaz, the outspoken member of the WP was praising the victory in the municipalities saying that the first step on the way to power was taken.⁶⁸ The results of the 1995 general elections proved Yılmaz right as the party won enough votes to come to power in a coalition government.

THE 1995 ELECTIONS – THE ROAD TO ERBAKAN’S PREMIERSHIP

The result of the 24 December 1995 Parliamentary elections once again underlined the increasing popularity of the WP in Turkey. The party won 21.4 percent of the votes, getting 6,012,450 votes in number, increasing its number of seats in parliament from 62 in 1991 to 158 in 1995.

Table 5.6. Result of the 1995 General Elections

Total number of votes: 29 101 469

Participation rate in the elections: 85.2 percent

	Number of Votes	Number of Seats	Percentage of Votes
Motherland Party	5 527 288	132	19.6
Democratic Left Party	4 118 025	76	14.6
True Path Party	5 396 009	135	19.2
Republican People’s Party	3 011 076	49	10.7
Welfare Party	6 012 450	158	21.4

Source: *Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 204*

The result brought an enthusiastic reaction from the Islamist circles, although with some disappointment that they could not be the majority in the Parliament, chanting the victory as “Good News! Welfare is Coming” (*Müjdelər Olsun, Refah Geliyor!*). After the elections, government was formed between the Motherland Party of Mesut Yılmaz and the True Path Party of Tansu Çiller. This government was short-lived mainly due to disagreement over the covering up of Çiller’s corruption allegations. The end of this government opened the way for a coalition government of Çiller’s True Path Party (TPP) with the WP and the long-awaited premiership of Erbakan.

THE WELFARE – TRUE PATH COALITION GOVERNMENT

Despite leading campaign before the 24 December elections based on an anti-WP discourse, and claiming itself to be the guarantor of the Republic against rising political Islam (the WP), the True Path Party under Çiller formed a coalition government with the WP within six months of the elections. The main motive that

brought the two parties together in a coalition could be seen in the desire of the TPP leader Tansu Çiller to cast off the allegations against her and the interpellation by getting the support of WP and on the side of the WP the desire to come to power and rule the country – or at least start “the winds of change”.

To stay in power, there seemed to be no other way for the TPP leader to start negotiations with the WP leader Erbakan. The two leaders were both sensitive to the issues of interpellations against them and seemed to find it relatively easy to stand together against the different corruption allegations in the Parliament. This factor led to the conclusion by some that the WP-TPP coalition “neither represented a democratic ideology nor a political tradition, but was rather an ordinary interest pursuit of the two party leaders.”⁶⁹ The WP-TPP (referred here as the Welfare-Path) coalition was formed on 3 January 1996. The TPP leader made speeches emphasizing the harmony and common understanding in the government. Çiller was saying, “it is told that working of two parties having different bases of support would be difficult. Parties with the same constituency would lead to harmful competition. I think we will be able to complement each other, find the right way and use the competition for service to our country”.⁷⁰

As soon as the government was formed, populist policies started to be implemented. One of the first policies was to increase the wages of state officials by 50 percent. The increase reached 70 percent for the ranks of the military personnel, leading to some speculation that this was a policy of the government to silence the military opposition to the Islamist elements of the government.

A more conservative discourse had taken over the political scene, affecting the TPP public speeches. The change in the discourse of the TPP leader Çiller, who used to represent the image of the ‘Republican Woman’, was reflected in her speeches like: “Our aim is not only nationalism. It is to believe and to say one word.

We are coming from roots that take the flag and the prayer (*ezan*) as holy. This is our essence: we are believers and we are nationalists".⁷¹

One of the main developments during the WP-TPP coalition was the attempt by the WP to increase its members in state positions by appointing its members as judges and state attorneys. The presence of Islamic dresses and the increase of the Islamic symbols in the public space led to some worries on the side of the military-bureaucratic élite. The WP opened debates that questioned the concepts of secularism and democracy in the public arena. Its attempts to increase the WP members in state positions, as mentioned above, the invitation of some religious order sheiks to the Prime Minister's residence for the evening meal during Ramadan,⁷² its attempt to open the way for female state officials to wear headscarves at work, the often repeated project of building a mosque in the Taksim Square in Istanbul as a manifestation to complete the conquest of Istanbul, could all be seen as factors leading to criticisms against this party by the military-bureaucratic élite of the country. These issues were brought onto the agenda of the National Security Council by the military members of the Council and five points were cited as leading to particular concern among the military: the mosque in Taksim, the headscarf issue, special Ramadan working hours, the new regulations for collection of the sacrificed sheep leather⁷³ and travelling to Hajj through land transfer.

On the foreign policy scene, there were some important developments, as well. As the Welfare-Path came to power, one of the first developments was on the partnership with Israel. In February 1996, the Turkish military had agreed on the basic terms of the agreement with their Israeli counterparts and the final agreement was signed in August 1996. Prior to coming to power, one of the milestones of the WP discourse rested on the termination of all relations with Israel and the description of this country as the mother of all the ills in the region and in Turkey. The old order

in Turkey was defined as a “Jewish order” and many of the leaders were shown as getting their orders from the ‘evil Israeli state’ which ‘should be destroyed’. Now in power, military relations with Israel were becoming stronger and the largest agreement with this country in this field had been approved with the signature of Erbakan. Despite criticism from its constituency and harsh reactions from the Arab countries, Erbakan had approved the agreement.

As a message to his constituency and to make up for the loss he suffered because of the agreement with Israel, Erbakan paid his first visit to Iran, followed some months later by visits to Egypt, Libya and Nigeria. These visits were referred to as a catastrophe for Turkish foreign policy and the Libya visit especially brought new worries to many. In Libya, Qaddafi said how disappointed he was with the Turkish state as it was now under the invasion of the US military bases; it had signed an agreement with the Israeli state and was not giving the Kurds their independence.⁷⁴ More interestingly, Qaddafi said that he was very glad that the WP had come to power; however, it would be wrong to expect the WP to fulfil what was in its programme immediately. In order to make the WP to come to power and accomplish its programme, every Turk must vote for the WP. Qaddafi also said that Erbakan was a member of an organisation called the International Muslim People’s Command, of which Qaddafi was the commander. In spite of all these statements, which were considered as intervening into the domestic affairs of the country, Erbakan remained silent, leading to an uproar in the media, and to an interpellation against Erbakan in the Parliament.

As in the Israeli agreement case, Erbakan continued to implement policies that were against his party discourse during his premiership. One of the important examples of this was his signing of documents that would lead to the sacking of military personnel from their office due to their relations with the Islamist

organisations. The WP and the other National Opinion parties that preceded it had been calling for action against the military organization and schools and were showing their dissatisfaction with the prohibition of *Imam-Hatip* graduates from entering into these schools. They were also harshly criticising the sacking of personnel due to disciplinary reasons from its ranks, especially due to links to Islamist organisations. Sometimes the accusations implied the unbelief of military members and their intolerance for Muslims in their ranks. Despite such a discourse, Erbakan signed the documents that would lead to the expulsion from the army of the personnel against whom such allegations were made, with no opposition. Such actions led many to question what the WP could accomplish in line with its discourse while in power.

However, the WP leader Erbakan was emphasizing how proud he was of their achievements in power. In a speech he made on the 13th anniversary of the formation of WP, Erbakan stated that:

The National Opinion movement that we have initiated in 1969 has been successful after 27 years of struggle. This struggle that started in Konya with the understanding of "When Right comes, all the evil is destroyed" has been successful with the help of Allah. On 26th December 1996, our nation has made WP the biggest party. As soon as the WP came to power, it made all the members of the nation pleased by giving them 50 percent wage increase... From now on we will continue giving good news to our population everyday. We will stop unemployment and migration. Not a single hungry person will be left in Turkey. Thanks to Allah, our land is full of resources; we will make use of them in the most effective way. We are not the government of the rentier class; we are the government of the oppressed [...]. We will be mobilised for service to our population and we will get their good prayers!⁷⁵

Despite praising the accomplishments of his party, Erbakan was aware that there was growing discontent within the party regarding the actions of the government. In addition to the ideological controversy over differences between action and discourse, the party was becoming less able to keep together the economically disadvantaged segments seeking the change in the economic system immediately that would lead to some wealth distribution and the Anatolian businessmen that were increasing their wealth. In addition to that they were not able

to provide their supporters with a new platform to voice their demands for change and a redefinition of the Kemalist modernisation project. The WP promised for long years before coming to power that it would bring a new version of modernity, not only involving economic progress but also moral development. Now in power, it was not able to deliver on the promises. The party was not able to implement cultural or moral development, let alone a “just economic order” that it had been advocating. Despite the increase made in the salaries of the civil servants and officers, a radical change in the economic system for a distribution of income had not been carried out. This is understandable to some extent; firstly because the WP was a coalition partner, not in power alone to carry out any policies it wanted. However, even if the WP had the power to change the laws a radical change in the economy would have been difficult due to its own constituency. The country had to remain capitalist as it had already been incorporated into the world economy and a large group of supporters of the party, the Anatolian businesses, were an integral part of this integration. Although some points were criticised as to the controversy between action and theory in private meetings, open criticism of Erbakan’s decisions and actions was impossible within the party mechanism.

The difference between the discourse of the WP and its actions in power brought with it the question as to whether Erbakan and his party leaders were mainly power seekers and used the Just Order discourse to reach out to the segments of the society that were marginalized by the new capitalist development, without really believing in the discourse. The Just Order discourse worked in gaining the necessary support to come to power. But now, the party was faced with the reality of its supporters’ needs and demands to redefine modernisation and change the system by altering the place of the periphery in the definition of the economic system and the public space. The WP leadership tried to control these circles and compensate for

what it could not deliver by radicalising the discourse and openly attacking the Republican principles in the speeches and party meetings. While complying with the military's recommendations in the National Security Council, the party discourse was shifting towards a more radical tone, placing it as a counter-force to the Republican principles. As the debate about what modernisation meant for the WP was going on, Turkey was on the brink of drastic changes in its politics. Erbakan's pursuit of policies at odds with the Islamist discourse of his own party illustrates both the instrumentalism of political parties as well as the limitations to the public space within which they operated. The military still had the power to determine what parties elected to government could and could not do.

THE 28TH FEBRUARY PROCESS

The month of February of 1997 witnessed some important developments that would leave their stamp on the future of the country. The Jerusalem Night (*Kudüs Gecesi*) that was organised by the Sincan municipality of Ankara, under the posters of the leaders of Hizbullah and HAMAS, to which the Iranian Ambassador to Turkey had also been invited, served as a catalyst in the process already initiated. While the Iranian Ambassador Muhammed Rıza Bagheri was calling for Shari'a rule in Turkey and saying that "we should not be afraid to be called as fundamentalists. The fundamentalists are the most intelligent, most civilised and most believing people", the governor from the WP was saying that they would "inject Shari'a on the secularists by force".⁷⁶ The governor, Bekir Yıldız, went on to say that the headscarves were their flag of honour. "We would fight for our beliefs, our flag that we are proud of. We have great patience. The entire world should know that our patience should not spill over."⁷⁷

Against such an open challenge to the Republic, the reaction of the military was harsh as expected. As it had shown before, the military would not allow any forces in the country to threaten its own modernisation programme. Faced with the latest developments, the military saw that Islam was not playing the role that was assigned to it under the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Some military officials were reported in the newspapers as reflecting the general concern in the different ranks of the Armed Forces. "Turkey is being pushed towards disaster. But because of the political interests and calculations, nobody tries to stop this situation".⁷⁸ Military tanks were seen on the streets of Sincan on the morning of the 4th of February 1997, "on their way to the Operation arena". However, the statement of "we fixed the unbalanced democracy", suggested that this was not a coincidence.⁷⁹

It was not only the military that was concerned about the developments, mainly caused by the WP part of the coalition government. Before the events of Sincan, and out of concern with the practices of the WP, a civil initiative, composed of the major syndicates, professional boards and artisans unions was formed mainly for the promotion of an "alternative in the Parliament against the developments targeting the major characteristics of the Republic".⁸⁰ This initiative also had the support of the President of Turkey and the President of the Parliament. The WP leadership reacted in a rather dismissive way towards the worries of these circles. Erbakan said that "the issue is not secularism; this is the worries of the people who want to use secularism as religion-hostility. These people are only a handful. And they have become fossils".⁸¹

The statements of Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of the MP, in this context were striking. He said that the country was facing three main dangers: Firstly, political corruption in the country had reached its peak; secondly, the principle of rule of law was being defied by the government, and thirdly the WP was posing a threat to the

establishment by its policy of filling state cadres with their members and by the radicalisation and militarization of the WP base.⁸² The military leaders were also concerned as well due to the organisation of the WP base under the title of “private guard”. Almost 50 thousand people were told to gather under this group and concerns grew over its resemblance to the pre-Revolution Iranian organisation. This group was organised by a group called “Sakarya Group”, and was also responsible for the private guarding of Erbakan.⁸³

The 28th February 1997 National Security Council meeting, which was later named and known as the “post-modern coup” and its aftermath as the 28th February Process (28 Şubat Süreci), met in the light of these developments. During the meeting, the military side demanded that some policies be immediately implemented against the increasing power of the WP and the spreading of “fundamentalist Islam”. The policies included the increasing of compulsory education from 5 to 8 years, which would lead to the closure of the secondary school parts of the *Imam-Hatip* schools, and opening of the new ones under the control of the Ministry of Education, the closing down of the private Quran courses, the implementation of the dress code (prohibiting the wearing of headscarves for women and long beards and religious caps for men) with no exceptions. The government was ‘advised’ as to necessary regulations to prevent the extremist religious groups from trying to divide the country along different religious sectarian lines.⁸⁴ The proposals led to harsh responses from the cadres of the WP. The WP Parliamentarian from Şanlıurfa, İbrahim Çelik, stated;

If you try to close down the İmam-Hatip schools under the WP rule, blood will be shed. I want blood to be shed too. Democracy will come by this way and everything in the country will be wonderful. The military has not managed to cope with 3500 PKK members, how will they manage the 6 million Islamists? If they pee against the wind, it will come to their face. I would hit who hits me. I am an Islamist to the very end, I want Shari’a law to come.⁸⁵

But such criticisms against the military “advice” did not change the result. Erbakan signed the proposals despite some postponement. By signing, he was acting against all the principles of his party and openly accepting the military’s position on the issues.

Since the WP had come to power in a coalition with the TPP, and Erbakan became the Prime Minister of the country, the military had been playing a more active role in the politics and using harsh words and criticisms against the elected government. By April, the Chief of Staff was announcing a change in the National Military and Strategic Concept. The threat perception of the military had been altered; now internal threat (Islamists) was the priority over the external threat. In the briefing held in the military headquarters, it was stated, “the divisive (PKK) and religious groups (WP), in unity, are trying to divide the Turkish Republic with their operations. This means the dissolving of the state. Under these circumstances internal threat precedes the external one and becomes a top priority”.⁸⁶ This could be seen as the military trying to secure the continuation of the Kemalist modernisation project from a growing challenge to its continuation.

There were some reactions to the National Security Council decisions and the increasing role of the military in the politics. On 11 May 1997, there was a big meeting in Istanbul that was organised by the Islamist circles, to protest against the decisions, especially those about the eight-year compulsory education and consequent closure of *Imam-Hatip*’s Secondary schools and the wearing of the headscarf. “Long live Shari’a” and “Arms stretched out to the Quran will be broken” were the main slogans of the meeting. The presence of the WP Parliamentarians showed the party’s support for the meeting. “Muslims are here, Where are the Seculars?” was another chant. Secularists were organising anti-Islamist meetings in

the meanwhile and after this meeting.⁸⁷ The tension in the political arena was strained more and more each day.

The idea presented here is that the 28th February event should be taken as the open manifestation of the conflict in politics. The clash of the Republican-secular ideology, now disguised under the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, and the Islamist ideology of the WP had taken place in the open, in the public space and the fight was over the occupation of the public space. The presence of people with Islamic dress and mode of conduct had been increasing significantly with the Welfare-Path in Universities, businesses, media and occupation associations. Now, however, the universities and public offices were declared as places where Islamic dress could not be worn. This should be seen from the perspective of the struggle over who defines public space and who defines identity. The clash of cultures and identities between the military-bureaucratic élite versus the Islamists is the significant feature of these developments. Thus it can also be defined as the attempt of the military to throw the alternative life-styles out of the system and to restore the state's monopoly of national culture with the support of the Kemalist civilians. In this sense it could be seen as the clash of cultures resulting from the clash between Kemalist and Islamist understandings of identity.

APPEAL TO CONSTITUTIONAL COURT FOR THE CLOSURE OF THE WELFARE PARTY

By May 1997, the state attorney opened a case for the closure of the WP based on the allegation that it had become the headquarters of action against secularism. The allegations were not only based on the practice of the party in power, but also on the past speeches that had been made by the members of the party in different occasions. There were cassettes circulating on TV channels containing speeches of different

members of the party openly criticising the system and Kemalist principles and often calling for the implementation of the Shari'a.⁸⁸

As the tension in society was growing, the dissatisfaction with the TPP leader Çiller was increasing as well. The leadership of the TPP was already under attack from the liberal part of the party and the key names of the party were resigning one by one in protest against the policies and statements of the WP part of the coalition. Çiller was saying that it was becoming more difficult for her to control the cadres of her party and was asking Erbakan to leave the Prime Ministry to her. She was asking for what Erbakan termed a "transfer in the air". According to this plan, by changing the roles of the two parties, making Çiller the Prime Minister and Erbakan her Vice-minister, the relations with the military would be soothed and the tension in society normalised. It was difficult for Erbakan to accept that a change was necessary, as he was naturally unwilling to give up the position he had been waiting for so long. But Çiller had started threatening to leave the coalition and there was no other chance but to accept her offer if he wished to continue the coalition government. The two parties agreed that Erbakan would resign from the Prime Ministership and they would go to the President with a petition showing that a coalition under Çiller would be able to get enough support for a new government. They would ask President Demirel to transfer the Prime Ministership to the TPP. There was no doubt on the side of both parties that Demirel would give the Premiership and the duty of forming a government to the TPP. But the plans did not work. Considering the tension in the society, after Erbakan had resigned from the Prime Ministry and returned the duty of government forming to Demirel, he gave this duty to Mesut Yılmaz of the Motherland Party. All the WP-TPP plans were spoiled and the dream of both leaders to stay in power until the year 2000 was terminated with the decision of the President. In less than a year the WP government

was out of power, leaving behind signatures committing the government to eight-year compulsory education, expulsion of members of Islamist movements from the military, improved relations with Israel in addition to a radicalising discourse with statements full of attack on the Kemalist order and the Republic.

Mesut Yılmaz formed a government with the DLP of Ecevit and the new Party called as Democratic Turkey Party (*Demokratik Türkiye Partisi* – DTP) composed of a group of former TPP members who resigned in reaction to the coalition with Erbakan. The new government aimed to fulfil the recommendations of the National Security Council, but this proved difficult as the WP and the TPP continued to sabotage the government's policies. Early elections were announced for April 1999 and this remained a rather short-lived coalition, mainly founded against the Welfare-Path experience in power.

The Constitutional Court closed the WP on 16 January 1998 and Erbakan was banned from politics for a period of 5 years. Even as the closure case was being opened against the party by the state attorney, another party called Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi* – VP) was being formed by the lawyer of Erbakan. In case the WP would be closed, the members would transfer to this party and thus the continuation of Islamist politics in the Parliament could be guaranteed. This was exactly what happened.

THE VIRTUE PARTY YEARS

After the WP closed down, all its members transferred to the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi* – VP). Attempts were made to make the VP independent of the WP legacy, in order to keep it away from allegations for closure. However, the leadership of the newly founded⁴ VP was given to Recai Kutan, who was a close comrade of Erbakan and it was obvious and badly concealed that it was Erbakan who governed the party

and took the decisions behind the scene.⁸⁹ The Virtue Party seemed to underline the issue of the headscarf as the main policy tool around which the discourse of the party would revolve.

The VP tried to change its image and to present itself as the 'bastion of democracy' in Turkey, in contrast to the Just Order discourse of the former WP. It designed a policy that included closer relations with the West and an implementation of a Western type democracy. It criticised the military-bureaucratic élite for not being 'modern enough' and presented this lack of 'modernness' on the side of the élite as the main threat to the system. The 'intolerance' of the 'ruling powers' towards individual liberties and any deviation from beyond Kemalist principles were criticised and were shown as *the* real threat to the country as opposed to the 'imagined internal threat' - the new threat definition of the military strategic concept. Within this perspective, the VP built its policy on the expression of different identities and presented these within the discourse of Western democracy, individual liberties and basic rights. For this purpose, the headscarf issue was a great symbolic tool in the hands of the Party. Recai Kutan, the leader of the party, said in his party speech in Kayseri that:

Some people, including some professors and rectors among them are saying that 'We do not want the girls with headscarf to enter the university because we want to protect the Republic'. Everybody, even the birds, laugh at these statements. What kind of a Republic understanding is this that opposes in a person's belief, the society's culture, traditions? To this understanding of Republic, they call a Banana Republic.⁹⁰

In the same meeting Vice President Abdullah Gül was saying:

Those that are stealing from the state, that are corrupt, that are hand in hand with the mafia and gangs are today hiding under the secularism guise. Would they be able to sit in the most prestigious positions if justice and freedoms were complied with in this country, if the society was not deprived of its values and treated as second class in his own country?⁹¹

While the establishment was banning the use of headscarves in public offices and universities based on the argument that it was not used as a religious requirement but rather as a political tool and the symbols of the National Opinion,

the VP was presenting this merely as a religious issue and blaming the state for disrespect to religious obligations. Cemil Çiçek described society as being stuck between the requirements of religion and the oppression of the state. “What will this society do now? Will he face the state for his religion or will he face the religion for his state?”⁹² A founding member of the VP, Nazlı Ilıcak, said:

When VP comes to power, this oppression will be solved. This headscarf repression will be solved, how? Because the VP will bring by votes women wearing headscarves to the parliament. Because there will be MPs with headscarves. Let’s see what they will say to this. Because there will be a minister with a headscarf. Wherever there is oppression, there is a political demand of this oppressed.⁹³

Before the 18 April 1999 parliamentary elections, Merve Kavakçı, who openly said that she would under no condition take her headscarf off, was put on the election list in a position from which she could be chosen to be a parliamentarian. The leaders of the VP repeatedly said that, if elected, Kavakçı would come to the Parliament with her headscarf and would take the Parliamentary oath with her headscarf. This would lead to another conflict in the parliament between the centre powers and the Islamists.

THE 1999 ELECTIONS AND BEYOND

In the 1999 elections, the VP won less votes than it expected. The controversial policies in power, as well as the inability of the party to deliver economically and culturally, coupled with its reactionary radical discourse seemed to decrease the support for the VP.

Table 5.7. Result of the 1999 General Elections
Total number of votes used: 32 495 217
Participation rate in the elections: 87.1 percent

	Number of Votes	Number of Seats	Percentage of Votes
Motherland Party	4 122 929	86	12.69
Democratic Left Party	6 919 670	136	21.29
True Path Party	3 745 417	85	11.53
Republican People’s Party	2 716 094	-	8.36
Virtue Party	4 805 381	111	14.79
Nationalist Action Party	5 606 583	129	17.25

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 204

The elections could be considered as a victory for the DLP, which had become the biggest party in power. The RPP was rather a disappointment as the party could not pass the electoral threshold and was left out of the Parliament. This came as a big surprise as the party had never been out of parliament in any elections that it participated in since its formation in 1923. Another surprise was the significant increase in the votes for the Nationalist Action Party, carrying the ultra-nationalist Grey Wolf legacy to power. The government was formed as a coalition between the DLP of Ecevit, the MP of Yılmaz and the NAP of Devlet Bahçeli, who was elected the head of the party after the death of the founding leader of the nationalist movement Alparslan Türkeş. Bülent Ecevit became the Prime Minister and this government is still in power as these lines were being written.

Kavakçı was elected to the Parliament and as expected her arrival to the Parliament with her headscarf on 1 May 1999 opened a new debate and a new open clash between the military-bureaucracy and the National Opinion group. The military-bureaucracy perceived the act as an attempt to “abolish the Republic”⁹⁴ and thought it to be the most dangerous Islamist manifestation in the history of the Republic, since this was carried on by a political party in the Parliament targeting “the brain of the state”.⁹⁵ Kavakçı’s status as a parliamentarian was cancelled and her Turkish citizenship was terminated on the grounds that she was an American citizen, a fact she had kept secret from the state authorities.

As the manifestations of the Islamist character of the Party was continuing with the headscarf issue, the party structure began to be criticized by its own members – the reformist group - for not being able to find a new image for itself in the political arena and for being very much under the influence of the Welfare Party experience. Some compared its condition to that of the later period of the Ottoman Empire, being subject to both internal and external attacks.⁹⁶ For many critics, the

party seemed to be two-headed, with the official leadership not being in full control of the party. It gave the image that it was Erbakan who ruled behind the curtains, an image reflected especially with the differences of opinion between Erbakan and the official administration. There was a widespread idea that the main priority of the party was to bring Erbakan back into politics via any means possible. Thus, this led to the questioning of the 'Virtue' of the Party.⁹⁷

The younger, reformist group in the party led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the former mayor of Istanbul, and Abdullah Gül started to challenge the old guard in an attempt to make the party more appealing for the masses and they even pronounced the need for a pro-system party. In the first congress of the Party, in May 2000, Gül challenged Kutan for the leadership of the party, representing the reformists against the traditionalists. However, Kutan by winning the support of Erbakan, managed to outbid the reformers and tried to consolidate his rule in the party.

On May 1999, the State Prosecutor Vural Savaş opened a case for the closure of the VP based on the grounds that it had become a centre of anti-secularist activities and that it was the continuation of the closed WP. As the internal opposition in the party was escalating with different statements from different groups, the constitutional court had found Savaş correct in his first point but rejected the second one, and the party was closed on June 22, 2001. After this date, the National Opinion was divided into two: while the reformists founded the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the traditionalists formed the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*) under Recai Kutan.

SUMMARY

During the period under consideration, economic liberalisation policies were implemented as a remedy for the failure of the developmentalist project of the state. These new policies broke down the structure built on the old state-led capitalist industrialisation and also the old capitalist élite. The changes in the economy, with the impact of globalisation as well, helped to intensify the challenges to the Kemalist modernisation project. The emergence of ethnic and religious identities, which had until now been subordinated to an imposed and supposedly monolithic national culture, made the continuation of the élite-defined version of modernisation more difficult. The state had to make concessions to the forces being unleashed at this stage in order to secure a continuation of that modernisation process. In an attempt to incorporate the new emerging groups, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was introduced into the modernisation project. So, the Kemalist modernisation project had been reformulated by the military-bureaucracy, as composed of capitalist development (a free market economy), Turkish nationalism and secularism put into an Islamic cultural context. By showing that the modernisation project could be reformulated, the élite had opened the doors for demands that wanted further reformulations and changes to the modernisation project from Kurdish nationalists to feminists, from workers' rights groups to environmentalists. While the feminists and environmentalists remained rather weak voices in the collective action, the Kurdish groups and the Islamists played the major role in the process.

The Turkish-Islamic synthesis was ultimately unable to integrate the Islamists into the system as ordained by the military-bureaucratic élites. Especially from the 1990s onwards, new demands were raised challenging not only the formula of modernisation but the entire modernisation project. This was seen with the demands for a Just Order that undermined the progress of capitalist development and

the calls for reviving the religious community. By challenging the modernisation project, the Islamists showed that the society was not an harmonious, homogenous whole but a fragmented and contradictory set of interest groups and contradictory needs that could not be resolved in a corporatist or even a limited democratic framework. The military-bureaucratic élites could not “incorporate” the Islamists by reformulating the modernisation project, so they were left with the options of fully democratising the country and risking the overthrow of their version of modernity or suppressing the Islamist movement. The party closures signify that the military-bureaucratic élite had chosen to “suppress” Islamists for the sake of continuation of the modernisation project.

¹ Galip Yalman, “The Turkish State and Bourgeoisie in Historical Perspective: A Relativist Paradigm or a Panoply of Hegemonic Strategies”, in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), The Politics of Permanent Crisis – Class, Ideology and State in Turkey, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002), p. 38

² Ahmet Evin, “Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After 1980” in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), State, Democracy and the Military – Turkey in the 1980s, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 201

³ Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), p. 181

⁴ The NSP already provided a political platform to voice the demands for an Islamic state. In addition to that from mid-1970s onwards, the ‘Islamic youth’ had been gathering around some journals – *Akıncılar*, *Akıncı Güç*, *Gölge*, *Düşünce*, *İslami Hareket* – that openly advocated an Islamic state and often wrote that “Western secular Republican order will be abolished. Islamic state order that is based on divine rules will be formed. Victory will be gained when we become a state”. For details see Soner Yalçın, Which Erbakan? (Hangi Erbakan?), (Ankara: Başak Yayınları, 1994), p. 151

⁵ TIS had firstly been put forward by the ideology of the Hearts of the Enlightened (*Aydınlar Ocağı*), an organization founded in 1970 by influential people in the business world, universities and politics mainly with the aim of breaking the monopoly of the leftist intellectuals in the political, social and cultural debate in Turkey. The TIS was shaped by the ideas of the leader of the Heart of the Enlightened, İbrahim Kafesoğlu, writing on the nature of the Turkish culture resting on the double pillars of Turkishness and Islam. During the 1970s, the elements of the TIS idea had been adopted by the NSP of Erbakan and the Nationalist Action Party – the Grey Wolves- of Türkeş. Each Party emphasized the different aspect of the TIS. This became a widely referred phrase for the ideological position of the military regime during the three years it was in power. For details see Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), Gencay Şaylan, Türkiye’de İslamcı Siyaset (Islamist Politics in Turkey), (Ankara: Verso, 1992), Doğan Duman, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye’de İslamcılık (Islamism in Turkey within the Process of Democracy), (İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Yayınları, 1997, Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, Turkey and the Kurds: An Example of Trans-State Ethnic Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 1997), Richard Tapper, Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State (London: Tauris, 1991).

⁶ Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, p. 184

⁷ Richard Tapper, Islam in Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State, (London: I.B.Tauris, 1991)

⁸ The leading members of the state apparatus is said to be leading *Aydınlar Ocağı* (Heart of the Enlightened) members from whom the TIS ideology developed.

⁹ Tanil Bora and Kemal Can, Devlet, Ocak, Dergah – 12 Eylül'den 1990'lara Ülkücü Hareket (*Nationalist Movement from 12 September to Present*) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000), 221

¹⁰ For studies concentrating on the incompatibility of the two concepts and the inconsistency of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis see Bozkurt Güvenç, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (*Türk İslam Sentezi*), (Istanbul: Sarmal, 1991), Vecihi Timuroğlu, Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (*Türk İslam Sentezi*), (Ankara: Basak, 1991)

¹¹ Kemal Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980", in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), State, Democracy and the Military – Turkey in the 1980s, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p. 156

¹² Birol Akgün, "Aspects of Party System Development in Turkey", Turkish Studies, Vol.2, No. 1, Spring 2001, p. 78

¹³ Üstün Ergüder and Richard I. Hofferbert, "The 1983 Elections in Turkey: Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns" in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, State, Democracy and the Military – Turkey in the 1980s, p. 81

¹⁴ William Hale, "Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective" in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, (eds.), State, Democracy and the Military – Turkey in the 1980s, p. 167

¹⁵ William Hale, "Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective" in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, State, Democracy and the Military – Turkey in the 1980s, p. 167

¹⁶ Sabri Sayarı, "Politics and Economic Policy Making in Turkey, 1980-1988" in Tevfik Nas and Mehmet Odekon (eds.), Economics and Politics of Turkish Liberalization, (London: Associated University Presses, 1992), p. 30

¹⁷ Sabri Sayarı, "Politics and Economic Policy Making in Turkey, 1980-1988", p.31

¹⁸ Roger Owen and Sevkett Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century, (London: I.B.Tauris, 1998), p. 118

¹⁹ Frank Tachau, "Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy", Turkish Studies, Vol.1, No. 1 (Spring 2000), p. 139

²⁰ Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "The Motherland Party: The Challenge of Institutionalisation in a Charismatic Leader Party", Turkish Studies, Vol.3, No.1, Spring 2002, p. 45

²¹ *ibid*

²² Sencer Ayata, "Patronage, Party and State: The Politicization of Islam in Turkey", Middle East Journal, Vol. 50, No. 1, 1996, p. 44

²³ Üstün Ergüder, "The Motherland Party, 1983-1989", in Metin Heper and Jacob Landau, (eds.), Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), p. 153-4.

²⁴ *ibid*.

²⁵ Nilüfer Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: the Case of Turkey" in Augustus Richard Norton, Civil Society in the Middle East, Vol.2, (Leiden: E.J Brill, 1996), p. 30

²⁶ For details and the links of different politicians, especially that of the Virtue Party with the religious orders see the recent study by Birol Yeşilada, "The Virtue Party", Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1,

Spring 2002, p. 71-73. For a detailed study of the religious orders and their political extensions also see Ruşen Çakır, Ayet ve Slogan – Türkiye’de İslami Oluşumlar, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1995)

²⁷ Emre Kongar, 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye (Turkey in 21st Century), (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1998), p. 253

²⁸ *ibid.*

²⁹ Nilüfer Göle, “Toward and Autonomisation of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey”, in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), Politics in the Third Turkish Republic, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 213

³⁰ Metin Heper, “State and Society in Turkish Political Experience” in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (eds.), State, Democracy and the Military – Turkey in the 1980s, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), p.8

³¹ *ibid*

³² Nilüfer Göle, “Toward and Autonomisation of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey”, p. 218

³³ *ibid*, p. 220

³⁴ *ibid*, p. 222

³⁵ Ziya Öniş, “Redemocratisation and Economic Liberalisation in Turkey: The Limits of State Economy”, Studies in International Economic Development, Summer 1992, Vol. 27, No 2, p. 11

³⁶ Ziya Öniş, “Political Economy of Turkey in the 1980s – Anatomy of Unorthodox Liberalism”, in Metin Heper (ed.), Strong State and Economic Interest Groups, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1991), p. 30

³⁷ *ibid*

³⁸ Ziya Öniş, “Political Economy of Turkey in the 1980s – Anatomy of Unorthodox Liberalism”, in Metin Heper (ed.), Strong State and Economic Interest Groups, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1991), p. 30

³⁹ *ibid*

⁴⁰ John Waterbury, “Export-Led Growth and the Right-Right Coalition in Turkey”, in Tefik Nas and Mehmet Odekun (eds.), Economics and Politics of Turkish Liberalization, (London: Associated University Presses, 1992), p. 64

⁴¹ *ibid*, p. 65

⁴² Korkut Boratav and Ergun Türkcan, Türkiye’de Sanayileşmenin Yeni Boyutları ve KİT’ler (New Prospects of Industrialisation in Turkey and State Economic Enterprises), (İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı, Yurt Yayınları), 1994, p.2, See also the study of Suleyman Ozmucur, Functional Distribution Of Income (Gelirin Fonksiyonel Dagilimi, 1948-1991), Bosphorus University Research Paper, ISS/EC 91-06, (İstanbul: Bosphorus University, 1991)

⁴³ Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Erinc Yeldan, “Politics, Society and Financial Liberalisation: Turkey in the 1990s”, Development and Change, Vol. 31 (2000), p. 499

⁴⁴ Ayşe Buğra, “Political Islam in Turkey in Historical Context”, in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), The Politics of Permanent Crisis – Class, Ideology and State in Turkey, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002), p. 120

⁴⁵ Aylin Güney, “The People’s Democracy Party”, Turkish Studies, Vol.3, No. 1, p. 123

⁴⁶ 50.27 percent voted for yes, to an amendment while the 49.76 voted for a no. This slight victory brought the banned former party leaders to the political scene.

⁴⁷ Nilüfer Göle, *Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: the Case of Turkey* in Augustus Richard Norton, *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Vol.2, (Leiden: E.J Brill, 1996), p.33

⁴⁸ Doğan Duman, *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye’de İslamcılık*, p. 104

⁴⁹ For details, see Uğur Akıncı, “The Welfare Party’s Municipal Track record: Evaluating Islamist Municipal Activism in Turkey”, *Middle East Journal*, Vol.53, No.1, Winter 1999

⁵⁰ The other Turkey had been an important jargon used for the lower middle classes, after mid-1980s, and especially in the 1990s. The suffering lower middle classes, small and medium businesses, peasantry, in short the underprivileged periphery was called as ‘the other Turkey’ against the centre and the privileged “first nation” – educated urban groups.

⁵¹ Ümit Cizre, “From Ruler to Pariah: The Life and Times of the True Path Party”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 3, No.1, Spring 2001, p. 86-87

⁵² *ibid*

⁵³ Discussion with Bahri Zengin in *Yeni Zemin*, No. 1, 1993 p. 29

⁵⁴ Ayça Alemdaroğlu, “1991 Yılı Refah Partisi Secim Kampanyası”, Paper presented in Social Science Congress, Middle East Technical University, 1999

⁵⁵ *ibid*

⁵⁶ Ruşen Çakır, “Türk İslamcılarının Politik Krizi” (*The Political Crisis of the Turkish Islamists*), *Birikim*, No.42, 1992, p. 32

⁵⁷ The People’s Labour Party entered the Parliament on a SDPP election coalition.

⁵⁸ Erik Zürcher, *Turkey – A Modern History*, (London: I.B.Tauris, 1993), p. 306

⁵⁹ Nilüfer Göle, *Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: the Case of Turkey* in Augustus Richard Norton, *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Vol.2, (Leiden: E.J Brill, 1996), p. 35

⁶⁰ For a detailed study of the events see Emre Kongar, , *21. Yüzyılda Türkiye (Turkey in 21st Century)*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1998), p. 254-263

⁶¹ Class, Culture and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations. *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 30 (1998), pp. 524

⁶² For an analysis of Islamist intellectuals in Turkey see Michael Meeker, “The Muslim Intellectual and His Audience: A New Configuration of Writer and Reader among Believers in the Republic of Turkey” in Serif Mardin, (ed.), *Cultural Transitions in the Middle East*, (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1994), pp. 153-188

⁶³ For a research conducted in this *site* see Ayşe Saktanber’s unpublished PhD thesis, “Islamic Revitalization in turkey: An Urban Model of a ‘Counter Society’, a Case Study” delivered to Middle East Technical University, Department of Sociology in 1995. Saktanber makes a survey on 25 families living in this establishment including knowledge about their lives, marriage, education and income focusing mainly on women. She talks about Islamic ways of conduct and symbols and their usage in this quarter of Ankara.

⁶⁴ Ayşe Buğra notes that this is the definition of W. Kymlicka, who uses it mainly for ethnic/national sense of culture. However, she notes the relevance of the term for the Islamic movement in Turkey, mainly for the WP, “as it attempts to establish religion as a cultural basis of a comprehensive reorganisation of social, economic and political life”. See Ayşe Buğra, “Political Islam in Turkey in Historical Context”, in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), *The Politics of Permanent Crisis – Class, Ideology and State in Turkey*, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002), p. 108

⁶⁵ Ali Bayramoğlu, *Türkiye’de İslami Hareket – Sosyolojik bir Bakış (Islamist Movement in Turkey – A Sociological Approach)*, (İstanbul: Patika Yayıncılık, 2001, p. 43

⁶⁶ Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999

⁶⁷ Quoted from Milli Gazete, 28 March 1995 in Mehmet Emin Gerger, Welfare from Municipalities to Power (*Belediyelerden İktidara Refah*), (İstanbul: Cemre Yayınları, 1996), p. 11-13

⁶⁸ Sevki Yılmaz, in a speech in Rize, 1991 in Party Closure document of WP.

⁶⁹ Gencer Özcan, "Introduction", Onbir Aylık Saltanat, (*Eleven Months of Sultanate*), Gencer Özcan, (ed.), (İstanbul: Boyut Yayınları, 1998), p. 33-34

⁷⁰ Şamil Tayyar, Refahyol Tutanakları (*Records of Welfare – Path*), (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1997), p. 20

⁷¹ Hakan Akpınar, 28 Şubat – Post-Modern Darbenin Öyküsü (*28 February – the Story of a Post-Modern Coup*), (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2001), p. 64

⁷² Considering the fact that all religious orders were banned under the Republic, this was perceived as an assault on the Republican principles and Kemalist reforms, thus showing the acceptance of the WP of these groups as legitimate against Republican Laws.

⁷³ According to regulations, the legal right to collect the sheepskin that is sacrificed in the religious Holiday is given to the Turkish Aviation Organization. WP wanted to change this regulation by proposing that individuals must be free to decide to where they want to donate the skin. Monetarily this was thought to bring a huge income to local Islamist organizations.

⁷⁴ Şamil Tayyar, Refahyol Tutanakları, p. 87. Hakan Akpınar, 28 Şubat – Post-Modern Darbenin Öyküsü p. 110

⁷⁵ Quoted in Mehmet Emin Gerger, Belediyelerden İktidara Refah, p. 13

⁷⁶ Cumhuriyet, 2 February 1997

⁷⁷ *ibid*

⁷⁸ Hürriyet, 3 February 1997

⁷⁹ Hakan Akpınar, 28 Şubat – Post-Modern Darbenin Öyküsü, p.178

⁸⁰ Kemali Saybaşı, "Siyasal Sistem Bunalımı" (*The Crisis of the Political System*), in Gencer Özcan (ed.), Onbir Aylık Saltanat, p. 90

⁸¹ Cumhuriyet, 5 February 1997

⁸² Kemali Saybaşı, "Siyasal Sistem Bunalımı", in in Gencer Özcan (ed.), Onbir Aylık Saltanat, p. 92

⁸³ *ibid*

⁸⁴ Hakan Akpınar, 28 Şubat – Post-Modern Darbenin Öyküsü, p.209

⁸⁵ *ibid*, pp. 168-269

⁸⁶ *ibid*, p. 262

⁸⁷ Ayşe Ayata notes that the WPP was behind the organization of the anti-Islamist meetings at the time. Ayşe Ayata, "The Republican People's Party", Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 118

⁸⁸ Ergün Poyraz, who had been a former member of the Youth Organisation of WP played a major role in the distribution of these cassettes and have revealed an insider's view on the Party in his books. See his books, Refah'ın Gerçek Yüzü, (*The Real Face of the Welfare Party*), (Ankara: MK Yayıncılık, 1996) and MNP'den FP'ye İhanetin Belgeleri, (*From NOP to Virtue Party, the Documents of Betrayal*), (Ankara: MK Yayıncılık, 1998)

⁸⁹ For a recent analysis see Birol Yeşilada, “The Virtue Party”, Turkish Studies, vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2002, p. 68

⁹⁰ Recai Kutan, Kayseri Meeting on 10 October 1998 in Party Closure Document of VP.

⁹¹ Abdullah Gül, Kayseri Meeting on 10 October 1998 in Party Closure Document of VP.

⁹² Cemil Çiçek, Anatolian News Agency, 9 June 1998

⁹³ Nazlı Ilıcak, Kayseri Meeting on 10 October 1998 in Party Closure Document of VP.

⁹⁴ Oktay Ekşi, Hürriyet, 2 May 1999

⁹⁵ Prof. Dr. Cahit Tanyol, Cumhuriyet, 15 May 1999

⁹⁶ Yeni Şafak, 25 March 1999

⁹⁷ Yeni Şafak, 11 Mart 1999

CHAPTER 6

DISCOURSE OF THE NATIONAL OPINION PARTIES

The aim of this chapter is to look at the discourse of the National Opinion Parties: the National Order Party, the National Salvation Party, the Welfare Party and the Virtue Party (all of which were founded by Erbakan with the exception of the Virtue Party) and all of which claim to represent the continuation of the same ideology – the National Opinion (*Milli Görüş*). If we want to see, in line with the New Social Movements debate, whether the Islamist movements are responding to modernity, and if so, how they challenge the modernisation process, it is necessary to look at the discourse of the parties representing the Islamist movement. It is important to understand exactly how the Islamists see themselves as responding to modernity.

The evidence so far presented has suggested that, at times, political parties have utilised Islamist discourse in an opportunistic manner, abandoning it when convenient or when the limitations on the public space have forced them to do so. However, the Islamist political parties have developed an identifiable discourse of their own which indicates their location and evolution within the wider grouping of Islamist movements. The nature of this discourse, and its challenges to Kemalist notions of modernisation, has been of fundamental importance, both in itself and as an ideological tool for opposition to the imposition of those ideas upon Turkish political society. By examining this discourse, this chapter serves a number of purposes. Firstly, it demonstrates the “Islamist” nature of these political parties. Secondly, it exposes the counter-élites’ challenge to the Kemalist modernisation

project. Finally, it lays out the ideological premises which have been picked up by the opposition for use against the military-bureaucratic elites.

THE NATIONAL ORDER PARTY

As stated in the previous chapters, the formation of the NOP coincides with the growth of class politics in the country and the party was seen as closely related with the interest representation of the petit-bourgeoisie, who were stuck between the competition of the big businesses and the workers' unions pressing for wage increases. When Erbakan was elected as the president of the Turkish Union of Boards, representing the small businesses in 1969, he was met with a reaction from the Boards of Istanbul and İzmir, where the big businesses had the upper hand. Against this reaction, Erbakan was removed from the position that he was elected to by the Justice Party regime at the time and his candidacy for entering the Parliament from this party's list had been vetoed instantly. As a result of these developments, Erbakan entered the 1969 elections as an independent from Konya and he was elected to the Parliament with an independent status. These developments further strengthened his position among the small businesses and helped him to gather their support under the new party that he would soon form: The National Order Party.

The National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi* – NOP), founded on 26 January 1970, defined itself in the party programme, as a forward-looking ideological party. The NOP programme starts by stating that the aim of the party was “to bring the strong morality and virtue that is in the nature of our great nation into practice and to bring order, peace, justice, happiness and salvation to the population”.¹ Developing “a real science that is purified from foreign imitation, that is creative and constructive, in addition to the moral development that we adhere to”² became one of the main objectives of the founding members. The NOP proposed in

its programme to build up “a civilization that will be a model for the world and will bring welfare and happiness and shed a light to humanity within a democratic order, without harming the national and moral values” thus, everybody was invited “to work for this great aim”.³ The aim of creating an Islamic state is not openly written in the programme as this would be against the constitution and the Law of Political Parties and would have led to the immediate closure of the party. Instead of an Islamic state, the NOP called people to gather around the ‘holy aim of forming a great civilisation’, with this civilisation being formulated according to Islamic premises.

In order to form this “great civilisation”, education was given a major importance and national struggle in the cultural field was proposed, “until the country is no longer underdeveloped and the society is an example to all humanity in every aspect”.⁴

According to the NOP programme, Turkey’s domestic problems could be divided into two. The first problem was in the economy: the dependence of the Turkish economy on foreign markets and capital and the low income per person with an unjust distribution of wealth. The second problem was what the NOP had been distinctively emphasising in its programme: the moral sphere. In an attempt to develop the moral sphere, the main group targeted by the NOP was the youth and “the necessity of the youth to be educated according to the national values”⁵ was put forward as a priority. According to the party programme, the Turkish educational system could not train the Turkish youth in line with the national targets but was rather based on a rejection of ‘great Turkish history’ that left the ‘hearts of the youth’ without any belief. The NOP leaders thought that such an environment increased the activities of the cultural imperialists for moral invasion. Marxism, cosmopolitanism and all foreign ideologies were seen as expanding their influence in Turkey due to

these wrong policies implemented for decades⁶. Thus, it was noted that the NOP considered it a duty, as much as national independence, to fight the moral invasion.

HAK VERSUS BATIL

Within the National Order Party programme, as well as in the following 'national opinion' parties, the world that we live in was portrayed as a constant fight of the *Hak* (the absolute right, right under all conditions) and *Batil* (absolute wrong, wrong under all conditions). While *batıl* represented the rights based on concepts of power, majority, privilege and interest, *hak* represented all the rights that were given by the God to all humans equally. National Opinion Parties claimed that they represent the absolute truth (*hak*) in the society, while all other parties and groups represent the absolute wrong (*batıl*). All other parties and the people who supported 'others' represented 'the wrong', as well as having an 'imitating mentality'. Therefore, all other parties had to be closed down for the implementation of the National Opinion, 'the absolute right', initially in Turkey and later in the world.

In January 1971, Erbakan referring to the fight between *hak* and *batıl* in the country located this struggle in the moral sphere. He said that 'the *batıl* front' composed of 72 parties and 'the *hak* front' was only defended by the National Order Party. Fighting against the National Order Party in this morality struggle was thus named as becoming "a Jewish soldier".⁷ Thus, every believer was invited to side with the NOP against such evil – the 'others'.

The appeal of the NOP to the petty-bourgeoisie could be seen in the party programme. Within the economic principles of the party, its opposition against the concentration of capital in the hands of the few was underlined, while more state support and help for the "industrialists" of provincial towns and the periphery (*taşra*) was regarded as a priority. The party's opposition against the "socialist and communist philosophy" and the materialist-capitalist ideas is underlined. The party

saw the nation as composed of spiritual and national values, encouraging honest work and earning and respecting ownership rights. The economic understanding of the party is noted to go beyond the socialist model of the Eastern Bloc and the 'free-ride capitalism' of the West, resting on both the material and the spiritual development of the individual. Thus, it was the only way that could take the humanity forward. The spiritual order was seen as the guarantor of a mixed economy and all mixed economy policies that did not rest on a spiritual basis and support were rejected.⁸ The NOP demanded a scattered and decentralised private sector in different cities of Anatolia, the channelling of investments to underdeveloped regions, abolition of exploitative interest system, changing of the tax system that "exploited the poor and favoured the rich". Erbakan held speeches that stressed the importance of the interests of the petit bourgeoisie:

"Economic mechanisms work for the interests of the big city merchants and the merchants of Anatolia know themselves as a step-son. The bulk of the import quotas are shared by the merchants of the three – four cities and these people also control the Union of Boards". "All the money in the Banks are invested by people of Anatolia but this money is given as credits to the merchants of the big cities". "It has been understood in short time that Union of Boards is working as a tool of the truly comprador mason minority." " This minority does not want the Anatolian merchants to improve their positions and develop. They would always want to control."⁹ These are some of the statements of Erbakan regarding this issue.

From these statements it is apparent that the NOP appealed to the small businesses of Anatolia; however, it would not be enough to explain the formation of NOP only with economic reasons. If it got the support of the whole petit-bourgeoisie, it would have been more influential in terms of the political representation. It must also be kept in mind that it is the continuation of the anti-

Western, anti-secular reaction to the modernisation period in the Republic, with reference to the “good old days” – the glorification of the past.

One of the manifestations of these glorifications of the good old days can be seen during the speeches of some prominent members of the Party during its formation stage. The first congress of the Party opened with slogans of “God is Great” (*Allahüekber*) and in an attempt to show the links of the party with the past, the leader Erbakan said, “Why would I hide the truth? The real builders of the party are Sultan Fatih, Sultan Yıldırım, Sultan Murat, Ulubatlı Hasan, Sultan Yavuz, Orhan Gazi, Kılıç Arslan and Sultan Hamit”.¹⁰ All these figures represent important heroic figures in Turkish and Ottoman history. In a speech in Ankara city congress the vice chair of the party Hasan Aksay said that the main difference of the National Order from the other parties was that they were not searching for a salvation in Moscow, China or Paris but in the 1000 years of road of belief (*hak yolu*).¹¹

In another speech, Erbakan was told that National Order was the name of the movement that would mobilise the believers in the country to get rid of the ‘sicknesses of communism and masonry’ in the country. The party was named as belonging to those that smelled of roses and heaven.¹²

The reaction against the Republican reforms and the Kemalist modernisation project, especially against secularism and policies liberating women, was reflected in the speeches as the reforms were seen as infringing the morality of the population. Aksay said, “since the Turkish women started going out naked into the streets, this soil that is watered with the blood of the martyrs is cracking with shame.”¹³

Not only the Kemalist reforms but also the cadres that carried on the Tanzimat reforms and the War of Independence were attacked as being Masons and Jews working against the real interests of the country. Erbakan had openly attacked

the first traits of the national resistance movement resembling it first to the despotic rule of Abdulhamit and later the foreign invasion. He said in Diyarbakır in June 1978 that

Masons had built up their headquarters in Thessalonica (where the CUP had been founded) and had converted some of the Ottoman officers to their cause, making them Masons. They had overthrown Sultan Abdulhamit from the throne; leading to the collapse of the Muslim Empire and by this way had transferred the rule of the world from the Muslims to the Jews. The National Order is the road to a thousand years of belief and the road to the right, after fifty years of darkness... We are going to make everybody know about the National Order in the country and we will not do this for our interests but for the consent of Allah and worship. The people who pray are the oppressed and the exploited in this country.¹⁴ *Parenthesis are mine.*

The NOP played an important role in the life of Islamist opposition in Turkey. Before the formation of the party, the Islamist opposition was represented in the opposition parties of the centre and with the anti-westernisation discourse that it propagated; it remained a marginal force that was countered by the class based arguments of the peripheral opposition.¹⁵ The NOP was to some extent successful in building up a political party that brought together the political preferences and religio-cultural identity of Muslims. In the beginning of the 1970s, the NOP managed to separate “Islamist politics” from those of the Centre-Right parties and gave it a real place in the political spectrum of the country.

The military intervention of March 1971, carried out with a memorandum sent to the government had been followed by the closure of the NOP by the order of the Constitutional Court on 20 May 1971. The court decided that the NOP was against the basic principles of the Republic, especially those based on secularism. The NOP had called into question the Kemalist modernisation project and advocated the creation of a new system based on Islamist principles that was against the constitution. In addition to the above-mentioned speeches of different members of the party, the publications by the party organs at the time were also shown as a proof by the court that the party was against secularist principles. Erbakan's ideas written in these publications suggested sentiments like “there could be a lot of benefits from

implementing the caliphate back into the system, including political benefits. I am not insisting that it should come, however, if the population want, everything is possible [...].”¹⁶ In another publication called *Islam ve İlim*, Erbakan writes, “There could be no source of truth except that of Islam.”¹⁷ Against secularism, the leader of the NOP noted that “the statement of religion and state are the same things and they could not be united is wrong and misleading. This is not right. Religion and state work together and go hand in hand. It is not possible to separate them.”¹⁸

The party was closed in May 1971. During this period when the NOP was founded and operated in politics, the modernisation project in Turkey consisted of state-led capitalist industrialisation, nation-state and secularism in a Westernisation framework. Regarding state-led capitalist industrialisation, the NOP, in a drive to place itself in the increasing class politics of the time, proposed a mixed economy that would protect the interests of the petit-bourgeoisie. It underlined the necessity for reform in the economic system that would provide favourable conditions for Anatolian businesses. However, it did not challenge the capitalist industrialisation per se. The main challenge of the NOP to the modernisation project was formed against the secularism and Westernisation pillars. ‘A civilisation based on Islam’ was proposed as the main alternative to replace the ‘alien and imported project of modernisation’.

THE NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY

As the NOP was closed down, another party, the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi* – NSP) that became a continuation of the NOP ideology was formed on 11 October 1972. Despite being the continuation of the NOP, the leaders had been more careful about their discourse and speeches especially in the beginning. In order to avoid another closure, Erbakan did not become a founding member of the

party. Erbakan's close friend Süleyman Arif Emre became the leader of the party. The party entered the 1973 elections under his leadership. Erbakan took over after the elections of 1973.

Emre in the First Party Congress underlined that the political parties in Turkey brought ideological conflicts into the core of the political debate and within this context he emphasized the ideological nature of the party. According to Emre, there were three main opinions in the Turkish political life: the Republican People's Party represented the "leftist opinion", the Justice Party represented the "liberal opinion", and the NSP represented the "national opinion" (*milli görüş*).¹⁹ According to this view, ideas other than the national opinion were materialist: for RPP, everything was material, for the Justice party, everything was money, while for NSP everything was morality. The RPP and the JP represented the two infidel ideologies, so "they will collapse one day and the Islamist 'national opinion' of the NSP will be dominant".²⁰

To the question of what the essence of the 'national opinion' was, Emre stated that

Our Constitution provides every individual the right to develop himself both materially and spiritually. Our party accepts the pursuit of both material and spiritual development in a balanced manner. We think that the leftist and the liberal ideas only seek material development and neglect spiritual development and morality in the society. This is a wrong approach because the basis of material development lies in the spiritual development [...]. We believe that the legal order have to be complemented and supported by a moral order. A moral order is the basis and guarantor of a democratic regime. [...] A regime can survive only with support of its believers. Thus, this support could be secured by spiritual and mental education of the individuals".²¹

The main aim of 'national opinion' was announced as building up material and spiritual development and the main way to attain such a development required educating the individuals in this direction. In the party programme and publications five main targets were put forward by the 'national opinion'. These were: 'Internal Peace', 'State-Nation Unification', 'Great Turkey Once Again Ideal', 'Spiritual Development' and 'Material Development'.²²

In an environment where the ideological clashes that were continuing in the country sometimes turned into terrorist acts, the principle of maintaining 'internal peace' was proposed and the need for tolerance towards other ideas was emphasised. The main route for increased tolerance and harmony in society was, again, to go through education in the moral sphere. The state-society unification constituted another aspect of national opinion. The elitist approach of the military-bureaucratic élite was criticised and the necessity of the state officials to respect the nation and its values was noted. According to the 'national opinion', the Turkish nation had been the 'most honourable nation' (*en şerefli millet*) during the course of history and at the present situation; it still carried the spiritual and material potential to form a civilization that would be an example for the whole of humanity. The Turkish nation was noted as having been the basis of civilisation in the past, contributing to the development of Western technology and development. The NSP adhered to building up such a civilisation, reviving what it had achieved before. The NSP's leaders thought that Turks lost their civilization-building mission with the defeats that they faced in the military wars. As they lost territories, the trauma increased, the central forces had been pushed aside and with every reform and new policies their freedoms had been restrained. "Therefore, the fight of those who take the holy scripts as their reference point is a fight for freedom, after this freedom is achieved a civilisational drive will come".²³ 'Great Turkey' will be formed once again with such a

civilisational drive. The importance of the spiritual development is already mentioned above; it was seen as constituting the core of all other developments in the society. Building up material development was also thought to depend on spiritual development.

The NSP was formed and operated at a time when the modernisation project continued to comprise of state-led capitalist industrialisation, nation-state and secularism in a Westernisation framework. The NSP as distinct from the NOP formulated a more sophisticated approach in analysing the problems of the country – that of modernisation – and offering solutions in line with the party ideology.

The first point to be emphasized here is related to the state-led capitalist industrialisation pillar of the modernisation project. In a parallel fashion to the state's industrialisation drive carried under the ISI policies, the NSP programme focused on industrialisation as well, but more on heavy industry. Within the party discourse, immediate industrialisation of the country was seen as a matter of life or death. The main target was identified as being to make Turkey the strongest industrial country in the world, heavy industrialisation being the slogan of the party. The NSP's economic ideology, just like that of the NOP, was dependent on the idea that the backwardness of the Turkish economy was because of its dependence on Western economies and capitalism. Turkey should use its own resources to develop its economy, rather than being dependent on Western capitalism. The party members announced that developing the economy to the level of the industrialised countries was the main aim and the national sources would be used to facilitate such industrialisation. This approach was welcomed and supported especially by the small tradesmen and producers that were on the stage of becoming capitalists. It could be noted that just like the 19th century ideologies of development, the NSP saw

industrialisation as the main target, yet, refused the cultural forms that have accompanied such economic development.²⁴

Within the economic order proposed by the NSP, national, strong, fast and decentralised industrialisation was seen as necessary to go beyond the developed countries' economic achievements. Within this perspective, the driving force behind the development of Anatolia would not be the 'happy minority' (*mutlu azınlık*) of the country – the Istanbul bourgeoisie – as the liberals would propose, nor the state as the leftists would propose but “regional development companies” of the national opinion.²⁵ According to the party programme, regionally organised industrial zones were to be built by the state all over the country as a necessity for the economic development. The party proposed to isolate foreign economic relations that were seen as harmful and exploitative. Relations with the European Economic Community, the so-called Common Market agreement, was seen as harmful and a continuation of Western imperialism since the Ottoman Empire was maintained by “some Zionist powers in the country to increase their wealth by keeping Turkey dependent and exploited by the foreign powers”.²⁶ Turkey's real interests were seen as resting in cooperation with the Muslim countries and the Common Market was seen as a necessity that should be founded with the Muslim countries, to which Turkey had historical and cultural connections.

In line with the NOP discourse, a second point to be emphasized in the NSP discourse is the moral development and the opposition to secularism and Westernisation in the country. The NSP increasingly demanded an Islamist order. As a continuation of the NOP, the party put itself within an antagonistic position against the Republican reforms and secular principles. Şevket Kazan, the vice president of the Party, openly said that the main aim of NSP was to “install the rule of Allah” in the country.

There are laws that are implemented in every aspect of life. Unfortunately, today, in family, trading life, criminal issues, in national and state jurisdiction, there is no room for the Quran. What is implemented in these areas is Turkish Civil Law. Where does it come from? From Switzerland. Trading Law? From Germany. Criminal Law? From Italy. The Constitution comes from French and German constitutions. We have many problems in our country and these (imported laws) are the reason for this. To say that religion cannot interfere in politics is to say that the rule of Allah cannot govern and His words would not be followed. The group called the National Salvation exists in this country to terminate the Jewish and Christian hegemony under which our motherland is suffering for 55 years and to make the law of Allah rule in these territories."²⁷
Paranthesis are mine

In a similar fashion, on 12 June 1979 Erbakan told in Izmir,

NSP is proposing that the weekend holiday should be on Fridays. The RPP and the JP are saying 'no' to this proposal. They have left the holy Fridays behind and made the Sundays of the infidels a holiday. We are proposing that the marriages should be conducted by the muftis. We are saying 'Let's put Quran courses to schools'. Why do the books of the schools of this country not start with the name of Allah?"²⁸

The members of the NSP also used the opportunity of Hajj to propagate their ideas. For example Erbakan in a speech held during his hajj service in Mecca in November 1979 commented on how the Turkish state should be governed and gave the formulate to achieve this - through jihad.

Allah has sent his prophet with Quran to all the *batil* (the absolute wrong) religions to dominate over all humanity, to terminate them and to make the word of Quran govern... There are many rules in the Quran that belong to the life of the individual, family life, morality, work life, state order. If these rules are followed, we say that the Quran governs. If these rules are not followed for the sake of some individuals, then we cannot say that the Quran governs. Do the people that govern us rule according to the Quran? We have to test this... What we see is that people who govern us rule according to laws that are taken from France, Germany, and Switzerland [...]. We have deserted the Quran some fifty years ago [...]. The Jews and Christians have worked to separate us from the Islamic life ... To make the word of Quran rule again is the duty for all of us. Every Muslim must work to make this possible. How will we make Quran rule? By Jihad! As Quran tells Jihad is a prayer. Jihad is the struggle to make Islam govern [...] and it is the duty of every Muslim. To make Islam govern is our duty and we will make it by law. This is possible by entering the Parliament. Because of that, the National Salvation group operates under party organization."²⁹

As seen from the quotation from above, Erbakan believed that changing the Constitution was the way for establishing the 'rule of Allah' in the country. In order to change the Constitution, a majority in the Parliament was seen necessary. That was shown as the reason why they were working under a party mechanism. According to Erbakan, the NSP had to become the governing Party in the Parliament in order to reinstall the Islamist rule, from which the Republican rule was deviating rapidly. "Two years later there will be a new election and after that the Salvation

Party will form a new government. With the formation of that new government, Turkey will embrace Islamic life".³⁰

However, these elections were not held as the military intervened into politics on 12 September 1980. The NSP was closed after the coup. During its period in politics, the party challenged the modernisation project, especially its secularism and Westernisation aspects. It proposed to bring an alternative order to the existing one based on Islamist rule, therefore standing in sharp contrast with the modernisation project.

THE WELFARE PARTY

The Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi* - WP), was founded in 19 July 1983, but could not enter the 1983 elections. The Welfare Party represented the continuation of the NOP and the NSP ideology. The principles of the 'national opinion' were reflected in the party programme. This time, different from the former parties, the WP started to advocate the formation of a new order, the 'Just Order' (*Adil Düzen*). Details of the 'Just Order' will be presented below. Firstly, the continuing elements of the 'national opinion' will be mentioned.

Through its discourse, the Welfare Party openly challenged the Republican system and the existing order in the country by naming it the "order of oppression" (*zulüm düzeni*) because the ruling élite had been plunged into the Westernisation process. For that reason they were seen as having an "imitating mentality" (*taklitçi zihniyet*) which prevented the development of creativity and the motivation needed for the reconstruction of "Great Turkey Once again" (*Yeniden Büyük Türkiye*).³¹

Within this argument, all political actors, except for the WP, were regarded as "a handful of a happy minority" (*bir avuç mutlu azınlık*) who were corrupt, unaccountable, unresponsive, incompetent and selfish. The WP proposed that, in

reality there were only two alternatives for the population: the WP (or in general the National Opinion) or the “imitating others”. Erbakan said that “in the political scene now, all the other parties are the same. The Motherland Party, the Republican People’s Party and the True Path Party are all equal to each other. They are all imitators; they are all imitators of Western interest-based order. They are like one single party”.³² The only other alternative to these ‘imitators’ was shown to be WP. Those who did not want the WP to come to power were labelled as either the rentier class or the ones who oppressed the population in the name of a secular Republic – the two components of this imitating mind.³³

The WP continued to regard the Quran as an order of life. The WP Parliamentarian from Bitlis, Zeki Ergezen, said that “the Quran came to the world to be implemented into all spheres of life. Will I believe in my Allah that has created me or in Demirel or Erdal İnönü? They are all infidels. Of course I will believe in Allah. Whatever he says is true”.³⁴ Thus, the only possible way for the implementation of the rule of God and the development of the country through a possible ‘state-society unification’ was seen to be under the rule of the WP. The real challenge for such a unification and the rule of Allah was seen as the presence of a culturally alienated bureaucratic-military élite and the solution was the replacement of this élite with the cadres of the WP, which would be in harmony with the culture and religion of the society. “Cultural unification of the state and society” was the main policy for the realisation of the Just Order.

The members of the WP presented themselves as seeking power not for their own interests but for morally superior purposes: the mission of rescuing Turkey. The members of the WP often stated that the Party “goes beyond the right and the left, representing the centre, the true history, culture, spiritual and moral values of the society”³⁵ that once “brought salvation and felicity to the people”.³⁶ The cadres of

the party are pious and since only those that surrender to Allah could be a just ruler, they qualify for running the state in a just manner. Because they fear the judgement of Allah, what they offer to the public would be solely an 'honest' government, when they would come to power.³⁷

Internal Peace, which had been an important component of the National Opinion, was also reflected in the speeches of the members of the party. As different from the ideological clashes and emphasis on tolerance for different ideas in the society, the WP focused on the Kurdish issue as a part of the internal peace discourse. The WP offered a solution to the escalating Kurdish terror in the south east of the country and the clashes between the Turkish military and the PKK members by taking Islam as the common point of both groups. Against the nationalist discourses Islam was brought as a uniting principle and the main component of the society. Istanbul Municipal leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said in a speech that "if you say, 'How happy is a person who says he is a Turk' (a famous statement of Mustafa Kemal), the other person will come and say how happy is a person who is a Kurd [...] In front of God, we will be questioned as what is your religion, what is your book and who is your leader. Not as to what is your ethnic group".³⁸ Other members of the party repeated in their speeches that they were ashamed of being named as Turk or Kurd. Şevki Yılmaz, a prominent and outspoken member of the party, said that "Allah does not need Turkishness; happy to be a Turk is a wrong sentence".³⁹

The WP tried to show that the "new order" that it proposed to create was an alternative to the modernization process that the Turkish state had been pursuing since its inception. By the 1990s, it started to widely advocate its new formula to replace the modernisation process: the Just Order.

THE JUST ORDER

The term 'Just Order' or 'Just Economic Order' started to be used by the Welfare Party after its formation. Seeing the decreasing economic power of the masses, on its way to becoming a mass party, the WP announced its remedy package for the ills of the society. As noted above, as early as 1969, the idea that moral and cultural development of the individual constituted the basis of economic development was laid down. "In societies where the individual element is strong, because these people will comply with justice and truth, they will work for the benefit of the society at large. By complying with the wishes of Allah by themselves, these people will create a model moral order that will form the basis of the economic order that will shed light on the world."⁴⁰ By the beginning of the 1990s, the name of that economic order was given: 'Just Order'. The new economic order had significant differences when compared with the heavy industrialisation drive proposed by the previous parties of national opinion. It can be said that in response to the export oriented development strategy and the flexible production patterns, announced after 1980, the party needed a new economic strategy to address the population. The appeal of the heavy industry drive lost its importance, in such an environment and it was now the Just Economic Order that the party proposed to implement. Considering the income disparities in the society at the time, especially reflected in the lavish life-styles of the jet-society composed mainly of the newly rich, and the eroding income of the salary/wage earners and the agricultural sectors, the term 'Just order', implying a just distribution of income and wealth appealed to many segments in society.

According to the leaders of the WP, the Turkish economy had been suffering from many illnesses: poverty, famine, unemployment, bribery, inequality of opportunity, the exploitation, subordination, injustices, inflation and depravity.⁴¹

“We have to analyse the reasons for the illness to find the cure”⁴². The illnesses were noted to be caused by five microbes: 1) interest, 2) an unfair taxation system, 3) printing money by the state leading to the increase in prices and decrease in money value, 4) foreign exchange, 5) credit.

These are microbes that we cannot see with our eyes that are eating the country from inside. The corrupt rulers of the country are using unseeable ways to exploit the society. The system is corrupt. It does not matter if an individual is putting his money in the bank on interest. It is bad too, but the main microbe is the interest that the country has to pay for money it had borrowed from the Zionist banks of the United States of America [...] You see the name of IMF in the newspapers. IMF is a reference institution. It doesn't have money. There is Zionism in the world and there are Jews. These Jews live in the US and control the money of the world. They are lending their money to the world under the state guarantee of the US and living on the interest of the money they lend. They are giving money to the whole world and controlling whom to give, under what conditions, when to get it back. They have formed an institution to make these decisions. What they call IMF is this Zionist, interest-based institution. It is owned by Zionist Bankers.⁴³

According to the WP discourse, the existing system in Turkey which, in the words of Erbakan, depended on the Zionist system, was currently run by making 60 million people work as slaves and taking back from them whatever they earned to be distributed to the Israelis, collaborator companies, tourist hotels and swimming pools which were crucial for the material and spiritual destruction of the national pride and morals.⁴⁴ Thus, this existing system was termed a ‘Slavery Order’ (*köle düzeni*). The cure for this ‘slavery order’ was the implementation of the Just Order. The Just Order was represented as a ‘perfect order’ where there would be equal opportunity for everybody, profit would be encouraged for the running of the economy but special interests would not serve as a tool for exploitation. The Just Economic Order allowed a market economy but it did not allow the creation of any monopolies. That was why it was ‘the perfect order’, based on the principle of absolute right (*hak*).

The necessity of implementing the Just Order not only stemmed from the need to make the country free of ‘Zionist exploitation’ but also rested on the approach of the WP to human beings and assumptions about the nature of humans. According to Erbakan, human beings by nature only want to consume but not to

produce. "This stems from their creation. Human beings are created to live in heaven, where they will only consume and not produce. Human beings are sent to earth for a temporary period to be tested and because of their nature stated above; they contradict this world's conditions. For human beings of this nature, we have to build up the Just Order"⁴⁵.

As the human beings do not want to produce by instinct, a mechanism had to be built to secure the production of goods. Everybody would produce in this system and there would not be any exploitation. In the Just Economic Order, there would be a balance between production and consumption. This balance would be maintained by restricting the right to consume according to one's contribution to economic production. Individuals would be able to consume as much as they produce, and not more. Therefore the gap between "the productive capacity of man and his unlimited wishes to consume" would be solved.⁴⁶ Erbakan defined 'money' as a document that showed how much an individual had produced and how much he could consume. Because this was a contract, in the 'Just Order', money equalled goods. The amount of goods for sale equalled the amount of money in the pocket of the person. By this way, interest would be stopped. As there would only be goods that were produced in the society, and the right to consume it would be given to those who produced it, there would not be any surplus to be distributed to those who did not produce it. Therefore, there would not be any interest gains. In such a system, there would also be no money printing, based on political motives, without production. The amount of goods would equate to the amount of money. So, there was to be no printing of money for political motives which was seen as the main cause of inflation in the society by the WP members. This would lift another burden from the shoulders of the masses. Credits would be provided for people who would like to start a business within this proposed system. However, it would be interest

free, based on the principle of *selem* credit. According to this principle, the person will be given the necessary amount of money against the promise of a future delivery of goods when they are produced. The creditor will thus keep the difference of the value of the goods at the time of their delivery and the initial amount of money provided. Founding a state bank was proposed for this purpose of giving credits. Such a bank based on *selem* credit would pave the way for interest-free banking as all other banks seeing the activities of the proposed state bank would have to provide credits without interest.

In the Just Economic Order, there would not be any taxation either. Although Erbakan said that those who owned eighty cows would give two of them, those who owned 160 sheep had to give four of them and others who owned different things had to give two and a half percent of their possessions to the state, this was not identified as taxing. As can be understood from the calculation of one fortieth of the wealth to be given away, this is the calculation for the amount of *zakar* that is given according to Islamist principles. This is defined as the right of the state for the service it would provide, rather than a tax.

In the Just Economic Order, a minimum role is given to the state in economy. The state would not make macro plans or factories but it would encourage the private initiative to make factories. Decreasing the number of state officials was noted as a priority in the party programme; there would be a small number of state officials, who would encourage private initiatives in some projects. Only two main roles were designed for the state. One would be an organising duty, whereby the state would act to provide non-profit organisations for the people, in services like the storage of produced wheat. The second duty of the state would be the provision of basic services like hospitals, roads, schools, electricity and dependable warehouse

officials, accountants and transporters. The state would provide twenty-four services of this kind for the society.

It can be seen from the explanation above that the Just Order is mainly designed for an economy that produces for the internal market and the production is mainly agricultural goods and small crafts. The state is prepared to provide warehouses to store goods, especially those of agricultural goods. The service sector is not taken into account within this system, and foreign investments and foreign capital are disregarded. The integration with the global markets and the free flow of capital seem to be highly neglected within this understanding. As money would only be the form on which the total amount of production of the individual for the market is written, how this would be dealt with in the international financial markets, and how the problem of convertibility would be solved are unclear in the programme. Because the system that is proposed would be highly self-sufficient, it seems that the WP leaders have neglected foreign economic relations as well.

It is interesting to see that Erbakan's Just Order remained rather unchallenged in the party at this period despite the contradictions that it posed for the interests of the rising Anatolian businesses that were integrated into the global economy and at the same time were one of the main constituencies of the party. How Erbakan continued his power in the party despite such a significant controversy is interesting to see. In addition to the absolute power of Erbakan in the party and his charismatic leadership in managing to keep different elements in unity, the external threat, that of the military-bureaucracy, had been important. Feeling threatened by the military-bureaucracy and the Kemalist establishment that could close the party that was openly basing itself on Islamist principles, the necessity of unity was emphasized and the Just Order had remained unchallenged. Only some weak voices were heard from the Islamist writers criticising the programme from opposite angles.

While one group told that the programme was not Islamist enough, but was rather based on modern economic ideology, others have emphasized that the Just Order in general was based on "mere fantasies", impossible to implement in the current Turkish economy.⁴⁷ This second group proposed that instead of Just Order, what had to be brought about was the implementation of a protestant ethic to Özal's policies that encouraged consumerism.⁴⁸ Both lines of criticism remained rather marginal and Erbakan with his new project of the Just Economic Order continued unchallenged in the party.

The aim of the WP's leaders was not only to bring the Just Economic Order, but to build up a Just Political Order as well. Regarding the Just Political Order, there was no analysis put in formulas as in the economic part, but some issues were emphasized in the speeches of the leaders from time to another. The widely discussed issue of the Just Political Order is the "right to choose laws". It takes this idea from the Medina Contract that was implemented under the time of the Prophet. Erbakan said regarding this:

We want the understanding of 'you have to live according to what I believe' abolished. There must be a multiple law system and the citizen should choose under which law system they would like to live. This is what happened in our history. There have been different belief systems in our history. Everybody had lived according to their belief and everybody was peaceful. Why should I be obliged to do what someone else believes? The right to choose law is an indispensable part of the right to belief.⁴⁹

One of the prominent names of the party, Oğuzhan Asiltürk, argued that the proposed system of 'multiple law systems' was much more developed and better than secularism.

We will tell people, "do you believe in this particular rule, do you agree in its implementation, all of you agree and this is what you believe? Then you can practice this among yourselves." The order that we are proposing is better than democracy - in democracies it is the majority that decides the rules. If you are not a part of the majority then your preferences are not taken into account. While in our order, everybody will practice what he or she believes and what he or she wants.⁵⁰

According to the WP members, this model of multiple law systems represented the utmost level of freedom, human rights and democracy. A multiple law system was proposed to work in society, where people would be able to live

according to their belief and be bound by the laws of this belief. Under such a system since everybody would be subject to some religious law, which were again predestined, there would be no need for any legislation except for some limited communal issues. What would be the communal issues and which issues would be regarded as out of the religious sphere were all subject to different interpretations.

While the WP is presenting this idea as the project of utmost freedom, it is important to see that this project is taking away all the features of the unitary state, dividing the society according to the belief systems, challenging the national development project of the Republic in its essence. Bringing the concept of secularism under attack, the WP proposes the anti-thesis of secularism. The existence of religion in every aspect of state and society and division of the nation according to belief systems constitute the core of this approach. The economic development was challenged by an alternative economic order – the Just Order. Now the Republican principle and secularism were challenged with the Just Political Order.

Looking at the Just Order project in general, the issue of democracy seem to be highly questionable in the minds of the leaders of the party. Both claims about the nature of human beings and the idea about existence of the absolute truth, bring to mind the questions about the understanding of democracy in the National Opinion cadres. The approaches to humans as predestined beings, whose future is already determined and who are in this world only to be tested for a period of time, contrasts sharply with the underlying philosophy of democracy that foresees the individuals' rights and capabilities to determine their future. As put forward by the concepts of *Hak* and *Batil*, the existence of an absolute truth that is given by God, also contradicts democracy. If there are true laws that exist in society, there will be no need for decision making by the people in the system. What is needed will be a

group of people who have the command of the absolute truth and the masses that will be governed according to these set rules.

Democracy seems to have been a tool for the WP and its predecessors, to come to power. This was openly admitted by Erbakan in his statements. "We should never forget that democracy is a tool. It is not an aim. Our aim is the formation of the 'Order of Happiness' (*Saadet Nizami*). Otherwise, you under democracy would choose this and the other would choose that and the order that is formed after the elections will be the 'Order of Oppression'; then there is no meaning in voters and elections".⁵¹ The WP's Parliamentarian from Kayseri, Şükrü Karatepe said that "There is a huge difference between the order that we will bring and that of secularism and democracy. While our order is located at the peaks of mountains, secularism and democracy are down in the bottom of deep valleys".⁵²

Having formulated the Just Order project, the demand of the WP to become a mass party became manifest. This could be seen in the party propaganda campaigns for 1991 elections. The WP having been successful in introducing the project, got most of its support from the big cities especially after the 1991 elections. Within the party, change was taking place "from being the party of the countryside and the 'believers'" to being the "party of the masses".

During the 1991 election campaign, the WP had used a strategy of not focusing on the leadership as the other parties had done but rather focused on the "man on the street", profiling his problems and offering solutions for the daily life of the "oppressed", economically, politically and socially.⁵³ The WP tried to show that it understood the problems of the ordinary people and committed itself for a solution, without being "elitist". The success of the party in the 1991 elections is an indication that the message the party gave was received positively by the voters and the Just Order discourse was thus approved.

The challenge of the WP to the modernisation project's economic pillar came from the Just Economic Order; the challenge to the political system came from the Just Political Order. The challenge to the cultural sphere was also strong. Statements like "Republic is not a virtue, it is made of mud ... 29 October (the date of the formation of the republic) is not a festival to be celebrated, it is the day of oppression for the Muslims", "Do not follow the road of the Satans of Thessalonica" (the birth place of Mustafa Kemal) were often repeated by the members of the party.

54

Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, another outspoken member of the party, was warning his audience in a speech not to forget the date of 3 March 1924 in the Parliament in Ulus, Ankara. It was the date of the abolition of the Caliphate when "all the population was devastated. *Ezan* was destroyed; we were destroyed. I am trying to grow up and live with the spirit of 3 March 1924. My Allah, you are capable of taking revenges. Make me your official to take your revenge. We were devastated by the Parliament and we will revive from the Parliament. We will start with conquering Istanbul".⁵⁵

In addition to these developments, what the WP wanted to achieve was to gain the monopoly on the definition of what Islamic morality and Islamic principles meant. In this respect Erbakan's assertion that "those who do not give their allegiance to me must look for another religion" could be read as an attempt to homogenize and take full control of the constituency as well as the broad movement.⁵⁶ It is interesting to see that most of the time the definition of what Islam meant was coupled by the calls for money and help for the WP. Turkey was seen in a state of cultural war and the WP was presented as the army against the alien, Western cultural traits. Erbakan said that

If you do not serve the WP, none of your worship will be accepted. There is no other way of being Muslim then serving the WP. There is no other salvation. Welfare is the army. You have to work with all means to help this army to grow. If you do not, then you

belong to a potato religion, not to Islam. This party is an Islamist jihad army. You cannot by yourself make jihad. You have to belong to some headquarters [...] Are you Muslim, then you have to belong to this army. You cannot be a Muslim without giving money to this jihad. The level of Muslimness of a person is weighed according to the money he gives to jihad. A Muslim would not give his *zekat* to a poor. He will give it to the headquarters of jihad. We are Muslim. We will go to those who want to make Quran sovereign. We are all obliged to be a part of the Welfare, because we make jihad. Those that work dearly for the Welfare go to paradise. Why? Because the Welfare means to work for sovereignty of the order of Quran."⁵⁷

Şevki Yılmaz, one of the prominent and outspoken members of the WP, made similar comments before he was elected as the municipal leader of Rize:

You have built up a Quran course, you made dormitories, you are educating pupils, helping with their finances. These are not jihad. These are good acts. Jihad is the struggle for power to make the rule of Allah the law in the country... Jihad is made with an army. The leader is determined [...] Today, if a Muslim has 100 liras, he will spare 30 lira for building up of Quranic courses and spare 60 lira to the political institutions that will come to power... The question that Allah will ask you will be 'why didn't you work for the establishment of an Islamist rule, in an order of unbelief.' [...] In this country, even the Jewish Abraham has understood that the symbol of religion is the Welfare. [...] Our duty is not to talk but to operate the plan as a soldier in this condition of war."⁵⁸

To the question of 'is Turkey *dar-ul harb* or *dar-ul Islam*?', the members of the WP answer that Turkey is *dar-ul irtidat*. It was *dar ul Islam* but it rejected that in time with Kemalist reforms and turned away from it. The population was Muslim but the administration was not. So, it was *dar-ul irtidat*. "You will follow Islam for centuries and then you will reject it and prefer West and Rome to Allah. There is no sin that is worse than this. In this country making jihad until the country turns to *dar-ul Islam* is compulsory. Everybody should work with utmost effort to get rid of this sin of the sins".⁵⁹

With its discourse and its cadres, the WP presented an alternative to the system as a whole. It challenged the Kemalist modernisation project in its entirety, in the capitalist development, nationalism, secularism and Westernisation pillars together. This was also stated in the speeches of the members of the Party. The WP's minister of Justice was openly saying, "The WP is a party that changes the order. WP is not an alternative to the Motherland, the TPP or the RPP. The WP is an alternative to the whole order. Because of that, WP is on the one side and all the other parties are on the other".⁶⁰

Ironically, the project of the WP, as a whole, is not very different from that of the Republican élite in the 1920s, what the WP rejects completely. Replacement of the current cadres of the centre – the military-bureaucratic élite – with the cadres of the ‘national opinion’ and the installation of new ideas to the population from above to pursue, in line with the Islamic premises, seem to be the underlining principles of the WP. It resembles the social engineering of the Republican regime, in a different parameter. In that sense some analysts have written that the WP project carried a “Republican character and is no different from the mentality it criticises”.⁶¹ Despite all the efforts to show an anti-elitist approach, the party discourse rests on the assumption that the people don’t know what is good for them and they have to be guided. The cadres of the WP see themselves as the true representatives of society. The replacement of the present political class with the members of the WP will solve all the ills of the Republic.⁶² Thus, the solution is mainly a cultural – moral one that offers the rule by the best or the virtuous men. This virtue in turn is defined by religiosity - Islam.⁶³

The Islamist discourse of the National Opinion seemed to have evolved in response to the military-bureaucracy’s efforts to redefine modernisation after the 1980 coup. The military-bureaucracy had brought the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in an attempt to revamp the modernisation project, in an Islamist framework. However, this was not enough for the WP. It tried to bring a wholly reconceived modernisation. No capitalist development, no nationalism, no secularism but Islam and the Just Economic Order, the community of believers, and a society divided according to the belief systems were proposed to replace the current system. Erbakan had been presenting an economic system that rejected the capitalist development, while most of the new supporters had already been working within the global market economy. Thus, what modernisation would mean and how the party

would adjust itself to the global developments became an important debate within the party. Since the implementation of the Just Order as a new strategy, the division had started within the party between those who wanted to become a part of the globalised economy and keep the Islamist values as a part of the system and those that rejected the modernisation in its entirety and wanted Islam as the new parameter of the system. Although the debate about modernisation continued, intensifying the division in the party, it remained of secondary importance to the goal of coming to power in unity. The WP has been successful in presenting an alternative system that gathered the newly emerging identities under a cultural framework – Islam. However, it implemented a totalitarian strategy of the replacement of the current cadres with that of the National Opinion as the basic policy.

However, after coming to power, the WP was unsuccessful in pursuing the policies that it advocated. The details of this were presented in the previous chapter. As the WP increasingly pressed its challenges against the system, the system itself became more polarised. The military-bureaucracy and the Islamist counter-élite competed to define and control the public space.

After the WP was closed, the members of the party transferred to the Virtue Party, which emphasized more of democracy, human rights and a pro-Western approach.

THE VIRTUE PARTY

With the formation of the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi* – VP), the discourse of the national opinion parties changed to a significant extent. The critique of the military-bureaucracy intensified as they were seen to have been behind the closure of the WP. Instead of an anti-Western discourse, the party stood as the bastion of democracy, blaming the established institutions and military-bureaucracy for not being

'democratic' and 'modern' enough. Analysing the situation in the country, the VP members focused on this point.

There is no reaction to the empowerment of the Virtue Party from the population at large. The population is supporting us and showing their support in the elections. But there are groups in Turkey that could not accept the democracy in the country and that is the civilian and military élites. That is the main strain in society now. They are also the reason for inflation and even for terror. If you put restraints over the population's opinions, views, belief and values to be represented and create a system along the opinions of a small bureaucratic minority, then there will be problems there. [...] This is what is happening in Turkey today.⁶⁴

Recai Kutan, the leader of the party, criticised the current system and the principle of secularism as understood by the military-bureaucracy.

Turkey is not a secular country. There are practices that are carried out under the name of secularism but it is all fake. Our understanding of secularism is that everybody will be free in their own belief. Nobody will pressurize anyone else about his belief. Those who want will believe and those that don't will not. This is what we understand from secularism. Secularism in Turkey is not in line with the universal understanding of secularism. Bring us the understanding of secularism in the Anglo-Saxon world and we will accept it with full support. We want two things to be materialised in the Parliament today: All different opinions in Turkey must be represented in the Parliament and political stability must be attained.⁶⁵

The criticisms of the 'Islamist intellectuals' increased towards the political system within these lines as well. The criticism was generally concentrated on the 'undemocratic' nature of the system in Turkey. Ali Bulaç, one of the prominent names of the 'Islamist intellectuals', has been writing that one of the major problems in Turkey was 'limitations' over the right to belief and the right to practise belief.

"It is the small minority with 'imitating mentality' that hold power centres in their hands and they try to impose their will and interests onto the whole of society. This is costing both a material and moral loss for the rest".⁶⁶ Bulaç says that "Turkey is in a vicious circle of oppression and undemocratic practices that is linked to the threat perceptions of this small minority... Because this 'minority' perceive the peripheral forces as a threat to the internal security of the country, anti-democratic practices made for the sake of preserving the democracy are mostly seen as a legitimate tool".⁶⁷ He wrote a commonly referred to statement: "we are a democratic country that preserves its democracy with anti-democratic rules".⁶⁸ According to Bulaç, the conservative and the religious urban merchants and

businessmen as well as millions of poor and unemployed people that live in the shantytowns were not represented in the political system and were more and more excluded from the system. As they were not represented and pushed aside as internal threats by the centre, political, economic and social crisis was escalating.⁶⁹

In line with this argument, another Islamist writer, Ümit Kardaş, wrote that the political system and the way things were formulated in Turkey were problematic and coupled with vicious circles.

There seems to be a dominance of bureaucracy, which has an ideological mission (Kemalism), and has an elitist attitude, with the belief that the population is not mature or educated enough to decide for him or herself. This is the main problem as it is blocking the way for the party leaders to bring the demands of the population forward in their policies.⁷⁰

Bureaucracy was seen as blocking the democratic participation of the peripheral forces and politics was seen as a rent distribution mechanism for the supporters of various parties. Thus, making 'real politics' and proposing solutions to the problems was seen as becoming secondary to rent making. "This vicious circle is surrounding all the mechanisms of state and a solution to this problem should be the core of politics in the country today".⁷¹

Erbakan made speeches about the undemocratic nature of the state as well. In an interview that he gave to journalists, he named the current state of affairs in Turkey as being based on a "horror tale". He emphasized that a 'horror story' was built up regarding what would happen if the Islamists (the National Opinion) came to power. According to Erbakan, some small but powerful group in Turkey based their policies on this 'horror' and tried to manipulate the system for their interest by using this argument. Erbakan linked the closure of his party and his political ban to this 'horror tale'.⁷² He emphasized that there was no need to be afraid of the members of his parties if they came to power. Erbakan argued that this was firstly because they had been on the political scene of Turkey for more than 30 years and had been tried well in politics in the past. They were basing their policies on the rights of

democracy and human rights and they wanted a close relationship with the West. They demand a democracy in the Western style. Being 'afraid of them' was against science and rationality according to Erbakan. There must be a clear and present danger to be afraid of something. They had not interfered in anybody's life-style or dress until that date, so it was against rationality to be afraid of the Welfare. 'A Just Peace' has been proposed by Erbakan which will offer a peaceful environment to everybody. This order of Peace would provide the same opportunities to those who wear the headscarf as well as those who do not. In this order, the parents would be free to give their children the kind of education that they would want. Erbakan was proposing an 'order of peace' that is based on equity and justice.⁷³ Thus, in the post-28 February political environment, Erbakan was proposing a 'Just Peace' to be added to the packages of "Just Orders" offered before by the WP.

In addition to emphasis on democracy and secularism despite having previously always been against introducing Western values and norms, Erbakan now appeared to be advocating pro-Western policies. He argued that his party's ideology still focused on national values but within the context of universal standards on democracy and human rights. He wanted to see the introduction of these predominantly Western values into Turkey.⁷⁴ Democracy in Western standards first of all meant a decreased role for the military in the country. Erbakan saw the 28th February and the role of the military as the main reason for the limitations on the National Opinion in Turkey; therefore, the decreased role of the military was a necessity for their survival. He argued that the military was being misinformed about the National Opinion members and that was why they were against them.⁷⁵

In line with this new argument, Erbakan altered his policies from support for the 'Great Turkey Again' to advocating a 'Turkey to live in' or 'liveable Turkey' (*yaşanacak Türkiye*). He was saying that it was impossible to build up the Great

Turkey once again, before making the country liveable with human rights and basic freedoms guaranteed. Before securing freedoms and providing an environment of free speech and right to live 'according to belief', it was impossible to create a 'great country'. To the question of 'despite being in politics for three decades Erbakan did not focus on these points as a priority before and what has changed now', he gave the answer that it was only in the last three years that intervention to basic freedoms and rights and unlawfulness in the working of the system had been resorted to.⁷⁶ He said that Turkey came to such a point that even if a party had received 80 percent of the votes, if the 'small minority that holds the power centres in Turkey' did not approve the results, it would mean nothing.⁷⁷ That was why at this moment the necessity of a 'livable Turkey' became more important.

Within the party, there was growing tension between the reformers and the traditionalists. Despite the changes in the party discourse emphasizing freedom of speech and democracy, these principles were not implemented in the party. The continuing rule of Erbakan, on the party, even though behind the curtains, seemed to prevent a new vision and new policy in the party. Attempts of the Party administration to avoid any kind of conflict, for the sake of overcoming the double-headedness and maintaining the unity of the party, to the point that there would be almost no discussion and debate, seemed to decrease the hope invested in this new party mechanism. Thus, the criticisms led to the resignation of some key names from the administrative council of the Party, such as Abdullah Gül. Gül said that, "It cannot go like this. It is not possible for the party to be governed like this. We need to be stronger, accurate and hope giving. The problems of the country force us to do this."⁷⁸ Cemil Çiçek also focused on the same problems: "This party looks like it had caught an AIDS virus. It cannot provide an alternative project at the moment. We have to overcome this, we have to make this party a party."⁷⁹

As the debate was continuing, the Constitutional Court decided to close down the VP on the 22nd of June 2001 on the grounds that the VP was the continuation of the WP. After that date, the members of the former VP split into two. While Recai Kutan and the group known as the 'traditionalists' founded the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi* - HP), the reformist group gathered under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the former mayor of Istanbul, and founded the Party of Justice and Development (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* - PJD). This division stemmed from the internal debate over what modernisation meant for the party, which had been going on for the last several years between these two sides. While the Kutan group continued to represent the National Opinion ideology and declared themselves as the heir of the Virtue Party, the PJD decided to follow a different path. Rather than a confrontational discourse and politics against the system and against the military-bureaucracy, Erdoğan announced that they would neither be taking Islam into the party politics, nor basing their politics on Islam. Implementation of the Shari 'a and building up of an Islamist state were defined as 'impossible' considering the new dynamics of the society that had been integrated with the world.⁸⁰ Defining himself as a 'globalist conservative'⁸¹ Erdoğan underlined the necessity of integrating with the global markets and the international system, saying that his party would refrain from a confrontational politics against the established institutions and the military-bureaucratic élite. The PJD declared that they would work within the system for the benefit of the whole population. The secular, democratic, unitary nature of the Turkish state is emphasized and 'not ideological platforms but the platform of modern democratic values' are shown as the ground on which the party would carry out its political activities.⁸²

Economic issues are given an important place in the party programme and the market economy and privatisation are shown as the main components of the

economic understanding of the party. The structural changes brought by globalisation are underlined and the necessity to increase competitiveness in the economy is shown as the basic road to cope with new changes in the global economic system. Foreign investment and foreign capital are seen as significant components that would contribute to the economic development especially with the information technologies and the experience the foreign investment would bring into the country.⁸³

Despite being formed recently and the charges of corruption targeted at its leader, Erdoğan, the PJD became popular in a short time. The appeal of the party for the traditional segments and the liberal economic approach bring to mind the politics of the Motherland Party under Özal and its reflections in the present date within the PJD. The coupling of export oriented growth and a conservative-moral approach – an authentic version of modernity – seem to be the direction that the PJD is leading to.

By rejecting the 'Just Order' both in its economic system and the multiple law systems, on which the Felicity Party is still advocating, Erdoğan aims to appeal to a larger constituency and become a centre party advocating liberal economy and conservative values and morality at the same time. Getting the support of the Islamist intellectuals and the Islamist bourgeoisie, the PJD will play an important role in the future of the country.

The 'new image' that the PJD members are presenting is seen by many as a disguise to get votes and come to power. Despite refraining from confrontation, the PJD challenges the value system and the élite of the country. In June 2002, in a TV discussion program in CNN Türk, the leaders of the PJD gathered in answering the questions of some journalists in a long discussion programme. One of the most striking statements of the party members was regarding the issue of the headscarf.

They were insisting that the military-bureaucracy “did not have the right to tell people what to do, what to wear, how to behave” and the question they asked was, “who are these people that try to dictate us what we should wear? Where do they get their power, as it is not from the population that wants freedoms and liberal environment?” This approach shows that confrontational politics between the Islamist circles – both the moderates and the traditionalists – and the military-bureaucratic élite will continue to be a feature of Turkish politics in the coming decades.

¹ Milli Nizam Partisi, Milli Nizam Partisi Programı (*National Order Party Program*), (Istanbul, 1970)

² *ibid*

³ *ibid*

⁴ See the Education Policy, Item 18, Milli Nizam Partisi Programı

⁵ Milli Nizam Partisi Programı

⁶ See Milli Nizam Partisi Programı, Education policy, Item 21.

⁷ Milli Nizam Partisi Davası, (*MNP Court Case*), Official Gazette, 14 January 1972, No. 14072. Direct quote from Erbakan’s speech in Samsun Party Congress.

⁸ See the Milli Nizam Partisi Programı, Economic Policy, Item 48–49

⁹ Muzaffer Sencer, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partilerin Sosyal Temelleri, (*The Social Roots of Political Parties in Turkey*). (Istanbul: Geçiş, 1971), p. 365

¹⁰ Milli Nizam Partisi Davası, Direct quote from Erbakan’s speech in Ankara celebrating the opening of the party on 8 February 1970.

¹¹ Milli Nizam Partisi Davası, Direct quote from Aksay’s speech in Ankara city congress on 16 January 1970.

¹² *Ibid*. Direct quote from the speech in Trabzon, opening of the party branch in the city.

¹³ Doğan Duman, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye’de İslamcılık (*Islamism in Turkey within the Process of Democracy*), (İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Yayınları, 1997), p. 74

¹⁴ Milli Nizam Partisi Davası, direct quote from Erbakan’s speech in Diyarbakır on 30 June 1970.

¹⁵ Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, Türkiye’de Modernleşme, Din ve Parti Politikası, (*Modernisation, Religion and Party Politics in Turkey*) (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1985), p. 104

¹⁶ Milli Nizam Partisi Davası.

¹⁷ Necmettin Erbakan, İslam ve İlim, 3rd. ed. (Istanbul: 1972), p. 6

¹⁸ Milli Nizam Partisi, Basında Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan, (*Prof. Dr. Necmettin Erbakan in the Press*) p. 10-11

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- ¹⁹ Doğan Duman, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye’de İslamcılık , p. 83
- ²⁰ Doğan Duman, , Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye’de İslamcılık, p.82
- ²¹ Direct quote taken from Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, Türkiye’de Modernleşme, Din ve Parti Politikası, (*Modernisation, Religion and Party Politics in Turkey*) (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1985), p. 110-111
- ²² Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, Türkiye’de Modernleşme, Din ve Parti Politikası, p. 112
- ²³ A prominent member of the Islamic intellectuals; writer and journalist Ali Bulaç argues about this point of civilization building in Zaman, 3 November 2001
- ²⁴ Binnaz Toprak, İslam and Political Development in Turkey, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), p. 104
- ²⁵ Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, Türkiye’de Modernleşme, Din ve Parti Politikası , p. 125
- ²⁶ ibid
- ²⁷ Soner Yalçın, Hangi Erbakan? (*Which Erbakan?*), (Ankara: Başak Yayınları, 1994), p. p. 143
- ²⁸ ibid, p. 141
- ²⁹ Turhan Dilligil, Erbakancılık ve Erbakan, (*Erbakanism and Erbakan*), (Ankara, 1994), p. 55-56
- ³⁰ ibid, p. 58-59
- ³¹ Necmettin Erbakan, Türkiye’nin Meseleleri ve Çözümleri: Program, (*Turkey's Problems and Solutions: Program*),(Ankara: Refah Partisi, 1991), p. 60
- ³² Direct quote taken from the speech of Erbakan in Erzincan in Ergün Poyraz, MNP’den FP’ye İhanetin Belgeleri, (*From NOP to Virtue Party, the Documents of Betrayal*), (Ankara: MK Yayıncılık, 1998), p. 123
- ³³ Milliyet, 28 February 1996
- ³⁴ Direct quote from Ergün Poyraz, MNP’den FP’ye İhanetin Belgeleri, p. 173
- ³⁵ Hürriyet, 7 November 1997
- ³⁶ Hasan Aksay, “Milli Görüş: Aydınlık bir Devrin Kapisinda” (*National Opinion: At the Doors of an Enlightened Era*), Milli Gazete, 16 November 1995
- ³⁷ Meydan 27 December 1993
- ³⁸ Direct quote of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in his speech in Aisburg in Germany, taken from Ergün Poyraz, MNP’den FP’ye İhanetin Belgeleri, p. 155. Parenthesis are mine.
- ³⁹ ibid
- ⁴⁰ Milli Nizam Partisi Programı. See Education Policy, Item 18
- ⁴¹ Refah Partisi, Türkiye’nin Gerçek Durumu, Sebepleri, Teshis, (*The Real Situation of Turkey, Reasons, Diagnosis*), (Ankara, 1991), p.4
- ⁴² The speeches made by Erbakan in Erzincan. Direct quote from Ergün Poyraz, MNP’den FP’ye İhanetin Belgeleri, p. 121
- ⁴³ Ergün Poyraz, MNP’den FP’ye İhanetin Belgeleri, p. 123
- ⁴⁴ Refah Partisi, Türkiye’nin Gerçek Durumu, Sebepleri, Teshis, p. 41

- ⁴⁵ Necmettin Erbakan, Adil Ekonomik Düzen (*Just Economic Order*), (Ankara: Semih Ofset, 1991), p. 24-25
- ⁴⁶ Refah Partisi, Tedavi: Adil Ekonomik Düzen (*Cure: Just Economic Order*), (Ankara: 1991), p. 19
- ⁴⁷ Ayşe Buğra, "Political Islam in Turkey in Historical Context", in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), The Politics of Permanent Crisis – Class, Ideology and State in Turkey, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002), p. 108
- ⁴⁸ ibid
- ⁴⁹ Speech by Erbakan on 23 March 1983 in Yargıtay Cumhuriyet Bassavciligi, Refah Partisi Kapatma Davası Iddianemesi (*Welfare Party Prosecution Document by the Upper Supreme Court*).
- ⁵⁰ Ergün Poyraz, MNP'den FP'ye İhanetin Belgeleri, p. 161
- ⁵¹ Necmettin Erbakan, Türkiye'nin Meseleleri ve Çözümleri: Program p. 46
- ⁵² Ergün Poyraz, MNP'den FP'ye İhanetin Belgeleri, p. 161
- ⁵³ Ayca Alemdaroglu, "1991 Yılı Refah Partisi Secim Kampanyasi", Paper presented in Social Science Congress, Middle East Technical University, 1999
- ⁵⁴ Ergün Poyraz, MNP'den FP'ye İhanetin Belgeleri, p. 161
- ⁵⁵ ibid
- ⁵⁶ Ruşen Çakır, Ayet ve Slogan – Türkiye'de İslami Oluşumlar, (*Verses and Slogan, Islamist Groups in Turkey*) (Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1995) p. 223-224
- ⁵⁷ Speech by Erbakan on 13 January 1991 in Sivas in an Education Seminar of the Welfare Party. Taken from Refah Partisi Kapatma Davası Iddianamesi. It is stated that these statements have been read loudly in the National Security Council Meeting where Erbakan was a part of and he had listened to these statements quietly.
- ⁵⁸ Speech by Şevki Yılmaz, in Refah Partisi Kapatma Davası Iddianamesi
- ⁵⁹ Speech by Sevki Yılmaz of WP, direct quote taken from Ergün Poyraz, MNP'den FP'ye İhanetin Belgeleri, p. 263-264
- ⁶⁰ Ergün Poyraz, MNP'den FP'ye İhanetin Belgeleri, p. 181
- ⁶¹ See the unpublished PhD thesis by Menderes Çınar, The Republican Character of Islamism in Turkey from the Perspective of 'the Political', Bilkent University, 1998
- ⁶² ibid
- ⁶³ Menderes Çınar, The Republican Character of Islamism in Turkey from the Perspective of 'the Political'.
- ⁶⁴ İstanbul Parliamentarian of the VP, Bahri Zengin's speech in Nokta, 5-11 July 1998.
- ⁶⁵ Interview with Recai Kutan in Nokta, 8 August 1998, p. 15
- ⁶⁶ Ali Bulaç, Zaman, 4 September 2001
- ⁶⁷ Ali Bulaç, Zaman, 5 September 2001
- ⁶⁸ ibid
- ⁶⁹ ibid

⁷⁰ Ümit Kardaş, “Yorum”, (*Comment*), Zaman, 8 Kasım 2001

⁷¹ ibid

⁷² Fehmi Kuru, Yeni Şafak, 9 November 1999

⁷³ Nazlı Ilıcak, Yeni Şafak, 21 September 1999,

⁷⁴ Nazlı Ilıcak, Yeni Şafak, 21 September 1999

⁷⁵ Nasuhi Güngör, Yeni Şafak, 11 September 1999

⁷⁶ Davut Dursun, Yeni Şafak, 5 April 1999

⁷⁷ Kürşat Bumin, Yeni Şafak, 6 April 1999

⁷⁸ Mustafa Karaalioğlu, Yeni Şafak, 27 July 1999

⁷⁹ ibid

⁸⁰ Ruşen Çakır and Fehmi Çalmuk, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – Bir Değişimin Öyküsü, (*Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – The Story of Change*) (İstanbul: Metis yayınları, 2001), p. 179-180

⁸¹ Ruşen Çakır and Fehmi Çalmuk, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – Bir Değişimin Öyküsü p. 178

⁸² Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Parti Programı Programı, (*Party of Justice and Development Program*), see the Introduction.

⁸³ Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Parti Programı Programı, see the Economic Issues, Section 3.1.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I have tried to examine the reasons for the growth of Islamist movements, and to develop an approach through which Islamic revivalism could be understood. I proposed that Islamist movements could best be understood as responses to imposed versions of modernisation in the Middle East.

I found that none of the three conventionally alternative approaches – socio-economic, political and cultural – was alone adequate to explain the growth of Islamist movements. By analysing Islamic revivalism as a response to modernity implemented by secular, modernising élites, all these three approaches are brought together in an anti-reductionist fashion.

The case study of this thesis was Turkey. The Islamist political parties in Turkey have been analysed as the most visible and (as argued throughout the thesis) most important manifestation of the Islamist movements' response to the modernisation project implemented by the military-bureaucracy in that country. Mustafa Kemal and his fellow reformers embarked upon a modernisation project that represented a continuation of the *Tanzimat* reforms implemented in the Ottoman Empire from the mid-19th century. A state-led capitalist industrialisation plan was put into effect to facilitate development, and private businesses were also encouraged to provide capital accumulation that could be used in the development of the country. The sultanate and the caliphate were abolished and replaced with a secular republican structure. Secularism constituted one of the main aspects of the modernisation project that defined the national culture of the country. The role of Islam was defined as being confined to the private sphere. Islamist movements

emerged as a response to this modernisation project, challenging its components. The Islamist political parties have played an important role in Turkish politics since the 1970s, and especially after the 1980s and the introduction of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis into the elites' modernisation project. In the 1990s their popularity carried them to power. They regard themselves as the true representatives of the people and promise to 'replace' the current order with an Islamic one similar to that which held the society together prior to the introduction of the Kemalist modernisation project. Despite the Islamist political parties' claim of representing the periphery and their use of Islamic symbols and discourse, their policies have reflected an instrumentalist use of religion, constrained by the function of power-seeking.

The validity of this analysis is not limited to the case study as no points in this analysis prevent it from having validity beyond Turkey. It aspires to contribute to the general understanding of Islamic revivalism in the Middle East.

The main characteristic of the modernisation process in the Middle East is its élite-imposed and alien nature. The modernising élite of the post-independence Middle East embarked on ambitious projects to develop their countries to the levels of Western countries. However, the modernisation process remained rather shallow in the region, lacking naturally derived roots. The modernising élite often remained unable to create necessary links to build a hegemonic ideology, leading to continuous questioning of their legitimacy. Most regimes rested on the economic aspects of the modernisation projects to derive legitimacy. Under the state-led industrialisation projects and expanding bureaucracies states managed to provide guaranteed employment for the educated youth, welfare services and subsidies for their citizens. As the economic expansion became unsustainable, the state's ability to deliver benefits for its citizens declined. This resulted in stronger calls for change⁴ in the system. The Islamist movements represent a response to the imposed modernisation

process and its failure to deliver its promises. The reason why collective action is pronounced in Islamist terms also becomes clear in such a perspective, as Islamist movements are a response to imposed and alien versions of modernity; they gather around authentic values in their response. At the same time the Islamist movements are a product of modernisation and incorporate the counter-élite in itself, which are now proposing an alternative to modernity.

By bringing in the New Social Movements approach as a framework for the analysis I have subordinated particularistic approaches to Islamic revivalism and analysed this phenomenon in the wider perspective of collective action. By this way, essentialist and Orientalist approaches are avoided. By comparing the Western and Middle Eastern themes, I have underlined that Islamist movements are not unique or confined in their causes, actions and rhetoric to the Middle East and are certainly not a result of the characteristics of Islam; rather in a similar way to the NSMs, they are best understood as responses to modernity.

Comparing the New Social Movements and the Islamist movements helped to show that collective action in the world in general has become a post-class phenomenon, focusing on identity politics and a critique of modernity. Islamic revivalism, like the New Social Movements, is both a response and challenge to dominant versions of modernity and of the élite. This approach could be useful in understanding the religious movements as well as other movements that rest on authentic themes in other settings where the modernisation project was imposed as an alien project.

A comparison with the New Social Movements also highlighted the differences between the industrialised Western world and the late developing countries, particularly with those like the majority of the Middle Eastern countries that embarked upon nation-building processes after colonial experiences. While the

collective action in the Western world – New Social Movements – work within post-modern environments, collective action in the Middle East takes place within an environment in which modernisation has not yet been fully achieved. We can say that New Social Movements are responses to modernity in the post-modern era, while authenticated responses to modernity, like the Islamist movements, operate in limited or incomplete modernisations. The differences in the nature of the public space in these environments also contribute to differences in political forms within which collective action takes place.

After September 11th, arguments of ‘clash of civilisations’ and essentialist and Orientalist understandings of the Islamist movements seem to be having a revival. As argued in this thesis, Islamist movements are best understood as responses to modernity, and as such are comparable to other movements that criticise and respond to imposed modernisation. Thus, I hope that this thesis has served as an antidote to the clash of civilisations approach.

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