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RACE, POWER AND RESISTANCE :

A STUDY OF THE INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, 1952 - 1972

by

C. P. MULLARD

Thesis submitted in accordance with the regulations for the degree of Ph.D. in the University of Durham, January, 1980.

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

16 MAY 1984

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study could never have been completed without the continuou support of many individuals and bodies. Within the latter category, I am particularly indebted to the Social Science Research Council who funded both the project and myself between September, 1975 and September, 1977; the present Institute of Race Relations through its Director for advice and early encouragement; the library of the Royal Institute of International Affairs for allowing me to consult 'non-restricted' materials; the Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York; the Department of Sociology at Durham University and last but not least King Alfred's College, Winchester, whose quest for a new academic role made it possible for large sections of the study to be written up.

The many individuals who have offered help at different stages in this study's development are far too numerous to list, but to all of them I wish to extend my gratitude. And to the few which follow there can be little doubt that without their generosity and support, I would not have even been able to have embarked upon the project. Foremost amongst this group must come Professor Philip Abrams who provided an open though critical environment at Durham in which it was possible for me, at least, to do productive research. I shall always be grateful for the encouragement, support, and the often undeserved confidence he displayed in my work as it progressed or otherwise from 1974 onwards. To Philip Mason, the Institute's director from its inception in 1952 to 1969, I thank warmly for the days he freely spent being interviewed, sometimes interrogated, for the many papers and documents he unearthed and donated, and for the considerable hospitality he and his wife afforded me at Hither Daggo during 1976. But in a crucial sense this project would not have seen the light of day in the form it has done if it had not been for the profound generosity and, yes, gracious magnanimity of Michael Caine who in a gesture of support, goodwill, and, I think, 'academic

truth' provided me with some 23 thickly packed files, several unclassified folders of notes and papers; approximately 2000 documents which covered the period from 1961-1972, and from which I have been able to reconstruct and interpret the significant years of the Institute's history. I should also like to thank Celia Brown for the many weeks and skilful patience she invested in the task of typing up the final draft of this study.

And finally, I am indebted to Judith, and our three children, Jay, Jordan and Saul, whose years are less than those I have actively spent on this study and whose patience and sacrifices I shall never be able to repay. To Judith, Jay, Jordan and Saul this study is dedicated.

ABSTRACT

This is a study of the radical changes that occurred at the London-based Institute of Race Relations and is thus historically focussed on the period from 1969-1972. Although an attempt is made to trace the history of the Institute from 1950 onwards and indeed account for and explain the so-called 'palace revolution' that occurred during 1972, the major theoretical focus of this study stems from an interest in two questions: why and how did resistance emerge at the Institute? What are its implications for a more general theory of resistance? It is suggested here that an understanding of what happened cannot be fully achieved without locating the events within, firstly, the broader historical and political framework of the development of black resistance, and, secondly, in a sociological tradition concerned in particular with explaining social change, conflict, power, and approaches to the understanding of race relations situations.

Given this framework which is developed more fully in Chapter Two it is suggested that the resistance which occurred evolved as a result of the combination of a number of discernable social conditions or factors. Firstly, the governing body, seen here as 'ideologists' in the Mannheimian sense of the term, consciously attempted to protect certain interests, values and beliefs, irrespective of the wider changes that were taking place during the late 1960s in the field of race research, policy, and practice. Their total insistence on this, which incorporated a specific conception of social reality, gave rise, secondly, to a sense, amongst sections of the staff, of controlled domination and oppression. This however could not be articulated by the staff, or 'utopians', until, thirdly, social space had been created in order, fourthly, to allow for the development of consciousness, and, fifthly, the construction of an alternative, utopian, approach to race relations

in which was subsumed a radically different conception of social reality. When, sixthly, this in turn was rigorously suppressed, and when, seventhly, the utopians saw in this and subsequent actions a real threat to their whole existence and identity as meaningful and relevant workers, they consciously organised resistanc

Although the ultimate success of their resistance depended upon a number of variables, including that of how effectively they could project their alternative approach, conception of reality and role for a radically restructured Institute, the dialectical and sociological quality of their resistance remained constant: it arose within a conflict situation and as a result of a profound clash between two socially organised and competing conceptions of the nature of social reality and the place or role of the Institute within that reality. Through the process of constructing 'instrume power', resistance was consciously organised and employed politicall to obtain 'property power', which entailed not only the eventual overthrow of the IRR Council but also the absolute rejection of the social sources on which its authority was based.

From this explanation a systematic attempt is made in the concluding chapter to unpackage and reorder these and other conditions, factors, and/or relations in order to formulate the propositional basis for a dialectical theory of resistance.

PREFACE

> "Too many of us are paralysed by our histories to want to change them. In the result we perpetuate the power of those who make our histories - to make ourselves even more helpless. When that 'we' refers to those of us in institutions and academies of higher learning given to the study of social reality, our refusal to change that reality makes us collaborators in the subjugation of the powerless by bringing credibility to power.
> We do not have to be at the barricades to be revolutionaries; we do not have to be grassrootists to be radical. To apprehend the social consequences of what we ourselves are doing and to set out to change it - merely to be traitors to our class - is in itself a revolutionary act.
> It is in that spirit of self-criticism and struggle that the Institute set out to change itself...."
>
> IRR/Race Today Collective, March, 1974

On one level, this is a study of that change.

By reconstructing the history of the Institute from the date its founder disclosed his ideas for such a body in 1950 to the so-called 'palace revolution' in April, 1972, an attempt will be made in the chapters that follow not only to account sociologically for the radical change that occurred, but also to suggest that such an understanding is only possible once an empirical and descriptive history reveals or suggests certain analytical starting points. In other words the close relationship that exists between history and sociology, historical event and sociological explanation, is one that both underpins and informs the methodology employed in this study. But this is not all. For whilst the relationship is a

crucial one for making, at least, partial sense of what happened, it can not by itself offer an overall theoretical framework in which, firstly, to locate the kind of change that occurred or, secondly, describe precisely the socio-political nature of the phenomena that evolved, or, thirdly, expose the assumptions embedded in most social actions and on which organised systems of social (inter)actions are established. An historical account can only provide at most a series of possible beginnings for a more critical look at the 'becauses' and 'of courses' that are often subsumed within historical analysis and the kind of sociological analysis favoured by the American and British schools of empiricism of a decade or more ago. For a far more searching and intrinsically flexible framework we need, as is argued in Chapter Two, to return to the insights afforded by a theoretical sociology which, for the purposes of this study, is rooted in the work of Marx, Weber, Mannheim, and, more recently, Rex. From this vantage point it has been possible not only to throw some explanatory light on the change that suddenly appeared to occur but, more significantl to reshape a set of roughly hewn general questions on resistance into the two chief questions with which this study is concerned: Why and how did resistance emerge at the Institute? And what are its implications for a more general theory of resistance?

Thus the record of the change is in a sense a way into the analysis of a particular kind of social change; one characterised by resistive struggle and the rhetoric if not exactly the theory and practice of revolution. The real focus of this study then is

on why and how the Institute or, more precisely, the staff and their supporters at the Institute, set out to change the body from one controlled and directed by a visionary group of upper-middle class gentlemen to one controlled and directed by 'radical' black and white political activists and academics. If this concern provides the organisational, research and empirical focus of the study, it only does so in respect of the major theoretical objective of the study which, simply, is to uncover the kind of social conditions and relations necessary for the development of resistance; or, to put it another way, to expose what could be called the propositional basis for the development of a dialectical theory of resistance.

Ambitious and problematic though this might be, it is a contention of this study that even a modest approach to the problems inherent in such an objective must begin not only at a level which is manageable and viable in the carrying out of painstaking, detailed research but also at a level - the Institute - which appears to possess symbolic significance as a microcosm of larger social processes. That is to say my decision to study the happenings at the Institute was partly determined by a judgement made about its symbolic value as a microcosm of the way relations and processes are ordered, controlled and, under certain conditions, possibly changed in society.

Other, less paradigmatic, reasons which impinged upon the actual conduct of the research included the knowledge that no monographic study of the Institute existed. Apart from one M.Sc. dissertation carried out by Walker (1973) as part of an assignment of the post graduate taught course in race relations at Bristol University, a booklet entitled Race and Resistance: the IRR Story by the Institute's former librarian and present Director, A Sivanandan, (1974), and a number of passing references to the events by John Rex, (1973), Robert Moore, (1975), and Michael Banton, (1972), the paucity of published material on the Institute's experience has bequeathed, even at the cost of repetition in places, an obligation to provide as much detailed documentation as possible to support my analysis. Whilst this study in no way represents a complete history of the Institute, particular attention has had to be given to both the handling and interpretation of historical materials: indeed a vital sub-task has been that of reconstructing certain aspects of the Institute's history from original and primary sources - letters, memoranda, reports, minutes, discussion papers, and so on. In order to cope with the sheer volume of such materials the footnotes to this thesis are largely devoted to this extensive work of referencing.

Whilst access to a number of early documents has been restricted by a thirty year non-consultation rule recently imposed by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and access to more recent materials held at the Institute itself has been effectively prevented

for reasons to do with the state of chaos the body is presently in and the suspicion with which any researcher funded by the SSRC or 'official establishment agency' is regarded, the gaps which have thus inevitably appeared as the research progressed have been, perhaps in places insufficiently, patched up with verbal reports and impressions. In fact, the problem of access to important materials after 1972 led directly to a trimming of the scope of the study, for originally I intended to continue it beyond 1972 in some detail in order to show how the 'new order' and the theory, practice, and aims of the resistive struggle had become institutionalised. Although this trimming has not distracted from the main purposes of the study, there can be no doubt that the added dimension a more comprehensive study would have provided would have been useful in ascertaining how the utopians of yesterday become the ideologists of tomorrow - thus opening the way for extending my conclusions into something that might have looked more like a cyclical theory of change and resistance.

To return, in part, to my primary interest in the nature of black resistance and, in a sense, to this study's combined theoretical and personal orientation, another reason for my decision to embark upon this project is derived from an experiential base. As an individual who has been involved for more than a decade in political race relations work, I have been struck and to some extent puzzled, (though not surprised), not only by the

growth of black resistance in Britain and elsewhere, but equally by the reactions of those who occupy positions of power both to the phenomenon itself and to what usually appear on the surface to be legitimate black demands for equality of treatment, opportunity and 'justice'. As a certain kind of sociologist then, it seems that instead of orientating one's research in terms of white-defined race problems *per se* - the blacks from the position of the powerful looking at the powerless - it could be more profitable to begin from a perspective rarely if at all explored in the literature on race relations: namely, from the bottom looking up. Whilst this to some extent represents my own *real* position within the social structure of metropolitan society, it does also possess and evoke a certain sociological stance and set of insights which I hope will become cogent and even self-evident in the pages that follow.

So it is in a very keen sense that the quotation with which this preface opened informs the methodology employed throughout this study, the interpretations made, and the social anchorage of its major findings.

CHAPTER ONE

THE SOCIAL CAREER OF THE INSTITUTE

The 'private' beginnings of the Institute of Race Relations can be traced back to the unofficial 1949 Commonwealth Relations Conference organised by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), together with its Canadian sister Institute at Bigwin Inn, Ontario.[1] At this Conference several delegates expressed 'extreme shock' over the racial developments and events that had occurred since the last Conference held at Lapstone, New South Wales, in 1938.[2]

Firstly, they suddenly realised that Commonwealth relations after the Punjab Massacres of 1947 had become explicitly 'racial' appearing to undermine the very existence of the Commonwealth, the beliefs, values, ideals, and economic interests on which it was based. Secondly, the observation that rapid decolonisation or, as they phrased it, 'the removal of the imperial ruler and arbiter' would expose further inter-racial problems within the ex-colonial territories themselves appeared to threaten even more deeply their commitment to worldwide racial harmony and international peace.[3] More intensely held after the 1945 Manchester Pan-African Congress's injunction to all colonial and subject peoples of the world to unite,[4] they, thirdly, believed that 'the new ex-colonial nations

would be concerned about the affairs of their expatriates or racial kin in other countries'.[5] Such a development convinced them beyond doubt that 'problems previously viewed as internal would (now) take on an international character'.[6] And, finally, it was deeply felt that both as a Cold War strategy and as a political expression of imperialist intent, 'Communist Russia would exploit racial feeling and divisions to weaken and undermine the capitalist powers'.[7]

The motivation for worldwide action expressed in the 'public' declaration of this 'extreme shock', or these 'private' anxieties, which in turn led to the 'public' beginnings of the Institute of Race Relations, came in an address to Chatham House on 4th May, 1950, a few months after the Bigwin Inn Conference.[8]

The then editor of the Sunday Times declared:

> "There are two problems in world politics today which transcend all others. They are the struggle between Communism and liberal democracy, and the problem of race relations.
> Of the two I am prepared to argue that the problem of race relations is the more important since, for one thing, it would remain with us in its full complexity even if Communism were settled down to peaceful neighbourliness with democracy in a world partitioned between them... Both problems are of crucial importance for the survival of our civilisation. Much more to the point is the fact that if the two became identified - that is to say, if Communism succeeded in enlisting most of the discontented of the non-European races on its side, so that the frontier between democracy and its enemies was a racial as well as an ideological and political frontier - then the danger would be greatly multiplied, and the chance

> of our ever coming out on top would be so much the poorer. To the extent that we solve the racial problem itself, we shall of course be preventing that combination from coming about. On the other hand, the fact that we face the problem in the presence of the Communist menace gives it a double urgency...
> Unless we start to catch up (now) we are in real danger of handing over command to Communism for sheer lack of knowledge and ideas on which to base constructive policies rivalling Communism in their appeal...
> I therefore put forward the proposition that the interested parties...should consider as a matter of urgency the establishment of a Commonwealth Institute of Race Relations for the scientific and objective study of matters related to race and colour...
> As a general proposition I do put it forward with great emphasis. For here is one of the most dangerous problems of the contemporary world, which can be solved only with greater and deeper study than is at present at our command. Unless we move steadily towards a solution, I see our civilisation in sharp and increasing peril."[9]

The various political themes developed in this apochryphal address were to influence the whole development of the Institute's social career from 1950 to 1972.

They dictated that 'the Institute envisaged should be seen as serving the world at large, or as a prototype for other such institutions that would grow up';[10] and that from 1952 to 1958, it should begin life as a race relations unit placed under the aegis of an international body - Chatham House, a body 'whose status and sound governance were assurred'.[11] The emphasis the <u>founder</u>[12] of the Institute placed on effective action, the

relationship between 'action' and 'scientific and objective' research, and the relationship between this and the protection of the capitalist, international social order were not only to influence the kind of research projects chosen but, just as importantly, they were to influence the kind of organisation the Institute would turn out to be, the way in which it would construct socially its notion of 'scholarship', and the way in which it would organise politically its stated objects:

> "To promote, encourage and support the study and understanding of, and the exchange of information about, relations between different races and peoples and the circumstances and conditions in which they live and work;
> To consider and advise upon any proposals or endeavours to improve such relations, circumstances and conditions;
> To promote, advise upon, collate and publish by any means...knowledge both practical and theoretical upon questions of race relations and other questions relevant thereto;
> (And) in connection with the aforesaid objects, to establish support and maintain information offices, libraries, advisory panels and educational centres; to promote and support conferences, meetings, receptions, lectures and exhibitions and generally to facilitate by financial support or otherwise, any means of making possible informed discussions and consideration of questions and proposals affecting race relations; and to promote and assist travel to different territories and between different territories by any persons interested, concerned or responsible in or for the problems of race relations."[13]

But above all else, and over time, the values, beliefs, and political orientation towards race relations implicit in Hodson's address helped, once socially constructed and politically

organised into the actual Institute, to shape the collapse of the body that was set up to preserve 'our civilisation' from the 'Communist menace'. They helped, as we shall see in later chapters, not only to explain the emergence in mid-1970 of 'radical elements' but they also helped to explain the founder's 'astonishment and dismay' that one after another of the staff had started to speak in 1969/70 'as if the object of the Institute was not only to remedy race relations, rather than to study them, but to do so essentially in favour of one party, the coloured population in Britain'.[14] In brief the way in which the Institute was constructed related refractively to the way in which it was dismantled. Whilst the concern of the middle chapters of this study will be to show why this in fact was so and how and why resistance developed, our concern here will be to describe briefly how the Institute was constructed and dismantled.

The Constructing of an Institute

The relationship alluded to by Hodson between the necessity to improve race relations and the protection of cultural, political and economic interests on the 'ideological and political frontier' enabled him within months of his address to collect 'a group of businessmen with enough vision to see the importance of the subject to the world in general and their own business interests

in particular.'[15] As the initial group of 'corporate subscribers' who agreed at a dinner party organised by Dougal Malcom at Brooks's to donate £15,000, they in effect guaranteed the embryonic Institute's survival for three years as a race relations unit attached to Chatham House. They included Dougal Malcom himself, who was then Chairman of the British South Africa Company; (Sir) Ronald Prain, who not only chaired the two big copper groups from Northern Rhodesia, Roan Antelope and the Rhodesian Selection Trust, but who had also agreed to sponsor through his companies the first and only British chair of race relations; Harry Oppenheimer and his Southern Africa mining interests through the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa; and a number of chairmen from smaller companies mainly based or operating in Africa.[16]

This impressive group of international and multi-national companies provided not only enough funds for the appointment of a full-time director, Philip Mason, in September, 1952, but also <u>all</u> the operating funds the unit required between 1952 and 1958. Just as significantly they set the precedent for other companies to contribute to race studies after the Institute became independent on 1st April, 1958;[17] and helped to provide the social respectability the international research foundations required before even considering the kind of massive support the Institute needed and requested. And to a lesser extent, in as much that they insisted that the Institute's director should not

duplicate the proposed theoretical work to be conducted by the Rhodes Professor of Race Relations at Oxford, that the early Institute should be concerned with practical and policy issues, that it should concentrate on disseminating 'factual' racial knowledge and the influencing of 'top people' who mattered in government and industry, the companies finally helped to reaffirm the Institute's proposed socio-political orientation and the kind of policy or action research it should promote or undertake.[18]

The creation of a body that would research 'the problems of the end of Empire' and offer advice on how to solve them demanded in addition to a sound financial base an equally sound social base and orientation.[19] Simply, if the Institute were going to have any effect at all, it had to identify clearly its social constituencies or clientele and co-opt it by appointing constituency representatives to its governing body; members it could trust, who shared the same commitment to improve race relations within the framework established by the founding group. From the appointment of Lord Hailey in 1952 as the first chairman of the Board of Studies to the appointment of Lord Walston as the last but one chairman before 'the palace revolution', all members were consequently selected from either the 'network of contacts and friends' possessed by the founder or, after 1958, similar 'networks' possessed by those who made up the 'core' group on various Institute Councils.[20] As well as being 'top people', as we shall see in more detail in Chapter Three, they were also public

figures who had distinguished themselves in one or more of the following career areas: journalism, the (missionary) church, industry or commerce, colonial or civil service, academia, politics, and after 1963, when the Institute successfully recommended the establishment of the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants (NCCI), race relations.[21] In short they were selected on the basis that they were friends or contacts, that they in fact did represent and would address on behalf of the Institute specific elite and decision-making groups in society.

In addition to their common social or class backgrounds, they were also expected to identify with and reflect what was conceived to be the real 'national interests' vis a vis race relations. This meant they needed not only to subscribe to the aims and objects of the Institute but also to accept in toto the assumptions implicit in the purposes of the Institute: that race was irrelevant to the potential of a human being; that race relations can be affected by government action; that government actions can be affected by reason; and that an improvement in world wide race relations could lead ultimately to improved international relations, the stability of the western order and the protection of 'our civilisation'.[22]

Only on two occasions in the history of the Institute were these assumptions ever questioned. The second, during the period 1969 to 1972, we shall turn to shortly, but the first occurred very early on in its career, immediately after the decision had been taken in 1954 to publish An Essay on Racial Tension - the Institute's first of more than 120 books published between 1954 and 1973.[23] The disagreements which had arisen within Chatham House some months before the completion of the final draft of Mason's essay, between its prestigious research committee then chaired by Dame Lilian Pensen and the majority of members on the Board of Studies, and which centred on how the Board should conduct, conceive, and publish its research, resulted in several important developments.[24] First they led to the resignation from the Board of Professor Raymond Firth who disliked amongst other things the pragmatic approach favoured by the majority towards race studies; second, they signalled the quiet withdrawal of others, including Lord Hailey, who possibly shared Firth's reservations; third, they led to the expansion and strengthening of the governing body to reflect united agreement, under Hodson's chairmanship, on the Institute's purpose and approach; and, finally, coupled with other developments such as the receipt of a £10,000 grant from the Rockerfeller Foundation, they led 'without any flags being lowered or raised' to the complete organisational autonomy and independence of the Institute.[25]

With independence and under the chairmanship of a distinguished scholar, Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders, it was at once realised that if the Institute were to become as influential as anticipated, then its subsequent research policy needed to be reflected not only in the areas and kinds of research to be undertaken, but, more importantly, in how members saw the nature and character of what Hodson had termed eight years before - 'scientific and objective' research in race relations.

In terms of the areas and kinds of research to be undertaken, its research objectives fell initially into five distinctive categories, each incorporating 'different aspects of the racial problem'.[26] The first four aspects, the international, imperial, post-imperial, and plural provided the substantitive direction for research to be conducted on the Institute's international front.[27] Of less interest to members in the 1950s, who believed that there existed no real racial problem in Britain, and thus of less significance, the fifth or 'residual aspect' provided the focus for research in Britain or on what it termed its domestic front.[28]

Taking up the observation made by Mason in his Essay that what was needed was to establish 'our own group wants' first before considering the 'otherside', the Institute from 1954 to 1967 set up a series of prestige research projects funded by

international foundations and companies to explore, report on, and to offer advice about international race relations.[29] In scope they ranged from the Rockerfeller studies on Rhodesia, the Industrial Group's Tropical Africa Project established to ascertain how 'emerging nations' would view neo-colonial and expatriate business operations, to the Ford funded Comparative Race Studies Project from 1962 to 1967 which, with a grant of $250,000, would research race relations and make policy recommendations relating to the improvement of race relations in and international relations with Brazil, Latin America, Africa, South East Asia, and the Caribbean.[30] The many full length monographs and many more reports and papers that resulted from this intense research activity were either published by the Institute's publishers, Oxford University Press, written up as scholarly papers for the Institute's international quarterly journal, Race, or disseminated in the form of 'facts', 'findings', and 'information' on racial matters in the Institute's monthly Newsletter, revamped as Race Today in 1969.

If the sheer volume of work was not matched on the Institute's domestic front after 1958, after the 'riots' in Nottinghill and Nottingham had triggered off sudden Institute concern, then the international status of its sponsors and research orientation most certainly was.[31] The Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust, for

instance, put up the money in 1959 to finance a study of West Indians in London, to find out how they were assimilating into British society. And from 1962 to 1968, under the direction of Jim Rose, the Nuffield Foundation provided just over £93,500 to fund the Institute's Survey of British Race Relations (Colour and Citizenship), and an additional £50,000 to be spread over the period from 1959 to 1964 to fund other important domestic 'developments'. Like the Rowntree project and indeed all subsequent domestic projects based at the Institute in Jermyn Street, St. James or, after 1969, at the Institute's Joint Unit for Minority Policy Research (JUMPR) attached to the University of Sussex, the Survey was basically concerned with two things. In the first place it attempted to ascertain the policy and other conditions required for the successful integration of (black) immigrants into 'the society in which they have come to live and work', so that all the institutions in our society could be protected. And, secondly, as practical, policy-oriented research, it was concerned with making policy and political recommendations to affect the changes desired.[32]

Although the areas of work and research orientation developed on both fronts reflected the interests of those who financially supported the Institute as well as those who governed and directed its operations, it did not in itself guarantee the flow of research

funds from foundations for further research or the support and confidence from Whitehall in its general policy-advice work. Instead this derived from how the Institute defined and incorporated the notion of 'scientific and objective' scholarship into all its research activities. To put it crudely, it came from the fact that all its constituent groups believed they could rely on the quality, accuracy, and apparent impartiality with which the Institute carried out its research objects. Insisted upon by Carr-Saunders from 1958 to 1964, and carried on by successive Institute Chairmen, scientific and objective research meant above all the total embracement of a set of methodological and political propositions that related to both how research should be conducted and how staff researchers should present their findings.[33] Like the Institute which was constitutionally prevented from expressing 'an opinion on any aspect of relations between different races and peoples',[34] it was expected that staff researchers too would refrain from expressing non-substantiated opinions. It was considered that objectivity could be achieved if Institute researchers refrained from expressing personal opinions, championing political causes, confusing 'facts' with opinions, and from presenting only one side of an argument or problem. Scientific work, on the other hand, could be established if researchers treated 'facts' as sacred, set out arguments or propositions logically and rationally, without allowing any emotive under or overtone to creep in and distort scholarly presentations of 'findings', and, in essence,

subscribed to the empirical and positivistic tradition of enquiry and investigation that dominated social science research in the 1950s and early to mid-1960s.

That the foundations applauded the scholarly distance and aloofness that such an instrumental embodiment of science and objectivity projected, and that government departments after 1963 availed themselves of the 'reliable' and accurate 'facts' and information produced by the Institute, only added to the political and practical weight of Carr-Saunders'crucial observations.[35] Not only did he wish to defend for instance what he termed 'the impartial or detached approach' against those who felt it was wrong because it lacked commitment, but he and all subsequent chairmen reiterated annually in their reports that, whilst less spectacular than 'warm partisanship', it nevertheless was of 'value as an influence on current affairs'.[36] And, further still, it could be measured in terms of advice sought from all quarters; the Institute's involvement in national, international, and industrial advisory and consultative bodies; requests for speakers in Britain and abroad; requests for articles from newspapers and other journals; the thousands of enquiries and visitors received in the unique and internationally renowned library; requests from publishers to provide specialist readers in race relations; unsolicited donations; a contribution of £25,000 from the 1965 Labour government in return for the

valuable services and 'reliable' information provided;[37] and, last but not least, in the willingness of commercial supporters and others to begin to raise £500,000 for the Institute's long term survival in 1970.[38]

Clearly the fact that constituency groups could rely on the accuracy and impartiality of Institute 'facts' and 'findings' made it that much easier for the Institute to establish an impressive and influential reputation not only in the field of race relations research but also in the field of policy advice. As the only national body in the field with the active support of well known public figures and the financial backing of international companies and foundations, the advice it gave freely or that which was requested by companies, international agencies, and, particularly, governments, had to be treated seriously. Thus its advice, for example, to the Home Secretary in 1963 that a National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants should be established to co-ordinate the work of voluntary racial harmony groups up and down the country resulted in an £11,000 annual grant to be administered by the Institute, the establishment of the first NCCI under Philip Mason's chairmanship, and the Institute supervised appointment of Nadine Peppard as NCCI's senior executive officer based at the Institute's headquarters in St. James's.[39] Similarly, the advice sought on a 'fair' national racial harmony and immigration policy by the Prime

Minister's office was almost incorporated word for word in the 1965 White Paper; and the advice sought by companies was quickly introduced into the framework of their overall management and industrial relations policies.[40]

By the mid 1960s then successive Councils had been able to create a body of some considerable influence, with a sense of purpose and commitment to scientific and objective scholarship. Its composition, backing, and pioneering research on both fronts brought it a certain authority and status, while its successful policy-advice role and seniority tended to cast it as the only legitimate body in the field, defining the acceptable areas and approaches to research, co-ordinating, through NCCI, racial harmony work, and providing, together with another sibling agency, the Runneymede Trust,[41] the kind of political and intellectual leadership required for improving race relations as defined in part by itself and in part by its elitist clientele.

What successive Councils had not achieved however, by the mid 1960s was, to use Mason's term, the 'institutionalisation' of the Institute's work.[42] The accomplishment of this entailed in essence the social and political articulation of its social and economic base and its indisputable achievements over nearly two decades. More specifically, it demanded that the Institute needed to identify and insist on the role it should play in what

it termed 'the national organisation of race relations in Britain'; consider just how its research programmes on both its fronts could be secured and expanded; and decide how the co-ordination of the agencies it had established or played a central part in establishing should be affected.[43]

To take the second issue first, as the solution to this affected the case the Institute made out in respect to its general organising and co-ordinating roles, the Institute needed to think of 'the domestic scene as very different from the overseas and try to establish in each field a kind of cell or unit doing original work'.[44] It argued to Ford and other likely sponsors that as it had always been as interested in and committed to the wider political as academic or research aspects of race relations - a fact reflected in its composition, Industrial Group researches,[45] and its promotion of the African Private Enterprise Group[46] - it more than any other agency was the most qualified in all senses to carry on the long term 'research' tasks envisaged. Thus the role of the international 'cell' later called the International Race Studies Programme (IRSP) was conceived not only as an international research unit to follow up and undertake fresh studies that expanded the theoretical frontier opened by Ford's Comparative Race Studies Project but also as a political 'cell' organised to influence international opinion, hold conferences, chart developments, and speak directly to those (whites) who held property or

other interests in countries deemed suitable for 'aid' and the transfer of 'democratic institutions'.[47]

Similarly, on the domestic front, it justified the institutionalisation of its work through the creation of the Joint Unit for Minority Policy Research (JUMPR) not on solely academic grounds or criteria.[48] In protracted discussions with the Home Office and the newly formed Social Science Research Council, the two possible British funding sources, it rather re-emphasised its crucial role in the development and formulation of racial harmony and immigration policies, its political and policy advisory work, and its socio-political conception of race relations research and practice.[49] Thus JUMPR would not only be concerned with the recommending of race relations policies in the practical areas of housing, employment, education, and so on but, more importantly and on a political level, it would continue the work initiated by the Survey; investigate in more detail the growing 'national problem'; and recommend policies required for the harmonious integration and socialisation of immigrants, for the protection of the social, political, and economic fabric of our society.[50]

Neither Ford nor the Home Office failed to realise the political importance of these requests from the Institute. In a telegram dated November, 1968 the former's representative, Frank Sutton, was delighted to notify IRR of Ford's informal approval of a $350,000 three year grant.[51] The largest

proportion of it, $300,000, was to go on 'inquiries into the effect of race on international agencies and international relations and the impact of urbanisation and industrialisation on ethnic groups': the international 'cell' or IRSP. The balance was to be earmarked for the domestic 'cell', JUMPR, in the expectation that British funding sources, if not the British government directly, would ultimately back its work.[52] The SSRC with government funds agreed in principle to do this, although it should be noted that it did insist on making a distinction between serious 'theoretical work' in race relations and the kind of work proposed for JUMPR. It thus subsequently accepted a revised version of an IRR proposal and agreed to fund for a decade 'theoretical work' under Philip Mason's chairmanship at the (IRR)/SSRC Race and Ethnic Studies Unit to be based at Bristol University.[53]

The decisions of Ford, SSRC, and the approval of the government all helped to make it possible for the Institute to claim in a de jure and de facto sense that it was already the national organiser and co-ordinator of most certainly the research element in overall race relations work. In respect to other elements and indeed to the problem of the co-ordination of other agencies in the field it suggested to the Home Office in particular that as the most senior body in the field with an international reputation and a Council on which all political, economic, media, and racial

interests were represented by distinguished public figures, it should be responsible for co-ordinating race relations practice and work and, on a broad policy level, the activities of the agencies involved.[54] Looking at the national scene as the Institute saw it, it identified twelve functions that needed to be discharged for the effective organisation of the national effort and allocated these chiefly to four organisations: the Race Relations Board then chaired by IRR Council member Mark Bonham Carter; the IRR funded and initially controlled National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants represented at all levels on the IRR Council; the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination whose dominant executive committee members, Dipak Nandy and Anthony Lester, were represented on the IRR Council and, after CARD's collapse in 1967/8, involved directly in the establishment and running of IRR's Runneymede Trust; and, of course, the Institute itself.[55]

At least to the Institute it then seemed to a large extent that it was already engaged unofficially in organising and co-ordinating the work of the main agencies in the field. By incorporating 'top' representatives from them onto its Council, by being almost the sole and certainly the only legitimate producer and distributor of racial 'facts' - the kind of information required by all other race agencies in order to carry out

many of their specific objects - it also considered itself to be the most qualified and (politically) suitable body to perform the organising and co-ordinating tasks it outlined to the Home Office.

So by the time of Mason's retirement in October 1969 and inside two decades, its Board members, Councillors, and director had been able to construct an internationally renowned and thriving Institute that in Lord Walston's words exercised 'some considerable influence on all matters related to race relations'.[56]

The Dismantling of an Institute

If the construction of a prestigious Institute, employing more than forty members of staff on an annual budget in excess of £170,000 in 1969/70, had largely depended upon the building of a body that reflected in all ways dominant definitions of political and economic interests and social reality, then its dismantling appeared to depend upon the political articulation of the obverse. Although this did not evolve clearly until 1970/71, the foundations for its development and hence the dismantling and reconstruction of the Institute already partially existed when Professor Hugh Tinker was appointed as the Institute's new director in October, 1969.[57]

For in national and international class and racial politics during the previous year a 'new mood' had arisen which affected nearly all race relations bodies. Reflected in the new politics of Black Power in America and Britain, Paris '68, university 'sit-ins', and the takeover of CARD in 1967/68, it was a 'mood' expressed in terms of revolutionary struggle on the one hand and participatory and open democratic politics on the other. It was a 'mood' that was brought into the Institute with the appointment of new staff to IRSP and JUMPR. As mainly young sociologists who had been involved in the student protest movement in 1967/68, they, with the support of Tinker and particularly the Librarian, Sivanandan, who had been at the Institute since 1965, started to question the very way in which the Institute had been traditionally organised, opposing what Mason had termed the 'Indian Civil Service model' of administration and control.[59] Within months of their appointments, and together with other staff, they were able to establish for the first time in the Institute's history a regular monthly staff meeting, a monthly executive committee meeting consisting of staff and Council members, a number of liason and specialist committees, and the principle that staff should be represented on all committees and participate in all decisions affecting organisation, research, and general Institute policy.

Although the new organisational structure instituted by Tinker raised some concern amongst Council members, especially those who believed along with Mason that it was the director's job to direct, to carry out policies decided by the Council, it did

not affect how they viewed the Institute, its research and policy work.[60] This was to come a few months later during 1970 when the central Institute staff embarked upon implementing their notion of participation. In brief this entailed, firstly, 'endless hours of debate and bickering' about the future role of the Institute; secondly, a critical examination of the Institute's social bases and clientele; thirdly, a re-evaluation of the Institute's past and current work, particularly that being planned by JUMPR at Sussex; fourthly, a re-appraisal of the Institute's financial sponsors, membership, and advisory functions; fifthly, a review of the objectives and editorial policy of Race Today; and, for our purposes here, lastly, a systematic assessment of that which appeared to symbolise and connect all these things together - the Institute's definition of research policy, orientation, and notions of scientific scholarship and objectivity.[61]

Arising from this kind of intense intellectual activity which effectively halted 'productive work' for twelve months, and created an atmosphere of permanent hostility between IRSP, where much of the critical thinking was taking place, and JUMPR, which wished, uncritically, to carry on the Institute's policy-oriented research tradition, several realisations emerged which were to have a decisive effect on the future of the Institute.[62] By far the most significant in terms of both its political impact and embodiment of growing staff criticism culminated in the production and dissemination of paper by Robin Jenkins, one of the IRSP fellows.[63] In this paper which was originally presented in

January, 1971, to a private meeting of the British Sociological Association, Jenkins attacked the most observable and public aspect of the Institute's work - its research. The Institute's work, according to him, reflected a 'rank betrayal of all the finest traditions of humanism and reason' and an 'almost totally uncritical white-washing of official racism'.[64] Amounting to a review of Colour and Citizenship in one respect and a scathing critique of the way in which the Institute conceived its objectives in another, he argued that most of the knowledge produced by the Institute was not scientific at all but ideological; that, policywise, it was ineffective in attaining its own stated objectives; that it served to increase the inequitable distribution of social knowledge, thus making the immigrants at the bottom of society relatively more impotent; and, finally, that the knowledge produced was, at best, a contribution to ruling ideology, and, at worst, a form of spying on the activities of the immigrant community.[65] His advice to all blacks was candid and politically informative: 'when researchers from the IRR come knocking on (your) doors for information (you) would be well advised to tell them to fuck off'.[66]

The importance of Jenkins' paper was not so much in what was said - as this had already been articulated in one form or another by staff in internal debate and discussion - but in that it was said publicly, that it forced the Council to defend its

definition of research, or, more precisely, two decades of Institute work; and that it made it possible for other staff to voice their grievances, their reformulations of the role and work of the Institute at a time when blacks were demanding a dominant place and role in all the agencies set up ostensibly to cater for <u>their</u> needs.[67]

It helped staff to find a meaning for their existence as 'committed' race workers and researchers, and indicated a way ahead for an Institute in a world where race relations and immigration had become undeniably political issues. It helped them to realise that:

> "Since IRR is dominated by liberals, performing in capacities which are the basis for many hatreds, we really have a profound problem; perhaps the liberals have the greatest problem of all because they are not very relevant and by no means the tide of the future; and in their weaker moments of self-consciousness they catch a glimpse of this. Yet they are in control. Isn't that a contradiction? (Further) who breaks up race relations meetings or performs as a thorn in the flesh of 'establishment' analysts? Such are the people who are either victims of discrimination or those acting as advocates for them. These two groups are frustrated by lack of progress in an area in which they have <u>direct</u> interests. Those of us who work in race relations must consult with, listen to and learn from these two groups of committed people because they can help show us where we are going wrong or placing wrong emphasis, and how we might do a more relevant and better job...
> Organisational relevance is the only thing that will guarantee long range survival. We must become co-opted by our clientele. They are a major part of the reality with which we deal. They are also the future, but we are the past. Such an orientation may not guarantee the building of a research empire of major international scope. But is that what we exist for?"[68]

The projection and political organisation of these and other realisations into what amounted to an alternative definition of social reality, research, political orientation, and hence role for the Institute in the 1970s took several forms. Firstly, and in striking contrast to previous definitions, a completely new clientele was identified - the victims of racial discrimination, oppression, exploitation, and their advocates. Secondly, reorganised to meet and express the needs of this clientele rather than the needs of government, industry, and largely white race professionals, Race Today was turned into a political organ to reach the racially oppressed: an organ for the oppressed and for the staff to express their identification with the oppressed. Thirdly, old research programmes were either abandoned or, like JUMPR's, forced to find a setting outside the Institute: they were replaced with projects that reflected an alternative research orientation, looking from the bottom up, rather than from the top down, and within the framework of a theoretical perspective culled from radical and critical social science and the street politics of black resistance and liberation.[69] Fourthly, the doors of the distinguished library as well as the pages of the monthly magazine were opened to greet the new clientele; the facilities and services were designated for the use of blacks. Fifthly, old notions of 'objectivity' were revealed as research procedures aimed to secure staff control and complicity and thus discarded as being implicitly ideological. Sixthly, a whole philosophy

(or ideology) of social relevance was created to replace that of 'impartiality' or what Carr-Saunders had earlier termed an 'impartial and detached approach'. And lastly, these realisations and the forms and actions in which they were expressed led to the development of a new awareness within the Institute, a strong feeling amongst staff that the Institute must change, and a growing unanimity that it must change in one direction in order to assure organisational relevance and hence survival.[70]

The reaction of the Institute's Council to what was known as the 'Jenkins' Affair' established the precise nature of the overall political process of dismantling the old and reconstructing the new Institute, and set in train a whole series of events and issues which culminated in the 'battle' for the Institute. Its absolute rejection of Jenkins' argument and insistence that Tinker should exercise his authority as director and sack the IRSP fellow helped not only to unite further staff support for Jenkins and illicit solidarity for Tinker, who refused to dismiss Jenkins on the basis of defending 'academic freedom', but more crucially it marked the point when the majority of staff had now no choice but to resist politically the authority of the Institute's Council. If this was not realised by all at the beginning of 1971, it most certainly was after the Council had decided in May to curb staff activities, lay down a 'code of ethics' for research and non-research staff alike, undermine the

director by proposing to appoint a co-director to take charge of all administrative and staff matters, reorganise the committee structure so as to ensure a built in majority of Council members, and to launch the first of several assaults on what it called the 'propaganda' and political bias in Race Today.[71]

It was after the Council's full acceptance of Mason's report - he had been requested to return to the Institute by the Council to resolve the problems Tinker viewed as being normal in any creative research setting - that the united staff decided that they needed to enhance their collective voice and engage in an organised programme of resistance.[72] In as long as it took to digest the full political implications of the report, the Council's unanimous opposition to and rejection of the staff's definition of a radical role for a reorganised Institute that would be informed by the demands and interests of a black clientele, the staff realised that they were no longer engaged in the activity of rational persuasion. They were confronting a Council that had made up its mind as to the future of the Institute; that insisted then and would go on insisting on its legitimate authority to act in the interests of all groups in British society, including those victimised and discriminated against on the basis of colour, religion, or ethnic origin. To change such a situation they had to act in a way, as we shall see in later chapters, that would have the effect of totally destroying the Council's credibility and

undermining its authority and power to insist on the conception of research and reality organised in the Institute.[73]

To do this, they needed not only to project positively and uncompromisingly their views on an alternative Institute, but if they were to dismantle effectively the Institute they needed to see that these views were represented on the governing body. In other words they needed to make sure that representatives of the clientele they addressed sat on the Council; that they possessed and were in a position of power; that they were placed ready at appropriate times in Council meetings to challenge and undermine the authority of the Institute's Council.

After a secret campaign to recruit two dozen or more representatives of the new clientele groups into the Institute's ordinary membership, this was achieved in the very first contested elections in the Institute's entire career. At these elections (held in September, 1971) Lord Walston who, according to the staff, epitomised Council opposition to radical change and was responsible for the resignation (dismissal) of Jenkins, the attack on Tinker's professional competence to direct the Institute, and the move to curtail the political development of Race Today, was ousted from the chair.[74] And five new members and representatives of the new clientele, including two black political community workers, were elected. The confidence and indeed authority this imparted to staff resisters became over the months that followed,

under Michael Caine's chairmanship, reflected in the full-scale launching of Race Today as a (black) political journal, the radicalisation of all Institute work and research, the setting up of meetings and one day conferences organised by blacks for blacks, and the involvement of blacks in nearly all Institute activities.

The opposition of the majority group on the Council to this increased political activity, to the very real threat it possessed to the Council's authority, was triggered off and also compounded by several other considerations. In the first place the Chairman had started to receive bitter complaints from some ordinary members, the police, race relations agencies, particularly those it either established or fully supported such as the Runneymede Trust, the Community Relations Commission (which succeeded the NCCI), and the Race Relations Board, and many of the commercial supporters who had traditionally underwritten all of the Institute's administrative costs.[75] Together with the concern of Ford and the communicated anxiety of the director of the Wells-managed fund raising campaign, which had reached a critical point in raising the £500,000 from multi-national companies required for the long term (financial) survival of the Institute, this latter group reiterated in the strongest terms of all the common complaint of all those who wrote to or approached the chairman and other Council members.[76] Namely, that the propaganda, political and racial bias in Race Today not only seriously crippled realistic fund raising endeavours but also

possessed the effect of driving off much traditional support and undermining the reservoir of liberal opinion and goodwill from influential groups and top people the Institute had always sought and depended on. At various times during the autumn of 1971, the Council representatives of the Institute's established clientele groups blamed the personal weakness and inability of Tinker to control the staff: they argued that as director he was solely responsible for the state in which the Institute now found itself - in permanent conflict: torn between conflicting views; under threat from a possible takeover by radical staff concerned only with 'the coloured population in Britain'; in serious danger of losing its international reputation; and, with the constant threat and in some cases actual withdrawal of commercial funds and general support, in imminent danger of collapse.[77]

Although the decision to oppose and confront head on staff resistance had been made in the late autumn, it was not announced in full until after Lord Seebohm had informed the Council that the February, 1972 issue of Race Today with its attack on Lord Goodman, an IRR supporter, South Africa, and the white liberal and racist establishment in general, had lost the Institute between ten and twenty thousand pounds in withheld donations.[78] At the March Council meeting two resolutions were subsequently passed with the unanimous support of the majority group on the Council and with the vociferous and total opposition of the five new members: that Race Today should be closed down immediately

after the May issue; and that the director should be sent on study leave until his contract expired in September, 1972, when a new director should be appointed.[79] It was also decided that these decisions should be ratified at an Extraordinary General Meeting of the Institute on 18th April, 1972.[80]

In the intervening weeks the battle that ensued between the two groups engaged in resistive and oppositional struggle not only raged on in the press but it also engulfed and engaged IRR's ordinary membership.

Between the 22nd March and the 12th April they were deluged with a series of letters from the Council majority and its supporters on one side, and the staff together with the Council minority on the other; each side attempting to define the social principles and political territory on which they stood and the racial perimeters of the final battle.[81] At the end of the day and as a kind of encapsulation of all that the Institute had stood for and all that they had believed in, the Council majority rested their case on the following propositions:

1. The director and staff had moved away from the objective presentation of facts, discussion and research, and had thus violated the constitutional principle that the Institute 'should not express an opinion on any aspect of relations between different races'.

2. Race Today's coverage and 'general style and tone' had not only been provocative, rejecting the Institute's high academic standards and status, but, as seriously, it had abandoned the 'assumptions implicit in the purposes of the Institute: these are that race is irrelevant to the potential of a human being, that human behaviour can sometimes be affected by rational argument, that race relations can be affected by government action, and that government actions can be affected by reason'.

3. Members of staff had not maintained the highest standards in distinguishing fact from opinion and treating fact as sacred; nor have they stated the views of opponents fairly and recognised that other people may hold different views without 'being wicked or stupid'. Instead they have been doctrinal, espousing the cause of one side within a Marxist framework.

4. 'Some of our principal (industrial and commercial) supporters have felt they could not continue to support a body which appeared to them to have departed...so clearly from its stated purposes'.

5. Over the last two decades, successive IRR Councils, composed of distinguished white public figures (like us) of liberal persuasions have built up an internationally renowned Institute which has helped to improve race relations in Britain and abroad.

6. We must face the fact that a divergence has grown up between the majority of the Council and the staff of the Institute. To a large extent, the director has allowed this to develop and it need not have happened: therefore there is now a situation where there exists no reliable leadership for the staff in particular and the Institute in general.

7. Finally, unless we take the immediate action we propose, the closing down of Race Today which is running at a considerable financial loss and the dismissal of the director, 'the alternative is disruption and an end to the Institute we know'.[82]

In contrast the staff, together with the Council minority, based their case on all that the Institute should stand for:

1. They answered the charge of bias and lack of objectivity through pointing out that 'objective' had come in the race relations industry to acquire a specialised meaning associated with and defined by those in power: the charge had not been substantiated and furthermore was incapable of substantiation.

2. No definition of objectivity should exclude certain views being put forward, and when there are (black) views which are not allowed expression elsewhere we have an added responsibility as an Institute of Race Relations to let them be heard.

3. Race Today's coverage and style is consistent with this and should thus be allowed to continue.

4. Professor Tinker appears to have been victimised for the stand he has taken on freedom of speech in general (Jenkins) and Race Today in particular: both the director and the principle of academic freedom he has always defended should survive.

5. The Council is out of touch and fails to respond positively to either the needs and aspirations of Britain's multi-racial community or the rapid changes that have occurred in race relations research and practice: socially and politically it is not in tune with these developments.

6. 'What is called into question is indeed the independence of the Institute, but we see this to include independence from big business pressure'.

7. What most concerns us about the present situation is that we have a Council - some of whose members only turn up for meetings once or twice a year - who <u>insist</u> upon the <u>right</u> to take decisions vital to the Institute (and Britain's black population) over the heads of members. This is the issue which must now be resolved: and unless the members of the Institute feel able to face this squarely then we very much fear that the Institute of Race Relations will become as irrelevant to the circumstances of our times as some other of our institutions.[83]

At the EGM of the Institute's members on the 18th April, 1972, the Council majority was defeated by 142 votes to 99 - and those present together with those who had remained absent subsequently resigned.

A black Chairman, Reverend Wilfred Woods, was elected to replace a tradition of white gentlemanly chairmen. Other members were replaced either by black activists or white radicals whose committed identification with the 'black cause' bore testimony to their suitability. And a year later Tinker was politically shifted from office to make way for Sivanandan, the acknowledged leader of 'the palace revolution', to be installed as the first black director. Both international business and research foundations withdrew their support, and as far as its founder, H.V.

Hodson, was concerned, IRR 'died a sad and appalling death'.[84] But under new direction and on an annual income of less than £5,000, - less than the original annual sum donated by the founding companies in 1952 - the new Institute thought differently.

Enthusiastically it pledged itself:

> "To examine the ways and means by which Third World peoples both in the metropolis and in their own countries, are being subjected to economic slavery and political subjugation, and to address itself to policies and programmes that will help to bring an end to that situation".[85]

In just over two years then the staff, together with their supporters, the new clientele, had been able to dismantle a body that had taken nearly two decades to construct. They had achieved the political basis for this by redefining their purpose and the objects of the Institute in terms of the reality constructed and daily experienced by the victims of racial discrimination and oppression - the new clientele of blacks in metropolitan and Third World societies. And they had achieved its actual political accomplishment by engaging in an organised and sustained campaign of resistance. In a very real sense they had appropriated the resources and taken over the demense constructed and occupied by a body for two decades: their clientele had become the <u>new</u> Institute.

CHAPTER ONE

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. For an account of the early history of the Institute see H.V. Hodson, Some Recollections of the Institute of Race Relations, June, 1976, an unpublished document held at the Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, York.

2. Ibid, p.3.

3. Ibid.

4. For the full text of the 'Declaration to the Colonial Peoples of the World' approved and adopted by the Pan-African Congress held in Manchester, 15th-21st October, 1945, see: Kwane Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom, Heineman, London, 1962, pp.44-45.

5. H.V. Hodson, 1976, op cit, p.3.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. H.V. Hodson, 'Race Relations in the Commonwealth', International Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1950, pp.305-15.

9. Ibid.

10. H.V. Hodson, 1976, op cit, p.5.

11. Ibid.

12. In the introduction to the 1976 'Recollections' Hodson stated: "My claim to that role (founder) is based on a succession of initiatives: 1. In an address at Chatham House - I first put forward the concept of such an institution. 2. As this address was well received, I proceeded to discuss the matter with a variety of people in the academic world, mainly Oxford and London, Chatham House, Whitehall, business operations

in multi-racial countries, the press, etc. 3. I personally received promises from a group of mining companies of the amount of money I had calculated was the minimum required to get the institution in being. 4. I negotiated with Chatham House the formation of a race relations research unit within the RIIA but separately financed and with its own Board. 5. I enlisted, in consultation with Chatham House, the first members of that Board, including Lord Hailey as its first chairman. 6. It was a personal connection with Philip Mason which enabled me to spot him as the ideal first director. 7. I persuaded Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders to succeed Lord Hailey and to take charge, as Chairman-designate, of the translation of the race relations unit into an independent Institute. 8. In the legal and other negotiations necessary for the independent establishment of the Institute I took a considerable part, and I was active on its Council in its early days."

13. Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Institute of Race Relations, IRR, London, 1958, pp.1-2, paragraph 3(1), a, b, c, and d.

14. H.V. Hodson, 1976, op cit, pp.15-16.

15. Philip Mason, The Institute of Race Relations, 8th May, 1976, an unpublished document held at the Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, York, p.2.

16. H.V. Hodson, 1976, op cit, p.6. For a further account see H.V. Hodson, 'The Study of Race Relations', Optima, Vol. 5, June, 1956, pp.52-3.

17. For a list of these companies see Appendix C.

18. In a slightly different form these 'conditions' are set out in H.V. Hodson, 1976, op cit, pp.6 and 7. They were agreed to by Hodson at a special meeting in All Souls to discuss the establishment of the Oxford chair, which Prain's companies endowed a sum of £100,000, in order to commemorate the centenary of Wilfred Rhodes' birth.

19. See Philip Mason, 'Ten Years of the Institute', Race, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp.193-202.

20. For a list of all Board of Studies and Council Members see Appendix A and B.

21. For further detail see Chapters 3 and 4 and Appendix A(i), (ii), and (iii), and Appendix B(i), (ii) and (iii).

22. These assumptions were later spelt out by Mason in an important document and 'Report to the Council of the Institute of Race Relations', IRR, London, 4th May, 1971. They were also restated in Chairman Michael Caine's letters to the ordinary membership in March and April, 1972. For the full text of these letters see Appendix D.

23. Philip Mason, An Essay on Racial Tension, Oxford University Press, London, 1954. For a full list of books published by IRR see Appendix G.

24. For a very detailed account of this period of the Institute's history see Philip Mason, 1976, op cit, pp.8-12.

25. Ibid.

26. These 'aspects of the racial problem' were initially sketched out by Hodson; see Hodson, 1950, op cit, p.309.

27. Ibid. The international aspect concerned the question of relations between nations and peoples of different race across their political borders; the imperial aspect concerned the question of European heritage of subject peoples of different race, or of the transfer of imperial power to them; the post-imperial concerned the question of white supremacy; and the plural aspect concerned all those societies where three or more racial groups contend for the heritage of power.

28. Ibid. The residual aspect was largely social and economic and concerned the race problems which arise where ever there exists a racial or colour minority.

29. Philip Mason, 1954, op cit, pp.136-139.

30. All these projects will, of course, be discussed in more detail in later chapters, but particularly in Chapter 4.

31. As a direct response to the Nottinghill 'riot' in 1958, the Institute hastily attempted to collect all published materials that existed on the British 'colour problem'. These were collated by James Wickenden and inside six weeks published. See James Wickenden, Colour in Britain, Oxford University Press, London, 1958.

32. For a more extensive if not critical treatment of the genesis of the British Survey see Philip Mason, 1976, op cit, pp.29-33; E.J.B. Rose, et al, Colour and Citizenship, Oxford University Press, London, 1969, pp.IXX-XXIII, pp.1-10, Appendix 1:1, 112; Philip Mason, 1968, op cit; 'Background Notes to Press Release (on Jim Rose's appointment and the Nuffield Grant)', IRR, London, 27th September, 1963; and IRR Council Papers, 120, 121 and 132, the last and most informative of which was called 'Survey of Race Relations in Britain: Progress Report, January, 1974', IRR, London. For further detail relating to the Survey's research objectives see Council Paper 143, 'Survey of Race Relations: The Outline Plan', IRR, London, June, 1964.

33. See in particular Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders, 'Chairman's Review of the Year', Annual Report 1963/64, IRR, London, 1964.

34. Memorandum and Articles, 1958, op cit, p.2.

35. Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders, 1964, op cit.

36. Ibid.

37. See Leslie Farrer-Brown, 'Chairman's Review of the Year', Annual Report 1965/66, IRR, London, 1966, in which he explains that the Institute by the summer of 1965 'felt that its reputation was established and that it could be more confident'in receiving funds from official bodies and agencies that might otherwise have jeopardised its 'neutrality' and 'autonomy'.

38. This fund raising campaign was organised by the Institute's Research and Development Trust with the professional services of Wells Management Consultants. Its object was to raise approximately £500,000 to secure the survival of the Institute for the next decade and to purchase a 99 year lease on a prestige office block in Central London.

39. See Council Paper 122, 'Co-ordination of Immigrant Welfare Work', IRR, London, 14th October, 1963, together with the Appendix to this paper: 'Recommendations to the Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council'. Also consult Council Paper 129, 'Advisory Officer', IRR, London, 21st January, 1964, for an account of how the government grant was paid and how the Institute effected complete control of NCCI. We shall be returning to this important episode or development in the Institute's history in Chapter 4.

40. Philip Mason, Interview, 18th February, 1976; Philip Mason, 1976, op cit, pp.27-29; and for an account of Mason's views on immigration control see also Philip Mason, Guardian, 23rd January, 1965.

41. For further detail on the social genesis of the Runneymede Trust, which will also be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, see Council Paper 161, 'The Runneymede Trust', IRR, London, 1st July, 1965; and Anthony Lester, 'Proposals for the Creation of the Runneymede Trust', IRR, London, 16th June, 1965.

42. Philip Mason, 1976, op cit, pp.40-41.

43. See Philip Mason, 'Race Relations in Britain: Some Thoughts on National Organisation and the Place of the Institute', IRR, London, 28th February, 1967. (To a large extent this paper was based upon Council Paper 21, 'Future Organisation for Research in Britain', IRR, London, 17th November, 1966, which in turn was based on Michael Caine's 'Future of the Institute of Race Relations', IRR, London, 23rd January, 1966).

44. Philip Mason, 1976, op cit, p.40.

45. The Institute's 'Industrial Group' which funded the Tropical Africa Project and other 'research' and 'political' work (we shall discuss in Chapter 4), was set up on advice from and substantially supported by Shell International.

46. For a list of the membership of the African Private Enterprise Group chaired by Philip Mason see Appendix E. This Group was established to keep international companies with economic interests in Africa informed of the research on and political developments relating to this part of the world.

47. Much of the thinking, as we shall see in later chapters, behind the international cell (IRSP) was started by the Ford Foundation and to a large extent taken up by 'The Thirty Year Group', an IRR/SSRC body set up to review possible long term race relations research.

48. See Philip Mason, 'Unit for Research in Race Relations in Britain (URRB): Draft Submission to the Home Office', IRR, London, 12th April, 1967. This Unit was later renamed the Joint Unit for Minority Policy Research (JUMPR). (N.B. We are only in possession of a final draft submission, but, after discussion with Philip Mason, we are assured that no substantial changes were made to it apart from correcting typing errors and so on).

49. These meetings will be analysed and fully referenced in some detail in Chapter 4.

50. Philip Mason, 12th April, 1967, op cit, pp.1-8.

51. Ford Foundation, 'Telegram from Frank Sutton to Philip Mason', IRR, London, 22nd November, 1968.

52. Ibid.

53. For an account of this proposal see SSRC, Ethnic Relations: The Work of the Research Unit on Ethnic Relations at the University of Bristol', London, 1975.

54. Philip Mason, 28th February, 1967, op cit. This paper was originally prepared for the Home Office.

55. Ibid.

56. Lord Walston, Interview, 27th October, 1976. Identical sentiments and indeed statements of fact were expressed by Walston and other peers in the House of Lords on 16th December, 1969. For an account of the discussion see House of Lords Debate, 16th December, 1969, Vol. 306, Col. 990-1195 and for further elaboration see Nicholas Deakin, Colour, Citizenship and British Society, Panther Books, London, 1970, pp.351-374.

57. Professor Hugh Tinker also combined the directorship of the Institute with that of IRSP.

58. For an account of the takeover of CARD see Benjamin W. Heineman Jnr, The Politics of the Powerless: A Study of the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination, Oxford University Press, London, 1972.

59. Philip Mason, 1976, op cit.

60. Ibid, and Interview, 1976, op cit.

61. An interesting and revealing account of this intense intellectual activity and the bickering and debate it stimulated is to be found in Robert Mast, 'Some Emotive Thoughts on IRR, with Special Reference to IRSP', IRR, London, December, 1970.

62. Nicholas Deakin, who had been the Deputy Director of the British Survey, was appointed in October 1969 as the Director of JUMPR. He always maintained that JUMPR's role in essence was to carry on the research tradition established by the Survey.

63. Robin Jenkins, 'The Production of Knowledge at the Institute of Race Relations', Independent Labour Party, London, June, 1971.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid, pp.6-21.

66. Ibid, p.21.

67. For an account of the import and significance of Jenkins' paper see especially, A. Sivanandan, Race and Resistance: The IRR Story, Race Today Publications, London, 1974.

68. Robert Mast, 1970, op cit, pp.106.

69. As a result of the tensions and 'bitter conflicts', Nicholas Deakin resigned from the Institute in the summer of 1971 and carried on his research (many JUMPR activities) elsewhere.

70. A. Sivanandan, 1974, op cit.

71. Philip Mason, 4th May, 1971, op cit.

72. Ibid.

73. The issues and themes briefly mentioned here form the substantive content of Chapter 6.

74. See A. Sivanandan, 1974, op cit, and Chapters 7 and 8 here.

75. These letters - a minimum of 25 - are documented and discussed in further detail in Chapter 8.

76. The director of the Wells Campaign, Colonel Gibson, communicated his 'deep anxiety' to the Chairman and Council members, Jim Rose and Lord Seebohm in particular. As we shall see in Chapter 8 this kind of pressure was an important factor in the Council's final decision, as in a sense it was pressure emanating from those individuals and groups who had always been the Institute.

77. See in particular Michael Caine's first letter to IRR members contained in Appendix D for a 'public' statement of these accusations.

78. See Alexander Kirby, 'Race Today Gone Tomorrow', in Charles Husband (ed), White Media and Black Britain: A Critical Look at the Role of the Media in Race Relations Today, Arrow Books, London, 1975, pp.200-201; and the IRR Council Minutes for the 67th Meeting of Council, 11th February, 1972, Minute 413.

79. See IRR Council Minutes for the 68th Council Meeting, 20th March, 1972, Minute 425.

80. Ibid.

81. See Appendix D for the full text of all the letters sent to IRR members.

82. These propositions have been extracted from the letters in Appendix D.

83. See Note above.

84. H.V. Hodson, Interview, 14th July, 1976.

85. IRR, Programme and Policy 1974, London, 1974, p.2.

CHAPTER TWO

RACE, POWER AND RESISTANCE (1): BROAD HORIZONS, NARROW FOCUS

How can the social analyst even begin to comprehend or make sense of what happened at the Institute? Clearly, to rely on an historical description of events, the chronological ordering of discrete actions or the minute dissection of a specific time-bound episode tends to lead the interpreter to emphasise the effects rather than causes of the change that occurred. As Rex has pointed out, such an approach taken by itself rests upon an inability to make explicit the general processes which most historical explanations assume. Through the employment of conjunctions like 'because', 'so' and 'therefore' there often exists an implicit reference to general psychological and sociological laws, but these tend to be of secondary importance.[1] The questions embedded in these conjunctions remain to be articulated and addressed by, amongst others, the sociologist.

'Thus' whether or not IRR is today actually achieving what it set out to do in April, 1972 is not our immediate concern. What is, however, is firstly the wider location of the 'resistance' that evolved; secondly, the achievement of a working definition of resistance; and lastly the establishing of an appropriate conceptual

framework and sociological perspective which is not only grounded in what happened but which, more significantly, attempts to provide the social tools for a general explanation of the radical change that occurred and for the possible construction of the social features needed to be included in any general dialectical theory of resistance. In other words, this chapter is more concerned with questions of how to proceed to understand what happened, and how possibly to interpret what happened and relate it to both a broader political history and a narrower body of knowledge on resistance. Towards the end it focuses on the kind of conceptual and theoretical issues that will be taken up and explored in more depth in the chapters that follow.

Broad Horizons

To begin with, neither the events nor the consequences of the resistive struggle can be seen as merely coincidental, a ghastly accident or mistake; something that could have been prevented by the Council's speedier action or simply another chairman.[2] Nor can any serious sociological explanation purport to view the events, the phenomena, as a series of political happenings and social rationalisations somehow mysteriously divorced from what had been occurring or developing in race organisations and black liberation movements throughout the world.[3]

In fact since the 1950s, the beginning of the Institute's career, and most certainly during the 1960s, there had emerged not only what Mason termed a 'wholesale revolt against Western values', but also an articulated, organised and ideologically-informed expression of that revolt.[4] As a phenomenon and distinctive form of political action, it was qualitatively quite different from the protest campaigns and demonstrations that had characterised the early American Civil Rights Movement or for that matter from the Indian political disobedience movement of the 1940s. Whereas the former attempted to act within the social, legal and political confines of the democratic state, neither basically challenging its legitimacy or authority, nor fundamentally questioning its ability or willingness to adapt to political pressure or demands, the latter movement always appeared to embrace two critical aspects. In the narrow negative sense of the term, Indian and other examples of political disobedience simply meant the refusal to abide by laws or commands of the established colonial authorities which were objected to either in themselves or for what they represented or permitted. And in the broader sense it embodied the performance of any act prohibited by the law or state, or the non-performance of any act required by the law or the state, simply with the purpose of securing changes in the actions, policies, laws, government or constitution of the state.[5] Whilst the socio-political line of demarcation between these two phenomena and forms of political activity is difficult to isolate other than in a purely legalistic

sense - protest tends to operate within the law, whereas political disobedience does not - the same cannot be said about 'resistance'.

From the beginning of recorded history, in nearly every form of society resistance groups or movements have emerged; but, more recently, it has been those essentially concerned with aspects of race and systems of social inequality based largely on racial categorisation that have added to our knowledge and refinement of the concept. Apart from the numerous resistive struggles waged against the authority of European colonists in Australia, Africa, America, and elsewhere during the centuries of European expansionism and imperialism, and apart from what Aptheker saw as the resistive revolts of the American Negro slaves in the nineteenth century, it was to the mainly African experience that firstly American and later British-based black activists turned for guidance, for a political meaning and understanding of their revolt against Western values and institutions.[6]

Here both the political and theoretical ground had been explored; the blackman during the 1940s and 1950s had confronted himself with the reality of the situation in which he was an integral part. His private and public struggle, as Fanon noted, was inextricably linked with a new humanity based upon the conscious

self-awareness of an oppression and exploitation that had formerly robbed andundermined his sense of national, personal, and collective identity. Simultaneously, he intuitively and consciously realised that:

> "This new humanity could not do otherwise than define a new humanism both for itself and for others. It was prefigured in the objectives and methods of conflict. A struggle which mobilised all classes of people and which expressed their aims and impatience, which was not afraid to count almost exclusively on the people's support, would of necessity triumph. The value of this type of conflict was that it supplied the maximum of conditions necessary for the development and aims of culture... The liberation of the nation was one thing; (however) the methods and popular content of the fight was another. It seemed to us that the future of national culture and its riches were equally also part of the values which had ordained the struggle for freedom."[7]

In other words the nature of the African experience, the resistive liberation struggle the Algerians, Mocambiquans, Angolans or others fought, was something that was radically new, that was eminently pertinent to the specific conditions and situations in which they had been previously imprisoned. For possibly the first time in the history of black resistance their conscious actions had combined in one social entity both the objects and methods of struggle. As these two features were intrinsically related to a mind and body changed radically through the consciousness of self as oppressed, exploited, and fettered to an alien system of social and economic production, one appeared to determine

the mode of the other. Symbolised in their actions, as individuals, as politically organised groups, they knew where they had been, where they were going, and how to get there: they knew at each level of consciousness which each stage of development and analysis precipitated previously where they stood in relation to themselves, history, and the future. They were for themselves, against history, for a new humanity: through meaningful action (to them) they were involved in working out 'new concepts to try and set afoot a new man', a new expression of themselves as autonomous yet collectively aware and oriented black Africans.[8] In their struggle they were formulating and projecting the three definitional aspects of resistance that have since informed the actions of the American black resistance movement as well as those of the 'militant radicals' who consciously set out to change IRR from the body it had been for two decades to the body it became in 1972.

On an objective plain the African experience embodied:

1. The total rejection of the dominant social, political and economic order.
2. Total rejection of the beliefs, values and institutions which underpinned the dominant order.
3. The possession of an alternative conception of a social, political and economic order.
4. The possession of an alternative institutional, value, and belief system.

Subjectively, and indeed subsumed within these objective aspects, there always appeared to exist another set, at times less obvious and more difficult to identify with precision. Reflected in part in the Negritude movement of the period and in its more contemporary offspring, Black Power, and further in the apparent development of a politically based black consciousness derived from individual and group evaluations about the relationship of the colonised (oppressed) to the colonists (oppressor), it included a number of social imperatives which Frantz Fanon, Sekou Touré, and others encapsulated in their writings. Simply, 'in order to achieve real action, you must yourself be a living part of Africa and of her thought; you must be an element of that popular energy which is entirely called forth for the freeing, the progress, and happiness of Africa.' There was no place for anyone outside the struggle who was 'not himself concerned with and completely at one with the people in the great battle of Africa and of suffering humanity.'[9]

Translated into a more formal and less poetic list of subjective aspects, Touré's sentiments can be reformulated to include:

1. Total identification with the 'cause' or goals of action.
2. Experience of being part of suffering humanity, or experience of being racially oppressed and discriminated against.

3. Identification with similar others who possess both a common experience and a common if not always conscious perception of the form and course of action required.

4. An immutable belief that one's identity is somehow inextricably connected with one's actions; and ipso facto to act in a certain way is to exist as a certain being.

Also from the African experience documented by those involved as well as other writers over the last two decades, a set of themes that relate to organisational issues and means can be detected: They include:

1. The creation of political organs of communication which primarily help to stimulate and rally support through the projection of both the objective and subjective aspects of struggle. (That is to say, unlike protest movements which essentially depend on changing parts of the system from within, resistive organisation as we shall see shortly is oriented towards an absolute change; its organs therefore need to be directed towards a potential membership, or, in the case of IRR, clientele, that see themselves standing outside rather than within the dominant system).

2. The development of symbolic or military action-cells to initially gain, defend existing, and increase social territory.

3. To establish alternative rules and norms for political procedure and protocol which not only challenge dominant conceptions of procedure and protocol but which also directly reflect the philosophy, principles, and bases of alternative strategic action and of alternative forms of social organisation.

4. To organise in a way which theoretically at least incorporates a total range of violent and non-violent expressions of political self in resistance.[10]

Taken together these objective, subjective and organisational aspects of resistance all assume certain specific ends or goals. That is to say resistive action as a political form of general social action is purposeful; it is directed towards goals which in themselves become not just an integral part of any definition of resistance but also become part of the justificatory system in which resistive action is determined and rationalised - made meaningful, purposeful, and legitimate to those who embark upon such a course.

In a Weberian sense then all resistive actions are intrinsically rational, a dynamic embodiment of the major features outlined by Weber in his discussion on zweckrational and wirtrational action.[11] That is, resistive action involves not only the 'rational weighing of alternative courses of conduct in terms of their utility to the actor', as Rex puts it, but also 'they refer to the single minded pursuit of an absolute value.'[12] This goal or end is thus seen on one level as an end in itself, something that demands an almost pure rational orientation, involving a conscious belief in the absolute value of a specific form of behaviour entirely for its own sake.

So:

> "Regardless of possible costs to themselves, (resisters) act to put into practice their convictions of what seems to them to be required by duty, honour, personal loyalty... or the importance of some 'cause' no matter in what it consists. ... (Thus) when action is oriented to absolute values, it always involves 'commands' or 'demands' to the fulfilment of which the actor (or resister) feels obligated."[13]

But yet on another level, resistive action is obviously oriented 'to a system of discrete individual ends'. The problem here, as Weber indicated, is not so much that this is the case but that as the ends are often various, 'the choice between alternative and conflicting ends and results may well be determined by considerations of absolute value'.[14] In Weber's view when this happens 'action is rationally oriented to a system of discrete individual ends only in respect to the choice of means'.[15] The theoretical problem posed, in a sense, becomes inverted rather than resolved. The typological quality of an end or goal becomes defined by the means chosen and employed: or, conversely, the ends take preference over and determine the means.

Difficult though this problem might appear to be, in the case of resistive action it will be suggested here that both its zweck-rational and wirtrational features intermix to form a hybrid type of wirt-zweckrational action. To adopt and in the context here adapt Parsons' well-known note on Weber's major two types of action:

> "The sole important consideration to the (resisting) actor becomes the realisation of the value... There is no question either of rational weighing of this end against others, nor is there a question of 'counting the cost' in the sense of taking account of possible results other than the attainment of the absolute end. (For it is only once this primary or absolute end is attained can others of secondary significance be also attained)."[16]

Given that this is so, it can be suggested now that the chief goal of all resistance and certainly that of African, American and later Black British resistance appears to be:

1. to acquire or construct power in order to:
2. change radically the political, economic and social structure of the society, organisation or group;
3. to dismantle the systems of exploitation, oppression and discrimination.
4. Free all, including the resisters, in social captivity or bondage.
5. Replace a former and institutionalise a new conception of of social reality, one which embodies the utopian beliefs and values that inform and undergirth resistive struggle.
6. Create a new conception of social man whose freedom is inextricably connected to his new role as communal or collective man, responsible to and for the total community rather than to and for himself or a sectional interest group within the community.

But possibly above all, those engaged in resistive struggle, according to Fanon and his modern disciples, must in their actions relate to others in similar situations. In Marx's sense of being conscious of a common situation, they must see themselves and what they are doing, bringing about, as being linked to a tradition of struggle, a history of a new humanity unleashed in the actions of those who countered the early colonists's guns with spears and bows and arrows. They must step boldly and defiantly across the divisive obstacles constructed by those who, historically, have attempted to maintain power and a political hegemony based upon the institutionalisation of the 'profit motive' and racial superiority. They must link together the experience of the past and present with the vision of tomorrow's future.

In fact:

> "Each generation must, out of relative obscurity, discover its mission, fulfil it, or betray it. In under-developed countries the preceeding generations <u>have</u> both resisted the work of erosion carried on by colonialism and also helped on the maturing of the struggles today. We must rid ourselves of the habit, now that we are in the thick of the fight, of minimising the action of our fathers or of feigning incomprehension when considering their silence and passivity. They fought as well as they could, with the arms that they possessed then and if the echoes of their struggle have not resounded in the international arena, we must realise that the reason for this silence lies less in their lack of heroism than in the fundamentally different international situation of our time. It needed more than one native to say 'We've had enough'; more than one peasant uprising crushed, more than one demonstration

> put down before we could today hold our own, certain in our victory. As for us we have decided to break the back of colonialism, our historic mission is to sanction all revolts, all desperate actions, all those abortive attempts drowned in rivers of blood."[17]

Not only must this historical and associational thread be woven into any model of resistance, but it must also be implied in any workable definition. In respect to this the African experience has clearly imparted several features which should be included in a broad definition. Firstly, the objective aspects contain both negative and positive attributes which should perhaps be separated in our definition and which specifically relate to what Mannheim has termed a utopian conception of a future state of social being and organisation.[18] Secondly, the subjective aspects whilst relationally connected to the objective appear by and large to encompass much that Marx had in mind when he noted that the proletariat could only exist as a revolutionary party and class once consciousness had been developed to reveal a social and political awareness of the common experience and situation the oppressed shared.[19] Thirdly, the organisational means or methods employed, as partially suggested, are crucial in helping to distinguish one form of political action from another: thus Fanon's insight that in resistive struggle the methods and objects become intertwined and become absolute in their expression, unconstrained by the ethical, democratic, and legal boundaries normally associated with Western (white) political activity, needs to be incorporated.[20]

And finally, the major goal of resistance, the acquisition or construction of power to bring about the radical changes envisaged, calls for the inversion of Weber's problematic definition of power, a reformulation which explicitly sees power as primarily a resource rather than as primarily a product of a relationship.[21] Thus in this context resistance needs to be defined partially in terms of the ability of actors to construct or acquire power against the opposition of others. In much the same way in which Simmel uses the concept, opposition becomes an integral part of the relationship between the two groups in social combat: it helps to preserve the existing structure or order, vigorously maintain the existing distribution or otherwise of power, and expose and sharply highlight the sources of conflict and struggle which in turn act to strengthen and vindicate resistance.[22]

From these four defining features, all exhibited in the African experience and, as we shall see in this study, incorporated in the radical vocabularies and definitions of political action and purpose within IRR, a working sociological definition consisting of a negative and positive interpretation of resistance can be formulated. In the negative sense, then, resistance is that kind of action directed against the authority of the dominant group in control of a society or organisation and that kind of action which seeks its legitimation in an alternative, utopian set of beliefs, values, and social institutions. And in a positive sense

it is that kind of collective action entered into to construct and acquire power by any means consistent with a utopian, alternative and consciously avowed set of beliefs and values to replace a dominant and opposing group's ideology and system of control with that of its own. To distill both parts even further, resistance is therefore that kind of collective action directed against the authority of opposing, dominant groups in order to acquire power for the purposes of instituting an alternative and utopian set of values, beliefs and institutions. In this broad sense, which is the sense that will be used in this study, the concept has become refashioned to emphasise its positive rather than negative connotations, to distinguish it from anarchy on the one hand and protest on the other; to add to it a revolutionary dimension which protest and political disobedience tend to lack and in so doing to move it closer to but not necessarily to make it synonomous with revolution. In fact its relationship to revolution has been adequately put as follows:

> "Political orders resemble forests and families in that they contain the potentiality of self-renewal, but this potentiality does not exclude the chance of failure and ultimate extinction. Revolution, when successful, signalises such extinction of a political order. Resistance is its harbinger and potential pathfinder."[23]

In other words resistance is today and was yesterday a way to the revolution the African resisters sought. Although its organisational aspects might have been adapted to meet particular conditions in different parts of the world, under slightly different

systems of political oppression, as a model for action developed here it has survived almost unchanged.

The theorists' and African resisters' legacy provided in America, for instance, what Franklin Frazier prophesied in 1962, some years before the evolution of Black Power and modern American black resistance, 'a new identification, a new self-image, and a new sense of personal dignity'.[24] By the beginning of the 1960s, black Americans had started to re-evaluate their social position in White America, and to reassess the (protest) objectives and strategies which had dominated black American social politics since the 1920s. Borrowing much of the ideological clothing, political analyses, and forms of political action from comrades in Africa, they had started by the mid-1960s to organise radical movements around the political and social messages transmitted by the slogan of Black Power. They were quick to pay political and organisational homage to black Africa; and as Carmichael and Hamilton indicate they realised, as had Fanon a decade before, that they were part of the new force, the struggle against international capitalism and racism and for the freedom or liberation of <u>all</u> black people.

Simply:

> "Black Power means that black people see themselves as part of a new force, sometimes called the 'Third World'; that we see our struggle as closely related to liberation struggles around the world. We must hook up with these struggles. We must, for example, ask ourselves:

> when black people in South Africa begin to storm Johannesburg, what will be the role of this nation - and of black people here? It seems inevitable that this nation would move to protect its financial interests in South Africa, which means protecting white rule in South Africa. Black people in this country then have the responsibility to (resist), at least to neutralise, that effort by white America.
>
> This is but one example of many such situations which have already arisen around the world - with more to come. There is only one place for black Americans in these struggles, and this in on the side of the Third World."[25]

Black Americans had not only started to relate to Third World resistive struggles, but after the mid 1960s they had also started to reformulate more appropriate tactics and policies; actions which reflected their new or revitalised vision of utopia. For the Black Muslims in the North it meant the creation of alternative social, economic and political structures, working towards a separate albeit black nationalist and indeed black capitalist Islamic state within America. Whereas for those later organised into the Black Panther Party on the West Coast their wants were less nationalistic, more secular. Influenced decisively by Fanon's Wretched of the Earth they, like the African resisters, wanted 'freedom'; the power to determine the destiny of the black community; a different kind of education, one which would 'teach true history and our role in the present-day society'; the end of police brutality coupled with the immediate release of all blacks held in federal, state, county, or city prisons; and, as one of their major political objectives, 'a United Nations supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate, for the purpose of

determining the will of black people as to their national destiny'.[26] For many politicised black Americans in the late 1960s, the politics of protest and moderation, as Apter observed, no longer provided any 'meaning to our generation', nor challenged our cherished institutions and beliefs.[27] Challenging both the authority of the state and the historic protest role of the old style Civil Rights Movement, blacks, according to Imamu Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones), were struggling and fighting for a new 'black value system'; one which looked towards Africa and incorporated the principles of Umoja (Unity), Kujichagulia, (self-determination), Ujima (collective work and responsibility), Ujamaa (co-operative economics), Nia (purpose), Kuumba (creativity), and Imani (faith).[28] Their poets, prophets, intellectuals and leaders started to listen to Touré, read Fanon, adopt Kwane Nkrumah's pan-Africanist vision, revise Marx, relate emotionally and politically to the resistance struggles in Africa, and learn the lessons offered in the international classroom of (black) history and struggle.

Retrospectively, whether or not they succeeded in what they had set out to accomplish in the late 1960s is neither here nor there, for what mattered to them and indeed to us here was that they were engaged in the act of resisting. They had become an organisational unit in the international movement of resistance

and revolt against Western values and institutions. Besides merely learning from the African experience, they needed to 'hook up' with it and other struggles; they too needed to follow the example set by their mentors of the new politics and engage in the internationalisation of struggle, the international traffic of ideas, tactics, analyses, and policies - a vision of a black man as a liberated man, able to stand up with others and understand and draw strength from his history of oppression in order to change the course of his future history, himself and society. Africa and America needed thus to form links with the embryonic struggle emerging in Britain, and conversely British blacks required the political and ideological fuel that linkage provides so that their struggles could be intensified and justified through identifying with something much larger than either the resistive struggle and eventual takeover of CARD in 1967 or what later transpired at IRR. The realisation, made more poignant with Stokley Carmichael's visit to Britain in 1967, that British blacks were as much a part of the international movement as those in America, Africa, Latin America, or South East Asia, cast a new light on the hitherto ad hoc and largely protest-oriented intra-organisational disputes that had occurred at CARD and in other white controlled race agencies.

Indeed:

> "As a result of the summer's events (Stokley Carmichael's visit, speeches, and Home Secretary Roy Jenkins's subsequent ban on his future entry into Britain), a different set of racial issues began to draw attention. Violence, colour consciousness, Black Power with all its connotations, a world-wide struggle against, white Western society emerged explicitly and loudly from the subterranean mumerings along the fringes of Britain's racial minorities to counterpoint and challenge the concepts of integration, multiracialism, and anti-discriminatory legalisms upon which CARD had been built."[29]

Directly springing from the African and now the American experience, but articulated by Jonny James Caribbean Workers' Movement and Britain's first avowed Black Power group, Obi Egbuna's Universal Coloured Peoples Association, this radically 'different set of racial issues' not only once politically organised led to a change in control and policy at CARD but it also indirectly pressurised IRR to re-evaluate its existing role and future in the national organisation of (official-white) race relations activity and research in Britain.[30] Within IRR, it marked the confused beginnings of what Sivanandan terms ' the growth of resistance', the intuitive and experiential understanding by the few black members of staff at IRR that after CARD, after Carmichael's visit after the presentation of the African and American experiences as they related to both the British situation and Britain's historical role in the world economy and colonial politics, they could either continue to support white control and definitions of reality through their silence or, as blacks, become involved in the international

movement of resistive struggle. As we have partially seen, they consciously chose to act resistively, to relate their experience to others, and link up on the broad horizon with international resistance, the new politics and revitalised struggles in the Third World and its colonised, displaced presence in metropolitan society. At one and the same time the struggle than ensued at the Institute emanated from and became 'hooked up' with the tradition of black resistance that had started in Africa and spread over two decades to the entire black world.

Although at quite a different level of organisation, directed against the authority of the governing body and only symbolically against that of the ruling elites in society, it nevertheless contributed to the wider movement in a way which its leaders saw as enhancing its own relevance and value. Simply, without the political insights and purpose afforded by firstly the African and later American and Latin American experiences, and without the backing of those engaged in struggle elsewhere, it would have probably developed, if at all, as an example of intra-organisational protest, concerned with getting some black representation onto the Council rather than changing the very nature of the Council and the Institute it controlled. But with recent black history behind it, a new politics of resistance taking shape, its own horizons were broadened to take account of and place itself amongst those all over the world who either had waged or were waging resistive war.

The IRR struggle thus not only became part of this tradition, but, as we shall see, it also embodied and helped to refine some of the defining features listed above. It is to this general model of (black) resistance that we shall now return in order to relate it to our central and indeed narrower question - what happened at IRR, or to rephrase it in terms of the focus of this study, how can we explain and account for the resistance that occurred?

Narrow Focus

Clearly from our broad definition of resistance, at least three fundamental problems or questions emerge if a plausible conceptual framework for the understanding of resistance is to be constructed.

In the first place some clarification is required in respect to the social portrait of those actors engaged in struggle, not just from the point of view of those who define their actions as resistive, but also from the position of those, the Council, who consciously and strategically opposed resistance. As a pre-condition of any potential resistance situation it has been

assumed firstly that two socially distinct groups exist and interact competitively, and secondly that both groups possess a set of interests which appear to be anchored in diametrically alternative conceptions of and political or social orientations towards social reality. Arising from this it has been further assumed that this social state in its making and in its continuation through struggle produces as it evolves conflict, the social product of a specific series of interactions characterised by the observable projection of opposing beliefs, values and interests.

Thus, as Rex has pointed out in a slightly different context, there appears to be contained within the definition employed here and within the resistance situation 'not merely two pictures of the world governed by two sets of different ends, but one picture of the world which represents it as stable, and another which sees it as marked by conflict, contradiction, and an inevitable tendency towards change'.[31] To draw upon Mannheim's formulation of the discovery of both worlds is, we suggest, a possible way of delineating the two groups in struggle on the basis of sociological rather than simply political or even psychological criteria. For in his discussion of ideologies and utopias he tends to relate the importance of both types of thinking and action to a notion of how society is organised, power distributed, and how ideas are legitimated at any given point of time. Because his conception of the structural features of political struggle is consequently grounded

in an empirical appreciation of the way in which society is organised, his definitions of ideology and utopia are particularly appropriate here. They can be slightly adapted not only to describe the actual social persona of the resisting and opposing groups, as we shall see in Chapters 3 to 6, but, more significantly, they can be interpreted in such a way as to indicate the possible nature of the dynamic part of the overall relationship that exists between the two groups.

His definition of ideology is as follows:

> "The concept ideology reflects the one discovery which emerged from the political conflict, namely that ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensively interest bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination. There is implicit in the word 'ideology' the insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it."[32]

If this definition is related to some of the assumptions just exposed together with those implicit in our rough model of resistance and also viewed against the brief description of the Council's position in 1971/72 offered in the previous chapter, several key things are discernable. At once it is apparent that the Council performed for two decades or more a dominant role in the organisation of IRR's affairs; it defined itself as the governing body or ruling group; and it saw itself as being responsible for

maintaining a tradition of scholarship marked by high academic standards and ideals. In other words it saw itself as the protector and indeed progenitor of a tradition of values and beliefs sanctioned partly by the wider academic community and, or so it thought, by other dominant groups in the social structure as well. Furthermore it also appeared on the surface, and certainly from the utopians' viewpoint, that it was so intensely interest-bound to the objective of improving race relations within a capitalist, liberal-democratic framework that it was unable to see certain facts presented by Jenkins, Race Today contributors and others that threatened its sense of domination and authority. Whether or not Council manifestations of its 'ideology' in action actually obscured the real condition of society and thus stabilised it is something we shall see in the next chapter, but that it reflected the Marxian notion of a ruling group's values and ideas governed by its relationship to the ownership of (IRR) resources is of little doubt.

It is moreover on this level that Mannheim's definition of ideology begins to exchange its descriptive value for more interesting analytical insights. For as well as being defined in terms of those who rule, a quantitative connection is forged between the rulers and the ruled. The ruling group dominates. And by implication it owns or controls the resources in the organisation or society it rules; and if power is to be seen

within a broadly construed Marxian framework as the primordial resource stemming from the ownership of 'property', the sources and means of production, then this too it owns or at least is able to determine both its accumulation and distribution. Integrally bound up with this, the third key contribution Mannheim provides concerns the hint at the kind of relationship that exists between dominance or the socially organised and articulated possession of resources and a stable social order. From his definition it is possible to see that this relationship enshrines two problematic features: the ability on the part of the rulers to maintain control or continue indefinitely to rule (a relational characteristic), and their ability to convince others in a 'democratic' situation of their superior eligibility to continue (an ideal characteristic). It is possibly because they are unable to do this all the time, and because in the process of convincing and the concessions that this implies, that the overall political situation changes and gives rise to alternative views on who should rule. Although there might be two of the several features which lead to the formation of different viewpoints on who should rule, at this stage we only know from our resistance model that those who resist <u>happen</u> to hold different world views.

In this respect we can use Mannheim's definition of utopian thinking as a descriptive vessel in much the same way as we have done with his definition of 'ideology. He explains that:

> "The concept of utopian thinking reflects the opposite discovery of political struggle, namely that certain oppressed groups are so strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of given conditions of society that they unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it."[33]

Clearly, as appeared to be the case earlier, we can once again apply Mannheim's definition to equate broadly with the position of those who saw themselves as radical resisters. The notions of oppression, alternative and opposing ideas and values, revolutionary purpose or goals, and of struggle are all present within Mannheim's definition. Indeed many of the features within our resistance model find either an implied or an exposed place in such a version of utopian thinking. But possibly what is most interesting about this definition is not so much its descriptive and apparent empirical validity, but its embodiment of some of the main features desired in any conceptual scheme concerned with resistance.

Like the concept of ideology, utopian thinking appears to be at one and the same time the reason for and the product of political struggle. In other words it often arises in a particular social content. From our model we can see that from the viewpoint of the resisting group the objects of resistive struggle as well as determining the methods of struggle as Fanon suggested, also seek to concretise the abstract content of the relationships forming the situation. That is to say conditions such as oppression or powerlessness are somehow extracted from the overall relationships which govern their existence and maintenance and are transformed

into apparently discrete primary and secondary goals - the acquisition or counter-construction of power (primary), the dismantling of oppression or its rendering into freedom, liberation, or even another form of oppression or tyranny (secondary). Why and how this is performed will concern us a little later, but here the recognition that it in fact does occur makes it possible to suggest that within the situation and indeed within any imaginative juxtaposition of Mannheim's definitions several types of relationships emerge, all connected in a positive or negative way to the possession or otherwise of power, the second and perhaps most complex of the three questions to be discussed before we can expand our conceptual framework.

Although glibly, resistance could therefore be seen as merely a political expression of a certain complex power relationship, it becomes clear from the forms listed below that this would not only be a grossly over simplified conclusion, but it would be one that would deny a more exacting appreciation of the form and role of power in the relationships and the precise nature of the dynamic aspect which characterises the relationships as ones of conflict as much as they are ones of power. To put this in a slightly different way, the problem before us appears to slip easily into a compound issue of classification, conceptual confusion, and

analytical shallowness if no attempt is made to separate the types of relationships most likely to exist in a resistance situation. Arising from our model and further strengthened by the insights offered by Mannheim, they can be set out as follows:

FIGURE 1 : RELATIONSHIPS IN A RESISTANCE SITUATION

Interior Situation			Exterior Situation
SOCIAL TYPE	Qualifying Relationships	Operating Relationships	Justifying Relationships
IDEOLOGY	1. Domination	3. Control-conformity	5. Legitimation
UTOPIA	2. Oppression	4. Change-transformation	5. Legitimation

In this Figure the qualifying relationship represents not only the major type of relationship that we suggest exists in a resistance situation, but, because of its social prominence as a feature of the situation, it in fact tends to qualify the nature of all other relationships to be found in a resistance situation. Thus the operating relationships we have isolated here are directly connected to their qualifying types in as much that they tend to express their instrumental form. The distinction, we believe, is a useful one as it helps also to connect what the actors themselves see as the social activity they immediately recognise as being 'true'

with a base or qualifying one which, the ideologists, at least, would designate as 'false'. Although a common and, (as will be shown shortly), an absolutely necessary relationship formed by both groups, the third type is related to the others in an exterior way. That is, it does not necessarily form part of the interior resistance situation, or indeed part of the internal structure of resistance itself: it is a relationship sought, established and developed in order to justify or legitimate the actions of groups in conflict, engaged in struggle.

The way in which all these relationships are related can be illustrated diagramatically as follows:

FIGURE 2 : HOW RELATIONSHIPS ARE RELATED IN A RESISTANCE SITUATION



(The continuous lines in this diagram signify harmonious and complementary connections; whereas the broken ones represent the areas and direction of conflict and struggle).

From this Second Figure it becomes quickly evident that the legitimation relationships formed are not only partially exterior to the internal resistance situation but that each is related to and qualified by the two groups in conflict. It is also possible to discern the respective social location of each in structurally prefigured conceptions of social reality, or, more simply, competing versions of the wider social order - that which exists according to the ideologists and that which should exist according to the utopians. Such a social picture where legitimation groups reside, and hence where the forms of the legitimation relationship is to be found, can be portrayed as follows:

FIGURE 3 : LOCATION OF LEGITIMATION GROUPS



The final consideration that needs to be introduced here before we discuss in more detail the types of relationships, concerns the power element in each. As assumed in the Figures above and articulated in the preceeding discussion, there exists the central idea of the role of power in all resistance situations. It is therefore important at this stage to clarify as precisely as possible the power element in the types of relationship already identified. This needs to be done in two ways. Firstly, it is necessary to entertain the view that within any resistance situation, as our earlier working definition of the concept shows, those whom we might call the ideologists already possess authority and power which in turn is sanctioned by dominant, legitimation groups in the institutional order. Once this is shown to be the case, then it can be further suggested that all the relationships formed by the ideologists contain a positive power component that indicates the group's support from others and own standing in the institutional order. That is to say, both the group's qualifying and operating relationships are in an elementary sense power relationships: they are constructed with the knowledge and on the basis that the ideologists have legitimate authority to act in a way that reflects the interests of those they represent.

Secondly and conversely, the utopians, on the other hand, start out with no power, or, more accurately, with no power that is recognised by the other group in either the qualifying or operating relationship. So within the interior resistance

situation their submission or powerlessness to begin with at least is almost total. Their intention to change their own power status and thus the overall power status of the relationships remains abstract, for the social territory that the relationships map is not only defined and occupied but also defended by those who mapped it out - the ideologists. In order to alter the power status of the relationships, power then needs to be constructed outside the interior situation, brought back inside, and used in resistance to effect the kind of changes desired.

This too can be drawn diagramatically as follows:

FIGURE 4 : THE POWER ELEMENT IN RELATIONSHIPS IN A RESISTANCE SITUATION

Relationships		Power
IDEOLOGY	Domination	+
	Control-Conformity	+
	Legitimation	+/-
UTOPIA	Oppression	-
	Change-Transformation	-
	Legitimation	-/+

Apart from the two qualifying relationships (1 and 2 in Figure 3) which, given all that has been said, are really self-explanatory, the other three main relationships in a resistance situation require some further elucidation. The third, control-conformity, for instance, whilst referring to the ideologists' relational position in struggle is nevertheless a feature of most ideologists' actions and hence the relationships established with others. Because the ideologists or the IRR Council majority attempted, as we shall see in subsequent chapters to control through emphasising conformity, a historical tradition of acceptable practice, values, and ideals which became institutionalised over two decades, it was able to establish and maintain a relationship with other groups in and outside IRR which had the effect of adding to its power. In contrast and in a sense the obverse side of the relationship, the change-transformation relationship constructed by the utopians in itself did not bring additional power; rather within IRR and its social constituencies which were organised to protect instead of changing the prevailing power positions or status quo it if anything made it more difficult to acquire and construct power. In fact the crucial relationship which actually alters the contending groups relation to power in a resistance situation appears to be the quality and kind of legitimation it inspires and organises from others for its cause. In other words the legitimation relationship entered into both within and outside the physical or organisational perimeters of the actual (struggle)

situation can, we believe, determine the outcome. Unlike the other four it is a variable relationship representing the external anchorage and in a way definition of all that transpires internally. It is that part of complete actions which imparts not just authority but in a Weberian sense exposes the social sources and support for that authority. The refractive or projectional process which to a large extent it depends upon and to which we shall return in its empirical setting in Chapter 6 and, more theoretically in Chapters 9 and 10, is thus governed by the contending group's ability to articulate and politically use these sources in resistive struggle. Depending upon the group's effectiveness in accomplishing this, its organisational efficiency, it can either lead to the acquisition or forfeiture of power. For those who form the dominant contingent in and control an organisation's life the relationship in struggle can no longer be assumed: it needs to be seen to be believed in, to be reflected in supportive action in order to be countered. (That the ideologists were unable to do this persuasively in the last analysis, when it mattered, contributed along with other factors to their defeat). And for those organising resistance, the relationship needs to be forged firstly so that their actions are sanctioned and approved by others, and even more important than this, so that a social possibility can be engineered or made to exist for the construction of power; an authority which in its use and deployment reflects a qualitatively different base from that which the ideologists possess.

If then the primary objective of all resistance is to gain power for its own sake and the secondary, is to perform or act prescriptively, and conversely the chief aim of the ideologists' opposition is to hold on to power, then power as it appears to manifest itself in the resistance situation needs to be re-examined more closely. For it is now obvious in this discussion that power as a concept is being used in several (complementary) ways.

To return briefly to Weber's problematic definition of power which, once inverted, helped to throw some light on resistance, he assumed not only that power relations involve conflict but that power itself was a product of a relationship defined in terms of 'the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests'.[34] Despite the rather peculiar ontological status he gives to power as a 'probability', the base idea that power can be the product of a certain kind of relationship is a useful one. It is for instance one which is reflected in part in all the above relationships, although it is in the legitimation relationship that it begins to take on a somewhat different presentation. For here the idea that power is a social commodity that can be constructed or manufactured deliberately under conditions specified by the actors involved in resistance provides us indeed with a determinable dynamic quality

which Weber's formulation lacks. It moves away from any one or two dimensional view of power and suggests that actual observable conflict in itself is not a necessary requirement for acknowledging the possession or otherwise of power. The trouble here, as Lukes remarks, is that 'the pluralists (and others) suppose that because power, as they conceptualise it, only shows up in cases of actual conflict, it follows that actual conflict is necessary to power. But this is to ignore the crucial point that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place.'[35] It is also to ignore the more orthodox conflict theorists' view of power, that it is a scarce resource; something which is fixed in amount, possessed largely by a dominant group, and highly desired by all. Such a conception, which is also present in the utopians' definition of social reality, rests on the belief that if one group has power, then another (themselves) has either less or none at all. This fixed resource or what amounts to a zero-sum notion of power at first sight appears to be conceptually unpromising. Further, it is difficult to see how both views on power, to be found expressed in the IRR if not most resistance situations, can be anything but complementary. To make them so requires in fact a fresh look at the implied role of 'interests' in Mannheim's two definitions and in the more explicit evaluation of interests provided by Marx. For if both the ideologists and utopians are almost obsessively interest-bound, then it is conceivable that these interests in themselves determine

at any given point of time the conception of power that actors individually and collectively hold. To illustrate this point further it can be hypothesised that the kind of race relations research and conceptual framework the Council majority wished to institutionalise required the maintenance and control of power (resource); but, in order to maintain that power against resistance, it had to generate and construct even more (relation); that is it had to appeal to those who had traditionally supported its work and form openly a legitimation relationship. Conversely, the utopians' interests, or at least the interests they declared themselves to represent, necessitated the stripping away and eventual appropriation of power held by the ideologists (resource); but, as they had no power in the first place, the protection of interests dictated that they needed to construct some, to build up a different power base, (relation), in order to place themselves in a position to expropriate effectively the power they desired. In other words not only are the two conceptions of power compatible within a resistance situation but they actually denote the two forms of power that appear to be present in resistive encounters or struggles. The first which is synonomous with the main aim or goal of resistance, the acquisition of what Parsons would see as a property of the system or organisation, could in effect be termed property-power; whereas the second form which more directly relates to what we have termed in our model as organisational means could be labelled instrument-power. In other words, to recall the essentially

methodological point made above, property-power here can be seen to refer to the dedicated pursuit of an absolute value, whereas instrument-power only possesses utility value. It is thus necessary to construct the latter in order to maintain or acquire the former.

As already indicated, however, the effectiveness of power-maintenance or power-acquisition in a resistance situation is dependent upon a number of variable factors. In a broader discussion on the theory and types of social conflict situations - and the resistance situation is in essence a particular type of conflict situation - Rex remarks:

> "The power situation as between the ruling and subject classes may change as a result of changes in a number of variable factors which increase the possibility of successful resistance or actual revolution by the subject class. Amongst these variable factors are leadership, the strength of the members, their capacity for organisation, their possession of the means of violence, their numbers and their role in the social system proposed by the ruling class."[37]

This third problem area which we have to take into account relates not so much to the occurrence of resistance in the first place or to even wholly how it can be identified. Once the variables have been ascertained, they chiefly help to show how resistance tends to be politically organised; its overall effectiveness, which, of course, is not a prerequisite for its

existence either as a phenomenon or as a character of specific relations or actions; and how the organisational means chosen, including the establishment of alternative rules and norms for political procedure and protocol, provide it with a distinctive character. The implications most of Rex's suggested variables possess for any proposed theory of resistance will hopefully become evident in Chapters 7 and 8.

Before listing our major working hypotheses as a summary of this Chapter's discussion, we need finally to add that our prime methodological task in this study is to delve below what often appears to be the case on the surface - to distinguish as far as possible between rationalisations on the one hand and grounded explanations on the other. Wherever we find them, then, rationalisations will be interpreted more as the outward symbols of conflict; that is as actors' expressions which impart a valuable insight to the ideological or utopian bases of their thought and subsequent actions. By doing this it might become possible not only to dymystify but also to relate actions to a framework of reference which seemed at all times to inform, shape, and even determine the type of actions performed. Besides making a rather obvious though problematic methodological point, such a procedure is more likely to unearth the activating component in action which mostly appeared to be integrally related to the maintenance or acquisition of power.

How this worked itself out in terms of actors definitions and perceptions of what was happening can to some extent be gleaned from Chapter 9.

But given the central prominence of power as both a goal of action and the means through which other secondary goals could be attained, and given all that has been discussed and suggested in this Chapter, the following by way of a summary can now be hypothesised.

That:

1. A dominant ideological group appears to maintain power and control in order to protect certain stated and assumed interests.
2. The protection of these interests ultimately requires the oppression and exploitation of others.
3. These protected interests are seen by others to maintain their relative powerlessness and undermine their expectations of controlling their own destinies.
4. Under specific conditions the subjective and objective realisation of this (consciousness) produces:
   (a) the formation of utopian and alternative values, beliefs, and views of the world.
   (b) the motivation to organise politically as a group espousing diametrically different conceptions and definitions of social reality.
   (c) the identification with others in similar situations and with similar experiences.

(d) the understanding that not to act is to acquiesce or condone the prevailing state or system of social organisation.

5. Utopian legitimation for this new view of existing things and of a future society is sought through a process of social projection.

6. Conflict emerges fully as the ideologists also attempt to seek further legitimation for their continued supremacy.

7. Interests, goals of a secondary type, become clearly articulated as each group attempts to construct some or more instrument power for the purposes of protecting or acquiring some or more property power.

8. Struggle ensues: the utopians resist, the ideologists oppose.

Within the context of what happened at the Institute, it is to an examination of the above and the attendant problems associated with each hypothesis that we now turn. The next two Chapters will thus attempt to describe the ideologists' position and perceptions of reality. In particular the following questions will be raised: What kind of social group were the ideologists? What were the stated and assumed interests they were seeking to protect? What were the social sources of their authority and power? How did they protect their interests?

From these and other questions, we shall then in Chapters 5 and 6 turn to and concentrate more on the utopians' experience. Here we will need to seek answers to at least the following questions: What in the context of the Institute were the specific conditions

which made it possible for a utopian consciousness to develop? How was consciousness developed? How and in what form were utopian conceptions of reality projected? Then in Chapters 7 and 8 we shall, as well as continuing to explore further questions relating to the two groups in conflict, trace historically and sociologically the protracted struggle that occurred before, in Chapters 9 and 10, returning to some of the conceptual issues and theoretical problems discussed here. The specific task of Chapter 9 will be to offer an explanation of really what did happen at the Institute, whereas Chapter 10 by way of a conclusion will attempt to show what this study has contributed to the formulation and understanding of a dialectical theory of resistance.

CHAPTER TWO

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See John Rex and Robert Moore, Race, Community and Conflict: A Study of Sparkbrook, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, Chapter 1.

2. These were views put to the Author by many of the old Council Members, particularly by Lord Walston, Lord Seebohm and Jim Rose.

3. Ibid.

4. Philip Mason, 'The Revolt Against Western Values', Daedalus, No. 2, Spring 1967, pp.328-352.

5. Leslie J. Macfarlane, Political Disobedience, Macmillan and Company, London, 1971, pp.11-13.

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7. Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Penguin Books, London, 1974, p.198.

8. Ibid, p.255.

9. Sekou Touré, 'The Political Leaders as the representatives of a Culture', Address to the Second Congress of Black Writers and Artists, Rome, 1959, quoted in Fanon, op cit, p.166. But for an expansion of his thesis on revolutionary culture see 'A Dialectical Approach to Culture' in Woodie King and Earl Anthony (ed), Black Poets and Prophets: The Theory, Practice, and Esthetics of Pan-Africanist Revolution, Mentor Books, New York, 1972, pp.48-75.

10. The literature here is vast: it ranges in scope and depth from Kwame Nkrumah's 1947 paper, 'Towards Colonial Freedom', Heinemann Educational Books, London, 1962; the scholarship of A.A. Mazrui and R.I. Rotberg, Protest and Power in Black Africa, Oxford University Press, New York, 1970; to Ronald Segal's The Race War: A World Wide Conflict of Races, Pelican Books, London, 1967. In Chapter 2 of Segal's book, 'The Black World of Africa', several of the earlier African resistance struggles are documented.

11. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, Freedom Press, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London, pp.115-120.

12. John Rex, Key Problems of Sociological Theory, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963, pp.82-83.

13. Max Weber, op cit, p.116.

14. Ibid, p.117.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid, p.115, note 38; the Author's additions in parenthesis.

17. Fanon, op cit, p.166.

18. Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1976.

19. Karl Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in The Essential Left, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1971.

20. Fanon, op cit.

21. Max Weber, op cit, p.152; "Power (Macht) is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests."

22. See Nicholas J. Spykman, (ed) The Social Theory of Georg Simmel, Atherton Press, New York, 1966, pp.112-127. Here Simmel states:

> "Opposition between elements within an association is not merely a negative factor. It is often the only means of maintaining associations which would otherwise be unendurable. The power and the right to oppose tyranny, egotism, and lack of tact make it possible to protect the integrity of the individuality on the one hand, while maintaining on the other hand interrelations which would otherwise have to be dissolved. Opposition is then not only a means for the preservation of the relationship, but is also one of the concrete functions of which the relationship actually consists..." (Ibid. pp.113-114).

23. Quoted in David Bell, Resistance and Revolution, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1973, p.1. (Note the quotation has not been accredited to any particular author and, as yet, I have not been able to trace the source).

24. See G. Franklin Edwards (ed), E. Franklin Frazier on Race Relations, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968, p.279.

25. Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America, Pelican Books, London, 1969, p.14.

26. Bobby Seale, Seize the Time: The Story of the Black Panther Party, Hutchinson and Co., London, 1970, pp.86-96.

27. David Apter, The Politics of Modernisation, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1965.

28. Immanui Amiri Baraka (LeRoi Jones), 'A Black Value System', in Woodie King and Earl Anthony, op cit, pp.137-147.

29. Benjamin W. Heineman Jnr, The Politics of the Powerless: A Study of the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination, OUP, London, 1972, p.181.

30. Ibid: For further detail on Johnny James Caribbean Workers Movement and Obi Egbuma's Universal Coloured Peoples Association.

31. John Rex, 1961, op cit, See in particular his discussion of Mannheim's sociology, pp.87-88 and 160-166.

32. Karl Mannheim, op cit, p.36.

33. Ibid.

34. See S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View, Macmillan and Co., London, 1974. For some idea of the extent of the so-called power debate and how different conceptions of 'power' have been formulated and employed see: T. Parsons, On the Concept of Political Power and Parsons (ed), Sociological Theory and Modern Society, The Free Press, New York, 1967; R.A. Dahl, 'The Concept of Power', Behavioural Science, Vol.2, 1957; Amos Hawley's paper, 'Community Power and Urban Renewal Success', American Journal of Sociology, Vol.68, January, 1963, pp.422-423 for an account of power as an attribute of social systems; A. Etzioni, The Active Society, The Free Press,

New York, 1968, pp.314-323 for a discussion of power as a societal force; P.M. Blau's exchange theory of power in Exchange and Power in Social Life, John Wiley, New York, 1967; for a view of power in terms of 'dependence' see R.M. Emerson's well known essay, Power Dependence Relations', American Sociological Review', Vol.27, February, 1962, pp.31-41; on the question of legitimation and effectiveness see Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, Doubleday and Co., New York, 1960, pp.64-79; and for a more recent defence of the concept see R. Martin 'The Concept of Power: A Critical Defence', British Journal of Sociology, Vol.22, No.3, September, 1971. However, it seems to the Author that in both Marx's materialist conception of history and hence his assumed theory of social class - See Dahrendorf Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1969, on this, a notion of power asserts itself which combined the instrumental and property aspects referred to here. (See in particular Karl Marx's preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and The Manifesto of the Communist Party, op cit.)

36. See A. Giddens, 'Power in the Recent Writings of Talcott Parsons', Sociology, Vol.2, 1968, reprinted in Tunstall's Sociological Perspectives.

37. John Rex, op cit, p.129-130.

CHAPTER THREE

THE IDEOLOGISTS (1): AUTHORITY, BELIEFS AND INTERESTS

From the inception of the embryonic Institute in 1952 to its radical reconstruction in 1972, it was clear that the Council or governing body addressed itself to three main features or objects of organisation. The first, as previously noted, was to create a reputable body which government, industry, scholars and others could rely upon for the objective and accurate production of facts, findings, and general information on matters concerned with race. Besides the accumulation of funds, the establishment of research projects, and the dissemination of 'facts' and findings, this also required what the founder and others saw as 'the building up of influence and authority':

> "In this new field of race relations research and study it was essential that we were seen by others, particularly government and industry, as an authoritative group; one which our constituent bodies immediately recognised as being composed of responsible and prominent people in society."[1]

> "Although it might be questioned today, it was absolutely essential to attract 'top people' to serve on and support the Institute's Council .... Our social and academic credibility and indeed our general ability to act positively and effectively was largely determined by this factor, a very basic recruitment principle which we adhered to throughout."[2]

> "There was little doubt that our support as well-known bankers, and industrialists, and as well-known public figures provided the Institute with a headstart over most other bodies: even if it did not in itself provide the Institute with a certain influence it certainly meant that people had to take some notice of what we said and did."[3]

Related assumptively, the second object of organisation concerned the whole question of values, beliefs, and interests. As well as desiring to <u>improve</u> race relations, there was also evident in the Council's vision of things a consensus on why race relations should be improved. In addition to Hodson's early warning about the threat of the 'Communist menace' and the implications this possessed for Western civilisation, there also existed general agreement on the following:

> "Neither the domestic nor the international economy could prosper if race prejudice or discrimination were allowed to influence economic decisions that related to promotion or efficiency..."[4]

> "It was highly desirable to integrate the newly arrived immigrants into the ways of British life before the problem grew out of control ... You could say that one of the main aims of <u>Colour and Citizenship</u> was to find out how this could be accomplished through government policy and action ..."[5]

> "It was certainly in the interests of the Western world that international race relations should be improved; this was something that Ford had always recognised. But it was also in the interests of the developing countries themselves that racial tension and hostility should be removed:
>
> > '(For) most informed people are today aware of the extent to which racial animosity influences policy in the United Nations. They would also agree that any racial incident in the U.S. or

> U.K. receives the full glare of publicity, stirs up resentment abroad and seriously affects the international influence of both countries ... This can be neither an acceptable thing for the U.S., U.K., nor for those countries firmly linked to the Western economy.' "[6]

And, thirdly, there was some measure of agreement about how the values, beliefs, and interests subsumed in the above statements could be protected on both the international and domestic fronts. Although they surfaced in terms of how race research and work could be best organised, they nevertheless provided the social basis and rationale for control, and for IRR's role in the social operation known as the international and national organisation of race relations research and work:

> "Our role in the international arena, we believed, was to foster the study of the subject and where ever possible in conjunction with Ford and other institutions beginning to take an interest in the subject to co-ordinate the development of a liberal approach to what after all was a politically highly charged and emotive area of study ..."[7]

> "As the most senior body in the (national) field, and as the parent body of most of the important race agencies in Britain, we considered that we had a responsibility to oversee developments and co-ordinate national research and, possibly, policy effort ... We possessed the facts, information, and it would not be too boastful to suggest, the academic and other resources needed to bring about and support a desirable approach towards race relations study and policy."[8]

> "By the mid-sixties we were the established, leading authority in the field. It was therefore natural for others wishing to enter the field to turn to us for advise and help, and for us to see that they not only got the right kind of help and advice but also that, without duplicating other efforts elsewhere, they were able to carry through their proposed programmes of action. This, of course, was one reason why our Council looked like a directory of all those national figures involved in the field ..."[9]

How these three features were related, how intensely they were believed in and projected, and, further, how they were manifested in the course of the Institute's development form the descriptive task to be undertaken in this and the next chapter. Whilst such a task cannot be separated from analysis, the actual analytical contribution this chapter makes to our study is firstly to uncover and expose the underside of IRR's projected image as a socially responsible and 'reputable' body in order, secondly, to relate what we discover to the wider framework suggested in the previous chapter.[10] And, lastly, it is here that Mannheim's definition and insights will be partially reformulated and used in the first stage of a compound argument: namely that the Council or, as portrayed here, the ideologists, were so intensely interest bound and committed to the 'improvement' of race relations that not only did they attempt to control race research and work, but they also endeavoured to control and stabilise a perception of and orientation towards both the so-called 'race problem' and social reality.

Power and Authority

From the first group of statements above, it is clear that the designation, 'top people', is insufficient to indicate the precise nature of either the ideologists' social position in and relation to the social structure or the root sources of their authority. These it would appear were derived from three distinctive components of the ideologists' overall social experience. The first, or the structural component, related principally to the kind of social background, position or prestige, and social class to which the majority of Council members belonged; the second, or relational component, exposed the sort of 'topness' that characterised Council membership generally. In other words how Council members were related to specific powerful groups in the social structure provided an objective and hence measurable index of the kind of elite, and in the context of IRR, ruling group they formed. And, lastly, the ideational source, the kind of ideas and values they shared which in turn were related to the other two components, provided an emphasis which approximated more to Weber's notion of traditional authority than to either of his other two pure types of legitimate authority.[11]

In respect to the first source not only was the founder anxious to attract an impeccable figure to chair the embryonic Institute, one who could assure the standing of the body within

government, industry, and the Chatham House network, but he and others were concerned about the 'social credentials' of all members.

For instance, Lord Hailey was asked to chair the emerging Institute attached to Chatham House because:

> "(He was) an eminent figure with experience of race relations, of the type of research and study involved, and of public affairs. He was also, as (Hodson) knew, a first rate chairman and a practical administrator."[12].

Other members of the Board of Studies were in a sense selected in a similar way. Not only were most contacts and friends of the founder, but, like Hodson, they were either public figures of some standing in their own right or they were people who had distinguished themselves in one of several career areas sought. Thus:

> "My selection of members ... was, I suppose, largely guided by my own contacts. For instance, Richard Wilberforce (now Lord Wilberforce) was a personal friend, a distinguished young lawyer, and a bearer of a name famous in connection with much earlier 'race relations'. Raymond Firth, the anthropologist, had served with me on the Colonial Social Science Research Council, whose Chairman for a long time had been Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders. Sir Kenneth Grubb, who brought early missionary experience and a great knowledge of Latin America, had been a colleague in the Ministry of Information. (Sir) Ronald Prain of Rhodesia Selection Trust was the businessman who had shown the greatest interest in the whole subject during my financial negotiations. Nowadays there would have been a far wider range of people known to be concerned with aspects of race relations, in foundations, universities, research institutions and so on. It has to be remembered that in the early 1950s the whole scene was new, (and all that one had to go on was a declared interest in colonial and Commonwealth matters and, preferably, some experience of the colonial situation.)"[13]

From the 1950s onwards complex vetting procedures were adopted which relied heavily on personal introductions, informal acquaintanceships, meetings usually at one of three leading gentleman's clubs in London, and 'biographical research', the consultation of current and past editions of Who's Who.[14] It was thus neither a coincidence nor, as one member put it, an'historical accident' that just under 90% of Board members between 1952-58 and that just over 80% of all Council members between 1958-72 possessed entries in one edition or other edition of Who's Who.[15] The possession of an entry was indeed a qualification of social suitability for election:

> "For those people we did not personally know - and this, I should say was a small number - we could gain a little more background information from Who's Who, other well known reference books, and, if need be, the newspaper library facilities our journalist members could draw upon ..."[16]

To simply view an entry however as a mere qualification for membership would be to deny the structural relevance of the biographical information and personal attributes sought. For it was on the level of what this information meant personally and symbolised collectively to those inside and outside IRR that mattered. In the first place, the knowledge that over 80% of the Council Who's Who-listed sample had attended distinguished public schools, 14%, including two of its Chairmen, having gone to Eton, and 5% each to Winchester, Charterhouse, Malborough, Rugby, and Sedbergh, suggested that the Council itself saw a public school education as evidence of high status, or, in the

words of the director, that such a background provided 'a certain knowledge that most had been educated in the tradition of the establishment'.[17] That over 75% of all Board and Council members had 'gone up' to Oxbridge was, on the one hand, something to be expected, given the kind of public schools attended and the formal and informal relations that existed between, in particular, the Clarendon Schools and many Oxbridge Colleges.[18] But, on the other, such a career base and indeed channel was something that was positively viewed, together with other social-career features, not only as an index of social position and possible influence but, as can be gleaned from the social circumstances surrounding Philip Mason's appointment as director, also as a confirmation of suitability.

For according to Hodson:

> "The choice of Philip Mason as director was a happy stroke of fate. We had been contemporaries at Balliol and had met in India: I knew of his successful career in the ICS and greatly admired his two novels set in India, especially Call the Next Witness, which showed an extraordinary understanding of the minds and lives of people utterly different in race, culture, and background. A mutual friend (who was it?) told me that, having retired from the ICS at independence, Philip was looking for something to do in addition to writing and publishing, and arranged a meeting at the Athenaeum. He was persuaded to take on the race relations job, and neither I nor anyone else ever had any other candidate."[19]

In the case of the Board of Studies and certainly in the case of the early Councils, the presence of substantial colonial ties or connections in the form of either having worked, like Mason, been brought up, or, through other kin, associated with

the colonies and the Commonwealth pointed to the kind of personal motivation desired as well as to the type of experience required to convince others that IRR, in one sense, was suitably equipped to research the 'problems of the end of Empire'. Subjectively the colonial experience afforded by all Board members and just over half of all Council members confirmed the efficacy of a recruitment principle designed to achieve as quickly as possible an authoritive reputation. It had a multiple effect of reflecting the relationship between the role of Britain's public schools at the turn of the century and the Empire and hence the individual ideologist's perception of his own place within the colonial movement; the effect, as will be shown later, of bonding members to a set of values and beliefs internalised at public school; and, through the operation of a selection procedure largely based on the personal contacts of one person, it had the effect of securing the initial support of top <u>colonial</u> people, or, people with at least specific colonial interests.[20]

In short, nearly all Board members and almost 75% of all Council members' social careers approximated to the following pattern: one began as the son of professional, upper middle-class parents who had pursued careers during the latter decades of the 19th century and first decades of the 20th century in the colonial services, industry, academia, government and other professions. From an infancy of probable privilege, childhood

was spent at a distinguished public or Clarendon school; and adolescence and early adulthood was spent, according to Mason, in the stimulating environment of Oxbridge where there appeared to be no perceptible difference between the values and traditions remembered and respected at public school, and 'those enshrined in the British way of life'. This was followed by at least three to five years in some branch or other of colonial or public service before embarking upon a second career, often in the same fields and professions that their father had entered. If not immediately, certainly within a decade one had reached a position within one's chosen career which was considered by others to be influential and by the Council to be an important relational source of authority.[21]

But this was not all. For although the quality which occupational success might have given to the kind of 'topness' obtained and the apparent social position each member might have occupied in the social structure, it did not wholly symbolise the structural source of the ideologists' authority. Rather this was complimented and further defined by three other attributes. The first was partly an achieved symbol of status or position in as much as it referred to the inevitable progression through time along a social route embarked upon at public school, via Oxbridge, out to India or into the City or Whitehall, before finishing up at the head of a corporation, government, or university department, or Fleet Street newspaper: it embodied a traditional respect for 'age'. Simply, the ideologists whose

average age on all Councils from 1958-72 exceeded 55 could always be relied upon to bring their particular brand of 'accumulative experience and wisdom to solving one of the major problems facing the (Western) world today.'[22] Such a notion of seniority or social age which at all times correlated positively with physical age helped in fact to define IRR's structural source of authority both to itself and others.

Or to put it in the words of IRR's director:

> "Although we were criticised severely for being too old, what our internal critics did not seem to understand was that influential people in our society are usually older people; they are people who have won their spurs and who have already made important contributions in one or several fields to social progress and reform ... As we as an Institute wished to make our own contribution in race relations, it seemed obvious to us that we should try and attract the kind of people who could help us do this ... people who could add to rather than distract from the limited authority and influence we were, by the early sixties, beginning to exercise."[23]

The second attribute amounted to a public recognition of either career success or the observable contributions members had made to societal progress and reform. As well as providing a symbol of authority generally, such recognition in the form of 'public honours' added a touch of social distinction and socially purchased prestige to all the various Boards and Councils from

1952 onwards. An analysis of the 1969/70 Council, for instance, revealed that just over a third of the Council were Peers or Knights, and nearly as many were OBE's or MBE's. Whilst some members like Lord Walston, Sir Kenneth Grubb, Sir Jeremy Raisman, Sir Ronald Prain, Sir Harry Oppenheimer, Sir Robert Birley, Lord Boyle, and Lord Seebohn had been decorated more than five times during their careers, nearly all had received at least two acknowledged distinctions. Indeed the knowledge that most members had achieved a high social position and had been duly honoured by those groups in society who act as arbiters of social worth brought a certain compliance and respect from those whom IRR dealt with and more importantly from those whom it employed.[24]

According to the director's secretary and personal assistant from the early 1950s onwards:

> "For many years we were impressed by the high standing of our Council members; people of the calibre of Philip Mason, Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders, Sir Ronald Prain and others were public figures we all respected for their eagerness to improve race relations. Unlike a group of maybe well meaning people, they, because of whom they were, were able to get things done and give us the confidence that we were not working blindly in the hope we could do some good. The people they knew outside the Institute assured us that our work was worthwhile ..."[25]

Indeed it was this latter point of external connection that provided the third attribute or indicator of high social position. That 34 Council members, representing 79% of the Who's Who listed and 63% of all Council members respectively belonged to prestigious gentleman's clubs suggested firstly that this formed a normal characteristic of the ideologists' lifestyle, and secondly that

it was so much part of an upper middle-class pattern of associational life that it was assumed that club membership itself engendered both individual and group authority.[26] Based on the notion that other 'top people' also frequented the leather armchair clubs, that associating and interacting with them bolstered, consolidated, and endorsed this authority, it was neither surprising that the first funds were raised at a dinner party at Brooks, nor that unofficial IRR meetings right up to the Reform Club meetings in 1971/72 were held in such venues. Such arrangements which few if anybody questioned were simply normal expressions of the kind of lifestyle favoured, the kind of authority base the ideologists possessed, and, the kind of connections they could point to and ultimately use.

The actual relational source of IRR authority stemmed, however, from more specific and consciously worked out social and organisational criteria than club membership which by and large was taken for granted. With an elitist conception of its role firmly implanted in the early 1950s and reaffirmed in the mid-sixties when all members agreed that IRR should remain a group of 'top people addressing other top people in society',[27] they included firstly the realisation that:

> "Our society in the 1950s and most definitely during the early part of the 1960s was organised and furthermore worked in a highly distinctive way ... To get ahead or for us as an Institute to succeed in what we originally set out to do it was important to take note of this, and as far as possible to reflect it in our organisation and approach to the task at hand ..."[28]

And, secondly, that:

> "In order to gain the authority and respect needed to influence action decisively, it was clear right from the beginning that not only did we need the support of men of influence but also the support of those who had reached the top of professions that were useful to our work ... (those in) industry, government, journalism, academic life, and much later, race relations ..."[29]

Apart from the obvious financial advantages the support of industry showered upon IRR, the network of contacts corporate commercial members could identify appeared to be more significant. Through the numerous company directorships held by members the network extended beyond the City of London and the domestic economy to the centres of industrial and commercial activity in most of the former African colonial territories, particularly in South Africa and Rhodesia, the United States, the Carribbean, Latin and South America, South East Asia, and Australasia.[30] It provided not only the resources for lavish hospitality referred to by Mason when IRR researchers travelled abroad,[31] the consideration of the establishment of 'intelligence committees' in Africa or elsewhere, the resources for setting up research programmes such as the Tropical Africa Project[32] and clientele bodies like the African Private Enterprise Group,[33] but more basically it offered an approved avenue for social support and appreciation of IRR activities. In exchange for help, advice, pamphlets and so forth on how race relations could be improved in industry, (or how profits could be safeguarded and maximised),

it further offered a social basis for the development of the influence IRR desired. Or as both Lord Walston and Lord Seebohn put it: 'the extent and value of industrial and commercial support was something that could not be easily dismissed: without it the Institute would have been doomed, with it the Institute could survive as a body which commanded the respect of most sectors of society, and the support of influential groups (including foundations) abroad.'[34]

The Rockerfeller Foundation, for instance, was so impressed by the number and international reputation of the industrial supporters that it did not hesitate to consider actively the early Institute's application for grant aid to launch its first major research project, in 1955, a study of Northern and Southern Rhodesia:[35] 'Dean Rusk (whom Mason knew well), not only knew personally some of (IRR) supporters but he welcomed the opportunity to declare his Foundation's approval for such an enterprise and to align its support along with that of some of (IRR's) bigger and internationally well-known industrial and commercial patrons.'[36] Likewise the Nuffield foundation, especially after the dinner party organised by its director-general and IRR Council member, Leslie Farrer-Brown, to raise approximately £20,000 per year 'development and operational capital' was also impressed by the number of international companies underwriting IRR's work.[37]

> "The fact that many were known to us and in most cases were friends of ours - that is I knew their chairmen personally or they were either Trustees or associated with the Trustees of Nuffield - greatly influenced our decision to finance the Survey of Race Relations ... And I suppose that I was then a Council member - in fact wore two hats - also helped to persuade the Trust that this (IRR and the Survey) was a worthy cause ..."[38]

Although no formal arrangement had been made whereby Nuffield would contribute from 1958-63 £10,000 per annum for operational and unspecified development work to match fixed industrial donations, there existed a covert agreement that, firstly, Nuffield would provide substantial funds if companies continued to support regularly (through seven year deeds of covenant) the Institute, and, secondly, that existing and new commercial supporters would either increase or pledge future support once they could see the possibility of large-scale foundation backing.[39] Made clear at the Nuffield/IRR dinner, at which the chairman of Shell-International, Imperial Chemical Industries, British American Tobacco, Barclays Bank, the Standard Bank of South Africa, and other international companies responded generously to the proposition that 'business would not flourish if there were inter-racial enmity', the point was quite simple: foundations needed to know for political rather than academic reasons that industrial patronage was assured in the long as well as the short term.[40] Without it no 'worthwhile' study of race relations in colonial or neo-colonial societies dominated if not controlled by international companies could be conducted; all the large foundations after all derived their existence and thus their

ability to finance projects from the surplus profits of mainly international enterprise.[41]

And, to take a final example in order to emphasise the point that it would have been difficult for IRR to have obtained both foundation support and the kind of authority this implied without industrial sponsorship, Ford's response appeared more than just illuminating: it actually summarised directly the relationship between industrial support and the dominant Western social structure; between, it would appear, foundations, industry or capitalism, and society.

According to the Institute's first director:

> "Joe Slater was quick to realise right from the outset of our negotiations with Ford back in 1960 the value of our industrial - or what we called, corporate - connections. It was clear that in no way were we attempting to undermine the traditional democratic constitutions on which western democracy was based; nor were we relagating the role of industry and others to the wings on the stage of international action. He understood without having to be told that industry like government occupied a central place in our thinking; and I must say he was very impressed by the number of international concerns, especially the Banks, Booker Brothers, who virtually controlled the economy of Guyana at that time, Oppenheimer's interests in Southern Africa, and others, whom we could call our friends ..."[42]

In other words the corporate subscribers - industry and research foundations - together were not only partially interlocked within the same network but through their support they were able to provide at least two crucial dimensions of this

particular source of authority. Firstly, they offered an avenue along which could pass approval and recognition in one direction and the projection of ideas, findings, advice and so on in the other; and, secondly, as well as symbolising a more general access route to a significantly powerful group in and across the various social structures which formed the Western, capitalist social order, they helped relationally to define IRR as a reputable and authoritative body, simply through the assumed relational ties or links they had with other powerful groups.

This could also be observed generally to operate in terms of the second relevant group IRR attempted to attract and incorporate onto its Council - the politicians. Here the linkage and functions were made that more obvious by the acknowledged roles of politicians and senior civil servants. Amongst other things, they were in business to represent or advise on the protection of interests.

Thus:

> "Although we often found it extremely difficult to get representatives from the Labour side - especially after James MacColl's tragic death - he also had been to Sedbergh - we knew from a practical and administrative experience that our ideas and interests could not be properly presented to all the areas and groups in government we needed to contact and sometimes influence without political support."[43]

Given that the dual function of the political and governmental group was basically the same as that of the industrial and other

occupational-status groups represented on Council, it followed that part of this source of authority arose from IRR's ability to open up contacts in the first place. Whereas corporate and industrial contacts originally came from the founder with 'the indispensable help' of the then chairman of the British South Africa Company, Dougal Malcomn', governmental contacts here and abroad were provided by nearly all Council members. As 95% of the Who's Who listed had spent some time during their careers in government employment at relatively senior levels in the Home Office, Foreign Office, Colonial and Commonwealth Office or other branches of the Civil and Colonial Service, they were all either able to furnish new contacts and access routes into the political and governmental network, or, like Mason, actually 'pop in' when necessary to renew or consolidate contact friendships.[44]

For instance:

> "One could come back from Africa, ask to see the Colonial Secretary, and tell him one's impressions. This was true both of Lennox-Boyd and Macleod. James Callaghan at that period was Shadow Colonial Secretary and equally accessible. The difference between the parties was one of speed and emphasis and they would all listen to ideas."[45]

Recognition of the value of such contacts and the ease with which they were casually cemented or turned into friendships was reflected not only in the impressive list of membership which included senior backbenchers and former government ministers from

both parties but also in their statements and addresses whilst in office. Here Sir Frank Soskice's statement to the House in 1965, the addresses given at IRR by the then Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, in 1966, and former Ministry of Education, Sir Edward Boyle, the following year, and further during the course of the House of Lords debate promoted by IRR's peers in 1969, the assumptions embedded in the relations that existed between the Mayfair Institute and Whitehall were quite clear.[46] As well as centralising the notions of social similarity, a commonness of purpose and policy, they also highlighted a belief that IRR really did reflect all acceptable public thinking on race and thus should be assumed to be a reliable, accredited body sponsored by those groups in society who mattered. It was to this assumption and hence to the reciprocation of acknowledgement so vital in the construction of authority that the Home Secretary in 1966 drew attention when he warned IRR members and invited distinguished guests at the Goldsmith's Hall, City of London, of the consequences of racism. Protecting society from such perils was of the greatest importance, and he found hope 'for the future in the enthusiasm of everyone present (that) evening, and the feeling in the country that was represented there.'[47]

This belief in IRR's apparent worth and collective representation of the public mood, thinking, and all that was legitimately acceptable to government vis-a-vis race research and policy could also be seen in Home Secretary Soskice's request to corporate supporter and IRR member, Sir (Lord) Jock Campbell.

In short, Soskice wished to ascertain informally IRR's views on the kind of national race and immigration policy that would best allay (in 1964/65) the growing public fear that Britain would be 'swamped by blacks'. A lunch time meeting was subsequently arranged at the Travellers Club and, according to Mason:

> "Jock Campbell scribbled down on the back of an envelope the gist of our talk and the ideas we had been discussing for some time in Jermyn Street. There were two main threads in our thinking. Firstly, there was the question of the public mood and demand for further immigration control. The problem here was that of how it could be achieved without looking prejudiced ... The second in the light of NCCI's (National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants) qualified success and our intention to improve race relations was the question of how we could achieve this at the same time as instituting more severe controls. The formula we came up with, and I think it was the right one, was that you call 'the integration stool'. The first leg symbolised immigration control through cutting down the number of vouchers issued; the second involved the passing of anti-discriminatory legislation (the 1965 Race Relations Act), and the third the expansion of NCCI as the major instrument for affecting integration. What was important was that the policy should be sold as one integrated package, placing more emphasis on its positive than negative aspects ...
> That same afternoon Jock conveyed our thoughts to the Home Secretary, and a few months later the 1965 White Paper appeared: it had provided a skeletal structure for the race and immigration policy we still have in 1976."[48]

Although this actual policy will be viewed in greater depth in the next chapter and within the context of the ideologists' form of control and domination, two points need to be made here. Firstly, based on the knowledge that Sir (Lord) Jock Campbell himself was an influential figure, anchored into several overlapping networks, the Home Secretary's request had the effect of

strengthening the relational contact between IRR and Government. The inclusion of particularly the IRR Industrial network's involvement and appraisal of ideas or policies which seemed to impinge upon that network's understanding and performance of its obligations to better race relations thus appeared to add a consultative aspect to political and governmental relations and in so doing conjoin two or more, if others were consulted, types of relational sources into a broader and stronger base for authority building and confirmation. And, secondly, the request assumed the existence of yet a further set of relations and hence authority possessed by IRR.

Broadly, this included what Mason termed 'academic credibility' and what Hodson saw in a more general way as 'the necessity to appoint senior academics and professional communicators, preferably eminent scholars and editorial journalists who had successfully combined both jobs during their careers' (himself).[49] As over 46% of Who's Who listed Council members had been or were academics and just over 60% had been or were engaged in professional journalism, mainly at the managerial or editorial level, this was almost assured. But besides the substantial presence of academic-communicators on the various Councils as professors or editors, which in itself guaranteed prestige and at least a symbol of influence, the relations established with both the academic and media world were as extensive as those in other areas. Academic connections, for instance, neither just stopped at Oxbridge nor were they merely confined to British universities.

Through the appointment of active professors known for their administrative and political skills as much as for their research expertise or work, they penetrated a certain sector of the academic community; one which cherished traditional academic values and a distinctive approach to race research and study.[50] As research academics they also knew colleagues in the various funding agencies, government departments interested in research, and other private and voluntary bodies concerned with educational and social progress. Although this was largely to be expected from any competent professor, the social impact to the outside world of a fairly large group of professors and others who saw themselves as academics on the Council, was of a kind which immediately aroused respect, and sometimes awe.

What however was not expected was the extent to which these connections encompassed marginal academic groups and in so doing overlapped with other networks. In this respect the annual universities conference organised on Professor Banton's suggestion by IRR in 1967, the Carr-Saunders Memorial Lecture, specific conference or meetings programmes, and other events only afforded a possible meeting point for contact.[51] Even Race, the Institute's quarterly academic journal, subscribed to by universities throughout the world and companies associated with IRR, was kept as far as possible a strictly academic journal, depending upon its prestigious academic editorial board and scholarly papers, reviews and articles for solvency. The actual convergence of the various networks came not so much on things seen as unimpeachably academic

but on the organisation of IRR's academic enterprise and its transmission of facts, ideas, arguments, and findings to the intelligent layman, government and industry. On this level the academic-communicator, (e.g. Mason), communicator-academic (e.g. Hodson as a Fellow of All Souls), or even the academic-industrialist (e.g. Runciman), came into their own. The combination of academic 'objectivity' with the more pragmatic imperative of seeing that new or reworked knowledge was effectively conveyed to those who mattered outside IRR required not only a close association between the groups concerned but also the expansion of IRR's monthly Newsletter, (Race Today), the ability provided by those with a journalistic flair to convert alledgedly scientific findings into readable prose, and the existence of a well-oiled and trodden access route to Fleet Street and other publishing centres.

That the latter existed and in the words of the editor-founder also performed the function of 'communicating Institute developments and progress, reporting back (to IRR) how developments were received in Britain and abroad by government and industry, and fostering a news approach that was inherently liberal and rational' cannot be denied.[52]

But more problematic and more difficult to ascertain was the relationship that existed between, firstly, the professional communicators and the professorial academics, and, secondly, the professorial academics and other groups. Here the clue was to

be found in the fact that some considerable interchangeability had existed in being an academic for some years, a journalist for others. Members who had such experience, which was coveted, intuitively realised that authoritative statements about race relations were made all that more authoritative if it could be demonstrated that the material they were based on was either directly provided or approved by academics. 'Objectivity', so to speak, was on loan to those, the professional communicators and other group members, responsible for the dissemination of information to clientele groups, discussing policy ideas and findings with government officials or industrial personnel, or the writing up of publicity sheets, items for the Newsletter, articles for the press, or interview material for radio and television. In this sense IRR academic members who up until 1969 were by and large removed from the doing of IRR research - this was left to those who John Rex termed the professional amateurs and gentlemen scholars - gave a particular gloss of academic credibility, rigour, and so-called objectivity to IRR activities and ipso facto the governing body itself.[53] Through their contacts with others in the wider academic community, they helped to make the progress of applications to funding agencies that much easier by advising how they should be prepared, submitted and defended. Whereas this made their presence needed instrumentally, their chief function in the view of other groups appeared to be to demonstrate that the research body was indeed engaged in carrying out 'objective' and hence reliable research.

The academic members were as indispensable to the success of the Institute as were the industrial members:

> "They, as a group, conferred upon the Institute a high academic status which was always immediately noted and appreciated where ever I went or to whomever I spoke during the course of carrying out my responsibilities as director Individuals, such as the first chairman of the Institute once it became independent (Professor Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders), brought additional qualities which only an academic of his international standing could possibly bring. They could be summed up in one phrase: without being seen or heard - he was a shy and rather aloof man - he and, perhaps, one or two others personified 'academic excellence' ..."[54]

Thus their presence and the aura of 'academic excellence and objectivity' they wafted helped to launch alledgedly research-based views, arguments, and conclusions through the services of the professional communicators as authoritative acts. And in the collective minds of other groups, they helped to create a base on which inter-group and organisational trust and faith could be built. Although some were very much part of the industrial and political groups and their overlapping networks, they all, as a collective and integral part of the governing body, made it possible for company chairmen, foundation presidents, Home Secretaries, and others automatically to assume that IRR's academic standing could (and should) never be fundamentally questioned. Their relationship with non-academic groups in and outside IRR was therefore based on the understanding that they not only knew what research in race relations was all about but that their former achievements - usually in other fields - had

already been acknowledged by other academics, foundations, and in many cases, government departments as singularly impressive.

Together with the other groups represented on the Council, the kind of authority they brought and continued to construct whilst serving as members possessed a source that referred more to the relations they had with others outside IRR than to any notion of personal charisma or legal sanction, or even social class background. Compared to the structural source of IRR's authority, this latter source sprang from an ability on the part of IRR to make full use of the social capital it had accumulated through the appointment of 'top people'. Its relationship to the former thus appeared to be one which called for the social-organisational use and deployment of static resources that already existed; it followed rather than preceded, actualised rather than symbolised, and connected positively rather than assumptively with that which bonds powerful groups together in society.

Values, Beliefs and Interests

Subsumed, almost enshrined, in the above and certainly in the second set of statements at the beginning of this chapter, there existed for instance yet another major source of IRR's authority; an assumption that all members either shared or, through contact and involvement, would come to realise and share

a number of values, beliefs and interests in common. As an ideational source of IRR's authority, these beliefs and interests can be grouped into three broadly construed social areas. Firstly, there were those which were socio-political in nature, sets of value-beliefs which showed a preference for one kind of social and political order. Complementing these, a second set, which was explicitly economic in nature, included not only a preference for one form of economic organisation over another but also a preference for the way in which capitalist production should be organised in Britain and abroad. And finally, although an intrinsic part of the other two, a third set addressed both a preferred moral order and a pre-eminently desired approach to the study and practice of race relations. Once placed and interpreted within the belief and value framework of IRR's external constituency groups, they together also helped to portray the ideologists' definition of social reality, their view on the role and 'problem' of race, and their primary motivation for working assiduously for the world-wide improvement of race relations.

Although the founder's address in 1950 had established the early political context in which race relations should be studied and subsequently improved, the actual refinement of both this context and its implication for Western society's ability to 'come out on top' was not to emerge until after the embryonic Institute had been installed at Chatham House. Then, the need to define a little less crudely what Hodson had seen as the battle between

'liberal democracy' and the 'communist menace' in order to attract commercial, industrial, and other forms of financial support became important.

On one level it was considered that national black minorities and majorities should all accept 'a national code, the ideals of Christianity and democracy, of freedom and tolerance'.[55] But on another, and indeed more illustrative level vis-a-vis the ideologists' political beliefs and values, all should recognise and accept that without the transfer of democratic institutions and the development of political allegiances based upon 'mutual interests' the political enemies of the West would not only succeed in undermining the capitalist powers, but would be in a position to exert influence and ultimately dominate the world that hitherto had been <u>protected</u> by the West.[56] What was required in these political circumstances was the understanding that Western

> "associations with colour and racism smear the positive aspects of Western ideals ... They are the product of the Enlightenment and lead, at best, to the theoretical equality of <u>laissez-faire</u> liberalism. Such equality is not enough. Neglect and exploitation have to be succeeded not by equality but by benevolent discrimination."[57]

Further, it was also necessary to realise that the liberal-democratic state was a highly complex and delicate organism, 'something whose construction is to be wondered at', whose governance should incorporate in Africa and elsewhere 'as much as possible of certain old-fashioned and not always mutually

compatible values, tolerance of others and freedom of speech, coupled with an ultimate right of self-determination.'[58] When such a view was set against the political backcloth of decolonisation and Britain's changing role in the 'winds of change' drama that unfolded in the late 1950s and early 1960s, it became even more clear that the values and beliefs which required protecting called, on the part of the ideologists, for a total reaffirmation of and absolute dedication to a notion of the political order culled from their own perceived role as top people, rulers and opinion leaders.

> "It was up to us - journalists, scholars, administrators, and international businessmen - to show how cherished democratic values and institutions could be safeguarded through improving radically domestic and international race relations ... Certainly we all believed in the positive contribution of liberal democracy to assure progress and racial equality. We wanted to see, particularly in the developing countries, the implementation of a political order that mirrored the democratic ideals of Western civilisation."[59]

The reasons for this were also clear:

> "We believed as a united body right up until the outbreak of the troubles in 1970/71 that a free, democratic state was in all ways better than any other form of government. It not only meant that we had a positive role to play in helping new countries to develop within a Western context, but it also meant, I suppose, that Britain and the West's political and economic interests could be best looked after if basic agreement existed on certain things ..."[60]

What these 'certain things' were became more often than not assumed and incorporated in glowing phrases about freedom, equality, democratic ideals, and to quote one leading industrialist

'realistic cost and opportunity structures'.[61]

They appeared to include a very basic understanding of the quietly approved hierarchical structure of society; a social and political order based on the centralisation of power in the hands of several elite groups, and hence the ability of these groups to reform, if necessary and if in their interests, the domestic or international order. They were based on an assumptive set of views which in essence embodied the ideologists' perception and definition of social reality. According to Mason, whose work and leadership in providing a rationale and so-called 'political-philosophical base' for IRR activities was central to the Institute's development, such a set of views embraced the following features:

> "The political and social order, as we appreciated it, contained much that was inherently good ... Unlike the communist order, it theoretically protected individual thought and action ... Because of this and other considerations it was something that should not be allowed to collapse, to be overthrown or replaced by an order based on a denial of freedom, opportunity, individual and thus social progress ... That our society and those within the West has always championed the most able to succeed and control the affairs of others is not entirely a bad thing ... (Perhaps what is is the institutionalisation of criteria for selection that is now possibly outmoded.)
> This view of the world might appear elitist but it is not by that fact necessarily incompatible with racial equality: it is based on what exists in real life and not in dreams and it is one which, defined in terms of individualism and freedom, makes it possible for blacks and whites to climb up the social ladder to influence and perhaps govern and determine the nature of the liberal-democratic order ..."[62]

If the political values and beliefs were often valuely couched and assumed, the interests with which they were associated were less obliquely drawn. On a general level they were voiced in terms of the maintenance of political control and influence in the former colonial territories. And, on the domestic front, they were specifically related to the continuing stability of the dominant political order. In Rose's early papers concerning the research objectives of the British Survey of Race Relations, for instance, he suggested (and it was agreed without debate) that the Survey should be conducted on two levels. First, indispensable basic knowledge on black immigrants, their cultures, customs, and 'the baggage they bring with them which may determine their attitude to the host society' should be gathered; and, second, its main thrust should consist of 'an examination of British society and its values, pressures and counter pressures in the character, traditions, and circumstances of the British in order to ascertain how political and public order, values and beliefs can be maintained without racial conflict'.[63] Whilst the general political interests mainly related to maintaining political stability and order, a political environment in which the ideologists had always survived, the more specific interests were articulated in terms of the protection of beliefs, values and institutions on which the preferred order had been built. Although this was often seen in terms of and sharpened by the existence of an alternative political order - the Communist menace - its actual impetus stemmed just as much from the desire to protect economic beliefs and interests as it did from the fear and challenge

presented by alleged Communist enchroachment and imperialism.

Indeed there existed no apparent distinction between the two sets of beliefs and interests. At all times it was assumed that a liberal-democratic state was synonomous with a capitalist state, that the latter could only exist within the confines of the former; and that political, social and other threats to liberal democracy were in turn threats to the economy and the beliefs, institutions and economic values, seen to govern its efficiency. As IRR's Council put it in a booklet arguing for limited industrial reform, the two were not only integrally related, but that one of the ideologists most important tasks was to ensure that blacks, as workers and citizens, were fully integrated into the dominant economic and social order.

For:

> "An integrated labour force, besides, is a prerequisite of an integrated society ... It therefore falls to industry in its affirmation of democratic institutions to find the vision that a changing society requires ... Racial tensions are far less damaging in a period of economic expansion and stability - but in a time of recession, political and social upheaval, which hits first those at the base of the economic structure, racial feeling becomes the catalyst, the explosive factor, the focus for resentment. Couple this ...with the continuing process of automation and consequent reduction in the numbers of jobs available and the situation becomes doubly dangerous.
> (Simply) efficiency demands the best use of manpower: discriminatory practices, on the economic level, are wasteful ... These factors together create a coloured underclass whose aspirations are blocked, whose potential is not fully realised, who, as producers and consumers, receive unequal rewards. This in the long term will create social unrest. In the short term it is at least uneconomic. Social mobility (or integration) is therefore the prerequisite of a harmonious and prosperous

> social order. It is in the interest of industry that one group should not be economically and socially immobilised."[64]

Given this apparent identification between the political and economic order, the realisation that one appears to determine the other, it was consequently believed by the ideologists that in addition to fostering racial integration there was also a need on the international front at least to identify political goals with economic interests. In other words the protection of the economic institutions and the values and beliefs they symbolised - competition, free enterprise, profit maximisation, individualism, and so on - became imperatively significant for the defence of the Western political order.

Expounded by IRR's governing body, this meant that:

> "The (ideal, post-colonial) Government of which we are thinking will need to develop the economy in every way it can and <u>will</u> seek to make use of foreign skill and capital so long as the national share in the profits and employment of the foreign companies are increasing. In the period just before independence, a foreign company which plays a big part in the economy may be of assistance by wise advice and by its recruiting policy. This has been the case in Northern Rhodesia (the Rhodesian companies controlled by Council member Sir Ronald Prain) and British Guiana (through Booker Brothers, directed by Sir Jock Campbell and Michael Caine), where industry has been sometimes ahead of the colonial government. But the supremacy of political considerations over industrial will mean that after independence, the company will have to adapt its policy to suit that of the government; its influence on the treatment of minorities will be much less than before because its first aim is to avoid expropriation or excessive taxation."[65]

Clearly, the view expressed about the relationship between the economic and social or political order was one that helped, firstly, to define more absolutely the nature of economic interests here and abroad and, secondly, to identify the basis of the kind of approach required to forestall possible expropriation and, as it was believed, racial warfare. In respect of the first issue, the economic interests resembled more a list of value imperatives than specific concerns. Although phrased in terms of what should be done once territories became independent or, indeed, how could black workers in Britain be harmoniously integrated into the total work force and economic structure, they were bounded by the prevailing view that the capitalist mode of production and organisation only needed to be slightly reformed rather than radically changed.[66]

International control which in turn meant the control of British capital invested abroad was in itself a political and economic interest. That it dovetailed with the interests of international companies was apparent; and in the view, shared by IRR's Council, of a representative of such a company who was to become IRR's last chairman before the takeover, it also reflected the depth and range of economic interests:

> "Booker Brothers and other large companies operating abroad had certain responsibilities both to their shareholders and the country in which they operated. First and above all else they had to make a profit, so that the company could reinvest and expand and

so that shareholders' confidence could be secured. As partners with government, secondly, we needed to make sure that both the scale of our business and the way in which it was organised did not undermine either the political or economic structure of the country: quite the opposite, we had to see as far as possible that it complemented it and, if necessary, help to stabilise it. Thirdly, we and in most cases the countries in which IRR corporate supporters operated were part of an international economic system; so we had a wider international responsibility to see that policies on wages, prices, and so on were not of a kind that would worsen international trading. Fourthly, we also had a responsibility to ensure that democratic principles as they appertain to business were fostered and viewed as superior to those offered by our real ideological competitors in the Third World: we had to demonstrate that not only could we continue to make a profit but that the way in which we did constituted a fairer system than Communism or international socialism. Fifthly, although this should have been mentioned earlier, we have a responsibility to our employees. Besides trying to see that they properly benefitted from the company's success in material terms, we hoped that with their material success they would help to champion the cause of private, humane enterprise in their own countries. All these responsibilities we had under colonialism and still have today; and all we have tried to fulfil to the best of our ability and means ...

At home, I think we all agreed that our role was a little different ... After the War many of our industries needed extra labour in order to survive. So not only did we have a responsibility to guarantee that survival and through it to stabilise the economic system we have in this country, but we also had the additional responsibility of seeing that with these new workers good industrial relations were maintained. We had to make sure that equal opportunities in industry existed for all; that industry realised that discrimination was incompatible with efficiency and what the economists call profit-maximisation; and further we had to get across a very basic reality - namely that our industrial or economic system not only formed the base of our political system but that it was in industry with its belief in private enterprise that many of our democratic ideals and values are realised."[67]

That agreement on political and economic beliefs and interests existed was perhaps less obvious than that which existed on what Mason termed the Institute's 'moral perspective'.[68] Here the base of the perspective or approach infiltrated and to a large extent shaped the peculiar construction the ideologists placed on their version of political, economic and ultimately, social reality. It crept into all that they said about the role of the Institute, the way they saw themselves as representatives of external constituencies, and the way they perceived the prevailing liberal-democratic order. It was interpreted within a much wider moral framework than that based upon the improvement of relations between people and groups widely different in culture, race or religion; it was one which evolved from several sets of beliefs which interlocked the individual with the social system and with a British historical tradition which found its expression in notions of the Commonwealth, international friendship, duty, and service.

For its credibility it relied almost totally on four pre-suppositions. In the first place it drew on the idea that man was essentially rational, motivated by good deeds recognised to be consistent with Christian theology and practice. Although defined in relation to Christian-moral purpose, 'good' in the context of British colonial history required the individual to accept that he possessed a duty to raise the moral, social and economic standards of those whom he was privileged to instruct, command, or less charitably, control. On an individual level,

despite severe reservations, the Director accepted the post offered by the founder because 'it was a duty which it would have been wrong to have refused.'[69] But on a social level it meant the realisation of those groups with power that in order to justify their apparent privilege they were obliged morally to do good. Not only did this portray in the director's view a kind of moral rationality, but it further illuminated the belief that man in all respects tended to act rationally. Thus the political and economic order was directly the outcome of rational thinking and behaviour, one that was informed and bolstered by moral precepts drawn in particular from a Christian theology tempered by the ideologists' practical experience of economic and political affairs.

However, this second presupposition of rationality went a little further than the acknowledgement that man acted rationally: it was also steeped in the notion that organised man acted rationally, and therefore both individuals and the groups to which they belonged would not only listen to rational arguments, but, providing they were set within an acceptable moral framework, would also be ultimately persuaded by them. In other words rationality as a moral rather than logical concept tended to be linked as an individual or group quality with the way a (rationally constructed) social system might be reformed.

In attempting to defend IRR's traditions and position after the Jenkins affair, a group of Council members articulated this by asserting that:

> "Whilst there can be no formal corporate opinion (expressed) the work of the Institute, since it began in embryonic form in 1952, has been based on certain assumptions. The first of these, which has been generally accepted, is that race is irrelevant to the potentialities of a human being. The rest ... are:
>
> (a) that human behaviour can sometimes be affected by rational argument;
> (b) that rational argument needs a background of fact and information ...;
> (c) that race relations ... can be improved by the (rational) action of governments and other organised bodies;
> (d) that governments sometimes yield to informed (rational) pressures and that social institutions are sometimes modified in the same way."[70]

Whether or not this was indeed the case is a question we shall return to in a later chapter, but what is significant here is the exposing of the third aspect of IRR's moral perspective - namely that it considered itself to be part of the Western moral order; 'one which, based on Christian and democratic ideals, not only fostered the international brotherhood of man, but one which, historically, has defended the virtues of duty, service and at times, personal sacrifice'.[71] Socialised into such a set of moral beliefs and values at home and at school, this meant in practice that the economic and political responsibilities the ideologists suggested they possessed were in a sense tied up with what they deemed to be good or morally proper in respect to the

general well-being of the moral order. As well as enhancing the stability of that order, they stood as sign posts for all to see that instead of being based on self-interest they were in fact based on ordained standards or ideals proclaimed by others to be rational, moral, and inherently good. In short there existed no dispute over the kind of prescriptive moral framework that governed ideologists' actions. All believed that they had a moral responsibility to improve the lot and social standing of the less fortunate black citizen here and abroad; all believed that they were acting in accord with the duties learnt at public school, whilst doing colonial service, or at Church on Sunday; all believed that society would respond to a kind of moral pressure which revealed to it the resolvable contradictions prejudice and discrimination presented; and all believed that in so believing and acting the moral order which was so intrinsically bound up with the political and economic order could also be preserved intact.

That these economic, political and moral beliefs and interests were also shared by the constituencies and contact-networks IRR addressed provided not only them with an air of indubitable respectability, but also provided IRR with the approved status required for the further development of its ideational source of authority. Together these three inter-related sources - the structural, relational, and ideational - formed what was at all

times assumed to be the legitimate basis of authority to improve international and domestic race relations. Or to conclude with the words of Lord Walston:

> "Like it or not, the Councils on which I served as Chairman were composed of highly distinguished people ... We all shared much in common and had much the same attitude towards race relations and the Institute's work ... Between us we could raise nearly as much money as the Institute needed; and our wide group of contacts, supporters and friends could always see that our work and message got through to the right quarters ... Because we were known and, I must say, respected by people in more influential positions than ourselves we were for over two decades able to influence companies and governments to improve relations ... For after all, that was what we were in business for - to improve race relations."[72]

CHAPTER THREE

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. H.V. Hodson, Interview, 14th July, 1976

2. Philip Mason, Interview, 18th and 19th February, 1976

3. Lord Seebohm, Interview, 28th October, 1976

4. Michael Caine, Interview, 12th July, 1976

5. Jim Rose, Interview, 13th July, 1976

6. Philip Mason, Interview, op cit; and the second part of this quotation is taken from Philip Mason, 'Draft Submission to Ford Foundation', 27th January, 1967, p.1.

7. Leslie Farrar-Brown, Interview, 2nd November, 1976

8. Philip Mason, Interview, op cit.

9. Lord Walston, Interview, 27th October, 1976

10. The actual theoretical task of relating the material and findings discussed here and in the following chapters will of course be systematically tackled in our final chapter; for as the study develops it will be seen that the framework outlined in Chapter Two will need to be both revised and considerably refined.

11. See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, Free Press, London, 1964, pp.324-358. Although it can be argued that Weber's types of authority are in essence sources of power, the working distinction made in this Chapter between the two concepts is in a sense an instrumental one. Broadly, we have reserved the concept of authority to relate primarily to the social bases of the Institute's power, and the concept of power we have maintained for that phenomena which occurs when authority is used or operationalised. In terms, then, of the two types of power identified in the previous Chapter, property-power, which concerns us here and in Chapter Four, becomes the use of authority once it is organised and legitimated within, or makes up, a system or organisational structure - the Institute. This instrumental power tends to be derived from the use of authority created outside a discrete organisational structure for the purpose of confronting or challenging, or even

bolstering up the established system. Whilst, as yet, this distinction is not totally satisfactory, it does however help to establish an important qualitative difference between the resource-property and relations-instrumental manifestations of power.

12. H.V. Hodson, Some Recollections of the IRR, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, June 1976, p.10. (My emphasis).

13. Ibid, p.11

14. The leading gentleman's clubs in London included: Brooks, Travellers, Atheneum, Reform, Pratts, Garrick and Saville. For more detail on club membership see Appendices A(iv) and B(iii).

15. All the statistical data that relates to the ideologists' social profile has been extracted from a study of entries in editions of Who's Who from 1952-1972. As 90% of all Board members (26 out of 30) and 80% of all Council members (41 out of 50) possessed such entries, it is assumed here that the size of the Who's Who-listed sample is sufficiently large to draw significant conclusions. The problems associated with this kind of research are legendary, but, as far as possible, I have attempted to check published biographical details, and hence the hypotheses formulated, through conducting often very lengthy interviews with former Board and Council members. Whilst obviously not as far reaching as Guttsman's work, The British Political Elite, MacGibbon and Kee, London, 1965, or as anything as precise as either C. Wright Mill's, The Power Elite, Oxford University Press, New York, 1959, or P. Stainworth and A. Giddens (ed), Elites and Power in British Society, Cambridge University Press, 1974, I have attempted to avoid some of the major methodological obstacles in this kind of work alluded to by particularly Giddens (1974), and by Giddens and Stanworth in their chapter on 'Elites and Privilege' in Philip Abrams (ed) Work, Urbanism and Inequality, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 198, pp.206-249.

16. H.V. Hodson, Interview, op cit. This statement was also confirmed by Philip Mason.

17. Philip Mason, Interview, op cit. Also see his comment on the appointment of Jim Rose as the Director of the British Survey of Race Relations (Colour and Citizenship) in The Institute of Race Relations, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, 8th May, 1976, p.32.

18. Whilst (IRR) Board member, Anthony Sampson, in Anatomy of Britain, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1964, provides a descriptive account of these connections, more thorough investigations of the relationship between public schools, Oxbridge, and elite membership are provided by Guttsman, op cit. (1959), Stainworth and Giddens op cit, (1974 and 1978), D. Butler and D. Stokes, Political Change in Britain, Macmillan, London, 1969; W.L. Guttsman, The English Ruling Class, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1969, and more recently by Colin Mellors in The British M.P.

19. H.V. Hodson, 1976, op cit, p.11-12 (his parenthesis).

20. Ibid; Also see Appendix (A)(v) for an indication of just how substantial the 'colonial tie' appeared to be amongst initial supporters.

21. In Weberian terms this is not exactly an ideal type, as other features such as an individual's precise relationship to the economic and political structure would need to be incorporated before a model of a hypothetical actor could be fully constructed. Although access to this kind of social data, especially in relation to elite groups in society tends to be restricted and often protected by those being studied, it has been possible however to arrive at a social approximation of the ideal features each member should have possessed or exhibited.

22. H.V. Hodson, 1976, op cit, p.11

23. Philip Mason, Interview, op cit. Although the structure of each Council from 1958 remained approximately the same, it should be noted that many of the founding Council members - e.g. H.V. Hodson, Sir Ronald Prain, Philip Mason, Sir Roland Oliver, Dr. Leslie Farrar-Brown - were all in their late forties, early fifties by 1958. For more detail relating to the age structure of respective IRR Councils see Appendix B(iv) and particularly section A, 'The Physical Age Structure of Councils'.

24. The 1969/1970 Council was in this respect typical of all others. See Appendices (A) and (B) for a full list of both Board of Studies and IRR Council membership from 1952-1972.

25. Janet Evanson, Interview, 30th October, 1976. As we shall see in Chapter Five, this view was pervasive amongst the Institute's staff before 1969. It helped, I suggest later, to control the development of internal criticism and partially explain why resistance did not emerge symbolically or in any other form before the end of 1969.

6. See Note 14 above for a list of the major London clubs which Council members visited frequently.

7. See Michael Caine, 'Future of the Institute of Race Relations', IRR, 23rd January, 1966, pp. 1-3. This paper or report which resulted from lengthy discussions with, in particular, Philip Mason, Peter Calvorcoressi, Sir Roland Oliver, Professor Hugh Tinker, and Nicholas Deakin, represented 'an attempt to bring together a coherent view of the future role of the Institute together with recommendations as to how and in what directions the Institute's activities should expand'. (p.1). All unanimously agreed that IRR should remain an 'elite group' and should continue to address 'top people'.

28. H.V. Hodson, Interview, op cit. These sentiments, it should be noted, were also shared by the majority of Board and Council members interviewed.

29. Ibid.

30. Besides the very obvious financial benefits to the Institute that accrued from these directorships, they were also an important feature of the ideologists' programme of counter resistance during 1971/72. In order to expand and consolidate their support during this period, as we shall see in Chapter Eight, all members were asked by the then Chairman, Michael Caine, to produce an up to date list of company directorships they held. Whilst the actual figure is difficult to ascertain precisely, an indication of both the extent and number of directorships held can be gleaned from Sir Ronald Prain's response. In a paper headed 'List of Directorships and Other Appointments held by Sir Ronald L. Prain, OBE, as at 18th October, 1971', IRR, London, 1971, we find that Sir Ronald chaired eight companies: Ametalco, Inc., Ametalco Limited, Bamangwato Concessions Limited, Botswana RST Limited, Makgadikgadi Soda Limited, Merchant Bank (Zambia) Limited, Roan Selection Trust Limited, and RST International Metals Limited; was a director in a further eleven: Australian Selection (Pty.) Limited, Barclays Bank International Limited, Bay Hall Trust Limited, Foseco Minsep Limited, International Nickel Company of Canada Limited, Mineral Separation Limited, Monks Investment Trust Limited, Pan-Holding S.A., Selection Trust Limited, Seltrust Investments Limited and Waverley Estates Limited; a member of the Advisory Committee of International Nickel Limited; Member of Council of: Council of Commonwealth Mining and Metallurgical Institutions (Chairman), Institute of Race Relations, Overseas Development Institute, and Overseas Mining Association (Past President);

a member of: American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers, Institute of Metals (Past President and Hon. Member), and Institution of Mining and Metallurgy (Hon.); a Trustee of: RST Group Benevolent Fund and Copper Development Trust Fund; and Hon. President of the Copper Development Association.

31. Philip Mason, Interview, op cit.

32. As we shall see in the next chapter the Tropical Africa Project which arose from a suggestion from an 'imaginative director' of Shell International was financed, organised, and controlled by a special Industrial Group established by IRR, and chaired by Council Member Sir Jeremy Rarsman, then Deputy Chairman of Lloyds Bank.

33. Established with the full support of IRR and chaired by Philip Mason, the African Private Enterprise was financed directly by international companies with substantial investments in Africa. See Appendix E for the membership of APEG as at September, 1967.

34. Lord Walston, Interview, and Lord Seebohm, Interview, op cit. This quotation represents a paraphrasing of sentiments expressed by the two peers.

35. The Rockerfeller Foundation granted a sum of £10,000 spread over three years, 1957-1960, to study racial problems in the Rhodesias and the implications of Federation for Western industrial and political interests. As we have seen this grant helped the Institute to set up as an independent body; and as we shall see in the next chapter, it also helped to define quite clearly the Institute's immediate and long term research and policy intentions on the international front.

36. See Philip Mason, 1976, op cit. p.14 for an account of his friendship/relationship with Dean Rusk, although the actual quotation has been extracted from Interview material arising from a series of interviews with Philip Mason, 1976, op cit. Between 1955-1958, Dean Rusk was the President of the Rockerfeller Foundation.

37. As noted in Chapter One, during the first months of independence in 1958, Dr. Leslie Farrer-Brown, then director of the Nuffield Foundation, agreed to host a dinner party at Nuffield House for the chairmen of international companies who could be expected to donate to IRR's work.

38. Leslie Farrer-Brown, Interview, op cit.

39. Ibid. According to Farrer-Brown, Nuffield were only prepared to consider the idea of regular support for development work after the Trust had been assured of substantial industrial support for IRR. It appeared that the actual negotiating formula consisted of a matching grant scheme: Nuffield would put up £10,000 per annum providing industry would do the same.

40. Philip Mason, 1976, op cit. p.19.

41. Whilst it is clear that the large foundations which supported IRR's work - particularly Rockerfeller, Ford and Nuffield - received their original capital and much of their current income from business profits, it is not often spelt out that most foundation trustees, if not advisors, are usually prominent businessmen rather than academics or even men and women who have distinguished themselves in careers other than those of business. This is quite noticeable from a cursory glance through the Annual Reports of the aforementioned foundations.

42. Philip Mason, Interview, op cit.

43. Ibid.

44. See Appendices A and B, particularly the data on employment and careers, for an idea of the extent of contacts Board and Council members could list.

45. Philip Mason, 1976, op cit., p.38

46. See IRR Annual Report, 1965, p.2 for an account of Sir Frank Soskice's statement; Rt. Hon. Roy Jenkins, 'Address by the Home Secretary to the Institute', Race Vol VIII, No. 3, January, 1967, pp. 215-221; Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Boyle, 'Race Relations: 'The Limits of Voluntary Action', Race Vol. IX, No. 3, January, 1968, pp. 289-302; and the House of Lords Debate, 16th December, 1969, Vol. 306, Col. 1007.

47. Roy Jenkins, 1967, op cit, p.220-1.

48. Philip Mason, Interview, op cit. For a more detailed account within the context of IRR's policy work see Chapter Four here.

49. H.V. Hodson, Interview, op cit.

50. Whilst attached to Chatham House, the early professional members, including Professors Firth, Mansergh, and Hancock, saw the study of race relations not only as a branch of their respective disciplines - anthropology and history - but, more significantly, they saw the study of the subject in terms of how the Western Order could be protected. In other words their academic interests in the field appeared to be largely motivated by wider social and political interests. Together with the academics cum journalists, academics cum industrialists, and academics cum politicians who dominated Institute Councils from 1958 onwards, the actual professorial members tended if anything to become more concerned with the social and political rather than the purely academic goals of race research.

51. Although Sir Alexander Morris Carr-Saunders died in 1966, he was succeeded as the Institute's Chairman by Dr. Leslie Farrer-Brown in 1964 who had then recently retired as the Director of the Nuffield Foundation. From 1967 onwards the Institute organised an annual memorial lecture, a prestigious event to which distinguished guests from Fleet Street, Whitehall, academia, and industry were formally invited. For a valedictory account of Carr-Saunders' academic career and indeed 'interest in and devotion to the work of the Institute of Race Relations', see Maurice Freedman and Christopher Hill, 'Sir Alexander Morris Carr-Saunders ; 1886-1966', Race, Vol. VIII, No. 3, pp.293-295.

52. H.V. Hodson, Interview, op cit.

53. John Rex, Interview, 9th September, 1976.

54. Philip Mason, Interview, op cit.

55. Philip Mason, 'The Revolt Against Western Values', Daedalus, Spring, 1967, pp.348-349

56. H.V. Hodson, 'Race Relations in the Commonwealth,' International Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 3, 1950, pp.305-315.

57. Philip Mason, 1967, op cit. p.350. For a broader treatment of this theme also see Mason, 'A Democratic Dilemma: Consensus and Leadership', Race, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1969, pp. 493-503; and 'Race Relations and Human Rights', Race, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 1-17.

58. Ibid; and see particularly Mason's views on the relationship between 'Africa' and Western values, and ideals in 'Race Relations in Africa: Considered Against the Background of History and World Opinion,' SCM Press Ltd., 1960, pp. 3-24.

59. Philip Mason, Interview, op cit.

60. Ibid.

61. Chairman of the Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company, (a Corporate supporter), as quoted in The Times, 20th November, 1963.

62. Philip Mason, Interview, op cit. (This list of views represents a summary of a two hour interview on the general subject of Mason's philosophy vis a vis race and the role of the Institute).

63. Jim Rose, 'Survey of Race Relations: The Outline Plan', IRR, London, June 1964, pp.1-3. It is interesting to note that such a viewpoint was common five years later, after the publication of Colour and Citizenship and after the IRR/SSRC decision to set up a Race Relations Unit at Bristol University: see in particular A.H. Halsey, 'Race Relations - the lines to think on', New Society, No. 390, 19th March, 1970, pp.472-4 and John Rex's convincing critique of Halsey's article in Race, Colonialism and the City, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973, pp.177-181.

64. Race and Industry, Who shall speak? IRR, London, 1971, pp. 1-17.

65. Philip Mason, 'Race Relations As an Obstacle to Progress: The Nature of the Problem', Background Paper for Kuala Lumpar Conference, February 1964, pp.15-16. For further elaboration on the same theme also see 'Race As a Barrier: Proposal for Joint Conference with the Congress for Cultural Freedom', January-February 1964, IRR, London, pp.1-8.

66. The Rockerfeller Studies (1957), the Tropical Africa Project (1959) and the Ford Comparative Studies embarked upon in 1962 all appeared, as we shall see in the next Chapter, to illustrate this viewpoint.

67. Michael Caine, Interview, op cit.

68. Philip Mason, Interview, op cit.

69. Philip Mason, 1976, op cit. p.5.

70. Philip Mason, 'Report to the Council of the Institute of Race Relations', 4th May, 1971, IRR, London, pp. 1-2.

71. Philip Mason, Interview, op cit.

72. Lord Walston, Interview, op cit.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE IDEOLOGISTS (2): RACE, POWER AND CONTROL

> "The importance of race relations, whether in national or international affairs, need hardly be stressed; that the social and political significance of 'race' is a matter of emotion rather than of reason does not make it less dangerous and, indeed, stresses the need for early diagnosis and preventive action. It will be enough to say here that, within Britain, the danger forseen is of a new and sharp division within society, accompanied by frustration, bitterness and revolt on one side and, on the other, by the moral and economic losses which usually accompany the exclusions of one part of a society from the full benefits which others receive. Outside Britain there is, in varying degrees, a similar danger of division and loss within most nation states. It is of special importance as a hindrance to progress in the countries of low income. Further, ideas about race may exacerbate or produce hostilities between nations, particularly when a minority has ethnic links with a majority in another state, or when the inhabitants in one state believe that somehow they are racially superior to another. Internationally, the danger is of a mounting hostility which seems likely, at the very least, to hamper the development of international co-operation."[1]

Given the above viewpoint, shared by the Council as well as the IRR/SSRC Thirty Year Group, and which obliquely defined the parameters within which the ideologists could legitimately act, two central questions need to be addressed in this chapter.[2] First, just how did the Institute approach its objective of improving race relations on both its international and domestic fronts? And, secondly, what was the social outcome of its endeavours? Related consequentially, it is clear that both

questions directly impinge on and, to some extent, define the assertion here that the ideologists were so intensely bound to a particular perception of social reality that not only did they collectively obscure and redefine actual social conditions to fit their conception but, moreover, through the use of their authority - power - they attempted to exercise a destructive mode of control over race relations developments on both fronts.

It is to these two questions and the implications they possess for the argument already sketched out that we now turn.

The International Front

As was shown earlier the initial problem the early Institute faced was that of dealing with what were ostensibly 'the problems of the end of Empire' and more covertly the problem of Communist encroachment in Africa and elsewhere during the Cold War. Both were integrally connected in as much that part of the decolonisation problem involved the protection of substantial economic interests in the (ex)-colonies, whilst the direction of Communist infiltration and influence called for a self-realisation on the part of the colonised that these interests and resources belonged geographically and morally to them. Through their suffering, labour, political oppression, and economic exploitation they had built up these interests and paid for them many times over under

a foreign regime which had humiliated and brutalised their pre-colonised way of life, and placed them in an almost permanent position of servitude and dependence. That this could not be denied by the ideologists at the Institute provided the basis for a dynamic liberal approach of partial affirmation rather than one of outright denial. It depended for its thrust upon a collective appreciation of a sense of 'duty', and for its commitment on a desire to atone for the wrongs that had been perpetrated in the past by colonists of quite a different stamp and from a somewhat different intellectual and social tradition from those who, in 1952, wished to improve international race relations.

Given this indisputable moral commitment, one reinforced by actual colonial experience, friendships that cut across racial categories, attachment to the moral and social tenets of the 'Commonwealth', but yet one which seemed starkly bare against a prior and stronger commitment to Western ideals and beliefs, the real problem for individual members and the Institute as a whole became one of how these two distinctive and apparently exclusive commitments could be reconciled. For if they could be, not only would the result produce a sense of inner peace, an acquittal of guilt, but more importantly it would lead directly to a formula for the improvement of race relations.

Although such a concern first surfaced in the founder's inaugural address, to be reinforced two years later in the first

draft of An Essay on Racial Tension, the positive articulation of what amounted to a redefinition or political replacement of the outmoded colonial master-servant relationship by a neo-colonial one came firstly in the early Institute's response to the 1955 Royal Commission's Report of East Africa, and secondly, in several papers specifically concerned with political as well as methodological approaches to the study of international race relations. In the case of its response to the Commission's findings, IRR saw many indications that suggested that colonial policies would in fact receive a welcomed response, providing 'individual Europeans approached Africans in a friendly and helpful spirit. What was needed in the Europeans' interest as much as in the Africans' was a policy that would bring the latter into an individual competitive economy.'[3] This, argued the founding members whose knowledge, practical experience, and industrial involvement in Africa went unquestioned, could be achieved through European and African partnerships; the training of African personnel in industry and business; and, once tested in all spheres, their eventual promotion to posts of responsibility.[4]

And in the case of IRR's more deliberative position aired in published articles and papers, it meant retrospectively that:

> "Britain has had to move much faster than seemed possible before the War - much faster than ideally seemed desirable ... There is the danger of earning hostility for herself by holding on too long; on the other hand, if she lets go too soon, there are alternative dangers of either disintegration or a possibly ruthless domination of the weaker elements by the stronger ... But what can we do about the

> Union and about Rhodesia, where we have already given away so much, though we still have responsibilities? ... How can a change be carried out without disrupting the economy and scaring away the investment that is so badly needed? ... (Simply) we should do our best in respect of Africa, to understand both sides of what is going on; to bear in mind a humane and Christian ideal towards which we are steering yet not ignore the realities of the present; finally, to be always asking questions."[5]

The Rockerfeller-sponsored project formed only the small, though essential, beginning of this interrogative task. Its significance was not so much the number of monographs, papers and pamphlets it subsequently produced but the way in which it evolved and the social functions it performed. In the case of its evolution as IRR's first major research project, funded for three years at a cost of £10,000, the important point to note was that it arose almost concurrently with the above 'new liberal approach' to international race relations. It emanated from three very specific requirements which had to be met if IRR were to receive the continued support of international business, make an impact on thinking on the international front, and use positively its carefully constructed prestige and world-wide network of contacts. Firstly, whilst some founding members, including the director, wanted to study Kenya 'because of its Indian element, its diversity of tribes, its scenery, and the kind of Englishmen who went there', the majority, including those who had substantial investments in the Rhodesias objected to such a choice on very simple grounds. They successfully argued 'that

Rhodesia - the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had just come into being - was more "important", in the sense that it would prove a more difficult problem to solve, because of much bigger British interests involved and because of its historical links with South Africa'.[6] Coupled with these economic interests, the second requirement involved the use of academic research skills for the surveying of all possibilities that would safeguard these interests and what Rusk saw as 'the continued involvement of the Western powers in the controlled development of Africa'.[7] In other words it appeared that IRR would be adjudged and the quality of its research assessed on the basis of its political usefulness, the political and economic questions it asked, rather than on its depth of scholarship.

> "In those early days we had to carefully balance a number of interests without prejudicing academic credibility and objectivity ... In the first place our commercial supporters, although they never exercised any direct influence, wanted something tangible in return for their support; then both Rockerfeller and, later, Ford, wished us to take on a more political role than we ever expected; and, thirdly, there existed the immensely difficult problem of easing relations between expatriates and those who talked about the expropriation of profits and business undertakings ..."[8]

So, lastly, the Rockerfeller studies in their conception and organisation were as much an exercise in public relations as they were in academic research. In fact much of the two new research fellows' and the directors' time during the late 1950s was taken up with discussing the 'new liberal approach' to expatriate businessmen, white settlers, and selected black representatives.[9]

As Lord Hailey had attempted to convince Africans through his monumental African Survey that economic partnership was a pre-condition for political independence in the early 1950s, the Institute's fellows in the late 1950s, early 1960s, armed with their new approach, attempted to sugar the pill of dispossession with promises of progress, development, and racial equality.[10]

The task was more easily stated than performed. The actual details of both the approach and the policy needed to be worked out by those who were either to implement it or continue to remain, as an influential force, within post-colonial society. Although IRR always understood this, it was not until 'an imaginative director' from Shell in 1959 urged IRR to examine closely this 'entirely new situation' in Africa, one in which Shell's managers brought up in a colonial world would shortly have to function, that further consideration was given to what turned out to be the chief intellectual and political problem IRR faced on its international front for nearly two decades. What Shell wanted to know was, firstly, what would it be like to function in independent countries ruled by black Africans? Secondly, what cultural factors, once free to do so, would militate against management-labour relations, and hence future profitability and investment? Thirdly, could these be overcome? Fourthly, if so, could management and industrial structures be kept intact, or would they require some fundamental change? Or to put all these questions another way, would it still be possible to maintain control through adopting a policy of what appeared to

the outside world as economic partnership in social progress, the adoption of humane and Christian ideals to the practicalities of 'development'.[11]

Shell was prepared to spend up to £250,000 to find the right answers through the deployment of ninety anthropologists in Africa; thirty teams composed of one black and two white researchers. Realising that 'the problem was a real one likely to confront many people beside Shell managers', but 'anxious not to appear too tactless by putting emerging countries under a microscope', the Institute managed eventually however to convince Shell of the efficacy of setting up an Industrial Group, one which would be financed by Shell and other companies with similar anxieties.[12] Controlled by businessmen, Sir Jeremy Raisman, then deputy Chairman of Lloyds Bank, Sir (Lord) Jock Campbell, Chairman of Booker Brothers, and others, the IRR Industrial Group's research programme, known as The Tropical Africa Project, was then set up primarily 'to assess the climate of investment for expatriate firms in some of the newly developing countries, to find out what the winds of change portended for business enterprise'.[13]

Twelve African societies were subsequently studied in depth with particular reference to the needs of industrialists. The material collected from the various 'intelligence committees' or what Hunter in a more scholarly way termed 'Study Groups' was only used in part to enrich his book; the rest was passed on

directly to companies, colonial administrations, other interested bodies, or simply fed back to the IRR-sponsored African Private Enterprise Group which met under Mason's chairmanship.[14] The many papers especially produced for the operation, of which seventeen were cited in Hunter's preface, were filed away as documents about either individual blacks or aspects of black African society needed for the practical implementation of the progress alliance.[15] Not only did the success of this operation stimulate amongst expatriate business interests and colonial administrators, new thinking about the way forward without loss of capital in post-independent Africa, but just as decisively it stimulated further research activity.

The balance of the Industrial Group's funds was immediately invested, for instance, in a study of early Portugese-African political relations in Angola; research on the economic and political success of Bantustans; a paperback series aimed at 'the intelligent layman'; a study of the democratic traditions and economic experiments in Ghana; and a work on 'the economic consequences of removing restrictions to African labour and the conditions which would be necessary to ensure economic stability and prosperity in a future South Africa'.[16] Other developments instituted to encourage thought within this framework included a series of meetings and conferences like the IRR/UNESCO financed Symposium on 'Industrialisation and Race Relations'; joint ventures such as the Carnegie funded East African Manpower Studies, and the UNESCO/IAU's on South East Asia; planned visits

throughout the fast decolonising world to advise on setting up Staff Colleges for government and industry, regular seminars and Study Groups on what Ford later called 'the new initiative'; and, lastly, the setting up of research groups which would be interlocked into the philosophy and research interests of the London and South African based Institutes of Race Relations.[18]

Although all these activities sounded impressive on paper as a list of on-going research at the Institute, they were in the Ford Foundation's view a little disorganised. Whilst they were conducted within a framework of which Ford approved, the constructing of a foundation on which partnership could be built and the surveying of situations which were ripe for investment and 'aid', there existed no evidence of a coherent strategy which would both ensure Third World complicity and a recognisable return on research funding. As made clear in its letter to the Institute setting out the terms of reference for the IRR/Ford Comparative Studies Programme, the Foundation, above all, wanted to see how supervised research and thought could effectively permeate the whole problem of 'aid', and, through this, how Western influence on Third World development could be exerted.[19] So not only was Ford keen to take over research developments from where the Rockerfeller studies left off, but just as significantly, it felt that the relationship between American and British aid to 'developing countries' needed to be monitored, assessed and evaluated within a comparative context. Along these lines, discussions with Ford's

Joe Slater during the autumn of 1960 had already revealed that what was required, now that Africa was being fully investigated, was at least a five year comparative study of Latin America, Asia, and the Caribbean, one which could shed some light on how democratic institutions could be transferred to Third World countries and how influence could be maintained without recognisable interference by America, Britain, or any other Western power. In the letter setting out their terms of reference for their $100,000 grant, Ford thus hoped that their Comparative Race Studies Project would 'produce a body of information and a volume of informed thought that would permeate the whole problem of aid to (Third World) countries, that would influence the governments, business houses, churches, and universities who send men to these countries and are concerned with making decisions which affect them and that would go to alleviate resentment and promote friendly relations'.[20]

In short, Ford wanted to re-direct IRR attention away from the philosophical and, it should be said, theoretical underpinnings of its liberal approach so that IRR's expertise and energy could now be employed on essential practicalities. Apart from a switch or extension in the Institute's role on the international front, this also meant that the Institute with Ford's patronage would need to step willingly over the border that demarcates policy research from covert politics; a quiet and skilful shuffle which Council members managed to perform without an obvious change in step.

It also meant, if Ford's message were to be taken seriously, that the Institute would have to thrash out clearly and strategically how it should proceed to meet Ford's request. This was done at a 'top-secret' conference at Ditchley Park whose Provost was then the former editor of the Sunday Times, H.V. Hodson.[21] Summarised as follows, the decisions taken and their implications for a future programme of control formed the Institute's operational terms of reference throughout the 1960s.[22]

Firstly, it was decided that given the political climate and nature of all interests to be protected, the forces of black nationalism and the search for identity should be understood and accommodated.

Secondly, 'when nationhood is achieved politically, there may be an ambivalent attitude towards the late imperial power - you want their technology but not their culture or ancestors.'[23]

Thirdly, it was now clear that whilst racism might have been useful during the colonial period, its usefulness for international capital in the 1960s had become unnecessary and wasteful.

Fourthly, for progress's sake, and certainly for the kind of aided progress IRR and Ford envisaged, it was better often to side uncritically with black or white 'dictatorial and powerful ministers organising affairs'.

Fifthly, certain procedures were absolutely necessary in order to gain access to and ultimately understand 'some factors affecting the smooth working of aid programmes; to study patterns of race, status, and power relations in multi-racial or culturally divided societies; and to discover how the latter helped or hindered development.'[24]

Sixthly, payment for information received was quite acceptable, as 'conventional squeeze' (patronage/bribery) was accepted as a norm 'in countries where there is a big gap between the law and its practice.'[25]

Seventhly, regarding economic interests or 'the problems of the banks, extractive industries and the diplomats', it was necessary for researchers to find out 'first, whether there was cash in an area and whether there would be deposits; second, whether there was likely to be room for safe investment in loans, and this depended upon the whole social structure'; and third, whether or not political leaders could be trusted to represent the developed world's interests.

Eighthly, regarding political interests including defence, it was felt that 'long term acceptance could be won by careful lending, especially to expatriate concerns and Syrian or Indian traders; by educating nationals to posts of responsibility; and by the pooling of information available to the professional anthropologist, the co-operative manager and the banker, the businessman, and the diplomat'.[26]

Ninethly, very little could be achieved unless the support of black prime ministers and others was secured: thus 'at ambassadorial level it was helpful to be able to give the local Prime Minister in confidence advance information of events to make him feel that he was in the inner circle of trusted friends'.[27]

And, finally, it should be appreciated that aid and development was good for 'them' (and 'us'). Through it, economic interests could be protected, sound allegiances formed, defence pacts established, democratic institutions, values, and beliefs safeguarded, and the Communist menace thwarted. Simply, without it and the kind of world sales organisation the Western powers could offer, 'they would have no outlet for their commodities, particularly if there was a world glut of their one commodity'.[28]

So:

> "In sum, the Conference seemed to say that a process of infiltration (of goodwill) and of stabilisation (of friendly relations) should precede intervention. Equally intervention would be unnecessary if the natives would only accept that development was good for them - bearing in mind, that 'without a world sales organisation', they would have no outlet for their commodities, 'particularly if there is a world glut of their one commodity'. What Western scholarship had to do in the circumstances was to inform and enlighten everybody concerned ... All Ford required of them (IRR scholars) was not their sophisticated tomes - which were too long in coming anyway - but their interim progress reports and the ground they laid in the course of their fieldwork for winning over the native intelligentsia to Western sociology."[29]

Although Ditchley, or rather the political strategy programme developed there, helped to cast IRR as something more than a mere academic research body, its precise role as firstly the initiator of policy objectives on the international front and secondly the international clearing house and organiser or controller of overseas race developments did not really emerge until 1965. By then its interim progress reports had been received and processed by Ford; its contact network had been greatly extended through the Industrial Group's political work; and preliminary work on the Ford Comparative Studies had possessed the effect not only of consolidating and enlarging this network but also of establishing considerable links with Third World governments and footholds in the various development plans envisaged. Its contribution to informed thought on its international front had, according to a Ford press release, in fact earned it 'a world wide reputation for the quality of its research in racial interaction in many countries and for its recommendations to improve inter-racial understanding and co-operation'.[30]

Ostensibly for this reason, Ford (in 1965) thus decided to donate a further $275,000 (to IRR). Part of it, some £50,000, was to go to replace Nuffield's original development grant, to ensure that IRR's administrative costs could be covered. And the rest of it, approximately £50,000, was to be spent on two specific projects which had arisen from the discussions at Ditchley and from the many meetings held with Ford's senior personnel.

Earmarked for 'carrying out further international functions', nearly £38,000 was to be used to finance diplomatic missions to Third World countries which were either currently seeking or proposing to seek development aid from Britain or America. Composed of IRR contacts and supporters - businessmen, journalists, and others - their objectives were to influence opinion leaders in the former territories, set up private conferences and meetings, and finally report back to IRR and Ford.

Also seen by the Institute and Ford as 'goodwill missions', their covert purpose was spelt out clearly by Ford at a meeting in New York in February, 1966.[31] At this meeting IRR's director was informed by Ford's Joe Slater of the very serious dangers facing Western powers. They included the growing division of rich white nations and poor non-whites into hostile groups; the explosion of internal tensions of a racial or quasi-racial kind; and the probable loss, unless something were done immediately, of "friendship" in these societies.[32] What Slater wanted from the Institute now that it had received the ($275,000) grant to put it on its feet for the next five years, was to mull over some of Ford's suggestions, incorporate them and come up with its own. Besides the need for an international clearing house which the Institute was now informally meeting, one which 'consisted of a first class filing system and of a small group of executive assistants who were good at going around to different countries

and finding out what was happening', there existed a real need for something else.[33]

Simply:

> "To make the work of the international clearing house really effective, I think you need something much deeper and that is a series of exchanges or specific programmes arranged between groups of nations or bilaterally between pairs of nations in which:
>
> (a) People from the top level for three or six months could go around looking, advising, commenting, and talking to people in the committee rooms of the House of Commons, and in a score of nodal points of this kind;
>
> (b) It is difficult to see such a combined team working on international problems. I think they will have to look at what is going on inside countries. If I am right in this, their location will have to be determined by the subject;
>
> (c) I think probably the most fruitful possibility of all, and certainly most likely to produce quick results, would not be academic. It would mean getting hold of a few people of a very rare kind, the man with good academic qualifications and the ability to express himself vigorously in short and powerful articles, and to talk well. The aim would be to build up a permanent international team of people of this kind, each of whom having considerable personal and practical experience and some emotional commitment in respect of a problem in his own country;
>
> A longer term, more orthodox approach would be the organisation of a longish conference, covering at least a fortnight, of not more than twenty-five leading international figures at the Rockerfeller villa on Lake Como; (the officers of the Rockerfeller Foundation have invited me to use it for this kind of purpose)."[34]

The second project which Ford wished to encourage and for which £10,000 was apportioned was known as the 'Aid and Growth Project'. To be directed by Guy Hunter, its purpose was 'to

examine the difficulties of transferring, by aid and in other ways, the institutions and techniques of developed countries into an extremely different social and economic setting in the developing countries'.[35] Inocuous though this might sound, its real significance was once again not in terms of its scholarly facade but as illustrative of the role research was meant to play in a broader and more profound strategy of influence on and control over the alleged 'development of race relations'. For example, beneath the liberal rhetoric, the Project would cover types of technology used and required; types of institutions and administrative systems used and required, such as settlements, co-operatives, plantation companies, marketing systems, and so on; types of skill and manpower services required; basic education required; wage, salary and earning structures and incentives; social services required, administrative, local, national, and international government considerations; and, finally, financial and aid implications for the Western powers.[36] Obviously, 'the kind of results that could emerge would not be recognisable as formal research such as academic sociologists and economists undertake. It would however <u>use</u> a good deal of current academic research and a good deal of first hand information from those responsible in the field for plans, schools, irrigation, factories, mining, and agriculture. The aim would be to produce a report which would stimulate thinking among planners, Aid Agencies, businessmen, politicians and so on. In this respect it would be at the same

level as The New Societies of Tropical Africa, but treating political rather than economic issues.'[37] Like this earlier project, it had already received the full blessing of the ODI, Ministry of Overseas Development, the Commonwealth Relations Office who had pledged to contact British missions overseas, many British universities, expatriate businessmen who would provide hospitality, and, 'in view of the size of their Aid programme and their interest in these subjects', American agencies such as A.I.D., the World Bank, and, of course, Ford. In effect the 'Growth and Aid Project' would attempt systematically to examine and possibly expand the political references worked out at Ditchley: it would attempt to show more convincingly than either the academics' interim reports or their final, polished works, how through aid and 'other ways' democratic institutions could be transferred to countries which the West wished to woo and influence.[38]

With the role of research as the attendant of policy formulation and control defined, the problem of IRR's organisational role on its international front still remained. Whilst the ideas and proposals concerning the 'goodwill missions' and the future of the Institute as an international clearing house helped to project it as a kind of agency body for Western capital and other American and British interests, what it wanted to know from Ford was whether this could form the only foundation on which it could operate and organise internationally. In short, the answer came

back during January, 1967, that this should only constitute a single rather than a 'composite function'.[39] Another, and in many ways more crucial job, would be to initiate and oversee 'the establishment of groups or Institutes interested in fostering an awareness of the problems of race relations'. Once such groups or satellite Institutes came into full being - which meant simply the extension of the nine 'intelligence committees' set up for the Industrial Group's Tropical Africa Project - the London-based Institute would become the natural co-ordinator of nearly all international race relations research and political activity. It would not only be freed from some of its 'traditional functions' which could be carried out by local groups on the spot, but it could also well benefit from others looking at the three research imperatives formerly investigated from London: namely the role of race in the formulation and conduct of international affairs; the effect of race on nation building policies in new countries; and, thirdly, the effect of race on international political and economic organisation, and vice versa.[40] Although the Institute's executive assistants would continue to keep this programme under review, the main job of the parental Institute would thus become one of co-ordination and direction; the receiving of specialised studies and reports, the collating and evaluating of findings, and the forwarding of them to Ford and other interested agencies, including government departments and international business, for prompt attention or maybe action.

To perform this expanded role efficiently, the effective control and management of international race research and work, two problems or rather potential conflicts needed to be resolved. The first concerned the relatively new political fact that the initiative for new Institutes had to be seen to come from independent countries themselves. This was resolved in a somewhat obscure and, out of necessity, complex way, as the Institute could not afford openly to place its reputation for scholarly research in jeopardy by being charged with rather crude imperial or neo-colonial intentions.[41] After a series of meetings in America with Slater who had detected IRR's anxiety about 'the carrying out of the assignment', and within the space of six weeks it was eventually decided, firstly, that funds from the Institute on Man and Science (formerly the Congress on World Tensions) and from Volkswagen, should be 'made available for poorer countries where no Institute existed', and, secondly, that they should eventually be channelled through the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR).[42] Providing IRR were prepared to support, advise, and guide these developments, neither UNITAR's director, Oscar Schacter, nor the Ford Foundation officers, could see any further difficulty with respect 'to the delicate political issues attending the assignment'. Philip Mason concurred, explaining at a special meeting convened by Ford to discuss the matter that he had 'always been a little worried about the prospect of using Ford Foundation money from an Institute in Britain to persuade

other countries to take an interest in race relations, but if this were done under the umbrella of a United Nations agency (with IRR acting as advisor and co-ordinator) the political difficulties would be reduced.'[43]

The second problem, however, was of a slightly different order, and its resolution tended to establish a working model for all future negotiations with other independent bodies setting up in the field. With more and more 'private' money being invested in race research programmes, particularly in the States, it entailed on one level the whole question of duplication, and on another, (for IRR), the even more worrying problem of its seniority and authority in the international field.

The Denver University Graduate School of International Studies, directed by Dean Dr. Josef Korbel, and funded by private business and an equally private Social Science Foundation, had during the mid-sixties started to make a name for itself in race research. What it now required was a director whose 'international reputation' would 'make Denver the leading point in the United States for the study of race relations as a factor in international affairs; who would look on race as a possible factor not only in the internal affairs of states but also as affecting the relations between states, and finally as a factor in the working of international agencies.'[44] Instead of taking the chair offered, IRR's director, however, managed to get Denver to admit 'that they were beginners in the field and that the Institute had more to teach

them than they did it.'[45] A transatlantic agreement was eventually negotiated; the terms of which allowed for the exchange of librarians so that each could study the others methods; the discussion of all research projects before their commencement; possible joint projects and publications; the exchange for short periods of senior executive officers and research fellows; and, once the Institute had firmly established its international unit (IRSP), a visit by its proposed research director (Hugh Tinker) 'to draw up a list of projects and decide which could be done on each side of the Atlantic and how they could be best done'.[46] In other words, as well as establishing a base and plan for mutual co-operation, this Atlantic agreement confirmed on the one hand the Institute's role as the sole international advisor and on the other its apparent legitimate right to control research developments from its international centre and base in London. It was indeed from this position and with the generous support of Ford that the Institute could justly declare itself as being the only recognised body in the international field; one which at all times appeared to be not only a leader and initiator of world opinion on race but one which, after 1967, also attempted with varying degrees of success to control race research and practice on its international front.

The Domestic Front

Similarly, the Institute saw its contribution to the improvement of domestic race relations in much the same way as it had done on its international front. Firstly, as very little thinking had been done on the subject before the Notting Hill and Nottingham riots, the need for some concerted intellectual leadership after the summer of 1958 presented itself.[47] As the only national body in the field and as the only body with the kind of resources at its disposal that could be harnessed to relate existing knowledge to present circumstances, it was thought that this kind of leadership would be merely a natural extension of its earlier work conveyed in the phrase - policy advice. Secondly, there existed its traditional role of research: what was needed here more than perhaps on its international front was a set of policy-oriented studies; research that had a direct bearing on existing policy, programmes that would in themselves aim to stimulate new policies. And thirdly, it was clear that if domestic race relations were to be improved then there would be a need for bodies, other than IRR, to be established to undertake practical and developmental tasks. In this respect it saw its function as one of encouraging and, as noted in an earlier Chapter, co-ordinating the (research) work of these proposed bodies.

Whilst this latter 'function' was to develop much later, after IRR had firmly established its domestic reputation, the organisational

and social base for its policy-advice work already (in part) existed. The frequency with which the director and other Council members 'popped in' to see government ministers and senior civil servants in connection with international matters appeared to provide the kind of accessibility needed for consultative advice. Further senior politicians, former civil/colonial servants, journalists, and businessmen on IRR's Council could be relied on to have the interests of the country, the welfare of liberal-democratic society, uppermost in their minds. But initially, even more significant than these two factors was the thought it had already invested in developing a distinctive 'approach'. Here its so-called liberal approach on the international front simply needed to be reformulated to apply to the domestic scene - 'integration'. For, at one and the same time such a policy term encapsulated both the liberal rhetoric and conservative intentions of the Institute's general approach to race relations: it married successfully the partnership and developmental features of IRR's international philosophy together with preservational intent, the maintaining of a system of structural relations with racial equality.

Articulating this a few years later, it noted that it was 'worth considering in more detail the wide range of meanings the word (integration) often carried in popular speech' for:

> "These divergences make for a great deal of confusion; the unspoken assumptions as to what is being talked about may be quite different on each side of the argument. No one can stop this ... All one can do is to try to indicate the meanings which are being attached to the word and illustrate them by examples from other parts of the world; this may suggest to thoughtful people that one usage is more helpful than another. It may also help us to be clear about what we (whites in white society) want, about our aims as a society."[48]

Dismissing 'absorption' and 'assimilation' as nonsensical policies that denied individuality and defining 'accommodation' as a sociological expression of a process of negotiation entered into by the majority with the minorities, IRR's director suggested the following as 'the kind of society towards which our aim ought to be directed':

> "Firstly) we cannot any longer be a self-contained nation-state, homogeneous in culture, breeding and appearance.
> (Secondly) nor need we become a faceless mass from which all individuality had disappeared.
> What we should hope, then, I suggest, is that the immigrant groups now in Britain ... will form a variety of groups, some wider, some smaller, and that these will retain some of their cultural traits. But we hope that members of these groups will also join other groups, trade unions, cricket and hockey clubs, churches, concert parties. The object should be a steady increase in the two processes of adaptation and acceptance until a stage is reached in mutual accommodation which may be called inclusion. This would be integration but not assimilation."[49]

The conditional rider on this nominally liberal approach came in the view that the Institute and others, notably the government, were 'determined to treat these immigrants who were here as kindly as we treated our older citizens; determined to

cut down sharply the number of fresh entries until this mouthful had been digested'.[50] Its genesis stemmed not so much from the anti-(black) immigration movement and lobby which emerged as a decisive force in British politics after Notting Hill, but rather from deliberations and analyses of the future stability of British society. Thus in a series of meetings with the Migrants Services Division of the West Indian Federal Government, the Colonial Office co-ordinating Committee on which it was represented, senior civil and colonial servants, and government ministers during 1959/60, the Institute was able to demonstrate convincingly that limited control, provided it was geared to the needs of British industry, would be beneficial to the nation, the immigrants, and for the betterment of race relations. The circuitous reasoning behind these proposals which were promoted and eventually adopted during the passage of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Bill appeared to be based on several assumptions. Firstly, and above all other considerations, black immigrants constituted a problem because they were black, because they reminded the liberal engineers of 'racial harmony' of another time and place in history which most would prefer to forget.[51] Secondly, as IRR's industrial supporters insisted, black workers were essential for continued economic prosperity. Thirdly, 'we were all God's children', and therefore all had a right to equal respect and status as human beings. And fourthly, our nation and society must be cherished and protected at any cost. Adopted more or less

in their entirety as the rational basis for Macmillan and Hume's Conservative Government's ad hoc race and immigration policy, these assumptions underpinned IRR's thinking up until 1964.[52]

Only when the Labour Government came into being did the Institute attempt to state its position and elaborate its views in more detail. For, afraid that the incoming government would scrap its original proposals, and aware 'that there was a serious danger of their responding to clamour by drifting step by step into actions that would be in the long run unwise',[53] the Institute felt that:

> "They (the Labour Government) ought to think out a policy and stick to it. I (Mason) went to see Sir Jock Campbell, later Lord Campbell of Eskan, whom I believed to be in their counsels... We both detested the idea of differentiating between people on the grounds of skin colour but we both saw that factory workers in a northern town, who remembered unemployment of the thirties, had reasonable grounds for apprehension at a large influx of people from countries with much lower average incomes. The fact that they were physically different made them an obvious target for resentment and we might end with a nation split into two hostile factions.
>
> Could one remove, or at least reduce the fear by checking the influx, and at the same time mount a massive campaign against discrimination inside Britain? That was a policy in a sentence, capable of infinite variation of emphasis when one considered the detail of either side of the bargain, but in broad terms I still think the best policy that was at all practicable. Sir Jock and I were agreed on it. I do not know whether he had discussed this with the Government before I saw him, nor whether they had already been thinking on these lines independently but this was the policy they adopted. I aired it in an article

> in the Guardian (eight months before the publication of Labour's 1965 White Paper and discussed it with people at ministerial level on both sides of the House even before then); it was worded in rather tough language which offended some people. There have been bitter objections to the policy, on the ground that to check the influx at all implied discrimination but I have not met anyone I can regard as at all sensible who would dispute that some check was needed on free immigration from India and Pakistan."[54]

As noted above the formulation of IRR control policies resulted from much earlier interpretations about the possibility of a nation being split into two hostile racially exclusive factions. So by the time the director arranged to see Campbell at the Travellers' Club in the Autumn of 1964, the rough guidelines or conditions that informed IRR's domestic liberal approach had already been worked out and discussed in some detail with interested parties. Thus not only could they be quickly written down on 'the back of an envelope over lunch', but when Campbell in a sense retailed them to Sir Frank Soskice, the new Home Secretary, and later to the minister in charge of immigration matters, Maurice Foley, they were received without undue consternation, criticism, or surprise. They were in fact received as a commodity for which the Institute expected some payment; 'as a contribution to a large scale programme to arrest prejudice and tension'.[55] Simply, the Institute would fully back its own policy, provide for Government the much needed moral and intellectual rationale for immigration control, and show how such a policy carefully balanced - the numbers game - could prevent

the nation from splitting into hostile factions. In return, the government would sympathetically consider making its first (and only) grant totalling £25,000 to IRR work, for not only had 'considerable use been made in recent years, by Government Departments and others, of the information and services which the Institute had built up',[56] but, perhaps more significantly, it hoped that it would continue to make full use of all IRR information services and particularly the results of its major domestic research programme, the comprehensive Survey of British Race Relations.[57]

Although several other domestic research projects were undertaken during the 1960s, the Survey to which the Government donated £10,000 of its overall grant was considered at least by the Institute to have formed its major long term work in domestic race research and policy formulation. Its relationship to both IRR's perceived role as the foremost intellectual leader on domestic as well as international race relations (policy advice) and its monopoly of the only legitimate ideas, arguments, and 'facts' on which this role was based - an important element in its control strategy - was therefore an extremely crucial one. On a superficial level it appeared to be founded on much the same premise as had determined earlier research projects abroad. There existed for instance an overwhelming need to collect information, 'facts', about the British situation so that realistic policies could be constructed; there existed a realisation that

what constituted 'realism' could only be defined in terms of what other powerful groups in the dominant social structure thought; and there existed a further belief that a 'Myrdal for Britain' should, as An American Dilemma had done for the United States a decade or so earlier, expose policy alternatives that were seen to reflect rather than challenge liberal-democratic ideals.[58] Or in the Director's own words:

> "It was precisely because we believed that the situation in Britain was still fluid - though attitudes could easily harden - that we thought it would be a good idea to do at this stage something comparable with what the Carnegie Corporation of America had done when they invited Gunnar Myrdal to undertake a survey of the scene in the United States."[59]

But on a more profound level, one which related research aims and objectives with existing perceptions of the power structure more clandestinely, the Survey, as suggested in the last chapter, was organised 'to ascertain how political and public order, values and beliefs, could be maintained without racial conflict'.[60]

This objective reflected not only the actual political basis but also the social purpose and identity of the project with the needs of the state as well as with those of groups which had much invested in the stability of a basically capitalist economic and social structure. To effectively perform such a task and ipso facto to effectively promote itself as an influential agency, IRR required a Survey director of the calibre of 'a de Tocqueville or

Bagehot or a Myrdal, someone with a detached lucid mind who would start from first principles and analyse the situation in Britain in the light of some incontrovertible proposition that no one would venture to deny'.[61] What it did not want was a Survey 'firmly embedded in an academic discipline, something which might be unintelligible to an educated general public', something which the groups IRR addressed could neither understand literally nor see in it its immediate relevance to their problems.[62] Although Jim Rose, its eventual director, realised from the outset that he could not be compared with Myrdal - 'one might as well compare Pitt and Addington'[63] - the qualifications and special gifts he brought to the post, and hence the Institute, were of a kind that fitted well its declared intention to influence and its unstated one to control as far as it could domestic policy and practice. Besides having been educated 'in the tradition of the establishment at Rugby and New College (Oxford)', Rose possessed extensive media contacts as the former director of the International Press Institute from 1952-1962 and, even more importantly, he was 'well-known and liked by the Labour Party hierarchy in Government' and was 'highly thought of by the American Foundations'; in fact he saw the job politically rather than academically and grasped the opportunity to consolidate political friendships and 'take the Institute into Whitehall in a way that really furthered our objectives'.[64]

According to Rose:

> "Much of our time was spent in Whitehall, talking and discussing policies over with senior officials and ministers. This we saw as a vital part of the Survey's wider function ... In order to write about housing, education, employment, social services, law and order and so on, and in order to influence in the right direction we of course needed to know in some detail the extent of government thinking on the subject ... They, on the other hand, wanted to know what we thought and what we were finding out so that, if necessary, they could change their policies and plans to accord with newly researched facts and information ... They always appreciated that we, as the only national body working in the research field, always attempted to present our facts and findings objectively ... This is why I think they consulted us so frequently ..."[65]

Whilst such a working relationship reflected IRR/Government closeness in thinking and conception, and established the role domestic research should possibly play, it did not however explicitly confirm the position of IRR as the legitimate organiser and often doer of domestic research. This in a sense came from two entirely separate directions: the first grew out of both its Survey and wider domestic programme; while the second resulted from an extended set of negotiations with government which ultimately and conditionally conferred upon the Institute a certain position and status in the national research effort.

In respect of the first direction, it considered that the facts or findings it unearthed should be set within a planned framework of necessary and hence future research. As it had already worked out its (liberal) perspective and decided on what

was important to research, it also felt that it had a duty to show how both could be achieved.[66] So, in conjunction with the newly created Social Science Research Council and with terms of reference principally culled from the Heyworth Committee's Report, the Thirty Year Group was established to assess not only international research prospects but also what was required in Britain.[67] In brief, it concluded that there existed a need for in depth studies in the fields of housing, employment, education, law and politics; longitudinal studies which would compare different ethnic groups to assess their ability to adapt and integrate; analyses and research projects 'to show whether or not tolerance could be taught and relative (black/white economic) efficiency assessed'; investigations to ascertain whether 'perceived ethnic differences, used as grounds for discrimination and categorisation, would become a source of stress likely to result in delinquency, divorce, suicide, or psychosis'; and more rigorously constructed studies to predict when blacks would become powerful enough to be wooed for their votes.[68] What these proposals pointed to in organisational terms was the extension of the existing Survey, from Rose 1 to Rose 11, and a refinement of the aims of domestic research. Indeed, Rose 11, as it was called, would attempt to:

> "Explore the processes of adjustment and adaptation, in what we may call the second phase of the immigrant settlement. (By then) they should have a roof over their head and have a settled occupation; they should have also begun to learn something of the ways of the new society ... Although they may be putting down roots it will be too soon to expect much sense of identification with the new country and they may continue to be segregated within their culture and inside an immigrant colony.

> The first criterion for choice of subjects therefore is whether the research will throw light on the process of adjustment of the different immigrant groups to their environment. This adjustment will not be all on one side ...(so) the second criterion in the choice of research programmes will be the light they throw on British behaviour and attitudes. The third criterion will be the relevance of the research for social policy."[69]

In other words, whilst the Rose 1 Survey would be restricted to assessing the apparent threat blacks posed to the social order, its natural heir, Rose 11, would attempt to show how it could be allayed through surveying and encouraging the processes of adaptation and accommodation, which, in turn, would lead to social integration. Further, it was envisaged at that stage by the Institute that a substantial part of the programme would be carried out by its proposed Unit for Race Relations in Britain (URRB), or, as it subsequently became known by the Joint Unit for Minority Policy Research, JUMPR. Although the actual programme was ultimately divided into two parts, the theoretical aspects reserved for the IRR/SSRC funded and supervised Race and Ethnic Studies Unit at Bristol and the pragmatic policy aspects to be retained directly under IRR's surveillance through JUMPR, the reasons why IRR should effectively oversee the national research programme remained the same. Outlined in its submission to the Home Office for funds to set up a domestic cell or unit, they included the following: first, the Institute had been the sole stimulator of domestic research; second it had always planned research 'with some indication of priorities' that were

in essence politically and socially defined; third, it acted as a clearing house and bibliographer of all research projects in progress, undertaken outside as well as inside the Institute; fourth, 'it had the only library in Britain specialising in the subject'; fifth, it not only published a quarterly, Race, and a monthly Newsletter, (later Race Today), but it was the only national body 'publishing or otherwise disseminating the results of research; sixth, it possessed the scholarly and other kinds of expertise within its Survey team to carry out 'overall planning of research'; seventh, in conjunction with the SSRC it had already done much of the preliminary groundwork (The Thirty Year Group); eighth, unlike a university, it was a body 'whose purpose it was to make sure that a programme was completed and a particular need fulfilled'; ninth, its international reputation had brought the backing of large foundations and international business; and, lastly:

> "There (was), then, a national problem, of providing for the continued stimulation and planning of research and the dissemination of the results: The Institute was designed to perform these functions ..."[70]

David Ennals, then the Minister in charge of race and immigration, responded:

> "We should find great difficulty in a scheme which meant that the Home Office would be making funds available to an outside body over which we would have no influence or control. Moreover, now that the Home Secretary is responsible for race relations in this country he feels that it might be more appropriate for the Home Office itself to take responsibility for the co-ordination of research ...

> On this basis, the Home Office ... would decide on an overall plan and then sponsor various projects ... One of the first projects we should want to look at under such an arrangement would be Survey 11.
>
> We (thus) recognise the importance of the Institute and would wish it to continue in being, but we have doubts about the wisdom of its ceasing to be independent of Government ... We would very much hope that the Institute would be able to continue to get its financial support as at present, and the Home Secretary has told me that he would be willing to write to Bundy, (President of the Ford Foundation), to ask whether Ford could continue their grant after 1971. We do not altogether rule out the possibility of some small financial support from the Government, if this should ultimately prove necessary ..."[71]

The Director replied:

> "(You spoke of the possibility of the Home Office setting up its own research unit). But I think there are principles involved which we ought to talk about. This is a radical and far-reaching step which I do think you ought to discuss in principle with a few people who have been thinking about this for a lifetime ... I do beg you not to make up your minds too definitely without much more discussion ... When we saw you, I left with you the suggestion that it might be better if the Government were able to put at the disposal of the Social Science Research Council a sum specifically for the object (of academic research and teaching). The Social Science Research Council might then, with the small number of people who have taken an interest in this subject (in the Universities), work out an efficient means of using money to the best advantage ...
>
> I am sorry to make such demands upon you, but I do think this matter is of great importance and I hope you will agree that at some stage the Home Secretary should see the Chairman of the Council ...[72]

Just over two weeks later, the director was able to report to the chairman of the Council on his interview with Sir Philip Allen, then Permanent Under Secretary at the Home Office:

> "Sir Philip Allen began by saying that he was glad to have the opportunity of a discussion. He himself regretted that the letter sent me by David Ennals had come in that form; he would personally have wished to postpone it or word it differently. He certainly wanted more discussion before any decision was reached. And they were only at the beginning of their thinking ...
>
> Finally, we agreed that there was common ground between us in that we both wanted to see a planning committee, from a variety of sources, with a permanent staff. I said however, that I felt there was a difference between us as to the relations of this body to Government. I pointed out how extremely tender the subject of race relations was to political pressure, and I repeated that I thought it was important that the committee should be detached and independent."[73]

Several months and many meetings later the director yet again raised the question of co-ordination with Sir Philip Allen:

> "First, let me recall the drift of our conversation. We were both, I think, agreed that there was an area in which it was best that the government should conduct research, particularly fact-finding research, and we also agreed that there was an area of research best done outside any government department. Where we differed was about the best means of co-ordinating this total volume of research and about where it would be best to locate the staff which is concerned with thinking about the overall direction ...

> As I said to you when we met, there is at present a tacit agreement between the parties to avoid incitment of racial feeling. Moreover, even while the truce lasts, a change of Government or a new Home Secretary might make a real difference to the Government's approach. While it is inevitable that the Government should decide what use to make of the results of research, it seems doubtful whether they should control the way questions are put and the way results are published ...
>
> A function which the programme we have in mind would perform would be to stimulate interest in the universities and here again I think it is important that the staff should be outside a Government Department and that the ultimate control should rest with a body on which the Government should be strongly represented but which it should not control ... It would (then) mean that there was in existence a body to whom you could pass work and with whom you could apportion the work to be done ...
>
> I hope I have not become so much a specialist in this field as to over-estimate its importance. The Government have themselves - both the Prime Minister and most emphatically the Home Secretary - indicated that they give it a high priority. But I venture to think that no-one has given more thought than the Institute to the problems of organising research in this field. I feel therefore that I ought to put the points of view which I have expressed to you personally to the Home Secretary."[74]

Three months later, and after detailed discussions had been held with the SSRC, the Institute's director wrote to Sir Philip Allen Again:

> "I am sure you know that I saw the Home Secretary yesterday - not to talk about current affairs but partly about the matters you and I have discussed. I made to him the points I have made to you about the independence of research and my hope that the Home Office would agree that there was a field for official research and one for independent research, and that they would support any proposals which might come out of the Social Science Research Council for research units.

> I did also say to him that I felt there would for some time to come be a need for a body which would be to some extent an instigator of research and in close touch with researching bodies, which would be outside the universities, which would have means of communicating to the public and means of disseminating information ...
>
> Finally, I said that I had no doubt that the Institute should be independent of Government. But one could not always have what one wanted. I began to think that if the Government did recognise that the Institute had formed a useful function and was needed in the future, it might be a solution if we applied for a grant to cover the expense of the library. At the moment our library is well ahead of any other in Britain as a specialist in this special field of race relations and particularly in its periodicals and press cuttings ...
>
> The Home Secretary expressed a general sympathy with the object we had in mind and emphasised the importance he attached to the need for research and of avoiding overlapping ...
>
> I thought I should write and let you know what I believed passed to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding between us."[75]

Whether or not this letter constituted a subtle piece of rank pulling or an attempt to demonstrate that politicians at senior ministerial level almost instinctively realised the advantages of allowing an agency body to control research developments on their behalf does not matter in this context, for what was important, however it came, was Governmental approval. And it was this, and this alone, which finally enabled the Institute to exercise the kind of control it thought it possessed the right and the resources to exert. In fact within months the SSRC announced its plans to set up a Race Relations Research Unit at Bristol. To be financed by SSRC funds made available from the government (£100,000 per year), directed by Professor Michael Banton, (an IRR member and

instigator of the annual IRR Conference), and to continue in existence for at least a decade, the chairman of its controlling body was to be 'Dr. Philip Mason, who was the first director of the Institute of Race Relations in London';[76] and it was expected that:

> "The work of the research unit (would) complement the policy oriented research being conducted by the Home Office and the Institute of Race Relations. The main emphasis of the SSRC Unit would be on fundamental research."[77]

The decision to circumvent initial government anxiety over directly funding an independent body, had been taken by the Institute as an 'alternative strategy' at the stage of 'informal discussions' with the Government and more formal ones with the SSRC. Then, according to Mason, 'the question was whether funds should come from the Government direct, or from the Social Science Research Council'.[78] 'The crucial point in these discussions was that Dr. Michael Young argued persuasively that the race relations unit for Britain should not be structurally and organisationally integrated into one university. He favoured a much looser connection which would enable the unit to remain dependent on the Institute'.[79] Indeed he even went a little further than this and asked:

> "Could IRR devise some new form of organisation which would retain for the Institute a substantial control? Would it be possible to give the staff of the new unit academic status while ensuring that they were answerable to the Council of the Institute? Would it be possible to appoint, as part of the scheme, lecturers, who would

> be paid by the Institute but would be stationed as members of the staff in other universities?"[80]

Although the Bristol based unit which came into being in 1969 did not exactly reflect these early proposals, where control would be clearly seen to be held by the Institute, it nevertheless in practice became integrally related to its parental body. Through its chairman, Philip Mason, its close working relations with IRR, and through the fact that it resulted from an SSRC agreed though IRR initiated 'major application for the support of research in race relations', it was bound to and part of IRR's overall domestic programme.[81] More centrally connected, however, was its organisational peer, the Joint Unit for Minority Policy Research. Originally named the Unit for Research into Race Relations in Britain (URRB), it was decided after lengthy talks with (Lord) Asa Briggs, that it should be attached in some way to the University of Sussex.[82] Here, the policy oriented research would, it was planned, complement the so-called theoretical work at Bristol. Financed in part by the Ford Foundation and the SSRC, to whom it successfully applied for substantial research grants, rather than directly by the Government, it brought the finishing touches to IRR's original intentions to stimulate, co-ordinate, and oversee domestic research work.[83] Jim Rose's deputy, Nicholas Deakin, was appointed as its director, and its terms of reference empowered JUMPR to make recommendations to IRR on three levels:

> "Work to be undertaken by the unit directly with its permanent staff (some of this would require additional funds from the Social Science Research Council).
>
> Work for which the Institute should seek funds from the Social Science Research Council or foundations, and which the unit would carry through by seconded or commissioned persons not on the permanent staff.
>
> Work which the Institute would not itself carry out but to which it would give its backing as being liable to contribute usefully to the general fund of knowledge."[84]

These in turn would be assessed in relation to proposals received from or discussed at Bristol, the Home Secretary's Advisory Committee on Race Relations Research - on which both Michael Banton (Bristol Unit's director), and Philip Mason and other IRR members served - and of course the Institute's own programme based in London.

Further, it was considered that:

> "A controlling body was needed (for JUMPR) and that one would suffice, though it would have two functions. It would approve the budget of the Unit and would be required to sanction any expenditure not covered by the budget. As to the research programme, it would rather hold a watching brief; it would expect to be kept fully informed of all research projects and to meet the Director occasionally to consider the whole programme and discuss it with him. It was agreed that this body should be kept as small as possible, say five members ...
>
> (Further) the Director of the Unit should, at any rate to begin with, confine himself to teaching, lecturing and planning and would have little time for field-work. The Assistant Director would be based in London at the Institute, be the liason officer with other universities, (particularly Bristol), would arrange seminars in London, undertake joint activities with the Institute such as preparing facts, papers, etc., would feed material of

> this kind into the Unit as well as the Institute, be specially concerned with commissioned work, and would if possible undertake research work of his own ... The Unit as it was proposed would be a training centre as much as a research unit and neither side could be neglected."[85]

Unlike IRR's promoted unit at Bristol, which at all times would attempt to maintain an academic and scholarly front, JUMPR needed positively to align itself not only with government departments to whom it directed its researches but also to the so-called 'race relations industry'. In other words it was along a policy axis (and the research role in its formulation), that both IRR research units and the Institute itself pressurised, stimulated, and ultimately exerted some control over domestic developments other than over merely race research.

The policy advice it offered in 1961/62 not only then in retrospect symbolised a conjuncture between what had been, what was, and what should be, but it also contained a specific social prescription for bringing all three features into harmony. To control the number of black immigrants entering Britain without giving practical expression to the moral and egalitarian-opportunity beliefs it held would have not fulfilled its purpose. More fundamentally than it ever consciously wanted, it was therefore forced by its own social and political prophecies, the implications of its research, and its interests to stimulate and point developments in a direction that would achieve this. Indeed it became evident to the Institute during the late fifties that such a

solution - the fostering of racial harmony whilst maintaining realistic controls - would not be implemented 'unless those of us who had been working in the field for some time grasped the nettle by the hand'.

> "We needed to yank it up and sow the seeds for integration; we needed, I was convinced, to stand up and be counted, to make sure that the little influence and authority we had was used effectively to improve race relations."[86]

This in turn meant that as well as developing or helping to inaugurate a whole network of race bodies charged with the object of socially and politically improving race relations, it needed to relate to these bodies in a way that would enable them to perform the social objectives it had already mapped out. Certainly up until 1965 when the government officially stepped in to take over a much expanded National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants (NCCI), the control relations established were as obvious as those it attempted to establish on its international front.

What the IRR had to do domestically was not only to provide the liberal rationale for control relations, but also to demonstrate its belief in the fundamental rationality of man, the view that through reason and 'objective' argument good would triumph over evil.

This it did through proposing with other 'liberal' groups, whilst the Commonwealth Immigration Bill was still being debated, that a nightwatchman body should be set up to review British race and immigration problems.[87] Chaired by Lady Stella Reading, this Home Office supported body, the Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council, drew its members mostly from IRR's Council and membership. As the precursor of today's Parliamentary Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, its job from its inception in June 1962 was simply to advise the government on race and immigration matters, including the possible re-organisation and co-ordination of racial harmony work that had mushroomed throughout urban Britain since the 1958 riots.[88]

In fact in nearly every major city ad hoc groups had formed to foster multi-racial friendship. Some were attached to churches, particularly local meeting houses of the Society of Friends (Quakers); others to regional Councils of Social Service; and all possessed firmer links with police and local government authorities than with the 'dark strangers'.[89] What they lacked according to IRR and the body it ideologically controlled, CIAC, was a coherent policy of integration. They were all moving in different directions, responding to locally construed needs, often duplicating work, and certainly misunderstanding the complexities involved in race relations theory and practice researched by the Institute. To co-ordinate their various activities, organise the abundance of

goodwill into a positive social force, and to provide the conceptual and administrative apparatus that appeared to be missing, the Institute during 1963 advised the CIAC and through it and indeed independently the government that a national liason body with a full time Advisory Officer should be established.[90]

> "We recommend that the terms of reference for such an Advisory Officer should be as follows:
>
> (a) The Officer is to be concerned with practical problems arising from the presence of Commonwealth Immigrants in Britain.
>
> (b) He is to have no executive function; his duties are to be purely advisory.
>
> (c) It will be his duty to consult and advise Local Authorities and voluntary bodies interested in the welfare of Commonwealth immigrants. He will bring to the notice of such authorities and bodies the experiments and methods of work of other bodies and any other relevant information, and may also suggest new experiments and methods of work.
>
> We have considered the best means by which such an officer might be guided (as) he will from time to time require guidance and the support which can be derived from discussion. It seems to us that he will need to draw on specialist knowledge in the matter of race relations and also on practical experience of dealings with community problems and Local Authorities. The Institute of Race Relations is best placed to supply the one and the National Council of Social Service the other. After considering the question of dividing responsibility equally between the two bodies we have concluded that it would make for administrative simplicity if the primary responsibility rests with one of the two, the other acting as a facilitating agency. This matter is central to the interests of the Institute of Race Relations, and we think it would be simpler if this body took the main responsibility ... The Advisory Officer should find that his task is considerably helped if he is in close contact with Mr. E.J.B. Rose who is directing for the Institute the Survey of Race Relations recently announced in the press, while the Newsletter of the Institute will provide a ready vehicle for circulating information.

> We recommend that the Council should request the Home Secretary to make available financial provision for the appointment of such an officer, who would be appointed and directed in his work by a voluntary committee.
>
> The voluntary committee might be composed of seven members (with power to co-opt two more); four, including the chairman, to be nominated by the Institute of Race Relations and three to be nominated by the National Council of Social Service ...
>
> The ultimate responsibility for the satisfactory performance of his duties by the Advisory Officer, should rest with the Council of the Institute of Race Relations, to whom the grant would be paid and who would account for the grant."[91]

Apart from the funding procedures which were revised to safeguard the Institute's apparent political independence, and academic objectivity - funds were ultimately channelled through the Womens Voluntary Service - these recommendations were fully accepted by the government.[92] Philip Mason became the first Chairman of NCCI in April 1964 and, more importantly, the Institute embarked as totally as it could, without raising either academic or political attention, on its programme of 'informed guidance'. After 1965, and also after its central role in the development of official government, immigration control and racial harmony policy (1965 White Paper), the Institute was forced to withdraw from the open sponsorship and control of official and voluntary effort in the field.[93] This came about partly because it had succeeded in getting government involvement when the latter informed Parliament that it was to take over and officially fund MCCI; partly because to continue openly would attract internal dissent and particularly

opposition from its professional academic members; and partly because by 1965 experience on its international front and at Ditchley Park had convinced it that there existed other less obvious ways of achieving much the same result.

The first and most logical in terms of its former relationship with MCCI was a form of proxy or representational control. Abroad this had worked quite efficiently in the disguise of 'intelligence committees', Institute groups in various countries, the Industrial Group, and the African Private Enterprise Group. Firstly, it either entailed a dominant presence and hence ability to project IRR thinking to the group(s) it established or courted, or, secondly, it entailed the direct supervision of aspects of the group(s)' work under the cover that IRR members were only acting in their individual capacities.[94] Although there also existed other minor control devices such as friendship debts and associational bonding, this appeared to be the chief device employed in its subsequent relations with NCCI and indeed its successor, the Community Relations Commission. Basically it depended upon the exercise of influence at two levels within the organisation. The first, as already indicated, involved the promotion and maintaining of close contact with senior administrative or professional staff. The first Advisory Officer, Nadine Peppard, for instance, was selected by IRR members, housed in IRR premises, and guided by IRR's director; and once NCCI became a fully fledged government-sponsored body in September

1965, the Advisory Officer on the Institute's recommendation became its first General Secretary.[95] Other senior NCCI staff including its first Public Relations and Information Officer and Research Assistant were also members of the Institute and worked in close co-operation, under indirect supervision, with the Institute. This professional relationship as it was sometimes referred to was that much strengthened by the presence of IRR representatives on the controlling body. Not only were the directors of the Institute and IRR's Survey and other IRR members prominent figures on the National Committee itself, but they were also centrally involved in the Committee's work which was basically carried on by its seven original Advisory Panels which in turn had been modelled on the Survey's Advisory Panel.[96] Only on the Health and Social Work Training Panels was the Institute not represented; on all others its representatives occupied positions which were relatively more powerful than others because of their access to and provision of Institute services.[97] They were for instance able to place the specialist services of the library at the various Panels' disposal; they were able to inject up to date facts and information gleaned from IRR's extensive press cuttings service and information gathering activities into Committee and Panel discussions; they were able to make available interim research findings, particularly from the Survey; they were able to offer introductions to those whom mattered (on race relations) in government, industry, and elsewhere; and, yet again,

as the most senior body in the field which had been thinking about the problems for more than a decade, they were in a position to make sure that their approach to the subject, the beliefs, values, and goals which informed their commitment to improved race relations, did not stray too far away from the main objective for which IRR had been the principal author - namely that NCCI should be 'required to promote and co-ordinate on a national basis efforts directed towards the integration of Commonwealth immigrants into the community'.[98]

Simply not only did it 'acknowledge some degree of parenthood for the first NCCI and thus for the second, and thus for the Community Relations Commission' but, at all times it seemed to maintain a form of paternal protection and guidance.[99]

Instead of wishing to exert influence however, on the organisational shape and structure of both NCCI and the CRC, IRR throughout the sixties was more concerned with seeking to control the way approaches to the subject were formulated, the kind of information that was disseminated, and the social and political impact of its thinking in action. Possibly more than any other group of considerations, these on the domestic front led directly to the formation of the Runneymede Trust, an Institute-sponsored body which specifically addressed itself to the 'propaganda function' denied to the Institute by its own

Articles of Memorandum and Association.[100] As both an organisational form for IRR's purpose of protecting the prevailing political and social order, and as an example of the creation of sub-agencies to co-ordinate an undeclared aspect of its work, the Trust, like APEG, evolved from the view that there existed definable (political rather than merely economic) interest groups that needed to be persuaded that political and social integration could only be achieved if the 'facts were known and placed within a wider political context'.[101] However, or so it was argued, it was improper for the principal advisory bodies to undertake the function(s) envisaged as they were neither designed to deal quickly with certain political aspects involved in public education areas, nor prepared to jeopardise their politically impartial, objective, and advisory roles.[102] Further, if the government itself sought to perform the kind of political activity required, there would be 'an obvious danger to freedom of speech and political democracy'. Other groups that might have been able to perform the task, such as the Economist Intelligence Unit, the British Carribean Association, or CARD, were rejected on the grounds that their aims were too narrowly defined to allow such an extension of purpose. The only feasible way forward was to establish a Trust along similar lines as the Potomac Institute in the United States with the objective of enquiring into the facts of racial discrimination, disseminating techniques for improving relations, preparing and distributing

propaganda literature; and providing politically significant information to, as well as maintaining close touch with, the Press, television, radio, political parties and industry.[103]

Whilst the Institute would find ways of instigating and supporting its work as fully as it could without actually offering its 'letterhead', it was also hoped that the Trust proposed by a small group of Council members would always 'work in close association with the Institute, draw much of its factual material from its library', but, diplomatically, 'would leave out both the suggestion of close co-operation with the Institute and the definition of the Institute's work' when approaching other bodies for additional support.[104] Recognising 'that with present resources it was not possible for the Institute to do everything', IRR came to the conclusion that 'it would in many cases be better that the cudgels should be taken up by bodies other than the Institute; that Council members interested should collect funds for this purpose; and form a voluntary committee of eminent people which could act as a pressure group in this matter, drawing on the Institute for its information and, in his personal capacity, the Director's advice on the formation of such a group'.[105] By July 1968, exactly three years after Anthony Lester's proposals for the creation of the Runnymede Trust were submitted to the Institute's Council, the Trustees were appointed.

They included Lord (Jock) Campbell, Council member Lord Boyle, Institute Chairman Lord Walston, Institute Director Philip Mason, and Jim Rose, Anthony Lester, Nicholas Deakin, and a number of other IRR members attached as either 'Advisors' or 'Consultants'. Institute Council member, Dipak Nandy, a former executive committee member of CARD was appointed as Runnymede's first director, and with funds mainly from IRR industrial and corporate supporters, the Trust emerged in 1968 as one of the Institute's principal sub-agency bodies.[106]

As Lord Walston pointed out in his Annual Report for that year:

> "Although entirely independent of the Institute we have close association with it, and were consulted continuously during its parental period ... I am sure that Runnymede, the Community Relations Commission, the Race Relations Board and the Institute will all complement each other in a very valuable manner".[107]

The way in which the various race bodies initiated or directly sponsored by the Institute actually complemented each other signified not only the deep extent of IRR's control: it also portrayed two other forms of control related intrinsically to IRR's perception of itself as the national co-ordinator of race relations activity. The first, as was briefly noted in Chapter One, concerned its general position as the legitimate cartographer and co-ordinator of the national organisation of race relations

research and practice. And the second to some extent sprang from its history as the instigator of action in the field and its belief that it should represent on its Council only the 'top people' involved or interested. Both were inter-related. That is to say, the functions it delineated in respect of its place in the national organisation were partly informed by the knowledge that representatives of all the organisations discussed had since 1965 been incorporated onto its Council to form in addition to the original interest groups a distinctive clique of race professionals.[108]

So with respect to its role as the national co-ordinator of race research and practice and the twelve main national functions IRR actually listed, in a document to the Home Office there certainly appeared to be no problem attached to the first two: the receiving, investigating and dealing with complaints by conciliation under the 1965 Race Relations Act; and the guiding and co-ordinating of voluntary effort to create racial harmony.[109] For the first represented a judicial and executive function statutorily performed by the Race Relations Board; and the second alluded to the work of NCCI/CRC. In both cases the chairman and/or senior executive committee members of the two bodies were also members of the Institute's Council. For instance, Mark Bonham Carter, on becoming the first chairman of the Race Relations

Board joint IRR's Council, continued to remain an active member throughout his subsequent chairmanship of the Community Relations Commission. Lord Boyle, the chairman of RRB's Northern Regional Conciliation Committee, and, as we have seen, other IRR members who were actively involved in the NCCI/CRC were all primarily committed to the Institute's work. And it was this primary commitment which made it easier for the Institute to resolve the problems that had arisen over the third function it identified, the making of recommendations to government on immediate policies and action. For, here, according to IRR, an element of competition had crept into the orderly arrangement of race relations work.[110] Many of the groups and bodies it had spawned were trying to establish themselves also as the legitimate advisor, and in the case of NCCI/CRC its statutory terms of reference had permitted it to do so. Thus what had to be decided amongst the race groups represented on IRR's Council was the kind of relationship that should exist between the producers of knowledge and the givers of advice. As it appeared embarrassingly clear that 'the very complex advisory function, in which account had to be taken of the results of research (IRR), as well as the feeling of local communities (NCCI/CRC)', could only be carried out properly if the parental body actually chose to communicate its findings and make its library and information services available, the groups amicably reached a working agreement.[111] In short, the upper hand

in the advisory function and relationship should, until the organisation and groups themselves built up a professionally competent research facility, remain substantially with the parental body.[112]

Unlike the advisory function, there existed room for 'approaches of varying degrees of militancy and detachment' for the next four itemised by IRR: putting the immigrant point of view; taking up 'hard cases' which fell outside the provisions of the 1965 and later 1968 Race Relations Act; combating defamatory or racist articles with counter propaganda; and 'providing positive information' for both the general public and those who hoped to to lead opinion. The immigrant point of view had hitherto been conveyed by (white) CARD whose active executive committee members, Anthony Lester, Dipak Nandy and Julia Gaitskell were all IRR members, but after the black takeover in 1967 this task could best be performed by NCCI/CRC as a 'secondary function', and the Institute itself, although the latter would 'need to exercise some diplomatic caution'.[113] 'Hard cases' should be handled by groups such as the newly created Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI) whose secretary, Mary Dines, and other leading members - all IRR members, working closely with IRR staff and using IRR facilities - could be relied upon, or the more 'responsible Commonwealth immigrant associations' connected with

and favoured by NCCI/CRC.[114] The propaganda function would of course be carried out by IRR's Runnymede Trust, and the production and dissemination of 'positive information', like the remaining four recognised functions, would continue to be the sole responsibility of the Institute. They included publishing research results, pooling and distributing information about research, planning and initiating research, and the actual doing of research.[115]

In short then, the future place or role of the Institute in the national organisation of race relations activity on its domestic front was to be that of the chief backroom planner, co-ordinator, and if necessary, initiator. Instead of being seen to act as such through openly fronting organisations, as it had done before 1965, it was by 1969, the year of Philip Mason's retirement and the setting up of its two major 'cells' - IRSP and JUMPR - able to control developments through its own Council as much as through representation on sibling groups; by being the architect of a liberal approach that appeared to satisfy all interests; by holding a monopoly of legitimate ideas and thoughts on the subject; by possessing exclusively the much needed facilities and services others needed to develop, to act; by being an international centre with well worn access routes to funding agencies, government(s), industry; by being approved as

such a centre by those it addressed here and abroad; and by being an institution not only of 'research' but also an accredited agency of social protection.

Through using its authority to construct power it thus appeared to be able to control not only developments in race research on both fronts but also to influence and guide the direction of much international and even more domestic race work and policy during the 1950s and 1960s.

CHAPTER FOUR

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Philip Mason, 'Thirty Year Group: Article Summarising Papers and Discussions', Social Science Research Council, 1967, p.1.

2. The 'Thirty Year Group', an IRR/SSRC body, was set up in 1966/67 to review possible long term race relations research for the next thirty years. For further information on this august Group see in particular Council Paper 25, 'Thirty Year Group', 24th January, 1967, IRR, London, pp.1-21; and Philip Mason, 'The Thirty Year Group: Article summarising Papers and Discussions', an unpublished paper presented to the Second Annual Conference of the Social Science Research Council, University of Warwick, 1967, pp.1-13. The initial members of this group were: Philip Mason, Prof. Maurice Freedman, Mrs. Ruth Glass, Nicholas Deakin, Dr. Ronald Goldman, Dr. Ainsworth Harrison, Prof. R.B. LePage, Prof. Kenneth Little, Prof. J.C. Mitchell, Dr. Stephen Morris, Prof. Margaret Read, Prof. John Rex, Dr. Henry Tajfel, Prof. Michael Banton, Prof. Henriques, Dr. Hourani, Prof. K. Kirkwood, Anthony Lester, Prof. Mayer, Prof. R. Oliver, Mrs. Patterson, Jim Rose and Prof. Hugh Tinker.
At a Group meeting held on Wednesday 13th July, 1966, the following additional persons were asked to join: Dr. Basil Bernstein, Thomas Hodgkin, Prof. G. Jahoda, Prof. Needleman, Colin Newbury, Prof. B. Roberts, Dr. Peter Robinson, and GND Worswick. (See Minutes of the meeting, 14th July, 1966, IRR.)

3. See The Report of the Royal Commission on East Africa, HMSO, London, June 1955; and for the Institute's response, A New Deal in East Africa, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, 1955, pp. 1-37.

4. Ibid.

5. Philip Mason, Race Relations in Africa Considered Against the Background of History and World Opinion, SCM Press Ltd., London, 1960, pp.1-24. This paper was delivered as the Burge Memorial Lecture at Church House, Westminster, on 31st March, 1960. However, for a further exposition of this approach see in particular Philip Mason's 'An Approach to Race Relations', Race, November, 1959, and 'Race Relations: A Field of Study Comes of Age', SOAS Papers, London, 1968.

6. Philip Mason, The Institute of Race Relations, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, 1976, pp.13-14.

7. Philip Mason, Interview, 18th February, 1976.

8. Ibid.

9. The two Research Fellows, funded from the Rockerfeller Grant were Richard Gray and John Clegg. The latter had been an agriculturist in Government Service in Northern Rhodesia, but, according to Mason, 'had decided he wanted to change to sociology or social work'. (Mason), 1976, op cit, p.14).

10. Lord Hailey, African Survey, R11A/Oxford University Press, London, 1952. The tribute paid to Lord Hailey by London University's Public Orator on receiving his honorary Doctor of Laws Degree in January, 1958, is particularly significant in this context. It opened:

> "It has been the glory of British Imperial Government that its officials have been men of great intellectual qualities and of high disinterestedness. That previous tradition Lord Hailey eminently represents and most worthily upholds. The forty years of his service in India and especially his governorship of the Punjab and later of the United Provinces was adorned by the enlightened virtues of the great administrator ... Lord Hailey was a natural choice to undertake this immense task (African Survey). On his retirement from India, he became Director of the African Research Survey. With indefatigable vigour he toured the African continent, and from this large investigation there issued an historic report which is a monument of administrative wisdom and which provided the indispensable foundation for all discussions of policy on African questions. Has it not been told how even African farmers hurry to local meetings with this invaluable but uncomfortably shaped volume tucked tightly under their arms? This close study of colonial dependencies Lord Hailey has continued (as the first chairman of the embryonic IRR at Chatham House)".

(RIIA, Annual Report, 1952/53, Chatham House, London).

11. Philip Mason, 1976, op cit. pp. 21-22.

12. Ibid.

13. See A.Sivanandan, Race and Resistance: The IRR Story, Race Today Publications, London, 1974, p.3. For further detail concerning the purpose, direction and funding of The Tropical Africa Project through the IRR Industrial Group see Council Paper 11, 'The Tropical Africa Project and The Industrial Group', 29th April, IRR, London, 1959.

14. Guy Hunter, The New Societies of Tropical Africa: A Selective Study, Oxford University Press, London, 1962. Guy Hunter, whose interests were in the successful development of new nations rather than in the broader picture of race relations in general had been appointed in 1959 by IRR to direct the Tropical Africa Project.

15. Ibid, pp.IX-XIX.

16. See 'Balance of Funds from the Tropical Africa Project', Council Paper 144(a), IRR, London, 20th July, 1964. David Birmingham was commissioned to undertake the Angolan project; Christopher Hill, then IRR's Assistant Director, the study of Bantustans; E.G. Tanoh, a study of democratic traditions and experiments in Ghana; and Prof. Philip Mayer on a proposed new South Africa project. The small balance left over was used to cover the cost of an IRR hosted dinner party for the African Private Enterprise Group: 'This discussion group was formed as a direct result of the Tropical Africa Project at the wish of some of the chief sponsors and it seemed reasonable that ... the cost of the dinner should be met from these funds'. (Ibid. p.2.)

17. Organised by Guy Hunter the papers presented to this conference were later published in Guy Hunter, (ed); Industrialisation and Race Relations: A Symposium, Oxford University Press, London, 1965. For not only an illustration of Hunter's academic industry during the 1960s, but also of his approach to race relations within a framework of development studies/sociology see Education for a Developing Region: A Study in East Africa, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1963; South East Asia: Race, Culture and Nation, Oxford University Press, London 1966; The Best of Both Worlds: A Challenge on Development Policies in Africa, Oxford University Press, London, 1967; and Modernising Peasant Societies: A Comparative Study in Asia and Africa, Oxford University Press, London, 1967.

18. For more general detail on these developments consult IRR Annual Reports for 1963, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

19. The Ford letter is mentioned in Mason 1976, op cit, pp.21-23, and quoted in Sivanandan, 1974, op cit. pp. 5-6.

20. Ibid.

21. The Conference was held between 31st October and 2nd November, 1962. For a full list of participants at the Ditchley Park Conference see Appendix F.

22. See Report of the Conference at Ditchley Park, 31st October - 2nd November, IRR, London, 1962.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid. Here the report goes on: if one came up before a court, it was 'natural to offer certain payments up to an approved value for any service which ... the judge or officials may render'. This section concluded 'self-interest helps to keep "squeeze" within bounds but extortion should lead to revolution or to the extinction of the goose that lays the egg'.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Sivanandan, op cit. p.6.

30. Cited in Leslie Farrar-Brown, 'Chairman's Review of the Year', Annual Report 1965/66, IRR, London, 1966, p.1.

31. See Letter from Philip Mason to Joe Slater, Ford Foundation, 3rd February, IRR, London, 1966, p.1 in conjunction with Draft Submission to Ford Foundation, IRR, London, 27th January, 1967, paragraph 1, which opens: 'During the past year, the Institute of Race Relations and the officers of the Ford Foundation have been discussing the dangers to international tranquility and obstacles to national progress caused by racial hostility ... '

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Annual Report 1965/66, IRR, London, 1966, p.4. This project was to be jointly sponsored by IRR and the Overseas Development Institute.

36. See Guy Hunter, 'Research Project of the Institute of Race Relations and the Overseas Development Institute : More Detailed Proposals', IRR, London, 1965, pp.1-10.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39 See letter from Philip Mason to Joe Slater, 26th January, 1967, IRR, London, which identifies the date of the meeting as Friday, 13th January, 1967 at which Ford's Officer informed the director that he had received a 'mandate from his Trustees to pursue vigorously the ideas discussed the previous year'.

40. See letter from Philip Mason to L.E. Waddilove, Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust, 4th October, 1967, IRR, London. This letter in effect was a report to Rowntree of the ideas discussed and state of negotiations reached with Ford. In it and indeed in the IRR's earlier general submission to Rowntree, 'Research in Race Relations', (submitted as Council Paper 31), 7th July, 1967, these main functions are set out quite explicitly.

41. See Philip Mason, 'Report on Philip Mason's Visit to U.S.A.: 23-9-67 - 1-10-67', IRR, London, 10th October, 1967, pp.1-6.

42. Ibid, pp.2-3.

43. Ibid. It should be noted that doubt or even anxiety echoed earlier reservations expressed in a letter to Joe Slater on 4th November, 1966: 'Any initiative to set up Institutes concerned with Group Relations (which I think would be a more tactful name) in other countries would clearly be a diplomatic operation of the utmost delicacy ...'

44. Ibid, p.3.

45. Ibid, p.4.

46. Ibid. For further information on these negotiations also see Philip Mason, 'Additional Note on Visit to U.S.A.: 23-9-67 - 1.10.67', 10th October, 1967.

47. The Institute's immediate response to the Notting Hill riots in 1958 was to commission, write and rapidly produce a survey of current research and facts on race in Britain. Completed in six weeks by James Wukenden it was published as Colour in Britain, Oxford University Press, London, 1958. Also during the same year a grant of £7,336 was secured from the Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust for a research project on West Indians in London.

48. See Philip Mason, 'What Do We Mean By Integration', New Society, 16th June, 1966.

49. Ibid.

50. Philip Mason, Guardian, 23rd January, 1965. Although this was the first published statement of the Institute's viewpoint on immigration control it was, however, and according to Mason, a view which crystallised in the Institute after the 1958 riots. As Paul Foot points out, the political demands for strict black immigration control arose in part as a reaction to the racial unrest in Britain during 1958/59 as well as a reaction to economic and employment conditions. For further evidence of this and the relationship between immigration control and politics see Paul Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1965; Chris Mullard, Black Britain, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1973; T.W.E. Roche, The Key in the Lock, John Murray, 1969; S. Patterson, Immigration and Race Relations in Britain, 1966-1967, Oxford University Press, 1969, particularly chapters 1-3; Derek Humphrey and Michael Ward, Passport and Politics, Penguin Books, Harmandsworth, 1974; John Rex, Race, Colonialism and the City, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973; and Robert Moore and Tina Wallace, Slamming the Door : The Administration of Immigration Control, Martin Robertson, London, 1975.

51. As Philip Mason put it: 'Unlike the Irish or Jewish immigrants during an earlier period of migration, they were visibly different and thus appeared to present more of a threat to our society ... our treatment of colonial subjects was not at all times as exemplary as it could have been ...' (Interview, 18th February, 1976).

52. Detectable in most of IRR's early internal papers on its domestic approach, these assumptions are also quite apparent in Mason's summary paper of this documentation: 'Notes on Integration, Assimilation, Accommodation and Multi-racialism with a suggestion as to the goals at which we should be aiming', IRR, London, 29th April, 1966.

53. Philip Mason, 1976, op cit. pp.39-40.

54. Ibid.

55. Leslie Farrer-Brown, Interview, 2nd November, 1976. Dr. Farrer-Brown was at this time the Chairman of IRR.

56. Annual Report 1965/66, IRR, London, 1966, p.2.

57. The funds for a British Survey of Race Relations were eventually secured with Farrer-Brown's help from the Nuffield Foundation. It agreed in late 1962, a few months after Ford's decision to underwrite 'important international developments', to grant £70,000 with a provision that a further grant of £23,500 would be made in 1965 if required. Including £10,000 from the 1964 Labour Government's £25,000 grant to the Institute, the overall cost of the Survey amounted to £104,290. Leslie Farrer-Brown's role in the actual negotiations with Nuffield - he was still then Nuffield's Director - was, of course, vital; it convinced most Council members, including the outgoing Chairman, Sir Alexander Carr-Sanders, that he should become the independent Institute's second Chairman. For Carr-Sanders views on Farrer-Brown's capabilities and experience in fund-raising and research administration, and recommendation that the retiring Nuffield Director should succeed him, see the letter from H.V. Hodson to Philip Mason, 25th January, 1964, IRR, London and more particularly, the letter from Sir Alexander Carr-Sanders to Michael Caine, 24th January, 1964, IRR, London. It reads in part:

> "Mr. Farrer-Brown is retiring from the post of Director of the Nuffield Foundation ... He has been approached and if the Council thought it right to invite him it is likely that he would accept the chairmanship. I need not emphasise the advantage to the Institute of securing the services of a Chairman with such a wide experience of the problems arising from the financing and administration of research ..."

58. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma, Harper and Row, New York, 1944. For an account of the hoped for relationship between this work and the British Survey's, see Philip Mason's Preface and Jim Rose's introduction in Colour and Citizenship, Oxford University Press, London, 1969.

59. Philip Mason, 1976, op cit. p.29.

60. Jim Rose, 'Survey of Race Relations : The Outline Plan', IRR, London, June 1964, pp.1-4. Also see Note 63 in Chapter Three.

61. Philip Mason, 1976, op cit, pp. 29-33.

62. Ibid.

63. See Jim Rose, 'Survey of Race Relations in Britain : Progress Report, January, 1964', IRR, London, p.3. It should however, be noted that Jim Rose's appointment was considered by Mason, if not by the whole Institute Council as 'the best in the circumstances'. What Mason and the Institute had wanted was an individual of the academic and public standing of Myrdal. But few people of the calibre of Lord Devlin, Lord Franks and twenty other prominent figures here and abroad approached were interested. (Mason, 1976, Interview, op cit.)

64. Philip Mason, 1976, op cit, pp.28-29 and Interview, op cit. Jim Rose was appointed as the Survey's Director on 1st October, 1963 (See letter from Philip Mason, to E.J.B. Rose, 17th September, 1963; letter from E.J.B. Rose to Philip Mason, 1st October, 1963, and Memorandum of Administrative Arrangements for Nuffield Survey', IRR, London, 15th October, 1963); and for further information on Jim Rose's qualifications for the post see 'Background Notes to Press Release', IRR, London, Thursday, 26th September, 1963.

65. Jim Rose, Interview, 13th July, 1976.

66. It should be remembered that much of IRR's so-called liberal perspective was always assumed, hidden beneath frequently employed concepts such as 'integration' and, 'racial harmony' and 'tolerance'; but, as already noted, some concerted effort between 1960-1965 was made to clarify both the Institute's policy position vis a vis U.K. race relations and its theoretical approach. With emphasis placed on studying immigrants, prejudice and other attitudes, the major research areas it chose to investigate were themselves illustrative of its overall approach. For an early list of these see Jim Rose, 'Survey of Race Relations in Britain : The Outline Plan', IRR, London, 1964, pp.1-14; and, for a final summary of all research projects commissioned for or undertaken directly by the Survey, see E.J.B. Rose and Associates, Colour and Citizenship : A Report on British Race Relations, Oxford University Press, London, 1969, Appendix 1:1, 'A Note on the Survey of Race Relations in Britain', pp.757-763.

67. See Note 2 above for references and further information on the Thirty Year Group. The Heyworth Committee was set up by the Government in 1963 'to review research in the field of Social Studies' and suggest how this could be better developed, organised and co-ordinated. Indirectly its Report (The Heyworth Committee Report, HMSO, London, 1964), led to the establishment of the SSRC's policy on programmes of research which, in turn, on IRR's advice, helped to inaugurate the Thirty Year Group. For more detail on this see in particular Dr. Michael Young, 'Note on Independent Research Institutes', SSRC, London, 19th May, 1966, pp.1-2.

68. See 'Thirty Year Group', 24th January, 1967, op cit.

69. Jim Rose, 'Survey of Race Relations in Britain : The Next Five Years', IRR, London, 17th October, 1966, p.4.

70. Philip Mason, 'Unit for Research in Race Relations in Britain : Submission to the Home Office', IRR, London, 12th April, 1967, pp.1-18.

71. Letter from David Ennals to Philip Mason, 15th January, 1967.

72. Letter from Philip Mason to David Ennals, 26th June, 1967.

73. Philip Mason, 'Interview with Sir Philip Allen, Wednesday, 12th July, 1967', IRR, London, pp.1-3.

74. Letter from Philip Mason to Sir Philip Allen, 30th November, 1967, pp.1-3.

75. Letter from Philip Mason to Sir Philip Allen, 6th March, 1968, pp.1-2.

76. From Ethnic Relations : The Work of SSRC Research Unit on Ethnic Relations at the University of Bristol, 1970-74, SSRC, London, 1975, p.3.

77. Ibid. The actual quotation originated from SSRC's Annual Report, 1969-70, pp.18-19, where the decision to establish a unit and its close relations with IRR are fully explained.

78. Philip Mason, 'Memorandum from Philip Mason to Council Members, IRR, London, 13th April, 1967.

79. Ibid.

80. Philip Mason, 'Report of Meeting with Michael Young on 21st February, 1967', IRR, London, 1967, p.2. Although at an earlier meeting with the first Chairman of SSRC on 21st October, 1966, the alternative strategy had been hinted at, it was not until the February 1967 Meeting that it surfaced as a practical possibility:

> "The alternative seemed to be (suggested Young), that we should put up to the SSRC the whole scheme ... I said I thought in this case we should still be well advised to go through 'the delicate diplomatic operation' we had outlined but that we must bring it to a point at which we could make an application to him in the course of the summer. And we must know that we had his backing ... He said we had every encouragement short of an actual cheque". (Ibid.)

81. See 'Submission to the Social Science Research Council', IRR, London, July, 1967, pp.1-6. Even though our main concern here is with the inter-agency and control aspects of IRR's attempt to organise and co-ordinate domestic research, it should be remembered that the political context in which the SSRC Ethnic Relations Unit - now at the University of Aston under Professor John Rex's direction - came into being was one of some significance. The political groundwork for the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act was being prepared; the Home Office was thinking about setting up its own research body - the Home Office Advisory Research Council - to supply it with the kind of facts it required for policy decisions; the development of a more organised anti-black immigration lobby, which to some extent came to a head with the eruption of so-called Powellism, was emerging in the South East and Midlands; and in the summer of 1967 the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination was taken over by a well organised group of black resisters. All these factors helped in various degrees to stimulate the quickness of the decision to set up the Unit.

82. See Philip Mason, 'Notes on a Conversation in Sussex', IRR, London, 8th February, 1967, pp.1-6. Those present at the Meeting at the University of Sussex on Sunday, 5th February, 1967 were Leslie Farrer-Brown, Philip Mason, then Professor Asa Briggs, who was shortly to become Vice Chancellor of the University, and Professor Henriques.

83. In a telegram dated November 1968, Joe Slater's successor, Frank Sutton, was delighted to notify IRR of Ford's informal approval of a $350,000 three year grant. Although the larger proportion of it, $300,000 was to go on 'inquiries into the effect of race on international agencies and international relations and the impact of urbanisation and industrialisation on ethnic groups' - the international unit or IRSP - the balance was to be earmarked for JUMPR. As the SSRC and other research funding agencies were only prepared to make grants for specific research projects, this sum in effect represented the bulk of its fixed revenue to cover administrative and operating costs. Thus it could be argued that the Ford Foundation more or less totally underwrote the operations of both 'cells', IRSP and JUMPR.

84. See Philip Mason, 'Unit for Research in Race Relations in Britain (URRB) : Draft Submission to the Home Office', IRR, London, 12th April, 1967, p.8. (N.B. The author is only in possession of a final draft submission which has been substantially revised and annotated for final typing. This document consists of 18 papers plus three short Appendices).

85. Philip Mason, 'Unit for Research in Race Relations in Britain', IRR, London, 6th March, 1969, pp.1-6. This paper documented and presented the discussions which took place at the Selection Board on Tuesday, 25th February, 1969, to appoint JUMPR's director.

86. Philip Mason, Interview, op cit.

87. I have not been able to locate the actual official proposals but according to Mason and other long standing members of IRR, the Institute, as the only national body in the field, saw itself as the principal author. For scantily more information on this however, see E.J.B. Rose and Associates, 1969, op cit. p.221 and 523.

88. See Commonwealth Immigrant Advisory Council, Report Cmnd 2119, HMSO, London, July, 1963. For a brief official history of the CIAC and its work consult its three subsequent Reports, Cmnd 2266, Cmnd 2458 and Cmnd 2796, all published by HMSO, London.

89. For instance, the Bristol Committee for the Welfare of Colonial Workers included representatives from the Co-operative Society, the Council of Social Service, the Council of Churches, the Chamber of Commerce, the Immigration Department of the Home Office, Her Majesty's Prisons, the National Assistance Board (Social Security), the Police Force, the Local Authority, and the Society of Friends. (From Robert A. Burt, Colour Prejudice in Great Britain, Princeton Press, New Jersey, 1960, p.104). For a not dissimilar account of the composition of the Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Community Relations Council and its predecessors see Chris Mullard, 1973, op cit; and for an account of the 'problems' presented by the so-called 'dark strangers' at this time and earlier see Shiela Patterson, Dark Strangers: A Study of West Indians in London, Tavistock Press, London, 1963; Michael Banton, The Coloured Quarter, Jonathan Cape, London, 1959; and A.H. Richmond, The Colour Problem, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1955.

90. See 'Recommendation to the Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council', IRR, London, 14th October, 1963. (This document/paper was also submitted to the Institute's Council as Council Paper 122, 'Co-ordination of Immigrant Welfare Work').

91. Ibid, pp.1-5.

92. The actual history of the first or for that matter the second NCCI has not as yet been written, but from the documentation the author possesses it is clear that the complex financial arrangements made through the WVS resulted in part from a desire to protect IRR's political impartiality. For evidence of this see in particular Council Paper 122, 'Co-ordination of Immigrant Welfare Work', 14th October, 1963; its Appendix, IRR's 'Recommendations to the Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council'; and for an even clearer statement consult Council Paper 129, simply called 'Advisory Officer', IRR, London, 21st January, 1964:

> "The effect of the method of payment is that the Institute will not have so much money passing through its books and will be free from any suggestion of influence through receiving a government grant. This is all to the good".

And as to IRR's control of NCCI:

> "The WVS will not wish to exercise any control over the Committee and do not even wish to nominate a member of it. I (Mason) suggest that the Institute should nominate Mr. Rose and Mr. MacColl as two of its nominees to the Committee and that it is left to me in consultation with CIAC to suggest the remaining one. (I suspect they will nominate me as Chairman)."
> (Council Paper, 129, p.1.)

93. See Immigration from the Commonwealth, The Prime Minister, White Paper, Cmnd 2739, HMSO, London, August, 1965. As we have already seen, together with Sir Jock Campbell (now Lord Campbell of Eskan), the Institute must be seen as an important if not the only principal author of this White Paper which articulated both the IRR/Government view on black immigration control and a programme for promoting racial harmony.

94. Whilst the Institute's Articles of Memorandum officially excluded the Institute from holding or expressing a corporate opinion or view, it made it that much easier for official Institute policy to be disguised in the form of recommendations or simply personal ideas from the director, chairman, or individual council member. In practice, of course, this clause meant that the Institute should not publicly hold a corporate opinion. And in practice it also meant that the bodies on which IRR members sat were safeguarded from feeling that they were being dominated or coerced by IRR members or personnel.

95. See Philip Mason, 1976, op cit. pp.26-29 for a general account of the development of what was called avuncularly 'Little Nicky', the NCCI under Mason's chairmanship from 1964-1966, and 'Big Nicky', the NCCI under the Archbishop of Canterbury's chairmanship.

96. The Survey's Advisory Panel was constituted of experts and established principally to review and comment upon research proposals submitted. From Spring 1964 until 1969 the following had served on the Panel: Michael Banton, Peter Calvocoressi, Maurice Freedman, Marie Jahoda, Shiela Patterson, Philip Mason, Michael Caine, Roland Oliver, Margaret Reed, Mark Abrams, Henri Tagfel and Richard Rose. NCCI's Panels were however established to review race relations policy rather than research in specific areas such as employment, housing, education and health. See The First Six Months : A Report of the Work of the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants from September, 1965, to March, 1966, NCCI, London, 1966, for a full list of the various Panels and an indication of the prominence of IRR members on them - particularly Philip Mason, Jim Rose, Nicholas Deakin, Anthony Lester, Loan Lestor and Shiela Patterson.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid, p.3.

99. Philip Mason, op cit, p.29.

100. See 'Proposals for the Creation of the Runnymede Trust', IRR, London, 16th June, 1965, pp. 1-4.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid; and see Council Paper 161, 'The Runnymede Trust', 1st July, 1965 for further detail on the social genesis of the Trust; and an article entitled 'The Runnymede Trust : The Race Industry', Ink, 14-20 April, 1972, for an interesting though slightly speculative history and analysis of the Trust's subsequent relationship to IRR and international business.

104. From the Minutes of the 35th Meeting of Council, 27th October, 1965, Minute 7, p.23, IRR, London. From the context of this Minute the meaning given to the word 'definition' appears to relate to the fact that IRR Council members considered the Trust's proposed work would be made more difficult if it were generally known that the Institute were primarily engaged in 'objective' and sober fact finding research. And, conversely, it was felt that if the Trust was publicly seen to be an integral part of the Institute's operations, IRR's ability to maintain its scientific, objective and scholarly facade would become impaired. The small group of Council members and others who seemed to back the Trust's formation included Anthony Lester, from whom the idea originated, Jim Rose, Dipak Nandy, and Philip Mason.

105. From the Minutes of the 34th Meeting of Council, 21st July, 1965, Minute 453, IRR, London.

106. See The Runnymede Trust 1970 : A Report, Runnymede Trust, London, 1971 for a full list of Trustees, Advisory Committee members and senior staff.

107. Lord Walston, 'Review of the Year', in IRR Annual Report 1968/69, IRR, London, 1969, p.2.

108. For an analytically interesting account of the growth of what Heineman originally termed 'the constellation of race professionals', essentially an organised system of family relations, see Benjamin W. Heineman Jnr., The Politics of the Powerless : A Study of the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination, Oxford University Press, London, 1972, pp.126-128. He noted:

"The main cohesive element among these 'professionals' was general agreement on the need for improving the conditions of life of the coloured immigrant in Britain. ... This shared attitude was necessarily important as a force which made people work closely together. Yet the 'professionals' were hardly a closed group (just as the 'constellation' was hardly a formal alliance). They did not necessarily devote full time to race relations, nor did they operate self-consciously in tandem. Through constant contact with one another they were able to know what others in the field were doing and to complement rather than duplicate their efforts. In the campaign for extension of laws, this informal planning could produce multiple activities giving an impression of strength. The 'professionals' often joked about their similarity to a stage army with the actor-soldiers disappearing through one trap-door to re-emerge from another. They were all conscious that through over-lapping membership they wore 'different hats' in the same enterprise.

The 'constellation' can be broadly described by noting the organisations with a rough similarity of views regarding new legislation, by indicating certain individuals who were in close and continual, if informal, contact, and by examining the interlocking memberships some of them shared.....

Of all the people in these organisations, the most active and in most continuous contact were Mark Bonham Carter; John Lyttle; Nadine Peppard, general secretary of the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants; Martin Ennals, Information Officer of the National Committee; his brother, David Ennals; Nicholas Deakin and E.J.B. Rose of the 'Survey of Race Relations'; Anthony Lester, Dipak Nandy, and David Pitt of CARD. These one might identify as the 'race professionals'. Some were active full time in race relations, others were not, but all were distinctly concerned with changing public policy."

The omission of Philip Mason and others from this list is not surprising as they were neither 'public figures' in the sense of wanting to court publicity, nor were they in Mason's view 'limelighters'. As I have attempted to show they were essentially powerful back-room planners, and to put it rather crudely, 'king-makers'. Through the Institute, they saw themselves as the co-ordinators of the 'constellation' and for this reason they successfully incorporated the race-professionals of <u>their</u> making (Nadine Peppard, Jim Rose, Nicholas Deakin, etc.), and those that appeared to emerge independently (Mark Bonham Carter, Anthony Lester, etc.), onto the Council.

109. See Philip Mason, 'Race Relations in Britain : Some Thoughts on National Organisation and the Place of the Institute', IRR, London, 28th February, 1967, pp.1-6. This document was forwarded to the Home Secretary and discussed by the Home Office in the context of the Institute's role vis-a-vis the organisation of national research, the setting up of the IRR/SSRC Ethnic Relations Unit and the establishment of JUMPR. To a large extent this paper was based upon Council Paper 21, 'Future Organisation for Research in Britain', IRR, London, 17th November, 1966, which in turn was written in the light of Michael Caine's earlier report, 'The Future of the Institute', IRR, London, 23rd January, 1966. So looking at the national scene in 1966/67, it had become apparent to the Institute that 'there existed a number of functions which needed to be discharged; a number of bodies discharging some of them, but not all, and there appeared to be an unacceptable amount of organisational overlap'. In these circumstances, it thus seemed 'desirable to identify and distinguish the functions needed and the best means of carrying them out, with particular relation to the role the Institute ought to follow in the future'. And this constituted the aim of the 28th February, 1967, op cit. paper.

110. Ibid, p.1.

111. Ibid.

112. This was informally agreed upon by in particular NCCI/CRC, and the Runnymede Trust. In the case of the Race Relations Board tacit agreement still existed in this respect, although to the annoyance of the Institute it had in Summer, 1966, together with NCCI, commissioned 'an outside body to undertake its discrimination Survey: we thought then we could have done the job just as well', (Philip Mason, Interview, op cit.) Although the PEP Report was later published as W.W. Daniel's Racial Discrimination in England, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1968, and although the ill-feeling that existed between IRR and RRB was quickly healed, the actual relationship between the two bodies always depended largely upon that which existed between the two chief executives - Philip Mason and Mark Bonham Carter. Especially when the latter took over from Frank Counsins as the Chairman of the Community Relations Commission, it seemed, as we shall see in a later chapter, that his allegiance to the Institute and acknowledgement of it as the legitimate co-ordinator of race research somewhat weakened.

113. Philip Mason, 28th February, 1967, op cit. p.3.

114. Ibid. One of the tasks of the NCCI/CRC was to keep an up to date list of all black/immigrant organisations and other bodies concerned with multi-racial matters. This list, which consisted of several hundred organisations, was used by local voluntary committees and community relations councils for both recruitment-selection and veto purposes. Each year local CRCs and other bodies were requested to let NCCI/CRC have up to date lists of immigrant organisations and other bodies in their areas, together with the names of so-called 'leaders'. From this information head office was able to draw up lists of bodies that were 'responsible' and could be relied upon to help foster good community relations; needless to say militant and/or 'Black Power' groups did not fall under this category: they were seen as disruptive agencies; groups that should be ostracised, neutralised, and positively discouraged from what was euphemistically termed 'the community relations and racial harmony programme'.

115. Ibid.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE UTOPIANS (1) : SPACE, CONFLICT AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Aspects of the kind of control exhibited and exercised on the two fronts were also detectable within the Institute. Despite occasional objections from members of staff who either wished the Institute to adopt a 'more positive approach' or to democratise and open up its internal structures, the Council and director during the 1960s remained adamantly indifferent.[1] In their view there existed no convincing need for change or to respond to the 'constant pressure from different quarters to enter more militantly the area of pressure groups'.[2] For over a decade the Institute had 'striven to become a clearing house of information regarding race relations throughout the world, a centre to which informed people of many shades of opinion and different background had turned to give and receive advice. To be effective in this way, the Founder members had believed that the Institute must stand above day-to-day politics and must be seen to be independent and to be dealing, in so far as it was possible, with the presentation of facts. They recognised that opinions and interpretations have their place, but felt that the Institute should on all occasions try to ensure that such comments were expressed with accuracy and moderation; as a corporate body it should refrain from making any pronouncements'.[3]

> "We believe that the Institute must continue on these lines. We should, perhaps, make more widely known our commitment, care and concern with the improvement of race relations and the extent to which the staff and information services are able to advise on important issues of the day, whether from a theoretical or practical point of view".[4]

Even after 1968, the passing of the 'Kenyan Asian' Bill (the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act), Enoch Powell's notorious speech, when again some members of staff urged the Institute to reconsider its role, the Council's response remained steadfastly secure in the belief that facts and reason were stronger than opinions and sentiment.

Simply:

> "Discussions must be based upon facts rather than emotion, and must take place in an atmosphere of objectivity rather than prejudice. It is here, in the short run, that the Institute can make its most important contribution ... As in the past, the Institute (must) continue to provide facts based on honest research in order to enable people to come to their own decisions".[5]

Even if those members of staff who internally had expressed some reservations about the Institute's involvement in both the 1965 and 1968 control policies had been allowed to air them publicly they would have been restrained by several considerations.

Firstly:

> "(Because) it was the job of the director, at all times and in all situations to make the staff feel that their work was important and vital; as necessary as their superiors for the improvement of race relations".[6]

Secondly:

> "(Because) to my mind we were too small to run any risk of fragmenting our total effort by speaking with more than one voice ... Our consultants and outside researchers will always tend to be strongly individualistic and unused to conforming to an Institute 'approach'; I thought it was therefore all the more important that the Institute staff, long-term and short-term, should be well co-ordinated so that there was no waste of effort".[7]

And thirdly:

> "Besides the fact that most of us really believed what our rulers inculcated - that we were indispensable, needed for the accomplishment of their mission to improve race relations - the Institute's internal organisation effectively militated against free speech, frank discussion, or staff protest".[8]

Organisational procedures and arrangements then had been created to reflect what the founder saw as 'a cycle of self-perpetuation; the problem of how to provide against a takeover from below which might alter the whole course and nature of the Institute'.[9] As well as spelling out the director's role in this, the various internal control provisions implemented during the sixties consistently reinforced the view that internal discipline and control was an essential prerequisite for successful fund-raising, political and industrial respect: for 'to be seen as a well-organised, disciplined company of assorted individuals created an impression which counteracted the emotive bases of our work; which clearly demonstrated that we approached the subject rationally, without allowing personal views and values to prejudice our factual findings'.[10]

Taken together, the three areas of organisational life affected by these provisions sealed off all possible avenues of internal protest. Firstly, the committee structure was organised in such a way as to debar staff representation; IRR work and services were compartmentalised, with many aspects of its work - the Survey, the research units - placed outside the Head Office, operating on a day-to-day basis almost independently; and the staff could only make their complaints through their departmental or compartmental heads. With the absence of internal arrangements for the airing of grievances, and for full staff participation in the work of the Institute, the director's views on organisation were not only confirmed but also adopted by the Council as organisational principles, the framework in which daily Institute life existed.

> "Not only was I of the opinion that the director should be in charge and take all the important decisions, but I also felt that if I had allowed, as the staff wanted, the creation of a joint Council-staff Executive Committee, this principle which I had lived by in the Indian Civil Service would have been seriously undermined ... And then you might as well not have a director at all".[11]

Secondly, these control provisions written into organisational life to conserve power at Council level extended to the way IRR's ordinary membership was recruited and hence directed. Neither allowed to apply for ordinary membership, nor take a central part in the 'screening' of applicants, the majority of staff were further alienated, denied yet another route along which theoretically

they could have voiced their grievances, protests, or even their general ideas about the future and role of the body for which they worked. Erected to safeguard Council rather than staff interests, the screening operation inaugurated for the selection of IRR members included the following procedures:

> "That (a) an application form embodying a questionnaire should be sent to the candidates; (b) when the completed application form is received, the candidate should be informed that formal election will be considered at the next meeting of the Council; in the interval senior staff may, at their own discretion, extend privileges of membership (with the exception of voting at general meetings); and (c) the staff will report to the Council Executive Committee at each meeting a list of persons who have applied for membership and make recommendations for their acceptance'.
> This recommendation was deliberately worded in general terms. Miss Evanson (Mason's personal assistant since 1952) has therefore made a point of satisfying herself that the applicant has been seen by at least one senior member of staff; and in the case of people who write in for the form she asks them to call in and see her to discuss the question of their sponsorship.
> Journalists are asked for a personal guarantee that they will abide by the rules governing meetings. In the case of Miss First (whose Marxist sympathies and activities in South Africa had worried a number of Council members), it was (now) known that a member of Council was to sponsor her and as she appeared to be a serious student making use of the library, there was no reason to postpone putting her name before the Council".[12]

Reviewing the formal controls written into the Institute's Articles in conjunction with its informal screening procedures, the director concluded that:

> "The danger of any group capturing the Council is therefore unlikely.

> The only question that remains is how to tighten election procedure in order to guard against undesirable persons slipping in without laying ourselves open to a charge of being exclusive or old-fashioned. It would be hardly consistent with our claim that 'Membership of the Institute is not restricted by reason of race, citizenship, religion or birth' if we were to introduce the criterion of political creed.
> (All we can do) is to interview applicants ourselves and then, if they seem likely to be reasonable people, allow them to attend a few meetings before election. Then I suggest that it is the private character and level of discussion at (these) meetings which should be our first concern in selecting Ordinary Members. Is their experience or knowledge of race relations likely to be a useful contribution to our work? Are they in sympathy with our objects and declared methods of achieving them? Are they persons of good character who are unlikely to bring the Institute's name into disrepute?"[13]

As these revised provisions in effect defined the kind or ordinary member sought, a person who would neither question the objects, declared method, nor political, social or theoretical perspective favoured by the Institute, staff protest, however vaguely formulated, could not be channelled through the ultimate governing body of the Institute.

But possibly more important than these two organisational constraints on internal criticism or staff participation was the third area of organisational life which encompassed the reality of being an employee, subject to subtle pressures to identify obligingly with IRR aims and methods, subject to dismissal. This in essence referred to the organisation and indoctrination of corporate consciousness; something that appeared intangible but

yet pervasive; something that manifested itself in Council ideology, IRR's reputation, as much as it did in organisational structures. On an observable plain, it commenced at the interview stage, gathered momentum through 'pep talks' with the director and senior members of staff, and fructified in the form of staff rationalisations, reasons for their apparent conformity.

Ranging from personal feelings of indebtedness or obligation to those of a more material kind, they encompassed views such as:

> "The Council always produced the goods; the means by which we could continue to serve the cause ..."
>
> "Their views appeared quite reasonable and, forceably argued by people with their backgrounds, very difficult to counter ..."
>
> "I'd worked as Philip Mason's personal assistant right from the early days in Chatham House and his intelligence and abilities were so impressive that even Prime Ministers listened ..."
>
> "Social deference has always played an important role in Britain's class structure ... They were at the top, we were somewhere near the middle or at the bottom; in a peculiar way we depended upon them for our own existence, they always appeared to be in the right ..."
>
> "They had done all the work building up the Institute and created both an environment and ethos in which we could fulfil our moral selves ..."
>
> "They were concerned men ... they always looked radical, there were no grounds to doubt their commitment ... they had put the subject on the academic and political map, they were not racists, we had a lot to be grateful for ... we at least had jobs."[14]

Thus like the Council, the staff too tended to accept Mason's pronouncements on internal organisation as final, somehow irrefutable. He had been with the Institute since its inception, and his charisma, personalised stock of authority, with each developmental success had grown to a point where no-one would openly challenge or dispute his administrative policies; something he himself began to realise. For by 1968 not only did he consider that he was 'about written out on race relations', but, as he later put it:

> "I also began to notice in myself a reluctance to take up new ideas which involved effort and decided it was time I went. I was 63 and I should have done seventeen years in Chatham House and the Institute by the autumn of 1969 ... The two units (IRSP and JUMPR) came into being in the autumn of 1969 and three months later I retired as Director ... Soon after the two units began I wrote a paper for the Council of the Institute suggesting that we could make a useful saving if Tinker doubled the part of Director of the Institute with heading the International Unit. I saw no reason why this should not work - and here again I was remembering experience in the war when Directors of Plans carried a joint responsibility to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and a separate individual responsibility each to his own service chief. The Council (as it always did) accepted my recommendations and Tinker succeeded me."[15]

Given then the tightness exerted on internal controls and indeed given the staff's apparent compliance, the dominant questions which arise are: Just how did the utopians emerge as a distinctive group within IRR? How did they come to formulate an alternative

world view, set of values and beliefs? What kind of relationship existed between them and those they originally opposed, ultimately resisted? Why did they resist? Slightly re-phrased to incorporate a notion of the kind of structural precondition(s) necessary for the emergence of utopian thinking and action, the first of these questions can only be interpreted, understood, and possibly answered within the context of organisational changes that occurred after Mason's retirement.

Space

Before officially taking up the post of Director of IRSP and the overall Institute, although he had been appointed the director-designate to both posts, Tinker's first job was to start planning the specific objectives and recruiting the staff, particularly for IRSP. The terms of reference for the two units were specified, and then incorporated in the statements sent to all applicants for the new posts in the Institute.[16] Over 150 applications were received for three or four IRSP research fellows and after sifting about 50% out as prima facie unsuitable, Tinker postulated the following criteria of final choice:

> "(i) We were attempting to form what might become the nucleus of a university department, rather than setting up a project team. Therefore, I looked for extensive coverage of the race relations field rather than intensive coverage of some special part.

(ii) It had to be made crystal clear that although we hoped we were embarking upon a long term operation, all we could actually promise was in the short term.

I therefore deliberately focused my attention upon two age groups. The first were people in their mid-twenties who might be still working for a Ph.D., or had just completed one, and who might benefit from applying their discipline to race relations problems for a limited period and who might then return to the mainstream of university life. Another kind of person whom I sought was somebody who had already established himself as a race relations specialist - probably someone in his late thirties - who therefore could return to academic life confident that there would be demands for his special knowledge."[17]

In contrast to previous recruitment procedures which were either closed and largely based on personal contacts such as the Rose, Deakin and Hunter appointments, or on a commissioned basis where academics continued to remain in their universities, these newly adopted procedures were 'open' and incorporated more explicitly academic criteria. They consequently led to a situation not only where the director needed to spend 'two weeks in the United States interviewing applicants' but also to one in which academic credentials alone rather than political or social interests guided ultimate choice. Thus:

"Eventually we appointed Robert Mast as Associate Director of the (IRSP) programme. Dr. Mast, an urban sociologist of the University of Pittsburgh, had wide experience of ethnic conflict and had indicated a wish to work upon a comparative study of conflict in cities. Three other research fellows were appointed: Robin Jenkins, a sociologist, specialising in conflict research, had worked in institutes in Scandinavia and had made a study of linguistic conflict in Belgium; Anani Dzidzienyo of Ghana had academic training in the United States and Britain (B.A., Williams College, M.A. Essex University), and Malcolm Cross had been a lecturer in sociology in the University of the West Indies."[18]

Besides re-focussing IRR's international research effort along academic lines, drawing in former university staff to plan, develop and actually undertake research, Tinker, as a senior university scholar himself, desired also to create within the Institute the kind of working atmosphere and arrangements he had coveted at London University's School of Oriental and African Studies. Personally he thought he could apportion his time 'roughly as follows: one-third as Director of the Institute; one-third as Director of IRSP; and one-third on (his) writing'.[19] Although in practice he spent about three-fifths of his time on running the Institute, he nevertheless firmly believed that the director should not only do research but also should be responsive to the feelings, thoughts and problems of his colleagues also doing research: he believed that the internal structure should as far as possible reflect this concern. He wished to see, for instance, Race, and the old Newsletter, which in 1969 under Peter Watson's editorship had changed its format, policy and name to Race Today, adopt a policy and an advisory structure more in accord with this belief. For both he extended the respective advisory editorial boards to include staff representation, and more importantly, he allowed the effective daily control of both journals to pass decisively to the staff. In the case of Race, the full editorial board met only once a year to discuss general policy, whilst 'the staff (and perhaps Council members) met three times a year, primarily

to review articles received' and in conjunction with the new editor, Simon Abott, a member of staff, to decide on what should be published.[20] Similarly in the case of Race Today, a staff advisory editorial board was formed 'to advise the Editor on all matters concerning Race Today'.[21] Unlike Sheila Patterson, who had been retained on a consultancy-fee basis or Peter Watson, a professional journalist, Alexander Kirby whom Tinker appointed on a full time basis in March 1970 to edit Race Today, arrived at the Institute with the staff's full support. As a former community relations officer who had been actively involved in an anti-fascist campaign in London's East End, he, like the other changes, epitomised Tinker's new style of leadership.

Or, as he himself put it:

> "Hugh Tinker, in particular, was looking for someone who would be acceptable to the staff; someone who knew the streets, had worked with blacks; someone who could communicate an urgency in race reportage ..."[22]

From the beginning of 1970 onwards this new urgency was injected into both journals. The majority of Race's book reviews and opinion pages were written by the staff; Race Today's 'Area Round Up' was contributed by staff working in the information section; the column Kirby's predecessor had given to the Library was expanded so that staff could write without editorial pressure 'its often acerbic reviews of pamphlet publications'; most of the articles

that appeared in Race Today were either written by staff or resulted from their, as opposed to Council, contacts; and, within a few months, it was quite apparent that Race Today, under Kirby's editorship, and with Tinker's approval, was becoming an 'opinionated' staff-conceived and oriented journal.[23]

The degree of democratisation and staff participation this reflected - something which both Tinker and his new staff were accustomed to in university settings - did not end here. Apart from the Institute's Race Relations Research and Development Trust governed by trustees Lord Walston, Lord Seebohm, and David Seiff, all Council members, and inaugurated to raise the £500,000 needed 'for the Institute's objectives and to safeguard the interests of the donors', the opening-up campaign quietly launched by Tinker and actively supported by the staff penetrated the entire organisational structure to a point where even new committees and 'arrangements' were established.[24] The idea of a joint staff-Council Executive Committee which Mason had 'vigorously fended off' since the notion had been first floated by Simon Abott in 1965 immediately received the in-coming director's full support and was established forthwith as a body to meet monthly. 'Empowered to take decisions on behalf of the Council as often as possible and prepare recommendations on matters of policy for the Council', for the first time in the Institute's career, day-to-day control, as Tinker insisted that it should, passed from the Council and directorate to full time members of staff.[25] Although the Council

on several occasions attempted to increase its representation from three or four to six or eight members, the staff with Tinker's backing remained in control. For not only had this been a director-designate/staff initiative in the first place, but more tellingly, it symbolised the philosophical base of the new directorate.

Instead of the tokenism that had often existed:

> "Staff representation has been (now) designed to give representation to each major section or department; and those attending have been the Secretary, the Director, the Deputy Director, two (junior) staff representatives, the head of the library, representatives from overseas and U.K. research."[26]

Virtually excluded from internal affairs and decisions, the Council received a further 'shock' as one member put it,[27] when it heard that Tinker's radical concessions to the mood of workers' participation, democratisation, experienced on the streets of Paris and in academic institutions here and abroad during 1968/69, had led directly to the setting up of a Staff Meeting, a standing committee of all IRR staff which met at least fortnightly.

Neither recognised by Council nor approved of by Tinker's predecessor who had in 1970 been drafted onto the Council, the above committee, 'although not formally constituted, was an essential and general part of the organisation.'[28]

Its principal purpose was:

> "To provide for exchange of information on work and ideas within the staff and to make recommendations and decisions concerning certain matters that affect all the staff."[29]

Further, the Research Committee was re-constituted to include 'all research staff, together with nominations (particularly academic) from the Council, and some outside members' and solely to 'advise on the design and execution of research carried out by the Institute'.[30] Only 'members of staff and invited persons' formed the Annual Conference Committee established to assist the staff convenor with planning the conference. The reorganised Meetings Committee, responsible for the two dozen or so public meetings held at the Institute each year would now restrict its composition to members of staff in order 'to advise the Meetings Secretary on topics and speakers'.[31] And finally, Tinker founded a new staff body called the Development Committee which was set up specifically to exclude Council members, to give an opportunity to staff to examine and study existing and future developments. Reporting on this and other Tinker-type innovations to an apprehensive Council in Summer, 1971, Abott concluded that:

> "This was a new Committee which had grown out of discussions on publications. Its main function was to identify areas, geographical and conceptual, that needed research and publication by the Institute ... This was essentially an ideas, forward-looking committee; it did not review present work ...

> There were, of course, other committees: on the one hand there were (now) meetings within departments - e.g. the Publications Section met regularly. On the other, there were a number of linking committees between the Institute and other organisations in which Institute staff (now) regularly participated."[32]

But in addition to these essentially organisational or structural changes which in turn emanated from an academic's rather than administrator's belief in the freedom of the individual to participate and contribute as fully as he or she could - a political reformulation and implementation of the notion of 'academic freedom' - there evolved a set of other changes, which also fundamentally reflected Tinker's style of leadership, and hence the degree of openness or democratisation he instituted. In his own words, these can be set out as follows:

> "The future of explanation, mediation and reconciliation: The accepted philosophy of the Institute in the past has been well summarised in Philip Mason's latest essay, Race Relations. Personally I am in full sympathy with (his) conception of an approach to race relations designed to bring about greater understanding, and a spirit of mediation and reconciliation, so eventually we are all really quite colour blind. However, we ought to consider whether this is not just a liberal dream".[33]

And on the question of the Institute's research relations to the real world:

> "Polarisation and Fragmentation: It is never easy to distinguish between short-term and long-term trends, but the recent acceleration of the conflict in the Middle East, the extension of the Vietnam War into Cambodia, and the alignment of British policy alongside that of South Africa in the face of Afro-Asian opinion all seem to indicate an increasing polarisation of world forces, black and white, rich and poor, the

> powerful and the powerless. In my view, the academic approach to social studies becomes meaningless unless it is related to the actual movement of social, political and economic forces. It may be that we will have to abandon the (Masonian) conception of 'race relations' - i.e. an improvement of relations between different peoples and their eventual assimilation into a universalistic community, and concentrate on divisions between peoples of different ethnic stock, religions, languages and cultures in structural terms. It may be that our analysis ought to focus upon conflict as the fundamental principle of race studies."[34]

Other research criteria which stood in threatening contrast to those favoured by Mason and the Council, and indeed which helped to open up discussion on theoretical, methodological and political issues - in short provide an elastic framework and broader (academic) perspective in which open and free discussion could be encouraged - included:

> "Objectivity: In my view we can go no further towards the goal of objectivity than as in Croce's definition of history: 'the consciousness of one's activity as one actually performs it ...' 'the self knowledge of the living mind'.
>
> How far can the social sciences claim to be scientific? They can certainly classify and quantify. This has led us to put our trust in surveys. It has been argued that the bigger the survey the more accurate, the more objective. But when the figures are analysed, the final interpretation remains personal ... To me the only meaning of 'scientific' is 'systematic', 'accurate'. ... If a Marxist like Martin Bernal or John Gittings writes a book, I value it because it is based upon detailed, patient, accurate research: not because it is Communist ... Similarly, the systems of Weber or Talcott Parsons may give coherence to a person's system of thought but are not any guarantee of objectivity. In the end the test has to be the quality of the work, an elusive concept largely in the minds of the readers.

Political Attitudes: I do not believe in 'political' or 'ethical' neutrality ... IRR began in the era of the 'winds of change', when there was a genuine consensus among middle-of-the-road thinkers that the colonial period had ended and that there was a need for a new relationship between black and white. The winds of change evaporated in the mid '60s. Now, IRR can no longer rely on the support of a consensus ...

Relevance: Some years ago I wrote, concerning the work of social scientists: 'We are not detached spectators, surveying a slide under the microscope: we are down there among the amoebae, wriggling with all the rest', (Re-orientation, 1963). It is important for us to determine what audience we are now trying to speak to. From Chatham House, the Institute inherited the conception that our audience consists of the decision makers and the opinion-makers: politicians, senior civil servants, serious journalists, etc., and the academic world ... Even if our research role today is confined to analysing and informing, we need to speak to a much wider audience. The climate of race relations is not being formed at Westminster, but in all our cities and towns, and we need to be both analysing and disseminating information at the popular level.[35]

And, lastly, in general:

"The terms of reference with which the Institute began remain 'the study of relations between races everywhere'. How far do we wish actually to contribute towards changing relations between races? Doubtless, it is important to record accurately what is happening, but the recorder cannot - and will not wish to - avoid commitment ... Any move towards methodological and ideological exclusiveness and arrogance should be deplored. That our field will be under constant pressure from those who wish to take more militant positions is just a fact of life ... Those who exert these pressures are entitled to make them. Those who differ are equally entitled to intellectual respect. The market place is often said to be the model for the Institute. What does this mean? It does not, I think, mean staying in the same place all the time. As the climate or temperature of race relations changes - and it has been changing rapidly - so the actual territory of the market place will change, but the trading must go on."[36]

Whether or not IRR Council members or staff agreed with them, the effect of Tinker's views and administrative actions directly led to the creation of 'space' or social room in which other ideas could germinate; in which those who worked at the Institute could begin to become an essential part of its work; in which a critical attitude towards research, race policy and indeed the future role of the Institute could take root and flourish.

Conflict

Given the main social implications of Tinker's style of leadership - internal democratisation, the creation of organisational, intellectual and indeed emotional space for open critical discussion and questioning - and given the recruitment of university academics, mainly sociologists, to the Institute's full time staff whose training had instilled in them the necessity to ask questions of quite a different order than those previously asked, the Institute rapidly became a place where conflict rather than qualified consensus distinguished most relationships. Both as a phenomenon and as an intrinsic part of these relationships it appeared to mainfest itself within the two units, IRSP and JUMPR, between the two units, and ultimately between the majority of the staff and IRR's governing body.

Within IRSP, for instance, several distinctive groups or sub-units emerged right from the outset. Later joined by Harrison and Brahm, Robert Mast, IRSP's deputy director, immediately began to reassess his 'academic life', his 'special knowledge', the relevance of both to the improvement of race relations. Caught

between the perceptions of the real world he had acquired in the United States and those perceived by the Institute's Council, his dilemma and hence that of the group he represented was how to import his and subsequently their conception of the real world into the Institute. Or probably, and more basically, how could 'their conception' which they believed to be different from either Tinker's or Jenkins' sub-units be articulated theoretically, academically, and, for them, sociologically.

For Mast saw his 'problem' as one of being:

> "An over-reliance on his American experience, an ignorance of the rest of the world, a too bourgeois approach to social science (which he was trying to overcome), probably some identity problems (who was he, what should he do to be 'relevant', how could being relevant tie in and be compatible with certain status needs that were residues from his past, etc.)?, and among other things, a chequered history of radicalism messed up by professionalism. In sum, his problem was one of adopting to rather new intellectual-emotional demands while not having had the proper preparation elsewhere".[37]

Attempting to rectify the latter through seminar discussions in conjunction with the anticipated project on 'Urban Conflict', the Mast group concluded that their task - and possibly IRSP's and IRR's should be to start with what is and proceed to analyse this within a conceptual framework that Tinker had already in part alluded to. Although not at all clear on how such a framework should be built up, they ultimately decided that their research objectives should:

> "Contribute to the general knowledge and theory of the socio-politics of social movements and social change through:
> (1) analysis of the objective economic and political structural inequities in which people of different ascribed characteristics co-exist; and
> (2) analysis of the conditions under which structural change occurs."[38]

Robin Jenkins' group, on the other hand, arrived at the Institute already deeply committed to the denigration of bourgeois sociology and society. Neither accepted by the IRR establishment nor initially by most staff colleagues, his approach demanded the viewing of domestic and international race relations as power relations, as relations between the white rich and powerful and the black poor and powerless. More theoretically anchored in a Marxist interpretation of historical development than Mast's approach, it called for an examination not of blacks but of whites, of imperialism and bourgeois ideology, of economic exploitation and oppression. Like Mast's group he wanted his work to be relevant, in touch with and reflecting the aspirations of those whom <u>he</u> saw as constituting IRR's <u>real</u> and only worthwhile clientele; but unlike Mast who still nurtured an image of himself as a detached 'scholar', he also wanted to work for radical political change, an ideal world in which those who produced a society's wealth should in turn control and determine that society's social, economic and political future.

The only area of apparent agreement between these two sub-units was firstly in their opposition to a study group set up by Tinker, though chaired by Lord Trevelyan, 'to investigate the probable consequences for Britain of entering the EEC in terms of net flows of labour' and, secondly, in their rejection of the approach adopted by Tinker's sub-unit.[39]

In the case of the Trevelyan study group to which Joe Ragaly of The Financial Times had been appointed to act as rapporteur both sub-units saw in it an attempt to produce even further evidence in support of a more discriminatory and rigorously implemented U.K. immigration control policy. Although the group also intended 'to consider the two alternative models of European treatment of extra-continental immigrants: the French model, involving a permanent sub-proletariat, and the German model involving a turn-around of guest workers with no conception of permanent settlement', it was clear to Mast, Jenkins, and others, including Librarian Sivandandan, from the group's composition - distinguished academics, politicians, civil servants, and businessmen - that the kind of relevance and clientele they wished to establish was being undermined by such a project.[40]

And, in the case of the Tinker sub-unit, both were hostile to the kind of work carried on and predicted for the future. For whilst Tinker proclaimed the value of a distinctive theoretical approach, one that would accommodate 'racial conflict', and,

furthermore, inaugurated workshops, meetings, committees, and stimulated discussions on these lines, he himself was 'mostly involved in administration, wheeling-dealing, negotiating for academic status for IRSP, doing historical, descriptive work of interest to him'.[41]

> "The Tinker-Cross-Dzidienyo (or sub-unit's) book will undoubtedly be an interesting popularised piece which describes the characteristics of the immigrant communities, but it is not an analysis of race relations, as the authors themselves indicate, so it will not fall into the 'relevant' category. Cross is well located in the Caribbean and pursues somewhat of a mainline approach to his work which guarantees ample publications. He is open to new ideas and therefore is intellectually adaptive. Dzidienyo is likewise adaptive, but obviously is targetted into the work necessary for his degree ... His third World orientation can be very useful if he applies it."[42]

Having the effect of drawing the Mast/Jenkins sub-units together in at least broad orientational terms, Tinker subsequently reported to Ford on 'the two conceptions of research which were being tested out within IRSP':

> "That which I am directing is likely to emerge on standard lines as an attempt to increase the sum of knowledge about what <u>is</u> with some hope that this might be applied to what <u>ought to be</u>. Jenkins' group are likely to apply themselves specifically to the techniques and ideologies of social and political change, excluding from their discussion all those areas they would regard as static and conservative. The two conceptions are, of course, working themselves out in our academic society everywhere in a situation of thesis and anti-thesis which seems highly unlikely to be solved by synthesis. I suppose the two conceptions can be summed up as analysis versus catalysis. This situation is at best an uneasy co-existence but it seems right that our Institute, which is so intimately connected to an area of unrest, tension and rapid change, should in its research work realise and reflect these problems."[43]

Relations between the two IRR units, IRSP and JUMPR, remained, according to Tinker 'somewhat distant'.[44] Due in part to physical separation, 'the need of both units (in the first few months of operation) to work out their own conceptions of their functions before they could usefully talk to each other', and 'to the markedly different approaches which the two units adopted to race studies', in fact conflict rather than Tinker's notion of distance characterised intra and inter-unit relations.[45] Thus the new staff recruited to carry out the policy remnants of Rose 1 through Rose 11 - as the theoretical bulk of this programme had to some extent been hived off to the Mason chaired Race and Ethnic Studies Unit in Bristol - also separated into two broad sub-groupings like their colleagues in IRSP.

Supported by Council members, Rose, Nandy and Lester in particular, Nicholas Deakin as JUMPR's director and as the leader of the dominant JUMPR sub-group, for instance, continued to see his role as one of promoting policy-oriented research, carrying on the research tradition for which IRR had become well known in Britain and abroad. Negotiations with the SSRC had within months of JUMPR's establishment resulted in what was termed an 'adjustment study', the first and vital part of the Rose 11 programme. The unit was 'to examine the process of adjustment through which coloured immigrants and their children are passing, in order to establish indices of their relative permanence or transience'.[46]

This was to be followed by the 'New Towns Study', funded again by the SSRC with a slightly larger grant worth £33,201. Coupled with a joint project with ILEA to discover the comparative job prospects of black and white school leavers, the former would attempt to establish how blacks could be dispersed from 'urban-ghetto-like areas' to the New Towns where it was supposed they could compete on more favourable terms with whites for jobs, where their presence would not create an unmanageable pressure on services, where they would not be noticed. To the Mast/Jenkins groupings in IRSP it appeared only too clear that:

> "JUMPR chooses research problems that have a good chance of being funded, and their recent success in getting grants demonstrates that they know on which side their bread is buttered. It really doesn't matter very much whether their research problems are the most important ones that could be chosen, or even whether the ones they do choose are any good at all."[47]

Even if this had not been the case, there was no denying that Deakin's group carried on where Rose and Mason had left off, rounding out and adopting a general integrationist perspective based upon much the same assumptions that had stimulated research in the 1960s; ones which spoke to the government of the day, which enshrined policy on what to do rather than explanatory imperatives, and one which politically was directed towards maintaining society's dominant values and institutions, the social order.

Introducing the so-called theoretical perspective for 'an abridged and updated version of the famous report' (Colour and Citizenship), in many ways the largest of JUMPR's projects, Deakin suggested that:

> "The implication for this book is that appeals to idealism are no longer in order. Any proposals for the amelioration of relationships between minorities and majority must be justified in purely practical terms. That is, they must be seen to have an application to the real problems of the adjustment process ...
> In adopting this approach there are two preliminary issues we would like to resolve. First, that in rejecting the liberal's approach from ideology, we do not wish to be understood to be rejecting the liberals ... The failure of the rhetoric cut the ground from under their feet. Unlike their critics, at least they tried, even if they did not understand.
> Nor do we accept the nihilism that has replaced liberalism as the fashionable orthodoxy. The twin doctrines of the necessity of violence and the impossibility of any solution short of sweeping all the pieces off the board and setting the game up afresh now command very wide support, and find strange bedfellows among the believers. Although parallel events in other multiracial societies are important, we do not accept that they are decisive evidence of the inevitability of violent conflict. For, ultimately, the determing element in deciding the future of race relations in Britain is the character of British society and the manner in which it responds to the stresses set up during the process of adaptation and change. To the extent that our society and its values are unique, so will the response be unique. And, in our view, there are still good grounds for arguing that present difficulties can be resolved without compromising either the cultural integrity of our society or the values and principles which animate it."[48]

Whilst this kind of socio-political pragmatism, a remoulding of the ideologists' earlier conception of the Institute's approach and method, pleased those who had always supported JUMPR's aims, it did

not however, convince all who worked at JUMPR. Forming a small and isolated group of newly recruited research fellows, this sub-unit tended,as had its counterparts in IRSP, to import their own perceptions and evaluations of the real world experienced by blacks into their work. Drawing as much on her outside experience as on her training in sociological method, the new research fellow working on JUMPR's adjustment study, for instance, found the very concept of 'adjustment' personally distasteful and methodologically suspect. She protested to Deakin and others that it was a value laden term which itself required investigation, for 'adjustment' implied a norm. And what was that? Middle-class, white, Protestant? Dismissed by Deakin and the two Council members who closely identified themselves with JUMPR's work and future, Jim Rose and Dipak Nandy, as 'unuseful', semantic, even destructive, her protests however were picked up by another junior colleague, the fellow working on JUMPR's school-leavers study. Similarly, she considered that questions of a qualitatively different kind should be addressed: the job prospects of school-leavers could not, in her view, be ascertained by a simplistic questionnaire circulated to black youth; it required a deeper understanding of the social milieu they were <u>forced</u> into. Further, it was even questionable that such a project should be undertaken at all, for the blacks she lived with, related to on a personal and cultural level, were not so much concerned about employment prospects as about how they could survive in a society that demanded they should 'adjust', 'adapt', or

'integrate' into the ways established by those who rejected them as 'citizens', as equal human beings. This line of questioning too was shrugged off by Deakin's dominant sub-unit which insisted that some of these 'more theoretical questions' were being researched at Bristol and that the purpose of JUMPR was to enquire into practical problems and seek practical solutions. But, although less coherent and articulate than the dissent expressed at IRSP, the sub-unit's consistent questioning and probing nevertheless culminated in partial defeat for Deakin's group, and their scholarly brand of liberal pragmatism, when Deakin proposed to commit the whole unit to carry out research projects for the CRC. The dissenting sub-unit together with other junior members of staff it had managed to attract from Deakin's group on the basis that CRC research would most definitely mean establishment research - finding out ways in which blacks could be controlled and badgered into accepting their lot - voted against it and the proposal was eventually dropped.[49]

But it was probably as much due to this (personal) defeat and the realisation by Deakin that some of JUMPR's staff were being influenced by what was going on at IRSP in London that the conflicts within JUMPR began to surface as part of the unit's relationship with IRSP. And, conversely, because IRSP and some members of the Institute's central staff had already concluded that 'the studies JUMPR proposed to undertake were patently not in the interests of

the black community' that they were neither 'relevant' nor 'evaluative', it tended to see its relationship with the Sussex based unit in a similar way.[50] In fact the conflicts that existed between the two were articulated, as was to be expected, on two levels, each reflecting something a little deeper than was readily apparent or admitted by the respective spokesmen.

First there was the whole question of relative status. At the regular staff meetings, occasions when IRSP, JUMPR and central staff met 'to discuss matters concerning them', these status differences appeared to possess more symbolic than actual meaning, differences that were more often than not interpreted by Tinker and others as 'personality clashes'. Mast, for instance, felt resentful that his researchers were not 'accepted as equals in the intellectual game'; that 'ideas alone should determine status' rather than how close he was to members of the governing body; and that IRSP radical thought, pioneered by his and Jenkins' sub-units, now almost converged, to forge a more creative and relevant perspective, was being both shunned and cast as destructive.[51] Deakin on the other hand thought that his unit was being deliberately starved by the Institute of essential funds; that Tinker as IRSP's research director positively favoured and promoted <u>his</u> unit; that he was too involved to assess impartially the merits of JUMPR; and furthermore the animosity that had grown up between Deakin (JUMPR) and other Institute staff had made it almost impossible to carry on doing worthwhile research.[52]

Partially concealed by what masqueraded as the politics of status, or what Mast termed the 'endless rituals, meetings, gossip, back-biting, back-stabbing, politicising and power deals' existed the second and by far the most crucial level of conflict - namely that over research orientation and perspectives.[53] For here the merged sub-units at IRSP and the embryonic sub-unit at JUMPR, together with a fast emerging central staff group affected in particular by IRSP's intellectual activity and led by Sivanandan, had by mid-1970 banded together to form a radical-thinking broadly-based group at most internal staff meetings. At one such meeting, JUMPR was vigorously condemned by black staff member, Leila Hassad, for accepting substantial SSRC funds for doing what this group repeatedly referred to as 'non-relevant' research. Referring to the New Towns Study she critically argued that 'trying to find out why immigrants don't move to new towns is like trying to find out why they don't go to the moon'.[54] At another, Mast, Jenkins and Sivanandan vitrioloically attacked JUMPR for its 'political' success; for adopting an apparently 'objective' theoretical perspective which consistently reflected preferred political beliefs and values. Not only did such an approach to research appear to guarantee funds but according to Mast and others, it also helped to merge what started out as differences in approach to differences in status. Recalling the ease with which JUMPR managed to secure £33,201 from SSRC to study 'dispersal policies' (New Towns Study), Mast informed a staff meeting that:

> "Earlier on I submitted an application to SSRC and was turned down; I asked for about the same amount of money as JUMPR got. I didn't get a reason for the turn down, but I'm sure it was for two basic reasons: the problem area was too controversial and the research design was poorly done. However, the research problem was a good one; of that I am convinced. It purported to ask fundamental questions. I suspect it was on that basis, and probably only on that basis, that John Rex, a member of the decision panel, said he had recommended approval."[55]

Yet at another staff meeting, JUMPR retaliated to IRSP/central Institute staff criticism by threatening to disassociate itself completely from IRR. It considered that discussions of the kind that Tinker had encouraged were a waste of both time and energy; that so-called personality differences could not be resolved through either 'reasoned argument' or compromises that had the effect of JUMPR's boycotting internal staff meetings; and that Tinker's interference (supported by central staff) with the way in which JUMPR saw its future and hence its internal employment policy had all militated against a creative and productive research environment.[56] It thus concluded that it should part company with its parental body and indeed during late 1970, early 1971, started to draw up proposals for hiving off much of its research activities to other agencies such as the Centre for Environmental Studies where the New Towns Project was eventually moved in June, 1971.

Accordingly:

> "If that happened, it would solve internal political problems, at least from JUMPR's point of view. They would not be caught up in the eternal dialogue and arguments that are based on political and philosophical differences; they would avoid being bugged by the left-wingers and devil's advocates who charge them with non-relevancy; they might solve some of the power struggles with other units. I am told, but don't know it directly, that JUMPR is experiencing its own internal dissent. This is quite reasonable to expect since JUMPR is not immune, any more than is IRSP, from contradictions caused by individuals bringing their part of the outside world into the work scene. I can safely predict that JUMPR's troubles will not be solved by moving away; they will only be temporarily salved and soothed by such a withdrawal. Later they will have to face the real world directly and I hasten to suggest that they will find themselves faced with an imponderable dilemma."[57]

Consciousness

Aware that JUMPR's threat, that the 'hundreds of hours of informal talk; the unofficial meetings; the political planning sessions; the schemes to undercut each other', was an invaluable process facilitated by Tinker's internal democratisation programme for the development of staff consciousness, the Mast-Jenkins IRSP grouping, together with Sivanandan's central 'core', realised that it did not go far enough.[58] It was essentially an internal process, a mapping out of research territory, a lining up of what Mast called 'natural enemies', a throwing around of competing approaches and ideas, rather than one in which ideas and perspectives

on social reality became connected to that reality.[59] In other words it represented an important preconditional state of interplay in which the deliberative use of space generated conflict and in turn conflict generated space; it represented that social interactive phase marked by conflict when the dialectical nature of the situation provided a social starting point for a different kind of action. It also symbolised a point at which these groupings inside the Institute could identify where they were - in conflict, out of step or disconnected from the very world that had revealed this state. To realign both, to reconnect a privatised social self with reality, the emerging utopians who were already moving towards a vision of an ideal world needed to externalise and relate often preconceived thought with actuality, to descend from the lofty heights of intense intellectual discussion or debate to the ground outside Mayfair; that ground they evoked conceptually - through their insistence on 'relevance' - to defend their departure from the traditional Institute approach of method.

Although in an ad hoc way this had already started in the many internal meetings which had often ended with one group challenging another to go down to Brixton or up to Notting Hill to see how it really was, it had not developed beyond the stage of recognition; a realisation that the 'endless rituals' had been vital for the 'grubby effort to find out who we are, where we're going and how to get there':

> "It represented productive time for me, and I think for others also. This process develops consciousness for those who need it. It has done so for me. I'll always need it, for I am always changing to keep pace with the changing world. Sometimes I need others to teach me about these changing worlds and tell me how I can relate to them; and I think others too have this need. But that process is also political and good."[60]

It indeed raised a much neglected though basic issue; namely that to castigate JUMPR and those who appeared to reflect the ideologists' interests in research terms as 'out of touch' presupposed that they, the utopians, were in fact 'in touch'. But when had they themselves last visited Brixton, Harlem, or the Africa they saw as oppressed? When had they last been 'relevant' in both a research and political sense? The consciousness they perceived, they thought they had acquired from meetings and debate, appeared to be of the same order as their research: hypothetical, anchored more in what they knew they should feel and think through reading radical social science rather than in the knowing of that they could not read about - personal experience. If they were going to convert consciousness as theoretical abstraction to consciousness as political reality, something that could be politically used, they needed to 'return to work', to move outside the internal situation they had constructed within IRR to where it was happening.

Realising this intuitively, Bob Mast in connection with his proposed study of urban conflict, thus returned to urban America just before the Kent State massacre, to talk and relate again to the blacks on the streets, in the ghettoes, waiting in court rooms. Profoundly affected by the drama of the state oppression he saw, what blacks were saying and doing, by the self-knowledge that he as a sociologist could not, as he had been doing, even begin to explain <u>their</u> situation without <u>their</u> co-operation, he finally resolved both the personal and academic conflict he had been experiencing. Simply the consensus, integration, equilibrium, pluralist models favoured by the Institute bore no relation to what he saw with his own eyes, heard with his own ears, or felt each time he walked the ghetto streets: they were sterile, if not totally misleading. Kent State, together with the black revolution that had occurred in the States since he had been at Pittsburgh, had not only revealed Arnold Rose's 1962 prediction of imminent integration and harmony as wishful liberal rhetoric,[61] but for him it had provided the refractive symbol, actual experience, necessary to embrace the view and perspective that:

> "Today, Negroes are at the bottom, and there is neither room above nor anyone ready to take their place. Thus only individuals move up, not the group as such: reforms help the few, not the many. For the many nothing short of the complete change in the system - the abolition of both poles and the substitution of a society in which wealth and power are shared by all - can transform their condition".[62]

In trying to make sense of Kent State, how what he saw and experienced connected with the theoretical thoughts and knowledge he possessed as a social scientist and hence with a systematic interpretation of the social world, Mast not only understood (now) that 'a proper study of race relations could not avoid analyses that investigate the political-economic context in which different racial ethnic groups interact', but also that IRSP's work was mostly worthless.[63] For in order to progress beyond what van den Berghe termed 'its rather pedestrian, applied, and atheoretical present state', the study of race relations must in effect meet certain conditions: firstly, scholars should develop modesty, integrity and self-insight; secondly, race should not be unduly reified as something external or prior to a particular social system under study; and lastly, race relations should be studied holistically and macro-sociologically, as well as cross-culturally and cross-temporally.[64]

Experienced first hand as both an observer and participant, Kent State, the U.S. riots, the recent growth of black social and political movements in the States, suggested to IRSP's associate director that the study of 'conflict' was not only essential but also needed to be fundamentally reformulated. Instead of developing hypotheses along Tumin's peace-conflict axis which discounted any notion of structural change, or merely treating it as a manifest protest in the manner of Simmel, Coser and others, latent conflict

and its relationship to power needed examination.[65] For, concluded Mast, only when analyses of conflict and power relationships from the view of those at <u>different</u> levels in the power structure are conducted, could 'relevant' analysis of structural change commence. From such a grounded perspective in which research design and theory seemed to reflect the concerns of those 'at the bottom', it would become less important to ask:

> "'Who governs' or 'who has power' than to integrate these questions with: 'Who are the powerless; how are they kept that way, and how can they obtain full civil rights?'"[66]

And on a political or what Mast termed 'action priority' level:

> "Relevancy is a more certain guarantee of both IRR and IRSP longevity than are redundant, old-fashioned, irrelevant and useless efforts ... After all we only exist as a function of concrete social problems: without prejudice, discrimination, injustice and inequality, we would not exist. Therefore relevant IRRs <u>must</u> view their field mostly from the point of view of those who suffer and any service to be rendered must be to them, not to those who perpetuate the suffering. This must be non-imperialistic, non-exploitative and non-authoritarian, and if we can function within these criteria, then we may have a right to consider the exploited-suffering as our constituency or clientele; but <u>only</u> in a service capacity. Thus their needs become <u>our</u> priorities."[67]

Whereas Mast's experience in the States had exposed and helped to resolve his own personal contradictions and disparities between political, intellectual (academic-sociological), and emotional selfs, Robin Jenkins' return to the real world via political (research) experiences in America, Europe and Latin America exposed and helped

to resolve contradictions of a more substantive nature. Unlike Mast's social journey, his required not so much that a portmanteau of feelings and concepts be unpacked, reorganised and related to produce a politicised theoretical framework for sociological understanding and explanation, but rather the unpacking of an already highly developed framework and the scrutiny of each theoretical and propositional piece or article in relation firstly to actual conditions, and secondly to his and IRR's role in the support or amelioration of these conditions. In other words, his journey and the processes which underpinned it incorporated a propositional beginning, an empirical middle, an analytical end, and, most importantly, a relational epilogue. It was along this path and on the question of the politics or philosophy of aid, that he discovered that:

> "Most nations were poor not because they lacked natural resources and human skills (though these of course were important), but because their wealth was expropriated. Until this expropriation is stopped, there will be no development - capitalist or socialist - in the poor nations. Instead there will be continuing under-development".[68]

In this context aid was therefore a hindrance to so-called development: it assumed not only that poor black, undeveloped societies should want to become like the rich, white, developed societies, but implicitly that development and under-development were separate phenomena. That no observer could maintain this false assumption after reviewing the historical evidence on America's

development through the underdevelopment of Africa via the slave trade was obvious.[69] But, concluded Jenkins, that the same process, though more obscure and sophisticated, was going on now was less obvious. What in fact his (political) research experiences showed in mid 1970 was that the philosophy that had informed the Industrial Group's work, Hunter's Tropical Africa Project, IRR's Development and Aid Studies, the 1962 Ford Comparative Studies, and other international work had been based on this false assumption.

Through a critical reappraisal of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa's statistical findings and relating this to the role of 'a few large companies working together', most of which figured prominently in the Institute's list of corporate subscribers and membership, Jenkins propounded that:

> "The economic structure of poor nations was the result of imperialist penetration. The poor nations were simply economic appendages of the rich nations. As long as they remained so, tied to the production of a few basic crops which declined in value and the extraction of mineral wealth that would one day run out, the poor nations could not develop ...
>
> The roots of underdevelopment were (thus) to be found in the close relationship that existed between the poor nations and rich capitalist nations. The giving of aid whether it was bilateral or multi-lateral, tied or untied, loan or outright grant, could only possibly exacerbate and deepen the process of underdevelopment. Foreign aid would be of use to someone but not to the people it was supposed to help."[70]

Thus:

> "The lessons for the poor countries should be clear: refuse aid, nationalise all foreign corporations without compensation, refuse to acknowledge any national debts or loans, and invest the vast amount of capital that would become available in genuine development programmes."[71]

The implications these findings held for the Institute's Council and for the Institute as a whole were soon to be spelt out clearly in another piece of 'relevant' research. But in the meantime they helped their author to close the gap between utopian thinking and theory and actual conditions; and in so doing to generate even deeper consciousness, a motivating awareness without firm evidence that his position in an Institute which supported so-called 'aid and development programmes' and research could not only possibly be contradictory but that as long as it continued to do so, it would also be supportive of the exploitation and oppression he revealed and criticised. From this fairly advanced and sophisticated beginning, it was not too big a step for him to a state of total personal revelation and political consciousness. Through his experience, for example, of being declared a prohibited immigrant in Rhodesia, (because of his publicly known opposition to Ian Smith's 'racist and oppressive regime'; his championing of the black liberation movement in Zimbabwe, and because he was seen by the white Rhodesian authorities as being a 'revolutionary communist'), he understood more quickly and deeply than most other 'radical' staff whose liberal image had helped to protect or even nullify their radicalism that there was only one legitimate racial and political side of the fence that demarcated the powerful from the powerless, the rich white nations from the poor black nations. But it was not until after he had been actually refused a visa by the Portugese colonial government to study the political economy

of Mozambique, that he consciously decided to submit the awareness he had discovered in his earlier research to a form of scientific investigation. He now knew that it was white rather than black Africa he should be studying; that it was the precise structure and nature of oppression and exploitation that demanded attention; and that both should be related to the Institute's involvement or otherwise in maintaining the conditions which prevailed: for it was only by asking these sorts of questions, doing this kind of work, that he could attempt to reconcile his own privileged position at the Institute with the cause he espoused.[72]

Choosing to investigate the strategic importance of the Cabora Bassa dam as it seemed to bring together and represent a physical, social and political expression of all that he suspected, he decided to juxtapose two conflicts. The first concerned that between white and black Africa as epitomised by Cabora Bassa's very existence; whilst the second related to the (Western) Institute's research and <u>ipso facto</u> political involvement in Africa's 'underdevelopment'.[73] Arguing that the dam was clearly intended to confirm and perpetuate the hegemony of the Portugese, South African, and Rhodesian governments over Eastern, Central and Southern black Africans, he demonstrated that Western economic and political interests were in no way the same, as argued by the developers, or even partially complemented those symbolised and projected through liberation struggle. Quite the opposite, they

politically and socially undermined the struggle, the very root sentiments expressed by Abu-Lughod a few months earlier in Detroit:

> "We stand united with our Black Brothers in the United States in South Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique and Angola; we stand united with the gallant fighters of Vietnam and with all other groups valiantly struggling against all manifestations of human oppression".[74]

Corbora Bassa, according to Jenkins, was just such a manifestation. And further, the Institute was deeply implicated in this oppression, the exploitation of black Africa. An examination of the principal investors in the project and in 'white Africa' generally had revealed that their 'top' representatives not only sat on the Institute's Council but that just over 50% of IRR's administrative funds and a substantial proportion of its total research budget came from these or similar sources. For instance, Barclays Bank International through its chairman Lord Seebohm, the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa through its chairman Henry Oppenheimer, the Roan Selection Trust through its chairman Sir Ronald Prain, the Bank of England through one of its directors Gordon Richardson, all sat on the Institute's governing body. Together with other corporate subscribers they had contributed from 100% in the early 1950s to just over 55% in 1970 of all the Institute's running costs. Now via the Research and Development Trust, these and other companies were preparing to safeguard financially the Institute's future for the next seven years.

Barclays International, the Standard Bank of South Africa and Booker Brothers, whose interests were beginning to move slowly from Guyana to Africa, all pledged to donate £10,500 each; Rio Tinto Zinc and British American Tobacco £7,000 each; Imperial Tobacco and Unilever £5,250 each; Barclays Bank £3,500; and British Steel £11,431.[75] Although Jenkins was unaware of the precise detail, he knew both who sat on the Council, the Research and Development Trust, and the general nature of their outside interests, as well as the fact that the Institute's library had just received a £30,000 grant from the Gulbenkian Foundation, which by any other name spelt Portugese.[76] Putting two and two together in a political sense and oppression, involvement and racial amelioration together in a sociological sense, he managed on a personal level at least, to equate his own neo-Marxist theoretical perspective with actual experience, an appreciation of the real world as one in which black workers in Third World and metropolitan society were not only fetterred to capitalism and imperialism but as a permanently enforced underclass made it possible for both to continue. Whilst his analysis of aid tended to confirm the view that Western Powers had always pillaged the Third World, the actual concrete findings or connections his research uncovered questioned perceptively and embarrassingly (for the ideologists) the Institute's own philosophy, approach and aid and development studies.[77] For Caborra Bassa, unlike any other piece of research, or the endless discussions, raised in a

very real and meaningful way fundamental questions about the Institute's role, his place in it, and that of others who were also developing a new way of looking at themselves, the world, and the function of research in stimulating political and social change.

In fact, 'for the staff of the Institute Jenkins' paper on Caborra Bassa spelt the end of innocence'.[78]

It raised openly what privately many had feared: that through its Council the Institute's direct or indirect involvement in Africa and elsewhere, if proved, would irrevocably undermine their own motives and involvement in what up until 1969 had been seen as 'the cause', the mission to <u>improve</u> race relations. If this absorbing belief in the cause at the expense of examining its management had since 1965 kept the Librarian 'shy and withdrawn', or even if Mason's policy and administrative controls and Sivanandan's own personal problems during the mid-1960s had made it virtually impossible to speak out, there was no little doubt that Jenkins' findings had triggered off in him, as the notional leader of the central staff group and the majority of the members of that group, an overwhelming desire to reappraise his own position at the Institute radically; himself in relation to his roots, his past and future.[79] Like others, Sivanandan, whose black skin only provided in the context of race relations research a symbolic

credential - often more useful to the ideologists' perception of justice and equality than his own - needed to relate and connect this almost non-impeachable revelation not only to his own oppressed experience in Ceylon and the Colonial Office where he trained as a Librarian, but also to his admittedly more experiential and thus grounded interpretations of the black worker in neo-colonial and metropolitan society.

Possibly for the first time whilst at the Institute, the opportunity to do just this came in 1970 when the Institute sent him to America as part of its 'Atlantic Agreement' with Denver. There, according to his own account, he was able to relate his own experiences as a black made more poignant and articulate by the twin processes of discussion and revelation at the Institute to at least three versions of reality projected by three distinctive groups: the white international race relations scene in the States; local urban black groups not included on his official itinary; and what Ford termed 'the race relationists of the free World.'[80]

Through advising and co-operating with the libraries of Ford's race units in Denver, Buffalo and Berkeley, he discovered that the arrangements made by Mason at Denver in particular were socially and politically unpalateable. Besides guaranteeing an IRR voice in nearly all international race relations programmes, they projected a view of blacks defined in terms of white Western

interests. As well as reflecting a concern, as already noted, for the integration of blacks into the dominant, social, political, and economic orders, their notion of reality precluded blacks, once 'integrated', from power positions within the structures that determined the various orders. The inclusion of blacks in their overall scheme of things appeared to be purely superficial, a public relations exercise on one level, a more subtle form of oppression on another. For social reality to them was white reality; power in and control over democratic America in which 'integrated' rather than 'liberated' blacks would perform similar though disguised roles in the American capitalist economy. Democracy or the constitutional, moral and ethical underpinnings of the American Dream provided the bases for action; opportunity structures should be opened up for all so that there would be a fair chance that colour would become politically neutralised; power should not be shared out on the basis of racial criteria, but rather it should be only shared amongst the meritocratic defined in terms of relative social, economic status, (which in turn would be largely determined by racial or ethnic factors). On a political level it was a definition of reality that relied on the social structural rather than psychological supremacy of racism: it positively incorporated a belief in open-opportunity structures so that whites could not be blamed if blacks did not succeed or take advantage of the new opportunities provided.

The shallowness or callous simplicity of both this definition and strategy for bringing about a desired state of things was indirectly revealed to the Librarian when 'he was called upon in

his other capacity (as a black) to speak to groups, particularly black and Chicano in Whittier, Oakland, Washington DC, New Palz, and New York City'.[81] Here Sivanandan came to realise more fundamentally than he could ever have done in Britain that the reality for blacks living in urban ghettoes meant not so much Jenkins' reapplication of Baran and Sweezy's underclass notions, nor Mast's structures of latent and manifest conflict, (social inequality), but social, political and economic death unless, as they were beginning to do, they could politically articulate self and hence group meaning through resistive struggle. Their reality had always been his, though unrecognised in its fullest extent. Their conception of a white world which through racial oppression, exploitation and other forms of socio-physical violence, including institutionally sanctioned murder, daily continued to kill them off in a social and often physical sense, probably helped more than anything else Sivanandan's personal journey from a point of being radically inclined to being a radical activist in the context of the Institute.

If what he had found at Denver and elsewhere in academic race relations settings brought a final rejection of the white creed, and in the black ghettoes a reaffirmation of himself as black, a fellow sufferer, then what he experienced in observing a third and operational definition of reality was something that strengthened his resolve to act in accordance with his renewed state of consciousness and growing self-image.

As a result of his official Denver visit, he was however subsequently invited 'to what was meant to be a high-powered week-long conference of select race relationists from all over the free world organised by James Moss of Buffalo University (now of the Ford Foundation), funded by Ford and held in Bridgetown (Barbados) in July 1970:

> "The conference was scheduled to last a week and was expected to produce a programme of centralised and coherent international race relations research and a plan to set up an international documentation centre and a data bank, probably in Barbados. (It was even hinted that the Institute's Librarian might be offered its directorship).
>
> The conference lasted exactly ten hours. In the morning session, in the very first hour, a Tanzanian lecturer, a Senegalese journalist and the Ceylonese Librarian from the Institute had made known their objections to the presence of Franklin Williams, at the conference. Williams, then Director of Phelps-Stokes Fund, had been the American Ambassador in Ghana during the time of the CIA's activities to overthrow Nkrumah. The Afro-Asian caucus refused to sit with him not merely to symbolise their rejection of American intervention in their countries but because Williams' presence put an entirely different complexion on the conference itself. Williams first protested his innocence - he was only the Ambassador, a mere functionary of Government, he himself was black and had participated in the civil rights movement, he had witnesses to his achievements for black people (ask James Moss) - but subsequently volunteered to withdraw from the conference so that it might go on. When the conference re-assembled in the evening, James Moss, the convenor, announced that he had just received a cable from New York to say that Ford had turned down the conference's tentative application for funds to set up an international documentation centre. The participants went home".[82]

For Sivanandan the above detailswere important because firstly the Conference's timing and location followed so closely on the Trinidad rebellion, the disturbances in Jamaica, and pointed to American anxiety over the Caribbean. Secondly, as Tinker also recognised from a somewhat different standpoint, it inhibited the organisation of such conferences in the future, not least of all by the Institute.[83] And, thirdly, for some, 'it showed that the common yoke of American neo-colonisation was more binding among the peoples of the Third World than colour or national categories.'[84] But in the context of the analysis presented here and indeed in Sivanandan's own developing consciousness, the conference broke up not only because of these realisations, or as Tinker inferred because of a 'violent interpretation of political loyalties':[85] it collapsed because the majority of black delegates, especially after Ford's swift decision, realised that white race relationists were subtly attempting to manipulate them into a position in which they would have to accept permanently a kind of social death. In other words the blacks who attended and Sivanandan in particular saw how the free world race relationists perceived not only their own power role but also those whom their 'profession' had been established ostensibly to help. Blacks could only be helped if they helped their helpers; integration could only be condoned if it meant a certain kind of integration; organisations could only be supported if their governing bodies and management were socio-politically accredited; and selected blacks could be bought off,

used, to consolidate a preferred social order, the liberal international race relationists' perception of social reality.

When this dawned on the 'Ceylonese Librarian from the Institute', when these evaluations were set against his observations at Denver, and his experiences in America's urban ghettoes, the connections between race, himself, neo-colonialism and metropolitan society became boldly apparent.

Firstly:

> "The metropolitan) state was patently racist, society had polarised."[86]

Secondly:

> "To protect ourselves, to survive, to exist as whole and integrated personalities with the right to self-determine our destinies we needed to act decisively; to struggle against the ideologies and structures which oppress us ... To stand aside from action (as I have done at the Institute) is not only to approve the oppressors' oppression but it is also to approve their image of us as inferior beings ..."[87]

Thirdly,

> "Less importantly, the effect of the conference on the Institute's Librarian and, through him, on the Institute was to affect a future conference of the Institute at which for the first time the academics were dethroned and the platform given over to the articulation of the black voice."[88]

And lastly on a personal level:

> "The 'coloured' man has by virtue of his colour, an instinct of oppression, unaffected by his class, though muted by it. So that the 'coloured' intellectual, in resolving his contradiction as an intellectual, resolves also his existential contradiction. In coming to consciousness of the oppressed, he takes 'conscience of himself' (Jean Paul Sarte), in taking conscience of himself, he comes to consciousness of the oppressed. The fact of his intellect which had alienated him from his people now puts him on their side, the fact of his colour which had connected him with his people, restores him finally to their ranks. And at that moment of reconciliation between instinct and position, between the existential and the intellectual, between the subjective and objective realities of his oppression, he is delivered from his marginality and stands revealed as neither 'coloured' nor 'intellectual' - but BLACK".[89]

This new consciousness which in a sense had developed out of and away from the Institute, on the ground, in the streets, with others, with self, was brought back into the Institute by the end of 1970. Mast, Jenkins and Sivanandan, as conscious individuals, as sub-unit or group leaders, thus provided the framework and stimulus for others also to engage in a similar process, to begin to learn how to take the first steps in resistance.

CHAPTER FIVE

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. This was a viewpoint expressed during the course of Interviews with particularly Philip Mason, Leslie Farrer-Brown and H.V. Hodson. The latter actually believed as noted in Chapter One that the essential feature of any organisation such as the Institute should be one that constitutionally and administratively embodies the principle of authoritative control, to be exercised by the executive body (the Council) and its chief Officer (the director). After giving some thought 'to the problem of how to provide against a takeover from below which might alter the whole course and nature of the Institute', in the late 1950s, he, as founder, concluded 'that since the members of the Council were elected by the Council, and the Council controlled the admission of members, the cycle of self-perpetuation was complete. Likewise the Council appointed the director and the director appointed the staff: the idea that these three elements might make a triangle of conflict did not arise, but if it had the remedy anyhow would have been obvious: the Council would have to dismiss a recalcitrant director, or the director would have to dismiss obstreperous staff members'. For the Founder's expansion of this view see H.V. Hodson, Some Recollections of the Institute of Race Relations, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, June 1976, p.13

2. See Michael Caine, 'Future of the Institute of Race Relations', IRR, London, 23rd January, 1966, pp.1-3.

3. Leslie Farrer-Brown, Chairman's Review of the Year', Annual Report of the Council 1965-1966, IRR, London, p.2.

4. Ibid.

5. Lord Walston, 'Chairman's Review of the Year', Annual Report of the Council 1969-1970, IRR, London, p.3.

6. Philip Mason, Interview, 18th and 19th February, 1976.

7. See Janet Evanson, 'Future of the Institute', IRR, London, December, 1965, pp.1-3, Simon Abott, also a member of staff, held much the same view in his working paper, 'Future of IRR', IRR, London, December, 1965, pp.1-6. These views were reaffirmed again during the course of interviews in 1976.

8. Sivanandan, Interview, 1st December, 1976.

9. H.V. Hodson, op cit, 1976, and see Note 1 above.

10. Philip Mason, Interview, op cit.

11. Ibid. As noted in the first chapter, the Institute's administrative structures were in fact modelled on Philip Mason's experience in the Indian Civil Service. He constantly referred to this experience during the course of interviews and much of his criticism of the way in which Maurice Foley conceived the organisation and administration of the expanded NCCI in 1966, for instance, stemmed from his experience in ICS. Suggesting the appointment of 'a permanent Civil Service with experience of the Cabinet Office' to co-ordinate NCCI's various committees, he went on: 'This would release Nadine Peppard for her missionary work in the centres of immigration ... I was thinking of my experience in the War as Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in India, providing secretaries for joint planning staffs at lower levels. The idea was brushed aside as impracticable by the civil servants ...' (Philip Mason, The Institute of Race Relations; Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, May, 1976, p.28).

12. Philip Mason, 'Report on Membership Procedures', (submitted as Council Paper 159) IRR, London, April, 1965, p.1. My parenthesis: Although there exists no documented evidence on the postponement of Ruth First's membership, that is, no evidence in the official minutes, Philip Mason, however, explained during the course of an interview with the author that it was Miss First's background and alleged Marxist sympathies that in fact had led directly to a further tightening up of membership procedures. Whilst his view was that Ruth First should be offered membership facilities, 'the Council was divided on the matter and it was only because she had been sponsored by Anthony Sampson - a respected former Board and Council member - that it eventually acquiesed'; (Interview, op cit.).

13. Ibid, p.1-2. For a slightly earlier discussion on the kind of political and industrial credentials sought when evaluating applications for ordinary members see 'Reports on IRR Membership Procedure', IRR, London, (January, 1962, and June, 1964).

14. Most comments have been extracted from the following two sources: (a) group interview with IRR staff members, 30th November, 1976; and (b) individual interviews with particularly Janet Evanson, Simon Abott, Alexander Kirby and A. Sivanandan.

15. Philip Mason, op cit, June, 1976, p.40.

16. Hugh Tinker, 'The International Race Studies Programme and its Future', IRR, London, September, 1970, p.5.

17. Ibid.

18. Hugh Tinker, 'Report to the Ford Foundation: On the First Year's Working of the International Race Studies Programme of the Institute of Race Relations', IRR, London, November, 1970, p.1.

19. Hugh Tinker, op cit, September, 1970, p.8.

20. See Simon Abott, 'IRR Committees', IRR, London, November, 1971 p.2. This paper represented an attempt to outline and evaluate IRR's Committee structure, pointing out through implication that the process of internal democratisation Tinker had promoted had been received only favourably by the staff.

21. Ibid.

22. From discussion - Interview with Alexander Kirby, March, 1973. Shiela Patterson and Peter Watson were former editors of Race Today's predecessor, the IRR Newsletter.

23. Ibid. This view, of course, was also held by the majority of Council members as we shall see in a later chapter.

24. The RDT, as it was called, was set up by the Institute in 1970 although it always remained separate organisationally and administratively from the Institute. As we shall see in later chapters it was ostensibly a fund-raising body charged with the aim to raise enough revenue to guarantee the Institute's survival after the last Ford grant($300,000) came to an end during 1972/73.

25. Simon Abott, op cit, 1971, p.2.

26. Ibid.

27. Michael Caine, Interview, 12th July, 1976.

28. Simon Abott, op cit, 1971, p.2.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid, p.3.

33. Hugh Tinker, op cit, September 1970, p.13. See also Philip Mason, Race Relations, Oxford University Press, London, 1970.

34. Ibid, p.14.

35. Hugh Tinker, The Role of the Institute of Race Relations, IRR, London, April, 1971, p.1.

36. Ibid, p.5-6.

37. Robert Mast, 'Some Emotive Thoughts on IRR, with Special Reference to IRSP', IRR, London, December, 1970, p.3.

38. Robert Mast, 'Class, Ethnicity and Structural Change in the Urban Context : Proposed Investigation', IRR, London, (undated), p.9.

39. See Tinker, September 1970, op cit. p.8. Tinker's comment on the failure of the Trevelyan Study Group was: 'Unfortunately, the subject of the study group did not seem to engage the interests of our Fellows'. (Ibid.)

40. Although little information appears to exist on the work of this study group, it is clear from its brief that it was to form part of the groundwork for the debate on black immigrant status - patriality and non-patriality - that followed and eventually culminated in the Conservative Government's 1973 Commonwealth Immigration Act.

41. Robert Mast, December, 1970, op cit, p.7.

42. Ibid.

43. Hugh Tinker, November, 1970, op cit, p.3.

44. Ibid; and see Tinker, September, 1970, op cit.

45. Ibid.

46. Funds for this study were obtained jointly with Social Community and Planning Research and amounted to £6,500. See Research Proposal submitted to SSRC, 1970, IRR, London.

47. Robert Mast, December, 1970, op cit, p.2. Examples of this group's papers which were quickly and easily produced and published and which in a sense reflected Mast's point that JUMPR knew 'which side its bread was buttered' included: Nicholas Deakin and Brian Cohen, 'Dispersal and Choice for Ethnic Minorities', Environment and Planning, Vol.2, 1970; Nicholas Deakin and Jenny Bourne, Powell, Minorities and the 1970 Election', Political Quarterly, October, 1970; and Nicholas Deakin and Clare Vugerson, 'Reflections on the Concept of the Ghetto', CES Seminar, March, 1971, IRR, London.

48. Nicholas Deakin, Colour, Citizenship and British Society, Panther Books, London, 1970, pp.21-22.

49. See A. Sivanandan, Race and Resistance : The IRR Story, Race Today Publications, London, 1974, for a general account of this JUMPR defeat. My reconstruction and indeed interpretation of this and subsequent events in the next few pages has been based on several various sources, including interview material, minutes and notes of staff meetings, special meetings called at IRSP and JUMPR, and Mast's December 1970 paper, op cit.

50. A. Sivanandan, Interview, 1st December, 1976.

51. See Robert Mast, December, 1970, op cit, pp.2-4.

52. For an account of this and particularly the so-called Tinker/Deakin 'personality clash', see Philip Mason, May, 1976, op cit, pp.44-46.

53. Robert Mast, December, 1970, op cit.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid, p.3.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ibid, p.2.

60. Ibid, p.2.

61. See Arnold Rose, 'Postscript Twenty Years Later', in Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma, McGraw-Hill, London, 1964, p.X/IV. Here he optimistically notes:

"The change had been so rapid, and caste and racism so debilitated that I venture to predict the end of all formal segregation and discrimination within a decade, and the decline of informal segregation and discrimination so that it would be a mere shadow in two decades".

62. From Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital : An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order' Penguin Books, London, 1968, pp.272-273, but quoted by Mast in Class, Ethnicity and Structural Change in the Urban Context, op cit.

63. Ibid. p.9 and See Mast, December, 1970, op cit, for the beginning of the emergence of this view.

64. From this point onwards Mast adopted Van den Berghe's 'conditions' as outlined in the latter's Race and Racism, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1967, pp.148-149.

65. See in particular Melvin Tumin (ed) Comparative Perspectives on Race Relations, Little Brown, & Co., Boston, 1969, p.3; and for examples of those who treated conflict as a manifest racial process, see: George Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1955; LewisCoser, The Functions of Social Conflict, The Free Press, New York, 1956; Lewis Coser, Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict, The Free Press, New York, 1967; Elton B. McNeil (ed), The Nature of Human Conflict, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1965; and Raymond W. Mack, 'The Components of Social Conflict', Social Problems, Vol. 12, No.4., Spring, 1965.

66. Robert Mast, undated paper, op cit, p.14.

67. Robert Mast, December, 1970, op cit, p.5. (his emphasis).

68. Robin Jenkins, 'The Roots of Under-development', Race Today, Vol.2, No.8, August, 1970, pp.270.

69. For an account of this now obvious historical and social conclusion within a generally Marxist framework see Pierre Jalee, The Pillage of the Third World, Monthly Review Press, London, 1968. Also see for a wider treatment of the theme vis-a-vis Latin America, Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, London, 1968; Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, New York, 1962 and John Gerassi, The Great Fear in Latin America, New York, 1963.

70. Robin Jenkins, August, 1970, op cit, p.29.

71. Ibid, p.270.

72. In other words, Jenkins' personal (re)discovery was not so much concerned with developing a theoretical framework for research, but with asking, for the first time within the Institute, questions which would both help him to justify his position in a bourgeois institution and to uncover the relationship that he suspected to exist between the institution and Third World under-development.

73. See Robin Jenkins, 'The Strategic Importance of Cabora Bassa', IRR, London, 1970.

74. Quoted in Javad Sadeeg, 'Support Palestinian Resistance Movement', Intercontinental Press, Vol.8, No.2, January, 1970, p.30.

75. For further information on proposed company donations see 'Institute of Race Relations : Interim Report by Wells Management Consultants Limited,' IRR, London, 1972, and in particular the entries under 'Gifts Received at 22nd February, 1972.' These totalled £101,892 and were mainly raised through personal contacts/directorships held by (Lord) Seebohm, Lord Walston, David Sieff, Michael Caine, Sir Ronald Prain, Lord Byers and G. Runcunan.

76. See Sivanandan, 1974, op cit. p.18.

77. See Robin Jenkins, 'Strategic Importance of Cabora Bassa', op cit. Although his other work during this period (1970) was not as significant in terms of his own personal (re)discovery or in terms of the general development of consciousness within the Institute, it is worth consulting, however, for the insights it provides to his thinking as a politically conscious academic. In particular see: Language Conflict in Belgium, Race Today, April, 1970; 'Peace Research : A Perspective,' Political Studies, No.3, 1969; and 'Ethnic Conflict and Class Consciousness', Studies in Peace Research, Croningen, Netherlands, 1970.

78. Sivanandan, 1974, op cit, p.18.

79. Sivanandan, Interview, op cit.

80. See Sivanandan, 1974, op cit, pp.18-19.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. See Tinker, September, 1970, op cit, p.12.

84. Sivanandan, op cit, p.19.

85. Tinker, September, 1970, op cit.

86. Sivanandan, Interview, op cit. For a later formulation of this conclusion vis-a-vis Britain, see Sivanandan, 'Race, Class and the State', Race and Class, Vol.XVll, No.4, Spring, 1976, pp.347-368.

87. Sivanandan, Interview, op cit. (my parenthesis).

88. Sivanandan, 1974, op cit, p.19.

89. Sivanandan, 'The Liberation of the Black Intellectual', Race and Class, Vol. XVlll, No.4, Spring, 1977, pp.332-333. Although printed in this form in Spring 1977, this particular article's history started (I believe) for Sivanandan in the late 1960s. To quote the editorial staff's comment it 'charts the black intellectual's journey - his stations of the cross - from race to class.' First written in 1972 for a symposium on immigrant intellectuals in Britain and later published as 'Alien Gods' in Colour, Culture and Consciousness, Allen & Unwin, London, 1974, we republish the piece in its original form despite its cultural bias. For as Cabral has pointed out, the domination of a people, whatever its material determinants, 'can be maintained only by the permanent organised repression of (their) cultural life'. Or as Sivanandan implies in this essay, 'economics determines society, culture defines it.' (pp.329-330).

CHAPTER SIX

THE UTOPIANS (2) : RELEVANCE, PROJECTION AND ORGANISATION

Towards the end of 1970, the three sub-groups represented by Mast, Jenkins and Sivanandan, came together to form what Mason later termed a corporate and united group of dissidents.[1] Mast's personal and final rejection of liberal or bourgeois social science, one which relied exclusively on methodologies which espoused value-freedom and objectivity as already existing states - providing research was conducted within and thus governed by certain rules - enabled an effective combination to take place with both Jenkins' and Sivanandan's view of existing conditions and visions of the future. The political imperatives that appeared to govern the former's perception of existing and future reality could now, for instance, become legitimate research goals as well as committed and in the overall group's vocabulary 'relevant' statements of political intent.

Little, if any, inconsistency of purpose as research fellows entered into the kind of transformation that occurred, after their return to the Institute. For Mast, experiences of the changed America of 1970, made more visible for him than ever before, above all in the Kent State massacres, were inextricably connected with the requirements of modern capitalism; in order to undermine the authority of capitalist social organisation, and reveal to the oppressed their oppression and help facilitate their liberation,

bourgeois ideology, became both a research and political objective merged into almost an article of faith, a belief about scholarship and relevance bundled into existence. Such a radical and politicised, if not totally ideologised, interpretation of the role of scholarship, social science, and through its practitioners, the anticipated role of the Institute as a whole, not only found the approval of Sivanandan's largely non-academic group, but, more fundamentally, helped to provide the bridge required for policy-oriented political action to converge with the production of knowledge on race. In other words the political and methodological gulf that had formerly separated the two 'radical' groups within IRSP, and which had hindered an alliance between the radical academics and radical activists, had almost disappeared with the new growth of consciousness.

Although interpretations differed as to the precise nature of social reality, social, political, and economic conditions under which blacks lived, this consciousness or explicated pattern of structurally related personal (re)discoveries seemed to possess a similarity that also suggested a shared appreciation of that reality. Besides agreeing in general on Jenkins' analysis of underdevelopment and his specific social critique of Caborra Bassa, there existed as months passed and in the course of heightened critical activity centred on the quest for personal and organisational relevance more and more agreement on more and more issues until not only were the utopians united in belief but also united in how to act politically.

How this evolved or more crucially how the notion of relevance was projected and transposed into a programme of political organisation for sustained resistance forms the central concern of this chapter.

Relevance

The demand for relevance which echoed throughout the Institute during the autumn of 1970 arose, as already partially indicated, from a process which called for comparisons to be made between how black actors perceived the world and how those who controlled the Institute saw both the world and the place of IRR in reconstructing and/or supporting that world. According to Mast only one approach, as noted earlier, could be shown to reflect the interests of those who experienced prejudice, discrimination, injustice, inequality; the black, exploited-suffering constituency or clientele.

Simply,

> "Relevant IRRs must view their field mostly from the point of view of those who suffer and any service to be rendered must be to them, not to those who perpetuate the suffering."[2]

Unlike the ideologists' conception of the world which emphasised consensus social solidarity and thus a model which by and large viewed Western societies as being integrated wholes, the emerging utopians possessed quite a different picture. For them it was increasingly clear that the state of chaos and disorder which existed in the world, one in which normal, orderly social processes were being continually challenged, was not caused, as the ideologists suggested, by anarchistic and revolutionary elements, bent on the

destruction of existing legitimate and legal social orders, but that:

> "Chaos and disorder (were) the product of inequitable social arrangements in which various aggrieved minority and under-status groups and nations were struggling to increase their share of wealth, to equalise gross status differences and to develop the conditions whereby greater social participation may be realised as well as greater self-determination."[3]

These two quite different points of view, conceptions of social reality, perspectives on the world, reflected not only how the two distinctive social groups within IRR interpreted the social bases of relevance (relevance for whom?), but also stood for two types of subjective reality resulting from two dichotomous and contradictory positions in any social order.

> "The division essentially was along the lines of haves v. have-nots, ins v. outs, integrated v. marginal, owners v. non-owners, pace-setters v. followers, dialectical lines of logical opposites which emanated from relative positions in social structure. In short, the classes and groups possessing relative abundance in resources and power perceive chaos and disorder as a state of disorganisation, illegitimate demands and threats to the status quo; while those short of resources and power perceived chaos as hope for a better life."[4]

Predictably then:

> "The participants in this struggle consisted of a wide assortment of social types whose classification was dependent on the stage of national development, on control of resources and power, on level of self consciousness, on level of political mobilisation, and on other

> factors ... Some internal struggles may be based on social characteristics not considered by everyone to be in opposition: sex groups, age groups. Other struggles result from differences in belief systems. A permanent struggle through time revolves around the discrepancies in control of economic resources."[5]

Thus, argued the utopians, any relevant theoretical approach to the study of race relations, the position of blacks in colonial and metropolitan social structures must start at this point. True or false, the assumption on which such insistence was based in the main stemmed from a marxian theory of racism in general, and Nikolinakos' notes on an economic theory of racism in particular.[6] It depended for its impact and indeed subjective relevance, as something which appeared engaging to the racially oppressed, on a number of beliefs about the origins and historical role of racism.

Nikolinakos listed these as follows:

> "First, that racial discrimination already existed in the ancient world; secondly that during the colonial era racism was used as a tool in exploiting the colonial people through imposing upon them a system of discrimination; thirdly that racial or national minorities have been historically and are in the present either dominant or dominated depending on their economic role in the society in which they have lived or are living; fourthly, that it is this last factor, the economic one, that seems to underlie the psychological or, what some call, the irrational origin of racism."[7]

Given the suggested dichotomous nature of society, the belief that political struggle invariably revolves around the control of economic resources, it followed, firstly, that 'economic interests underlie the racial mantle under which the conflicts appear', and, secondly, that it was:

> "Important therefore every time to search for the economic interests at stake as well as for the classes of social groups actually involved in racial conflicts. For ... racism is finally the 'nationalization' on ideological grounds of a class conflict. ... Racism, if not considered in its economics, appears as a case where history goes mad!"[8]

Set within this framework which acted as both a theoretical perspective or approach for the doing of academic social science and a political stance towards the understanding and reshaping of the world, Sivanandan's group, known at various times as the Institute's 'core', saw 'the true force of capitalism's collective unconscious. In short it was to recognise:

> "Exploitation predictates a whole way of life, a culture which in its turn makes exploitation 'natural, a sad fact of human nature, to be contained by an illusion of democracy and salved by the anodyne of Christianity. It is to recognise that exploitation is the raison d'etre of capital and informs the collective unconscious of the capitalist".[9]

Once such a conclusion was accepted, Sivanandan's 'core' - the Library, Race Today, and Publications - became 'united in its desire to secure for the Institute the independence of thought and action

that it had lost in the boom period of the race industry', when IRR clearly became identified with the objectives of government, the policy-makers, and international capital.[10] In their view the Institute 'had been cast in a role not dissimilar to the role of straight government bodies such as the CRC and the RRB or of 'independent' bodies such as Runneymede Trust: the Institute was a buffering institution (of the kind identified by Katznelson) if not an outright instrument of social control'.[11]

So:

> "The 'core' began to question the Institute's relevance to the realities of the day, to the objective situation outside. The time was long gone to speak of the relations between races or of stemming the tide of discrimination; discrimination had become institutionalised in the executive, the legislature, in the judiciary even. That, at least, was the incontrovertible evidence of (the core's) own work."[12]

It meant in brief that the work 'core' staff members had done, essentially practical and investigative rather than analytical, had helped to re-orientate what Mast's group blandly termed from 'the sufferer's viewpoint' to something less liberal in conception, more radical in appeal. Instead of focusing 'their efforts on underdogs and victims and their immediate bureaucratic caretakers?', the core group, unlike the others, were representatives of the underdogs: it was therefore their own standpoint they applied to what Gouldner once termed the 'study of overdogs, power elites, the leaders, or masters, of men'.[13] Combined with the methodological insights of

sociologists Mast and Jenkins, the overall approach appeared to fuse into more than just a way of seeing the world, doing research: it appeared to become an exclusive statement of relevance; one which partly by definition and partly through political and emotional commitment precluded any other reformulation or alternative.

Indeed it formed the anchor point, even creed, for assessing the 'relevance' of all aspects of the Institute's work, including the actual role of the Institute itself.

The implications it possessed for the kind of research IRR should promote and do were as far reaching as those it held for the organisational and management structure of IRR. In the case of the former, these were spelt out decisively and radically at a two day conference instigated by Mast and Sivanandan and influenced by their respective experiences in America.[14]

> "Intended as an application of relevant and radical social science ... its purpose was to analyse and compare the means by which social institutions cope with, help articulate or repress demands for change made by minority groups in Britain and the US - the blacks, the poor, the young, women, etc."[15]

Above a photograph of Malcolm X and an injunction accredited to him. ... By any means necessary, to free our people ..., Robert Mast continued:

> "We hoped it would direct attention to the extent to which the British and American experiences have been qualitatively similar or different. We thought more should be known about the transference of experience from one society to the other, and the extent to which one learns from the other. Both societies seemed particularly amenable to this enquiry since they share a common language, a similar economic system, are predominantly white, have roughly equal class structures, embody institutionalised racism, and share common orientations toward the international order ...
>
> The charge to writers was that the two societies should be examined in general perspectives, but that ideas and data should focus on one institution. Something of an overview should be attempted of where things are today, the reasons how they got that way and the probable direction they are going. Authors might see connections between economic class and other differentiating criteria such as age, sex, race and ethnicity, and the impact of any such connections on institutions should be considered. And the different social movements in both countries (black liberation, women's liberation, youth counter-culture) should be considered along with dissent based on social class. Enquiry should concentrate on the possible new forms that institutions are taking and the way this may affect the broader society. How is capitalism being affected? Will new forms of family life emerge? Are new ideologies developing?"[16]

Seven institutions were chosen for detailed examination - law, government, religion, economy, family, education and welfare. Although the contributions and discussions on each were summarised by Mast and Evans in a later Race Today article, what was particularly significant about the conference was that, firstly, there existed more agreement than disagreement about the radical aims of future research; secondly, the 'black voice', to be heard for the first time at an official IRR event, was persuasive enough for many white

radical participants (mostly social scientists) to confuse revolutionary rhetoric and ideology for alternative, social scientific analytical possibilities; and lastly, 'the conference turned into a general critique of western capitalism and culture', a system that should be fought 'by minority groups seeking freedom, equality, and justice'.[17] In such a context 'relevant' research in general meant the conducting of critical analyses of capitalism from the perspective of the black oppressed and exploited. And, in particular, it posited that 'the class and racist natures of both societies were thought to be the fundamental points of reference for police and law analysis'; historical and comparative analysis of the emergence of capitalism and imperialism were essential together with 'structured thoughts' on the intersection of race and class, the whole question of identity as manifested in black and women's liberation movements; the English and American churches were beyond redemption and needed to be destroyed rather than studied, although the ghetto-priest or drop-out clergy, as counter-institutional personages, were worthy of study as indeed was the future appeal of the Nation of Islam to western blacks; and the direction that economic analysis should take in terms of redistribution of resources was in the end resoundingly clear:

> "Many thought that the contradictions in capitalist society should be exposed. In terms of the present system, the main question seemed to be: Can a re-distribution of resources be wide enough to buy off a dissatisfied labour force? Marginal redistribution is meaningless if, in the long run, people get less.

> How is redistribution accomplished now, some asked. And some suggested that the solution lay in raising expectations so that people will demand more. There was argument about the issue of 'too much theory and not enough action'.[18]

Similarly, the participants' deliberations on the family, education, and welfare forced the conference to return 'to square one: the system must be changed, in its economic and political aspects, in order for other, less tangible freedoms to be achieved'. For research to be relevant, a scholar to be politically radical, it and he must also become effectively aligned with this endeavour. Research must become the servant and disciple of revolutionary change, cutting away the undergrowth of deception to expose naked inequality, revealing the contradictions in the system, preparing signals for the political fighters to follow, but all the time subconsciously or openly taking its commands, spiritual orders, from the political Gods it serves.

Projecting for Support

Whilst the conference helped to clarify research aims and strategies, unify and consolidate the embryonic resistance group growing daily within the Institute through appealing to a collective sense of purpose and shared understanding of social reality from a broadly Marxian perspective, it and other similar events also became an important feature in the arousing of further consciousness.

But possibly the most significant and deliberate action(s) undertaken to stimulate deeper consciousness-building, to project a relevant perspective and conception of both race relations research and political action through the Institute actually historically preceded the conference by a few weeks.

Critically attacking the Institute's controllers or ideologists and with the full support of the corporate group of IRR radicals, Robin Jenkins' paper on the Institute represented the first concerted attempt to follow through politically the implications of what Tinker had identified earlier as 'the new mood of relevance'.[19] Unlike a number of other IRR radicals Jenkins had taken the charge of 'too much theory, not enough action' seriously; he understood consciously as others did intuitively that in order to do relevant research or to act politically in a relevant way the Institute itself had to be changed radically into a relevant body. And in order for this to be achieved, firstly, the kind of relevant analysis proposed had also to be used to understand how the Institute operated, the kind of knowledge it produced; secondly, the findings and hence the theoretical and indeed political base of the exercise should be projected; and thirdly, once others at the Institute and elsewhere, particularly the politically active black groups, fully appreciated the contradictions inherent in the alleged role of the Institute they would organise to agitate for change, to resist what Jenkins

saw as the hegemony of the ruling class, the 'boss-men' of race.[20]

Indeed the first of the three assumptions on which the paper was based reflected such a belief. In the preface to the original version of the paper he set them out as follows:

> "My first assumption is that the Institute of Race Relations is capable of changing its role - otherwise there would be no justification for being there, and no point in making an indictment of its activities. Its response to this indictment might indicate whether the assumption is correct or mistaken. My second assumption is that social science can be both objective and scientific, and my arguments for that position follow very closely the arguments of Althusser, Poulantzas and Schmid. My third assumption is that it is essential to distinguish between the production and consumption of knowledge."[21]

From this base he set out to examine some of the IRR knowledge produced. His argument that much of it was not scientific, but ideological, indeed either a contribution to ruling ideology or 'a form of spying on the activities of the underclass which makes it more accessible to manipulation and control by the elite', depended for its force and hence supportive significance by simply pointing out the connection between the kind of power structure that existed at IRR - its relations with the overall British power structure, the Western order, and international monopoly capital - and the kind of research, definition of 'race problems', it favoured.[22] From his opening introductory paragraph to his concluding policy recommendations, he thus not only attempted to project an alternative way of looking at social reality, doing research, but, more importantly, he attempted through his 'indictment' to undermine the basis and

rationale for IRR's existence, role and conception of the 'race problems'. In the hope that others would also see how irrelevant IRR had become, had always been for the black oppressed and exploited, the focus of his critique was on the fundamental contradictions that existed for all who worked for or supported IRR. This he made clear in the way he chose to begin his paper, or as one member of the radical group put it 'launch the first offensive in the battle for control, the campaign of sustained resistance'.[23]

'Situated in Piccadilly', he opened, 'conveniently close to the House of Commons, Whitehall and the Travellers Club, the IRR boldly proclaimed its unofficial status and political virginity on everything it published. It was registered as an educational charity to encourage and facilitate the study of the relations between races everywhere.'[24]

He continued:

> "Given the supposed scientific status of the Institute, it might seem a little odd that only seven members of the Council are social scientists. The others include thirteen representatives and owners of international monopoly capital and its various interests. They include such men as Michael Caine of Booker Bros., Sir William Pedler of Unilever, Sir Seebohm Rowntree of Barclays DCO and Harry Oppenheimer, the South African magnate who heads Anglo-American, de Beers, and over sixty smaller corporations ... What is clear, however, is that the areas in race relations that are deemed worthy of attention within the IRR are precisely those areas that are identified as problematic by international monopoly capital and its interests. 'Problems' tend to be identified in terms of the interests of those at the top.

> As of 1970, the annual budget of IRR is around £160,000; this comes from corporations owned or controlled by members of the Council, from other corporations, from foundations set up by corporations and from investments ...
>
> In the shelter of this £160,000 contributed by various members of the British, American, Portugese and South African ruling elites, there are about forty full time staff of whom half are researchers, most of them convinced that their work is at once, independently conceived and in the 'national interest'. Various members of this research staff (mainly working at JUMPR) thus encounter no moral or political difficulties in working for the 'improvement of race relations in Britain' whilst at the same time cultivating their relationships with such institutions as NATO, the Imperial Defence College and the notorious Adlai Stevenson Institute, financed largely by the Shah of Persia and part of the University of Chicago."[25]

Taking IRR's Survey in its published form, Colour and Citizenship, as representative of the Institute's total domestic research output, Jenkins incorporated an earlier argument sketched out by McGreal and Corrigan to establish his first point concerning the ideological nature of the knowledge produced by IRR.[26] And this entailed a notion that for research to be scientific it must be empirically valid and theoretically adequate; in order to attempt any serious analysis of the state of race relations, it must therefore depart from rather than endorse the historical idealism of Myrdal and relate race relations to the basic monopoly capitalist structure of Western (British) society. Because Rose and Deakin failed to do this and possibly unwittingly also failed to understand the difference between a scientific method and the production of 'spurious correlations', pretty diagrams, and tables and percentages, they became 'guilty of rank betrayal of all the finest traditions of humanism and reason':[27]

> "They substituted ignorance and 'revealed preferences' for truth and reason, practically gloated over manifestations of attitudinal irrationality as though this proved the impossibility of a more rational social order. In the end they merely rationalised irrationality, produced 'science' that was in fact ideology and recognised as genuine human needs only those factors - like maintaining a pool of unemployed - that were essential to the preservation of the status quo. This knowledge they produced was not scientific; instead they were engaged in the mutual affirmation of a solid chunk of ruling ideology."[28]

And further because of this the knowledge produced was, policy-wise, ineffective in attaining its own stated objectives 'to have an application to the real problems of the adjustment process, and relate to the short run as well as the long term, the back-streets as well as Whitehall';[29] and 'to equip members of these minorities to be equal citizens as well as to be equal under the law, to compensate (them) for disadvantages that were peculiar to them. Such action was imperative to prevent a feeling of alienation from growing within the coloured communities and to ensure that individuals were able and willing to exercise their rights as citizens'.[30] On each count, Jenkins showed that the authors, the domestic research programme, and hence the Institute as a whole had failed, suggesting that in the case of their claim to be relevant to the back street their recommendations 'were made squarely to Whitehall'. In fact of the 78 recommendations at the end of Colour and Citizenship, 41 were to central government and its agencies, 23 were to local government and its committees, 6 were to the churches, 4 were to the police, 3 to employers, 3 to trade unions, one to the press and one

to the immigrant community.[31] The recommendation to the immigrant community was really a recommendation to government too:

> "We recommend that as leaders are identified they should be consulted by government departments, by local authorities, and by the police and that they be invited to be members of local bodies such as regional health boards and educational and housing committees of local authorities which serve the community as a whole."[32]

'Such a recommendation', concluded Jenkins, 'was pure neo-colonialism - co-opt the leaders, tokenise them and get them to feed information about their communities to the police and the government':

> "Liberal and universalistic claims to the contrary, the whole perspective of this research is the perspective of those at the top. One is reminded of the description of American sociology by Nicolaus:
>
> > 'Eyes down, to study the activities of the lower classes, of the subject population - those activities which create problems for the smooth exercise of governmental hegemony ... The things that are sociologically <u>interesting</u> are the things that are interesting to those who stand at the top of the mountain and feel the tremors of an earth-quake.'
>
> Despite their consistent attempts to influence government and their obvious satisfaction that their work was discussed in the House of Lords, the applied knowledge produced by IRR is not even effective at this level ... To the extent that their work is a product of the ruling ideology, it serves as useful propaganda for government use, but if a government and a ruling elite is to remain in power, it requires its social scientists to feed them accurate information about what is going on down below, amongst the people at the bottom. Not only do Rose, Deakin and associates <u>not</u> do this, but they confuse the issue by serving up knowledge that is based on bowdlerised ruling ideology and contains little or no scientific information.

> From the point of view of almost any vested interest, the knowledge produced by IRR is, policy-wise, ineffective. In addition their focus on government as the agency for their policies is indicative of their elitist orientation."[33]

But whilst these two features of Jenkins' composite indictment in a sense relegated IRR's usefulness (for blacks) to nil, 'a minor obstruction in their struggle for freedom', an irrelevant body engaged in irrelevant research and work, they did not project either the alleged social outcome of such activity or expose fully the interest based nature of IRR's work. In other words they did not convey the alternative conception of social reality, of doing research, which had given the (re)discovered, experientially based consciousness its political and radical social scientific portrait. This was to come in the second part of Jenkins' argument which propounded that IRR served to increase the inequitable distribution of social knowledge, to make blacks, already at the bottom of society, more powerless, and to act as a spying agency on the activities of the black community. 'Although I am sure that Rose, Deakin and others (including the IRR Council) would like to view society as a sort of jig-saw puzzle', stated Jenkins, 'in which the immigrant pieces require certain "adjustments" before they will fit properly, the model which I shall propose here is easier to defend with the data contained in National Income and Expenditure published by HMSO:

"Out society can be viewed as a pyramid in which the small elite that owns most of the personal wealth and indirectly controls government activities sits at the top whilst the vast majority whose capital amounts only to a few Premium Bonds at the most, is found at the bottom. The researchers in IRR are fairly high up in this pyramid and although few of them own any significant amount of capital, most of them receive an income well above the mode. They can direct their research interests upwards or downwards or horizontally from their own position in society. Forgetting the horizontal model which does not concern us here .... the downward model typically deals with surveys of the characteristics of people lower down in the system. Because the researcher is working in the same direction as the power structure, he usually has good access to his data and is able to make a quantitative, statistical analysis of it. If his work is applied research its object will be to manipulate and control those activities that take place lower down in the system. Its theoretical focus will therefore be integration, conflict resolution, social control, etc. The upward model is very different. Since there are few units at the top, the research will be in terms of case studies. Access to data will be very limited because the elite takes its decisions and does its deals in private. If the work is applied research, its object will be subversive and its theoretical focus will be conflict, polarisation and revolution.

Practically all the knowledge produced by IRR resulted and results from the application of the downward, manipulative model of social research... The implications of these two models of applied social research have only been made clear at the international level so far. When the US army tried to initiate Project Camelot on revolution in Latin America it was denounced as scientific imperialism but when the IRR does intensive research on immigrant minorities there is not a murmer ...

The IRR is engaged in a large scale, long term programme of research into the characteristics and behaviour of the immigrant population. The knowledge that is so produced circulates in books amongst the elite. As a result, there must be more knowledge of the immigrant population of Britain available than there is knowledge on almost any other social group. What has the immigrant population got from all this research? Has the IRR written a single pamphlet that is of any use to them? No, the IRR has 'worked to create and increase the inequitable distribution of knowledge, it has worked to make the power elite relatively more powerful and

> knowledgeable, and thereby to make the subject, (immigrant) population relatively more impotent and ignorant', (Nicolaus)."[34]

So Jenkins asked rhetorically, employing a second quotation from Nicolaus:

> "What if that machinery were reversed? What if the habits, problems, actions and decisions of the wealthy and powerful were daily scrutinised by a thousand systematic researchers, were hourly pried into, analysed and cross-referenced, tabulated and published in a hundred inexpensive, mass circulation journals and written so that even the fifteen year old high school drop-outs could understand it and predict the actions of their parents, landlord, manipulate and control him?"[35]

Inversely, Jenkins posed the answer in his conclusion:

> "The IRR acts as a watchdog for the ruling elite, makes sure that they receive ample information on the sub-proletariat and ample warning of impending revolts. In this respect, the IRR complements the work of the police which, according to Deakin, 'were employed in an intelligence role - they were the medium through which most of the scanty information about minorities reached Whitehall'. Whitehall spies on the immigrant communities through the police and the IRR and in the process, the immigrant community becomes a laboratory for work to advance the careers of compromised and corrupt social scientists. I use these adjectives advisedly because the researchers in the IRR have compromised themselves to the position of defending the status quo and corrupted their science to the point of producing ideology in disguise.
>
> If there was any indication that British capitalism in the seventies would be able to operate without a sub-proletariat, it might just be possible to justify the scientific colonialism that is engaged in by the IRR when it studies immigrants in the inner city ....

> (But) the present evidence from the USA, West Germany, France, and Switzerland indicates that in its advanced stages, monopoly capital can only maintain some sort of stability in wages and profits by the presence of a sub-proletariat which is exploited more intensively than the proletariat in both housing and jobs. If this is indeed the case, the immigrant communities in Britain will have to form their own organisations to seize their own freedom. In order to do this they will have to wrap their communities in a protective secrecy that makes them inaccessible to manipulation and control. When researchers from the IRR come knocking on their doors for information they will be well advised to tell them to fuck off."[36]

Despite the fact that according to Jenkins the Institute had already become hopelessly compromised scientifically and politically, possibly too late realistically to expect it to change, it nevertheless possessed three options on paper, one in practice. First, it could cling to the liberal convictions on which it was founded - that good people, by saying good things in public places could make the world a better place. If, however, IRR did cling to these convictions it would more and more find itself saying good things to itself and receive precious little funds to do it with either. (And, anyhow, Deakin and Rose had argued that 'the liberal hour' or era in which such an approach might have had some effect was now past). Second, it could move to the right with the then present political climate on race relations, thereby adopting a position where it served the twin functions of justifying the status quo by producing ruling ideologies, and spying on the immigrant communities for the ruling elite. (If their work was anything to go by, this was the direction in which Deakin and Rose and associates - including

95% of IRR's Council - would move). And thirdly, and more preferably, it could endeavour to become a scientific institute dedicated to the search for and clarification of truth in the field of race relations.

And:

> "To do scientific research on race relations is to attack and undermine various ideologies on race relations - including the ruling ideology of the British bourgeoisie - so the work will be interpreted by this bourgeoisie as subversive (true), revolutionary (perhaps) and unscientific (false). On the other hand, such research might possibly be of use to those with no vested interest in the status quo."[37]

By taking the initiative or, as Sivanandan put it, saying 'no more than what the majority of the Institute staff had felt for a long time', Jenkins had symbolised internally, at least, the beginning of what some called 'rebellion', others active resistance.[38] He wanted his paper to be seen as a warning to the Institute of the way in which its research could become compromised. In a letter to Jim Rose he went on to point out that:

> "If the paper is seen simply as an attack on personalities, then I will have failed right at the start to stimulate the sort of debate that I think is not only fruitful but also necessary - though there is no doubt that several people, myself included, will find it tough. Maybe it is asking a lot but I hope that you can bring yourself to see my paper in this sort of light."[39]

Neither Rose nor Deakin could. They, as indeed did Jenkins, realised that the argument was inextricably connected with the position they held at the Institute, in society. What they understood, as again did Jenkins, was that it was sufficiently cogent and politically

original enough to consolidate existing internal discontent. The critical discussions or attacks aimed at JUMPR's research programme a few months earlier were now no longer hot air: in the form of an 'academic paper' they had become refashioned into an observable instrument or weapon of resistance and battle. Circulated to sociologists in and outside IRR, the Press, all members of IRR staff and Council, the paper was applauded, criticised and incessantly discussed within the Institute.

For the enlarging group of utopians who were now beginning to see not only how 'relevance' could be projected but also instituted, the Council's and particularly the Council-JUMPR sub-group's reaction to the paper and Jenkins intensified rather than squashed support. The calls for Jenkins' resignation, demanded by Rose at a hastily convened midnight meeting in Lord Walston's Albany flat, were interpreted by nearly all staff, including Tinker, as a direct assault on academic freedom.[40] Severe Council criticism which took the form of an 'absolute and total condemnation of Jenkins', publicised and circulated to the Press as well as IRR staff, immediately led to a staff resolution being passed at a specially convened staff meeting in full support of Jenkins' right to say and publish what his research had revealed.[41] But more significantly, Council reaction, together with Deakin's outrage, helped to provide for the radicals the kind of opportunity they had long been seeking to launch a more vitriolic and politically pointed attack on JUMPR.

> "We had always been united against Deakin's particular brand of research at JUMPR. Jenkins' critique which clearly set out the ideological nature of Rose 11 (as much as it had done Rose 1, Colour and Citizenship), provided us with the occasion to make our disgust and profound disapproval felt - politically and academically."[42]

This came at a staff meeting soon after the Council's formal discussion of Jenkins' paper. Not only was Deakin verbally attacked for masquerading as a 'radical researcher' when to radicals it was patently obvious to whom his research was directed, where his ambitions and interests lay, but, now, after the heated furore that had accompanied the reception of Jenkins' paper, he symbolised the 'enemy'. He was, according to several staff reports, 'a police spy', a 'lackey of the white racist establishment', and along with Rose, Nandy and Lestor 'the Fabian-liberal, the black community's worst enemy'.[43] So fierce was the attack, so emotionally charged was the situation, so desperate were the utopian radicals to vent their spleen, frustration, hatred of the situation in which they found themselves, which Jenkins had exposed on both the international (Caborra Bassa) and domestic fronts, that the meeting escalated into what Young and Humphry termed a 'punch-up'; a bitter squabble on one level which led certainly to a punch being 'delivered to Mr. Deakin's face by a radical supporter', and a political battle on another at which the ideological enemy was routed.[44]

It was at and after this meeting that Deakin decided finally to carry out his previous threats to resign. In his opinion an 'unconducive atmosphere' had arisen which made it impossible for him

personally to survive within the Institute and professionally to continue his direction of JUMPR now that many of his junior fellows had defected or joined the camp of the central IRR utopians.

Reporting his decision to the Sunday Times, he stated:

> "I have said that I cannot in present circumstances continue to do my job. The phoney divisions which have appeared in the last six months have got worse and worse. How research is done is not the issue, it is a matter of personalities. I hope to carry on elsewhere my research, which is directed to radical criticism of the status quo."[45]

But even before Deakin's decision it had become quite clear to Rose, Lestor, Nandy and other Council members, as one of the founding Council members, Sir Roland Oliver, pointed out to a later recruit, Sir Robert Birley, a former headmaster of Eton, that:

> "Jenkins was no isolated phenomenon, but that the whole of the International Unit was of that ilk."[46]

Summarising the events and discussions that had occurred at 'the first meeting ever held of the steering committee of the International Unit', Oliver continued:

> "I came away with the very strong impression that (they were all radicals united to undermine the Council's authority in general and the past and present work of the Institute in particular).
>
> Two members of the Unit - Cross and Dzidziyenyo - were abroad on fieldwork. Besides Tinker, therefore the staff was represented by Mast, Jenkins, Braham, and a cheroot-smoking young lady in a purple track suit called Barbara Harrison. We listened to them talking about their work by the space of three hours, and I came away with a thick pile of their literary productions, on which I have spent a despairing day.

A good deal of the trouble must be due to Mast, though I would not think him as intellectually disreputable as some of the others obviously are. He speaks and writes in clouds of sociological polysyllables, but his basic outlook is very simple. It is that the only thing that matters in the world is Equality, and to him Race is nothing but a very small and indistinguishable result of Inequality. The function of an Institute of Race Relations is therefore to engage in general analyses of the 'political economy' of the various countries of the world, with the condemnation of inequality as the top priority. To him it is clear that an Institute should be addressing itself to the underprivileged rather than to the Establishment, and that the purpose of its studies is to 'demythologise' the underprivileged, so that they shake themselves free of the 'latent conflict' caused by inequality and turn to the 'manifest conflict' which alone brings about the radical change of structures, and helps to make us all like Cuba and Tanzania, Zambia and China (Mast's order).

His 'Plan of Ongoing and Immediate Future Work' expresses, though at greater length, the attitudes summarised above, and proposes a series of seminars of which the proceedings are to be published under his own editorship. This seems a proposal well calculated to dry up all financial support for the Institute.

In this document we are told that Miss Harrison is 'developing expertise' in Oceania and parts of S.E. Asia, that Braham is developing East Africa and Jenkins Southern Africa. Miss Harrison's paper on 'Race Relations in Malaya 1957-70' (seemed) quite sensible as far as it went. Not so a paper by Braham called 'Race, Class and Structural Change in Kenya 1900-1970' - a childish and naive document of 40 pages concocted from journalistic and propagandist sources, showing no knowledge of any of the more obvious standard secondary works on Kenya and East Africa ... it cannot possibly be described as an intellectually respectable piece of work, of the sort that could be accepted in any decent university for the lowest kind of graduate work.

This brings us to Jenkins, who has completed one volume called 'Exploitation' under our auspices, has another called 'Towards a Science of Liberation' two-thirds completed, and now proposes a major study of the political economy of Mozambique. For this he is planning to learn Portugese, but not to visit Mozambique, because he has been declared a prohibited immigrant in Rhodesia and fears he would be refused a visa by the Portugese. He said he did not think it necessary to visit countries about which one was writing authoritative works. It seemed plain to me that there was nothing scholarly about his approach.

> Firstly, I have studied an application by the IRSP to the SSRC which is a hopelessly incompetent and unconvincing document, didactic, jargon-ridden, uncosted, and not really about research. Not unnaturally, it has been turned down by SSRC and this must be counted a major setback ... Presumably, Tinker must have seen such an important draft before it was submitted, and if so, this is frightening.
>
> All in all, I am afraid it looks as though IRSP is a self-recruiting group of way-out lefties of very dubious intellectual standing, and speaking as a member of London University, I am quite clear that this is not a group with whom the University should do anything to promote closer ties. Speaking as a member of IRR's Council, I feel very perplexed. On the whole I think the honest course would be to have a show down now and face the inevitable controversy and ridicule and loss of confidence by supporters that would be involved. The only other course would be to let IRSP run out its remaining 18 months and then close it down. Either way, I think we should have to get rid of Tinker in the end. It is inescapably his responsibility. He recruited Mast, and Mast and his young men are now in charge of Tinker. I think this means that Tinker should go now, and that we should hope that most of IRSP would resign with him - though they probably won't when it comes to the point ...
>
> This is a brutal conclusion to reach about someone who has been one's friend and colleague for 22 years, but I can see no alternative."[47]

What Oliver had overlooked, though it was certain from his letter that he had sensed it, was firstly the extent of the self-recruitment of 'way-out lefties' that existed at IRR, and secondly, the reasons why the internal groups' popularity had rapidly increased. Simply, as already shown, its support was not merely confined to IRSP: after the distribution of Jenkins' paper it extended to include all of JUMPR's research fellows, the Institute's central core, including all members of staff who worked in the Library, information and

publication divisions, and the editor of Race Today, at least 32 of the 40 full-time members of staff. For all, the paper and the ensuing debate which according to Tinker and others 'prevented any serious work from being done', raised five questions which could only be reconciled academically and politically in one of the three ways suggested by Jenkins himself at the end of his paper.[48] In addition to and against the backcloth of the issue of academic freedom which, of course, only emerged after publication, the first - and to some extent all - concerned the issue of relevance. If, as committed researchers and workers striving to create a climate in which change could occur, it was established beyond doubt that the organisation for which one worked was managed and funded by representatives of international monopoly capital, the oppressors and exploiters of black workers here and overseas, how with integrity and sincerity could one claim to be 'relevant' in the sense already defined? Secondly, and this in Jenkins' view was inextricably bound to the first predicament or contradiction, how could race relations be improved, the cause championed, when researchers were straitjacketed into a dominant conception of social reality, like it or not, by a tradition of IRR scholarship which appeared at all times to reflect that conception? Or to put it another way, no matter how relevant future work could be made to become, unless the past was critically confronted and challenged, it would always remain overshadowed, lacking real credibility. Thirdly, how could research be continued or, for some, careers expanded and safeguarded, without the full support of the 'new' clientele political, social

and academic relevance had unearthed? Fourthly, for the white socialist-scholar, how could he or she assuage the sense of guilt that had arisen from his or her ignorance, association with a body that appeared to be as much an agency of control as the police? And even more significantly for those black members of staff, how could one's identity as a black be either re-established or constructed when it became clear that one's involvement with the Institute could be now (mis)construed as one's involvement with the sustained oppression and exploitation of black brothers and sisters? Or as one black member phrased it:

> "Who was I? Where was I? To have sat on the side-lines would have been to deny my existence as a black, exploited worker: to act as I did was to reaffirm who I was, where I was."[49]

Clearly, in raising these questions, and others of lesser import, and in sketching out a future programme of action for the committed and relevant social scientist, Jenkins' paper not only had the effect of expanding and consolidating utopian support but also that of bluntly answering the questions posed by Tinker four months earlier during a period when all were acrimoniously engaged in a search for <u>meaning</u>:

> "Where shall we find ourselves as (largely) Western people in IRR? With the increasing rejection by the darker skins of the pale-skins as their interpreters - who shall we be? If our main audience is the affluent West, what shall we have to say that is relevant?"[50]

Now that the majority of staff knew how to become relevant, how to act consistently and purposefully within an explicitly political as well as 'academic' framework, the next task was to project or export externally what they had discovered in order to attract additional, alternative support, to reach out to a new clientele to expose the social base and undermine in a fundamental way the authority and hence power base of the old.

Although Jenkins' paper which had been circulated amongst BSA sociologists, reported in the Press, and distributed to some black-based organisations and groups that had requested a copy, had started this process, it was through Race Today that the real external campaign for support for a utopian conception of the world was launched. Here, under Kirby's editorship and Sivanandan's political guidance, Race Today's image and orientation radically shifted from one of being a race news magazine, producing accounts mainly of official race developments in Britain, to being 'a vehicle of journalistic positive discrimination. It had always seemed to (Kirby) that its great potential lay in opening its pages to the expression of views by people who were on the receiving end of racism - the voice of the victims themselves."[51] Whilst such a policy dictated that more of its pages, articles, should be written up by blacks or the 'victims themselves', it also meant that the editor, his assistants and IRR staff contributors, by and large, possessed more than merely a descriptive knowledge of the victim:

they understood, as Race Today's leader which followed the appearance of Jenkins' paper suggested, that:

> "So often the race debate, within and between nations, seems a matter of finding the quickest and easiest answers, of aiming for the deepest complacency of the greatest number by the cheapest means: how legitimate protest can be headed off, how few non-whites need to be admitted, how far to assuage the opinion of a public one has failed totally to inform. Yet it is a truism to describe the presence in Britain of a seizeable black community as a trace-element in society: the agonies which it undergoes differ - for the most part - only in degree from those which have for generations borne down the British poor."[52]

Thus:

> "The demands of racial and of social justice in Britain largely overlap, and neither can be satisfied in isolation. If we seriously want to end racial inequality we shall be forced to think hard about the sort of society we are aiming for: questions will have to replace glib answers ... A society that can work itself up into a state of righteous indignation over forty Pakistanis in a Bradford cellar while it remains unmoved by real injustice has got the bedclothes firmly over its head."[53]

As conceived by Kirby, his IRR contributors, the reconstructed role of Race Today was then to pull back systematically the bedclothes to expose racism, inequality and social injustice in their naked form; to provide for the reader, the black communities it solicited, a grounded interpretation and analysis of the real (racism) conditions under which they laboured and tried to survive. In other words, the campaigning zeal for which Race Today became known and appreciated by blacks was no more or less than an attempt to project a way of seeing the world which corresponded directly with

earlier theoretical and political discussions held within the Institute. From January 1971 onwards with both the 'Little England v. the World' editorial and the anonymous 'Letter from Prison' article,[54] the journal not only became the organ of the oppressed victim but also the organ through which he could relate to himself, through which IRR radicals could, according to Sivanandan, express their 'findings', their identification with the exploited - a journal which reached out for the support of those who <u>really</u> mattered.[55]

The basis of this relationship, of the utopian group's success in attracting external support, depended then upon a kind of political empathy, the projecting of a relevant approach or perspective which in its subjectivism accurately reflected clientele aspirations. And in return, the printing of the black man or woman's day to day experience which more often than not rawly reflected and fitted favoured conceptual models; or provided the flesh and blood for more confident conceptualisations of present and future realities. For instance, the author of a 'Letter from Prison' - an article which was given prominence in the journal and provided the design idea for the cover - suggested that:

> "The treatment of black prisoners would largely depend upon the social and cultural attitudes brought into the prison environment from the outside society. Every feeling becomes intensified, focussed; a mild antipathy to blacks on the outside can become a vicious hatred behind prison bars ... The officers take their cue from the senior staff and the white prisoners take their cue from the officers (and all from outside in society)...

> Black prisoners are carefully allocated, so that there are never two in the same cell - 'because they might gang up on the white prisoner'. On the exercise yard black prisoners are not permitted to 'bunch'. In the weekly church service they are discouraged from sitting together. In a fairly acrimonious, one-sided interview with the Governor, a prisoner was told: 'You people infest the country, demanding Black Power and God knows what, but I'll have none of your equality nonsense here!' ... Life for the black prisoner becomes a series of taunts, insults and humiliation. 'What makes you bastards stink so much?'"[56]

Undeniably real as, in a wider sense, it was allegorical, this article received its theoretical and political complement in the very next issue. In a short and punchy article Peter Hain attempted to sketch out a broader perspective for understanding and opposing apartheid, one which should expose the structure of white supremacist economies and become allied more centrally with militant and more resistive opposition to racism in Britain.[57] It was followed a few pages later by a more theoretical piece in which black writer and academic, Len Bloom, argued that whilst classes within nations might share a common fate and common struggle, 'the struggle for racial equality and justice merges with the striving for economic and national autonomy'.

He concluded:

> "Nkrumah recently said: 'I don't deny the existence of the struggling 'wretched of the earth', but maintain that they do not exist in isolation, as a Third World. They are an integral part of the revolutionary world, and are committed to the hilt in the struggle ... to end the exploitation of man by man'.... The overwhelmingly

> important question of race today is not alone the concern of one underdeveloped country or exploited class, but of all. The welfare or harm of one underdeveloped and underprivileged group is inseparable from the concerns of others."[58]

Such a conclusion permeated the whole issue. Whether or not the article was about racial stereotypes in history textbooks, black unemployment, or indeed the growth of black solidarity groups in America, the message in these editorialised articles came over with resounding clarity: connect or hook up with the revolutionary struggle and merge <u>your</u> black consciousness with <u>our</u> white-class consciousness. The emotional appeal for blacks and the proof of relevance for IRR utopians rested on an absolute acceptance that:

> "The warp and weft of black life in Britain today is a sense of frustration and failure engendered both by outright racism on the part of local authorities, landlords and others, and as well by the insensitivity and shortsightedness of those who see no need to make special provision for the special needs of those without whose labour they could not survive."[59]

What was required in these circumstances, argued the May 1971 editorial was - Power to the People!

Reporting approvingly on the Soledad rally at Central Hall, Westminster, on 20th April, 1971, Kirby continued:

> "What most of the audience had gone there for (except the FBI and Special Branch, whom an early speaker took care to welcome), was not so much discussion of the facts of the case alleged against the Soledad Brothers as an affirmation of faith in the justice of their struggle ... what they heard and experienced was sacremental, too, in pointing them beyond themselves, so that they left the hall with consciousness heightened and imagination touched."[60]

The conclusion most drew from the experience propounded the editorial concerned:

> "The indivisibility of black resistance to a racist status quo, and the unity of the revolution which ignores national boundaries as much as racial ones... Really though it was George Jackson again who went to the heart of things on injustice: 'I call on myself, have faith in myself. This is where it must always come from in the end'. 'Power to the People' was a rallying cry in Central Hall that evening (and in Race Today for this and future months)."[61]

In short, as one astute though severe critic suggested in his confidential report and analysis of Race Today for the last chairman of IRR's Council:

> "In reality Kirby, his supporters, (and other IRR radicals) see the struggle of the black man for dignity, equality, and a proper equitable place in our society as a part of a world struggle to overthrow established systems everywhere. Believing this, they therefore must relate their interpretation, their reporting, their selection of the facts, as far as race relations in this country are concerned, to a determinist view of contemporary political and economic problems...
>
> (Thus) what Race Today has set out to do within the last twelve months is to present a water-tight and holistic ideological interpretation of what happens in race relations in Britain today. All the jargon of exclusive interpretation is there. Events are blown up and given an emotive sloganised label... This is, of course, in accordance with Leninist views - or indeed the views of Hitler put forward in Mein Kampf - on the making of propaganda for a movement which presents its own complete interpretation of world events...
>
> To sum up, what happens to black people in this country is only important in so far as it forwards the overthrow of our present system. The blacks are to be used as an instrument of the revolution and, cleverly used, they can be bent in such a way that that event, historically inevitable anyway, can be hurried along.

> They must therefore always be presented as a class doomed for ever to degradation, perpetually exploited, chained, in the dungeons of Castle Capital. If young blacks can be brainwashed into believing this, then there will indeed be a corrosive revolutionary weapon at hand in our cities, and it will be possible to demonstrate in a splendidly emotional way to sympathetic intellectuals the changing nature of capitalism, and the eternal validity of the interpretation of Marx-Engels-Lenin and, according to taste, Trotsky or Mao.
>
> At all times, therefore, blacks must be presented crouched over parrafin stoves in the appalling poverty of the ghetto, or as heroic struggling proletarians. What must never be mentioned is the fact in race relations today, that tension is lessening, and that the embourgoisement is now under way... But such deviations from the dialectic must be suppressed: Lenin said so."[62]

Although harsh, angry and in places highly questionable, Norton's analysis did strike at the heart of what Race Today was attempting to do. If it was nothing else, it had quickly become an organ for the projection of utopian interpretations and analyses of reality; an organ which sought to heighten cousciousness amongst its readers; and an organ which urged all to act politically and radically against social and racial injustice.

The extent and depth of external support gathered for Race Today's policy, the utopians' way of seeing and acting in the world, was considerable. Although at times difficult to isolate from other considerations such as later the continuation of the journal itself, it was clear to the radical group that its sales which increased by 34·8% between June 1970 and June 1971 and its distribution network, which consisted of as many complementary as sold copies to black groups and organisations ranging from the

Universal Coloured Peoples Association to ad hoc action groups in Brixton, Notting Hill, London, or Chapel Town, Leeds, reflected the fact that it had in a comparatively short time been received enthusiastically and read by a new, emerging clientele.[63] This was further demonstrated by the rapid increase in numbers of black activists, community workers, and scholars to the Institute, particularly to the Library, where Librarian Sivanandan started to hold regular meetings and discussion groups. And in the letters of support that surged in as sales rose to 3000 copies a month, it became more and more evident that as well as black workers and non-workers, white radical scholars were also attracted.

For instance, one wrote:

> "I have found the magazine... to be essential reading because of its relevance to the real problem of race relations in Britain and the rest of the world. I have been impressed by your willingness to publish material which is important but which might, because of its nature, be denied exposure elsewhere.
>
> I feel that in writing this letter I am expressing the views of others as well as my own views. A large number of people with whom I have come into contact have commented how relevant, interesting and important they find Race Today now."[64]

And, almost twelve months later, another radical academic wrote:

> "...Race Today is the most important publication in the field of race relations. It is a vital source of information and news for people who are in any way concerned with race relations... it is the only publication which deals in an open and unequivocal way with the position of the ex-colonial worker in Britain and Europe and which draws out the very important connection between the exploitation of black workers in Europe and in the under-developed countries. Finally, it is the only journal with a national circulation through which coloured communities in Britain can express themselves to a wider public..."[65]

This latter point was also one that the mainly black supported and directed Teachers Against Racism movement endorsed before going on to state:

> "As a grassroots movement of teachers involved in the multi-racial school situation all over Britain our membership considers Race Today to be the best current publication on the subject. Far from lacking objectivity our members find that Race Today reflects the reality of their own experience both in the school and in the community... The(utopian group in) IRR and Race Today are at this moment in time and with their present policy respected by community groups all over Britain...."[66]

In addition to such unsolicited letters, the expansion of the correspondence pages noted by Derek Humphrey who thought that 'Race Today could eventually take its place beside the Spectator and the News Statesman in its sales pattern',[67] and the fact, as recorded by Bernard Coard, that Race Today was at least representing 'the fundamental problems voiced by over one hundred and fifty parents and youth groups at the grass roots levels in all the major British cities' (he had recently visited),[68] there existed yet another important indicator of support. In short this entailed not only the increase in number of meetings, conferences and open staff-initiated seminars, but also the radical change in the composition of participants that occurred. Where as before 1970, IRR's Annual Conference and other public meetings were mainly 'academic' and attended by white scholars and representatives of the agencies and constituencies it largely addressed, after 1971 the conferences covered and partly serviced by Race Today were dominated by black activists.

Indeed, argued Downing, as he reported on IRR's 1971 Annual Conference:

> "Future conferences must build on this foundation... It was clear from the opening session that not only the form of this year's conference was to be different - no 'intellectual names' for instance - but also the tone was to be changed. Whereas in previous years issues such as the criminality of strong elements in the police could erupt only occasionally from the floor, this time they were out front. Formerly people were embarrassed by the intrusion of the (black) world on their deliberations, but this time many were embarrassed by the unreality of some of the criticisms from the liberal Establishment...
>
> Naturally this challenge to the conventional white administrative wisdom was thought unbalanced by some; a few perhaps even felt inhibited from expressing their critical views. In itself this was a pity, though in the context of black voicelessness on most occasions it is cut down to size as a grievance."[69]

Further, the depth of general support for IRR's unofficial policy of relevance and the beginnings of the racial factionalism that subsequently emerged within the utopian group, could be gleaned from both the kind and level of discussion that occurred. For instance, of the many issues debated, 'one of the things that repeatedly showed its head was the question of reform and revolution':

> "While no one claims it isn't an issue, the form in which it was - and is - frequently raised is a load of rubbish. It is usually presented as an either-or: if you are one kind of hard-headed person, with practical problems immediately facing you, you think you have to be a reformist... If you are another kind of hard-headed person... you can see how reform is utilised to avoid more important changes; and how structures of power and oppression persist...what is pressing is to unite the two analyses...

> This particular debate is only able to take the form it does because most of the people involved haven't even troubled to read standard discussions of the issue, like Lenin's What Is To Be Done? and Left Wing Communism: an infantile disorder. The real issues in the debate about reform and revolution are questions of assessing the tactical importance of particular militant demands and actions, and of how best to alert people's minds to the implications of their frustrations: not whether a particular action can be slickly labelled reformist or revolutionary.
>
> Another question which repeatedly raised its head was the white radical syndrome. This takes two forms. One is the urge on the part of some whites to verbalise awareness of guilt for centuries of racist oppression... a way of establishing bona fide guilt credentials... The other form is to desire to be a white general for a black army, or at least an adviser, or at the very least a hanger-on of black groups in struggle... (Both forms were vigorously rejected by blacks and white involvement was relegated to) providing equipment or some service and make yourself known as someone who will...
>
> (Finally) another important question raised at the conference was the role of black people in Britain as the catalyst of socialist revolution, through being a Third World enclave committed to an alternative world order... and through demonstrating the nature of capitalist bureaucratic Britain to white workers, many of whom have been blinded by their marginal gains since the war..."[70]

Whilst this question was left unresolved, the fact that it and others monopolised the conference in place of questions appertaining to immigrant welfare, law and order, English-teaching programmes and the like suggested that the support for the utopians' conception of relevance had grown to the point where it itself was engaged in redefining 'relevance' to those who originally proclaimed it. Or, to put it another way: it appeared that by mid-1971 external support principally from two quarters - black grassrootists/political activists and young white, radical scholars - had greatly helped to strengthen and polarise utopian views within the Institute.

Organising to Resist

In fact this was precisely the case. The problem that arose within the broadly-based and in essence loosely inter-connected utopian group was the one of relative influence and control of participating sub-groups; the exact problem which Ron Philips, amongst other black grassrootist-political-activists, addressed at the conference.[71] In the early months of re-organisation, the re-alliance of political interests and social scientific perspectives, the desire to become relevant, to be able to relate to the victims of racial oppression and exploitation, had clouded the question of the respective roles of white and black participants in struggle - the question of whose struggle and for whom? But to a large extent the question had remained unasked: it had been submerged in the intellectual activity that had occurred to a point where it was almost assumed that, primarily, the theoreticians of revolutionary struggle at the Institute - Jenkins and Mast - were, firstly, the activists responsible for formulating the new conception of relevance, and, secondly, in conjunction with Kirby's Race Today, were responsible for projecting it internally and externally. In other words within the Institute itself, though not outside amongst the new and mainly black supporters, there existed for Sivanandan and other black staff an unacceptable paradox, even contradiction.

Simply:

> "Jenkins represented one school of thought, the black members of staff the other. The former maintained that the Institute should refuse to take a penny from the capitalists and called for a showdown with the Council, the latter that they would take money from the devil if necessary and hope that they would not get bought off in the process: black people had no choice, they could not fight the system bare handed, they must get the tools of the system to fight the system with. Besides, they were now as wary of being taken over by the white left as once they were of the liberals."[72]

With the backing of external black support, the expressive demand for black participation in IRR affairs, and, ironically, with the form in which Council's reaction to the Jenkins affair took, enough pressure was brought to bear internally to resolve what threatened the collective force of all intentions to resist. In short, the second or black view won the day and:

> "Jenkins felt that in all integrity he could not be of service to his colleagues any more. By the time Walston asked him to retract his criticisms of Colour and Citizenship, he was ready to resign - and did so."[73]

With his resignation, the subsequent complete support that staff gave to Sivanandan, as the black representative of the struggle outside disguised as a Librarian inside, as the resister who could actually and symbolically relate theory to practice, action to suffering, provided the kind of unity and organisational base necessary for resistive struggle.

In the space of eighteen months, from the beginning of Tinker's directorship to Jenkins' resignation, the staff had then formed themselves into a utopian group, espousing a political philosophy and projecting a unified conception of social reality that stood opposed to that preferred by the ideologists, the controllers, managers, and financial backers of the Institute. Furthermore, they had reconstructed what was once the ideologists' house journal, the Newsletter, into a political organ of resistance; one which communicated their conception of the world which in turn reflected the experiences and views of the new black and underprivileged rather than the old white and privileged clientele. Through the support of this new clientele they had found their external base, their source of authority and its legitimation. They, in short, had become a force to be reckoned with; a group now committed to imposing their will through resistive struggle.

CHAPTER SIX

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Philip Mason, Interview, 18th and 19th February, 1976. Also see his, The Institute of Race Relations, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, May, 1976, pp.44-59 for an account of his version of the 'corporate and united group of dissidents'.

2. Robert Mast, 'Some Emotive Thoughts on IRR, with Special Reference to IRSP', IRR, London, December, 1970, p.5.

3. Robert Mast, 'Class, Ethnicity and Structural Change in the Urban Context', IRR, London, 1970, p.1.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Marios Nikolinakos, 'Notes on An Economic Theory of Racism', Race, Vol. XIV, No.4, April, 1973.

7. Ibid, p.365. For the further expansion of the relationship between economic factors and discrimination, also see Marios Nikolinakos, 'Economic Foundations of Discrimination in the Federal Republic of Germany' in Han van Heute and Willy Mergert (eds), Foreigners in Our Community, Keering N.V., Amsterdam, 1972; and for an abbreviated version see 'Germany: The Economics of Discrimination', Race Today, Vol. 3, No. 11, November, 1971. This, together with Paolo Cinnani's seminal paper, 'Migrant Labour: The Rich Get Richer' was originally presented to the Congress on 'Foreigners in Our Community' organised by the Ann Frank Foundation and the Netherlands United Nations Association in Amsterdam, August, 1971.

8. Marios Nikolinakos, 1973, op cit, pp.378-9.

9. A. Sivanandan, Race and Resistance: The IRR Story, Race Today Publications, London, 1974, p.7.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid, p.17. For an account of Ira Katznelson's conception of political buffers see, firstly, his 'Participation and Political Buffers in Urban America', Race, Vol. XII, No. 4, April, 1973, pp.465-480; and, secondly, Blackmen, White Cities: Race, Politics, and Migration in the United States, 1900-1930, and Britain, 1948-1968, Oxford University Press, London, 1973.

12. A. Sivanandan, 1974, p.17.

13. See Alvin W. Gouldner, 'The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology and the Welfare State', in Jack Douglas (ed), The Relevance of Sociology, Appleton-Century-Cross, New York, 1969. Although this debate preoccupied most IRR staff internally during 1970/71, it was later publicly expressed in the 'Quarterly Forum' pages in Race during 1972/73. In particular see Lee Bridges, 'Race Relations Research: From Colonialism to Neo-Colonialism: Some Random Thoughts', Race , Vol. XIV, No.3, pp.331-41; and John Rex, 'The Future of Race Relations Research in Britain: Sociological Research and the Politics of Racial Justice,' Race, Vol. XIV, No.4, pp.481-488. Although Bridges and others who took part in the debate tended to see race relations research as being informed more by political objectives than by methodological considerations in sociology, Rex tended to take up a more sociological stance. His position seemed to reflect directly many of the points made by Weber in his classic essays 'The Meaning of Ethical Neutrality', and 'Objectivity in Social Science' in The Methodology of the Social Sicences, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1949; and even to a greater extent, observations made by Gunner Myrdal in his celebrated Appendices to An American Dilemma.

14. This two day conference - A Comparative Analysis of the Impact of Minority Group Demands on Institutions in Britain and the United States - was held at the IRR on 6th and 7th February, 1971.

15. Robert Mast, 'British and U.S. Response to Minority Demands: A Comparison', Race Today, Vol. 3, No. 4, p.115.

16. Ibid.

17. Robert Mast and Barbara Evans, 'The Conference Summarised', Race Today, Vol. 3, No. 4, p.126.

18. Ibid.

19. See Robin Jenkins, The Production of Knowledge in the Institute of Race Relations, IRR, London, 6th January, 1971. As opposed to the later, revised, edited, and extended paper published by the Independent Labour Party, June, 1971, it is this original version we are quoting from here. For, unpolished, it provides a better illustration of Jenkins' actual position and critique than the second version.

20. Essentially this is one part of the overall process of social refraction we discuss more fully in Chapters 9 and 10.

21. Robin Jenkins, 1971, op cit, p.(i).

22. This, or rather the international aspect of Jenkins' thesis, had been in part already set out in an earlier paper, The Strategic Importance of Cabora Bassa, IRR, London, 1970.

23. A. Sivanandan, Interview, 1st December, 1976.

24. Robin Jenkins, 1971, op cit, p.1.

25. Ibid, pp.1-2.

26. See John McGreal and Philip R.D. Corrigan, 'Ideology in Colour and Citizenship', unpublished paper, London School of Economics, April, 1970. Besides exposing the analytical hollowness and the ideological assumptions implicit in 'the liberal solution of integration', this paper suggests (and discussions with Philip Corrigan in February/March 1976) confirm that others outside the IRR had already started to evaluate its research and contribution to the 'improvement' of race relations.

27. Robin Jenkins, 1971, op cit, p.16.

28. Ibid.

29. Nicholas Deakin, Colour, Citizenship, and British Society, Panther Books, London, 1970, p.21; but quoted in Jenkins, 1971, op cit, p.16.

30. E.J.B. Rose and Associates, Colour and Citizenship, Oxford University Press, London, 1969, p.676; but quoted in Jenkins 1971, op cit, p.17.

31. Ibid, pp.675-753.

32. Ibid, pp.731-2; but quoted in Jenkins' 1971, op cit, p.19.

33. Robin Jenkins, 1971, op cit, p.19. (The quotation included from M. Nicolaus was taken from 'Remarks to the 1968 ASA Conference' to be found in Catalyst, 1969 and American Sociologist 1969; and also during 1969/70 distributed by the LSE Sociology Society).

34. Ibid, p.20. For an analysis of social science research in terms of Schmid's upward, downward, and horizontal model, see H. Schmid, 'Science and the Control of Social Systems' in Dencik, A (ed), Scientific Research and Politics, Lund, Sweden, 1969.

35. M. Nicolaus, 1968, op cit.

36. Robin Jenkins, 1971, op cit, pp.24-26.

37. Ibid, p.27.

38. A. Sivanandan, 1974, op cit, p.20.

39. 'Letter from Robin Jenkins to Jim Rose', IRR, London, 15th January, 1971.

40. See Robin Jenkins, 'Institute of Race Relations: Why I Resigned', Ink, 26th June, 1971, p.8-9 for a full and detailed account of how the Staff interpreted the Council's reaction.

41. Ibid.

42. A. Sivanandan and a group of staff employed by the Institute during 1969-1972, Group Interview, 1st December, 1976.

43. Ibid.

44. See Hugo Young and Derek Humphrey, 'Punch-up, Spies, and Marxist in Race Row', Sunday Times, London, 28th March, 1971.

45. Ibid, p.3.

46. Letter from Sir Roland Oliver to Sir Robert Birley, IRR, London, 26th February, 1971, pp.1-3.

47. Ibid.

48. Robin Jenkins, 1971, op cit, pp.19-22. For Tinker's views on the importance of the internal debate see his 'Report to the Ford Foundation: On the First Year's Working of the International Race Studies Programme of the Institute of Race Relations', IRR, London, November, 1970.

49. Leila Hassad, Interview/Discussion, April, 1973, (My paraphrasing).

50. Hugh Tinker, 'The International Race Studies Programme and its Future', IRR, London, September, 1970, p.14.

51. Alexander Kirby, 'Race Today, Gone Tomorrow' in Charles Husband (ed), White Media and Black Britain, Arrow Books, London, 1975, p.194.

52. Alexander Kirby, 'Little England v. the World', Race Today, Vol. 3, No. 1, p.1.

53. Ibid.

54. Anonymous, 'Letter from Prison', Race Today, Vol. 3, No. 1, January, 1971.

55. A. Sivanandan, 1974, op cit, p.17.

56. Anonymous, 1971, op cit, p.23.

57. Peter Hain, 'Opposing Apartheid: Towards a Broader Perspective', Race Today, Vol. 3, No. 2, February, 1971.

58. Len Bloom, 'Ataturk and Nkrumah: Two Political Prophets', Race Today, Vol. 3, No. 2, p.52, February, 1971.

59. Alexander Kirby, 'Beyond the Bill', Race Today, Vol. 3, No. 4, April, 1971, p.109.

60. Alexander Kirby, 'Power to the People?', Race Today, Vol. 3, No. 5, May, 1971, p.145.

61. Ibid.

62. Graham Norton, 'Race Today: An Analysis', IRR, London, 1972, pp.1-4. (Although now in our possession, this document was prepared as part of the overall Council Campaign to close down Race Today).

63. We shall be identifying more clearly this 'new clientele' in Chapters 7 and 8.

64. Letter from Louis Kushnick, Department of American Studies, University of Manchester, to the Editor of Race Today, IRR, London, February, 1971. This, together with other appreciative letters, was cited in Appendix B, 'Letters from Readers' in A Kirby, Race Today: Application to Joseph Rowntree Social Service Unit, IRR, London, November, 1971, pp.1-8.

65. Letter from Robert Moore, then Senior Lecturer in Sociology, University of Aberdeen, to Michael Caine, IRR Council Chairman, IRR, London, 27th March, 1972.

66. Letter from Bridget Harris, Teachers Against Racism, to the Council of the Institute of Race Relations, IRR, London, 22nd March, 1972.

67. Letter from Derek Humphrey, The Sunday Times, to the editor of Race Today, IRR, London, February, 1971; quoted in Appendix B, 'Letters from Readers', op cit.

68. Letter from Bernard Coard, black writer and scholar, to Michael Caine, IRR, London, 10th April, 1972.

69. John Downing, 'Institute of Race Relations, 24th/25th September: A Conference Report', Race Today, Vol. 3, No. 11, pp.387-8.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. A. Sivanandan, 1974, op cit, p.21.

73. Ibid.

CHAPTER SEVEN

RESISTANCE (1) : PREPARING FOR STRUGGLE

If Robin Jenkins' paper symbolised the beginning of staff resistance at the Institute, then the Council's reaction to what it termed the 'Jenkins Affair' signalled the beginning of organised counter-resistance.

Besides attempting to reaffirm what it saw as the bases of the Institute's tradition of unbiased or impartial scholarship, of the Institute's role, it went one step further. It tried not only to consolidate its now questioned right and authority to preside over the Institute but, in so doing, insisted on punitive and severe remedial action. More than was evident in its public remarks, it realised that if the Institute were to survive as the body it knew and promoted, it was of fundamental importance to act or counter-resist decisively. Thus Lord Walston, as Chairman, possessed little doubt about the kind of action required:

> "I saw it as my responsibility to the Council and the Institute membership to prune out the destructive radicalism that had been allowed by the director to flourish... (and) to encourage an immediate return to a balanced and responsible approach..."[1]

This, as will be shown in the pages that follow, entailed at least three sets of considerations which in turn called for three distinctive courses of action. The first concerned the general

question of what to do about Jenkins, his supporters, and the so-called 'militant mood' that had suddenly arisen. The second, which reflected much that the Jenkins Affair had symbolised, involved the question of how the Institute could be shored up to survive; its authority and hence power base consolidated and articulated in a way that would guarantee that survival. And the third set of related considerations arose often in the form of rationalisations or justifications for one particular course of action over another. They spoke directly to the issues and promoters of these issues as perceived by the ideologists; they called for the identification and exposure of real and false issues, and required, as far as possible, their resolution in action. All three sets were inter-related.

For the utopians, on the other hand, whose resistive stance had evoked counter-resistance, each set and the Council actions that ensued, raised alternative questions and subsequent courses of action. They included questions about how the resistive, militant mood could be maintained, and expanded after Jenkins' resignation: how could the Institute be radically changed to replace one kind of authority-power structure with another to reflect their perceptions of reality and those of the people they represented; and finally, they included the question of how the issues and enemies they perceived could best be promoted or identified to make resistive struggle appear to ordinary members and non-members to be a legitimate

form of political action.

As points of strategy as well as points of theory for their on-going resistance, they did not however really surface until after the Council's reaction to the Jenkins Affair: in fact they arose during the course and out of this reaction, the product of interaction in a special kind of conflict situation.

Counter-Resistance or Insistence

The first reactions to Jenkins' paper were neither academic nor professional. Although presented emotionally at the special midnight meeting in January, 1971, at Lord Walston's Albany flat and presented in such a way as to suggest that Rose and Lester at least had interpreted the paper as 'simply an attack on personalities', they were political and ideological.[2] What annoyed most members was, firstly, Jenkins' audacity in even questioning the role of the Institute and its research; secondly, that he did this in such a way as to cast the Council as a group of 'fuddy-duddy reactionaries only concerned with promoting their own interests';[3] thirdly, that these and other criticisms 'inspired by Communist and Marxist sympathies' had been deliberately broadcasted outside the Institute without either the director or Council's prior knowledge;[4] fourthly, that the paper from a political and theoretical stance not shared by the Council had vitriolically accused IRR's corporate supporters, on whom it had depended for survival since 1952, of being enemies

of freedom, equality, and black peoples; and fifthly, if allowed to go unchecked, 'the venom which Jenkins had spouted could spread not only throughout the rest of the Institute but throughout the whole community interested in researching or solving racial problems':[5] it could shake and perhaps eventually destroy the social foundations on which the Institute had been built; on which the present Council - and previous Councils - had constructed its power to control and govern. But for Jim Rose and his close friend and colleague, Anthony Lester, the depth of annoyance went even further. Not only had the former been the major author of Colour and Citizenship, the director of Nuffield's Survey on British Race Relations, and the latter the principal architect of the Runneymede Trust and a staunch supporter of Nicholas Deakin and JUMPR, but of all the active Council members they appeared to have most to loose:

> "This was (so) ... for several reasons. You must remember that Jim Rose put a lot of time and energy into the Survey ... he turned down other posts which paid considerably more than we could offer in order to come and direct our Survey ... But, I think what stunned him and Lester most was that their radical credentials, as former Fabians, and as being well in with the Parliamentary Labour Party, were now in dispute ... They were well on the Left of centre, whereas most of us, it would be fair to say, were conservative-liberals on the right of centre ... In part, they therefore felt more affronted than most of us when someone more radical than they accused them of being traitors..."[6]

Given this fairly plausible though partial explanation, Rose and Lester's response or the root problems had then as much to do with personalities per se as they did with what Mason later saw as 'ethical procedures'.[7]

For instance, according to Rose some years later:

> "I and others, I should add, thought the only proper course of action was to dismiss Robin Jenkins at once ... Besides casting untruths abroad about the Institute, Colour and Citizenship, Nicholas Deakin and myself, he was bitterly against all that the Institute had previously stood for... His brand of defunct and hence inappropriate radicalism - that is, inappropriate in our society, although it might have some relevance in societies where exploitation and oppression really do exist - was nevertheless highly destructive... It was essentially aimed at destroying everything, the good with the bad, bringing about a revolution by any means possible and at any expense... My position was simply that if this was what he wanted to do then he should not pretend that he was engaged in scholarly work... And it was our duty to see that the original values and beliefs, scholarly standards, were at all times protected... In my opinion there was no other response to Jenkins' assault other than to fire him..."[8]

But as Hugh Tinker categorically refused to do this, the aggrieved Council group's course of action seemed to be quite clear. Rejecting both Tinker's main reason for refusal, that which addressed itself to the principle of academic freedom, and his own suggestions for alternative action, the group demanded that the whole subject should be brought up at the Executive Committee and, if need be, the next meeting of Council. They could not accept Tinker's suggestion that he should ask Jenkins to apologise for any 'personal distress' his paper might have caused, to agree in the future to notify the Director or Deputy director of any critical statements about the Institute he wished to distribute, and to accept that future publications should not be hastily produced or couched in a language that was likely to cause personal offence. They wanted

nothing short of Jenkins' instant dismissal. And when this was not forthcoming at the January Executive Committee, they became even more incensed with Tinker's inability to see what was <u>really</u> at stake, insisting that the whole matter should at once be referred to Council, where neither Tinker's peculiar conception of his responsibilities to the Council, though interpreted as if they were only to the staff, nor staff loyalties,would interfere with the decision that, in their opinion, had to be made. In their eagerness to open up the affair at Council level they found themselves paradoxically siding with the utopian-staff representatives at the meeting who, for quite different reasons, also wanted the affair raised and discussed at Council level. In contrast, Deakin's position on the subject and general feeling that 'he did not wish to pursue the personal implications of Robin Jenkins' paper' was ignored by Jim Rose, Sir Robert Birley, and others who:

> "Urged that the paper should be considered by the Council at its next meeting; it should be given a prominent place on the Agenda and should be circulated in advance to all members of Council. (For) the specific criticisms of the Institute could not be ignored."[9]

Against a background of conflicting interests, unstated motives and shrouded in the stuff that appears to make science fiction anything but fantasy, it was eventually agreed that the paper should be placed before Council for discussion. According to Chairman Lord Walston, the job of the Council would be 'to examine the serious criticism made and decide:

"(a) how far that criticism was justified and,
(b) to what extent it might be prepared to take notice of the criticism and amend its role accordingly."[10]

Further, 'for security reasons, the Paper would be circulated only to those members of the Council resident in the United Kingdom and the Secretary should append a note asking members to treat the paper as confidential until the date of the meeting'.[11]

Whilst such secrecy and confidentiality reflected the importance which Council members attached to the paper in terms of its supposed effect, if leaked, on industrial support and confidence, it was also intended to contain and seal off discussion within the Institute so that a way acceptable to Rose, other Council members, and hopefully the majority of staff, if not Tinker, could be found to dismiss Jenkins. Although the paper was subsequently leaked to a New Society reporter, the main thrust of the Rose-inspired campaign of counter-resistance was planned to fructify at the Council meeting on 23rd March. At this meeting, and with the knowledge that Lester if not Rose had been 'discussing Mr. Jenkins' paper outside the confines of the Institute', both members supported by Sir Robert Birley and Lord Walston attempted to pass a vote of no confidence in Hugh Tinker for not instantly dismissing Jenkins. Marginally rejected on the grounds that such a vote would only help to widen existing divisions, differences of opinion, and extend the Institute's troubles to include yet another issue, the competence or otherwise of its director, the Council decided to reserve its condemnation solely for Jenkins' paper. It generally agreed that the statements

at the end of the paper that accused the Institute of serving the twin functions of justifying the status quo by producing ruling ideologies, and spying on the immigrant communities for the ruling elite should be repudiated.[12] And as for the allegations that the Institute worked against the interests of the immigrant communities it thoroughly deplored them, 'because they were untrue: the Institute had always existed to ameliorate the situation of immigrants and not to exacerbate their problems'.[13] Whilst recognising that a certain amount of self-criticism was 'both inevitable and desirable' and that 'there should be no obstacle to radical research provided, unlike Mr. Jenkins's criticisms, it was conducted genuinely along objective and honest lines, the Council agreed unanimously:

> "To express their fullest confidence in Mr. Rose and Mr. Deakin both as regards their technical competence and integrity. The Council also condemned the attacks upon them in Mr. Jenkins' paper... It was further agreed that the Chairman should talk to all members of the staff with a view to ascertaining the reasons for the manifest tension which existed within the Institute and Research Units; to investigate how far these tensions impelled research and the other activities of the Institute; and in order to suggest action by which these could be overcome."[14]

But almost before Walston could launch his one-man enquiry into internal unrest, the angered and active counter-resistance group on the Council attempted successfully to widen their campaign. Deeply frustrated by the Council's declarations of sympathy for their point of view, yet wary of taking the action they desired, they decided privately to externalise IRR's problems, and hence their

determination and struggle to counter what they saw as 'destructive, Communist forces operating inside the Institute'.[15] The first and in a sense decisive phase of their strategy, which they had started before the Council meeting, was to watch and where necessary subtly guide John Gretton's researches into an article on 'The Race Industry' he was preparing for New Society.[16] They expected, although Tinker attempted to play down the unrest at the Institute when approached and warned Lester and others 'of the dangers of discussing the Jenkins Affair' with the press, that the article would force a reply from Jenkins. This it did. Defending himself against Gretton's misreading of his conclusions and attempting 'to put the record straight' in a letter to New Society, he reaffirmed and publicised his original indictment through arguing that:

> "My criticism of the Institute is that it no longer practices what it preaches, that it has slipped away from the scientific perspective with which it started and is increasingly slipping into acceptance of the conventional wisdoms of a racist ideology..."[17]

Appearing on the 25th March, two days after the Council meeting, after Tinker had informed the Council that Jenkins would refrain from publishing his findings and making statements outside the Institute without his knowledge and approval, this letter and particularly the extract above was seen immediately by Rose and Deakin as constituting a breach of promise, obligation and trust. They and others informed Tinker of this, and he was left with no

choice but to duly suspend rather than back Jenkins on the 29th March.

The second phase of their strategy which commenced immediately after the Council meeting amounted to a direct exertion of pressure on Tinker by using again their contacts with the press. Only this time, instead of allowing things to take their guided course in the hope that the reporter would simply raise the issue, they decided, firstly, that they would need to discuss the matter with their press colleagues - especially Harold Evans, the editor of the Sunday Times, who was a close personal friend of Jim Rose - and, secondly, that the issues as they saw them should be centralised in any press reports.[18] This strategy culminated five days after the Council meeting with the prominent article and editorial in the Sunday Times on the 28th March. Under the headline 'Punch up, spies, and Marxist in Race Row', senior reporters Young and Humphrey interpreted what they had been told within the framework of an established, internationally respected and scholarly Institute, whose survival was now seriously threatened by 'bitter ideological dispute'.[19]

It went on:

> "Some members of the Institute's ruling Council fear that the body's very existence is being put in question by the assaults of so-called radicals on its tradition of scholarly investigation...

> Mr. Deakin's collaboration with Mr. E.J.B. Rose in the book formed the main text for the Jenkins onslaught... To the familiar pattern of academic disputation, this conflict adds some bizarre features: a Marxist sociologist using capitalist money to undermine the Institute for which he works; (and) allegations from the radical camp that their colleagues are not merely mistaken but police spies ... The serious terms of the argument will be familiar to anyone who has followed the recent history of student protest. The radical challenge rests on the basic premise that no established institution is capable of independence unless it is first dismantled and all its practices subjected to a radical critique ...
>
> Two issues seem to be particularly in the mind of the Council. One is the fear that the same tactics which have been attempted, unsuccessfully, at several universities to radicalise academic work are now being directed at a body which, being small and charitably financed, is more vulnerable to them... As one Council member said: 'How can a foundation for peace (Ford) finance something which is in danger of being converted into a political body promoting conflict ...'
>
> The second concern is for the quality of the research under way in IRSP, which has £125,000 of the Ford money. Two projects, in Brazil and the West Indies, are considered promising (they are framed within the same ideological boundaries as earlier IRR research). But two others notionally dealing with urban racism (Mast's work), and the political economy of Mocambique, Jenkins' own subject, are thought to be suffering from the interminable self-examination which the radicals have been conducting. 'I am in favour of Marxist analysis', said a second Council member, 'but not of vulgar Marxism'.[20]

Deliberately defining the 'bitter debate' with the Council's interests in mind, against the utopians' case, though stopping short of actually telling the Council that it must sack Jenkins, the editor pontificated:

> "The argument at the Institute is no longer about academic methods. Still less is it about academic freedom. The Institute is confronted by an attempt to alter and ultimately destroy the purpose of its existence. The rhetoric which supports this attempt is modish but lacks intellectual solidity. It should not persuade any liberal to be an accomplice in the destruction of what he believes in. The Institute's Council has the responsibility to ensure that it is preserved, to do a job it has done well for twenty years."[21]

For Walston this arranged coverage was only marginally helpful. It supported his and the Council's general view of things, but what it did not and of course could not do was to create an atmosphere in which Walston could 'prune out the destructive radicalism' without further internal polarisation. In fact if Institute differences, debates and conflicts were, at this stage, allowed to be aired in the media before he had had time to complete his enquiry and to recommend firm remedial action, the enquiry itself could be viewed as being far from impartial. Two days after the Sunday Times report he thus sent the following letter to all Council members:

> "The press has turned its attention to the Institute and numerous members of staff have been asked for statements. Under my authority, instructions have been given to all members of staff to refer any press enquiry to me to deal with. I would be grateful if members of the Council would observe the same convention in case they receive an enquiry about the present situation within the Institute."[22]

On this understanding which formed one of two staff conditions before co-operating with his enquiry, Walston clumsily attempted to carry out his search for the causes of internal unrest.

> "He used the classic dividing tactic of interviewing members of staff individually and then refused to report back to the staff although that had been (the other) condition on which the staff had been willing to be interviewed in the first place."[23]

Three weeks later Walston reported to an anxious Council, one that was by now looking for firm leadership, a final but 'fair' end to the Jenkins affair, that there was no evidence of subversion, or attempts to undermine the Institute. Although he found evidence of tensions between different sections and individuals of the staff, between staff and Council, and between the two research units, in his opinion this was something that could be dealt with easily providing the Council at once accepted the recommendations in his 'package'.

> "The salient points in this 'package' were (a) the resignation of Mr. Lester from the Council; (b) the dismissal by the Director of Mr. Jenkins; and (c) the appointment of an Administration Director so that henceforth Professor Tinker could devote his full energies to the post of Research Director, IRSP and JUMPR being amalgamated into one research body with one Steering Committee."[24]

Whilst these recommendations accorded with the majority of the Council's wishes, they could not however be accepted. Too bluntly expressed without any apparent or articulated rationale, Council members on balance felt that dispensing with the services of either Council members who had deliberately raised the temperature of the affair and conflict by pursuing an open campaign in the Press, or of members of staff would, if done without water-tight justification,

only further aggravate present problems.[25] Compounded by the fact that since the last Council meeting the staff had expressed full confidence in Professor Tinker's leadership, believing that there should be only one overall director of the Institute, and had expressed similar motions of support in Jenkins' right to communicate his findings as a scholar, it appeared that any attempt to implement these recommendations would lead to the Institute's imminent collapse rather than survival.

At the base of the Council's general lack of decisiveness once confronted with a solution, an effective counter-resistive course of action, nestled, according to Mason, three 'profound reservations'.

They were:

> "That there existed a feeling that Walston's report had not been based on a statement of the Institute's constitutional position, the philosophy and traditions of the Institute to which members subscribed... (Secondly), that the proposed action appeared to be based on the principle of summary justice, a desire at any cost to rid the Institute of its problems ... (And, thirdly), that it was not possible to glean from his brief report either how problems arising in the future could be quickly resolved without crudely having to resort to the drastic measure of terminating contracts, or how the Institute could reorganise itself so the Council at all times could maintain firm internal control..."[26]

For these, at the time, unexpressed reasons, it was decided that Philip Mason, who a month earlier had been persuaded to return to the Institute to help resolve internal difficulties and conflicts,

should be asked, with the assistance of up to four others, 'to enquire further into the present difficulties and suggest a possible solution taking into account all the papers laid before Council and including a definition of the position of Council members'.[27]

Given under two weeks to complete this assignment, to provide what amounted to an ideological and justificatory base for the action already proposed by Walston, Mason immediately set out, first, 'to define the questions on which the Council should reach decisions and secondly to recommend answers'.[28] Arranging his final report around these two concerns, in the first part he suggested that the questions needing to be asked and answered appertained to: the formal objectivity of the Institute, conduct of staff, tasks and role of the Institute in the long and short terms, organisation, and personalities. And the second part he reserved for a list of formal recommendations which in effect conveyed to the Council the committee's own answers to the questions posed.

Under the first section on the formal objectivity of the Institute he asserted that all proposed Council action should be based on, consistent with, and reflect the legal instruments of the Institute as a charitable company. In short, and for the purposes of the investigation, this meant that the Institute should reaffirm its main objects as listed in its Memorandum of Association without

advocating any change; that it should at all times abide by its constitutional ruling that it should not express corporate opinions or views that could be construed as being those of the overall Institute; and that it should understand and make clear that 'the work of the Institute had, since it began in embryonic form in 1952, been based on certain assumptions.' (And) the first of these, which had been generally accepted, was that race was irrelevant to the potentialities of a human being. As we have already seen, the rest, which were implicit in the Memorandum of Association, were:

> "(a) that human behaviour can sometimes be affected by rational argument;
> (b) that rational argument needs a background of fact and information which has to be looked for and made public;
> (c) that race relations, which are manifestly worse in some countries than in others, can be improved or worsened by the action of governments and other organised bodies; and
> (d) that governments sometimes yield to informed pressure and that social institutions are sometimes modified in the same way."[29]

Reformulating, then, the question of formal academic objectivity into a political philosophy of liberalism, one which assumptively had always reflected a belief in the essential rationality of man and action and a consequent set of values and interests that stemmed from this belief, it could now be suggested that:

> "Within these assumptions, it is possible to accommodate on the Council and on the staff a very wide range of opinion. It is possible to think it most unlikely that any improvement will take place in South Africa without revolution; it is possible to believe that even in the UK revolution and the abolition of capitalism will cure the problem finally and yet to work for the present within the Institute, in the hope of alleviating symptoms. What, however, does not seem a possible position for a member of the Council or of the staff would be to hold that there can be no improvement anywhere without revolution, that therefore any effort anywhere that is not directed to revolution is harmful because it delays revolution. The Institute is run on charitable funds obtained on the basis of the assumptions (listed); to use these funds for a contrary purpose is a breach of trust and comes close to obtaining money under false pretences..."[30]

Based on this kind of reasoning and indeed ideological interpretation of the assumptions on which the Constitution and the Institute's past work had rested, the Council needed, firstly to decide whether or not Mason's summary of the position of the Institute and of the consequences flowing from the Memorandum and Articles of Association was accurate and what he termed fair; and, secondly, whether or not the Council wished to change what he interpreted to be the Institute's formal statement of objectivity as set out in the words 'that the Company as such shall not express an opinion on any aspect...' For if it did, then it would have to realise not only that a fundamental change in the constitution was required, but also that the Ford grant it was now spending and the £500,000 it was in the process of raising through the Wells-managed fund raising campaign of the Research and Development Trust was being

done unethically if not completely illegally: it constituted an act of misrepresentation. So on the Committee's recommendation the Council without debate decided to endorse Mason's analysis and interpretation as being accurate and fair and further to reassert its commitment to a notion of objectivity which called for the total suppression of anything that could be viewed as a 'corporate opinion', or anything that was not based upon a 'background of fact and information'.[31]

Given what many Council members considered to be now both the exposed assumptive base of the Institute's former work and that of past and all future action, the second area of questions, which concerned the conduct of staff, were viewed as being logically consistent, flowing quite convincingly from the base premise that objectivity in essence meant factual, accurate, informed and balanced presentations. In practice, recommended by Mason's Committee, it meant that all members of staff should therefore:

> "(a) Maintain the highest standards of journalism and academic enquiry, in distinguishing fact from opinion and treating fact as sacred even if it is unpalatable;
> (b) emphasise that their opinions, if expressed publicly, are personal;
> (c) recognise that other people are entitled to hold different views and generally try to avoid suggesting that their opponents are either wicked or stupid;
> (d) in editing publications or arranging meetings, give an opportunity to people whose views differ from theirs; and
> (e) dissociate their personal activities from the Institute, for example, by not using the address of the Institute in expressing views to the Press."[32]

Further:

> "The machinery for the expression of views as to the role of the Institute and what it should be doing exists in staff meetings and there are staff representatives. If they wish to challenge the assumptions (above, the Council's position) and the Memorandum and Articles of Association, they must address their proposals through these channels to the Director, who represents the Council... They should not express criticism of this kind in public without consulting the Director. Members of Council as a matter of courtesy have also usually followed these conventions."[33]

That these standards of conduct were also unanimously accepted by the Council was to be expected, but that staff were to be asked to adhere to them contractually was not. Here the reasoning became clearer in the last three areas Mason identified, as together with the question of conduct all three openly related to questions of control. In the case of the long-term task and role of the Institute it had to be realised that recent developments, the virtual collapse of JUMPR with Deakin's resignation, the inability to secure funds for purely 'academic' work which, anyway, was now being carried on in universities and at the Bristol based SSRC/IRR unit, and, given the kind of work being done at IRSP, the impossibility of moving into the financial orbits of London University (SOAS), showed clearly that a radical change of direction was needed. Away from academic work and the obsessive 'long-continuing and purely exploratory seminars and discussion', emphasis should now be shifted towards practical and hence easily realisable matters - the preparation of

papers on specific issues, as done by the Bow Group or Fabian Society; the setting up of workshops or study groups; the building up of a centre for visiting professors; commissioned work, as in the original paper-back series launched by Mason in the early 1960s; arranging for the provision of finance for travel to enable books to be written, and so on.[34]

If, as the Council did, it were decided to follow this course, the Institute's short-term task and role would entail regarding IRSP as coming to an end with the Ford funded three year programme. Not only would it have to be regarded as a number of individual projects in the meantime to be merged with the remnants of JUMPR into an overall Projects and Research Department, but more importantly, a Director of Studies would be required to plan and encourage IRR's total research effort. Such a development would not necessitate much change in organisation, though the job specification and the responsibilities of the new Director of Studies would need to be clearly decided. Where the change should come, argued Mason, was in what his committee termed 'communication between Staff and Council'.

The legal status of the Institute, 'as a charitable body with aims and objects for which the Council are legally and financially responsible', required in short a return to a pre-1969 committee structure and pattern of internal control. Although it was agreed as one of Tinker's reforms that staff representatives should be

allowed to attend to speak though not vote at Council meetings, it was now felt that:

> "So far the presence of staff at Council meetings has not led to a notable improvement in relations and it may subsequently be thought proper to reconsider it and return to the more usual arrangements by which heads of departments are present when particular matters are discussed, the Director always representing the staff. There is a difference between deliberation and decision... it may hamper business if a decision-making body is confronted by representatives of another body which has formed views separately... (However), there can be little doubt that it would make for better liaison if some members of Council could take a closer part in the affairs of the Institute through sub-committees. There should be a sub-committee of the Council, with staff participation, meeting quarterly at least, for the new Projects and Research Department. There is already an Executive Committee which meets monthly and which has a responsibility for all the activities of the Institute. But it suffers, as all such committees have in the past, from the dilemma that busy people cannot always attend and unless they are regular in attendance, feel they are not being effective. It needs members of Council who can give more time (to sitting on Committees and making sure that the legal responsibilities of Council are being carried out - for without their presence and number the Committees will continue to be dominated and controlled by staff).[35]

Carefully concealing the control provisions in the above recommendation, in effect blaming both Council members and staff and in so doing producing a 'balance' between the conduct of staff and Council members, Mason then turned to 'the two points involving personalities', the Robin Jenkins Affair and the control and direction of the Institute, IRSP, and its research.

He argued that:

"(The former) was the less important of the two. There can be no question that the paper presented by Robin Jenkins to the BSA would be in breach of the code of conduct here proposed. But this, long understood in the Institute, had not been formulated. Jenkins subsequently expressed an apology to the authors of Colour and Citizenship for his reference to them, but, in spite of positive instructions by the Director that he should not criticise the Institute in public, did so in a letter to New Society.
Such behaviour would entail dismissal anywhere except in a university, where we are told it would not be unusual. But the Institute is not a university and the task of raising money is difficult enough anyhow and would be quite impossible if others did the same. Further, the trend of Jenkins' paper would seem to most readers to mean that the writer does not accept the aims of the Institute... The first step is to ask him whether he does accept the aims of the Institute and the standard of conduct here proposed. If not, he should, to vary his own expression, seek a niche elsewhere...(Then) since the matter has been discussed in the Press it would be necessary to publish in the Press the fact that the affair had been settled...

This leads directly to the really important point ... The Director has been criticised for failure to control IRSP and the Institute generally, and for not presenting the Council with clear recommendations (on the Jenkins affair) and alternatives (for a reorganised and disciplined Institute). It is essential that this criticism should be faced... It is essential that the Council should express their confidence in him either as Director or as Associate Director in charge of projects... If Dr. Mast had provided the leadership that was hoped for, it might have been possible for Professor Tinker to leave IRSP largely to him and concentrate on the main Institute. This, however, has not worked. The Chairman's proposal of 26th April therefore envisaged associating with Professor Tinker a joint administrative director, a move which would give him time to concentrate on the research or projects side. But the Council have clearly expressed themselves against dual control... The only choices open therefore are:

(a) to confirm Professor Tinker as Director and seek a Director of Studies of the required calibre for the new Department.

This would give him the kind of support which Lord Walston's plan sought to achieve; it would inevitably mean that the emphasis of his work lay mainly on the administrative side. It would give him less time for study and writing and for the expression of ideas through study groups and in publications.

Or:

(b) If course (a) is not accepted, and Professor Tinker has indicated that he would not be prepared to accept the post of Director of Studies, the Institute would therefore have to make two new appointments."[36]

The only area in which the Committee 'did not think it proper to make recommendations' was in this one. It considered that all its other recommendations fell within its direct terms of reference but that the question of Tinker's administrative and political competence which had been raised openly by Rose, Lester,and quietly and privately expressed by most other Council members, was a question that could only be resolved, 'discussed and voted on in the absence of Professor Tinker and all members of staff'.[37] So at the 6th May Council meeting at which all Mason's recommendations were accepted, the staff, including Tinker, withdrew, and on their return, the Chairman informed them that:

"The Council has decided (by 11 votes to 2) to appoint a Director of Administration to be jointly responsible with Professor Tinker for the running of the Institute; Professor Tinker would continue to be responsible for the research activities and it would be necessary to formulate plans for the division of responsibilities for other sections of the Institute."[38]

Consolidating Power and Positions

Whilst Tinker's immediate reaction to Mason's new package, which only differed slightly from Walston's original package, was firstly to offer his resignation, secondly to draft a lengthy letter for the Press outlining his specific objections to the course of action and charging the interest-bound Council with acting dictatorially to make race relations worse rather than better, and thirdly, under pressure from the staff who offered their full support, to withdraw his resignation twenty-four hours later, Robin Jenkins' reaction amounted to that of the defeated. Unlike Walston's somewhat perfunctory plan, Mason's had produced a situation in which the staff, including Tinker, had to make a choice. Either they could choose to back a conception of the Institute they believed in by now siding openly with the threatened director who had made the emergence of that conception partly possible or they could continue to support the cause of a relatively junior member of staff whose brand of Marxism undermined the importance of 'race' at the expense of seeing Tinker demoted or even sacked. And, in the case of Tinker the issue was equally clear: either he continued to defend what was rapidly becoming an untenable case in the light of Jenkins' breach of trust or, to put it rather crudely, he had to start with the staff's support to defend his own position and job, to clear his name and reputation. As the issue had now evolved into an

entirely different though related one, where the whole Institute's work as carried out by a politically aware and conscious staff was now endangered, the choice was not that difficult to make. Once put to Jenkins and once the latter could justify a personal course of action he had decided upon during his suspension, he made it possible for both the staff and Tinker not to have to admit to their choice. His resignation, which followed a series of 'silly semantic games with Lord Walston' which attempted to elicit from him a definitive statement in support of the Institute's aims, as suggested by Mason, and a public retraction of his critique, in fact, as we have seen, ultimately helped to clear the ground for further staff resistance, to remove the barriers and intellectual haze that had concealed the actual positions of the resisting and counter-resisting or opposing groups.[39]

But in the meantime, and based on the sure knowledge that with the identification and re-alignment of staff support behind Tinker, Jenkins would be forced to resign, the Council saw and seized an opportunity to further consolidate its power and position. Aware that Tinker would neither accept willingly the post of director of studies nor remain at all times loyal to the Council now he had in effect been demoted, Walston wrote to all Council members in the following vein:

> "Since the last Council meeting there have been a lot of talks between Philip Mason, Hugh Tinker and myself about the future of the Institute... I have become increasingly convinced that the situation we are now facing cannot be resolved on a committee basis. One of the things that is essential for an acceptable agreement is that the negotiator should have the authority to clinch a deal when it looks possible, rather than to have to refer it to a committee or a Council which cannot meet for several weeks. What I am now asking you to do is to give me the authority to do this. I know that this appears to be asking for a blank cheque, and I would like to fill in the figures as firmly as possible after a further informal discussion with as many Council members as I am able to meet."[40]

This discussion took place at four o'clock on Friday, 4th June at Lord Walston's Albany flat.[41]

Following upon Tinker's unwillingness to accept wholly the proposals put to him by Walston after the Council's major resolution had been passed, three 'possible courses of action' were discussed at the meeting. The first of these entailed that the director should be given notice to take effect from 1st October 1971. 'The advantages of such a course were that it was most closely in line with the Council's views: and that it would most quickly bring to an end uncertainty and enable the Institute to start afresh with the smallest possible delay. The disadvantages were that it would almost certainly attract considerable publicity which would not do the Institute good at any time, and at this moment would make it impossible to proceed with the £500,000 appeal.'[42] Remembering that

Institute funds with, in particular, the ending of the Ford grant would probably run out in twelve months' time, it would also cause considerable ill-feeling among the staff with the result of several resignations. Although this in itself could be overcome, it would however make the difficulty of recruiting new staff far greater than would have otherwise been the case.

'The second course was to ask the director to stay on until October 1972, but to give him the freedom to leave earlier if he so wished. At the same time Philip Mason, (whom Council and staff respected and to whom in many cases, they owed jobs, as the Institute's first director and developer), would become Executive Vice-Chairman, spending one day a week in the Institute, and being available on the telephone the rest of the time.'[43] Here, suggested Walston, the main disadvantage would be that, knowing he would be leaving the Institute within fifteen months, Tinker might still not take the drastic steps necessary to put it back on course, and in particular, to control research so that the final year would be productive. On the other hand it would have the following advantages:

> "(a) that the return of Philip Mason, even on a one day a week basis would come close to the appointment of an Executive Director, and at the same time would be extremely acceptable to the staff;
>
> (b) the director would be able to devote almost all his time to his own research and directing that of others, leaving other matters to staff under the supervision of Philip Mason;

(c) that the director's retirement would coincide with the end of the Ford grant and therefore, from the publicity angle, could be presented in such a way as to do the least damage both to the Institute and the director himself;

(d) it would give the director plenty of time to look around for a suitable job;

(e) it would give the Institute plenty of time to look around for a suitable successor - in both these cases the academic year is of significance;

(f) it would be acceptable to the staff and it is unlikely that we should get resignations; and

(g) it would be possible to go ahead with the appeal immediately, and negotiations could be undertaken with Ford for a renewal of their grant."[44]

The third possibility differred from the second only in the timing of Tinker's final departure. The essential feature of all three, that Tinker should at the least cost to the Institute be sacked, remained however the same. Obviously, if he were allowed to stay on only until June 1972, as proposed in the third course of action, the main disadvantage would be 'a continuing uncertainty; a further lengthy discussion in twelve months' time as to his suitability or otherwise; and, if his appointment were not renewed, the difficulty of his finding a job and of the Institute finding another director within the three months before his notice expired.'[45] The main advantage, on the other hand, consisted of the high probability that he would have a strong incentive, encouraged by Philip Mason's presence, to take a firm line within the Institute; and that the chances of rescuing research would be more likely than if course two were pursued.

However:

> "After considerable discussion course two was agreed upon by all those present as being the course most likely to ensure the survival of the Institute, which must always be our main objective. It is essential that this matter be cleared up once and for all within the next ten days at the most. I would therefore hope that you can give your approval to the scheme as I have set it out... I must emphasise that this matter has now gone on for many months and the longer a final decision is delayed, the longer it will take for the Institute to recover (its rapidly diminishing authority and power). In any case it is essential that the matter be resolved before the Annual General Meeting on 22nd July."[46]

Within three weeks of the Albany meeting the matter as far as the Council was concerned had been resolved. With Jenkins' resignation, albeit in protest, it felt that its position all along had been vindicated, that the bases of its authority and conceptions of the Institute's role and hence kind of research had been proved both legitimate and correct. And with Tinker's verbal, if not written, indication that reluctantly he would accept the course of action proposed, most Council members agreed with Walston and Mason that 'the staff, if they wished to keep their jobs, would have to tow the line. There were now no causes left; with Tinker's agreement to the new arrangements obtained, the dissidents had been effectively routed'.[47]

More confident than it had been since the Jenkins affair surfaced in January 1971 and assured of its position as the rightful 'governing body', the Council publicly announced what it deemed to be important

and final 'changes at the Institute of Race Relations'. In addition to announcing the official establishment of the Research and Development Trust set up 'in order to fund the Institute's many activities on a long-term basis', it, as an almost symbolic statement of retrieved authority and power, informed the media that:

> "There is to be reorganisation at the Institute of Race Relations... Research on race relations in Britain and overseas is (now) being united into one department under the Director of the Institute, Professor Hugh Tinker. For the future, in addition to longer-term research, there will be increased emphasis on short-term ad hoc research, study groups, conferences and reports. Nicholas Deakin, Director of the Joint Unit for Minority and Policy Research, will be leaving the Institute in July and continuing his work at Sussex University. Robin Jenkins, Research Fellow, International Race Studies Programme, who was mentioned earlier in the press, has decided to continue his work outside the Institute, and has resigned, and has left the Institute. Philip Mason is to be appointed as an Executive Vice-Chairman and so play an additional part in the affairs of the Institute..."[48]

Re-active Resistance

But whilst Council members were preparing for their victory, the staff too had already started to prepare a vigorous campaign of consolidation and an even more vigorous though highly secretive campaign of further resistance of a qualitively different kind.

Freed from its immediate obligation to Jenkins by both Jenkins' decision to resign and the Council's to turn the whole affair into what the counter-resisters termed 'the Tinker problem', the staff

were able to reject strongly Mason's package and analysis of the Institute's problems. Whilst they accepted that perhaps Jenkins' language had turned out to be irresponsible, that there existed an urgent need to reorganise Institute affairs, and even that it might be better for all concerned to have a clear statement on guidelines for future staff conduct, they could neither understand nor accept the passages and, ultimately the Council's resolution, that referred to Tinker.

For:

> "What does not seem clear to us is why the Council, in view of its particular criticism of the research activities of the Institute, deems it necessary to bring in a director to govern its core functions. That the present director, who has come under heaviest fire in his research capacity, as head of IRSP, should then be asked to continue exclusively in that position further compounds the illogicality.
> His supposed administrative inadequacies, it would appear, came to light only at the time of the Jenkins episode. It then seems to us that he is being penalised for exercising his administrative right as director in refusing to 'sack' Jenkins. But even if it is adduced that the Council had been critical of the present director's administrative calibre even before the Jenkins affair, the fact that he has had the staff solidly behind him should have merited some consideration as against a director, say whose calibre is unquestioned but who is himself unavailing of staff loyalty. In deciding, besides, to offer the present director a joint directorship in charge of Projects, the Council is going back on its own firm decision to avoid dual control. Else, the post of Director of Projects does not carry the same status and/or weight as the Administrative Director. In which case the director qua director has lost his position...
> One clear thread of logic alone seems to run through this maze of contradictions: that the Council's concern is not so much with putting the Institute on its feet but with bringing the staff to heel..."[49]

Realising, then, that the Council's counter-resistance had been directed principally towards firmly re-instating its own authority and ability to control Institute affairs, and against their demands for 'relevance' and an authoritative voice in the day to day running of the Institute, the staff became even more determined to promote their demands, their conceptions of both the role of the Institute and the role of its employees, members and managers. Although this renewed determination arose partly out of the anger and frustration they felt at being brought to heel in the way that they had - through compromising their action by calling in Mason whose knowledge of the Institute's history and development was as much respected by Council and staff alike as was his total and proven dedication to improved race relations - it also, as inferred, arose from the fact that they now considered themselves to be oppressed, to be brought under a system of control they had for eighteen months successfully dismantled and partly replaced with what they termed a 'fairly open and participatory form of internal government':

> "Simply, we had only but a few choices open to us. Either we could accept in whole the combined Walston-Mason package which would have meant in practice a return to pre-1969, a scrapping of the reforms and advances we had made, and a suppressing of consciousness and the principles of relevance on which our resistance was based. We could have attempted to arrive at a compromise - and a few staff members, mainly those whose personal loyalty and allegiance to Mason went back to the mid 1960s, wanted this. This would have called for accepting some of the less outrageous features of the package in return for continued

> staff participation, the right and power to express views on how the Institute should be run, the kind of research it should do, the clientele it should address and ultimately co-opt. I suppose we could have also ditched Tinker at that stage which would have made things easier for the Council, taken the initiative with which to insist that they dropped their plans for re-organisation. Or, as we did, we could intensify our resistance, re-fashion it to meet the new oppressive situation and openly redirect it towards the only goal that mattered - power.
>
> As far as I was concerned this was the only logical, realistic and politically responsible course open to us... To have taken any other would have entailed the acceptance of a permanent state of oppression...
>
> What we had to do was, in the words of Bobby Seale and Huey Newton, to seize the time, organise and strengthen our resistance..."[50]

In practice such a decision necessitated the organisation of a campaign divided into two distinctive parts. Already embarked upon with the staff's reaction to the Walston-Mason package, conveyed in the letter to Mason quoted above, the first required an open, clear and decisive statement of their position; their intention on the basis of their conception of reality, IRR's role, to practise what they preached, to continue to highlight in what they did and said the ideological assumptions on which the Council's position and action were based. In contrast, the second part entailed the adoption of a low political profile: it called for covert organisation, the extension and incorporation of the political basis of their overt action to include external groups, the membership at large; and, as with the Council's hopes, it was planned to culminate at the July 1971 Annual General Meeting.

Turning to the first part of the campaign, which events, in a sense, had already decided, the staff's interpretation of the Council's 11 to 2 vote in favour of demoting Tinker demanded not only staff loyalty and support for Tinker but, just as significantly, it meant, if Tinker were to be used effectively as an issue around which further resistance could be organised, that he too should be drawn into the resistive fold. In fact his support of the staff's overall position, as opposed merely to his defence of Jenkins' academic rights as a scholar, became a crucial factor. What was needed immediately after the Council's decision to persuade him not to resign and during the course of the following weeks, when Walston was planning his final solution, was a programme of identification, a series of meetings to convince him that if he departed the Institute would either collapse altogether or become a place where ideological pronouncements and findings were served up as scientific research. Although the first of these meetings was arranged by Mason who had been 'surprised by the Council's vote, thinking that after some admonishment it would re-confirm his position as the Institute's Director',[51] it was the second, at which Simon Abott informed him that his resignation 'would do a lot of damage to the Institute and himself',[52] and subsequent meetings with the staff, which turned out to be for Tinker the deciding factor. For it was during these almost half-daily gatherings that Tinker appreciated, possibly for the first time, the sincerity of the central staff now

joined by the utopian fellows from the abandoned JUMPR programme who all promised to resign en bloc if he were not re-instated, and the committed stance and organising ability of Librarian Sivanandan, who had emerged since Jenkins' suspension and with it Mast's withdrawal as 'the architect of the new attitude'.[53] Their support and the propositions they put to him were convincingly appealing and persuasive.

Could he as the nominal if not actual director also risk the careers of others, who were prepared to back him up to the hilt, in all he said and did? Given that his effectual demotion left him in a position where he neither had the trust or confidence of the Council nor the kind of authority that this trust and confidence hitherto had brought, could he not now secondly draw upon a new source of authority, given to him by the staff through their absolute support, to continue on a daily basis in name and deed as the actual director - the person to whom the staff had ascribed this status? Thirdly, and rather bluntly, as his directorship had made it possible for the staff to articulate their views, to become dominantly represented on the Executive and other committees, could he now under personal career threat and attack and with a clear conscience free himself from the consequences of his own actions? Fourthly, was not his overall approach to the doing of research compatible with the staff's views on research and relevance? And, finally, in a political and personal sense would not his resignation or acceptance of the Council's decision amount to a discrediting of

his position and perception of himself as a 'radical-liberal', a person who believed it was important to maintain and radicalise the middle ground? Together these propositions were of a kind which if answered in the negative not only called for the rescinding of a personal decision, the acceptance of support, the identifying of self with that support, but made it possible for Tinker and the staff jointly to prepare a new domestic research programme which would give full expression to their notion of relevant research and action.

Prepared as a proposal to the City Parochial Foundation which would concentrate on 'local remedial projects supported by external analysis, this programme epitomised perhaps more starkly than any other example of 'relevant' research effort during this period just how the utopians viewed their role in the Institute.[54] Besides emphasising the need to be seen to be relevant, to have something to say and offer to the black clientele they courted, the programme represented a direct assault on the Institute's traditional conception of its research. With its focus on support to black and selected multi-racial groups already working at neighbourhood level, it departed from the idea of race specialists being commissioned or directly employed by the Institute to undertake research. By insisting that local, black, and multi-racial groups should be encouraged to pursue practical projects, community events 'based wholly upon the initiative of immigrant leaders' which represented

'self-help and approaches to problems which were not imitative but original', and stimulated to take an active part in an analysis and assessment of their impact, the staff with Tinker attempted positively to relate what they could do and provide to the needs of the community.[55] The projects to be supported with cash grants of between £400 and £2,700 ranged from the Mkutano Project, which operated in North Camden and North Islington 'to teach West Indian youngsters certain skills and crafts in evening classes', the Shepherds Bush Social and Welfare Association, a black families' group concerned with youth alienation problems, and sponsored by Reverent Wilfred Wood, to a prison visiting and prison rehabilitation project.[56] All these projects possessed, argued the staff, a research as well as a practical element. Almost all of them 'responded warmly to the possibility of the Institute being the channel for support; although nearly all wondered whether or not they would be able to perform the research task satisfactorily and displayed 'some uneasiness about the possibility of their having to account to an outside body of which they knew little (the City Parochial Fund)'.

But:

> "In order to ensure that the grants were being properly used, and yet to assure the workers (nearly all black) that they were not being supervised in a paternalist manner, it was proposed to recruit into the Institute's staff somebody to act as a liaison worker with the groups. This person would combine the roles of social investigator and reporter and keep in regular touch with the local work and as far as possible with

> those for whom the projects were provided (young people, women, offenders - the people in need). It was expected that this worker would make regular contributions to Race Today and would promote interest in the projects, and make a competent social analysis of their developments, which can be described as research: though of a very practical and pragmatic kind."[57]

A far and strident cry away from the Institute's normal conception of its race work - policy advice to government, industry, and elite groups in white society - and race research, the Project formed the first major component of the utopians radical campaign to undermine Council's authority in this area. The second which had already been created and now flowed from this programme in that a further £5,000 was sought from the Foundation to increase Race Today's size, circulation, and effectiveness, required that the magazine should become not only the journal for blacks and radical-whites in race relations, but also the organ of resistive struggle.[58] The time, according to the editor, had long since passed for the journal to continue hedging its bets, accepting the Council's definition of 'balance' which meant more often than not 'the printing of articles that would not upset IRR's chief backers', and the treating of the race bodies and agencies - CRC, Runneymede, etc. - that the IRR had established with 'a reverence they did not deserve', and 'the suppressing of the black victim's point of view'.

In fact:

> "It was during April, May, June and the summer of 1971 that we collectively decided to launch a new-styled magazine; one which would interpret the original aims of Race Today within the framework of those, the black community, who sufferred the most in a racist society..."[59]

Besides siding with revolutionary struggle in the April and May issues and attacking the basis of government community relations and development policies in the July issue, the kind of stance adopted by Race Today provided an even more significant symbol of the utopians position.[60]

It included not only more in depth political coverage of racial conflict situations, but, according to Kirby:

> "It seemed to all of us involved in Race Today, which virtually meant the whole Institute staff, not simply those of us who worked on the magazine full-time, that another, more direct approach was needed if people were to be enabled to know how deep the corrosion of racism was biting, something which the Institute's traditional approach could not - on its own - hope to tell them. And if that meant Race Today lacked 'balance', then we would question not our presentation but the motives of those to whom balance was so important."[61]

With all staff now deeply involved on a daily basis and organised around the task of preparing each month's edition, the magazine and its offices, which in social effect appeared to occupy the whole Institute, subsequently became, along with the library, an important structural and organisational part of the staff's overt campaign. It became the place where ideas met actualised experience; where statmenets of intent were worked out in debate, on paper for publication: it was the place where the majority of staff felt they were connected with those with whom they wished to identify.

And, supportively, the Library, on the other hand, became during this period under the leadership of Sivanandan the place where ideas were literally thrashed out before being processed and translated into readable prose in Race Today's offices. It became the hub of the campaign's organisation, the place where strategies were worked out and decided upon; and where, through the many library-based meetings, enough intellectual activity and political energy was created to launch the staff's covert counter-offensive - its second and more penetrating phase of resistance.

Directed against Council's authority and for the establishment of an alternative basis of authority and power, its planning was conceived with three crucial things in mind.

They were:

> "(Firstly), it was important to keep a low profile. Whilst it appeared that we were bitterly annoyed with the Council's decision to control us, it was imperative that we did not play our hand until the right moment... (Secondly), the right moment was already fixed for us, the Annual General Meeting; or, rather, the actual beginning of the moment was fixed - a target date we had in mind... And (thirdly), if we were ever going to win the battle and eventually the war, it was also imperative that those we chose to represent us - our point of view, political philosophy, and aims - should in fact represent us and not some other interest..."

So, secretively, during the late Spring and early Summer of 1971 Sivanandan and others embarked upon a far more practical and politically motivated campaign of projection than the one they had launched nearly a year earlier. Lists of contacts were drawn up; black and

radical white organisations were alerted; black and radical white leaders from outside, the street neighbourhoods, were invited to attend meetings in the Library to discuss the kind of Institute they wished to see; and staff members engaged upon a more intensive speaking programme than ever before - one that was distinguished by the size of potential audiences, often very small; the colour, often more black than white, if not completely black; the political persuasion, always radical, mostly socialist outside Labour's left wing; and its social composition, black manual workers, the unemployed, and so on.

To these audiences and to selected individuals who showed an interest in the Institute's work, providing it could be re-oriented and related successfully to the needs of a black clientele, the message projected became crisply clear. Simply, without their support either the Institute would continue as it had always done, as a permanent obstacle in the way of real racial equality, or, because the staff felt they had to do something, it would collapse altogether. Neither alternative appeared attractive, especially when there existed a more than evens chance, with sound organisation and resolve, that the Institute could be radically changed to become the black oppressed's body, the articulator of the black voice, the champion of the black cause as defined and experienced by blacks. All that was needed to bring this about was the full and committed

support of those who <u>now</u> mattered and the political organisation of this support. As to the latter, the librarian would put 'at the disposal of all those interested to make an institution of the people, for the people, the full resources of the library', the organising ability and assistance of those working already to change the Institute from within.[63] And, as to the former, the staff could only wait and see who volunteered, who were prepared actively to join 'the struggle for freedom, the right to self-determine our own existences'.[64]

From those who came forward, or rather responded to the appeal and analysis projected by Sivanandan's organising cell, and from those contacts and friends personally selected as 'people who were thinking with us, in the right way', two groups were formed.[65] In the case of the first, by far the largest consisting of some twenty-five community activists and radical academics, it was decided that a week or so before the AGM they should apply for membership to the Institute. And in the case of the second, which consisted of nine individuals selected and urged to act mainly by Sivanandan, it was planned that they should make themselves available at the last politically practical moment to stand for, and thus contest for the first time in nearly twenty years, Council elections.[66]

> "Political stealth was an important consideration in our resistance campaign... To have publicised our intentions any earlier would have given our enemies and critics time to counter-organise... (Thus) surprise was, tactically, as important a weapon as the support we could organise..."[67]

By delaying applications for membership and by promoting a united group to stand for Council - five of whom were bona fide members, four were not - it was calculated that the Annual General Meeting, when faced with this situation and packed with staff-community support, drawn from the first group, would have little choice but to accept their displayed interest as being sincere and act upon this rather than on any suspicion it might have harboured to the contrary. In effect this was what happened; although the Council and particularly politician Lord Walston and founding-director Philip Mason realised a week or so before the July AGM as applications for membership and nominations for Council 'from odd, quite unexpected people', flooded in that something 'quite unpleasant was afoot'.[68] But by the time the discovery was made, it was simply too late to cancel or postpone the AGM; 'it had to go on and we had to see how we could if possible salvage the situation and prevent the Institute from being wrecked by people who appeared to be motivated in a different way (from us)'.[69]

But before they could do anything at all, some of the forty-two members present, primed by Sivanandan and vociferously backed by the attending group of would-be members, attacked the Council for what they saw as a deliberate delay in the election of new members. Although partially grounded in the fact that some members of Sivanandan's first group had applied for membership in plenty of time to allow them to attend the AGM, the real force of the charge

rested on Sivanandan's knowledge that the Council, obsessed with the Jenkins and Tinker problems and with bringing the staff to heel, had neither had the time nor inclination to carry out this aspect of its normal business. Forced, then, into a corner where the Council had to admit to its own negligence and to promise to 'look into the question of reducing delay as much as possible', and kept in that corner by further innuendo directed at the real intentions of Council, the latter body ultimately had to admit also openly that it 'had no wish to exclude from the election anyone who was prepared to become a member and who might be elected to membership of the Institute'.[70]

For this reason, and, at this stage, appearing to play into the hands of the staff and its supporters, Lord Walston proposed an adjournment 'so that the Council could be convened in an adjoining room to consider all applications for membership' including those of the four non-members who were standing for election to the Council.[71] On the return of the Council, the Annual General Meeting was resumed and the Chairman, on the advice of his Council which in ten minutes had quickly realised the implications of all that had transpired, made two announcements. Firstly, and to the staff group's satisfaction, he announced 'that twenty-five members had been elected to membership including the four for whom nominations to Council membership had been received', and secondly:

> "That he was demanding a poll on the sixteen names now before the meeting (including his own) for election to Council and he directed that the poll should be taken at twelve noon on Thursday, 16th September. He explained that only by conducting a poll at a later date would it be possible to be fair to those members of the Institute (the bulk of the Council's supporters) who had been unable to attend the Annual General Meeting and who could not possibly be informed of the four nominations which had just been validated."[72]

Masking the calculated, counter-resistive thrust of the Council's decision with the talk of correct and responsible procedure, he re-emphasised, as he detected disquiet amongst the staff supporters' group, 'that both he and the Council were anxious that all possible names should be included in the election because it was obviously desirable that membership of the Council should be inclusive of all who might have a contribution to make to the Council's deliberations'.[73] Though the demand for a poll was not in itself an item for discussion, as this constitutionally appeared to be the only way to resolve a situation that had never in the Institute's history arisen before, where more people were nominated than there were vacancies to fill, the timing of it was. Against the Council and its supporters' claim, who now with the validation of twenty-five additional memberships appeared to be outnumbered, that it would be improper to proceed immediately with the elections, the staff together with their old and new supporters felt that a vote on the sixteen nominations should be held there and then. Fuelled by the obvious political reasons behind this demand and the certainty that they would get elected those they had asked to stand, they anchored their arguments on

ground that was only too familiar. In the first place, using the authority invested in the constitutional procedure of a 'Chairman's ruling' to stave off possible defeat, when it was evident that a significant number in attendance wanted to go on with the elections, was morally and ethically if not legally indefensible. Secondly, by announcing such a decision in a perfunctory manner without offering members an opportunity to discuss what they felt or wished to do gave the impression not only that the Chairman was yet again operating in dictatorial style but that he did not care much about either the constitutionally democratic spirit of which the Institute boasted or the feelings and viewpoints of the ordinary members who could usually only spare the time to attend one meeting a year, the AGM. Thirdly, this presumptious action which seemed to be based on an arrogance that in turn could only be based on a sense of (racial) superiority, and (class) privilege mirrored the many actions Walston and the Council had taken since the beginning of the Jenkins affair. It should be seen, suggested some, as an example of the kind of way the Chairman and Council had conducted the affairs of the Institute. Their summary disposal of Jenkins without once discussing in detail the validity or otherwise of his major criticisms, their demotion of Hugh Tinker who had striven hard against severe odds to promote the Institute as a body doing relevant work, and the veiled attacks made against the new-style Race Today, the people's magazine, could now all be seen as part of a lineage and

pattern exemplified in their most recent decisions. Fourthly, suggested Lee Bridges and John Downing, not only were they as incompetent as those they charged were competent, but as actual representatives of the ruling class - white, propertied, wealthy, connected in high places - they had no business whatsoever to control and pronounce on the future well-being of those they defined as in need of <u>their</u> assistance. In short, and finally, their decision to adjourn the AGM for nearly three months reflected their desire to continue conducting Institute business in the only way they knew how when faced with just resistance; through edict, issuing orders from a distance and insisting that their authority backed by monopoly capital and the approval of elite groups in society was a better kind of authority than that which stemmed from grass-root support.

For these and similar reasons, and after something of a defence had been weakly mounted, the two members who had been acting by arrangement as the spokesmen of the staff and their supporters proposed 'that the meeting had no confidence either in the Council or the Chairman'.[74] Only a procedural inconsistency prevented the motion from being put and in all likelihood, given the balance at the meeting in favour of the staff's position, from further embarrassing the Council and Chairman.[75] Lord Walston, however, remained adamant and 'firmly indicated that he would not withdraw

his demand for a poll' to be held in September. Although unstated at the time, his reasons for not doing so were soundly political:

> "My political instincts told me that if neither I nor the Council had acted straight away we could not have prevented the situation from deteriorating even further... If we had let them get away with their plans to deepen the rifts then no amount of gallant effort would have restored the political impartiality we were seeking... Although they didn't seem to understand it, the basic political truth was that we, yes, as, I suppose, representatives of the establishment, were the only people who could save the Institute - we had the contacts, money, and influence... no-one would, unfortunately perhaps, listen to an unemployed coloured youth from Brixton... It was (however) this influence and the Institute's reputation we needed to protect if the job at hand was going to get done... This is certainly why I and many other Council members felt we had to stall the elections..."[76]

But as Mason realised, delay could work as much in the favour of the utopians as it could for the ideologists.

For:

> "At some point in the summer there was a (profound) change of atmosphere... The staff now kept saying - at least in public - that they were solidly behind Tinker and their opposition to the Council increased. They constantly spoke of the Council being determined to 'bring the staff to heel', which I do not think was an important element in the thinking of the members of the Council with whom I spoke most often. But it was a good phrase for raising the heat of discussion. They were also much disturbed about the presence on the Council of members associated with Runneymede and the Community Relations Commission, whom they regarded as rivals if not enemies... I think some of the staff had now fully perceived that the Constitution gave the members at the Annual General Meeting power to decide who should be members of Council and that thus ultimately the members had power to control the Institute as they wished... There can be no doubt that 'the Staff' - and I think this means Siva - decided to see what use could be made of the membership..."[77]

That this was indeed the case appeared clearer after the AGM than before. For not only had the strategy been exposed during the meeting, the covert campaign made overt, but with Walston's ruling it now meant that the utopian resisters had to organise that much harder to keep interest alive through the summer months against anticipated attempts by Council ideologists to undermine early support and marshall their own. They were helped, however, by one fact of traditional and prosperous upper middle class life: 'most of our supporters, the long-serving members who shared our views on the Institute were unfortunately either away on holiday during the crucial months or away on some business trip'.[78] The edge this gave to the utopians'ability to maintain interest proved to be almost as vital as the daily strategy and support-managing sessions in the Library. For it meant that whilst the ideologists were unable to organise their counter-resistance effectively, the utopians were able to capitalise on this fact, even to middle of the road, floating members, by pointing out that in effect they were being controlled and race projects decided upon by a group of absentee industrial Lords and Knights. Indeed, everything as far as possible during these hectic months was interpreted to suit their case, to add legitimacy to their position and resistance.

But it was in the Library that the real work of heightening consciousness, gathering more support, organising and directing the resistance, was done. And largely it was around planning of the

proposed 1971 Annual Conference on 'The Local Community, Self Help and Self Defence' to be held a week after the poll that the utopians were able to further consolidate their position in a very real way. Besides having an acceptable excuse to go out into the community to publicise IRR's Sixth Annual Conference, to hold what were ostensibly Conference planning meetings in the Library, Conference organisation also afforded the first chance - as the City Parochial Fund had not yet arrived at their decision - to involve centrally IRR's would-be new black clientele in an actual project. It was to be <u>their</u> conference, 'an opportunity given to black activists to express their perspectives on the situation: a mole's eye view'.[79] They were to plan the conference, they were to do the talking; they were for the summer to take over physically the space usually reserved for and occupied by white scholars in the Library. They were to learn first hand how the Institute was organised, by whom and for what purposes; they were to listen to the staff case and analysis of the internal oppression experienced; they, in return, were to link up their experience with that of the staff, and leave each night more and more sure of their support for the staff's position and struggle. To many outsiders as well as to the odd Council members who visited the Institute during the summer, their presence to say the least was greeted with anxiety.

For instance, one member felt that:

> "The library had been turned into a large political seminar, with Sivanandan holding court..."[80]

Another was astonished to find:

> "Hippies, Black Power fanatics, lounging around, making so much noise that those who were there on legitimate business could not concentrate..."[81]

And a third postulated that:

> "The library had become a street-corner; it was full of people who looked unemployed and unemployable ... not the sort of people you would expect to find in a highly respectable and well known academic library..."[82]

Although their presence and the kind of voluntary work they were engaged in might have confirmed the ideologists' worst fears - certainly those few who bothered to visit the library - they had precisely the opposite effect on those ordinary members, the majority, who did not attend the AGM, who were still open to persuasion, one way or the other. After being contacted individually by members of staff, or by community activists from the recently elected group of ordinary members and told of recent developments, many, according to Sivanandan and indeed the voting figures on the 16th September, were impressed.[83] In short, some welcomed warmly the emergence of a more radical and relevant stance; others considered that black community participation in the affairs of the Institute provided 'a living symbol of the Institute's constitutional commitment to improve race relations'; a few responded by coming in to the library to meet and talk with supporters; and yet others found it so

difficult to reconcile the conflicting views and positions at the Institute that they had already decided to abstain from voting.[84]

So by the time of the poll, which was opened from noon to 12.30 p.m. on Thursday, 16th September, many members had been approached by staff supporters and had become convinced that a viable Institute could only exist if members of the black community were represented on the governing body; if the Institute adapted in structure and policy to the needs as expressed by these new supporters. And, in the event that the majority had not heard directly from either the chairman or other Council members, they appeared to record their votes with this in mind.

Of the 150 members who eventually voted, only 7 actually turned up to cast their vote; the rest were recorded as 'valid proxies', and the result of the first contested election was as follows:[85]

	For	Against	Majority
Mr. Lee T. Bridges	53	69	-16
Mr. Michael H. Caine	108	28	+80 ELECTED
Mr. Mark Bonham Carter	108	34	+74 ELECTED
Miss Stella Colkett	85	44	+41 ELECTED
Mr. John Downing	69	53	+16
Mr. Felix Greene	49	69	-20
Professor F. Henriques	99	41	+58 ELECTED
Mr. C.R. Hensman	88	36	+52 ELECTED
Mr. Gus John	111	20	+91 ELECTED
Mr. Louis Kushnik	91	30	+61 ELECTED
Mr. E.J.B. Rose	97	42	+55 ELECTED
Mr. Douglas Tilbe, J.P.	94	41	+53 ELECTED
Lord Walston	85	51	+34
Mr. Harold Wolpe	64	62	+2
Rev. Wilfred Wood, J.P.	137	6	+131 ELECTED

Power and Positions Consolidated

From the point of view of both groups in the conflict situation, the outcome of the elections was relatively successful. In the case of the utopians, they had achieved nearly all that they had planned. Lord Walston, the Chairman and figure-head of the Institute, who had effectively led the counter-resistance, had been defeated in the poll. Five representatives of the staff's position who were either actively engaged in grassroots community politics, radical academic work, or both, had been elected. Not one of them had benefitted from a public school education followed by Oxbridge; not one of them held a single company directorship or membership of a distinguished London club; not one of them was traditionally connected to the established power groups within the social structure. All of them possessed an alternative conception of race relations, the role of the Institute: all of them tended to perceive themselves as representatives of 'ordinary people, black and white, the employed and the out-of-work, the homeless, and those who were discriminated against daily in their struggle to find a job, a home, a place in the community.'[86] Through them, the staff had a voice at long last on the Council; the community appeared to be represented; and theoretically the alternative, resistive movement inside and outside the Institute had now become legitimised through electoral success. 'Relevance', and a new role for the Institute based upon this and the actual as opposed to assumed needs of the

black community, also appeared to be no longer something that had to be fought for: the mandate so to speak of the five members enshrined this conception of future developments. That they were voted in at all and that Walston was voted out suggested - or so the utopians thought - that the majority of IRR members, too, favoured a new approach and accepted generally if not totally the utopian version of events, future plans and possibilities.

On the surface it appeared that the ideologists, on the other hand, had lost as much as the utopians had gained. With Walston's departure it appeared that their case or interpretation of events, the Institute's role, and the problems of race relations, had been partially rejected by the ordinary membership. But alternatively, it could also be interpreted in quite a different way: namely that the membership had voted neither really against Walston and his supporters, nor for the radical utopians but, instead, they had voted for the <u>survival</u> of the Institute. That such a vote implicitly entailed making some sort of evaluation and assessment of which individual or group would be most likely to assure this and which would not did not really matter in practice. For by September it was clear to all, even perhaps to Walston, that most members who attended the July AGM had certain misgivings about the way Institute affairs had been conducted, the adverse publicity, and, in particular, the treatment meted out to Hugh Tinker whom most members respected

for his radical-liberal convictions. Council members knew, then, that the Institute would have to change in order to survive, and that the membership had indicated the kind of change it preferred only made things easier rather than more difficult.

It made it, for example, that much easier for Lord Walston to step down, accept an IRR Vice-Presidency, and continue as Chairman of the Research and Development Trust (for all members affected could find numerous reasons and excuses for the membership's decision, the least of which being that of lack of information and daily involvement; but it would have been quite another matter if the Council had had to make a similar decision). It also made it easier for the Council to be able to convince Tinker and staff alike it was now best to start afresh; that the new Chairman, Michael Caine, should be appointed in a caretaker role until the next AGM, when not only a new chairman would be elected but also the name of the new director would be known. So, at some cost, the ideologists felt that the situation had been arrested if not as yet completely resolved. They had neither won nor lost, but their counter-resistance had prevented the utopians from taking over. Their position and power to act, or so they thought, had been consolidated by this fact.

CHAPTER SEVEN

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Interview, Lord Walston, House of Lords, 27th October, 1976.

2. No-one can recall the precise date of this meeting, although it must be assumed that it fell some time after the 16th January 1971 when Jim Rose received Robin Jenkins' paper and letter which warned against seeing his critique simply 'as an attack on personalities' and before the Executive Committee meeting on 28th January, 1971.

3. Interview, Philip Mason, 18th and 19th February, 1976.

4. Interview, Jim Rose, 13th July, 1976.

5. Interview, Lord Walston, op cit.

6. Interview, Philip Mason, op cit.

7. This resembled part of Mason's interpretation of the Jenkins affair as contained in his 'Report to the Council of the Institute of Race Relations', IRR, London, 15th May, 1971 which will be summarised and discussed in detail later on in this Chapter.

8. Interview, Jim Rose, op cit.

9. Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting held on Thursday, 28th January, 1971, IRR, London, Minute 122(3).

10. Ibid, Minute 122(7).

11. Ibid.

12. Minutes of the 59th Meeting of the Council held on Tuesday, 23rd March, 1971, IRR, London, Minute 331(2).

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid, Minute 331(3) and (5).

15. Interview, Jim Rose, op cit.

16. See John Gretton, 'The Race Industry', New Society, 11th March, 1971, pp.385-6.

17. Letter from Robin Jenkins to the Editor of New Society 25th March, 1971.

18. Whilst Jim Rose admits to conversations being held between himself and Harold Evans, the Editor of the Sunday Times, and with other reporters, 'all now eager to follow up the New Society, story', the actual number and depth of meetings is uncertain, 'as we met quite often as friends as well as professionally'. (Jim Rose, Interview, op cit.)

19. Hugh Young and Derek Humphrey, 'Punch-up, Spies and Marxist in Race Row', Sunday Times, 28th March, 1971, p.3.

20. Ibid.

21. 'A False Attack', Sunday Times Editorial, 28th March, 1971.

22. Letter from Lord Walston to Council Members, IRR, London, 30th March, 1971.

23. See Robin Jenkins, 'Institute of Race Relations : Why I Resigned', Ink, 26th June, 1971, p.8. for further detail.

24. Minutes of the 60th Council Meeting held on Monday, 26th April, 1971, IRR, London, Minute 339(1).

25. Council Member W.G. Runciman considered that the abrasive action initiated by the Chairman did in fact not only aggravate the problems but also provided, in retrospect, an unacceptable framework in which to ask pertinent questions. In other words, Walston's package actually defined who was guilty before, so to speak, the court sat and judge pronounced. (Interview, W.G. Runciman, 29th October, 1976).

26. Interview, Philip Mason, op cit.

27. Minutes of the 60th Council Meeting, op cit. Minute 339(5).

28. Philip Mason, 'Report to the Council of the Institute of Race Relations', op cit, page 1, paragraph 1.

29. Ibid, p.1, paragraphs 4(a) to (d).

30. Ibid, p.2, paragraph 5.

31. See Minutes of the 61st Council Meeting held on Thursday, 6th May, 1971, IRR, London.

32. Philip Mason, 'Report to the Council of the Institute of Race Relations', op cit, p.2, paragraphs 8(a) to (e).

33. Ibid, p.3, para. 9.

34. Ibid, p.4, para. 13 (i) to (vii).

35. Ibid, pp.6-7, paras 23, 24. My parenthesis and summary of the tone and assumptions contained in these paragraphs.

36. Ibid, pp.7-9, paras, 25-31.

37. Ibid, p.9, para.31.

38. Minutes of the 61st Council Meeting held on Thursday, 6th May, 1971, op cit, Minute 345.

39. See Robin Jenkins, op cit, p.8. His version of events was as follows:

> "I was eventually interviewed by Lord Walston and Professor Tinker. Walston decided to go against all the Council decisions and demanded what amounted to public self-criticism from me. Did I still recommend immigrants to say 'fuck off'? Did I still maintain that the Institute worked as a police spy? Did I still maintain that 'the immigrant community becomes a laboratory for work to advance the careers of compromised and corrupt social scientists? I was asked to give written answers to these questions, which I did, clarifying my position on some points, and retracting nothing. Back came a real face-saver from Walston to the effect that I had now made 'a reasonable retraction of the points in (my) paper to which the Council as a whole and I (Lord Walston) myself took exception'.
>
> I replied that I was not prepared to play such silly semantic games with either Lord Walston or the Council. I had been suspended ten weeks and there was still no resolution in sight so I resigned (on Friday, 18th June).
>
> The resignation was in protest at four things:
>
> 1. My research work had been obstructed.
> 2. The Chairman, Council and Director all wanted to sack me and the only reason they had not done so was because the staff would not allow it.
> 3. My suspension was likely to go on for ever.
> 4. The Council had persistently shown its inability to direct the Institute in any decent or sensible direction."

40. Letter from Lord Walston to Council members, 27th May, 1971, IRR, London.

41. Those present were: Mark Bonham Carter, Michael Caine, Professor F. Henriques, Professor H. Himmelweit, Philip Mason, and David Sieff; those who wrote giving Walston the authority he sought were Sir Robert Birley, Peter Calvocevessi, Richard Hornby, Anthony Lester, Sir Ronald Oliver and Jim Rose.

42. Letter from Lord Walston to Council members, 10th June, 1971, IRR, London, p.1. This three page document in effect amounted to a detailed report of the discussions and decisions taken at the Albany Flat meeting on Friday, 4th June, 1971.

43. Ibid, p.1.

44. Ibid, p.2.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid, p.3, my parenthesis.

47. Interview, Philip Mason, op cit. The same sentiments were also expressed by Lord Walston.

48. 'Changes at the Institute of Race Relations', Press Release, IRR, London, embargoed until 0001 Hours on Thursday, 24th June, 1971.

49. Letter from Staff Representatives Alexander Kirby and Hilary Arnott to Philip Mason, 13th May, 1971, IRR, London.

50. Interview, A. Sivanandan, 1st December, 1975. The same sort of explanation was provided by nearly all other members of staff interviewed.

51. Interview, Philip Mason, op cit; also see Philip Mason, The Institute of Race Relations, Centre for Southern African Studies, University of York, June, 1976, pp. 49-50:

> "I thought the Council should be put at the jump. I expected that a majority would give him that vote, though perhaps one or two would resign. I still thought that with Tinker's many gifts and the confidence a favourable vote would give him, all might be well". (p. 49).

52. Ibid, p. 49.

53. Ibid, p. 52.

54. See Hugh Tinker, 'A Proposal to the City Parochial Foundation for Local Remedial Projects: Supported by External Analysis', 10th June, 1971, IRR, London, pp.1-4.

55. Ibid. p.4.

56. The projects were divided into already existing fully working projects, those almost operational and those still at the planning stage. In the first category were a Neighbourhood English Classes Project (£1,200), the Mkutano Project (£500), and a Fun with Learning Scheme (£400), supported by the Association of Commonwealth Teachers. The Harlesdon/Kensal Rise Community Development Project (£600), and the South East Summer Schools Committee Project 'formed to tackle the problems of the West Indian child who has been categorised as ESN and placed in a special school', (£1,200), constituted the second group. And besides a request for £5,000 to provide for Institute support for the developing of Race Today, the following three projects came under the last category: the Sherperds Bush Social Aid Welfare Association project (£2,000), the Prison Visiting and Prison Rehabilitation Scheme (£2,700) and an Asian Immigrant Girls Action Project (£400).

57. Ibid, p.4.

58. Ibid.

59. Interview, Alexander Kirby, March, 1973.
(Unlike the bulk of the other interviews cited in this study, this was conducted at a time when I was first considering the feasibility of this study. During the time when most of the interviews were undertaken, Alexander Kirby was 'somewhere in Africa engaged in political-missionary work').

60. See Race Today issues for these months and particularly the Editorial in the July issue: Clare Ungerson, 'Community Development - What Future?' Vol. 3, No. 7, 1971, p.3. In this issue there is also to be found an interesting statement of Tinker's conception of 'Involvement in the Local Community', pp.230-232.

61. Alexander Kirby, 'Race Today, Gone Tomorrow', in Charles Husband (ed)., 'White Media and Black Britain,' Arrow Books, London, 1975, p.195.

62. Interview, A. Sivanandan, op cit.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. They were Lee Bridges, Stella Colkett, John Downing, Felix Greene, Gus John, Louis Kushnick, Douglas Tilbe, Harold Wolpe, and Wilfred Wood.

67. Ibid.

68. Interview, Philip Mason and Lord Walston, op cit.

69. Interview, Lord Walston, op cit.

70. Minutes of the Thirteenth Annual General Meeting of the Institute of Race Relations held at Chatham House, 10 St. James Square, London, SW1 on Thursday, 22nd July, 1971 at 1745 hours, IRR, London, Minute 7(1) to (6).

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid, 7(4).

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid, Minute 8(1).

75. The Minutes record the incident as follows:

> "After Mr. David Sieff had expressed amazement that Mr. JDH Downing, after having withdrawn his name from the list of nominations for Council membership, could second a motion of no confidence in the Council and the Chairman, Mr. Lee Bridges by leave withdrew his motion'. (Minute 8(2)"

76. Interview, Lord Walston, op cit.

77. Philip Mason, The Institute of Race Relations, 1976, op cit. pp.52-54.

78. Interview, Lord Walston, op cit.

79. See John Downing 'Conference Report: Institute of Race Relations, 24th/25th September, 1971, Race Today, Vol. 3, No. 11, November, 1971, p.387.

80. Interview, Jim Rose, op cit.

81. Interview, Lord Walston, op cit.

82. Interview, Philip Mason, op cit.

83. Interview, A. Sivanandan, op cit.

84. This latter group, however, only formed a minority of those members who were active to the point of attending meetings.

85. See Brenda Bailey, Alexander Kirby, Hugh Tinker, 'Report of the Scruitineers Appointed to Supervise the Poll on 16th September, 1971', IRR, London, September, 1971, p.1.

86. From a discussion with Wilfred Woods, May, 1973. (This, like the material referenced in Note 59 above, formed part of the preliminary feasibility exercise I conducted in 1973/74).

CHAPTER EIGHT

RESISTANCE (2) : THE STRUGGLE AND THE NEW ORDER

Superficially it appeared after the poll and election of Michael Caine to the chairmanship, that the Council in particular and the Institute generally had arrived at what Rex would term a 'truce situation'.[1] For, to begin with, Caine would only accept election on certain conditions. These included abiding by the agreement that 'the Director's term of office should conclude at the end of September 1972'; that the Institute would benefit from a new start and that the search for a new director should begin as soon as practicable; and, whilst he had no 'preconceived ideas as to the development of IRR', a new orientation with 'new definitions of policies and objectives' should be worked out so that the Institute could 'survive and be rejuvenated'.[2]

In return and with the profound reluctance of the staff, Tinker 'accepted without demur that his appointment would not be renewed after September, 1972'. Officially, his acquiescence arose 'because he had been assured that the chairman elect was not beginning with preconceived proposals about the Institute; that he would participate in all the essential decisions, including the selection of a new director', and, finally, because 'he had appreciated the loyal support of the staff during a period of tension'.[3] Unofficially, as will be suggested here, he realised politically and physically that the Institute needed time to

establish new relationships within its own community and with those groups outside who were either now sceptical of the Institute's ability to survive as the body they trusted and respected or were now anxious to play a central part in the Institute's future. Possibly for this reason as much as for his professional desire to have been seen historically to have acted correctly and honourably, he insisted that the staff's resolution of support, passed two days before the October Council Meeting at which the 'truce' was formalised, should be formally entered into the Institute's historical records as a definition of 'what ought to be the position of the Director of IRR':

It stated:

> "The staff welcomes the appointment of the new Chairman, while at the same time affirming its opposition to any suggestion that the Director's appointment be terminated in September 1972 in view of his proven support for academic and journalistic freedom, which are integral to the Institute's aims and purposes."[4]

Whilst the insertion of this resolution invested his actual long term intentions with a certain ambiguity, for the purposes of the negotiated truce it in fact added an air of verisimiltude to the tense and difficult position in which he found himself, the conflicting interests he articulated, and, furthermore, to the truce framework that was being negotiated. It provided an opportunity for the staff and their newly elected representatives on Council to voice loudly their opposition without being able to challenge

effectively Caine's conditions. Also, with Tinker's acceptance of these conditions, the old Council members, on the other hand, were not only in a position where they could, under pressure, make further concessions, but psychologically they were in a state of mind - fearing no real backlash - where they actually believed they could survive, providing as the chairman put it 'nobody rocked the boat'.[5] But, more importantly, it provided the kind of atmosphere and political environment required for the completion of truce arrangements.

So far as Tinker was concerned this meant, firstly, that the old Council members would have to accept in toto his earlier paper on 'The Role of the Institute of Race Relations', a paper, asserted Tinker, that had been approved and accepted by the staff as a frame-work in which they could continue to work effectively.[6] Although, like the new chairman, he saw the immediate task ahead as one of 'keeping together the Institute as a joint effort in which a variety of functions supported each other,' it also meant, secondly, that a number of assurances would have to be given. The staff, for instance, would need to be assured that they could continue to do their work without undue pressure, and all members would need to be assured that the Institute would retain its independence and continue serious work for the improvement and study of race relations. Thirdly, the following guidelines should also be immediately adopted: namely, that the Institute should not, as it had done previously, discourage new thinking about its functions; that this should be directed to issues, not personalities; and that the debate about

the role of the Institute should never be extended into the arena of public statements or press discussions, an arena which some old Council members had used with considerable effect during the Jenkins' affair.

Fourthly, and in opposition to the governing body's view maintained since the Chatham House days, the Institute, in descending order of priority, should now feel obliged to address:

> "(a) persons who were themselves from areas of racial conflict.
> (b) persons active at 'grassroots' level of race relations.
> (c) race relations experts, mainly university teachers and serious journalists.
> (d) those whose work brought them into contact with race problems - Whitehall, Westminster, the Town Hall, the Church, and so on.
> (e) those representatives of business and industry whether individuals or companies who recognised the importance of race."[7]

And finally:

> "Probably <u>all</u> our members wish to be assured that the Institute as a whole remains independent and resists attempts to influence it into representing one of the above (or any other) interests exclusively; and also that there is a clear distinction between information - or data gathering functions (including research) which must be accurate and based upon the methodical collation of evidence, and interpretation - which is probably equally important, but which has to rely upon individual judgement and analysis."[8]

In short the truce was based upon the realisation of the extent and dimensions of power each group claimed to possess. With the presence of six new Council members who seemed to hold the same utopian conception and aims as the majority of staff, the ideologists theoretically at least could not, without eliciting inquisitorial comment, do exactly as they pleased. In exchange for keeping nominal control, the authority to raise money for survival, their positions, they had to meet in full the Tinker-staff demands, including that which sought a radically new orientation for the Institute. And, conversely, the utopians had to be seen as having relinquished many of their long term aims and accepted the formula for organisational equilibrium fashioned mainly by Tinker if they wished to benefit from the new era of 'flexibility and partnership'.[9] Indeed, given that both groups wanted to see the Institute survive, it was in both of their short-term interests, whilst they re-thought their positions through, to maintain the truce and interpret it in such a way as to convince themselves of partial victory.

Reporting the new arrangements to the Ford Foundation, Mason predicted that within weeks rather than months the Institute would be operating as 'normal'; the standards of scholarship and objectivity would be reinstituted; and, under the chairmanship of an internationally renowned company director, there would exist possibly a better chance than ever before of eventual financial solvency.[10]

In fact:

> "By October we thought we had achieved a good working relationship. Although it meant that we had to soften what some had seen as an exceptionally hard line ... become more flexible and adaptable, even accepting the other side's point of view on a number of issues, I then thought it was worth doing ... It freed me from the difficult and delicate situation in which Walston had placed me (as Executive Vice-Chairman) and it seemed to restore quickly the kind of cordial and respectful atmosphere I had always known and had attempted to foster... In retrospect, however, I think we made a grave mistake: we gave far more away than what turned out to be the empty promises of co-operation we received."[11]

Hollow Truce, Hallowed Ground

Mason's retrospective view was, however, not quite as retrospective as he supposed. Many old Councillors, at the time, whilst appearing to go along with the arrangements, were of the opinion that Caine had perhaps conceded too much, that somehow within the framework of the truce the balance of power, representation and influence needed to be slightly tilted in their favour or else 'it would seem as if not only the director but that the Council was being controlled by the staff and its representatives'.[12] Along with Professor (Sir) Roland Oliver, they still considered that Race Today 'was not a proper part of the Institute's function, that its quality was not sufficiently high, that it did not make a big enough impact in Universities, and that it needed to contain more factual information and less propaganda'.[13] At informal gatherings, particularly

at the Reform and Travellers' Club, they privately realised that if they were going to raise the necessary funds for survival, if they were going to re-establish the Institute as the body they had known, then ultimately they would need to create a formula which in effect either totally undermined the rigorously protected notion of editorial freedom, combined editorial and managerial functions, or both.[14] Although never openly expressed or, for that matter, featured in the negotiated truce, such a viewpoint crystallised even further during September/October when the Chairman of the Race Relations Board complained bitterly over Race Today's publication of Hetherington's article - 'Why I Left the Race Relations Board'.[15]

Threatening to refer the whole matter to the Press Council and interpreting the act of publication as an Institute-staff attack on the Board, he declared: 'it begins to look clear that the attack was the subject of a carefully prepared and carefully concealed plan, which would have been defeated by any premature disclosure ... to publish'.[16] His anger was further intensified by the fact that the Institute at its September, 1971 annual, (black promoted and directed), conference had passed a resolution, which had been reported in the press, 'condemning the Board for its treatment of Mr. Hetherington and promising support for other conciliation officers' who wished to speak out against the Board's efficiency in handling complaints, who wished to promote the view that as a control-buffer type agency the Board in both deed and spirit was acting against the real interests of the victims of racial discrimination.[17]

Sir Roy Wilson concluded:

> "I find it sickening that I have to raise with you the matters dealt with in this letter. I hope that you will accept that the last thing I should like would be to take up any position hostile to the Institute or unhelpful to them or to you in your respective tasks and difficulties. Indeed the main reason why I have written to you as I have is that I fervently hope that the Board and the Institute can as soon as possible - and it cannot be too soon - get back to co-operating with and helping each other. That object cannot readily be achieved as long as people behave in the way I have described in this letter.[18]

Although Race Today's editor in conjunction with Sivanandan and other members of staff had not informed the Board of their intention to publish Hetherington's article because, as had happened before, they feared that the Board or some other agency would have successfully intervened, and although, certainly in respect of the September Conference resolution, the charge of scheming to undermine the Board's authority appeared grounded, Mason on behalf of the Council chose to defend the editors' decision to publish.[19]

He replied:

> "I think it is the function of an unofficial body to criticise. Race Today is a journal which does criticise the present operation of the machinery which is intended to improve race relations ... I don't think that anybody can be exempt from criticism merely because of its good intentions. If there is any validity in (Hetherington's) points then I hope that the Board will not regard this as an attack but will set about improving things ... To accept that condition (allegedly imposed by the author that the article should remain confidential until publication) may or may not have been an error of judgement, but I see nothing in it that is in breach of a journalist's code of ethics ..."[20]

If only seen within the context of working out the truce arrangements referred to above, such a defence not only seemed reasonable but also necessary for the establishment of trust. That it concealed some doubts over the way the staff had acted, and that several weeks later over lunch at the Reform Club the defence was partially withdrawn by Caine, did not really matter for either the purposes of internal Council staff relations or for the purposes of those who wished to tilt the fine balance of power symbolised in the truce.[21] For, what mattered to the latter group, including Chairman Caine, was that an opportunity had arisen where it could legitimately focus attention on an area of the Institute's work which still threatened survival. And, further, an opportunity had also arisen for the Council on the basis of the trust engendered subtly to exert the kind of pressure needed to curb if not completely undermine editorial freedom.

An instance of this arose shortly after Wilson's complaints when (Lord) Seebohm was informed by the editor that Race Today had just received and was planning to publish a letter highly critical of Barclays involvement in and policy on South Africa. Made worse by the fact that only the month before Seebohm as Chairman of Barclays International had contributed an item to Race Today announcing his bank's liberal, progressive approach in South Africa, Clarke's letter possessed a political thrust which appeared to topple Barclays' image as a non-racist organisation and the trustworthy reputation of its

chairman: it charged the bank and Seebohm in particular with disseminating 'amongst its own British customers false and distorted racial information of a kind which not only severely misleads those customers but aids the specious racial propaganda of a foreign state'.[22]

On receiving a galley proof copy of the letter, Caine wrote to Seebohm:

> "If you tell me that you would prefer the letter not to be published, I will see that such is the case."[23]

Seebohm replied:

> "I do not wish to bring too much influence on what Race Today publishes but I did think (Clarke's) letter was quite irrelevant to the note I was asked to submit earlier (for publication) and as the publication to which the correspondent refers is out of date and will be shortly replaced by something less journalistic, it seemed to me that its publication might be felt to be unnecessary - but it is up to you."[24]

Three days later Race Today's editor reported back to the incoming chairman that after some discussion Clarke 'had no wish to embarrass the Institute': he had thus decided reluctantly to withdraw the letter from publication.[25]

However both this and the prolonged wrangle with the Board had provided the excuse or occasion that many old Council members had been waiting for since the truce had been informally negotiated.

They announced confidently that the future of Race Today would now have to be reconsidered against the background of recent complaints; like the chairman many were inclined to the view that a Trust should be formed to promote Race Today so that it need not be so closely interwoven with the affairs of IRR.[26] Such a hiving-off arrangement would, suggested some ideologists, enable the magazine to indulge in freedom of expression which would not embarrass IRR, especially now that the Institute had reached a critical stage in its fund raising campaign, and especially now that the £100,000 already promised had been raised by former chairman Walston, current chairman Caine, vice-chairman Sieff, and Council member Seebohm.[27] What worried them more than anything else was that if Race Today continued to publish militantly political editorials, articles critical of race agencies promoted by IRR, and points of view that were hostile to those who had traditionally supported the Institute, including themselves, 'nobody would financially support the Institute; nobody would wish openly to support a Marxist interpretation of events, however useful it might be'.[28]

With this suggestion which possessed almost the status of a policy decision, as nearly two thirds of the Council appeared to support Caine's view, the hollowness of the truce was exposed. The ideologists desired once again to reassert their control over all IRR activities, the utopians, interpreting the truce as a signal of

conditional victory, they wished at this stage to consolidate and gradually institutionalise their gains and position by working and viewing things in much the same way as before. If this precipitous state had not been revealed or realised at the time of Caine's suggestion to hive-off the magazine, then it most certainly was a few weeks later when Kirby prepared and circulated a lengthy paper in defence of Race Today's editorial policy, claim of social relevance, and central place within the Institute and within its overall programme of activities.[29]

With the full approval of at least Council members Sieff, Rose, Seebohm and Mason, the chairman responded to the paper in a way which confirmed the ideologists' intentions 'to wound, but not to strike'.[30]

He retorted:

> "In the short term your arguments are very persuasive for a full identification between the Institute and Race Today, but in the longer term I still believe that a topical, flourishing and positively discriminating Race Today would thrive better if it were independent to some extent of the Institute...
> Finally, I like your phrase 'to let the hurt and the anger and the injustice of so many people's lives come out in Race Today's pages', but I also believe it necessary for us to use every effort to encourage the bodies being criticised to stand up for themselves in public, i.e. in your pages, and this may require more thought and persuasion than has been exercised in the past..."[31]

Whilst the editor and staff in effect ignored the chairman's suggestion, believing that the Council would have to learn to accept that Race Today was only reflecting the changing realities in the national/international world of race relations, the chairman's reaction to what he termed their 'obsessive stubbornness' was quite incisive. Deciding to broaden the base of his position, to turn what looked like a personal row into an inter-group dispute, he forwarded three back copies of Race Today to Seebohm, asking for his critical comments and suggestions; contacted other Council members 'to alert them of the real dangers facing the Institute'; and informed Rose who had unearthed yet another complaint about Race Today's editorial policy that the magazine was 'a most important subject around which there is much controversy. We are to discuss it at length at the Council meeting on 6th December. Your (critical) views are, I know, shared by many.'[32]

The complaint received by Rose in fact brought another opportunity to shape the issue of the magazine into one of ultimate survival, to open up the wound already inflicted and to firm up the ground on which the ideologists stood and which they wished at all costs to protect. The origin of the complaint had actually emanated from Colonel Gibson, the Wells' executive in charge of the appeal. According to Rose, he had always been 'embarrassed by Race Today's editorial policy which he thought might obstruct the appeal'.[33] But that in the November issue the editor had printed an unsigned editorial 'A Scape-

goat for Bradford', critical of the police, (racist) British society, and blaming the death of the Parmar family on 'the maniacal behaviour of one twisted (white) mind' when it was known by the editor that two Pakistani youths had committed the murder, was 'a disgrace: it is bad enough when the popular press sensationalise a case like this but to have the Institute playing this game is monstrous'.[34] The concern and disgrace felt by Gibson was further compounded by Rose's sense of outrage that one of his papers, the Bradford Telegraph and Argus, edited by Peter Harland who had been 'trying hard to keep the temperature down in Bradford', had also been severely criticised in the editorial. Indeed, he would not have written to the chairman in such vehement terms if he had not been 'disturbed by the general tone of Race Today and by complaints which (he) gets all the time about it'.[35] Almost as soon as Rose had forwarded to Caine copies of these letters of complaint, six further developments occurred which convinced the chairman that his views on the magazine's future were correctly conceived.

Immediately after the appearance of the editorial, the Deputy Chief Constable of Bradford wrote to Kirby informing him that he intended to bring the whole matter up with the Chief Constable. He expressed 'extreme disappointment' that Kirby should have allowed the correspondent to have written in the terms he had 'about this incident' in a 'journal devoted to the interests of coloured people'.[36]

Secondly, the Deputy Chief Constable passed on his complaint to Council member Mark Bonham-Carter in the hope that the latter would be able to exert further pressure.[37] And, thirdly, acting in his capacity as Chairman of the Community Relations Commission, Bonham-Carter wrote to Caine: 'Another protest about Race Today ... It does seem to me that the police in Bradford have real cause for complaint. There can be no excuse for publishing the leader once they (the editor and staff) knew that two boys had been charged with the murder of the Parmars'.[38]

Armed with these examples of profound discontent and, in some instances, emotional outrage, the fourth development arose from Caine's own initiative to meet the aggrieved Chairman of the Race Relations Board, Sir Roy Wilson, for a working lunch. Although the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the legal implications of the Hetherington article and to seek some guidance on the legality of Race Today's editorial policy, the covert intention was to sound out Board opinion and gather Board support for the proposal to hive-off the magazine.[39] Unlike this, the fifth development was in a sense co-incidental and was greeted with some embarrassment. A certain Mr. John Briggs proposed to sue the Institute for libel and misrepresentation, arising from John Armitage's article in October's Race Today on 'The National Front in Huddersfield'.[40] Although neither the Chairman nor the Council took the threat seriously, it did however against the mounting background of 'substantiated

complaints' from industry, race agencies, the press, the police, and prominent individuals, have the effect of intensifying unease, and, privately, the ideologists' resolve to act decisively.

The final development, which amounted to a significant Council member's full approval of Caine's policy suggestion, came in the form of Seebohm's reply to the chairman's earlier letter.

He argued:

> "The cost of Race Today at the moment really rules it out of court. I also think that its expense is a serious handicap to those of us who are trying to raise the money. It does publish the most controversial articles without any editorial comment and those who do not know the Institute as well as you and I are very apt to accept these articles as the views of the Institute.... However, to bring it down to sordid finance, I do not think we can possibly afford to continue its publication."[41]

The staff's reaction to Caine's proposal put formally at the December Council meeting was swift and to the point - as they saw it. The editor suggested that whilst it was true that the magazine was making a loss, it, like other unprofitable Institute activities, should not be judged by this yardstick alone: its distribution had in fact nearly doubled in a year; it had 'developed to meet new challenges' and should not be seen as a self-financing, cost-effective exercise. Such a journal should actively seek and publish black views in the belief that 'future action to improve racial co-operation and harmony may be based on a realistic appraisal of, and debate on, current tensions and disagreements'.[42] What Council members had to decide,

Kirby argued, was, firstly, whether the journal should be inside or outside the Institute, whether the Institute should be relevant and responsive or irrelevant and unresponsive; secondly, whether Race Today should be considered merely as a commercial venture, in which case additional resources were needed rather than insisting on changes in editorial policy; and, thirdly, whether or not it should, like the library and other projects, be considered as a service point - something which the City Parochial Foundation's grant had endorsed.[43] Simply, the issue of Race Today's financial viability, never voiced in terms of other IRR projects had been drummed up and promoted as a justification for effectively closing down the magazine.

Against the charge that in 'tone and style' the magazine had departed from the traditional and normally sober accounts fostered by the pre-1969 Institute, the staff argued that:

> "There was a need to use the language of the people who are giving information on what is really happening, and that publicising the ghetto rhetoric should lead to increased understanding.... Embarrassment was a functional part of articulating reality."[44]

Expanding on this point, new Council member Stella Colkett insisted that, as well as acquiring a readership amongst the younger members of immigrant communities in Brixton, Race Today was also offering an important information service to blacks about the workings of the established race bodies in the field. Contrary to old-Council opinion, expressed particularly by Bonham-Carter, the staff re-emphasised that one of the magazine's most important functions was not to

educate the white community but 'to force the white establishment to listen to the grievances of the black minorities.'[45]

In short:

> "The staff are entirely (and unanimously) opposed to any suggestion that Race Today should cease to be an integral part of the Institute because they believe it to be an objective expression of the values which they and the Institute hold."[46]

Faced with this unanimous staff resolution passed at an especially convened staff meeting, and indeed some dissent within its own group coming from Mason, Runciman, and Calvocoressi in particular, the ideologists had little choice but to step down.[47] Summarising the Council's discussion, the chairman noted that 'there was a divergence of views between the necessity for interpretation and the need to provide a forum for exposure of the grievances for immigrant minorities'. Swayed by the force with which the utopians had put their case and the second thoughts some of his own members were having over the wisdom of 'striking hard' at the moment, Caine was 'inclined to agree that the magazine should be given a further lease of life' for a twelve month period, after which it should be reviewed again.[48]

For the utopians, this test of power or attempt to reassert the authority of the old Council conducted by the ideologists had convinced them of at least three things, all related to their main objective of fundamentally radicalising the Institute by obtaining or constructing the necessary power. In the first place, they were

now convinced that through their representatives on Council, through staff solidarity as witnessed in the unanimous resolution in support of Race Today, they now actually possessed a substantial amount of power: against the wishes of a significant group of old Council members, Caine's deliberate attempt to lean on members to hive-off the magazine, they had managed not only to stave off execution but had achieved a little more: they had given the impression of retilting the balance of power in their favour. Secondly, and connected to this observation, they all now realised more than was possible to do so over the Jenkins affair or at the time of the poll, that resistance itself was the only political strategy that would effect the changes they desired. Now that Race Today had replaced the Jenkins affair as the most important single issue, and now that it provided a sufficiently broad enough symbol of meaningful relevance for all the staff, all could now act resistively, irrespective of their former political allegiances and beliefs.

But, thirdly, the most revealing of all lessons learnt and understood politically during these weeks related to and accumulated from their history of resistance. Simply, more than ever before in their conscious struggle they believed that providing they continued to organise effective resistance, they would ultimately succeed. Already they had six or nearly a third of the Council members behind their cause. Already they had managed with partial success to defend an academic's right to express freely his considered views. Already they had ousted from the chair a peer whose views on race were by 1971 considered to be reactionary, whose style of leadership appeared to be autocratic to the point of an institutionalised dictatorship. Already they had launched a radical and politically

conscious journal aimed at supporting and reporting on the national and international black struggle for racial justice. Already with the CPF's grant, now received, they had embarked upon a quite different conception of research. All these consciously planned events and changes put together not only added up to an impressive break-through in the way the Institute was organised, and could conceiveably develop, but they helped to bring about a pattern of piecemeal success and a kind of social solidarity required to see confidently the likelihood of total success.

Given this new confidence, they thus decided to demonstrate through Race Today their total opposition to the ideologists' conception of the Institute's role, their total commitment to the view that the magazine as the symbol of the proposed new Institute should be seen by blacks in metropolitan and third world societies to be relevant to their struggle. They had to respond to those they represented, the new black clientele, and their own sense of oppression at the Institute at a level of political engagement that juxtaposed two competing conceptions of reality, two forms of organisation to foster each. Although much of this work in respect to the British or domestic front had commenced during 1970/71 with Jenkins' critique of the Institute, John Redaway's article, 'Whatever Happened to the Community Relations Commission', and with several pieces on the Race Relations Board, its political impact and decisive location within an accepted and coherent utopian frame of reference did not really emerge until after Hetherington's article.[49]

Reorienting their critique of the Board within this framework, the November issue of the magazine was more or less devoted to an analysis of the Board's functions and activities. In a bitterly aggressive editorial Kirby posed the problem: 'When two widely differing definitions of the public interest are held, who shall decide which is right?' He answered: 'The (black) public, perhaps? For it is that public's urgent need for greater social and racial justice that both the Board and Race Today ....(should) exist to serve'.[50] Taking up in a slightly different context the same point, Sue Bovey, an assistant conciliation officer, agreed that if the Board were to become an effective agency of social change rather than control it would need to recruit black as well as white staff with experience of the 'real world' - and not white graduates just out of university. They would need to be trained in quite a different way, and the Race Relations Act would need to be fundamentally changed if greater social and racial justice were to be achieved.[51]

Tim Hetherington's second article, solicited by the utopians to form a central part of their political and editorial campaign against the Board, went much further than Bovey's. Hetherington in fact wanted a 'radical change in the structure of the Board'.

For:

> "Unless there is participation by genuine representatives of the coloured community, the Board will become increasingly irrelevant... There is a crisis of confidence, which the staff of the Board, the CRC, and the Institute are only too aware of. The only way to overcome this is to restructure and revitalise the organisations in the race industry'.[52]

Turning to the question of black control, the apparent conclusion of both his article and, for that matter, the utopians' struggle, he went on:

> "The argument that greater participation by black people will antagonise the white majority represents an outmoded and patronising view of race relations. I believe that in the long run it is the black community themselves who must tackle the problems they face in this society. The only hope for official organisations is to recognise this and to encourage the kind of involvement that will lead to a genuine expression of black people's rights."[53]

Utopian criticisms of the Board also applied equally to Bonham-Carter's Community Relations Commission. Indeed, from November onwards, nearly all Race Today contributors saw the Commission's social functions and operations in much the same way as Hetherington had seen the Board's. Even Hill and Issacharoff in their soberly academic study on community action and race relations were obliged to note that there had been 'a tendency to portray the Commission as a paternalistic national body which interfered with local committees and prevented them making an effective assault upon racial equality'.[54] Further they had to concede that there existed an alternative approach, one favoured by the utopians, that called for opting for 'independent if impoverished action outside the official (white dominated) race relations framework'.[55] If, however, this study was mildly supportive of an 'ideal' centralised Commission, the many articles, experiences of local workers and blacks, as recorded in the pages of Race Today and elsewhere, were not.

Nearly all appeared to criticise the CRC for being too bureaucratic, too out of touch with grassroots opinion and activity. As an effective instrument of social control, it appeared according to Moore and others to uphold the racist status quo, deny self-expression of the black's right to exist on his own terms, and define the boundaries of legitimate community relations activity within a liberal-consensus view of society.[56] The way in which the Commission acted, argued Lionel Morrison in January's issue of Race Today, or the way in which it did not act, often generated more fear and distrust amongst all sections of the community: it worsened rather than improved race relations.[57]

Whilst these criticisms of the Board and CRC directly led to both bodies withdrawing their regular contributions to the journal, staff criticisms of the Institute promoted Runneymede Trust, its conception of race relations, symbolised both the breadth and depth of their analysis. Reviewing a Runneymede publication, Race and the Press, which contained articles written by Peter Harland (Argus and Telegraph) and Harold Evans (Sunday Times), Sivanandan wrote:

> "Nowhere in this repetitive mixture of self-praise, self-deception and faint self-deprecation does any structural criticism emerge. No one suggests that some might have more access to the media than others: that there are voices not being heard that must be heard. News, never actually defined, is the scape-goat, the excuse, the ultimate vindication. Will the press (and Runneymede) never challenge the values of the society which cherishes it and which it so gratefully champions?"[58]

And turning to a second Runneymede publication, Attitudes of Young Immigrants, the reviewer caustically wrote:

> "By dint of impressive percentages drawn from small scale surveys, the pamphlet struggles to establish a pecking order among, respectively, the Indians, West Indians and the Pakistanis. Platitude follows platitude; what is the sense of talking about an 'integrated society' without first talking about a just society: of discussing 'militancy' without discussing what this really means? Allegations made against the police are dismissed as evidence of disaffection and rumour-mongering, not as serious matters to be investigated in their own right, with implications that affect us all.... An inane attempt to reassure us that everything is going to be alright, really, after all."[59]

Any view that opposed Runneymede's integrationist-consensus approach and conception of ideal race relations was, argued the staff, re-edited or crushed completely. Pointing to the fate of Gus John's Race in the Inner City, which was severely edited by Runneymede, cutting out controversial passages and paragraphs of radical analysis, nearly all the staff by February 1972 shared the view: 'that there was a declared state of war between the two bodies, the Runneymede Trust directed by Council member Dipak Nandy and the Institute; and for that matter, between us (the utopian staff) and the rest of the race relations industry'.[60]

But, if the utopians sustained critique of the industry's domestic agencies - RRB, CRC, Runneymede - unearthed the connections between the ideologists' conception of society, liberal-race relations management, and domestic racism, then its criticisms of policy on the

international front not only compounded these connections but also said something crucial about the relationship between both domestic and international racism and between this and (international) capitalism. The February cover of Race Today, for instance, made it quite clear that the utopians wished to identify their struggle with that being waged in Africa, their analysis of racism with that which informed African guerilla resistance. The front cover picture of a somewhat bloated and obese IRR supporter, Lord Goodman, together with his view that 'right or wrong we should seize the opportunity' to settle with Ian Smith's Rhodesian government was dwarfed and politically contextualised by the caption: FIVE MILLION SAY NO. Similarly, the back cover advertisement for the Anti-Apartheid Movement's February demonstration against the 'sell out' symbolised as pointedly as any article that both Race Today and IRR staff had given up any pretence of masking their views, striking 'a balance between the objective presentation of facts and opinions'.[61] They were not for independence before majority rule; they supported the struggle of the Zimbabwe people; they forcefully accused Britain and many of its (IRR) industrial, political and press groups of complicity in Rhodesia's race laws; and, in short, they now saw no future for the old Council chaired and governed by representatives of monopoly capital, international racism.

Faced with such a declaration, the Council majority were simply forced into a position where they had to make a stand, to strike and to counter-resist. So at the February Council meeting the chairman, according to one observer, 'waded into the opposition around him as if he were fighting for his life'.[62] He reiterated his criticism of the style of the magazine; he protested that 'the tone of the paper was irritating and disturbing'.[63] Whilst he had been prepared to give it an experimental lease of life two months earlier, now confronted with repeated, unfounded attacks on hitherto friendly race agencies and, worse still, industry, he was no longer convinced that this was in the Institute's best interests. Philip Mason, too, had changed his mind. Whereas he had always been prepared to defend editorial freedom and indeed the staff's wish to keep Race Today within the Institute, he now considered that 'IRR's corporate supporters might need reassurance rather than the opposite': recent articles attacking the Institute's sibling race groups, his own early initiatives, Lord Goodman, and other supporters were 'quite unforgiveable'.[64] Professor (Sir) Roland Oliver reserved his assault for what he termed 'Race Today and the staff's politically dogmatic approach: he claimed to represent (the majority of) IRR members who did not see their views reflected in Race Today'[65] The magazine had become a political weapon against middle class values and the indubitably good intentions of many progressive members of the so-called British establishment. Reflecting the views of all old Council members, the vice-Chairman commented on the fact 'that the

paper seemed to be attacking the police too often'.[66] But more than anything else, it appeared to be February's cover which shocked and disturbed the ideologists: it was the picture and 'malicious attack' on Lord Goodman that aroused a sense of deep betrayal, a commitment to act. Not only had Goodman along with other IRR supporters such as Lord (Jock) Campbell been crucial as social brokers to the Institute, carrying its work and ideas into public-political areas of influence, but he had also been a key contact figure in IRR's fund-raising campaign. According to another such figure, Lord Seebohm, 'he was very hurt by the irresponsible attack and he was seriously considering his support and financial help to the Institute'.[67] He had bitterly complained personally to Seebohm about the whole management of the Institute: simply 'funds could not be raised for a good cause if it were obvious to the informed outsider that the troops were running the show'.[68] As well as profoundly affecting Goodman's attitude towards the Institute, the February issue alone, accused Seebohm, 'had cost the Institute some £20,000 in support he had been unable to raise for the Well's campaign'.[69] Together with other 'damaging issues' of the magazine, stretching back to the October attack on the Race Relations Board, Race Today in all had cost the Institute nearer £50,000 in withheld donations from British and international companies. Apart from Runciman's suggestion that the editor should be asked 'to restrain the polemics of the paper whilst IRR consolidated its position', the old Council members were only prepared to hint, at this stage,

at what they had all privately agreed upon. Seebohm, for instance, 'felt obliged to send a copy of Race Today to any potential donor', pointing out covertly that their donations would be spent on fostering division and conflict, an approach that was hostile to all respectable companies and individuals whose values and beliefs happened to clash with those favoured by the staff.[70] The chairman, on the other hand, and speaking on behalf of those old Council members who were not present, intended to call a special meeting of Council on Monday, 20th March, to decide formally on the future of the magazine, and informally on the future control of the Institute.[71]

Rejoining the struggle which he had attempted to avert through a negotiated peace or truce, Tinker in a lengthy letter to Caine the following morning voiced staff as well as his own views and reactions to the ideologists' apparent volte face.

He wrote:

> "I was appalled at the course of events at last night's meeting. Sandy Kirby was accused of irresponsibility, but you showed an extraordinary irresponsibility in starting up an attack on Race Today without considering the consequences.... We now have a situation which, I suppose, two thirds of the Council are wanting to end Race Today in its present form and yet, so far as I can see, are willing to wound yet afraid to strike... If the axe comes down under the circumstances now developing it will affect almost every activity of the Institute. With one or two exceptions the staff will be completely alienated from the Council...

> The question to which we are being asked to address ourselves by an important section of the Council is this: 'How far can the Institute go before it upsets right-wing big-businessmen? ... But even now we might try asking if there are alternative ways of financing some sort of Institute which do not depend on trimming our sails to the susceptibilities of people who are essentially opposed to everything, not just Race Today, which the Institute stands for. There must be some businessmen who realise that if we aren't prepared to protest in print, then people will end up protesting with guns."[72]

The Final 'Battle'

The very same morning that Tinker's letter arrived, the Chairman was confronted with Professor (Sir) Roland Oliver's resignation. No longer could Oliver sympathise with Caine's predicament of having 'to move slowly to gain credibility amongst the radicals'; no longer could he associate himself with an Institute 'bullied by its staff'.

In fact:

> "For eighteen months past I have been aware that there was nothing I could support in the Research Programme of the Institute. For twelve months past I have been quite clear that I had no confidence in the Director. For nine months past I have realised I had no confidence in any section of the staff, and I now realise that I have no confidence in the will or ability of the Council to change the situation in the root and branch fashion that is now necessary. I therefore realise that I cannot possibly continue to support the financial appeal. In view of last night's revelation about the spurious advertisement in Race Today (the anti-Apartheid's anti-Smith, anti-Pearce proposals demonstration), I cannot really regard the Institute as any longer a trustworthy recipient of charitable funds."[73]

Although Oliver eventually withdrew his resignation, the threat of it, together with half-concealed threats from other old members, and the even keener exposure threat detectable in Tinker's letter, undoubtedly forced Caine to act in accordance with the interests of those who had always traditionally supported the Institute - indeed to act and counter-resist in the only ultimate way that was possible.[74] He immediately solicited the help of Philip Mason who had now decided that 'a show-down or confrontation was both necessary and unavoidable' and dispatched letters to Sieff, Lester, Bonham-Carter, Seebohm, Prain, Birley and Oliver in order to arrange a series of meetings over lunch at the Reform and Travellers Club between 29th February and 6th March.[75] The purpose of the meetings was not only to discuss the campaign 'Notes' Mason had promised to provide but also to arrange in some detail how the battle should be fought, on what grounds it should be based, and how it should be timed.[76]

Given that the fund-raising Trust had voiced its total opposition to the magazine; 'that the Appeal would fail unless drastic action were taken'; that the editor and staff could not run Race Today differently; and that 'Tinker was not prepared to give any time to thinking about the future of the Institute', Mason suggested, that in these circumstances there were only three realistic courses of action open.[77] Firstly, Tinker, who would be 'merely a hindrance in the office' should be sent now immediately on study leave and 'forbidden to enter the office'. As 'propaganda and lobbying as the

champion of immigrants', and as it was 'not compatible with the aims for which (the Trust) have been trying to raise money', Race Today must be closed down, and the editor must go. Although the staff will threaten to resign en bloc if the editor and director were sacked, Mason, however, suspected that there would be 'some second thoughts when it came to the point':

> "I believe the moment has come when we should face this and tell them to go if they have any doubts - like Henry V at Agincourt."[78]

Secondly, the Institute could 'throw (itself) sobbing on the bosom of the Ford Foundation'. But the problem with this strategy was that it would not succeed 'unless (it) had something in which it believed and some future'. And for that, the preferred course outlined above was necessary anyway: for once that had been successfully engineered the Institute could then go back to Ford for further assistance.[79] The last and irrevocable course of action was simply 'to close down' altogether. But, again, although Mason 'did not oppose this in all circumstances', he considered that the Institute still had assets, that 'there was still much useful work to be done'. The real problem as he saw it was to guarantee the Institute's survival without jeopardising its past reputation for scholarly and 'objective' research.[80]

How precisely this was to be achieved, was quite another matter. Not only were 'the methods and timing' of counter-resistance 'the most difficult part in practice', but in theory, as had been the case

over the Jenkins affair, they required a kind of constitutional and political analysis of the past and present situation - something which only Mason's knowledge and expertise could furnish, something which he would work on and produce before the next official Council meeting. But the immediate problem was a tactical rather than theoretical one, the difficulty of obtaining majority-Council approval for the drastic course of action envisaged. For, as six Council members were 'hand in glove with the staff, solidly behind Race Today, they could not be relied on to keep anything from the staff'.[81] 'Providing the majority of IRR members could be brought up to scratch', and providing secrecy and surprise could be maintained in contacting individual Council members before the meeting, by denying the right of attendance to all staff, and, finally, providing generous redundancy terms could be settled beforehand for those employees who wanted to resign, the first phase, at least, of the battle could be won.[82]

Indeed:

> "Once these momentous steps have been taken IRR members should be informed in writing in a personal statement from the Chairman. Whether there ought to be an EGM called by the Chairman, or whether he should say he would wait until the AGM and risk a member demanding an EGM was a matter on which (Mason) would accept the view of someone who knew more of company law and practice than (he) did."[83]

A new director now would thus need to be appointed as soon as possible and informed that 'as soon as the purge has taken place (he) would be brought in, if only on a one day a week basis'.[84] The

staff would need to be told candidly and firmly that some of them had 'joined the wrong body', they would be better off in a political organisation; and 'if anyone felt aggrieved, well, the Institute would do its best to give good terms'.[85] To the press, or other groups, or individuals who questioned the drastic action contemplated, two things should be made known. Firstly, 'it might be advisable to point out that if Michael (Caine), David (Sieff), Seebohm, Boyle, Prain, Mark (Bonham-Carter) and (Mason) resigned, all income would dry up. And the Charity Commissioners would take a hard look ...'[86]

And, in effect outlining an ideologised theoretical basis for counter-resistance, secondly:

> "For those who feel strongly about any aspect of social or political affairs there are various degrees of commitment as well as different approaches - some may feel that they must chain themselves to railings and to go to jail; others write thoughtful articles. Again different societies demand different approaches - some amenable only to bullets - some listen to reason. Also different styles of advocacy - for some cases a strident scream - to other audiences and for other cases a quiet reasoned approach, conceding to adversary some points ... All this brings me to the point that in race relations, there is room for a wide variety of attacks.
> There <u>is</u> polarisation of opinion - and a vast middle ground of people who want to sweep the whole thing under the carpet, hoping it will stay there, or that if the carpet is ever moved, the problem will be found to have gone away.
> What is the answer to this? Increased stridency? Trying to force the fate of submerged on the attention of majority? Trying to make it hurt? At the same time trying to make the submerged feel that they have a champion and give them self-respect?

> Something to be said for this view. Not satisfactory to say will produce a white back-lash.... Involves a judgement about our society - how far has it gone in rejecting traditional social conscience and readiness to listen to voice of justice? If you judge still open to this appeal, then you may need to tackle problem on several different fronts. Both a popular and elitist attack. Some degree of hurtful stridency as noted above and also - conducted by a different body - a reasonable and carefully phrased assault by argument, facts and persuasion...
> I take this view of British Society. Not yet wholly deaf to justice and reason. Therefore there is room for an IRR on former lines and it is to achieve this we have acted."[87]

Rounding out and refining this statement and in response to a request from the Chairman, Professor (Sir) Roland Oliver eventually produced a clearer and more politicised version of the Council's position - one that was endorsed by all actively planning and waging counter-resistance.

He suggested:

> "There are two basic approaches to the study of race relations between which every individual and every institution concerned with the subject must decide. One approach starts from the premise that race relations, both internationally and within nations, are capable of being very much improved, without a radical reconstruction of most existing societies, by means of better information, leading to more intelligent and less prejudiced attitudes. The other approach sets little store by information except as a weapon with which to fight. It starts from the belief that racial tensions, both national and international, are the real reflections of real inequalities caused by real exploitation and real oppression, which can be assuaged only by the real removal of those inequalities. It is not interested in reform, which can only postpone the day of radical reconstruction. The race war is merely a facet of the class war, and, to fight in it, one must identify oneself unmistakably with the oppressed majority of mankind, shouting its slogans, sharing its hurt and its anger, and siezing every occasion to denounce the hypocrisy of the wishy-washy liberal approach...

> The Council of the Institute of Race Relations has, after eighteen months of growing tension, decided to stand fast on the 'liberal approach'".[88]

In practice this would thus mean that:

> "First, such an Institute of Race Relations based in Britain will be trying to address the whole of British society, and that means primarily the indigenous majority. It will hope to keep the respect and co-operation of racial minorities. But it will not be a minorities lobby, and if it has to choose between informing the majority and pleasing the minorities, it will choose the former... It will be an organisation which seeks accurate and up-to-date information about the causes of racial tension and the means of allaying it... It may be taken for granted that the general trend of the evidence will be to encourage British society to be constantly reforming itself in more tolerant and more egalitarian directions... But the findings of such an Institute will always be expressed in the language of rational decision making. It will not tend towards demonstrations, confrontations, or show downs, which would belie its character... But of course that is not all. Even pragmatists have to keep things in proportion and to this extent no Institute of Race Relations could turn a blind eye to Southern Africa. The involvement of British industry and commerce in this system of oppression is an added reason for British concern. But Southern Africa is an area where the essential facts are already known all over the world, and are unlikely to be significantly added to by any research Institute based in Britain. Southern Africa, therefore, is important as a touchstone, as a standing example of how wrong things can go.... But a pragmatic Institute of Race Relations will devote most of its time to things which can be changed for the better by the action of those to whom it speaks..."[89]

Now that the group of ideologists on the Council had fully accepted Mason and Oliver's stance or account of their position vis-a-vis the Institute's future role, and now that the scheduled Council meeting on 20th March had been redefined as the political date for

the open counter-attack, the way ahead was clear for the kind of planning and organisation required to secure compliance, and to reconstruct the power lost or wrested from them in the preceeding months.[90] Letters were sent out to nearly all industrial supporters urging them to avail themselves of a December decision to quickly join the Institute as ordinary members with voting rights; a group of thirty-five companies responded, pointing out that the rather belated Constitutional change, if enacted earlier, would have saved Walston from defeat.[91] Meetings were held and letters exchanged with Council members Bonham-Carter and Runciman who for quite different reasons possessed some reservations over the action proposed.[92] Bridges were mended in particular with Jim Rose who had always advocated prompt, decisive action, a kind of institutional reinstatement of his former reputation as director of the British Survey, a deep personal and public hurt that had not been revenged fully since its infliction by Jenkins' paper and Tinker's refusal to sack the culprit.[93] But now, because 'the Chairman and others had finally come to their senses', Rose, together with Council member and Runneymede Trust director, Dipak Nandy, who, in turn, feared a historical playback of his experiences at CARD, a resistive <u>coup d'etat</u> by radical blacks inspired by Johnny James' dedicated form of urban Maoism, threw themselves into the practical political business of arranging an extensive press campaign.[94] Aided by Lester, they were soon able to report back to Caine in a long, detailed letter that 'the key journalists who have to be prepared

in advance about the Institute's position were: Peter Evans of The Times, Martin Adeney of the Guardian and John Kemp of the Daily Telegraph.' They agreed to let the chairman have in a second note 'the journalists from the Mirror, the Mail and the Sun' who could be relied on as completely as Duff Hart-Davis on the Sunday Telegraph who was 'very friendly and bright and would undoubtedly take the point'. Like Harold Evans at the Sunday Times who had been kept constantly informed of developments, they believed that the chairman's decision to talk to Rees Mogg, the editor of The Times, and Joe Rogaly of The Financial Times was 'absolutely right'. Although written by Nandy, they ended their letter with a euphoria reminiscent of a victorious ancient past:

"See you at Thermopylae!"[95]

It resounded with much the same depth of confidence that arose from another area of the campaign's organisation, the City based and directed fund-raising appeal. Here Seebohm and others by the end of February had accumulated approximately £140,000 worth of 'promises', only £10,000 short of the target set for their realisation into hard cash donations. They had informed most of the potential donors of the situation at the Institute and had extracted from them assured, informal promises that they would not donate unless the old Council's authority was reaffirmed, its power resecured, and its approach to race relations institutionalised - unless Race Today was closed, Tinker and Kirby sacked, and Grenville-Grey, the new director waiting in the wings, appointed 'to re-stabilise and re-organise the Institute in a reputable and responsible manner'.[96]

Expectedly, the utopians' reaction to the Council's purge was emotive, confused, yet aggressively hostile. They had been successfully caught unawares; they had not expected the confrontation for some months, although of course they had always realised it would come. In fact the only indication that March 20th would be the day of the commencement of a month-long bitter battle were the vague hints disclosed at the February Council meeting and the fact that Tinker had been summoned to a meeting with Caine at 4 o'clock that Monday afternoon, March 20th. (And then he only came away with the knowledge that there was to be 'an important meeting' at which 'the Chairman planned to make proposals'.)[97] The six new Council members had also been kept in the dark, although mysteriously the West Indian World had prophesised with alarming accuracy a few days before that plans were afoot to sack Tinker and shut down Race Today.[98] In these circumstances then, they were forced to accept that they would have 'to organise on the spot, in the territory proclaimed and guarded by the reactionaries - the Council meeting in the Council room'.[99]

But even this was denied to them. For, as planned and right at the beginning of the meeting, the chairman announced that he had certain 'funadmental proposals' to make which he would like the Council to deliberate in the absence of the staff, including the director. Although Tinker was eventually allowed to be present,

this made little difference to the outcome. The group of thirteen old Council members, including Runciman who appeared to realise at the eleventh hour where his ultimate loyalty and interests rested, voted to sack Tinker forthwith, and close down the magazine. The six new Council members voted against the composite motion and signalled to the staff waiting outside the Council room to storm in and take over the Institute symbolically.

In Sivanandan's words:

> "For a moment the masters of human kind were taken aback by the angry rebellion of women. They appeared to have been momentarily visited by a nightmare vision of the revolt of the natives whom they had so long dominated. The moment passed and they were in control once more. But just then the telephone rang. It was Joe Rogaly of the Financial Times - he was going to press - could (Council member) Anthony Lester give him the story he had been promised. The masters were once more thrown into confusion. Caught in the crossfire between the staff and the Council minority, the Chairman decided to put the proposals to a meeting of the Institute's members at an Extraordinary General Meeting."[100]

But despite the staff's storming into the Council room and demanding that 'democratic discussion' should take place, neither the majority decision on Race Today and the Director, nor that which approved the official membership of thirty-five corporate, industrial subscribers could now be reversed. All that remained to be done, suggested Sir Ronald Prain above the noise of angry protests and accusations, 'was to ask the members in Extraordinary General Meeting (to be held on Tuesday, 18th April), to approve the

action of the Council'.[101] The final fate of the Institute would be decided there. In the meantime no redundancies would be made, though negotiations could be commenced; Tinker could remain in office; and Race Today could continue for just two more issues, those for April and May, 1972.

Against this background and indeed the background of the pre-planned press campaign launched the morning after the meeting in the Financial Times with Joe Rogaly's indictment that IRR had 'been infiltrated by would-be revolutionaries and radicals who had sought, with some success, to turn it into a machine for propaganda against the government and capitalism', the utopians realised that if their campaign of resistance were to succeed it would have to be conducted politically on several different fronts.[102] It would need to be planned not simply as a direct response to Council-defined issues - although these needed challenging - but forcefully to undermine the ideologists' case through again exposing the socio-political assumptions on which it rested and by projecting a credible alternative conception of the Institute's role to that now fully articulated by the ideologists. In short the time had approached when they had to convince all (or at least a majority of all) those actively involved in the Institute's work, and not just hand picked supporters, grass root black activists who could always be relied upon to turn up at meetings and vote in accordance with the dictates of one particular creed as opposed to another. They had to turn what hitherto had

been an essentially internal, office-bound struggle into an open public struggle: they had to extend the basis of their support and construct more and more instrumental power.

This in turn called for a far more sophisticated form of leadership and organisation than before: it required that overall leadership and plans for resistive organisation should be led by a black whose credentials in the politics of resistive struggle should, firstly, at least equal those of Mason in the politics of liberal reform and accommodation, and secondly, should have been impeccably demonstrated. On both counts, Sivanandan emerged again as the principal leader and organiser. It was to him that the utopians, including Tinker, turned for advice; it was he who always appeared to be able under pressure to apply as many of Lenin's principles of revolutionary organisation as were appropriate; and it was he who saw that the struggle had to be extended, taken into the territory of the Council majority - the press - and conducted on several 'politically sensitive fronts'.

Simply:

> "If (we) had any hope of winning the battle, it would have to get a fair reporting from the press... it would have to be turned around to face another history and the experience of those creating it..."[103]

To achieve this two press statements and a press conference were organised. The first statement coming from six dissenting Councillors sought not only to give the other side of the struggle but, more

importantly, attempted to juxtapose a crude elitist approach with that of an open, democratic, equality-based version of the utopian's purpose. For instance, 'the six' firmly dissassociated themselves from the decisions taken, stating that they were actually the only 'elected' members in contested elections, and implying that they thus truly represented internal IRR opinion as well as the opinions of those who suffered from racial discrimination. Secondly, what was basically in question was not the Institute's objectivity but 'the belief of some (elitist) members of the Council that the needs of those whose contributions keep the Institute in existence were no longer being met by the continued publication of Race Today.'[104] Making the connection between themselves, the whole of the united staff who after all did the day-to-day work, and supportive external black and academic groups, they argued that Race Today should be seen as 'the public proof of the concern and commitment of the Institute':

> "Only in terms of its sensitivity to the issues of racial injustice could the Institute... justify its continuance... Talk of lack of objectivity, of propaganda and other similar charges are not only untrue but divert attention from the reality of race relations in this country."[105]

Followed immediately by a statement from the Director and Staff which clearly demonstrated unanimity and a powerful consensus in support of the magazine's continuation, Sivanandan managed to project in forty-eight hours an image of a body which was not so bitterly divided as some liked to believe but which apart from the thirteen

old Councillors, was totally united in its opposition to racial injustice.[106] Projected and moulded further at the press conference held on Wednesday, 22nd March, the physical reality of the image was persuasive; the commitment and dedication which informed it was so earnestly sincere - as is often the case when people are fighting for their existence, livelihoods - that even those sections of the press institutionally bound to establishment interests started to rethink. Confronted with impassioned pleas from a distinguished professor who had at one time been active in Liberal Party politics, a black librarian who had come to the Institute from the Colonial Office library in 1965, and was certainly no fly-by-night infiltrator, solid evidence of big business pressure and influence on IRR affairs, hundreds of letters of support, and even more black and white people here and abroad prepared to go on resisting, the press whatever their original intentions made it possible 'for the first time in two years of bitter battle for the staff to put forward their case'.[107]

Setting the tone for future press coverage, John Kemp in the Daily Telegraph the morning after the press conference gave over two-thirds of his article to the utopians' case. Martin Adeney in the Guardian also supported the staff's analysis and in a later editorial positively came down in favour of keeping Race Today alive and supporting 'projects which would be relevant in relieving the more immediate problems of coloured communities'. Peter Evans in The Times even went one step further: 'If members support the Council

majority it is likely the Institute will be regarded as too aloof by immigrants voicing injustice. It is bound to become a target of criticism along with the Community Relations Commission and the Race Relations Board - seen as part of them against us.' Wilby and Legum in The Observer expanded on the them/us theme by articulating concisely the two different approaches and exposing inferentially their respective social bases. From their piece it was clear that they favoured an Institute which would be 'primarily acceptable to Britain's coloured citizens and to those engaged in the wider liberation struggle'. Although other articles in other papers were not quite so explicit, it was clear simply from the amount of favourable coverage that within a fortnight the utopians had completely undermined - with the exception of the Sunday Times and the Financial Times - and in a sense usurped the press campaign diligently organised by the ideologists.[108]

Even if this had failed, organisation of media coverage on the second front, the alternative, community based press, would have at least got the message over to the utopians' supporters. But in the event what happened was that this front could be re-fashioned and maximised analytically to expose in some detail the assumptions on which the ideologists governed. Continuous discussions with, for instance the West Indian World had led not only to the forecasting

of the 20th March as 'D-Day' but, more importantly, it had led to a reaffirmation of black support, the way in which the struggle at the Institute had become 'hooked up' with the whole struggle for black liberation and power in metropolitan and third World societies. In an editorial, 'Money or Principles', the largest circulating black owned and directed paper in Britain declared that Race Today's political coverage of 'liberation movements and black political groups and viewpoints' had made it a friend and helpful resource for all black activists organising 'grass roots participation in race relations.'[109] In a later article based on material supplied by Sivanandan who had in the meantime reorganised the Institute's entire information services section into a 'political depot which supplied the ammunition to sustain active resistance', the journal maintained that the ideologists or 'high powered clique had South African financial interests'; they were more interested in protecting these than 'promoting good race relations in this country'.[110] Listing the members of this clique, together with their commercial and industrial interests, the paper soundly condemned the alliance between capital, however liberally employed, and race research, policy, and practice. Several days later this analysis was extended in a long article by black journalist Lionel Morrison who argued that white, big business interests were dictating, controlling and defining what constituted legitimate race policy and practice.

In the words of one of his interviewees, a black IRR staff member, he concluded: 'I would rather be unemployed than kowtow to these people (and their interests). The time we had no say in what really concerned us is long past'. Thus the ideologists needed to be defeated if blacks in Britain were to self-determine their futures and understand their history in the way it really happened.[111]

Although similar interpretations of the utopians' position were reported in and supported by the white underground press, particularly Private Eye and Time Out, it was obviously through the utopians' own organ, Race Today, that they were able firstly, to state their case and position, secondly use it as a weapon of resistance to attack vigorously the ideologists' conception of things, and thirdly, to organise further support for their struggle.[112] In fact the April issue achieved all three objectives. Symbolically printed in red its cover page was designed to look like a banner, a symbol of the utopians' resolve to resist until the end. It carried the following sloganised message out into the grass roots communities it served: 'Last Issue But One: Why We Face Closure'. Reiterating in public the arguments they had made many times in private at meetings of the Council and Executive Committee, three staff members spelt out in a punchy editorial why the magazine should be reprieved.[113] This was followed on the next page by an article entitled 'What the Debate is About', consisting of the press statements sent out a week

or so earlier and a substantial extract of a letter sent to all members of the Institute by the director.[114] And on a third page the editor printed an unsolicited article by black journalist Hal Austin who said in a style reminiscent of ghetto feeling and rhetoric what all (black) supporters knew and wanted to hear repeated again and again:

> "The attitude of 'we're doing you a favour, nigger', that liberals display has been the main cause of black people's distrust of the race relations industry. But then again, white do-gooders have never really listened to niggers. They regarded them as food for their intellectual appetites and devoured them as they like. The closure of Race Today is regarded by black people as yet another facet of the arrogance and trickery behind the race industry. The closure is another blatant example of the white, middle class, all-British habit of closing your eyes and pretending that nobody is there...
> Many blacks have got the message (now) that liberalism is a very thin veneer; a very thin lacquer that covers the most gangrenous racism imaginable: 'If anyone wonders why the anger of blacks is so often turned upon the white liberal, it is because, while professing to be a friend, the white liberal has generally turned out to be more white than liberal'... If there is one thing that the bosses of Britain wouldn't tolerate a liberal view on, it's race. Any position left of official Labour Party policy is viewed very myopically by the bastions of the 'Britain-is-Best' brigade...
> If Powell's speeches served notice of our being unwelcome, and the Tory election victory an endorsement, then the closure of Race Today is the most blatant attestation of a shift to the right of consensus. This shift from acquiescence to reactionary pressure by the last outpost of liberalism certainly is indicative of the mobilisation of forces gearing for the inevitable showdown..."[115]

If Austin's article symbolised in language and juxtaposed through deed and statement the magazine's value as a weapon to attack viciously the ideologists' conception of reality, then its effectiveness as an actual instrument for organising support can be adduced from the response received from the utopians' appeal to its hitherto passive supporters 'to comment on the role Race Today has played and could play' in a radicalised Institute.[116]

By the score and from all quarters letters poured in: the response gave staff resisters 'a tremendous boost, similar in kind to encouragement we had received for a considerable time, but far more broadly based'.[117]

Representing in a sense the extent of academic support and responding directly to the ideologists charge that Race Today lacked objectivity, John Rex wrote:

> "Race Relations research should be objective in the sense that it regards the goals, policies and actions both of governments and those who are opposed to governments as open to description and analysis along with any other facts. What seems clear to me is that, insofar as the Institute's research workers have either ignored or optimistically mis-represented the goals of the government (in Colour and Citizenship), their research has been regarded as objective, but that serious analysis of these goals (possibly Jenkins paper, some Race Today articles, etc.), tended to be regarded as ideological or political. This is a view more widely held than the more simplistic view of one member of your Council (Jim Rose) who told me that he was only prepared to do research which was useful in the maintenance of a capitalist society."[118]

Refining both his personal stance and argument a little further, Rex wrote to The Times two days later in the following terms:

> "It is hard to avoid the conclusion that what is really at issue in the Institute is not the question of the commitment of Race Today but the challenge which it represents to the ideologies which the Survey of Race Relations promulgated as objective truth in Colour and Citizenship. I say this, not as one who wishes to substitute some sort of utopian and revolutionary ideology for the Conservative one of the survey, but simply because I believe that an Institute which believes in the sacredness of facts should scrutinise more closely the ideological comments of some of its own earlier work. On the other hand, of course, if what we are really arguing about is whether capitalist pipers should continue to play the Institute's tune, that is another matter. If that is the case, one can only hope that more reputable settings can be found for race relations research."[119]

A supporter of the (black) utopians position at the Institute and elsewhere for a decade or more, Robert Moore angrily pronounced:

> "It seems to me that you are not just demanding that your employees iron out differences of emphasis and method, and that the style and tone of publications be in keeping with your definition of the objects of the Institute. You are asking us all to accept a package deal which includes:
> (i) your own consensual and mandarin interpretation of British political processes.
> (ii) your definition of the relationship between 'objective fact' and what is personal - in other words you are telling me (as a sociologist) how to do my job.
> (iii) your definition of what the Institute should be like in the light of (i) and (ii) above.
> I would want to argue that if you start from these assumptions then you become a very special kind of body, with a partisan position, and that you preclude yourself from achieving certain goals that I might regard as legitimate for an Institute. In the end you are setting yourselves up as the sociologists who have the true picture of the world, and the men who have made the correct value judgements, and you are going to make us conform to it."[120]

Other 'academic' letters of support besides elaborating in many ways on the red-herring issue of 'objectivity' covered between them at least four other central questions. All, for a start, resoundingly supported the continuation of Race Today. Some, like one of Yale's professors of sociology, highly commended the staff in the 'experimenting and exploring with new perspectives and approaches', pointing out that 'the controversial nature of some of the Institute's work had been a marvellous spur to both lively and productive discussion'.[121] More directly than Wendell Bell, the Co-ordinator of the Caribbean Studies Program at Pittsburgh concentrated on the question of adaptation to change: as times had altered considerably the Institute was simply now 'forced to adapt itself to the specific needs of the time if it were to survive'. Survival demanded of the Institute 'a very acute awareness of the societal changes that have taken place', something that should 'inform all its activities and by dint of this fact compel the Institute radically to shift its terrain'. In short this necessitated the strengthening rather than the closing of Race Today which was reflective of the changes, needs, and new departures', and the placing of emphasis on 'the demands of the people it seeks to investigate and less on those of established opinion'.[122]

And, finally, there was received an important batch of letters which, from the utopians point of view, struck hard at the core of the Institute's problems: in many forms they adumbrated the view that Race Today provided 'just the focus that makes the Institute a

stronger force against racism and racist practices'. They all hoped that IRR could re-affirm 'this progressive path'.

But:

> "If this proves uncomfortable to those members of the Council reflecting the vested interests of the organisations they are affiliated with, it would seem that it is they who should withdraw their affiliation rather than using their power to prevent the up-to-date, critical research which the staff seems to be involved in."[123]

Whilst these letters from the international academic community were crucial in debunking the ideologists' somewhat confused and inherently ideologised definition of 'objectivity', and were also crucial in imparting associationally a degree of respectability, prestige, even authority to the utopians' case, they were in the main, however, a form of support that Council members could embarrassingly ignore. In the first place many of them were not going to be in attendance to speak or vote at the AGM. Secondly, some letters like Professor John Galbraith's which 'fully supported the majority position' had also been received to help counter and neutralise the utopians' file of an estimated nine hundred letters of support.[124] Thirdly, most had been written by sociologists, 'a sub species of academic life notorious for their extremism and radical sympathies'.[125] And thirdly, they could be ignored, or, perhaps more accurately, accommodated on the basis that after all they were only written as personal viewpoints. What appeared to trouble the ideologists more was another kind of engineered support,

the utopians success on yet another essential front - a front composed of recognisable groups and organisations active in either race relations research and political work or the defence of the rights of the oppressed.

For instance the group academic support that came from the University of Sussex where JUMPR had been uncomfortably sited, the Centre for Mass Communication Research at Leicester, the editorial offices of Black Lines, a well-known American Journal of Black Studies, and the majority of staff connected with the IRR/SSRC Race and Ethnic Studies Centre and the department of sociology at Bristol University could not be so easily dismissed as 'personal' or the rantings of an extreme fringe of alienated social scientists.[126] They represented the quasi-organised profession of race research outside the Institute. Although the professor of sociology and director of the IRR/SSRC unit at Bristol refused to sign his colleagues' letter sent to The Times and the Institute's Chairman, indicating that he intended to vote for the Council's motion, the Bristol signatories struck the kind of chord that by now reflected the feeling of the majority of academic race researchers in and outside the Institute.

They warned that:

> "The disappearance of Race Today, in its present form, will be a grave loss... It has provided a platform for very different views of race relations. For any or all of these to be suppressed would be extremely dangerous."[127]

The critique of academic researchers at Bristol not only helped to compound the ideologists growing anxiety but also helped to bolster three other sources of group support and instrument power. The first of these arose from the emergence of an organised group of agency race workers which protested strongly against the Council's decisions. Individual employees and ex-conciliation officers of the Race Relations Board joined forces so to speak with Tim Hetherington who in a letter to The Times remonstrated: 'To silence this excellent magazine... seems to be a sad reflection on the state of the race industry in this country'.[128] Compensating for the fact that Board employees - and it was estimated at the time that over 66% were behind the utopians' campaign - had been contractually debarred as civil servants from expressing political views in public, the professional employees of some fifty or so community relations councils partly financed by the Commission and organised into an Association of Community Relations Officers informed IRR's Chairman that:

> "The special General Meeting of the Association of Community Relations Officers which met yesterday was indeed deeply concerned about the future of Race Today. We recalled our resolution of 2nd October 1971 which was passed on to the Institute at that time:
>
> ('This conference ... strongly deplores the decision taken by the Council of the Institute of Race Relations to cease publication of Race Today in its present form in the very near future and it (now) urges the Extraordinary General Meeting when it meets to reverse this regrettable decision')"[129]

The Secretary of ACRO, Aaron Haynes, went on:

> "As practitioners in the field we have found Race Today a thoroughly useful and competent journal and an indispensable contributor to our work. We can assure you that as officers working in close contact with the local community Race Today has established itself as the most important single publication for the advance of understanding and the promotion of a just society..."[130]

The kind of communities to which ACRO referred included many black groups organised locally and nationally - from local West Indian and Asian groups on Tyneside, the national West Indian Standing Conference, and Indian Workers Association, to the Black Unity and Freedom Party which stridently claimed on behalf of the majority of black political groups up and down the country that:

> "The Institute of Race Relations does not represent the interests of Black People. Since those who have created the monster, Lord (Jock) Campbell of Booker Brothers, Harry Oppenheimer of South African Gold Mines, Barclays Bank and many others are raving mad capitalist-imperialist dogs; they can more represent Black people than the 'devil' can represent 'God'. The IRR is the political barometer of the racist capitalist dogs. It was created specifically to collect information on the views and needs of the black and oppressed people of the world. When such information was collected, the fascists elements used it to paper cover the cracks in their tottering system...
> All serious minded people must (therefore) support Professor Tinker and the other progressives, and oppose the fascist elements. The IRR as it stands is a fascist tool. Those interested in genuine 'Race Relations' must create an organisation from the ruins of the present conflict that will serve the interests of the black and other oppressed peoples."[131]

If BUFP's position seemed too extreme and, according to the Chairman, defamatory, to be taken seriously, other less emotive statements from groups working at the neighbourhood level were that much more influential. Thus The London Organisation for Student Community Action, the Committee of the Telegraph Hill Neighbourhood Council, the London Council of Social Service's Committee for Inter-racial Co-operation, the Society of Friends Community Relations Committee, and a dozen or so more multi-racial, politically moderate community groups could not be disregarded as 'maniacally paranoic'.[132] For their respectability and moderation in the past had always been held up by the ideologist as an example of the way (race) business should be conducted. Now that they had come out into the open and now that they knew the feelings of their clients on whom they had always depended for their existence as voluntary and/or charity workers, they could without compunction endorse and co-author the accusations made by the vicar of Brixton:

> "Your intention to close down Race Today is like a stab in the back ... Those whom I have counted as friends are in fact on the other side ... Why muzzle us all? Are you deliberately trying to promote the myth of a scheming Establishment? - which is exactly what the closing down of Race Today seems to say to us. Or are you purists who will only allow, from some form of self-preservation, an oligarchy of Research?"[133]

The final group which Sivanandan and his political workers managed to rally behind their struggle possessed possibly more established political muscle than all the others put together. It was quite clear from the tone of their resolutions that both the Magazine and Book branch of the National Union of Journalists and the Kings Cross branch of the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs would have, if necessary, involved their respective National Executive Committees in the dispute over Race Today's closure. The tone of the NUJ resolution which 'was passed without opposition' also suggested that the political and social analysis offered by the utopians had been swallowed wholly without the slightest hint of doubt.

It read:

> "This meeting strongly condemns the decisions of the Council of the Institute of Race Relations to stop publication of Race Today which is making a vital contribution to the fight against racism in Britain."[134]

Taken together and sharpened to a razor's edge by Tinker's decision to sue the Council majority for defamation of character, the balance of power of the social armies engaged in battle had appeared by the first week in April to have shifted noticeably and changed in character.[135] As the founder of the Institute later saw it, the struggle was now no longer about the survival of the Institute, "it was about the survival of the ideals we had always proclaimed,

those which had led (Hodson) to establish a race relations unit at Chatham House in 1952: it had become a more profound struggle, one which involved our self-respect, our judgements about the way society was and ultimately should be organised'.[136]

Although at the time this view was indeed discernable in the part he played in the defence of the Institute he had created two decades earlier, the significance of his contribution was that it heralded an extension and intensification of the ideologists' campaign. For with the sudden and to the Council majority inexplicable change of sympathy of the press, the upsurge of wider support than ever envisaged for the 'radicals' and with the 'retreat from reason' that appeared to surround them, the ideologists finally realised at the eleventh hour that they too should organise more effectively instead of assuming that somehow 'people would vote for them on the basis of the facts presented' and relying on 'the goodwill and sense of reason that (their) supporters had always possessed'.[137]

Consequently Hodson's letter to The Times was written in the hope that much of the political and social ground lost could, through the exercise of influence and persuasive, rational argument, be regained.

He thus wrote:

> "As a founder of the Race Relations Institute and progenitor of its pre-natal life within the Royal Institute of International Affairs, I feel great concern about its present dissensions...

> The Institute was created to be a centre of factual information and scientific study in regard to relations between races anywhere in the world. For this purpose academic detachment and political impartiality are essential. There is plenty of room for other sorts of organisation concerned with race - idealist, propagandist, partisan, political, religious, or sectional. But incompatible purposes cannot co-exist within a single organisation... Once one is tempted by enthusiasm or indignation from the path of scientific detachment, not one route is open but many, and divisive controversy can happen at every fork and cross roads... Merely to raise such questions is to demonstrate how vitally necessary it is to have a pure source of objective information and reasoned debate, uncontaminated by commitment to any particular opinion or line of approach, in order to guide the judgement of those who have to act or publicly express themselves on matters of race relations - politicians and administrators, journalists and controllers of media, businessmen and trade unionists, leaders of churches and other un-official bodies - and their constituents, that is to say, all of us as electors or members of affected groups...
> It is therefore strongly to be hoped that members of the Institute will support the majority of the Council at the Extraordinary General Meeting which is to be called on 18th April."[138]

Whilst Hodson had possibly forgotten the reasons why Professor Hancock had attacked his original conception of the Institute as a political lobby, why Dame Lilian Pensen had objected to the bias and lack of objectivity in Mason's Essay on Racial Tension, and why Professor Raymond Firth had resigned in disgust with the approach to the study of race relations favoured, it was clear that Mason had not done so.[139] His sense of history, organisational intrigue, politics and power had not deserted him. Objectivity defined either in Hodsonian terms or in the way the Institute had practised

it was a nonsense academically; he agreed with Rex. But, objectivity remodelled as a political expediency against revolutionary resistance and as one of the ideologists' main barricades behind which to hide and fight made as much sense as Mason's penultimate warning to all Institute members:

> "If the members of the Institute do not support the Chairman's policy, fourteen members of Council, including myself, will feel compelled to resign and it is my belief that within a few months the Institute will come to an end. If the majority of the Council have your support, I believe we can make a fresh start and continue to do useful work. The voting may well be close."[140]

Neither this letter and others from individual Council members, including a second from the Chairman, nor any last ditch attempt at the Booker Brothers London flat or elsewhere to regain the lost ground could stem the mounting gush of support for the utopians' struggle.[141] All in fact now rested on the question of how many supporters for both groups in resistive combat would turn up at the AGM. Right up until the last forty-eight hours and despite the many meetings held over lunch, after work, at the Reform and Travellers Club, the ideologists could not glean any more than a general impression. The Easter vacation had started and many of their would-be supporters were still on holiday or, like even the Chairman, out of the country; and even if they were not it was still considered in their social circles - despite Walston's Summer 1971 experience - <u>infra dig</u> or positively 'bad form to blatantly badger up support and

cajole people into doing something they could quite rightly decide for themselves'.[142] And further in April, the end of the financial year, many corporate supporters were busy either with preparing their own end of year accounts, travelling on business trips, or, as Sir Ronald Prain wrote: attending 'the Annual General Meeting of International Nickel in Canada, which (he) had promised to attend as a director'.[143] Even the threatened rail strike which prevented Michael Banton and others, who, unlike the utopian supporters, tended to be country-based, from being at the meeting to vote in favour of the Council did not however seriously alter the favourable impression gathered by the evening of 17th April that: 'The total number of valid proxies received by 6 pm last night (16th April) was 135 of which 87 can be regarded as for the Resolution and 48 against the Resolution'.[144]

Unhampered by the conventions of upper middle class life and protocol the utopians, on the other hand, were in a slightly better position to assess the strength of their support. They knew that their newly recruited members to the Institute would neutralise the votes of the newly enfranchised group of commercial supporters; they knew they could rely on all their London based followers to turn up; and they anticipated that academics at Bristol and Sussex together with Rex from Warwick and Moore from Aberdeen would make a special effort to arrive in person to vote. But even after totting up the votes they could rely on they were by no means certain of

success. The only thing they were certain about was the strategy they planned to employ which entailed basically moving an amendment to the Council majority's motion congratulating the editor of Race Today and the Institute's director on two counts: the way they were doing their respective jobs and the way in which they conveived of a future role for the 'new' Institute.[145]

Their anxiety however, was misplaced.

For nearly all of their supporters and very few of the ideologists turned up to vote. After what The Times called a 'stormy three and a half hour meeting' and led by Sivanandan, they succeeded in moving the planned amendment and, after Philip Mason's bitter, personal, uncharacteristically 'irrational' attack on Hugh Tinker, winning the support of members for it. Although a delay of an hour passed whilst the Institute's lawyers and stockbrokers, appointed as tellers, counted and recounted the proxy votes in grim amazement, the result turned out to be a complete victory for the utopians. The amendment had succeeded by 89 votes to 17, and with the inclusion of proxies the amendment was officially carried by 142 votes to 99.

The New Order

Over the next few days, all the old Council members resigned, and the outgoing Chairman received a number of letters of condolence and commiseration. Lester wrote, for instance, 'to express his sympathy for what (Caine) went through last night',[146] and his admiration for his courage. Bonham-Carter, Dipak Nandy, Richard Hornby, Jim Rose, Ronald Prain, Edward Boyle, Joan Lestor, David Sieff all apologised for their absence and together with Garry Runciman who had attended wished that they could have done more to help.[147] But of all these letters only two, one from Philip Mason, the other from Robert Birley, offered real sympathy in the way of giving partial explanations for what had happened. The latter for example suggested that race relations had become an area of study and action where people regrettably had now to take sides: the utopians found 'it impossible to believe that objectivity was of any value; they regarded it as a withdrawal'. In a postscript the former headmaster of Eton suggested that the rail go-slow had played its part: 'several people whom (he) had talked to and had said they would vote for the resolution did not turn up'.[148]

And Philip Mason wrote:

> "I don't think we were wrong to have a confrontation but clearly the line we took in our letter(s) carried no conviction. On my part it was an error of judgement to try to explain why we were convinced nothing would go right with Hugh Tinker there. One could not say all and it was a mistake to say too much. Again, I am sorry I let you down.

> On losing the battle, I feel quite philosophical. Let them have a bash. What we did when I was in charge is not affected. But I do much regret having made the mistake of trying to tell why we should get rid of Hugh Tinker which I was told afterwards no honourable man would have done. (According to Martin Adeney's account in the Guardian the next morning at least one speaker claimed that it had moved him to vote against the Council majority). This does wound me as I thought I was being moderate and also felt we owed them some explanation."[149]

Apart from a half-baked proposal coming from Birley, Oliver, Walston and tacitly supported by Mason to refloat the 'old' Institute again in six months time the end of two decades of dedicated, hard work at the Institute had arrived.[150]

Mason's threat or prophecy of near bankrupcy was, according to Seebohm, a foregone conclusion; 'a natural end for many (capitalists/ ideologists) whose association with the body had become more and more painful as events escalated'.[151] Whether or not the trustees of the Institute's Research and Development Trust actually decided collectively to withdraw financial support at a certain date did not matter. For what was important, as noted by the Institute's incoming and first black Chairman, Wilfred Woods, was that there occurred a sudden 'flight of capital' shortly after the 'palace revolution'.[152] Simply for the ideologists 'the Institute was no longer the kind of body we could usefully support:

> "Rather than withdrawing our support immediately we (Booker Brothers) and many other companies whose deeds of covenant were due to terminate during 1972/73 decided not to renew support. To have withdrawn immediately would have looked like sour grapes..."[153]

And as to the promises of donations worth nearly £150,000, Lord Seebohm noted:

> "We could not ask companies to withdraw their pledges but in the circumstances, and as expected, most did."[154]

Likewise the Ford Foundation and others including the Rowntree Memorial Trust (Seebohm) and Nuffield (Farrer-Brown) also decided 'in the circumstances' not to renew their existing support or favourably entertain new applications for grants.

The utopian Institute had to survive on its own account, drawing support and funds either directly from its new clientele or from those organisations and bodies sympathetic to its new revolutionary aims. Organisationally and politically this meant that the white director had to go - for not only was he drawing a large salary the body could no longer afford to pay but it was considered that his brand of radical liberalism could now only hinder the complete revolutionary reconstruction envisaged. His contract was not renewed, and embittered and dejected, he was replaced by the Institute's first black director, Sivanandan, the leader of the successful resistance struggle. As a white activist who knew too that his days were numbered, Kirby also resigned the following year, 'for it was now time to hand over Race Today to a black political activist - Darcus Howe'.[155] The magazine was hived off from the

Institute later the same year for as much economic as political reasons and a new revolutionary 'collective', Towards Racial Justice, was established to produce, edit and promote it as the journal which articulated the voices of black people.[156] The Institute's old academic journal Race was appropriately named Race and Class and produced and financed directly by the Transnational Institute, a body committed to international revolutionary struggle, as a joint TNI/IRR publication. Sivanandan was installed as its new editor and for the first time - consciously, at least - articles were screened not on the basis of academic criteria but on the basis of political allegiances, approach, and philosophy. Luxury offices in Mayfair were exchanged for a cramped basement in Kings Cross. All salaries were severely cut along with the total number of staff to its present complement of two full-time 'sisters' and the various Councils since April 1972 have been politically if not totally racially cleansed, made progressively more revolutionary and black.

This latter development has been achieved through systematic screening where both black and white members are today checked over for signs of any political deviances. Under Woods' chairmanship from 1972-74 the transition to such a preoccupation was only slightly detectable; under black John La Rose's which lasted for another two years an attempt was made to institutionalise the theory and practice of earlier (black) resistive struggle, but this failed and John La Rose himself was in a sense ousted from the chair because his

cultural tendencies and analysis were grittier than his belief in the director's political wisdom and advice. Replaced by a white, academic neo-Marxist, Louis Kushnik, the Institute at present appears almost solely concerned with exercises in political cleansing.

Since April 1972, then, it has evolved from a black radical to a white-class revolutionary body; from a tolerant radicalism to a benevolent dictatorship, from open research to closed party-line polemics, from ideology to utopia and back again to ideology - only this time the ideologists wear a different coloured mask.

They have pledged themselves:

> "To examine the ways and means by which Third World peoples both in the metropolis and in their own countries, are being subjected to economic slavery and political subjugation, and to address (themselves) to policies and programmes that will help to bring an end to that situation."[157]

CHAPTER EIGHT

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. See John Rex, Key Problems of Sociological Theory, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1961, pp.127-9.

2. From the Minutes of the 65th Council Meeting, 21st October, 1971, IRR, London. See in particular Minute 381 (i) to (ii).

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. However this resolution was passed at the Staff Meeting on 19th October, 1971.

5. Michael Caine, Interview, 12th July, 1976.

6. Minutes of the 65th Council Meeting, op cit. Minute 394. See also Hugh Tinker, 'The Role of the Institute of Race Relations', IRR, London, April 1971, together with Hugh Tinker's 'Immediate Aims and Objectives', IRR, London, April, 1971, pp.1-2.

7. Hugh Tinker, 'Immediate Aims and Objectives', op cit, p.1.

8. Ibid, p.2.

9. This was the fashionable phrase employed by the ideologists to reflect the nature of the relationship embedded in the truce.

10. Letter from Philip Mason to W. Pendleton, International Division, Ford Foundation, 27th October, 1971.

11. Philip Mason, Interview, 18th and 19th February, 1976.

12. Lord Seebohm, Interview, 28th October, 1976.

13. For an historical appreciation of this view and particularly Professor Roland Oliver's antagonistic position see: Minutes of the 66th Council Meeting, 6th December, 1971, Minute 406 (1) to (13) and Minutes of the Executive Committee, 1st December, 1971, IRR, London, Minute 232.

14. Interview, W.G. Runciman, 29th October, 1976.

15. Letter from Sir Roy Wilson to Philip Mason, 4th October, 1971. See also Tim Hetherington, 'Why I Left the Race Relations Board', Race Today, Vol.3, No. 10, October, 1971, pp.326-327.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. According to Kirby, 'several years earlier, in fact, there had been a case when an article critical of the Board was removed from the next day's Sunday Times on a Saturday afternoon when the paper was at page proof stage, after consultation between its editor (Harold Evans) and the Board's Chairman, (then Bonham-Carter)'. For further elaboration see Alexander Kirby, 'Race Today, Gone Tomorrow', in Charles Husband (ed.), White Media and Black Britain, Arrow Books, London, 1975, pp.198-200.

20. Philip Mason's letters to Sir Roy Wilson, 6th October, 1971 and 7th October, 1971; the extract is taken from the second of these letters.

21. Michael Caine had lunch with Sir Roy Wilson on Friday, 19th November, 1971 to inform him unofficially about the proposals he had in mind concerning the future of the magazine.

22. L. Clarke's letter first arrived at the Race Today office on 14th October, 1971. Besides severely criticising Barclays Bank's booklet Emigrating to South Africa, 1969-70, the main target of Clarke's controlled outrage was that of the Bank and the Chairman of its International Division - Lord Seebohm. See Race Today Vol.3, No. 10, p.330, October, 1971 for then (Sir) Frederic Seebohm's account of Barclay's policy in South Africa and his announcement that: 'Barclays Bank DCO are to pay equal rates for equal work to all male employees in South Africa regardless of race'.

23. Letter from Michael Caine to Lord Seebohm, 15th October, 1971.

24. Letter from Lord Seebohm to Michael Caine, 18th October, 1971.

25. Letter from Alexander Kirby to Michael Caine, 22nd October, 1971.

26. Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 3rd November, 1971, IRR, London.

27. The whole debate on Race Today was in fact conducted against a background of the Institute's plans for ultimate financial security and survival. Thus the members of the Trust were more than anxious either to hive off the magazine, change its political complexion, or, as we shall see later, close it down altogether.

28. Lord Walston, Interview, 27th October, 1976.

29. Alexander Kirby, 'Race Today : Paper to be presented at the next Council Meeting on 6th December, 1971', IRR, London, November, 1971.

30. This phrase was employed by Hugh Tinker to summarise the Council's hesitancy to act decisively on the future of the magazine.

31. Letter from Michael Caine to Alexander Kirby, 15th November, 1971.

32. See the Chairman's letters to Lord Seebohm; Jim Rose and David Sieff in particular, all written on 15th November, 1971.

33. Letters from Jim Rose to Michael Caine, 9th and 16th November, 1971.

34. Ibid, 9th November, 1971.

35. Ibid. See also 'A Scapegoat for Bradford?', Race Today, Vol.3, No. 11, November, 1971, p.361, the editorial which offended not only Colonel Gibson and Jim Rose but also the Bradford police. (Note that after leaving IRR's staff, Jim Rose had taken up a position with the Westminster Press as an editorial director).

36. Letter from C.E. Heap, Assistant Chief Constable, Bradford, to the Editor, Race Today, 12th November, 1971.

37. The complaint was passed on to Mark Bonham-Carter at an evening meeting in Bradford on 15th November, 1971.

38. Letter from Mark Bonham-Carter to Michael Caine, 19th November, 1971.

39. See Note 20 above.

40. For further details on this claim see W.E.L. Fletcher's Memorandum, 'Libel and Slander Insurance', 16th November, 1971, IRR, London, and for the full text of the article, see John Armitage, 'The National Front in Huddersfield', Race Today, Vol.3, No.10, October, 1971, pp.335-338. Incidentally John Briggs, a solicitor and notary-public, was at that time a member of what Armitage termed the Huddersfield NF's 'elite'. This elite provided the central organisation and obtained funds for local political activities.

41. Letter from Lord Seebohm to Michael Caine, 20th December, 1971. Although this letter arrived after the December Council meeting, its contents were however expected and known to the Chairman.

42. Council Minutes of the 66th Council Meeting, op cit.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid. This resolution was passed at an informal staff meeting on 6th December, 1971.

47. Philip Mason, for instance, 'did not himself think that hiving off the magazine would be practical; Calvocoressi 'could not see how hiving off the magazine would assist in overcoming difficulties'; and Runciman 'was puzzled as to the decisions called for from Council. He asked whether the vetting procedure imposed on the Editor had produced the right results and he was anxious that past mistakes should not be repeated'. (Ibid).

48. Ibid.

49. It would seem likely that its emergence coincided with the realisation that the Council's former threats to restrain the magazine's role could no longer be treated as possible intentions.

50. Alexander Kirby, 'The Public Interest', Race Today, Vol.3, No.11, November, 1971, p.361.

51. Sue Bovey, 'Recruitment and Training : The Board Can Do Better', Race Today, Vol.3, No. 11, p.362.

52. Tim Hetherington, 'The Race Relations Board : Where Now?', Race Today, Vol.3, No.11, pp.382-84.

53. Ibid.

54. Michael Hill, 'Community Relations : Seeking the Best Model', Race Today, Vol.3, No. 11, pp.367-68. For a more detailed account of their argument see Michael Hill and Ruth Issacharoff, Community Action and Race Relations: A Study of Community Relations Committees in Britain', Oxford University Press, London, 1971.

55. Michael Hill, op cit.

56. See in particular Robert Moore, Racism and Black Resistance in Britain', Pluto Press, London, 1975, pp.103-115 and in general, the author's own Black Britain, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1973.

57. Lionel Morrison, 'The End of a Fair Housing Group?', Race Today, Vol.4, No.1, January, 1972, pp.26-27.

58. A. Sivanandan's review of Jones, Clement and Others, Race and the Press, Runneymede Trust, 1971, in Race Today, Vol.4, No.1, January, 1972, pp.29.

59. A. Sivanandan's review of Peter Evans, Attitudes of Young Immigrants, Runneymede Trust, London, 1971, Ibid.

60. Gus John, Race in the Inner City, Runneymede Trust, London, 1971. The view quoted here was expressed by A. Sivanandan during the course of an extended Interview on 1st December, 1976.

61. See the front and back covers of Race Today, Vol.4, No.2, February, 1972.

62. A. Sivanandan, Interview, op cit.

63. Council Minutes for the 67th Meeting of Council, 17th February, 1972, IRR, London, Minute 413.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid, and actual wording from an Interview with Lord Seebohm, 28th October, 1976.

68. Ibid. Lord Goodman's reported speech by Lord Seebohm.

69. Council Minutes for 67th Meeting of Council, op cit.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Letter from Hugh Tinker to Michael Caine, 18th February, 1972.

73. Letter from Roland Oliver to Michael Caine, 18th February, 1972.

74. Oliver's resignation, of course, was withdrawn immediately after he was informed of the 'drastic steps' the Chairman proposed to take. In a letter to Oliver on 25th February 1972 Caine assured him that there was 'a shape emerging on which I would hope I could persuade you to continue your position and contribution'.

75. These letters were only sent to members who had hitherto urged positive and decisive action on the issue of the magazine.

76. Philip Mason, 'Confidential Notes for Michael Caine', 25th February, 1972, pp.1-4.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. These notes were contained in a second paper by Philip Mason, 'Lobbies and Opinion Factories: Sketch of Possible Article' which was attached to his Notes and circulated to selected members.

88. Roland Oliver, 'A Pragmatic Approach to Race Relations', signed but undated, pp.1-3.

89. Ibid.

90. Much of this planning was conducted over lunch at the Reform Club and Travellers Club between 7th March and 20th March, 1972. At a crucial lunch meeting on 10th March with Philip Mason, detailed arrangements, which included the dates and times of press meetings, visits to and meetings with supporters (Walston and Oliver Woods), and so on, were finalised. In the Chairman's record of this meeting, 'Points from Lunch with PM', it is interesting to note that under item 1(d) he states 'Trustees (of the Industrial Appeal Fund) have in a sense always made three conditions: (i) Hugh Tinker (to go); (ii) Race Today (to go); (iii) Control of funds'.

91. Attempts to enfranchise companies or industrial supporters started immediately after Lord Walston's defeat, but there appeared to be no urgency expressed on this matter until it was clear that the truce if it ever existed had failed.

92. Whilst Bonham-Carter's chief reservation concerned his public position as a chairman of a statutory body - he could not become directly involved, although he would help in any other way he could; Runciman's position was a little more complex. Firstly he was friendly with several members of staff, particularly Kirby; secondly, he disapproved generally of any encroachment on academic freedom; thirdly, he was not too sure that 'strong-arm tactics' would produce desirable results; and, perhaps, finally, unlike the industrial and professional race-agency Council members, he was often trapped between two conflicting identities - that of an academic social scientist of some repute and that of a businessman of almost equal repute.

93. I am suggesting here as I have hinted elsewhere that Rose's motivation for prompt action and perhaps even for the effective closing down of the Institute altogether always appeared to stem from what happened during the Jenkins affair.

94. Dipak Nandy's fears are openly expressed in his letter to Michael Caine dated 27th March, 1972, which incidentally, he wished to be removed from the files of the Council after the battle had been lost. The reason for this was quite clear in the language he employed to describe the black resisters who successfully took over CARD in 1967; they were working class 'ruffians' who did not understand 'Queensbury rules'.

95. Letter from Dipak Nandy to Michael Caine, 14th March, 1972.

96. Lord Seebohm, Interview, op cit.

97. Letter from Michael Caine to Hugh Tinker, 16th March, 1972.

98. See items, 'Race Today Face Closure', (p.3) and 'Money or Principles', (p.6) in West Indian World, No.41, 17th March, 1972.

99. A. Sivanandan, Interview, op cit.

100. A. Sivanandan, Race and Resistance: the IRR Story, Race Today Publications, London, 1974, p.23.

101. Minutes of the 68th Council Meeting, 20th March, 1972, IRR, London, Minute 425 (23).

102. Joe Rogaly, 'Keeping a Cool Head About Race', Financial Times, 21st March, 1972.

103. See A. Sivanandan, 1974, op cit. p.23. The second part of this quotation has been taken from interview material.

104. 'Press Statement by the Minority of the Council of the Institute of Race Relations', IRR, London, 21st March, 1972.

105. Ibid.

106. 'Press Statement from the Director and Staff of the Institute of Race Relations', IRR, London, 21st March, 1972.

107. A. Sivanandan, 1974, op.cit., p.23.

108. See John Kemp, 'Staff Back Race Institute Chief in Sacking Fight', Daily Telegraph, 23rd March, 1972; Martin Adeney, 'Race Institute Split Over a Symbol', The Guardian, 23rd March, 1972; Editorial, 'In-fighting Over Race', The Guardian, 29th March, 1972; Peter Evans, 'Race Body at the Crossroads', The Times, 23rd March, 1972; and Peter Wilby and Colin Legum, 'Relations are Near Breaking Point in Race Institute', The Observer, 26th March, 1972. Other favourable articles in terms of coverage included: Lin Edgson, 'Race Institute Director refuses to Quit', Daily Express, 22nd March, 1972, Tony Rocca, 'Internal War Over Policy Threatens Race Peace-makers', Daily Mail, 23rd March, 1972; Rosemary Collins, 'New Fears Follow Race Split', Sunday Telegraph, 26th March, 1972; and just possibly the Economist's article on 1st April, 1972 'Calling the Tune'.

109. See Note 98 above.

110. See 'Race Today Closure', West Indian World, 31st March, 1972.

111. Lionel Morrison, 'The Execution of Race Today', West Indian World, 14th April, 1972.

112. See 'The Race Indistry', Time Out, 14th-20th April, 1972; and Private Eye's, 'Heads I Win Tails You Lose Department', 14th April, 1972.

113. See Hilary Arnott, Heather Dayus, Alexander Kirby, 'Race Today - And Tomorrow?', Race Today, Vol.4, No.4, April, 1972, p.109.

114. See 'What the Debate is About', Race Today, Vol.4, No.4, April, 1972, p.110.

115. Hal Austin, 'Race Today : A Black View', Race Today, Vol.4, No.4, April, 1972, p.111. For an indication of the considerable amount of support amongst community workers and others for the magazine see Malcolm Cross's somewhat hastily conducted survey, 'Race Today: A Consumer View', Race Today, Vol.4, No.5, May, 1972, pp.171-2.

116. Hilary Arnott, et al, op cit.

117. Alexander Kirby, 1975, op cit, p.205.

118. Letter from Professor John Rex to Michael Caine, 24th March, 1972.

119. Letter from Professor John Rex to the Editor of The Times, 27th March, 1972.

120. Letter from now Professor Robert Moore to Michael Caine, 27th March, 1972. See also Moore's letter to The Guardian, 30th March, 1972, in which he argued that Race Today provided a unique bridge 'between academics in the field of race relations and the people they studied'.

121. Letter from Professor Wendell Bell, Yale University, to Michael Caine, 4th April, 1972.

122. Letter from Richard Blackett, Co-ordinator of the Caribbean Studies Program, University of Pittsburgh, to Michael Caine, 7th April, 1972.

123. Letter from Professor Tabb, Queens College, University of New York, to Michael Caine, 11th April, 1972.

124. Letter from Professor John Galbraith, University of California, to Professor (Sir) Roland Oliver, 7th April, 1972. Galbraith hoped that 'the vote would be overwhelmingly affirmative'.

125. Interview, Lord Walston, House of Lords, 27th October, 1976. Although said with tongue in cheek it did however, within the context of the whole interview, seem a significant statement.

126. See especially Christopher Bagley's letter dated 28th March, 1972 from Sussex University's Centre for Social Research, and Brian Johnson's from Sussex's Institute for the Study of International Organisation dated 13th April 1972; Charles Husband's letter from Leicester's Centre for Mass Communication Research, 30th March, 1972; Clarence Rollo Turner's letter from Black Lines, 13th April 1972; and the group letter from Bristol University published in The Times on 28th March, 1972.

127. Bristol University Group letter, op cit.

128. Letter from Tim Hetherington to The Times, 27th March, 1972.

129. Letter from the Association of Community Relations Officers to Michael Caine, 11th April, 1972.

130. Ibid.

131. Statement from the Black Unity and Freedom Party, undated, (April, 1972), IRR, London. This was circulated to IRR members attending the EGM and to other bodies and groups.

132. See joint letters from The London Organisation for Student Community Action to Michael Caine, 14th April, 1972; the Telegraph Neighbourhood Council (nine signatures), 14th April, 1972; Friends Community Relations Committee, 14th April, 1972; and the London Council of Social Service's Committee for Inter-Racial Co-operation, 6th April, 1972. Two other letters are worth consulting to reveal the depth of community feeling against the Council majority's decision: Letter from Dan Archer, Director of the Brixton Hostel Trust, 22nd March, 1972 and letter from Bridget Harris, Teachers Against Racism, 22nd March, 1972. As the majority of these letters received from apparently hitherto 'respectable groups' were also published in leading daily newspapers, they tended to have more effect than those only sent to the Chairman.

133. Letter from Rev. Robert W.H. Nind, St. Matthew's Vicarage, Brixton, to the Chairman, 14th April, 1972.

134. Letter from Robert Norris, Secretary, National Union of Journalists' Magazine and Book Branch, to the Chairman, 12th April, 1972. See also the letter from the Kings Cross Branch of the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs, to the Chairman, 14th April, 1972.

135. Hugh Tinker's decision to legally challenge the Council majority's 'accusations' was taken after Michael Caine had distributed his second letter, dated 10th April, 1972, to members of the Institute. (See Chapter 1 for an account of the timing of Caine's letter, and Appendix). In a letter dated 13th April, 1972 to the Chairman, Tinker's Solicitors, B.M. Birnberg and Co., demanded 'a retraction and apology on five counts, together with an indemnity for their client's costs. They wanted a retraction, firstly, of the accusation that the Director had 'deliberately flouted his responsibilities and had acted in a manner which had jeopardised its charitable status and damaged its appeals for finance'; secondly, that he had 'turned the organisation from a sober fact-finding body to a body which voiced protest in an ostentatious manner'; thirdly, that he had misused Institute funds; fourthly that he should not have taken the care he should have done in discharging his responsibilities; and, lastly, the accusation that the Director was, in part, responsible for alienating the staff from the Council. On behalf of the Chairman, Stephenson, Harwood and Tatham in a letter to Birnberg and Co., dated 14th April, 1972, refused to apologise and retract, pointing out that in their opinion even if the letters 'could be said to be defamatory, there was no doubt that they would be covered by the defence of qualified privilege'. After the 18th April, the EGM, the matter was dropped, but during the run up to the meeting it helped as indicated in the text to accentuate deep feelings of inter-group hostility.

136. H.V. Hodson, Interview, 14th July, 1976.

137. Michael Caine, Interview, op cit. This point of view was however, expressed by the majority of Council members interviewed.

138. Letter from H.V. Hodson to The Times, 28th March, 1972.

139. See Chapter 1. Interestingly, the founders were not only accused of a lack of objectivity, but the 'stuffy arch-Conservatives' (Mason's phrase) in Chatham House also accused them of being emotionally too committed. Mason's retort, as we have seen, was that what they did not understand was the importance of race relations in the world, how it was affecting peoples, and how the subject could not be treated solely from an academic, objective point of view!!

140. Letter from Philip Mason to all members of the Institute of Race Relations undated, April, 1972. For Mason's abbreviated thoughts on 'objectivity' and response to John Rex's letter in The Times, see his own to that paper dated 28th March, 1972.

141. The second letter from the Chairman was dated 10th April 1972. One such meeting held at the Booker Flat - Flat 1015 Kings House, St. James Hotel, Buckingham Gate, London, SW1 - was that called on Tuesday evening, 28th March in order 'to have the opportunity of discussing the best form of tactics in presenting our case'. The letter Michael Caine sent to only the Council majority members on 23rd March, 1972, went on:

> "It is clear that the press comment (now) is going to be active ... probably until the meeting to be held on the 18th April. As far as I am concerned, our main task is to secure a majority support from the Members at that meeting. I now attach a list of members which may help you to identify those whom you personally know. Philip Mason has written to those marked with an 'X'... At this meeting (at Booker's flat), I think we should discuss, in the light of press comment and the letters which the Director and staff and the minority members of the Council are sending out ... another letter to members".

The Chairman wished to redress the damage done by the utopians' press campaign as soon as possible as he planned to be out of the country from 29th March to 9th April.

142. Michael Caine, Interview, op cit. He himself, for instance, felt that he could only ask close friends rather than simply all those he knew as business associates or colleagues.

143. Letter from Sir Ronald Prain to Michael Caine, 24th April, 1972.

144. Letter from IRR Secretary, W.E.L. Fletcher, to the Chairman, 17th April, 1972.

145. This strategy was decided upon several days before the meeting, for when Professor John Rex arrived at the EGM, he 'found that Siva(nandan) had the organisation in hand'. He was sad that Sivanandan found no space within his scheme for Rex's resolution, but like most of the other staff supporters he acted in a way - moving a procedural motion - which helped Sivanandan's plans. (Communicated to the author in a letter dated 10th September, 1976, and during the course of an interview on 9th September, 1976).

146. Letter from Anthony Lester to Michael Caine, 19th April, 1972.

147. Both reasons and excuses given for proposed non-attendance included: 'flu from Joan Lester (letter dated 24th April, 1972;) important American meeting from Dipak Nandy (cable from Chicago), long standing prior engagement from Mark Bonham-Carter (letters 14th and 19th April, 1972); a trip to Israel from Jim Rose, (letter 6th April, 1972); and simply regrets from Lord Seebohm (letter 13th April, 1972).

148. Letter from Sir Robert Birley to Michael Caine, 21st April, 1972.

149. Letter from Philip Mason to Michael Caine, 20th April, 1972.

150. See Sir Robert Birley and Philip Mason's letters to the Chairman of the 21st and 20th April, 1972 respectively.

151. Lord Seebohm, Interview, 28th October, 1976.

152. See IRR's Annual Reports 1972/73 and 1973/74.

153. Michael Caine, Interview, op cit.

154. Lord Seebohm, Interview, op cit.

155. Communicated to the author in May, 1973 by A. Kirby during an early feasibility study for this project.

156. Whilst the 'field research' for this study was being conducted during 1976/77, T.R.J. was squatting in a Council owned property in Shakespeare Road, Brixton, London. And the Institute itself from a basement in Kings Cross was living out of packing cases. Although most of its library was shelved, this was under threat of effective closure, if not through lack of funds for updating and servicing, certainly through repeated attacks by local National Front groups and a landlord concerned about his tenants' ability to pay future rents.

157. From Programme and Policy '74, IRR, London, 1974, p.2.

CHAPTER NINE

EXPLAINING WHAT HAPPENED

In Chapter 2 we attempted to outline the two objectives of this study. They were, firstly, to explain what happened at the Institute, and secondly, to ascertain the implications our explanation might possess for a dialectical theory of resistance. As indicated by the discussion in Chapter 2 and in the way the other Chapters have been organised, it was essentially the latter concern that provided the chief focus of our study.

Although its relationship to our first objective remained constantly informed and shaped by the empirical material introduced and analysed, the material itself in many crucial areas was neither completely available nor detailed enough to sustain the kind of analytical probing required to expose the entire presuppositional base of a dialectical theory of resistance. This was due in part to the very nature of studying resistive struggle itself. For not only was it necessary for the resisting group, the utopians, to maintain a low political profile in especially the early stages of struggle but it was also vital at all times to maintain a high degree of confidentiality in matters concerning organisation, tactics, and even leadership. Unlike the ideologists who, as part of their professional and class culture, characteristically

documented their thinking, plans, and policies in memoranda, letters, reports and so on, the utopians tended to operate secretively on the level of informal meetings and 'tactical sessions'. In a political sense, which in turn appears to be an important characteristic of most resistance struggles, and one which Lenin organisationally incorporated in his notion of a 'profession of revolutionaries' the records of these meetings were firmly lodged in the experience of the moment to form part of each resister's framework for political action.[1]

Simply, as Lenin asserted:

> "The organisations of revolutionaries must consist first, foremost and mainly of people who make revolutionary activity their profession. (This is why he spoke of organisations of revolutionaries). In view of this common feature of the members of such an organisation, all distinctions as between workers and intellectuals, and certainly distinctions of trade and profession must be utterly obliterated. Such an organisation must of necessity be not too extensive and as secret as possible."[2]

Despite the very real limitation on data gathering that such a principle of resistive and revolutionary organisation imposes, the material we possessed did reveal a number of significant insights which helped to clarify the presuppositional base for a dialectical theory of resistance. If these insights at the moment lack a certain theoretical rigour and appear to lack full substantiation in our empirical Chapters, they must nevertheless be seen as a set of empirically derived post-hypothetical formulations

for the purposes of further research. Further, whilst we do not make for our findings any claims of universal validity, we do though defend the proposition that both our explanation(s) and (theoretical) conclusions possess a far more reaching significance than the study of a relatively esoteric and, for many outside the field of race relations, unknown Institute might suggest.

This is the case because our study has focussed more on the second than first objective stated above in the belief that the study of resistance is meaningless without a theory of resistance; that explanation as Weber correctly pointed out often harbours sociological theories or 'plausible hypotheses' and is always dependent upon them for meaning and sense;[3] and that, as Marx's work confirmed, theory <u>is</u> explanation.[4] In our attempt to bring together the two methodological traditions in contemporary sociology, the Weberian and Marxian, and in our concentration on two of the oldest of all sociological problems concerned with 'order' and 'change', we would suggest that this study, if not always successfully, has nevertheless attempted to transcend the often prosaic empiricism, and atheoretical and ahistorical trends of much subsumed under the heading of sociological research in race relations. By any other name, our search for an empirically grounded theory of (black) resistance has become then in essence a theory of social change or, more precisely, a political part of a more general theory of social change.

Finally, if this study has contributed modestly to our present stock of sociological knowledge on resistance at the Institute and elsewhere, and towards a resistance-based theory of social change, then it should also be stated here that we believe it has something interesting to say about race relations policy, race research policy, and the political organisation of bodies engaged in race relations work and research. Although we shall return briefly to some of these issues at the end of our final Chapter, the main purpose of these two concluding Chapters is to summarise and discuss our two interdependent sets of findings; in this Chapter to explain what happened with the help of earlier theoretical exercises, and in the next to extricate from our explanation the presuppositional basis for a reformulated theory of resistance.

Race, Ideology and Control

Against and located within the framework of our model of resistance discussed in Chapter 2, which of course will be substantially revised in the pages that follow, we can set out the skeletal structure of our overall explanation as follows:

1. The governing body of the Institute of Race Relations, seen here as 'ideologists' in the Mannheimian sense of the term, consciously attempted to protect certain interests, values, and beliefs. Irrespective of the wider changes that were taking place during the late 1960s in the field of race research, policy, and practice, and the organisational and political changes that were occurring within the Institute itself, the ideologists steadfastly maintained a conception of the Institute, its political role and work, that consistently reflected these interests, values and beliefs.

2. Their total insistence on this, which incorporated a specific conception of social reality, gave rise to a sense amongst certain sections of the staff, of controlled domination and oppression.

3. Once identified and experienced as oppression and once sufficient social space had been created and the process of social refraction entered into for the full development of consciousness, the conditions became present for the emergence of utopian thinking and for the emergence of the 'utopians'.

4. As an alternative and diametrically opposed group with a qualitatively different approach to the study and practice of race relations which in turn subsumed a radically different and alternative conception of social reality, the utopians insisted not only on the acceptance of their version of social reality as being somehow more 'real', but they campaigned for their approach to race research, work, and policy to be adopted by the Institute. Their approach,as well as guaranteeing survival in the long term for a body that in 1969 had appeared to have outlived its usefulness,would also assure a high degree of 'relevance' for the Institute.

5. When this approach was rigorously suppressed by the ideologists and further when the utopians saw in these suppressive actions and all subsequent actions of the ideologists a real threat to their whole existence and identify as meaningful and relevant workers,they consciously and collectively organised resistance.

6. As a result of effective resistive organisation and leadership they were able to construct enough instrument power to help legitimate their claims, beliefs and approach, to establish a temporary truce, and convert a specific kind of conflict situation into one in which conflicts and differences appeared to be accommodated through negotiation.

7. When this arrangement collapsed as a result of each group's attempt to alter the balance of power in the truce situation or to gain more property power through organising further resistance and counter-resistance, the battle for control of the Institute commenced in earnest.

8. The utopians succeeded because their resistance was better organised than the ideologists' counter-resistance, and because the ideologists in the Institute could no longer secure legitimation for their actions. The legitimation crisis that confronted international capitalism in the late 1960s, early 1970s convinced the majority of the ideologists at the Institute that the most senior body in the field had indeed outlived its usefulness; that there were other and better ways of protecting interests and 'improving' race relations.

Clearly this set of explanatory statements is quite inadequate as it stands. Not only do they need expanding and clarifying, but they need to be unpacked to expose the hidden assumptions, pieces of theory, and problems for theory they contain before it is possible to tackle the second task we have set ourselves in our final Chapter.

In the first place, whilst it was clear, as shown in Chapters 1, 3 and 4, that the ideologists were motivated to improve race relations in order to protect certain social, political and economic interests, values and beliefs, their actual conception of reality still needs to be clarified. Here, in order to ascertain its ideological nature, we need to be a little more precise concerning the various beliefs that made up the ideologists' conception of reality; and particularly how they were legitimated and provided the ideologists with an almost imperative right to act for and on behalf of others.

To employ Myrdal's definition of beliefs, the actual ideas the ideologists firmly held 'about how reality actually is' included, first and foremost, an absolute belief, almost a faith, in the social virtues of a reformed capitalism as the most satisfactory and culturally amenable mode of economic production and social organisation.[5] Secondly, they believed that capitalist societies, including Britain, consisted on the one hand of hierarchically organised and overlapping status and class groups. But, on the other, they were 'open' in the Popperian sense of the concept, allowing considerable social and labour mobility, freedom of expression and action.[6] Dismissing any idea of a pluralist, or, to use Galbraith's term, counter-vailing conception of power, they believed that all effective power was centralised at the 'top'.[7] Whilst the kind of symbolic power alluded to by Parkin was held by groups located at the bottom of the social order, real power was in the main deployed by 'top people' and distributed amongst specific and specialist elite or broker groups such as the Institute who, in the case of race relations, acted as the proxy custodians and interpreters of the interests of national and international capitalism.[8] Fourthly, they also believed in what amounted to a Parsonian exposition and analysis of the social system: that it was an integrated system of functional parts or institutions based upon a unitary value system.[9]

They further believed that the groups making up such an integrated system acted rationally. According to the ideologists' viewpoint, individual and group actions were not only conceived within a dominant economic and political framework of interests, but they were tempered and informed by a sense of justice and fairness. This made it possible for groups and societies that formed the Western, capitalist order to change in the direction of more justice and fairness; to be open to rational and informed argument, and to change the nature of their actions so as to close the morally offensive gap that sometimes appeared between values and beliefs held and actual reality. Their awareness of what Myrdal termed a 'Dilemma' as a disturbing feature of their interpretation of social reality provided the condition for the final major element (to be mentioned here) in their overall presentation of reality.[10] This simply included the belief that in the last analysis race as a determining feature of social behaviour and position was irrelevant. Once the gap between values and beliefs held and the effect of actions performed had been corrected, all groups, irrespective of their racial, ethnic or religious origin, would become an integrated part of capitalist society. They would become an integral part of the reformed Western Order; the ideologists' conception of reality would become theirs in a complete sense: their former exclusion from or subordination in the social system would be resolved and made binding by closing the gulf between what should be and what is, between social valuations and beliefs.

The accommodation if not conscious acceptance of racist beliefs in the ideologists' conception of reality was to be found in their power definition of the social order. As they held to a positional or heirarchic view of themselves in relation to other less powerful, more subordinate groups in the social order, they existed in structural terms as the superior of those they sought to help or control. Whether or not this manifested itself in beliefs, values and attitudes held by individuals becomes irrelevant, for,historically, those white groups in the institutional order the ideologists represented on the Institute's Council had always considered themselves to be superior to black groups in (neo)colonial and metropolitan society. In the context of international relations and indeed the 'Aid and Development' research and work conducted by the Institute in the mid-1960s, this superiority, as Tinker asserts, resulted from the fact that:

> "During the first three decades of the twentieth century there was still a concentration of political power and economic wealth and ideological initiative in Western Europe and North America. Because these three forms of dominance were fused together within the white - predominantly Anglo - segment of the World, it was this segment which demanded the world's response. It remained natural for a neo-Darwinian belief in a hierarchy of peoples to persist, with white ascendency as an accepted feature of the international scene."[12]

In terms of collective as opposed to individual responses, white ascendency and superiority manifested itself in the ideologists very conception of the 'race problem'. For not only

did they consider that the 'race problem' was in part attributable to the disposition of blacks to make trouble, 'to disturb the processes of good government and the social order ordained by the whites', but they also insisted that blacks were trying to invade their domain.[13]

Thus:

> "The relative status of white, brown and black was defined exclusively by the dominant group, in terms of their natural right to this dominance. The subservience of the rest was rationalised in terms of their unfitness, their backwardness, their lack of moral fibre... The 'race problem' then was the problem of the non-white who would not accept the leadership of the white."[14]

Given this the ideologists at the Institute fervently believed that they and they alone were the best equipped to advise decision and policy-makers on how possibly to solve the 'race problem'. As ex-colonists, international businessmen engaged in the Third World and employing black labour, they knew all about the 'problems'. Further, they possessed the right or superior definition of the world; they were the right or superior people who possessed the means to act effectively; and, to re-emphasise the point, as whites their experience and relative affluence and power put them in a superior position to any other group which lacked one or more of these four attributes. The value connotations and imposition attached to being white and thus 'right' cannot be overstressed,

for the ideologists not only needed as a precondition for their conception of reality to believe in white superiority over black inferiority in order to justify their concern but, we would suggest, they also needed to assume this in order to maintain and justify to others their position as the Institute's controllers and legitimate managers.

In other words what we are suggesting here is that legitimation for the ideologists' conception of reality and thus authority to act and power to enact was not merely derived from the dominant institutional order but in fact was derived from the dominant racist institutional order as described by Hall et al, Rex, and others.[15] This of course makes the additional point which is not made at all clearly, if at all, by Parkin in his discussion of the first of his three 'meaning-systems' that the process of legitimation can be viewed as a two way process.[16] In the context of our discussion the ideologists collectively formed part of this social order and as individuals they were 'top' or high ranking representatives of the institutions which composed this order. In their capacity as a group that formed part of the order they were subjected to the core values, beliefs and endorsements that emanated from other groups in the order. To maintain their place in the order and the respect and endorsement of other groups, they needed to show that the core beliefs and values they held corresponded quite closely to those held by others; and that in their thinking and

actions they in fact provided a mirror image of the prevailing normative order. In other words the assumed racist dimension of their conception of reality was supported and endorsed by that which featured as an ideological and functional part of the capitalist institutional order. But as 'top' or high ranking representatives of other groups in the institutional order, they occupied, as we saw in earlier Chapters, positions of power and privilege, and this in itself tended to mean that they possessed greater access to the means of legitimation. Or, as Parkin puts it, 'that is to say, the social and political definitions of those in dominant positions tend to become objectified and enshrined in the major institutional orders, so providing the moral framework of the entire social system'.[17]

Such a reciprocal process of legitimation from and to the institutional order and the kind of legitimation relationships we outlined in Chapter 2 and fleshed out in our empirical Chapters, ensured not only immediate and legitimate authority for the Institute but just as importantly, it guaranteed the immediate acquisition of instrument power. Manifested in the form of regular contributions from corporate supporters, the largest amounts coming from multi-national companies to cover administrative and operational costs; hitherto unprecedented and in the context of the value of money in the 1960s enormous, research grants from internationally renowned foundations; and the active support of

establishment and what Keller has termed 'strategic' elites in the racial power structure, this instrument power enabled the ideologists to do two things: firstly, to construct even more property power than the early institute possessed by virtue of the way it was organised; and, secondly, to insist to the stage of domination that its view of race relations research, work, and practice was the only legitimate and thus realistically conceivable approach.[18]

But before we turn to the question raised in our explanation of how domination was achieved, sanctioned and, up until 1969, accepted as normal by the staff, we need to say something about the relationship between the conception of reality legitimated in and from the institutional order and dominant ideology. For it would appear that the nature and intensity of the ideologists' insistence was to a large extent dependent upon the fusion of beliefs about reality and of beliefs about interests. That is to say that their beliefs about interests were, as we saw in Chapter Three, inseparable from those about values, and hence their depiction of reality.

Why this was so was not readily clear. For whilst Marx's well worn thesis concerning the relationship between dominant ideology and the ruling class might seem appropriate in this context, it does not as it stands say very much that is convincing

about how ruling class ideas and beliefs are in fact equated or are one and the same thing as ruling or dominant ideology. Although Lukacs's work for many of the reasons outlined by McDonough does not take us far along this torturous path, it does at least make three points which are highly relevant here.[20] Firstly, because Lukacs sees ideology as a manifestation of the 'reification of commodities' especially in capitalist societies, he not only enables us to see more clearly the material basis of Marx's conception of ideology, but, secondly, to appreciate why the dominant belief or meaning system is wholly determined in a reflectionist or, more accurately, refractive way by the economy that prevails in any given society.[21] Simply, this is the case because economic interests per se and their protection require that they be elevated and transformed into practical ideals, such as the maximisation of profit in capitalist society, and philosophical modes of conception that idealise, rationalise, and enable these ideals to be approached. Whilst an entrepreneurial form of philosophical individualism underpins the production of economic capital, its social counterpart with its emphasis on class stratification, social mobility, tends to underpin the production of social capital: the possession and distribution of essentially economic rewards in the social system that is differentiated on the basis of an individual or group's relationship to economic production. Because of this interrelationship

between interests, practical ideals, philosophical conceptions, and the social order, and because the class that controls the means of production of economic and social capital in society tends to be the most powerful, the ideas that emanate from the interests that such a class attempts at all costs to protect, thirdly, permeate and saturate the social system in its entirety.

Although there might be present in Lukacs' formulation of ideology, as McDonough points out, a confusion of ideology with power, far more important for our purposes here is the limit which his formulation imposes on the actual socio-cultural rather than economic derivation of ideology.[22] Both his notion of the manifestation of the 'reification of commodities' and 'saturation' need to be taken a little further, as Poulantzas appears to do, when he anchors both characteristics in what he terms 'lived experiences'.[23] Poulantzas's definition of ideology is broader and also more specific because of this; he not only recognises that it consists of a 'relatively coherent ensemble of representations, values and beliefs, but also that it exists as a specific objective level in the social order.[24] As a relatively coherent system of ideas and beliefs based upon an equally coherent set of interests it is concerned with the <u>whole</u> of the world in which men live, their relations to nature, society, other men, and to their own political and economic activity: it reflects the way in which dominant groups in the social order live their conditions of existence. Or to put this summary into Poulantzas's own words:

> "The status of the ideological derives from the fact that it reflects the manner in which the agents of a formation, the bearers of its structures, live their conditions of existence; i.e. it reflects their relation to these conditions as it is lived by them. Ideology is present to such an extent in all agents' activities that it becomes indistinguishable from their lived experience."[25]

In spite of much theoretical tooth-picking some recent critics have engaged in over the concept of 'lived experience',[26] it seems to us that this notion when taken together with the subject and individual features inherent in Althusser's theory of ideology - that individuals come to recognise themselves as subject by the functioning of ideology in the material apparatuses, practices, and rituals of everyday life - goes a long way towards demonstrating for us just how their conception of reality formed an integral part of dominant ideology and why this could not be but insisted on.[27]

Simply, like the utopians were to do later, the ideologists defined their 'existence' in terms of the way they lived and experienced it. In other words the lifestyles of the ideologists described in this study, the values and beliefs they held, the stated and assumed interests they desired to protect, all appeared to reflect the conditions of their existence and in their living or social being, as epitomised in the way they perceived and organised the Institute, they reflected their relation to these conditions. They were not only 'top people' representing dominant

and powerful groups in the institutional order but steeped in the values and beliefs existent in this order, which in turn permeated the whole social system, they perceived that the real interests of those they represented were their interests; that the dominant conception of reality reflected their own. The only step that they could not take but which we are taking is to understand that all this formed their ideology.

This discussion has helped us to achieve two objects. Firstly, as intended, it has helped us decisively if not wholly to explain the relationship between the ideologists' conception of reality and dominant ideology; and, secondly, it has provided some of the theoretical groundwork we need to expose in order to explain the relationship between this and domination.

In the case of this latter relationship we have already seen that the ideologists' need to insist on their definition of reality was inextricably tied up with self-valuations about their own existence as 'top people' possessing the only realistic, acceptable and legitimate version of reality, and thus the only realistic and acceptable approach to race relations research and policy. Not to have insisted would have devalued their version of reality, and in practical terms their authority or 'right' to act in a way that was consistent with their beliefs.

The question, however, of their domination and indeed oppression of groups, symbolically represented by the staff, was up until 1969 a theoretical one. That is to say whilst they possessed the means of domination in as much that they possessed a monopoly in owning and providing Institute facilities, recourse to constraints that ensured the compliance of would-be dissenters, and, as we have just seen in part an ideology that justified their monopoly and constraints so as to gain willing as opposed to forced compliance, they did not need in any real way to exercise overt domination. Not only were the latent forms of domination sufficient to suggest that they could exist in an overt sense and thus evoke deference, respect, and compliance, but also, as we saw in Chapter Five, the relationship between the (old) staff and the ideologists, between staff beliefs and dominant ideology, contained a paternalist feature that, in essence, defined both the nature of internal control and, it could be said, the unconscious structure of domination.

In the case of the nature of control that existed, McKenzie and Silver's, discussion of working class Conservatives is extremely apt in this context.[28] For they showed just how people who occupy subordinate class positions in relation to the ruling class or elite actually contrive to redefine their subordination. Using the term 'deferentials' to describe such people, they suggest that:

> "...deferentials, although seeing themselves as subordinate, do not feel themselves inferior. English deferentials feel themselves the moral if not the social, equals of the elite because they appear to accept the classic doctrine that all who properly fulfil their stations in life contribute worthily to the common good... English working class deferentials are provided with a sense of esteem by the very ideas which justify and explain their social and political subordination."[29]

Clearly from the statements of staff recorded in Chapter Five something very much like this was occurring at the Institute between 1952 and 1969. Similarly from these same statements and in connection with the structure of domination it is possible to agree in full with Lockwood when he suggests that:[30]

> "Local status systems...operate to give the individual a very definite sense of position in a hierarchy of prestige, in which each 'knows his place' and recognises the status prerogatives of those above and below him. For the deferential traditionalist, such a system of status, had the function of placing his work orientations in a wider social context. The persons who exercise authority over him at his place of work may not be the same persons who stand at the apex of the local status system, but the structural principles of the two social orders are homological; and from neither set of relationships does he learn to question the appropriateness of his exchange of deference for paternalism."[31]

What, initially, might appear to be a problem of the application of these findings to the pre-1969 staff at the Institute, who most certainly were not working class, becomes less of a problem when it is understood that the (lower) middle class from which most of the staff came is not homogeneous in the sense that all groups within

it share identical relations with the means of production. Neither can we assume here that all groups within the so-called middle class share the same amounts of power: there are clearly groups in the upper echelons of the middle class which both possess more power because of their relatively high status and structural position, and thus they appear to identify more closely with the new and old aristocracy's beliefs and values.[32] That this is probably the case and that this study has shown how specific upper middle class groups together with representatives from the old and new aristocracy came together on the Institute's Council would also suggest that Council and staff members were as different culturally as they were structurally.

The staff's acceptance of and belief in the ideologists' conception of reality and matters to do with race relations however did not entail a sense of self-abnegation, for they believed they were part of the 'middle class', albeit a part with relatively low status. Rather the deference and respect they exhibited tended, to adopt terminology developed by Parkin in a slightly different context, 'to be bound up with a view of the social order as an organic entity in which each individual has a proper part to play, however humble.'[33]

> "Inequality is seen as inevitable as well as just, some men being inherently fitted for positions of power and privilege. To acknowledge the superiority of such people is not to demean or belittle oneself, since all must benefit from their stewardship of society."[34]

Space, Social Refraction, and Consciousness

Given all this, just how did a utopian group with a utopian consciousness and definition of reality emerge at the Institute? Or to put this question another way and to divide it into two interdependent parts: under what conditions did the latent forms of domination and oppression become manifest, and, perhaps, more importantly, just how did individual and collective consciousness evolve? These two interrelated issues, of course, lie at the centre of our explanation of the development of resistance at the Institute.

In order to address the first, we need to draw together what our research uncovered about our key concept of 'social space' developed in Chapter Five. Here it will be remembered that we argued that the creation of social space was, firstly, a necessary precondition for the development and practice of consciousness; secondly, that without its existence, resistance itself would not have occurred; thirdly, that it resulted from a number of developments including, not least, a change in the Institute's directorship and subsequent direction in 1969; and, finally, that it had to be constructed if it did not already exist as a product of the new direction in the main spheres of Institute life and activity. As the theoretical question of its preconditional status will be taken up in the next Chapter, for the moment it is the last of the four points we need to discuss; namely the three kinds of space - organisational, intellectual and emotional - or social room developed.

The first kind of space, as we have seen, was created largely through the democratisation and processes of staff participation implemented by the new director. The second was created in part by and with the influx of critical-thinking scholars, mainly sociologists, from university settings. And the third, emotional space, came about as a result of a qualitatively different attitude held by the new director to academic relations and the pursuit of 'scholarship'.

Such 'space' not only provided room for individuals to begin to think openly about questions and issues which for two decades had remained the sole preserve of the director and Council Members but in its development it tended to objectivise experiences and conditions. By this we mean it afforded staff the opportunity, hitherto denied to them without their being consciously aware of it, to see the actual conditions and relations that had made up their experience as Institute employees. It made it possible for the staff to stand back from the situation in which they had formerly worked, the conditions which they had unconsciously accepted, and begin to see the possibility of new situations and conditions arising. In other words, it provided the environment to give back to some and generate in others a notion of political self and awareness.

Each of the three kinds of space allowed for the development of a specific component in overall consciousness. The first or what might be referred to as the structural component which was prefigured in the creation of organisational space arose out of a process which revealed to staff the structural basis and manifestation of interpretations given in relation to their social position in the Institute and the wider society as a whole. The second or objective component prefigured in the creation of intellectual space arose from a similar process which revealed to staff not only just how they and those they related to were dominated and oppressed by the ideologists but also how domination and oppression had been in part legitimated by their own compliance and acceptance of the ideologists' authority. And the third or subjective component in consciousness prefigured in the creation of emotional space arose, like the other two, out of a process of social refraction which enabled individual actors to equate and reconcile their own subjective positions, thoughts, and feelings with the external objective and structural realities already exposed.

Although we shall return in our final Chapter to a more detailed description of the process of social refraction and its four interlinked sub processes - orientation, identification, relation and rejection - we need here for the purposes of our explanation to define it briefly. By social refraction we mean a process which enables individuals or groups to develop consciousness; a process in which they identify social objects and conditions

including their own position(s) in the dominant social structure and institutional order through tracing observable social situations to the material and cultural bases from which these situations evolve. This definition assumes at least two fundamental premises about the nature of the social world as it is perceived, experienced, and built up by actors - premises, which we shall also return to later. It does, however, enable us to address now the two parts of the question we posed a moment ago as one.[35]

In respect to the structural component of consciousness which arose out of the organisational space created after 1969, the organisational initiatives implemented reflected and juxtaposed in essence alternative forms of organisation, administration, and involvement in nearly all Institute matters. They demonstrated just how inappropriate previous forms of organisation had been in an Institute explicitly concerned in its 'stated' objectives with the promotion of racial justice and equality. Symbolically, they implied that all previous forms had represented not only a view of the place and position of all staff in the Institute but also their place or position in society. The realisation of this came through the staff's own re-orientation to the new organisational and democratic forms. Their mere presence against a background of critical discussion and intellectual space this helped to provide forced them to view what had existed, the social situations of which they had been a part, as being refractive

images of sub-structural reality. Once they were encouraged within the new forms and as part of the opening up and democratisation processes to relate these processes and forms refractively to their own experience and conception of self they started to realise that a kind of racial class structure had prevailed within the Institute; that places or positions within this class structure had been maintained and regulated by administrative rules and procedures determined by the former Director and Council; that those at the bottom of this racial class structure, the youngest and mostly black Members of staff, had been the least significant in terms of either their ability to influence or even recommend ideas; and that the social structural dimensions of the ideologists' conception of reality had actually existed as an internal condition at the Institute. Finally, once they began to compare their perceptions and experiences with others outside the Institute and especially those they felt they should represent or work for, they gradually came to realise that the social composition of the Council indicated that the Institute's orientation to social reform and race relations had been, and still was, conditioned by the views of those it traditionally represented; that it had been patently an elite body serving a clientele that might have been appropriate in the 1950s but not in the late 1960s, early 1970s; that the forms of organisation had not only deliberately secured staff

powerlessness and institutionalised staff alienation as being normal but had internally reflected how subordinate racial class groups in society were controlled; and, finally, they came to understand in part how the ideologists had maintained an internal system of domination through the development and implementation of organisational and administrative forms that had been essentially exploitative and oppressive. At this stage in the development of consciousness and in the process of reorientation to the new organisational forms which in turn had made it possible for the refractive (sub)process to occur, they now knew that they had been exploited and oppressed in as much as they had been expected to do much of the manual-knowledge work, the collecting and collating of material, and much of the work to do with keeping the Institute in being without a voice in its running. Unconsciously, if not willingly, they had played a central role in their own exploitation and inferentially in the exploitation of those they championed.

Interrelated and interdependent - and this needs to be emphasised strongly as consciousness did not evolve in discreet stages - the objective component of consciousness appeared to arise out of the refractive (sub)process of identification which in turn was enabled to develop by the intellectual space created at the Institute. Developed largely outside the Institute by those sociologists recruited in late 1969, the different conceptions of doing research and the radically different theoretical perspectives

they employed helped, like the organisational forms, to juxtapose starkly two alternative ways of thinking about, researching, and looking at the world. Given that the staff had already started to understand their real positions inside and outside the Institute, that they had started in part to understand how they were dominated and oppressed, and given that they favoured a democratic as opposed to authoritarian organisational and administrative order, they were already favourably predisposed to questioning in meetings, discussion groups, seminars, and so on the authority of those who dominated. In other words, they were favourably predisposed towards extending their knowledge of their own oppression, resolving the contradictions vis a vis their positions that partial consciousness had thrown up, and therefore to producing further knowledge on how they inside the Institute and subordinate groups outside had been and were still being dominated and oppressed; or maintained in their subordination.

This not only called for the reapplication of the general process of refraction but it demanded that they should engage in the sub-process of identification. They needed to identify the phenomena which produced distortions between what existed and appeared to exist; to identify the mechanisms which maintained these distortions; and identify the broker agents which in a

sense traded in them.

In political and intellectual practice the first task entailed the piecing together of the ideologists' conception of reality or ideology which was achieved after endless hours of often heated debate. The second, also achieved in critical debate, involved a more general political and sociological discussion which attempted to isolate the institutional mechanisms and the institutions themselves which not only maintained these distortions but which either existed in or were represented on the Institute's Council. And the third task achieved in the same way focussed attention on the Institute itself: in its completion it revealed that the body the staff worked for was in fact a broker agency. Its stock in trade consisted of social palliatives (reform policies), hallucinary drugs or deceptions (interest-bounded goals), and 'proofs' (IRR research) and its business was to redefine the socially unacceptable as the socially acceptable without changing anything very much.

Additionally, and in many ways more importantly, the process as a whole revealed to the now emerging utopians that the ideologist's account of the social world, their conception of reality, precluded any notion of mass participation in bringing about change. It tended to reserve the role of change, or, more accurately, reform, for themselves. Black groups became almost

defined out of existence. Paradoxically, they became relegated into positions of permanent inferiority, integrated into the class system but performing roles in and being defined in terms of 'our civilisation', the continuation of the white international Western Order. Not only would they be denied the right to exist as historically and culturally distinct groups but all, including Third World and colonial 'underclass' or 'sub-proletariat' groups in Britain, would be denied the right to negotiate on their terms the positions and roles they should occupy in the domestic or international Western Order.[36] For the utopians, such a conception appeared to redefine the role of racism in terms of social and political as opposed to merely economic objectives.

In terms of the Institute's political role and research this had meant on the domestic front the advocating of quick integration of 'immigrants' into the dominant belief and value system and into society as a whole so that domestic capitalism and 'the society we know and cherish' could be protected and further stabilised. Any black underclass that might have existed needed to be socially and politically lifted and broken up so as to affect the absorption of underclass (Black West Indians) or caste-like (Black Asians) groups into appropriate positions in the white class structure. Order and stability and all that they implied could only be achieved by integrating socially unwanted 'coloured immigrants' but economically useful 'coloured workers' into the class structure.[37]

On the international front it had meant the annexing of so-called 'emerging nations' or Third World societies to the 'emerged' or First World societies. By the very process of annexation itself conceived by the dominant they would become unequal and thus relatively powerless partners in the maintenance of international capitalism and the Western order. They, as Tinker has more recently put it, would become not only 'free' partners in the development of their underdevelopment but they would become and remain subservient client groups.[38]

Whilst these and other realisations emerged as 'objective' states and conditions, things that could be observed and verified, the development of consciousness could not become complete until individuals and the staff as a whole <u>related</u> and reconciled what they now knew to their own subjective condition and experience. In other words the subjective component in consciousness could not develop out of the emotional space created until the refractive sub-process of relating had been completed. Of course this process was carried on alongside the other two: it was the most important of all. For, we would suggest, it was largely at the subjective level in thought and action or on the level at which actors related themselves to prevailing conditions and, conversely, prevailing conditions to themselves, that the political self emerged as a form of self-conscious reality. What the creation

of emotional or personal space achieved then was the provision of sufficient room for staff to do precisely this: to embark upon the task of personal revaluation and to relate refractively the knowledge gained to 'personal' or subjective conceptions of position, experience, and notion of 'self'.

As we saw in Chapters Five and Six this entailed a return to America for Mast, a shedding of the 'bourgeois sociology' in which he had been schooled and, amongst other things, the deprofessionalising of himself and the rejecting of a middle class biography or personal history in order to begin to relate to blacks, to become 'relevant', and to reconcile a former self with a new experience and awareness. The contradictions that had been exposed in terms of his position and role in a body he saw as being reactionary, oppressive, white elitist, and working against the interests of blacks were made that more pronounced once he started to relate and attempt to reconcile his own subjective experience with the new structural positions and objective conditions or states he now perceived, and understood to exist as 'reality'. In the case of Jenkins, as we have seen, it meant 'going back to work', and for Sivanandan the search for self and its reconciliation with structural and objective appreciations of reality necessitated the (re)believing in his blackness as the indisputable symbol of his and his people's oppression. And in the case of the majority of staff, black and white, it meant an often prolonged period of

agonising, sometimes desperate effort, to find within past experience, past self, the bases for a political reconstruction of self, an inner vision and strength that would enable the new politically conscious and self-conscious self to emerge socially as a radical and utopian identity.

But the contradictions exposed by the refraction process were too large to be reconciled without engaging in a process of rejection. The only way the staff could exist was to exist as utopians. In order clearly to disassociate themselves from a racist, elitist, dominant white conception of reality they had to reject it and replace it with an alternative view of the world based upon alternative or utopian social principles and aims. In order to resolve the structural contradiction of their position in and outside the Institute they had, in Lenin's words, to abolish 'all distinctions as between workers (black junior staff at the Institute) and intellectuals (white senior academic and administrative staff at the Institute)';[39] they had to see themselves as belonging to one group, a united group of staff-workers bound together by common experiences at the Institute, objectives, and definitions of reality in terms of their new clientele's positions and experience in the domestic and international capitalist order. They had to reject the forms of differentiation implicit in the ideologists' conception of reality, the forms that had existed inside and still existed outside the Institute. In order to reconcile their newly perceived and actual positions in the

Institute with the kind of research and work for which the Institute had built up an international reputation, they possessed no choice but to reject the social, political, and so-called 'academic' or 'objective' basis on which this work had been conceived. This in short meant that they had to reject the authority of the ideologists who had hitherto largely determined the areas and kinds of research and work the Institute promoted. As the 'professionals', the full-time workers identifying with the aspirations of the racially exploited and oppressed, they now, or so they thought, possessed the right if not yet the actual authority to resist encroachments on their research or work domain. Whilst ultimately this meant the resisting of the ideologists' authority to control and manage <u>all</u> Institute affairs, in the short term it meant the advocating, incorporating and eventual institutionalising of a notion of 'relevance' in Institute research and work.

Relevance, Resistance, and Legitimation

The importance of 'relevance' for the utopians' should not be underemphasised. It helped to identify the new clientele sought; to bridge the barrier, even credibility gap, between the staff and the various black groups they courted outside the Institute. It helped to gain physical support for the approaches to research and work they were developing; it helped to legitimate their position; and it helped in the building of political pressure to influence the ideologists to adapt to the new situation. Not least of all, it helped the utopians to justify their presence within the Institute. As a catchall concept, as a central part of the utopians' ideological apparatus it served not only these functions but possibly more crucially it also helped to determine the kind of research projects that should be sponsored and their political and theoretical orientation. It obviated the necessity to be politically neutral or in the ideologists' language, 'impartial': it sidestepped any real discussion of the issues entailed in the notion of 'scientific objectivity'; it justified the radicalisation of Institute organisational and administrative practices; and, as we saw in Chapter Six, it justified the radicalisation of Institute resources and services such as its monthly magazine, Race Today. In short relevance served as a social, political, and research expression of the utopians' identification with the Institute's new black clientele. On one level it became their raison d'etre at the

Institute, on another it made and impregnated all their subsequent actions with meaningfulness, and on yet another it formed a policy expression of the staff as utopian actors: it conveyed their conscious intention to resist.

As we noted in Chapters Six and Seven the emergence of collective resistance came not so much with what we termed the social projection of relevance and the utopian approach to research and political race relations work it entailed. It came <u>after</u> the utopian approach had been partially suppressed, after the ideologists had decided to prevent Robin Jenkins and thus other members of staff pursuing the development of social and political relevance which had initially involved a critical re-evaluation of the Institute, its prestigious research projects, organisation, and role. It came at a point when the ideologists' reaction to the new utopian approach threatened to squash the utopians' existence and new identity as meaningful and relevant political workers. It marked the point when a general conflict situation became a specific resistance situation. In other words whilst resistance as a conscious form of political action appeared to arise as the only consistent (or reconcilable) form of action from the process already described, its actual performance appeared to depend upon the presence of actions which contained significant threat-potential. Or to put this another way when the latent forms of oppression and domination became manifest and immediately

recognisable as such by the utopians in what could be termed 'refractive symbols and issues such as 'The Jenkins Affair', the '<u>Race Today</u> Closure Issue' and the 'Tinker Affair', organised resistance either resulted, or became intensified.[40]

The significance of these symbols and issues as social dramas in which the bases, foci, and positions in resistive struggle are acted out and projected is fundamental to the theory of resistance we shall discuss in a moment.

But before we turn to such a discussion there are two more points arising from our explanation which we need to say something about. From different instances they both concern and take us back to the question and problem of legitimation. Whilst the second relates to the loss of legitimation for the ideologists' actions, position in the Institute, the first relates to the acquisition of legitimation for the utopians' conception of reality, their definition of events that took place at the Institute, and their approach to the future organisation, work, and role of the Institute: for their resistance. Here, as shown in Chapters Seven and Eight, it not only entailed their forging of specific legitimation relationships with external groups which in turn formed part of an alternative institutional order but it required that firstly representatives of these groups should be voted onto the Institute's governing body, and, secondly, that

others should be persuaded to join the Institute's ordinary membership. Thus legitimation and hence the authority of the utopians was sought and received from new black clientele groups, radical white politically conscious groups, radical social science groups, and racially and/or class based revolutionary movements in metropolitan, Third World, and European societies whose thinking and political actions either symbolised or had actually brought about an alternative, utopian social order. The instrument power that this provided helped legitimate their approach, claims, and resistance: it enabled the utopians to expose the most prevailing irony, paradox, and contradiction of all at the Institute: that it was a body of distinguished white gentlemen working for the improvement of race relations without the support and against the interests of blacks.

While it had indeed been possible to maintain this irony before 1969, before the organised development of consciousness inside and outside the Institute, it was no longer so after that date. The French Revolution as Posner terms the events that occurred in Paris in 1968 had happened;[41] the internationalisation and trafficking of the black experience had taken place; and international white authority, power, and its economic formation - capitalism - had been threatened and challenged to a point where the Western World - including Japan - is still witnessing an organised counter-attack on behalf of capital.

Thus the crisis of legitimation that the ideologists experienced at the Institute came from two directions, but one source.[42] Recent world events in the political organisation of race relations had seriously threatened the hitherto secure positions, political stances, values, and beliefs that had underpinned their original motivation to improve race relations. And recent world events in the class and revolutionary politics of the oppressed in Europe and elsewhere had questioned the very social order they cherished and held up to epitomise freedom and equality for all people, including blacks. In the context of the Institute the majority of the ideologists on the Institute's Council and nearly all of their traditional commercial supporters could no longer openly express the beliefs that they had held so firmly for so long, for fear of being permanently labelled racists, white liberals, oppressors, by the utopians and their new clientele. All they knew - including Council Members representing the Race Relations Board, the Community Relations Commission, and the Runnymede Trust - was that the organisation of race relations research, the forming of race relations policy, and the advising on race relations practice could no longer be left to the most 'senior' body in the field now threatened by the same political malaise and insurrection that was undermining the entire stability of international capitalism and liberal-democratic forms of government. Possibly for these rather than the reasons actually stated, they did not turn up at the fateful EGM: they quietly withdrew their support and surreptitiously sealed off real access to further funds and legitimation.

So in their abandonment of the Institute they helped nearly as much as the resisters' own actions to assure the successful outcome of organised resistance. For in essence their quiet and gentlemanly withdrawal delegitimated the actions of those few who really remained to fight the battle. It stripped them of any real authority and the organisation of most of its instrument power.

For nearly all, other than the utopians, the Institute had outlived its usefulness.

CHAPTER NINE

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. V.I. Lenin, What is to be Done: Burning Questions of Our Movement, Foreign Language Press, Pelling, 1973. See especially Chapter IV, pp.122-188.

2. Ibid, p.138.

3. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan Limited, London, 1964; especially Chapter 1. We would suggest that both of Weber's types of explanation, that which is adequate on the level of meaning and that which is 'casually adequate', are in essence theoretical constructions in their own right. They might not be comprehensive 'theories' or 'laws', but if they meet the criteria suggested by Weber they inevitably become theoretical features of would be 'theories' or social 'laws'.

4. This needs little amplification other than to make the general point that nearly all of Marx's major sociological work was concerned with explaining how societies developed and changed, extracting from this not only his historical materialist conception of history but also his revolutionary theory of social change.

5. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1964, p.1027. In fact the whole of Myrdal's first Appendix, 'A Methodological Note on Valuations and Beliefs', is very much worth consulting as an important sociological discussion on this topic and is indeed one that has helped to clarify several issues in our study.

6. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963; especially Volume 2.

7. See in particular John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1967. As a member of the Institute of Race Relations it is interesting to note that his writing on Third World Economic development had some considerable influence on the ideologists' view of Third World development. For Galbraith's own ideas on the subject see his Economic Development, Oxford University Press, London, 1964.

8. Frank Parkin, Middle Class Radicalism: The Social Bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1968.

9. T. Parsons, The Social System, Free Press, Chicago, 1951.

10. Gunnar Myrdal, 1964, op cit.

11. Hugh Tinker, Race, Conflict and the International Order: From Empire to United Nations, The Macmillan Press Limited, London, 1977.

12. Ibid, p.130.

13. Ibid, p.131.

14. Ibid.

15. For excellent accounts of different aspects and from slightly different orientations of the racist institutional order see: Stuart Hall, et al, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order, The Macmillan Press Limited, London, 1978; and John Rex and Sally Tomlinson, Colonial Immigrants in a British City: A Class Analysis, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979.

16. Frank Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order; Social Stratification in Capitalist and Communist Societies; Paladin Books, 1975, Chapter 3, pp.79-102. The three systems he identifies are the dominant value system, the subordinate value system, and the social value system. Whilst we have some difficulty in understanding how these meaning systems are actually constructed and how they precisely relate to the dominant institutional order, the insight that they exist is not only valid but also a useful one in terms of what we are suggesting here.

17. Ibid, p.83.

18. Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class, Random House, New York, 1963. Whilst the ideologists as a group formed part of what is loosely termed the ruling or establishment elite, it should however be noted that as also members of a fairly specific elite group such as media and academic groups they possessed the kind of 'strategic' significance and role described in Keller's book.

19. G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, Merlin, London, 1971.

20. See Roisin McDonough, 'Ideology as False Consciousness Lukacs' in On Ideology, Working Papers in Cultural Studies 10, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, 1977.

21. Lukacs, op cit: He sees ideology as being wholly determined in a reflectionist manner by the economy, whilst we will be suggesting in this and the next Chapter that in fact ideology is related in a refractive manner to the economy. That is to say certain substances and mechanisms distort and hence refract the economic or sub-structural base in ideology.

The process that leads to consciousness, which we term social refraction, and consciousness itself reveals and in a sense straightens out the refraction (distorted image) into a reflection.

22. Roisin McDonough, op cit, pp.33-44.

23. N. Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, New Left Books, London, 1973, pp.206-7.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. See in particular, John Clark, Ian Connell, and Roisin McDonough, 'Misrecognising Ideology: Ideology in Political Power and Social Classes', in 'On Ideology', op cit, pp.106-122.

27. See in particular L. Althusser, For Marx, Allen Lane, London, 1969, and Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, New Left Books, London, 1971, especially his much quoted essay on 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' for what could be termed the Althusserian line on ideology.

28. Robert McKenzie and Adam Silver, Angels in Marble, London, 1968.

29. Ibid, p.249, but quoted in and taken from Frank Parkin, 1973, op cit.

30. David Lockwood, 'Sources of Variation in Working Class Images of Society,' Sociological Review, November, 1966.

31. Ibid, p.251.

32. Such a situation is of course assumed in most of the literature on elites in society. For evidence of this see in particular the collection of essays in Philip Stanworth and Anthony Giddens (ed), Elites and Power in British Society, Cambridge University Press, London, 1973, and their own more recent paper, 'Elites and Privilege' in Philip Abrams (ed), Work, Urbanism, and Inequality: U.K. Society Today, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1978, pp.206-243.

33. Frank Parkin, 1973, op cit, p.85.

34. Ibid.

35. In order to further on understanding of this section it might be useful at this stage to consult Chapter Ten here and particularly the section headed 'Social Refraction and the Development of Consciousness'. The writing up and organisation of material problem we have experienced in this Chapter has had to be unsatisfactorily resolved by reserving this Chapter for explaining what happened and for a discussion of the problems inherent in our explanation, and the final Chapter for the contributions our work has made towards a dialectical theory of resistance. Whilst this somewhat artificial distinction has made our task much easier it has unfortunately entailed in this Chapter the abbreviation of much that is essential in our explanation; and it has tended to give our final Chapter the appearance of a piece of Simmelian formalistic sociology. However, more often than not in the completion and writing up of research decisions such as this have to be made if the research is ever going to see the light of day!

36. We have adopted both of these concepts here because an analytical distinction can be made between them. Differing from what we understand Rex 1979, op cit, (in Chapter One and Note 9), to be saying we would suggest that a social underclass in British society can only exist as a descriptive expression of a structural condition in relation to the dominant class structure: blacks in Britain do not as yet either form an 'under' or any other class in or for themselves. (When we do we shall perhaps see the development of mass as opposed to localised resistance). Similarly, a 'black proletariat', as Paul Baran and Paul Sweeney appear to employ the term in Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order, Penguin Books, London, 1969, can only exist, if at all, in an economic sense and in a society in which a black working population has resided for several generations and hence has become structurally attached or possibly 'integrated' into the dominant economic order at a level below that order which is both demarcated in terms of race and economic roles. In this sense it is also difficult, as yet, to see colonial blacks in Britain as constituting a 'sub-proletariat'. (At the moment the Author is in the process of putting together a paper on this theme under the working title: 'Racial Underclass or Sub-Preletariat: A Misrepresentation of the Social Position and Economic Roles of Blacks in British Society').

37. These concepts were those used by the ideologists at the Institute during the late 1960s when the adjective black was still considered to reflect bad taste and a sign of prejudice!

38. Hugh Tinker, 1977, op cit.

39. V.I. Lenin, 1973, op cit.

40. See Note 35 above. A more detailed discussion of 'refractive symbols and issues' will be found in the next Chapter.

41. See Charles Posner, Reflections on the Revolution in France: 1968, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1970.

42. See Stuart Hall, et al, 1978, op cit, for an impressive account and analysis of the crisis confronting Western Capitalism and society and how the crisis was (and still is) policed in particular relation to the so-called and labelled racial crime of 'mugging'.

CHAPTER TEN:

RACE, POWER, AND RESISTANCE (2): SOME CONCLUDING NOTES TOWARDS A THEORY OF RESISTANCE.

In the last chapter I suggested that the resistance which occurred at the Institute could not be explained solely in terms of either the internal structure or the relationships that appeared to govern the pre-1972 role of the Institute. Whilst some attempt was made to contextualise what happened in relation to the 'crisis' facing Western capitalism and, more particularly, in relation to the apparent undermining of traditional forms of Western authority, a certain part of my explanation remained at the level of description in chapter eight nd assumption in chapter nine. In one sense this part, the relationship between the form of resistance that occurred within the Institute and the forms of black resistance that appeared to characterise the pattern of black social (re)actions to white racial authority in Britain as a whole from the mid-1960s onwards, can be expressed quite simply. It entailed a combination of black political and social experience which, firstly, helped to provide the context of resistance, and, secondly, either explicitly or implicitly helped to inform the nature and organisation of 'utopian' resistance at the Institute.

But in another sense, to establish precisely the complexities subsumed within such a general statement would require the initiation of a further, very substantial, but linked piece of research. As can be seen from the theoretical framework of the research project enclosed in the wallet at the back of this thesis, and which I see as the necessary contextual sequal and/compliment to my study of the IRR, the larger theoretical task involves the exploration in some detail of both a whole gamut of relevant specific relationships and the overall relational and dynamic context which appears to prestructure the management of and reactions/challenges to UK racial policies and practices. While I consider this a necessary extension of the research contained in the present study, it is an extension that could not adequately be incorporated here because of

the financial, time, and other constraints imposed both by the regulations of the University of Durham, and by the research setting itself, I do nevertheless see the need in terms of the formal and theoretical purposes of this chapter to indicate generally at least the broad contours of these relationships.

Provisionally, these can be viewed as two sets of interrelated consequences which, whilst historically specific and experientially based, generated the relational framework for the partial construction and continuation of 'utopian' resistance. The first set appeared to stem from the historical, political, and social legacy of both successful resistance, such as that which occurred within the Campaign Aganist Racial Discrimination during 1967, and the more numerous examples of unsuccessful resistance which during the late 1960s and early 1970s tended to characterise the pattern of internal racial politics in some local voluntary liaison committees (Newham), community relations councils (Tyneside, Teeside, etc.), and some black directed bodies such as the West Indian Standing Conference and the Southall-based Indian Workers Association which all experienced (resistive) 'leadership struggles'. From these examples of what might be called intra-organisational resistance, that which occurs and is initially focussed on securing power within organisations, the 'utopians' at the Institute acquired not only a number of models on which to base resistance strategies and internally-directed political action, but, just as importantly, their consequences provided in part: i) the context and political milieu in which intra-organisational resistance was seen to be possible if not always effective; (ii) the form of action necessary to reveal and clarify the position of blacks working in and/or belonging to groups managed mostly by white race professionals; (iii) the moral-racial pressure, motivation, and political imperative to act resistively if the 'utopians' desired to identify exclusively with the wider black struggle against racist authority and racial oppression; (iv) a source of legitimation for 'utopian' resistance; and (v) moreover a source of historically specific experience

which called for the symbolic incorporation of and identification with past and present forms of intra-organisational resistance.

Related to this set of consequences on the level of the externalisation of resistance, the second set derived from the various forms of extra-organisational resistance that seemed to characterise the nature of external racial politics during this period. Illustrated in the rapid development and the political stances towards institutionalised racism, of black groups such as Johnny James's Caribean Workers' Movement (CWM), Obi Egbuna's Universal Coloured People's Association (UCPA), Roy Sawh's Black People's Alliance (BPA), and, in its political phase, Michael Malik's Racial Adjustment Action Society (RAAS), which all predated the 'utopian' resistance, the consequences of extra-organisational resistance or resistance which was focussed decisively outside the setting of specific organisations and against institutionalised racist authority in general helped to provide: (i) the analytical context for the understanding of the position of blacks and white radicals in race relations bodies, a context which became more racially specific as resistance evolved; (ii) the rationale and political necessity for the 'utopians' to relate their struggle and, by a process of social combination to become implicitly informed by the various forms of UK based extra-organisational resistance; and (iii) it helped to provide, perhaps most importantly of all, the external foci of resistance and the social linkages the utopians required in order to make sense of their experience and that contained within the colonial history of racial oppression as manifested in the existence and political articulation of UK extra-organisational black resistance.

On this somewhat general and, as it stands without further research, theoretically inadequate level, the contours of the relationship that appeared to exist between utopian resistance at the Institute and other forms of intra- and extra-organisational resistance outside the Institute

reflected the historical, experiential, and racial structure of inter-group-legitimated resistance. The utopians learnt from and related to the resistive practices and strategies fashioned by groups engaged in intra and extra-organisational resistance and in turn many of these groups connected with and supported the utopians' resistance at the Institute.

Whilst this essentially relational qualification which was assumed and concealed in the explanation of resistance offered in the previous chapter needs to be taken into account in any attempt to construct a 'dialectical' theory of resistance, the actual purpose of this relatively brief and final chapter is to summarise other more empirically and researched based contributions my study might have made to such a theory.

I shall begin by setting out the major preconditions and conditions for resistance before returning to a more detailed scrutiny of the process of social refraction and the development of consciousness. Then I shall look at what I have termed 'refractive issues and symbols' in order to ascertain more precisely than was possible in my empirical chapters their actual 'type' and function in resistive struggle. And finally, before drawing out other limitations of this study and, more constructively, some of the implications the work possesses for race relations research generally, I shall need to outline the stages of resistance and to readdress once again the whole question of legitimation for resistance itself and that which it can lead to - revolution.

But before I attempt to embark upon this task of summary and reorganisation it might be usegul to outline my original model of resistance so that we can see as we proceed just how

substantially our work has changed or added to it.

It will be recalled from Chapter Two that its elements incorporated eight original working hypotheses. They were that:

1. A dominant ideological group appears to maintain power and control in order to protect certain stated and assumed interests.
2. The protection of these interests ultimately requires the oppression and exploitation of others.
3. These protected interests are seen by others to maintain their relative powerlessness and undermine their expectations of controlling their own destinies.
4. Under specific conditions the subjective and objective realisation of this (consciousness) produces:
   (a) the formation of utopian and alternative values, beliefs, and views of the world.
   (b) the motivation to organise politically as a group espousing diametrically different conceptions and definitions of social reality.
   (c) the identification with others in similar situations and with similar experiences.
   (d) the understanding that not to act is to acquiesce in or condone the prevailing state or system of social organisation.
5. Utopian legitimation for this new view of existing things and of a future society is sought through a process of social projection.
6. Conflict emerges fully as the ideologists also attempt to seek further legitimation for their continued supremacy.

7. Interests, goals of a secondary type, become clearly articulated as each group attempts to construct some or more instrument power for the purposes of protecting or acquiring some or more property power.
8. Struggle ensues: the utopians resist, the ideologists oppose.[2]

Preconditions for Resistance

Almost right from the outset our research showed that the first three elements or working hypotheses needed to be substantially revised. Not only were they too general and ambiguous, but as preconditional statements they neither addressed what we have come to appreciate as a crucial precondition, the possession of the only right or legitimate version of social reality, nor did they say anything at all, other than by implication, about the place and role of racist ideas in the ideologists' actual conception of reality. Coupled with the further weakness of their inability to fill in the gaps between the protection of interests and the preconditions of oppression and exploitation - and domination must now be added - these omissions not only need to be erected as preconditions in their own right but they also need to be viewed under headings that convey the defining social character of each. These headings, under which fall very specific sets of preconditions, can be called the ideological, material, and positional preconditions of resistance.[3]

Under the first heading, our research would suggest that there exist at least three interrelated preconditions. Firstly, the ideologists, as a group, need to hold firmly a set of related beliefs about the nature of social reality which in turn reflect non-negotiable values and interests. That is to say the ideologists not only need to believe that their conception of reality is the only right one but that the values and interests which underpin and shape it also represent the right values and interests. Secondly, these beliefs must include and reflect a notion of absolute worth and hence maintenance of the major institutions which provide an observable representation of social reality, and which symbolise for the ideologists all that makes up 'our culture' and epitomise the traditional basis and historical linkages in 'our civilisation'. That is, the beliefs themselves need to be tradition bound, based upon a history of the ideologists' involvement in constructing the dominant culture. And thirdly, in the case of race or class relations, and often in the case of both, these beliefs need to incorporate and in a sense predetermine the role all groups should occupy in the maintenance of the ideologists' conception of reality and the kind of society it reflects. The threefold function of these interrelated and firmly held beliefs, as ideology, is in the first instance one of legitimating the position of the group of ideologists to its members and other groups; secondly, to negate

the legitimation or social viability of any would-be contending set of beliefs; and, thirdly, to specify a blueprint for all legitimate action and, in the context of our study, a blueprint for the kind of race relations research, policy, and practice favoured.[4] In other words, the possession of an indivisable, non-negotiable ideology is of vital importance: the beliefs contained within it need to be held with creed-like fervour.

Connected to and refracted in these beliefs as interests, the material preconditions of resistance define in part the kind of power held by the ideologists, the kind of social conditions that the social use of this power engenders, and the nature and kind of control that is contrived by these preconditions. The first of the set of four necessitates that the ideologists need to possess a monopoly of ownership of the means of social production, and in the example of the Institute this meant the ownership of the means of the production of racial knowledge, research, policy, and forms of political or community practice that were consistent with and followed from the fact of ownership. The social condition that such a monopoly of ownership, transformed into property power, gives rise to is that of domination. Secondly, the ideologists also need to possess a monopoly of provision; that is the providing of facilities, services, and kindred items which in turn help to generate or produce additional property power. Whilst the ownership of means

basically entailed, as we have seen, the ownership of capital or research funds and the ownership of fettered labour (IRR staff) and contract labour (IRR commissioned scholars), the ownership or monopoly of provision included all the support services required for the production of racial knowledge - secretarial and clerical expertise, photocopying, publishing (certainly by the Oxford University Press[5]), and superb press cutting and internationally renowned library facilities. The reputation, kudos, and prestige the work this labour produced over and above the production of knowledge represented in a Marxian sense not only the surplus value of the commodity - the book, paper, or article - but also the surplus value produced by both types of labour.[6] Thus the articulated monopoly of provision theoretically at least reflected the social condition of exploitation. In contrast, the third and fourth precondition reflected the social condition of oppression. For, because the ideologists needed to have, and did have, a monopoly of access to legitimation for the ownership of material means and provision, and because they needed to have, and did have, a monopoly of coercion, or of available coercive constraints, once employed the two together produced oppression. Simply the right to own, the authority to insist, and the holding of sanctions that ensured compliance - from the withdrawing of benefits, promotional opportunities, to outright dismissal of, for instance, Jenkins and Tinker, or the closure of Race Today - could produce no other but a condition of

oppression. So the overall function of the material preconditions for resistance is neither merely that of increasing property power and hence the ideologists' bank of authority, nor is it solely related to producing conditions of domination, exploitation, and oppression as these follow as a consequence of the articulation of authority: it is to ensure that firm control is maintained by the ideologists. That is to say the four material preconditions for resistance, whilst reflecting the material base and interests implicit in the ideologists' culture are in fact reformulations of the base, its beliefs and interests, and what Althusser would call the ideological state apparatuses, into the apparatuses of social control, security, and the protection of the social order: into, in other words, repressive state apparatuses of domination exploitation and oppression.[7]

The final set of preconditions for resistance reflect the other two in a positional sense. That is it reflects the features of the other two as they are embodied in social positions and roles in the social structure and institutional order. The first positional precondition is that the ideologists must either constitute as a whole the ruling group or class in a society or in the case of localised resistance - that which occurs within a specific geographical or organisational area (the Institute) - they must be drawn from or directly represent that group.

Secondly, in their daily existences or 'lived experience', the ideologists must be seen to form and belong to such a ruling group or class. And, finally, they must occupy positions in the organisation (localised resistance), social structure and institutional order (mass resistance), or in both that confirm and symbolise not only their status as 'top people' but also the ideological and material foundations on which this status has been achieved or ascribed.[8] They, of course, must be white in a race relations situation; whereas in a class relations situation colour does not share the same significance as their actual class position.[9] The function of this set of preconditions is more to do with the visual representations of the authority that is ultimately resisted. They serve the purpose of displaying the badge of authority daily worn by the ideologists; they aid the daily construction and presentation of authority to the ideologists themselves and to others - for instance, club membership has this effect: the going to the Atheneaum can be seen as an authority constructing and consolidating exercise for the ideologists, and for others the knowledge that they go is received as a presenting exercise - and, lastly, these positional preconditions all serve to reproduce socially the legitimate contours or social delineation of power-holding groups in society.

Separately the ideological, material, and positional preconditions outlined are insufficient to provide the total preconditional base for resistance. They must all be present. For, as we have seen in our own study, it is the totality of their existence which in fact produces alternative and utopian stances adopted. Together they provide resistance with its distinctive dialectical quality of 'against this, for the opposite' but separately they can only give rise to other forms of political action.

Social Space as a Multiple Condition for Resistance

Like our first three working hypotheses, the various points merged together under our fourth in our original model of resistance are deficient in several respects. At that stage we were obviously not at all clear about the distinctions we have since made between preconditions and conditions. Nor were we sufficiently precise concerning both the location and role of consciousness in our model. From the kind of review of the development of resistance movements we undertook in Chapter Two, we of course realised that the development of consciousness played a central part in resistance, and, furthermore, that how it developed formed possibly the most difficult of all problems we would have to tackle. What we did not understand earlier was that there appear to have to be at least two important and inter-related conditions in existence before resistance can occur.

In other words the preconditions for resistance alone or even the obvious condition of consciousness are in themselves not enough. For in order for the first to be recognised as preconditions and the latter to develop at all as a condition, the construction and acquisition of social space is required.

The reasons for this are not complex. They are almost as obvious as those which dictate the conditional status of consciousness in resistance. In the first place the hegemony produced by the ideologists in their insistence that their ideological interpretation of reality in fact constitutes reality per se produces a situation in which there exists no room to think or act outside the prescribed limits sanctioned by them.[10] The job of surviving for all other groups becomes in a sense the sole task that can ensure existence within the structure of social and economic relations legitimated by the dominant ideology. To question these relations and the structures they embody not only requires space or room in which to do so, but it also requires a critical orientation towards dominant ideology. But without the creation of a different kind of space this too is impossible to achieve. For, secondly, as a result of their position in the social structure and as a result of how they are controlled in these positions, actors are 'forced' to subscribe often unconsciously to the beliefs implicit in the dominant and ideological conception of reality. Whilst paternalism at one and the same time confirms their actual position in the social structure and holds out the promise of

social mobility or a way out of their position, their acceptance of and compliance with the prevailing and hegemonic state of things reinforces the legitimation of objective conditions. That is to say with the absence of space and the realisation it helps to impart the dominated, exploited, and oppressed tend unknowingly to legitimate their own conditions of domination, oppression, and exploitation. And thirdly, the hegemony established by the ideologists precipitates and determines that other actors see themselves, their position and social identities, as constructions of dominant ideology and reality. They exist in relation to it, as a product of it, and not in relation to others in similar situations. Subjective experience is defined in terms of objective existence. As well as occupying all space to the point where actors can only create identities in terms of an acceptance of prevailing conditions, the ideologists in their total occupation of space are able to exert the kind of control over others that negates even the possibility of political reaction.

Until space is created for actors to begin to recognise the nature and bases of the conditions which prevail and which pass as 'normal', they cannot understand the kind and depth of control that exists as a whole and in the three areas in which all space has been occupied or denied: the organisational, intellectual and emotional.[11]

Not only then must space exist as the first condition for resistance, but it must also exist in multiple form; in the three areas listed above and outlined more fully in previous chapters. If it only partly exists in one or two of these areas, the development of consciousness can never be completed because the full nature and dimensions of control will never be revealed. To put this another way: partial or selective space can only provide the condition for partial or selective consciousness: and whilst this might be sufficient to trigger off protest or other kinds of political action it tends to prove insufficient for the development of political resistance as defined in Chapter Two. The reason for this is that in order for resistance to develop as a form of political action actors must possess in all respects an alternative definition and conception of reality: one that is revealed in the full development of consciousness.

How the space is provided for this to happen will of course differ from one situation to another. But in most it will probably result out of a rapid or gradual process of <u>reform</u> rather than <u>struggle</u>.[12] As we have seen in the case of the resistance that occurred at the Institute the reforms adopted and implemented by Tinker helped to create the kinds of space needed; but as we can see, for instance, in Southern Africa today, space can be an importable and exportable commodity. That is to say space can be provided by the presence of an external revolutionary force which can have the effect of quickening up internal reforms or the

forcing of the ideologists to release their hold on constraints within in order to protect borders from the military and ideological threat presented outside. If only measurable in terms of smaller numbers of visible domestic troops, police, procedures, and so on, the latter method tends to have the same effect as reform: (temporarily) the hold on some if not all the constraints is removed.[13]

Social Refraction and the Development of Consciousness

The relationship between the first condition of space and the second of consciousness; or rather the relationship between the three kinds of space created and the three interdependent components of consciousness - the structural, objective, and subjective component - is what we have termed a prefigurative one. That is, the possibility of consciousness is contained and revealed within the kind of space generated. The way to consciousness is through engaging in the process of social refraction.[14] Consciousness therefore needs to be worked at. It does not suddenly dawn as implied in our model of resistance. Nor does it result as a self-revealing consequence of the prevailing preconditions, or as merely the product of struggle. It comes through the active engagement of the refractive sub-processes <u>in</u> struggle. Whilst the process itself (and its four sub-processes) is in some respects a dialectical one in that it juxtaposes what is (thesis) with its polar opposite (antithesis), it, however, goes further than this.

In the first place it requires that actors understand and internalise the dialectic as it emerges as part of <u>their</u> reality. And secondly, it relocates experience as a central part of the process. That is to say, the process itself informs, shapes and reconstructs reality in terms of the experience of actors; that reality which prevails in its ideological form into that which exists in its material form. Dialecticism is only a partial description of the mechanism and not of the experience: refraction is a description of both.

The two premises which were assumed in our definition presented in the previous chapter now need to be directly addressed. Firstly, our definition assumes that observable social situations or what we would prefer to call projected realities are not all that they might appear to be on the surface. They are, we would suggest, social manifestations and constructions of phenomena and relations that exist below the immediately observable. That is not to say that they are neither observable nor thus researchable, but it is to suggest, secondly, that two kinds of reality appear to prevail in the social world which are in turn related refractively. The first is a form of projected reality, essentially a distorted image of the base or sub-structural reality. And the second is in fact this base or sub-structural reality, that which lies at the base of the refracted image or projected reality. The connections that exist between the two,

or more accurately the substances which produce and the mechanisms which maintain distortions, the medium of refraction, need not only to be identified but they also need to be seen as that which mystifies. For it is the medium which refractively distorts and which gives the impression that somehow two types of reality actually exist when in fact only one really prevails.

The total process of social refraction, as we noted in the last Chapter, consists of at least four interrelated sub-processes - orientation, identification, relation, and rejection. The first three, as we have also seen, correspond very closely indeed with the three components of consciousness. The engaging in each it would appear reveals to the actor(s) an integral part of overall consciousness. Unlike the other three, the fourth helps to define the relationship of resistance to the formation of consciousness. But before we attempt to set out how each probably works, we can list them all together with their corresponding component of consciousness as follows:

Sub Processes	Components of Consciousness
Orientation	Structural
Identification	Objective
Relation	Subjective
Rejection	Action (Resistance)

The first of the four sub-processes requires that actors or groups need to re-orient themselves to the social world, a probability that occurs when organisational space has been created. In order to do this and to produce a conception of social position and hence the structural component of consciousness, it appears that actors then need to do three things:

1. View what exists or the social situations in which they find themselves as being refractive images of sub-structural reality.
2. Relate what they see at the base of the refraction to their own experience and conception of self.
3. Compare what they have perceived and their conceptions of self with others with common experiences and in common situations.

Whilst this, we would suggest, produces a conception of position, the identification sub-process produces knowledge on how actors are controlled and maintained in these positions - the objective component of consciousness. This sub-process requires that actors:

4. Identify the phenomena or things which produce refractions.
5. Identify the institutional mechanisms which maintain refractive distortions, that refract sub-structural or actual reality as projected reality (refracted images).
6. Identify groups, agencies, and institutions which act as the mystifiers or social brokers of sub-structural reality.

Then in the relation sub-process which appears to produce the subjective component of consciousness actors need to:

7. Relate refractively these (4) substances, (5) mechanisms, and (6) groups, agencies, and institutions to derived conceptions of position.
8. Relate refractively (4), (5), and (6) to personal or group experience.
9. Relate refractively (4), (5), and (6) to notion of self.

This in fact entails a reverse process of refraction. It calls for, as we have seen in the Institute experience, a 'going back' in mind, experience, and work to what exists, the immediately observable situations. Once related to position, experience, and self, the knowledge of control acquired in the identification sub-process produces antagonistic contradictions in position, self, and experience which can only be completely resolved in the final sub-process of rejection. This in turn means that actors then need to:

10. Reject substances and things which produce the refractive distortions.
11. Reject the mechanisms which maintain refractive distortions.
12. Reject groups, agencies, and institutions which either act as social brokers or social protectors, or both, of sub-structural reality.

In this rejection sub-process not only do refractive images or projected realities become reflective but in an important sense the sub-structural realities surface and become immediately observable. They become one. In the actor's perception there no longer exists a distortion between projected and sub-structural reality: the social angle of refraction is straightened to expose one dominant conception of reality and the preconditions of resistance it embodies. This is the point at which consciousness appears fully to emerge and at which it forms the basis for alternative utopian thinking and action. For it is within the rejection sub-process that actors become committed on all levels to the kind of utopian reality they have to espouse and strive to institute in order to resolve very fundamental contradictions and preserve their new credibility as relevant workers. As can be seen in the rather crude diagram below it also becomes the point at which actors possess the kind of knowledge and the kind of absolute confidence that such knowledge produces to act politically to change radically the reality that consciousness reveals. It is the point when knowledge precipitates political action, when theory becomes practice and practice becomes theory: when knowledge and action combine in the self realisation of political consciousness.[15]

And finally, it also becomes the point when resistance presents itself as the only viable and meaningful course of political action to follow. (For it is the only kind of political action which both entails a radical stance against the authority

and power used by the ideologists to exert control and embraces a counter definition of reality and programme of action to institute that reality).

FIGURE (1): SOCIAL REFRACTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS



(Key: P.R.: Projected reality; R.M.: Refractive medium; and R.S.: Substructural reality. The broken lines indicate the changes which occur in the refractive sub-processes 2, 3, and 4).

Threat Potential, Refractive Issues and Struggle

The point at which actors actually consciously decide to resist is quite a different thing from identifying when resistance presents itself as viable political action. Although this crucial step is missing from our model, it would however appear from our research that the decision to resist is in fact made only after the projection of the new consciousness and after such a projection evokes opposition. In other words resistance is entered into at the point when opposition threatens, on one level, the validity and viability of utopian consciousness, and, on another, the very basis and structure of the utopian consciousness now developed as

well as the actors' total commitment to it. When opposing actions possess threat-potential resistance follows.[16] In the case of the Institute it was, then, only after the ideologists firmly opposed the projection of a different and alternative approach to race research, policy, and practice implicit in Jenkins' paper and conveyed in Race Today editorials and articles that the staff, as utopians, consciously decided to engage in resistance. Of course in practice and in struggle a gap does not exist between the development of utopian consciousness and the conscious decision to engage in resistance. This is so because in the first place utopian resisters anticipate and expect opposition; secondly, because, unlike resistive organisation itself, the development of consciousness, as we have seen, is not a secretive process and thus undetectable by the ideologists; and, thirdly, because the decision to resist is in itself an outcome of the refractive sub-process of rejection. The crucial point we are therefore making is that whilst the decision to resist actually precedes opposition, the engaging in resistance tends to follow opposition.

The significance, however, of this opposition is not only vital for the general continuation of resistance but it also plays a vital role in the organisation of resistance in the resistance situation. Firm opposition to resistance, firm insistence on the ideologists' authority to act in accordance with preconceived notions of the 'interests of all' tends often immediately to produce

one or more refractive issues and symbols. Coercion and sanctions are not only mobilised and employed against the utopian actors who project alternative definitions of reality, research, policy, and practice, but, just as revealing, the ideologists in their opposition are forced to erect these issues as negative indicators and examples to all who attempt to resist their authority.

But this is not all. Refractive issues and symbols - the Jenkins Affair, the Tinker Affair, and Race Today - possess as much significance for the utopians' campaign of resistance as they do for the ideologists' campaign of opposition. There are at least three distinctive types.[17] Formative issues such as the Jenkins Affair and the early opposition that related to the radicalisation of Race Today rather than to its closure tend to emerge at the beginning of resistive struggle. For the utopian resisters they symbolise in part the possible form their resistance will take and are usually connected with the projection of the utopians' alternative conception of reality. They help to demarcate the future territory of resistive struggle in as much as they seek and begin to address a new clientele; one which hopefully will offer support and eventually help to legitimate resistive action. In their emergence they in fact symbolise how theory relates to action in resistance. For the ideologists, on the other hand, such issues indicate the necessity of effective opposition. They help to focus attention on the 'new mood of

rebellion' that many had possibly detected some weeks, months, or even years earlier. In short they help to establish the form that all opposition will eventually take.

The second category of issues tends to emerge as resistive struggle gathers momentum. More often than not they tend to focus on what could be termed particular issues in as much as they arise out of and symbolise a particular aspect of either resistance or opposition. For instance, the Walston affair symbolised for the utopians the tyranny of oppression, the autocracy of leadership - in fact the autocratic, authoritarian, repressive and oppressive organisation at the Institute - and provided the issue around which a particular form of resistive organisation could be developed: the ousting of Lord Walston from the chair. Conversely, the Tinker affair symbolised for the ideologists the weakness of the director's leadership which in turn accounted for, according to them, the upsurge in staff resistance and radicalism. It of course also provided for the utopians a particular issue that symbolised the style of leadership favoured by them in the new utopian Institute.

Whilst both these types of issues provide in varying degrees the short term foci of resistive and oppositional organisation, they do not however symbolise the composite nature of struggle. They do not provide in themselves enough symbolic gestures, meaning, and consequences for the identification of the struggle as being

unmitigating and absolute in all respects. Only composite issues such as the closure of Race Today which in effect meant the sacking of its editor and staff and the severe curtailing of most staff political activities can in fact do this. The striking characteristic of all composite issues is that they symbolise for all actors, the utopians and ideologists alike, what the struggle is about. Within the framework of a composite issue the various strands, tensions, conflicts, emotions, and objects of struggle interplay to produce polarised statements of position and resolved intentions for the whole of the organisation or society. It is in the composite issues that actors lodge their identities as utopians or ideologists. To retreat or compromise would not only result in a loss of face and authority but, of more importance, it would result in the self-annihilation of identity and all that had provided meaning for existence, work, and struggle.

Although this category of issues is by far the most important, and although it is possible for one issue in one category to expand or contract into another issue in another category, all refractive issues are refractive because they reveal to all actors some or all the beliefs, interests, and conditions that underpin or result from the competing conceptions of social reality projected in struggle. For the utopian resisters they all in varying degrees help to focus resistive energy and organisation; help to identify clearly the enemy and thus provide targets for political expressions of hate and contempt; and help to locate and define the kind and

sources of authority they are resisting against in struggle. And struggle itself organised around these issues helps to heighten rather than produce consciousness; helps to maintain and increase the space required for this heightening; and helps to convey the urgency of winning, the reaching of explicit objectives.[18]

Power, Control, and the Stages of Resistance

However it might be rationalised, whatever ideological form it might take, the chief objective of all resistance, as we noted in our model and as we have shown in this study as a whole, is the acquisition of property power in order to bring about one or another kind of utopia. And the major objective of all opposition is to maintain control; to protect and defend the institutional and ideological forms of the reality that exists. How this is achieved or accomplished need not be repeated here other than to re-emphasise the distinctions made between property and instrument power. Not only is this an important distinction because it enables us to see the two organisational problems in all resistance campaigns: the securing of support and legitimation for resistive action, and the actual taking over of organisations or societies. It is also important because it helps to define the stages of resistance and the relationship that exists between

the two organisational problems. In respect to the stages, it would appear that resistance tends to pass through projection, action or implementation, reactive, and vindicative stages. The second stage, as we have seen, tends to follow the first phase of opposition launched by the ideologists and calls for the immediate construction of instrument power; the third tends to follow the second phase of opposition and is reactive in as much that it reacts to the way in which ideologists handle refractive issues of a particular type; and the final stage represents the last 'battle' to acquire the property power and hence control of the organisation or society. And in respect to the two organisational problems, the legitimation for resistance and the resulting instrument power which is derived from supporting groups automatically qualifies these groups and their representatives to form the revolutionary vanguard to acquire property power by taking over the organisation or society. That is to say that the two organisational problems are related in such a way that the solution to the first provides the means for the second to be solved.

Legitimation, Resistance, and Revolution

To return to our original model of resistance for the last time, we suggested in our fifth point that legitimation for utopian conceptions of reality, research, policy and practice is sought and gained from a process of projection. On one level this of

course is the case, but it does not constitute the whole story. As we noted at some length in Chapter Two and showed in even greater length in Chapters Five to Eight, legitimation for resistive action came as a result of establishing firm relationships with new clientele groups.[19] The projection process aids the reaching of such groups and the conveyance of a declaration of intent, common experience, and objects but it cannot in itself produce the kind of legitimation required. This is entirely dependent upon whether or not the groups contacted firstly agree with the utopian conceptions projected, secondly, whether or not they possess confidence in the utopian group mounting resistance, and thirdly, whether or not they see the linkages between the struggles they might be waging and the resistance campaign projected. That these three pre-requisites for the establishing of legitimation relationships in fact existed at the Institute suggests that the new clientele groups in particular saw the revolutionary possibilities that were implicit in the utopians' projection of the struggle. And it is at this level of analysis we seek to round off our 'Notes' towards a theory of resistance.

For all resistance may lead and, under certain conditions which fall outside the scope of this study, invariably does lead to revolution. And in the last analysis support and hence long term legitimation can only come from those groups committed to revolutionary struggle and the bringing about of the 'revolution'.

Whilst this today partly accounts for the small size and influence of the Institute, in the late 1960s and early 1970s when it was 'fashionable' to be revolutionary, when it was fashionable for organisations and groups on the broadly construed left - from young and career-conscious social scientists to establishment trade unions - to flaunt their radicalism and revolutionary sympathies, the securing of support and hence legitimation was not that too difficult to achieve. If this was not grasped by anybody else it was most certainly grasped and employed brilliantly by the present director of the Institute of Race Relations.

Limitations and Implications of Research

To help balance the inconclusiveness of the 'Notes' above, which do not provide anything like a comprehensive or integrated theory of resistance - although, I believe, they take us some way along this complex path - and which in effect must be viewed as the basis for more broadly conceived research already alluded to at the beginning of this chapter and outlined in the annexed paper, I should like to end this study by referring to some of its limitations as well as to some of the implications it possesses for future race relations research.[20]

In a very direct sense its limitations have been largely patterned by the way in which it was initially conceived as a feasible research project and by the way in which I conceptualised the problems and objectives of the research. They in fact include three minor limitations which when added together amount to one relatively major weakness at the level of sociological generalisation about the nature of black resistance. Firstly, the decision to study the Institute as an important institutional representation of racial policy, practice, and research during the 1950s and 1960s required me to place emphasis on and to negotiate access to research materials and sites with those who developed and managed the Institute and that in turn effectively militated against broadening the scope of the research. Secondly, as the research was conceived to investigate the

dialectical basis of resistance in relation to the position of black and white groups in the dominant institutional order, it has tended in parts to under-estimate and under-analyse a significant aspect of the relational context of resistance, the larger context to which I have already referred. And, lastly, this study has not been able to sift and grapple with the complexities involved in assessing fully the relationship between the resistance that occurred at the Institute and that which then and since has characterised the pattern of North American 'race relations' and Third World colonial relations. Together these limitations have restricted the extent to which I have been able to generalise about the nature of black resistance. But in no way do I see them as invalidating what I view as the contributions this study might make to sociological and race relations research in particular and race relations in general.

If anything, one of the two major implications of this study for future race relations research is to be found in its limitations. Simply, in order to research and theorise in the field of the political sociology of race relations and, particularly, in the sub-field of the political sociology of black resistance, a number of research decisions have to be made which are as political as they are sociological. From this study it would appear that race relations research cannot be conducted on an adequate ethical basis if in its conception researchers are unaware and fail to take into full account the way in which blacks define their social situation and view the whole research enterprise. Implicitly sociological in terms of the way in which race relations are conceptualised and studied,
these two considerations inevitably would
not only specific research orientations but also the possible forms of explanation and theorisation. For my own part, and I would suggest on the part of others researching in the field, they have called for the "problematisation" of political commitment as forming part of the sociological structuring of race relations research.

Related to this last point but against the backcloth of the increased professionalisation and expansion of race relations research and the rejuvenation of the SSRC Race and Ethnic Studies Unit now based at the University of Aston, it would seem that the second and, here, final implication this study possesses for future race relations research addresses the whole question of the historical and political context of race relations.[21]

If the majority of researchers in the field either continue to deny or understate the crucial importance of this context, the study of race relations will always remain on the level of an appeal to the liberal conscience for qualified and piecemeal change. What the resistance struggle at the Institute clearly demonstrated was that only through an understanding of the historical and political context and specifities of race relations was it possible to construct policies and practices that would, if implemented, bring about radical changes not only in the organisation of race relations research but also possibly in the structure and nature of the pattern of race relations in British society.

Thus from this study it would seem that the political and historical contextualisation of research constitutes a precondition for the understanding of the actual sociological nature of race relations and, finally, for the forming of policies and practices that would lead to their change.

CHAPTER TEN

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. It should be remembered throughout this Chapter that what follows can only be called 'Notes', because the gaps in our research which in part, as we have mentioned in Chapter Nine, result from the very nature of resistance itself and in part from the kind of organisation we have been studying are too many to produce a rounded and integrated theory of resistance. As such a summary does not call for a large number of references we shall try to indicate in these footnotes the kind of gaps that exist and the kind of research that needs to be undertaken to reveal the missing links.

2. In order to place this model in the context in which it was conceived it might be useful for readers to re-consult Chapter Two.

3. We make no claim that we have been able to list all the preconditions required for resistance, although we do feel that we have managed to uncover the most important ones.

4. See M. Vaughan and M.S. Archer, Social Conflict and Educational Change in England and France, 1789-1848, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1971, for a similar account of the role of ideology in education.

5. The relationship the Institute possessed with the Oxford University Press is indeed extremely illustrative of the kind of control alluded to here. In the first place the OUP agreed to publish all IRR works, providing the Institute undertook the whole editing process, irrespective of the quality or length of the works. (See Appendix G for a full list of OUP/IRR publications). Secondly, OUP passed on for recommendations to publish or otherwise all other race relations books emanating from other sources. And thirdly, through IRR contacts in the major academic publishing houses and its own reputation for distinguished scholarship, it was able through the 'reading' services it provided to control a very high percentage of all race relations books published in Britain between 1952 and 1972.

6. See Karl Marx, 'Value, Price and Profit', in Marx, Engels Lenin, The Essential Left: Four Classic Texts on the Principles of Socialism, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1971, pp.51-101; but particularly pp.80-88.

7. See L. Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' in his Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, New Left Books, London, 1971. We would thus agree with Althusser that the role of the ideological state apparatuses is in part to secure the ideological conditions for the relations of production and role of the repressive state apparatuses is not only to secure the political conditions for production but also to maintain these conditions. The relationship between the two, we would suggest, is that the former in a qualitative sense precedes the latter and that both are connected in the social articulation of dominant ideology, that is in hegemony or hegemonic practice.

8. We have failed to make before although we have always assumed this distinction between localised and mass resistance. However from previous research on Aboriginal resistance it is clear that the distinction contains little if any analytical or theoretical significance. (See Chris Mullard, Aboriginal Resistance: A Study of its Social Roots and Organisation, University of Durham, 1975). In fact one of the reasons we decided to study resistance at the Institute was to see whether or not the social bases and organisation of localised resistance was any different from that to be found in examples of mass resistance. We can conclude now that they are not.

9. Whilst we have been primarily concerned with a race relations situation we have been always aware that our work and findings with slight adjustments are equally applicable to class relations situations. Further, whilst our particular kind of race relations situation does not precisely fit any of those listed by O.C. Cox it does however contain enough features in several of them to warrant the appellation. (See Oliver Cromwell Cox, Castle, Class and Race: A Study in Social Dynamics, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1959, pp.353-380, and particularly his paragraphs on 'The Ruling Class Situation' and 'The Nationalistic Situation', 'The Bepartite Situation', and 'The Stranger Situation'.)

10. See A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971. We use the concept of hegemony here not only as a form of ideological domination reflected in the essentially political and repressive apparatuses of domination, exploitation and oppression but also in the wider sense alluded to by Gramsci - in economic, political, cultural, ideological, philosophical and in what Gramsci himself termed 'the ethico-political' dimensions that characterise relations within and between class groups. For an interesting and thoughtful paper which at the beginning

attempts to reclaim for the concept its full meaning as developed by Gramsci see Stuart Hall, Bob Lumley, and Gregor McLennan, 'Politics and Ideology: Gramsci' in On Ideology, Working Papers in Cultural Studies 10, Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, 1977, pp.45-76.

11. This is an area which requires further research in terms of trying to establish precisely all the relationships which appear to exist between the three types of space identified. As regards the third type of space and in retrospect it would perhaps be more accurate to term it 'personal' rather than 'emotional' space, as the latter word does tend to convey all kinds of connotations which are not centrally related to what we have been trying to say here.

12. We shall take up this point concerning the relationship between consciousness and struggle in a moment.

13. Whilst this area too needs to be researched further, it is however clear that the relationship between political liberalism/reform and space is a crucial one. In fact it could be that reform, as opposed to masking or re-defining the preconditions of resistance as structural or personal aberrations which can be altered, in fact does much more than we even suggest here. It could for instance provide the kind of surplus energy required for thinking as well as acting in some circumstances: for instance reform of the labour laws in South Africa, the laws that govern work hours, contract, and meetings - and this is very close to the Oppenheimian thesis concerning the role and implications of an expanding capitalist economy in apartheid states - could provide enough surplus energy and time (space) for blacks to be able to develop full consciousness. Certainly we are not at all convinced of the thesis that only equates reform with control, for its functions are far more complex than this.

14. In this concept resides both a major strength and weakness of the whole study as we see it. Its strength rests in the fact that it attempts to reveal just how consciousness emerges, the most important of all questions addressed in this study. As developed here its weakness, on the other hand, stems from the fact that we have found it extremely difficult to define precisely. The scope for further research here is tremendous.

15. There are of course many problems here that we have not been able to resolve. Possibly the most important concerns the actual relationships between the four refractive sub-processes. At this stage we are not at all sure what they might be. Whilst it is convenient to suggest that these sub-processes are engaged in together rather than separated out as either stages or phases in the development of consciousness, it does not help us very much in trying to understand more precisely just how actors are 'forced' into doing what they appear to be doing in each sub-process. This is yet another problem we shall have to look at in future research.

16. See Chris Mullard op cit 1975 for the substantiation of this finding in also the case of Aboriginal resistance against white Australian authority.

17. There might indeed be more, but our research to date has only revealed three types of refractive issues.

18. Unlike the position Marx adopted and many of the positions to be found in the majority of the political neo-Marxian schools of thought developed this century, we are suggesting that the role of struggle in resistance situations is not so much concerned with the development of consciousness per se but more with the heightening of consciousness; with the maintenance of existing and the production of further space; and, most importantly, with the recruitment of others into resistive or, ultimately, revolutionary political action. We would go on to say that it is in struggle that consciousness is spread rather than originally created. For whichever way this problem is concerned or formulated it would always appear that the acquisition of political consciousness on the part of some actors - the professional revolutionaries and leadership - is the very thing that precipitates struggle. Simply, in order to engage in struggle in the first place actors must be conscious of something. The quality of consciousness might therefore be determined by struggle; but to suggest that struggle determines consciousness is just a little absurd. (In other words we are drawing tentative political and sociological lines here between conflict situations (the formation of consciousness), resistance situations (the acquisition of consciousness) and revolutionary situations, (the political application of consciousness)).

19. There is little point in repeating all that we have said about legitimation relationships in Chapter Two. What is significant however is that our study basically confirmed the existence of the kind of relationships we identified in Chapter Two.

20. One major omission to be found in our work and hence in these 'Notes' towards a theory of resistance is the absence of any clearly articulated theory of justice and/or social equality. Although such a theory is assumed in all that we have said, it needs not only to be spelt out but also to be incorporated as a central feature in any fully developed theory of resistance. The theory of history, and of the state, like the more sociological one of social change, that are reflected in these 'Notes' also need some considerable tightening and expansion. It is for these reasons and others contained in the major problems for future research identified here, that we feel that a more broadly conceived research project is required: one that possesses a comparative dimension and that is empirically anchored in the development of the post war black resistance movement in metropolitan (UK/USA) and Third World societies. Hopefully with the support of one or more of the white funding agencies we are about to allude to, this task in short represents how our work can be possibly developed and continued!

21. Professor John Rex officially took over the directorship of this unit, conceived originally as an IRR/SSRC venture, from Professor Michael Banton in October, 1979.

22. This point reminds us of a similar point made by Philip Abrams in Philip Abrams and Andrew McCulloch, Communes, Sociology and Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, especially in Chapter One, pp.7-19 and Appendix 1, pp.221-226.

A P P E N D I X 'A'

BOARD MEMBERSHIP

(i) Members of the Board of Studies at Chatham House, 1952 - 1958.

(ii) (a) Social Biographies of Board Members, 1952 - 1958.

(b) Working Sheet on 'The Colonial Connection : Employment, Voluntary Appointments, and Colonial Ties'.

(iii) The Colonial Connection : An Analysis of the Board of Studies' Membership, 1952 - 1958.

APPENDIX 'A'

(i) Members of the Board of Studies at Chatham House, 1952 - 1958

1952 - 1954 (16 Members)
The Rt. Hon. Lord Hailey (Chairman), Miss Peter Ady, H.V. Hodson, The Rev. E. Philip Eastman, Prof. Raymond Firth, C.W.W. Greenidge, Sir Kenneth Grubb, Prof. Sir Keith Hancock, Prof. Vincent Harlow, Prof. Sir Nicholas Manseigh, Philip Mason, Sir R.L. Prain, Prof. Margaret Read, Dr. Arnold Toynbee, (Lord) Richard Wilberforce, Oliver Woods.

1954 - 1956 (15 Members)
H.V. Hodson (Chairman), Miss Peter Ady, The Rev. E. Philip Eastman, C.W.W. Greenidge. Sir Kenneth Grubb, Prof. Sir Keith Hancock, Prof. Sir Nicholas Manseigh, Philip Mason, Sir R.L. Prain, Prof. Margaret Read, Dr. Arnold Toynbee, Oliver Woods, Albert Hanrani, John Barnes.

1956 - 1957 (19 Members)
H.V. Hodson (Chairman), Miss Peter Ady, The Rev. E. Philip Eastman, C.W.W. Greenidge, Sir Kenneth Grubb, Prof. Sir Nicholas Manseigh, Philip Mason, Sir R.L. Prain, Prof. Margaret Read, Dr. Arnold Toynbee, (Lord) Richard Wilberforce, Oliver Woods, Albert Hanrani, C.W. Armstrong, W.L. Gorrell Barnes, Prof. C.E. Carrington, Patrick Gordon Walker, Prof. Roland Oliver, Anthony Sampson.

1958 (22 Members)
H.V. Hodson (Chairman), Miss Peter Ady, The Rev. E. Philip Eastman, C.W.W. Greenidge, Sir Kenneth Grubb, Prof. Sir Nicholas Manseigh, Philip Mason, Sir R.L. Prain, Prof. Margaret Read, Dr. Arnold Toynbee, (Lord) Richard Wilberforce, Oliver Woods, W.L. Gorrell Barnes, C.W. Armstrong, Prof. C.E. Carrington, Patrick Gordon Walker, Prof. Roland Oliver, Anthony Sampson, Sir Alexander Carr Saunders, Dr. Maurice Freedman, Dr. Marcus James, Sir John Slessor.

APPENDIX (ii) (a)

SOCIAL BIOGRAPHIES OF BOARD MEMBERS, 1952-1958

Name	Date of Birth	Age	Education					Employment					Voluntary Appointments			CL	PD
			School		Higher												
			P/B	G	OC	RB	O	PS	Pol	Ind	AC	J	Gen	Com	R		
Miss Peter ADY																	
ARMSTRONG, Col. C.W.	9.5.99	59	*		*			*	*	*			*	*	*	*	*
BARNES, Sir John	22.6.17	41	*		*			*			*		*	*	*	*	*
CARRINGTON, Prof. C.E.	21.4.97	61	*		*			*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
CARR-SAUNDERS, Sir A.	- 86	72	*		*			*			*	*	*	*	*	*	*
EASTMAN, Rev. Philip																	
FIRTH, Prof. Sir R.	3.01	57		*		*		*			*	*	*	*	*	*	*
FREEDMAN, Dr. M. (Prof.)	11.12.20	38	*			*		*			*	*	*	*	*		*
GORRELL-BARNES, Sir W.	23.8.09	49	*		*			*		*			*	*	*	*	*
GREENIDGE, C.W.W.	- 89	69	*		*			*					*	*	*	*	*
GRUBB, Sir K.	9.9.00	58	*		*			*		*		*	*	*	*	*	*
HAILEY, Lord	15.2.72	86	*		*			*			*	*	*	*	*	*	*
HANCOCK, Prof. Sir K.	26.6.98	60	?		*			*			*	*	*	*	*	*	*

Name	Date of Birth	Age	Education					Employment					Voluntary Appointments			CL	PD
			School		Higher												
			P/B	G	OC	RB	O	PS	Pol	Ind	AC	J	Gen	Com	R		
HARLOW, Prof. V.	14.8.98	60	*		*			*			*	*	*	*	*	*	*
HANRANI, A.																	
HODSON, H.V.	12.5.06	52	*		*			*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
JAMES, Dr. Marcus																	
MACADAM, Sir I.S.	18.7.94	64	*		*			*			*	*	*	*	*	*	*
MANSERGH, Prof. N.	27.6.10	48	*		*			*			*	*	*	*	*	*	*
MASON, P.	19.4.06	52	*		*			*			*	*	*	*	*	*	*
OLIVER, Prof. Sir R.	30.3.23	35	*		*			*			*		*	*	*		*
PRAIN, Sir R.	3.9.07	51	*					*		*			*	*		*	*
READ, Prof. Margaret	- 89	69	*		*			*			*		*	*			*
SAMPSON, A.	3.8.26	32	*		*			*			*	*	*	*		*	
SLESSOR, Sir J.	3.6.97	61	*					*			*	*	*	*		*	*
TOYNBEE, Dr. A.J.	14.4.89	69	*		*			*			*	*	*	*	*	*	*
WALKER, P.G. (Lord)	7.4.07	51	*		*			*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*
WILBERFORCE, (Lord)	11.3.07	51	*		*			*			*		*	*	*	*	*
WOODHOUSE, C.M.	11.5.17	49	*		*			*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*
WOODS, O.	21.11.11	47	*		*			*				*	*	*	*	*	*

KEY: P/B: Public or Boarding School; G: Grammar School; OC: Oxbridge; RB: Redbrick University; O: Other School; PS: Public School; Pol: Politics; Ind; Industry and Commerce; AC: Academic; J: Journalism; Gen: General Voluntary Appointments held; Com: Commonwealth and Colonial Voluntary Appointments held; R: Race Relations Appointments held; CL: London Club Member; PD: Holder of Public Distinction.

SOURCES: Lists of Board of Studies Members held at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House; RIIA Annual Reports, 1952 - 1958; and 1952 - 1958 editions of Who's Who.

APPENDIX (ii) (b)

THE COLONIAL CONNECTION : EMPLOYMENT, VOLUNTARY APPOINTMENTS AND COLONIAL TIES

	PUBLIC SERVICE				POLITICS			ACADEMIA			JOURNALISM			INDUSTRY				VOLUNTARY APPOINTMENTS			COLONIAL TIE			
	CA	CH	G	W	C	La	Li	U	P	OA	S	FL	OJ	OS	H	UM	DC	CS	RC	CC	BE	Wo	FM	VA
ADY, Miss Peter																								
ARMSTRONG, Col. C.W.	*			*	*							*		*		*	*			*		*	*	*
BARNES, Sir John	*	*		*				*					*						*			*	*	*
CARRINGTON, Prof.C.E.				*				*					*		*	*			*	*	*		*	*
CARR-SAUNDERS, Sir A.	*	*	*					*				*	*					*	*	*		*		*
EASTMAN, Rev. Philip																								
FIRTH, Prof. Sir R.				*				*				*	*					*			*		*	*
FREEDMAN, Prof. M.				*				*			*	*	*					*	*					*
GORREL-BARNES, Sir W.	*	*	*	*									*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		*		*
GREENIDGE, C.W.W.	*												*						*	*	*	*	*	*
GRUBB, Sir K.	*	*	*	*								*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*		*		*
HAILEY, Lord	*	*	*	*					*	*		*	*					*	*	*	*	*	*	*
HANCOCK, Prof. Sir K.	*			*				*				*	*					*	*		*	*	*	*
HARLOW, Prof. W.	*		*	*				*				*	*					*	*	*		*		*
HANRANI, A.																								
HODSON, H.V.	*	*	*	*				*			*	*	*		*	*	*		*	*		*		*

	PUBLIC SERVICE				POLITICS			ACADEMIA			JOURNALISM			INDUSTRY				VOLUNTARY APPOINTMENTS			COLONIAL TIE			
	CA	CH	G	W	C	La	Li	U	P	OA	S	FL	OJ	OS	H	UM	DC	CS	RC	CC	BE	Wo	FM	VA
JAMES, Dr. Marcus																								
MACADUM, Sir I.		*		*					*			*	*						*	*		*		*
MANSERGH, Rev. N.		*	*	*				*	*			*	*						*		*		*	*
MASON, P.	*	*		*				*	*	*		*	*					*	*	*		*		*
OLIVER, Prof. Sir R.	*	*	*					*				*	*						*	*	*		*	*
PRAIN, Sir R.			*	*									*	*	*	*	*			*	*	*	*	*
READ, Prof. Margaret	*							*				*	*					*	*			*		*
SAMPSON, A.	*			*				*			*	*	*						*			*		*
SLESSOR, Sir J.	*	*	*	*								*	*						*	*	*	*	*	*
TOYNBEE, Dr. A.J.		*	*	*				*				*	*					*	*			*		*
WALKER, P.G. (Lord)		*	*			*		*			*	*	*						*	*		*		*
WILBERFORCE, (Lord)			*	*				*				*	*						*					*
WOODHOUSE, C.M.																								
WOODS, O.	*	*		*							*	*	*						*			*		*

This specific Working Sheet has been included to provide an example of the kind of work undertaken in order to build up a more detailed picture of Board Members. Similar working sheets were compiled for (a) School Education; (b) University Education; and (c) Traceable Club Membership.

KEY: CA: Colonial Administration and Affairs Abroad; CH: Colonial Administration and Affairs at Home; G: Other Government Service; W: War Service; C: Conservative; La: Labour; Li: Liberal; U: University; P: Private or non-university but with University status such as Chatham House Professors and Scholars; OA: Other; S: Staff Journalists; FL: Fleet Street contributors and connections; OJ: Other kinds of journalistic experience; OS: Overseas industrial and commercial employment; H: Home industrial and commercial employment; UM: Senior upper management; DC: Company Director or Chairman; CS: Colonial Social Science Research Council; RC: Royal Commonwealth Society; CC: Other Colonial and Commonwealth Voluntary Appointments; BE: Born and/or Educated in the Colonial Territories or Dominions; Wo: Worked for more than three years in the Colonial Territories or Dominions; FM: Family connections in and/or married to person from the Colonial Territories or Dominions; VA: Voluntary Appointments held in organisations and bodies with direct interests in Colonial, Dominion or Commonwealth matters.

SOURCES: The same as in Appendix (ii)(a) above.

APPENDIX 'A'

(iii) THE COLONIAL CONNECTION : AN ANALYSIS OF THE BOARD OF STUDIES' MEMBERSHIP 1952 - 1958.

Between 1952 and 1958 there were thirty Members in all, twenty-six of whom possessed Who's Who entries, that is just over 86%. The remaining four non-listed Members were:

Miss Peter ADY - no reliable information available, but she acted as Secretary to the Board.

Rev. Philip EASTMAN - A representative from, and one time Secretary of the Christian Missionary Society.

A HANRANI - 'A statutory black' (Philip Mason).

Dr. Marcus JAMES - 'A statutory black' (Philip Mason).

Both Sir Iveston Macadum and C.M. Woodhouse (then heir to the 4th Baron Tevrington) were, like the Chairmen of RIIA, ex officio Members of the Board of Studies. They, unlike the Chairmen, and as Director-Generals of RIIA, have been included in the analysis because, as well as exerting some considerable influence on the Board, they both attended meetings and held numerous discussions with Philip Mason, the Board's Director of Studies.

Lord Hailey was the first Chairman of the Board of Studies, from 1952 - 1954; and H.V. Hodson succeeded him and continued in the post until 1958, when the Board became an independent Institute, and its Members formed the core of the IRR Council.

PART 1

General Findings

(i) Education: The general educational backgrounds of Board of Studies' Members appear to have several common features. Twenty-four of the twenty-six Who's Who listed attended 'distinguished' public schools either in the United Kingdom or colonies; only one Member, Professor Sir Raymond Firth, went to a Grammar School. Of this figure, twenty-two went on to Oxford or Cambridge, and two to London University, (London School of Economics). In other words only two Who's Who listed Members did not receive a higher education at an established University: Sir Ronald Prain and Sir John Slessor. The latter, the then Marshall of the Royal Airforce, received a specialised further education at the Imperial (Military) College of Defence, and Sir Ronald, a Rhodesian industrialist, probably went straight from Cheltenham College into business. As a percentage of the twenty-six Who's Who listed we can conclude that approximately 96% went to both public/private schools and on to university - mainly to Oxford or Cambridge (88%).

(ii) Employment: The pattern here is as interesting as that to be found in education. All twenty-six Members were, at one time or another, former public/civil servants (100%); mainly engaged in the colonial/commonwealth, diplomatic/foreign services, or employed in the various 'Intelligence' divisions of the old Ministry of Information. Only two were actively engaged in formal politics, although nearly all possessed informal links with the political establishment, in either the capacity as 'advisors', members of the House of Lords, or through association on other voluntary bodies and at their respective 'clubs'. A further six were well-known international

businessmen, holding a minimum of seventy-five company directorships - a group of companies, which, mainly specialising in colonial trading operations, were to become the backbone of IRR corporate subscribers, accounting in the initial years for more than 90% of IRR's operating funds. As to be expected, nineteen Members had during their careers been either employed on a full-time or part-time basis as lecturers, teachers, researchers, fellows, and a further seventeen had been engaged as staff or free-lance journalists.

(iii) Voluntary Appointments: These, by and large, appear to be extensions of Members' professional interests. Although all Members were involved in two or more voluntary organisations, apart from the Board of Studies and later IRR, the interesting, and most significant findings to emerge were that all (100%) were members of organisations, advisory committees and so on which possessed distinct colonial/commonwealth interests or were established to 'improve' colonial/commonwealth relations. In fact twenty-two (84%) of Who's Who listed Members were members of groups and committees which sought to improve the state of race relations in either the colonies or the United Kingdom. Further, these interests were an important aspect of membership recruitment to both the Board of Studies and early IRR. For example, whilst Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders was Chairman of the Colonial Office sponsored Colonial Social Science Research Council, from 1948 - 1952, and Lord Hailey before that from 1943 - 1948, many of the academics on the Board of Studies and IRR Council were also members of the CSSRC. More research is needed to verify this and other similar connections fully before we can be at all definitive about 'interlocking committee memberships'. But, at this

stage, however, there is sufficient evidence (33.3% of Board of Studies' Members were CSSRC Members) to suggest that the connections were 'meaningful' in terms of recruitment, and, for our analysis, in terms of the conception of the 'problem', the role of research, and so on.

(iv) Clubs: In much the same way as voluntary body membership, club membership also tells us something about Members' conceptions of 'the problem', social reality, and life styles. It is not the 'get away from the wife' aspect that interests us here, but rather that club membership can be viewed as indicative of life styles, a way of doing things, social acceptance, and respectability. It can be viewed as a support structure which sustains and perpetuates middle and upper middle class values, beliefs, and perceptions of realities. the Masonian recruitment rule: 'he belongs to Club X, took a first in a, b, or c at Balliol after leaving Winchester and is well known to members d, e, and f, etc.', finds a measure of endorsement in club membership. For instance, twenty-three of the twenty-six Who's Who listed were members of 'leather-chaired' London clubs (88%), and between them they held at least thirty-seven individual club memberships. The most popular club was the Atheneaum, a scholarly establishment in which two of its Members once counted all the 70,000 books with a feather duster, (See Bernard Levin's review of The Atheneaum in the Observer, 7th March, 1976), and which accounted for ten or 40% of the club membership. Six members belonged to the clubs 'next door', Brook's and Travellers, and between them the three clubs possessed fourteen Board of Studies Members or 56% of the Who's Who listed. It was therefore possible, as did happen quite often, to hold 'informal' Board of Studies' meetings over lunch at one of the three clubs.

The significance of this takes on a new light when it is remembered that Philip Mason's normal practice was to spend four nights at home in Romsey, Hampshire and three nights a week at his London club, The Travellers, which was convenient because it was just down the road from the office'.

(v) Public Distinctions: During their careers all Members received at least three 'public distinctions', ranging from OBEs, MBEs, and Knighthoods to honorary degrees from universities all over the world - particularly from Oxbridge, the colonies and commonwealth, and most interestingly from South Africa, (University of Witwatersrand). As well as an indication of social standing - Lord Hailey had 22 public distinctions; Carr-Saunders 14; Mason 4, etc,-the number of public distinctions have been interpreted in this study as also an indication of the kind of authority and power Members possessed.

Although these findings give us a general picture of Board of Studies' Members, they are not at all conclusive. Not only do we need more detailed information (see Part 2 below), but we also need to show, as argued in this study, that social 'careers' or personal social biographies are meaningful and significant in terms of social action, that is that there exists a relationship between an actor's social biography, lifestyle, and the actions he or she performs individually or collectively.

PART 2

Education

As we have seen the educational background of Members appears to follow a distinct pattern: from a 'recognised' public school - to either Oxford or Cambridge Universities.

(i) School: Of the 26 Who's Who listed Members, twenty-four (96%) attended recognised public schools; whereas the corresponding figures for Board of Studies' Members as a whole were twenty-four out of thirty (80%). This figure, and indeed all figures in this Appendix, represent a minimum percentage, for it is conceivable that any of the four non Who's Who listed Members could have - and most likely did - all received a public school education or study at Oxbridge.

From a preliminary analysis of schools (see Table 1) five (20%) of the Who's Who listed went to Winchester, and a further three (12%) attended Marlborough College, making a total of eight (32%) or just under a third of all Who's Who listed Members. A further five Members received schooling abroad (the Colonies or Dominions) at prominent public/private establishments (see Table 2). This figure of 20% of the Who's Who listed membership who received a 'colonial education' is based upon the assumptions that Professor Sir Keith Hancock, who was born in Melbourne, actually received his education in that City, and that it was of a private/public kind. The evidence that has guided our assuming this is that most of the 'academic' schools in Melbourne are of a public/private kind; that these schools do grant scholarships; and that, finally, Hancock's career - an academic certainly from the age of twenty-six onwards; Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford, 1924 - 1930 - suggests not only that he went directly from school to university, but also that he was an academically 'bright' child. Thus we have assumed that he attended one of Melbourne's private/public schools as either a fee-paying pupil or scholar.

In terms of our analysis however, and the construction of an 'ideal-typical' member, what is important is that a significant percentage received a 'colonial education'. When this is taken together with another important finding, which will be later discussed under the heading 'colonial interests', we shall be able to assess fully its real significance.

Of the remaining thirteen members (52%), it can be seen from Table 1 that the majority of them attended prestigious English public schools, ranging from Eaton (Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders), to the military ('Imperial College') school at Haileybury, where Sir John Slessor, Marshall of the Royal Air Force, was a pupil. What was interesting in 1958 was that only one Member went to Eaton. After 'independence', the official establishment of IRR, at least six of the IRR Council Members were old Etonians.

TABLE 1

SCHOOLS ATTENDED BY BOARD OF STUDIES MEMBERS

Schools	No.	% of Who's Who listed	% of all Members
Winchester	5	20	16.5
Marlborough College	3	12	10.0
* Colonial Schools	5	20	16.5
Others			
Eaton	1	4	3.3
Hackney Downs	1	4	3.3
Merchant Taylors	1	4	3.3
Durham School	1	4	3.3
Greshams School	1	4	3.3
Stowe	1	4	3.3
Sedburgh	1	4	3.3
Melville College	1	4	3.3
Cheltenham	1	4	3.3
Rhoedean	1	4	3.3
Haileybury	1	4	3.3
Wellington College	1	4	3.3
Total	25	100%	82%

* See Table 2

TABLE 2

COLONIAL SCHOOLS ATTENDED

School	Colonial Territory/Dominion
Christs College	New Zealand
Auckland Grammar School	New Zealand
Harrison College	Barbados
A Melbourne School	Australia
College of St. Columba	Ireland (Eire)

Notes:

(i) See above for an explanation of 'a Melbourne School' (Sir Keith Hancock).

(ii) Although the school Professor Sir Raymond Firth attended, Auckland Grammar School, is named a Grammar School and has been recorded as such in Appendix A (ii) 'Social Biographies of Board Members, 1952 - 1958', the actual status of it is more akin to an English Direct-Grant than to a provincial grammar school.

(iii) We have included the College of St. Columba (Professor Nicholas Manseigh) here rather than in the list of United Kingdom public schools (Table 1) because Ireland, certainly since if not before the potato famine in the 1840s, has been treated by the British, and possibly by a minority of the Irish as a 'colonial territory'.

(ii) University: Of the twenty-six Who's Who listed Members, twenty-four (96%) went on to university: fifteen to Oxford, seven to Cambridge and two to London (Kings College/London School of Economics), (See Table 3). Two of the Members who went to Cambridge - Sir Iveston Macadum and Professor Margaret Read - also took further degrees at London; the former at Kings College and the latter at the London School of Economics.

Three Oxford Colleges - Christ Church, Balliol, New - 'educated' nine (36%) of the Members who went up to Oxford; whereas at Cambridge, the only College which appears more than once in our data is Trinity (8%).

Although little can be deduced about the word views of individual Members from this kind of research, without making, in our opinion, untenable assumptions about the nature of individuals and individual institutions (colleges), what can be said, however, when taken in conjunction with schools attended, and other data relating to clubs, employment and general interests is that:

(a) A definite pattern, reflecting middle to upper middle class lifestyles, emerges.

(b) An Oxbridge background may not have been an absolute necessity as a qualification for membership, but it was probably a critical factor in assessing competence, interests and social acceptability.

(c) The Oxbridge background helped, we suggest, to maintain institutional academic responsibility, authority, prestige and support. Here, of course, twin assumptions are being made that Oxbridge tends to produce the most 'distinguished academics' and that other people see this as being so. Whether

or not this twin assumption is valid is not in our research context very important, for what matters is that the majority of the Board and subsequent IRR Council Members believed it to be the case.

TABLE 3

UNIVERSITY ATTENDED

University	No.	As % of Who's Who listed	As % of all Members
Oxford	15	60%	50.0%
Cambridge	7	28%	23.3%
London	2	4%	6.6%
Total	24	96%	79.9%

TABLE 4

OXBRIDGE COLLEGES ATTENDED

Oxford	No.	% of Who's Who	% of all Members	Cambridge	No.	% of Who's Who	% of all Members
Christ Church	3	12%	10%	Trinity	2	8%	6.6%
Balliol	3	12%	10%	Pembroke	1	4%	3.3%
New	3	12%	10%	Downing	1	4%	3.3%
Magdalen	1	4%	3.3%	Corpus Christi	1	4%	3.3%
Corpus Christi	1	4%	3.3%	Kings	1	4%	3.3%
All Souls	1	4%	3.3%	Newnham	1	4%	3.3%
Brasenose	1	4%	3.3%				
Pembroke	1	4%	3.3%				
* N. College	1	4%	3.3%				
TOTAL	15	60%	50%		7	28%	23.3%

* No actual college listed for Sir Martin Grubb, although he has been an honorary Fellow of St. Peters since its inauguration.

Employment

From the previous Appendix, it can be seen that Members tended to gravitate towards four main areas of employment: public/civil service, politics, academic, journalism and industry. What was particularly interesting was the amount of overlap between employment areas. Further analysis

revealed that the three main areas of overlap were public/civil service, academic and journalism. Although it is a fairly easy and acceptable task to combine careers in academia and journalism, the critical employment area which largely accounted for this high degree of overlapping appeared to be that of the public/civil service. With retirement age in the colonial section of the field optional after the age of forty-five or twenty years service, it seemed that many Members still felt themselves to be young and alert enough to take up a former career option or embark upon an entirely new one.

Another general feature was that the 'careers' of Members, yet again, tended to reflect a middle to upper middle class lifestyle - not just because of the kind of employment area chosen, but because of the degree of interchange that existed. This lifestyle pattern was further supported by the 'level of entry' into the various employment areas. With, perhaps, the academic field being the only exception, entry into the colonial field 'abroad' or 'at home', and into other branches of government service was invariably at the 'administrative' level and, within this Diplomatic and Civil Service grade, at a point higher than normal graduate entry. All Members who did active war service entered the services as commissioned officers. And looking at the first jobs of staff journalists and industrialists, we found much the same pattern.

Thus from our date in Appendix A(i) we can make the following general conclusions:

(i) All Who's Who listed Members undertook public service jobs, of one kind or another, during their careers.

(ii) Those who left the public/civil service on retirement or before favoured second careers in politics, academia, journalism or industry.

(iii) Entry into first, second and in some cases third and fourth, careers - with the exception of academics pursuing only an academic career, apart from wartime public or 'active' service breaks - was at high or senior (managerial) level.

(iv) That, probably, assumptions made about educational and family backgrounds - that is school and university attended; family connections of a colonial, gentry and/or 'public' kind and so on - accounted for (iii) above. Although this is an assumption-based conclusion, and therefore tentative, evidence from interviews conducted however does suggest that it can be substantiated.

(v) All Members possessed an acquaintance, if no more, with the field of journalism and publishing; either as staff members, freelance journalists, contributors to specialist journals, periodicals and so on, or as authors - see Table 5.

(i) Public Service: From Appendix A(ii)(b) it is clear that colonial service abroad (CA) or at home (CH) is a significant feature. Sixteen Who's Who listed Members (64%) were engaged in the colonial service abroad for more than three years; and fifteen (60%) at home (See Table 6). The abroad placements were mainly in India, the 'Empire', rather than in the West Indies or Africa, although Board Members were recruited from each colonial area. Statistically, however, the Indian Empire connection (ICS) was significant. Both Chairmen of the Board, Lord Hailey and H.V. Hodson, and the Director, Philip Mason, had served in the Indian Colonial Service, all distinguishing themselves in their 'first' careers. Socially, ICS service

proved to be an important contact-recruitment point, as well as providing an administrative model for Board of Studies and, later, IRR organisation. The relationship between experience (career) and outlook, world views, is still highly problematic and from this kind of data inconclusive. But from interviews held with Board and subsequent Council Members, the published writings of Hailey, Hodson and Mason in particular, there is again sufficient evidence to suggest that outlook or world views - and hence the role of research, Board of Studies and IRR - were largely informed by career experience and the views of those Members responsible in part for the administration and maintenance of the Empire.

This finding too applies to those who were engaged in the Colonial service at home, mainly in the Diplomatic, Foreign, and Colonial offices, and the Empire Division of the Ministry of Information. Of the fifteen employed in these 'colonial departments' between 1925 and 1955, ten (40%) had also done some colonial service abroad. The other six (24%) of the Who's Who listed Members were mainly people who had opted either to do their war service in one branch or another of the colonial service, or, as experts (academics) in colonial or commonwealth offices, were recruited or asked to act as 'advisers'. If this group is therefore included under our 'colonial connection' heading, we can see that at least twenty-two (88%) of the twenty-six Who's Who listed Members were engaged in some capacity, at home or abroad, in the colonial service. In the further analysis below, 'the colonial tie', which supports this conclusion, an attempt will be made to try and isolate more precisely the kind of connection each Member possessed with the colonial world.

But in the meantime, our third public/civil service heading, Government, has been raised to assess the web-like spread of contacts throughout the Government departments, an important feature as we have seen in this study in terms of 'getting things done', authority, and respectability building. Preliminary analysis shows that nearly all the major government departments were represented in the Board of Studies between 1952 and 1958 by senior civil servants, and that thirteen members (52%) had either 'done time', as more than one member put it, in a government department or pursued careers as professional civil servants. What is interesting about this finding is that (a) Mason and others considered such a background as an essential qualification for membership; (b) that a hardcore of members chose the Foreign Office and Colonial and Commonwealth Office and the Diplomatic Service as career starting, and in some cases, finishing points; and (c) that the government service appeared to symbolise public dedication, respect for authority and a sense of national interests, to Board and IRR Council members alike.

All these latter points were further supported by 'war service'. At least twenty (80%) of Members took part in 'defending the nation'; the other five (20%) either possessed legitimate reasons for not doing so (too young, too old), or were contributing in a way that was acceptable, but not classified as 'war service' - in teaching, industry and so on. That the majority of Members had contributed at a senior level in one way or another to the war effort became in Hodson's words 'a good indication that they believed in what we were trying to do: they had the interests of our country at home and abroad constantly in mind'.

(ii) Politics: Although only two (8%) Members were active politicians, that is Members of Parliament, nearly all the Members, through public/civil service appointments at a senior level, were indirectly involved in political life.

(iii) Academia: This employment area is, of course, one which most people would expect to be highly represented on a 'research body'. Over eighteen (72%) of Who's Who listed Members were either actively pursuing academic lives, or had in the past been employed by educational institutions. Sixteen (64%) of them were employed by universities, and the remaining two (8%) were working for private, non-university, research institutes, (see Table 7). The actual disciplines represented included History, Politics, Social Anthropology, and Classics (turned social commentators). The absence of sociologists (apart from the social anthropologists, who did not regard themselves as being sociologists) can be accounted for in a number of ways. Firstly, most of the early work on 'race' had been done by anthropologists; secondly, the relationship between the anthropological and colonial experiences was such that the point of contact and reference by the colonists and colonial public/civil servants was by and large with anthropologists rather than sociologists; and, finally, sociologists were considered to be non or anti-academic, that is non 'scientific', generalists - a feeling towards sociologists which remained throughout the life of the Board of Studies and the IRR up until 1972, (see the first article in the first edition of RACE, November 1959, in which Sociologist Michael Banton makes a plea for more 'sociological consideration' Thus the academic disciplinary context of the Board of Studies, although ostensibly 'multi' and 'inter', was largely provided by the historian (Oliver, Hancock, Toynbee and Mansergh), the social anthropologist, (Firth, Read, Freedman), and gentlemen

scholars whose training in Greats at Oxbridge according to Mason more or less equipped them for any job or task at hand.

Further, the recruitment of academics to the Board of Studies was mainly at a professorial level, a level which assured for the Board immediate academic respectability, academic authority, a certainty regarding the mutually understood but often non-explicated political perspectives to be employed in all research, and also assured a sound, tried and tested approach towards 'scholarship'. In this category ten (40%) of Members were in chairs or had held chairs in universities, and the remaining eight (32%) were considered to be either of professorial ranking in their specialised fields or, as Hodson put it, 'on their way to the top of the academic tree'. The academic group, for instance, included the then present and a future Director of the London School of Economics, two directors of the School of African and Oriental Studies, a Master of St. John's College, Cambridge, a number of Oxbridge professors, and several governors of the London School of Economics and other educational institutions. (See Table 8 : As can also be seen from this Table, the eleven 'professorial' Members of the Board of Studies held between them, during their careers, at least seventeen chairs, one acting chair, and four directorships of established research institutes).

TABLE 5

EMPLOYMENT AREAS

Area	No.	% of Who's Who Listed	% of all Members
Public/civil service	26	100%	86.3%
Politics	2	8%	6.6%
Academia	18	72%	60.0%
Journalism	20	80%	66.6%
Industry	6	24%	20.0%

TABLE 6

EMPLOYMENT : PUBLIC/CIVIL SERVICE

Type	No.	% of Who's Who Listed	% of all Members
Colonial Service abroad	16	64%	53.3%
Colonial Service at home	15	60%	50.0%
Other Government Departments	13	52%	43.3%
War	20	80%	66.6%

TABLE 7

EMPLOYMENT : ACADEMIA

Type	No.	% of Who's Who Listed	% of all Members
University	16	64%	53.3%
Private Research Institutes	4	16%	13.3%
Other (Schools, Colleges, etc.)	2	8%	6.6%

(iv) Journalism: The relationship between the 'twin' worlds of academia and journalism/publishing is both obvious and, again, one to be expected in a research body where a central part of its work concerned the production of 'publications' and the publishing of academic papers and articles. Thus the high proportion of free-lance journalist members (twenty, or 80%) and the even higher proportion of those linked through publications/publishing (twenty-four or 96%), to the profession, is no surprise. What is perhaps, is the number of staff journalists that were recruited to the Board of Studies, including the editor of the Sunday Times, (Hodson), the Colonial and Foreign Affairs Editor of the Times, (Woods) an Assistant Editor of the Sunday Observer, (Sampson) and a number of editors of specialist magazines; a group which accounted for five (20%) of the membership. (See Table 9). Remembering that the original idea for an independent Institute came from the Editor of the Sunday Times,

H.V. Hodson, it is possible to conclude from this fact and data gained from an interview with the former Editor that journalist members were suggested and recruited by him; that it was considered that high ranking journalists specialising in colonial and foreign affairs had much expertise to offer of a topical, impressionistic and political kind; that the Institute's foundation resulted more from a political-journalistic initiative than an academic one - that is academics were 'grafted' on at a later stage - and thus the staff journalist group always remained significant throughout the history of the Board and Institute Council; and, finally, that the editorial journalists functioned not only as indicators and purveyors of current political thought and development on 'the problem', but also as communicators with the political establishment - a task that could not be carried out as effectively by the public/civil service Members. The role played by professional journalists as detailed in various places in this study was therefore crucial and the prominence of Members with journalistic experience on the Board was to be as much expected as those who possessed industrial experience and expertise.

TABLE 9

EMPLOYMENT : JOURNALISM

Type	No.	% of Who's Who Listed	% of all Members
Staff	5	20%	16.6%
Freelance	20	80%	66.6%
Other *	24	96%	80.0%

* This generalised heading represents an attempt to ascertain just how many Members possessed press/publishing contacts through published work - an important factor in terms of assessing the role of the press/journalism in authority-building; and, in the case of the career of IRR, after 1958. It also includes Members who were governors and members of the Advisory Council at the BBC.

TABLE 10

EMPLOYMENT : INDUSTRY

Type	No.	% of Who's Who Listed	% of all Members
Overseas based	4	16%	13.3%
Home based	5	20%	16.6%
Upper Management	6	24%	20.0%
Directors/Chairmen	5	20%	16.6%
Total Employed.	6	24%	20.0%

(v) Industry: In all six Members (24%) were working in industry: four (16%) were connected with firms with extensive overseas (colonial) interests and five (20%) with United Kingdom or European based firms, all with substantial overseas trading interests, although primarily concerned with 'home' workers. In all seventy-five traceable directorships were held between them, a fact that helps to explain why several Members feature in each column in Table 10. Although it has not been possible to carry out any detailed analysis on 'directorships', it does appear that a high percentage (70%) of the traceable directorships were directly concerned with South African, Rhodesian and East African Federation commercial and industrial interests - a finding not only supported in Appendix C on 'Corporate Supporters', but also supported by Mason who admitted that between 1952 and 1958, all donations came 'from firms with African interests'.

As is to be expected, all of the industrial Members held senior executive posts, and all but one were chairmen or directors - and in many cases, both.

What emerges from these findings in the five employment areas is the high degree of interchangeability and connectedness - or bedfellowship, a fact which only can possibly be explained in terms of 'agreement' over 'aims', 'objectives' which, in turn, were derived from how IRR founders saw 'the problem' in relation to both their own and the country's interests. Total identification with the 'democratic-liberal order' ('Western civilisation'), nurtured at school 'up' through university, and through the colonial public/civil service, and extending beyond that into other fields of employment, seemed to be then a crucial qualification for Board of Studies, and later, IRR Council membership.

Club Membership

The belonging to a particular club(s) is no proof in itself that the individual member possesses certain interests or views on certain subjects - unless the club, like the Alpine, or Naval and Military Club, is subject or interest oriented to a point where membership is dependent upon a formal declaration of 'interests' and types of employment experiences. But what can be said, in general terms, is that club membership and 'regular' attendance is to some extent indicative of a particular kind of life-style, normally associated with the upper middle classes. In as far as this is 'true', and in as far as club membership was seen by other Board of Studies/IRR Members as being an indicator of 'character', 'suitability', 'influence' and so on, then it is necessary to consider it as yet another common social feature, which appeared to characterise Members as a distinctive upper-middle class elite group.

From our research on Club Membership it soon became evident that the range of club memberships included many of the most distinguished 'leather-chair' London Clubs. Including the House of Commons and Lords, classified as one club here, eighteen London-based and two country based clubs made up the impressive list. Twenty-two (88%) of the Who's Who listed maintained a minimum of thirty-seven club memberships between them (see Tables 11 and 12), averaging out at just under two clubs per Member. The most popular club appeared to be the Athenaeum, probably because of its literary, philosophical and scholarly associations, with the Travellers (colonial and commonwealth interests) and Brooks (the oldest and most 'established' of them all) jointly showing as the second most popular.

Athenaeum: The most august of the big clubs, it is housed in a big stucco building, behind the golden goddess Athene, facing the senior (United Service Club) in Waterloo Place. Unsociable and uncomfortable, it is a place 'where all the arts and sciences are understood', said Russell in 1906, 'except gastronomy'. Members always walk up the right hand broad staircase, which necessitates changing the carpets round each year so as to wear both down equally. According to Anthony Sampson, both a Board of Studies and IRR Member, and to "Chivas", (C. Graves, Leather Armchairs : the Chivas Regal Book of London Clubs, Cassell, London, 1963):

> "The Athenaeum retains an atmosphere of bleak and uncomfortable wisdom: a bust of Charles Darwin broods over the hall, and the Greek letters, Alpha, Theta Eta evoke intimidating memories. Moreover there is always a cluster of bishops, and the club is never without episcopal activity on a Trollopean scale. (Trollope himself used to write his novels in the long drawing room before breakfast...)

> "For all its dignity, it is not above intrigue: members have complained that they could hardly hear themselves talk above the noise of lobbying - particularly for university grants: the Athenaeum is the favourite meeting place for Vice-Chancellors. It is also a centre for a very unclubbable breed - the scientists who use it as a base for maneouvre and fundraising. 'The last war was run by the Athanaeum on one side (of Waterloo Place,) with the scientists and civil servants, and the Senior on the other, with the admirals and generals': one scientist explained, 'since they all talked very loudly, it wasn't difficult to discover what was going on'."
> (Anthony Sampson, Anatomy of Britain, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1962, p.70.)

In all, ten Board of Studies Members (40%) belonged to the Athenaeum.

Travellers: This Club was founded in 1819 with the support of the Duke of Wellington, whose portraits clutter the walls. One of the stringent membership qualifications was, and still is, that all proposed members had to show that they had travelled at least five hundred miles from London. It is very conscious of its dignity and colonial/Empire associations. It has tall West Indian waiters and menus with a silhouette of Ulysesses.

> "Diplomats with their careful arrogance set the tone. Usually the Foreign Office is well represented on the Club Committee; and so misbehaviour in the Club is a double disaster.

> A few friendly men are crammed into an underground bar: but the chandaliered dining room and coffee room are full of supercilious second secretaries... In the summer holidays, the Garrick, where members are expected to speak to each other, shares with the Travellers, where conversation with someone you don't know is virtually forbidden. 'I always know when the Garrick's shut', said one veteran Traveller, 'You hear laughter in the bar of the Travellers'." (Anthony Sampson, op cit.)

In all, three (12%) of the Board of Studies Members belonged to the Travellers. (This number was to increase rapidly, after 'independence', that is after 1958).

Brooks: A more sociable and arrogant 18th century Club in St. James Street. Founded in 1764, and frequented by Fox, it was the scene of reckless gambling by the whig aristocrats in Regency times: George Drummond, of Drummonds Bank, lost £20,000 to Beau Brummel and had to resign from the Bank. It is now mainly conservative and much less reckless; but, according to Sampson, it keeps a certain style, and boasts the best hall-porter in London: "Bored-looking men stand in front of a blazing fire".

Like the Travellers, three (12%) of Members belonged to Brooks's. Two Members (8%) belonged to the United University (Oxbridge), a Club which refuses to admit Members from London University - united against universities - and which has book rests on all the lunch tables. And a further two Members (8%) belonged to the Naval and Military.

TABLE 11

CLUB MEMBERSHIPS (a)

Club	No.	% of Who's Who Listed
Athenaeum	10	40%
Travellers	3	12%
Brooks's	3	12%
House of Commons/Lords	3	12%
United University	2	8%
Naval and Military	2	8%
M.C.C.	1	4%
Pratts	1	4%
Carlton	1	4%
Alpine	1	4%
Reform	1	4%
National Liberal	1	4%
Canning	1	4%
Nikean	1	4%
Whites	1	4%
Saville	1	4%
Beefsteak	1	4%
R.A.F.	1	4%
Norfolk	1	4%
University (Dublin)	1	4%

TABLE 12

CLUB MEMBERSHIP (b)

Type	No.	% of Who's Who Listed	% of all Members
Club Members	22	88%	73.3%
* Core Club Members	14	56%	46.6%

* This category is made up of Members belonging to the Athenaeum, Travellers or Brooks's, less cross-memberships. (Sir John Barnes and Philip Mason).

Colonial Interests : Voluntary Appointments

TABLE 13

'COLONIAL' VOLUNTARY APPOINTMENTS

Type	No.	% of Who's Who Listed	% of all Members
Colonial Social Science Research Council	10	40%	33.3%
(Royal) Colonial/ Commonwealth Societies	22	88%	73.3%
Colonial/Commonwealth Commissions	14	56%	46.6%

One of the problems of attempting to ascertain 'colonial interests', and ultimately the colonial tie or connection (see below), through employment patterns - in our case the public/civil service area - is that many Members, after leaving the various branches of the colonial service, either embarked upon new professions or switched jobs after the start of decolonisation in 1948. Thus the following of employment careers is not always an enlightening or accurate exercise in helping to find out the continuing degree of 'colonial interests'. A further guideline - and it can only serve as such - needs to be employed; thus our reason for raising the heading of colonial voluntary appointments.

Under this heading, we have not restricted our research to the years in which Members sat on the Board of Studies, but have extended it before and beyond the 1950s in order to ascertain whether or not voluntary association commitments were of an ephemeral or permanent kind. In all cases we found they were of the latter, partly, no doubt, to be explained in terms of social background (the charity-supporting tradition to be found amongst upper middle class social groups), and, partly, we believe, in terms of a commitment to causes, based on a number of beliefs about the quality and extension of 'western civilisation' (order).

Although the number of voluntary associations were interesting, averaging at least four per Member and ranging across all the fields of social, political, cultural and economic activity, we have tried to concentrate on one specific body, the Colonial Social Science Research Council, and two general areas of involvement: (Royal) Colonial and Commonwealth societies, organisations and groups (RCS) and membership of national or international commissions, committees, and other bodies established to enquire into colonial or commonwealth 'matters'. The narrowing down of research to one specific and two general areas naturally possesses

disadvantages, but we think it is probably sufficient to suggest that 'colonial interests', and hence the experiential framework in which views and ideas are formulated, supported, and acted upon, extend far beyond early socialisation settings, (home, school, university), and employment areas.

All twenty-five Who's Who listed Members either sat on the CSSRC, were active Members of Colonial and Commonwealth Societies, or served on one or more colonial/commonwealth commissions, committees or advisory bodies. (See Table 13).

At least ten (40%) of the Members were also Members of the Colonial Social Science Research Council, a body which was established and sponsored by, and met at the Colonial Office. In fact the Chairman (Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders) and Secretary (Sir Professor Raymond Firth) of the CSSRC were also prominent Members of the Board of Studies. It would seem then that the CSSRC not only acted as a recruitment point, but also complemented the Board of Studies' work. Because of this significant overlapping or interlocking membership factor, it can be reasonably assumed that: (a) areas of interest were similar; (b) approaches and perspectives were not at all unalike; (c) government colonial policy affected both, that is in terms of both subject area and political orientation; (d) problems for research were in part determined, in both cases, by equatable considerations, that is the squaring of research proposals with governmental, industrial and general colonial interests, e.g. problems of adaptation, the transfer of 'democratic' institutions, and so on; (e) the degree of interlocking, added authority and prestige to both; and finally, (f) both, through funding, could effectively control the kind of research favoured.

Whereas membership of the CSSRC to some extent reflected academic and research interests and orientations, it could be said that membership to (Royal) Colonial and Commonwealth societies reflected more clearly the social, cultural and quasi-political

(or colonial) interests of Board of Studies Members. An example of the bodies included under our RCS heading were: The Royal Commonwealth Society, The Royal African Society, The African Studies Association, The Indian Civil Service (Retirement) Association, The East Indian Association, The Rhodes Trust, and The British Council. Of all the bodies the two which featured most regularly were The Royal African Society and The Royal Commonwealth Society, bodies which several Board of Studies Members served on as ordinary Executive Council Members, Presidents, Vice Presidents and Chairmen.

Twenty-two of Who's Who listed Members (88%) were not only Members of various Colonial/Commonwealth bodies, but also served on one or more of these bodies in a voluntary executive capacity, that is as officers, Executive Committee or Council Members (N.B. We have only traced positions held rather than ordinary membership, as this appeared to give a more significant picture of 'colonial interests' and colonial commitments than 'ordinary' membership).

Under our Colonial/Commonwealth Commissions heading, we have included such bodies as: the Commission on University Education in Malaya; the Commission on Higher Education for Africans in Central Africa; the Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies; the Commission of Enquiry to examine problems of Minorities in Nigeria; the Commission of Churches on International Affairs; the Overseas Migration Board; the Commission of Development of British Guiana and Honduras; the League of Nations' Permanent Mandates Commission; Economic Mission to Belgian Congo; Commission on Constitutional Reform in British Guiana; Sudan; and other colonial areas. Although many Members served on more than one such body, at least fourteen (56%) of Members served on one. Broadly speaking the Commissions fell into four general headings: education (well represented); economic and industrial; social (excluding education but including poverty); and political and constitutional.

Ostensibly, all of them were established either to investigate or recommend how the 'native's lot' could be improved.

We would therefore conclude that all Board of Studies Members possessed a highly developed sense of colonial interests, and that their participation at an executive level in the work of Colonial/commonwealth voluntary bodies, the CSSRC, and specialised Government Commissions tended to suggest that they felt strongly about not only the future of Britain's colonial Empire, but also about 'our civilisation' or the political and cultural stability of the Western order.

The Colonial Tie

In order to be a little more precise however about the nature of the Members' colonial tie or connection, we have attempted to show in Table 15 the kind of social connection that existed. From this Table based on a more detailed analysis of colonial interests, it is possible to see the relative status of each Member's 'connection' Obviously those Members who were born and/or educated in the colonies, worked in the colonial service (abroad), possessed family connections or married into colonial families, and sought or were honoured with voluntary appointments by bodies with specific colonial/commonwealth interests, possess a higher 'relative status' than those who were attached in only one, two, or three ways.

In this way we can see from Table 14 that nine (36%) of the Members were born or educated in the colonies; nineteen (76%) worked in a senior capacity in the colonial service; a further eleven (44%) possessed immediate family colonial connections or married into established colonial families; and finally, that all,

(100%) were engaged voluntarily in bodies with colonial and commonwealth interests.

From Table 15 it can be seen that we have attempted roughly to ascertain the nature of the colonial connection according to the number of 'colonial ties'. What becomes clear here is that the colonial connection can be roughly divided into two degrees of 'strength': the very strong, three or more ties, (eleven Members or 44%), and the strong, two ties (twelve or 48%). The weak connection is made all the weaker because the only traceable connection we have found is that through membership to a voluntary association. Naturally if the tie had been one of birth/education, work, or family, the status of Group A would have been somewhat different. As it stands then, Group A represents a virtual absence of colonial connection, though exhibits some colonial interests, whereas Groups B, C and D display a considerable degree of colonial connection and interests. Thus it can be concluded that at least twenty-one of the Members of 84% possessed substantial connections with the colonial world through, at least, two of the four ties listed above.

TABLE 14

THE COLONIAL TIE

Type	No.	% of Who's Who Listed	% of all Members
Born/educated	9	36%	30%
Colonial work	19	76%	63.3%
Family connection	11	44%	36.6%
Voluntary connection	26	100%	86.3%

TABLE 15

COLONIAL STATUS GROUPS*

Status	No.	% of Who's Who Listed	% of all Members
Group A (Voluntary association only)	2	8%	6.6%
Group B (2 ties)	12	48%	40.0%
Group C (3 ties)	7	28%	23.0%
Group D (4 ties)	5	20%	16.6%
Total	26	104% '	86.3%

* Groups A and D present no problems, other than the one of designation, but the other two are problematic, for contained within B is the possibility of at least six permutations and in C another five. We are sure this could be worked out more accurately through the use of statistical formulae or a computer, but here to help simplify we have given the Born/Educated and Family/ Marriage factors the same weighting in both Groups B and C.

' The 4% discrepancy here is due to the fact that we have taken one member to equal 4% of the Who's Who listed population.

A P P E N D I X ' B '

COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP

(i) Members of the IRR Council, 1958 - 1972.

(ii) Social Biographies of IRR Council Members, 1958 - 1972.

(iii) Race, Class, and Authority: An Analysis of IRR Council Membership, 1958 - 1972.

APPENDIX B (i)

MEMBERS OF THE IRR COUNCIL, 1958 - 1972

1958-1959: Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders, KBE, (Chairman); William Aitken, MP; Mrs. E.M. Chilver; Leslie Farrer-Brown, JP; Maurice Freedman, Ph.D.; Sir Kenneth Grubb, CMG, LL.D.; H.V. Hodson; The Rev. Marcus James, Ph.D.; J.E. MacColl, JP, MP; Philip Mason, CIE, OBE; Sir Ronald Prain, OBE; Sir Jeremy Raisman, GCIE, KCSI; Prof. Margaret Read, CBE, Ph.D.; Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir John Slessor, GCB, DSO, MC; J. Thompson, OBE; Oliver Woods, MC.

1959-1960: Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders, KBE, (Chairman); William Aitken, MP; Mrs. E.M. Chilver; Leslie Farrer-Brown, JP; Maurice Freedman, Ph.D.; Sir Kenneth Grubb, CMG, LL.D.; H.V. Hodson; The Rev. Marcus James, Ph.D.; J.E. MacColl, JP, MP; Philip Mason, CIE, OBE; Sir Ronald Prain, OBE; Sir Jeremy Raisman, GCIE, KCSI; Prof. Margaret Read, CBE, Ph.D.; Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir John Slessor, GCB, DSO, MC; J. Thompson, OBE; Oliver Woods, MC.

1960-1961: Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders, KBE, (Chairman); William T. Aitken, MP; Mrs. E.M. Chilver; Leslie Farrer-Brown, CBE, JP; Maurice Freedman, Ph.D.; Sir Kenneth Grubb, CMG, LL.D.; H.V. Hodson; The Rev. Marcus James, Ph.D.; J.H. Lascelles, OBE, TD; J.E. MacColl, JP, MP; Philip Mason, CIE, OBE; H.F. Oppenheimer; Sir Ronald Prain, OBE; Sir Jeremy Raisman, GCMG, GCIE, KCSI; Prof. Margaret Read; Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir John Slessor, GCB, DSO, MC; Oliver Woods, MC.

1961-1962: Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders, KBE, (Chairman); William T. Aitken, MP; Mrs. E.M. Chilver; Leslie Farrer-Brown, CBE; Maurice Freedman, Ph.D.; Sir Kenneth Grubb, CMG, LL.D.; H.V. Hodson; The Rev. Marcus James, Ph.D.; J.H. Lascelles, OBE, TD; J.E. MacColl, JP, MP; Philip Mason, CIE, OBE; H.F. Oppenheimer; Sir Ronald Prain, OBE; Sir Jeremy Raisman, GCMG, GCIE, KCSI; Prof. Margaret Read, CBE, Ph.D.; Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir John Slessor, GCB, DSO, MC; Oliver Woods, MC.

1962-1963: Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders, KBE, (Chairman); William T. Aitken, MP; Mrs. E.M. Chilver; Leslie Farrer-Brown, CBE, JP; Maurice Freedman, Ph.D.; Sir Kenneth Grubb, CMG, LL.D.; H.V. Hodson; The Rev. Marcus James, Ph.D.; J.H. Lascelles, OBE, TD; J.E. MacColl, JP, MP; Mrs. San Ntiro; Roland Oliver, MA, Ph.D.; H.F. Oppenheimer; The Rev. P.A. Potter; Sir Ronald Prain, OBE; Sir Jeremy Raisman, GCMG, GCIE, KCSI; Prof. Margaret Read, CBE, Ph.D; Anthony Sampson; Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir John Slessor, GCB, DSO, MC; Oliver Woods, MC.

1963-1964: Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders, KBE, (Chairman); M.H. CAine, (Hon. Treasurer); Mrs. E.M. Chilver; Leslie Farrer-Brown, CBE; Sir Kenneth Grubb, CMG, LL.D.; H.V. Hodson; The Rev. Dr. Marcus James; J.H. Lascelles, CBE, TD; J.E. MacColl, MP; Prof. Roland Oliver; H.F. Oppenheimer; The Rev. Philip A. Potter; Sir Ronald Prain, OBE; Sir Jeremy Raisman, GCMG, GCIE, KCSI; Prof. Margaret Read, CBE; Anthony Sampson; Oliver Woods, MC. Director: Philip Mason, CIE, OBE.

1964-1964 and 1965-1966: Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders, KBE, (President); Dr. Leslie Farrer-Brown, CBE, (Chairman); Sir Kenneth Grubb, CMG, LL.D.; H.V. Hodson; M.H. Caine; Mrs. E.M. Chilver; H.R. Finn; Dr. G. Ainsworth Harrison; Prof. Fernando Henriques; Richard Hornby, MP; Eric Irons, JP; Dr. H.S. Morris; Prof. Roland Oliver; H.F. Oppenheimer; The Rev. P.A. Potter; Sir Ronald Prain, OBE; Sir Jeremy Raisman, GCMG, GCIE, KCSI; Prof. Margaret Read, CBE; Frederic Seebohm; Prof. Hugh Tinker; Oliver Woods, MC.

1966-1967: Sir Jeremy Raisman, GCMG, GCIE, KCSI; and Oliver Woods, MC; (Vice Chairmen); Dr. Leslie Farrer-Brown, CBE; (Chairman); Sir Kenneth Grubb, CMG, LL.D.; (Vice Chairman); H.V. Hodson, (Vice Chairman); Michael H. Caine; Mark Bonham-Carter; P.H.A. Brownrigg; Sir Robert Birley, KCMG; H.R. Finn; Dr. G. Ainsworth Harrison; Prof. Fernando Henriques; C.R. Hensman; Prof. Hilde Himmelweit; Richard Hornby, MP; Eric Irons, JP; Anthony Lester; Dr. H.S. Morris; Dipak Nandy; Prof. Roland Oliver; H.F. Oppenheimer; Sir Ronald Prain, OBE; Prof. Margaret Read, CBE; Christopher Rowland, MP; Frederic Seebohm; Prof. Hugh Tinker

1967-1968: Sir Jeremy Raisman, GCMG, GCIE, KCSI; and Oliver Woods, MC; and H.V. Hodson (Vice Presidents); Lord Walston, JP; (Chairman); Sir Kenneth Grubb, CMG, LL.D.; (Vice Chairman); Michael H. Caine; P.H.A. Brownrigg; Sir Robert Birley, KCMG: Mark Bonham-Carter; Dr. Leslie Farrer-Brown, CBE; H.R. Finn; Dr. G. Ainsworth Harrison; Prof. Fernando Henriques; C.R. Hensman; Prof. Hilde Himmelweit; Richard Hornby, MP; Eric Irons, JP; Anthony Lester; Dr. H.S. Morris; Dipak Nandy; Prof. Roland Oliver; H.F. Oppenheimer; Sir Ronald Prain, OBE; Prof. Margaret Read, CBE, Frederic Seebohm; Prof. Hugh Tinker.

1968-1969: Dr. Leslie Farrer-Brown, CBE; Sir Kenneth Grubb, CMG, LL.D.; H.V. Hodson; Sir Jeremy Raisman, GCMG, GCIE, KCSI; Oliver Woods, MC; (Vice-Presidents); Lord Walston, JP; (Chairman) Sir Robert Birley, KCMG: (Vice Chairman); Michael H. Caine; P.H.A. Brownrigg; Mark Bonham Carter; Prof. Fernando Henriques; C.R. Hensman; Prof. Hilde Himmelweit; Richard Hornby, MP; Eric Irons, JP; Anthony Lester; Miss J. Lestor, MP; Dr. H.S. Morris; Dipak Nandy; Prof. Roland Oliver; H.F. Oppenheimer; F. Pedler; Sir Ronald Prain, OBE; Gordon Richardson, MBE; E.J.B. Rose; W.G. Runciman; Frederic Seebohm; Dr. David Stafford-Clark

1969-1970: Lord Walston, JP, (Chairman); Sir Robert Birley, KCMG; Michael H. Caine; Sir Edward Boyle, Bart, MP; P.H.A. Brownrigg, CMG, OBE, DSO; Mark Bonham Carter; Prof. J.B. Cullingworth; Prof. Fernando Henriques; C.R. Hensman; Prof. Hilde Himmelweit; Richard Hornby, MP; Anthony Lester; Miss J. Lestor, MP; Philip Mason, CIE, OBE; Dipak Nandy; Prof. Roland Oliver; H.F. Oppenheimer; Sir Frederick Pedler; Sir Ronald Prain, OBE; Gordon Richardson, MBE; E.J.B. Rose; W.G. Runciman; Sir Frederic Seebohm; Dr. David Stafford-Clark, FRCP; David Sieff.

1970-1971: Lord Walston JP, (Chairman); Sir Robert Birley, KCMG; Michael H. Caine; Lord Boyle; Mark Bonham Carter; Peter Calvocoressi; Prof. J.B. Cullingworth; Prof. Fernando Henriques; C.R. Hensman; Prof. Hilde Himmelweit; Richard Hornby, MP; Anthony Lester; Miss J. Lestor, MP; Dipak Nandy; Prof. Roland Oliver; H.F. Oppenheimer.

1971-1972: The Rev. Wilfred Wood, JP, (Chairman); Lord Avebury; Miss Stella Colkett; Mrs. Ann Dummett; Prof. Fernando Henriques; C.R. Hensman; Augustine John; Louis Kushnick; Robert S. Moore; Prof. John Rex; Vishnu D. Sharma; Douglas Tilbe, JP.

1972-1973: The Rev. Wilfred Wood, JP, (Chairman); Lord Avebury; Lee Bridges; Tony Bunyan; Stella Colkett; Alison R. Day; Lewis F. Donnelly; The Rev. John Downing; Ann Dummett; Lawrence Grant; Peter Hain; C.R. Hensman; Prof. Fernando Henriques; Augustine John; Louis Kushnick; John la Rose; Michael Lyon; Robert S. Moore; Sybil Pheonix, MBE; Prof. John Rex.

SOURCE: Taken from the Annual Reports of the Institute of Race Relations, 1958 - 1973.

APPENDIX B (ii)

SOCIAL BIOGRAPHIES OF IRR COUNCIL MEMBERS, 1958 - 1972

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	AGE	EDUCATION						EMPLOYMENT					VOLUNTARY APPOINTMENTS			CL	PD		CD	
			PB	G	O	OC	RB	OE	PS	Pol	I	AC	J	GV	CC	R			No		No
HODSON, Henry Vincent	12.5.06	66	*			*			*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	5	*	1
MASON, Philip	19.4.06	66	*			*			*			*	*	*	*	*	*	*	5		
CARR-SAUNDERS, Sir Alexander	86	80	*			*			*			*	*	*	*	*	*	*	14		
GRUBB, Sir Kenneth	9.9.00	72	*			*			*		*		*	*	*	*	*	*	6	*	2
FARRER-BROWN, Leslie	2.4.04	68	*				*		*		*			*	*	*	*	*	6	*	1
RAISMAN, Sir Jeremy	6.3.92	80		*		*			*		*			*	*		*	*	7	*	5
CAINE, Michael Harris	17.6.27	45	*			*					*			*	*		*			*	3
WOODS, Oliver	21.11.11	61	*			*			*				*	*	*	*	*	*	1		
PRAIN, Sir Ronald	3.9.07	65	*						*		*			*	*		*	*	7	*	12
OPPENHEIMER, Harry Frederick	23.10.08	64	*			*			*	*	*			*	*		*	*	6	*	12
SAMPSON, Anthony	3.8.26	46	*			*			*			*	*	*	*		*				
OLIVER, Prof. Roland	30.3.23	49	*			*			*			*		*	*	*					
MARCHANT, Sir Herbert	18.5.06	66	*			*			*	*				*	*	*	*	*	3		

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	AGE	EDUCATION						EMPLOYMENT					VOLUNTARY APPOINTMENTS			CL	PD		CD	
			PB	G	O	OC	RB	OE	PS	Pol	I	AC	J	GV	CC	R			No		No
TINKER, Prof. Hugh Russel	20.7.21	51	*			*			*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*	*			
ROSE, Eliot Joseph	7.6.09	63	*			*			*		*	*	*	*			*	*	2	*	2
READ, Prof. Margaret	89	83	*			*			*			*		*	*						
MALCOLL, J.	27.6.08	64	*			*			*	*			*	*	*		*				
POTTER, Rev. Philip	19.8.21	51		*			*							*	*	*					
JAMES, Rev. Dr. Marcus																					
LASCELLES, J.																					
AITKEN, Sir William	05	59	*					*	*					*	*		*	*	2	*	4
CHILVER, Mrs. Elizabeth Millicent	3.8.14	58	*			*			*			*	*	*	*			*			
FREEDMAN, Prof. Maurice	11.12.20	52	*				*		*			*	*	*	*	*		*			
SLESSOR, Sir John	3.6.97	75	*						*			*	*	*	*		*	*			
RICHARDS, Dr. Audrey	99	73	*			*			*			*		*	*	*	*	*	2		
JAHODA, Dr. Marie																					
TAVERNE, Dick	18.10.28	44	*			*			*	*			*	*			*				
THOMPSON, J.																					
SEEBOHM, Sir Frederick (Lord)	18.1.09	63	*			*			*		*			*	*	*	*	*	6	*	10
HORNBY, Richard	20.6.22	50	*			*			*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*		*	
HENRIQUES, Prof. Fernando	16	56	*			*			*			*	*	*	*	*	*				
BIRLEY, Sir Robert	14.7.03	69	*			*			*			*	*	*			*	*	10		
BROWNRIGG, Philip Henry	3.6.11	61	*			*			*		*		*	*			*	*	4	*	5

NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	AGE	EDUCATION						EMPLOYMENT					VOLUNTARY APPOINTMENTS			CL	PD		CD	
			PB	G	O	OC	RB	OE	PS	Pol	I	AC	J	GV	CC	R			No		No
BONHAM-CARTER, Mark	11.2.22	50	*			*			*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*	*		*	
LESTER, Anthony	3.7.36	36	*			*			*	*			*	*	*	*	*	*	2		
WALSTON, Lord	16.6.12	60	*			*			*	*	*			*	*	*	*	*	5	*	
HIMMELWEIT, Prof. Hilde	-		*			*			*			*	*	*							
HENSMAN, C.R.																					
RUNCIMAN, Walter G.	10.11.34	38	*			*					*	*	*	*			*			*	2
LESTOR, Joan	-				*		*		*	*				*	*	*					
IRONS, Eric																					
FINN, H.																					
MORRIS, Dr. H.																					
HARRISON, Dr. G. Ainsworth																					
NANDY, Dipak																					
ROWLAND, Christopher	26.9.29	38		*		*			*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*				
STAFFORD-CLARK, David	17.3.16	56	*				*		*			*	*	*							
RICHARDSON, Gordon	25.11.15	55		*		*			*		*			*			*			*	9
PEDLER, Sir Frederick	10.7.08	64		*		*			*		*			*	*	*	*	*	2	*	2
BOYLE, Sir Edward	31.8.23	49	*			*			*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	8	*	2
CULLINGWORTH, Prof. J.	11.9.29	43		*			*		*		*			*			*				
SIEFF, David	12.3.11	61		*					*		*			*		*	*			*	
CALVOCORESSI, Peter	17.11.12	60	*			*			*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*			*	2
Mrs. Sam NTIRO																					

KEY: AGE: Age in 1972; PB: Public or Boarding School; G: Grammar School; O: Other Kind of School; OC: Oxbridge; RB: Redbrick University; OE: Other Higher Educational Institution; PS: Public Service; Pol: Politics; I: Industry; AC: Academia; J: Journalism; GV: General Voluntary Appointments held; CC: Voluntary Appointments concerned with Commonwealth or Colonial matters; R: Voluntary Appointments concerned with Race Relations; CL: Club Membership; PD: Public Distinctions and honours; CD: Company Directorships held.

SOURCES: As in Appendix A.

APPENDIX 'B' (iii)

RACE, CLASS AND AUTHORITY: AN ANALYSIS OF IRR COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP, 1958-1972

Between 1958 and 1972 there were in all fifty-four Council Members of whom forty-three or 79.62 (80%) possessed entries in Who's Who during this period. Generally the purpose of this Appendix is neither to set out an argument - although perhaps one is detectable in the title and the way we have chosen to organise the material - nor to duplicate either the material or the kind of exercises undertaken in Appendix A. Instead it is, firstly, to provide additional general information on Council membership which is used in and informs our study and, secondly, to provide more detailed data in relation to the following particular areas: (A) The Physical Age Structure of Councils; (B) Education; (C) Club Membership; (D) Employment; (E) Directorships; and (F) Voluntary Appointments and Public Distinctions.

(A) The 'Physical' Age Structure of Councils.

The average age of the Who's Who listed Members was 58.78 (59), which is somewhat misleading, for it was not until after 1967/68 that the Council decided, in the face of criticism, to 'recruit' a number of younger Members to their body. Before this date the average age was almost six years higher, that is 63.86. Further there were a number of older Members, known as the 'founders', e.g. Hodson, Grubb, Farrer-Brown, Woods and Prain, who were re-appointed at non-contested elections year after year; so this too

possessed the effect of pushing up the average age for any one particular Council. Thus, in order to arrive at a more revealing figure, we need to compare the average age for each Council, and to work out the average 'effective' age of Council Members on this basis.

The immediate reason for doing this is to ascertain, firstly, in a physical and later in a social way, whether or not one of the resisters' chief criticisms was in fact valid; namely, that Council Members, by and large, were 'old', upper middle class, and out of touch with the needs and aspirations of the black community and, consequently, with the kind of research, and political action and policy required to affect a significant change in black/white relations here and abroad.

In order to determine what the 'physical' age structure of Councils, in fact, was it is necessary to do a number of smaller calculations which in themselves should reveal some interesting data on the composition of individual Councils. As shown in Table 1 we need to know (a) the total number of Members on each Council; (b) the number of Who's Who listed Members for each; (c) the proportion of Who's Who listed Members as a percentage of (a); and finally the average age for each Council. From this material it should be possible to work out (i) the average Council size; (ii) the average number of Who's Who listed; (iii) the average percentage of Who's Who listed, and (iv) the average 'effective' age of a significant proportion of the Council.

TABLE 1

COMPOSITION AND AGE STRUCTURE OF IRR COUNCILS

Councils	(a) Total Number of Members	(b) Who's Who Listed	(c) Who's Who Listed as % of (a)	(d) Average Age of (b)
1958/59	16	14	87.5%	54.78
1959/60	16	14	87.5%	55.78
1960/61	17	15	88.2%	56.53
1961/62	18	16	88.8%	55.12
1962/63	20	17	85.0%	55.35
1963/64	17	15	88.2%	55.46
1964/65	17	15	88.2%	56.46
1965/66	21	17	80.9%	56.24
1966/67	26	20	76.9%	54.37
1967/68	26	20	76.9%	56.26
1968/69	28	24	85.7%	55.6
1969/70	30	28	93.3%	56.00
1970/71	27	25	92.6%	56.73
1971/72	27	25	92.6%	57.73
Averages:	21.85	17.64	86.59%	55.89

NOTES:

(i) In 1966/67 and 1967/68, a concerted attempt, as already noted, was made to 'recruit' a number of younger Members, like Anthony Lester (31) and Garry Runciman (35) as well as a number of 'recognised blacks in the political field such as Dipak Nandy. Both factors appear to account for the slight drop in average age in the percentage of Who's Who listed.

(ii) In order to help 'stabilise' the Council after CARD's take-over by 'militant blacks' in 1967 and the 'troubles at the Institute' during 1969/70, more influential Members were drafted onto the Council, including the return of Philip Mason from retirement, Lord Boyle, Professor Cullingworth (just after the publication of his Report), David Sieff of Marks and Spencers, and an old Etonian, Peter Calvocoressi, who had been associated with the Institute since its inception. Thus from this kind of material, which generally supports other kinds discussed in this study, the Council's reaction to internal criticism and resistance tended to be one of entrenchment, and the consolidation of its own power base. Perhaps the significance of the increased percentage of Who's Who listed - 92.6% in 1970/71 and 1971/72 - should be consequently seen in this light.

(iii) The presence of younger Members, those under forty, possessed the effect of generally lowering the average age of Members to a point where even the 'average figure' is somewhat deceptive. For when an analysis is done on the basis of age groups, it is clear, as can be seen from Table (1) (a), that the majority of Members were considerably older than the average age of 55.89 years; and, further, that influential Council Members between 1969 and 1972, the founders, office-bearers, and so on, tended to be in their mid to late sixties, or even early seventies.

(iv) At this point one serious point does arise: namely that it is often thought that 'academics' are usually quite old before they become 'influential', that is professors; and so, on a research body, would it not be natural to find a predominance of elderly scholars? As will be shown in detail later, the academic group accounted for less than a third of all Members, and the majority of them in 1972 were under the average age of 57.73. For instance, Henriques joined the Council at the age of fifty and left at fifty-six; Chilver from forty-five - fifty-two; Freedman from thirty-nine - forty-three; Oliver from thirty-nine - forty-nine; Tinker from forty-five - forty-seven; Runciman (a scholar of professorial status

if not actually a professor) from thirty-five - thirty-eight; Cullingworth from forty-one - forty-three, and so on. Certainly, then, in the case of the IRR, this criticism does not appear valid. Instead, once shown to be invalid, it raises, we feel, a more significant question relating to the degree of 'consciousness' and role of the academic at the Institute; something we have discussed and attempted to evaluate at various places in this study.

TABLE 1 (a)

AGE GROUPS WITHIN IRR COUNCILS

	Over 70	65-70	60-65	55-60	50-55	45-50	40-45	35-40	30-35	Total
1958/59	1	2	1	2	4	3	-	1	-	14
1959/60	1	2	1	2	4	3	-	1	-	14
1960/61	1	2	2	3	4	2	1	-	-	15
1961/62	3	1	1	3	3	2	1	2	-	16
1962/63	3	1	1	5	2	1	3	1	-	17
1963/64	3	-	2	4	2	-	2	2	-	15
1964/65	3	1	1	5	1	-	2	2	-	15
1965/66	3	1	2	3	3	2	2	1	-	17
1966/67	2	1	4	4	2	3	1	2	1	20
1967/68	2	2	4	5	1	4	1	-	1	20
1968/69	1	3	5	5	3	4	1	1	1	24
1969/70	2	2	7	6	2	5	2	1	1	28
1970/71	2	3	6	5	-	5	2	2	-	25
1971/72	2	4	7	3	2	3	2	2	-	25

From Table 1 (a), the actual age structure of the fourteen Councils from 1958 - 1972 is far more revealing than an overall average figure. Several general conclusions emerge from this kind of data:

(i) That apart from the first two Councils, where the age groupings above fifty-five amounted to 42.85% of the total Who's Who listed, the older age groups consistently accounted for more than half, (See Table 1(b)).

(ii) That Councils from 1968/69 to 1971/72 were significantly 'older' than previous Councils, partly due to natural continuous ageing of long standing Members, and partly due to a conscious policy of recruiting 'well known' figures in order to increase prestige, reputation and authority, at a time when external events at CARD and elsewhere (especially the States), and internal criticism/resistance began to emerge as possible 'threats' to authority.

(iii) That - and this constitutes a hypothesis for further research, (see below) - the majority of Members responded to and were informed by (political) interests and values which were more clearly identifiable with the pre Suez/Notting Hill era than the late sixties and early seventies.

(iv) That the older groupings, especially the three above the sixty - sixty-five years group, were more influential in the day-to-day administration and policy of the various Councils, as not only did they occupy the official voluntary posts, but they were also to be found on the specialised committees and panels of the Institute. In fact very few annual reports were published which did not extoll the virtues and foresight of the Institute's 'founding members' - a yardstick for developments and, right up until 1972, a force always to be reckoned with.

(v) That with this built in deference to the older age groupings, partly based upon 'age', social class, approved success and achievements, (which as we saw in Chapter Three constituted some of the various dimensions and sources of 'authority'), there was by and large a constraint placed on

those few Council Members who 'wished' to criticise or resist majority views and values. Further, recruitment to Council, via non-contested elections until 1971, was on an appointment basis which had the effect of both stifling and neutralising radical expressions; barking was expected and acceptable, but biting was not.

(vi) Finally, Table 1(a) reveals - or rather the Working Paper from which the Table was drawn revealed - that the significant age-range, in terms of recruitment to Council, posts held, etc., was from fifty - seventy years; a twenty year span which meant that many of the long-serving Members who were recruited in the late 1950s, early 1960s were in their mid to late sixties by April, 1972.

TABLE 1(b)

AGE GROUPINGS: AS A PERCENTAGE OF WHO'S WHO LISTED TOTAL

Council	Group A 55-70	Group B 40-45	Group C 30-40
1958/59	42.85%	50.00%	7.14%
1959/60	42.85%	50.00%	7.14%
1960/61	53.33%	46.66%	0.00
1961/62	50.00%	37.50%	12.5%
1962/63	58.82%	35.29%	5.88%
1963/64	60.00%	26.66%	13.33%
1964/65	66.66%	20.00%	13.33%
1965/66	52.94%	41.17%	5.88%
1966/67	55.00%	30.00%	15.00%
1967/68	65.00%	30.00%	5.00%
1968/69	58.33%	33.33%	8.33%
1969/70	60.71%	32.14%	7.14%
1970/71	64.00%	28.00%	8.00%
1971/72	64.00%	28.00%	8.00%

Notes:

(i) This Table shows conclusively that there were only two Councils which drew more than half their Members from age groups B and C - namely the first two.

(ii) But more significantly, as the Who's Who listed sample in 1970/71 and 1971/72 accounted for 92.6% of the total Council's composition, nearly two-thirds (64%) of all Members came from age Group A. This also applied to 1969/70, where the Who's Who listed accounted for 93.3% of the total Council.

(iii) The relative drop in the Council's average age during 1965-1967 can be accounted for by the increase, as we have seen, in new 'younger' Members, as a response to the mounting criticism during these critical years.

(B) EDUCATION

The educational background of Council Members was not unlike that of their predecessors at the Board of Studies. The majority of them were educated at a recognised British public school before going on to an Oxford or Cambridge College. The few that did not follow this pattern, either received their schooling at an 'independent' grammar school, before going on to University or at a non-direct grant educational establishment. Only one Member, Joan Lestor, attended a county secondary school.

Not only does this provide further evidence of the upper middle social class base of the IRR, but, more analytically, it suggests that educational backgrounds, and the various social influences and socio-political cultures they reflect, were an important contributory factor to the forming of more specific socio-political identities.

From the three tables below which summarise, and are themselves extracted from the various Working Sheets on Education we have compiled, it is clear that the pattern which emerges and the implications it possesses for the kind of 'membership' sought is more than obvious.

TABLE 2

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF IRR MEMBERS

2(a) School

School	No.	% of Council Members	% of Who's Who listed
Public	35	64.8	81.4
Grammar	7	12.9	16.2
Other	1	1.8	2.3
Total	43	80.00	100.00

2(b) Major Public Schools

Public School	No.	% of Council Members	% of Who's Who listed
Eton	6	11.1	13.9
Winchester	2	3.7	4.6
Charterhouse	2	3.7	4.6
Marlborough	2	3.7	4.6
Sedbergh	2	3.7	4.6
Rugby	2	3.7	4.6
Total	16	29.6	37.2

Besides the above major public schools, our additional Working Sheets on Education revealed that other Council Members, by and large, had received their schooling at highly 'reputable' private establishments, including: Roedean, Benenden, Perse, Stowe, Cheltenham, Westminster, Leighton Park, Haileybury, and Bedales. The number of old Etonians in Table 2(b) (six or 11.1% of all Council Members), appeared to be of more than a little interest: a former Eton Headmaster, Sir Robert Birley, was not only a distinguished Council Member, but of the three Institute Chairmen between 1958 - 1972, two of them, Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders and Lord Walston, were old Etonians. In fact, if we were to trace systematically Council Members who attended the major public schools, as listed in Table 2(b), we would find that they always formed a 'core' of each Council between 1958 - 1972, accounting for at least 25% of the total composition. Because of this, the schools, together with their ex-pupils who made up a significant part of this 'core', are worth listing in full.

1. ETON: Lord Edward Boyle, Philip Henry Brownrigg, Peter Calvocoressi, Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders, Walter Runciman, and Lord Walston.

2. WINCHESTER: Mark Bonham Carter and Richard Hornby.

3. CHARTERHOUSE: Henry Oppenheimer and Dick Taverne.

4. MARLBOROUGH: Sir Kenneth Grubb and Oliver Frederick Woods.

5. SEDBERGH: Philip Mason and James Maccoll.

6. RUGBY: Sir Robert Birley and Jim Rose.

From these public and 'grammar' schools thirty-three Members went on to Oxbridge and a further six to established red-brick universities. One Member, Sir William Aitken, (Beaverbrook family), received his higher education from a university in an 'old' Commonwealth Country - Toronto University, Canada.

2(c) Higher Education

University	No.	% of Council Members	% of Who's Who Listed
Oxbridge	33	61.1	76.7
Redbrick	6	11.1	13.9
Others	1	1.8	2.3
Total	40	74.0	93.0

For the purposes of this Appendix, we have not attempted to detail the various colleges attended, although this is possible to do from our Working Sheets, because the picture which emerges in all but one respect is similar to that described in the previous Appendix. The only difference is that in a very general way it is, however, possible to talk about a 'Balliol connection' in as much that Mason, Rose, Hodson, Taverne, Birley, Bonham Carter, Calvocoressi, Maccoll, and a number of others were all Balliolmen, and that in our discussions and interviews with a number of them, Balliol, like the star from the East, tended to figure prominently in and illuminate most of their references. (Whether this is just another example of the kind of adolescent immaturity that appears to feature in the lifestyles of this type of class grouping, it is difficult to say - but apart from the anecdotal interest it provides, its relevance, compared with the Oxbridge culture as a whole, is, like the knowledge that Hodson sports two warts on a prominent part of his anatomy, quite minimal).

Of more significance was the preference shown by Members to belong to mainly London based clubs.

(C) CLUB MEMBERSHIP

Predictably, it has been possible to trace sixty-five individual club memberships shared by thirty-four Council Members, representing 79% of the Who's Who listed and 63% of all Council Members respectively. This averages out at 1.9 per club member; 1.3 per Who's Who listed member, and 1.2 clubs per Council Member. Unlike the Board of Studies' Members, where the Atheneaum appeared to be the most popular club, followed closely by the Travellers, it would seem that, although the Travellers remained the second most popular, Council Members by and large preferred Brooks - a club founded by Fox in 1764. Excluding the House of Commons, of the top three listed in Table 3, Brooks, in a political sense, is still by far the most conservative; the Travellers, as an extension of the Foreign and Commonwealth (Colonial) Office canteen, is possibly the most 'empire' and racially conscious with its West Indian waiters; and the Atheneaum appears to tower above them all for its scholarship, euridition, and eccentricity. Their actual political influence, today, is of course difficult to gauge, but their value as being indicative of a particular kind of lifestyle can neither be minimised nor discounted. Similarly, the political convenience factor as a recognised meeting place for Members and supporters must always be borne in mind. This, as we have shown in this study, played an important role at critical points of the Institute's history; from the 1951 meeting at Brooks where several multinational companies agreed to underwrite the Institute's establishment and development to the 1971 meetings held at the Reform Club to discuss oppositional tactics and a campaign for the saving of the Institute.

Although Members between them belonged to twenty-three London clubs in all, we can set out in Table 3 the nine clubs that appeared to be the most popular amongst Council Members from 1958-1972.

TABLE 3

CLUBS WITH THREE OR MORE MEMBERSHIPS

CLUB	No.	% of Council Members	% of Who's Who Listed
Brooks	9	16.6	20.9
Travellers	7	12.9	16.2
House of Commons	6	11.1	13.9
Atheneaum	5	9.2	11.6
Pratts	4	7.4	9.3
M.C.C.	3	5.5	6.9
Carlton	3	5.5	6.9
Garrick	3	5.5	6.9
Saville	3	5.5	6.9

Besides the clubs listed in Table 3, the following accounted for a minimum of two memberships: Reform, Navy and Military, and the Royal Commonwealth Society - although we suspect that many Members, whilst belonging to the latter, did not consider it for the purposes of their Who's Who entry as a London club; (because of this we can only in fact trace two memberships). Of the single memberships, the following clubs can be listed: Alpine, National Liberal, Canning, Nikean, Whites, Royal Yacht Squadron, Beefsteak, RAF, and the Bath.

The importance of this kind of research, as suggested earlier, rests not merely in its general interest, but in how lifestyles and socio-political identities are constructed and acted out. From all the clubs mentioned above, including those in our Appendix on Board of Studies membership, we can draw a number of general conclusions about the nature, style, and image of each. On the

basis of these conclusions we can classify them under a number of useful headings such as (a) Political - Brooks, Whites, Carlton, Pratts; all Tory strongholds; (b) Public Service - Travellers (Foreign Office and Colonial Office), Reform (Treasury), The Senior (United Service Club), and the various military/defence specialised clubs; (c) Intellectual - Athenaeum, University, and Union, (d) Cultural - Garrick, Savile, Bath, and the R.C.S. Of course such a classification only provides a rough guide to the substantive interests of the various clubs, which, in turn, indicates the major interests of individual Members. Its real significance rests not in its analytical force per se but for the purposes of our study in its representational value. That is, as elite bodies the London clubs to which the majority of Council Members belonged 'housed' groups engaged in and concerned with political, administrative, financial, academic, and cultural matters at the highest level in society.

(D) EMPLOYMENT

From our Working Sheets on Employment we have been able to establish that Council Members had significant experience of and tended to be employed in one or more of the following fields: Public Service, Politics, Industry, Academia, and Journalism. In fact it is possible to view each Council as being composed of members from the above fields, together with another less identifiable field - the Church. Apart from the ordained members, and each Council possessed at least two, it is difficult to ascertain the precise size of this group - but the influence of it through ordained and prominent laymen, such as Sir Martin Grubb, a permanent Church Commissioner (ex Missionary) of the Church of England Assembly, was, according to Mason, more considerable than the actual size of the group suggests. (Interview).

When considering the so-called moral base of the Institute's mission, the improvement of race relations, and, indeed, the moral and church convictions of individual members, it is not at all difficult to see how religious ideas - such as the equality of all men in the eyes of God - and those who represented and projected them featured prominently. In fact, it could be argued that the popularity of the Public Service amongst Council members stemmed from quasi-religious notions of 'service', 'duty', 'vocation', and 'commitment'; notions which have traditionally wedded the Church to the state, the middle/upper middle classes to both; notions which were learnt at public school and elsewhere; and notions which appeared to account for the involvement of distinguished public figures on the various IRR Councils.

From Table 4, we can see that apart from two Members, Michael Caine, (Director of Booker Brothers), and Garry Runciman (Oxbridge Academic/Businessman), both too young to have served in the 1939-45 war, all Who's Who listed Members at one stage or another in their careers had been engaged in professional public service work. Although, as is to be expected, academics constituted a significant proportion of the Councils, it is interesting to note, when compared with the original Board of Studies membership, that the size of the group, between 1958-1972, and, particularly, between 1965-1972, diminished, whereas the size of the industrial group, businessmen and/or senior company executives, grew significantly during the same period; so much so, that by 1969 it was by far the largest group represented on the Council. The number of professional journalists remained approximately the same, but those engaged actively in politics, or possessed more than informal contact with the party-political and Government machine, such as Seebohm, Pedler, Bonham Carter, Boyle and others, grew both in stature and influence so the IRR in the mid-sixties discarded its ostensibly non-political interests, and actively entered the fields of race relations, immigration, and social and political policy.

TABLE 4

EMPLOYMENT AREAS OF IRR COUNCIL MEMBERS

Area	No.	As % of Who's Who Listed	As % of Council Members
Public Service	41	95.3	75.9
Academia	20	46.5	37.0
Industry	21	48.8	38.9
Politics	14	32.5	25.9
Journalism	26	60.4	48.1

(N.B. The high figure for journalism includes all those Members who considered themselves to be freelance and/or part time journalists, as well as the professionals. Thus quite a number of academics fall into this category; the reason we have included them here is to show clearly the actual number who were either engaged in or had strong, contributory, and political, connections with the profession. In 1972, as we have seen in Chapter Eight, this proved to be an important factor in the national press campaign the ideologists launched against the utopians.)

It is clear from Table 4 that Council Members were, more or less, equally distributed between the main five employment areas, with some overlap in both public service and journalism - a striking feature being that 95.3% of Who's Who listed Members were or had been engaged in public service. This in itself tends to suggest, and it is further reinforced in interview statements, that Members and hence the Institute viewed the improvement of race relations as a kind of public duty, a charitable act which needed to be performed by those who had access to decision-making agencies and bodies in order to safeguard economic, social, and political stability.

What is also interesting, when taken together with the educational and club membership backgrounds, is the high degree of class similarity. It would seem in this respect that the qualifications needed to be 'appointed' a Council Member had less to do with actual experience in and of race relations situations - apart from several noticeable academic Members such as Freedman, Jahoda, Henriques, and so on - than with the possession of certain kinds of credentials which reflected a traditional, upper middle class background.

(E) DIRECTORSHIPS

Although more research needs to be carried out on directorships, it has been possible to locate so far approximately 150 individual directorships amongst the Who's Who listed, or 3.40 each. Of the sixteen actual company directors traced, 37.2% of Who's Who listed and 29.6% of Council Members, at least six of them possessed more than ten directorships, with Sir Ronald Prain holding a minimum of eighteen, Harry Oppenheimer a minimum of twenty-two, Frederick Seebohm a minimum of eight and Gordon Richardson a minimum of ten. Although the number of directorships held possesses no intrinsic value alone - other than of interest - it is when we begin to discover the connections between corporate subscribers, mainly national and international businesses, and Council Members; between type and operating areas of companies and the social biographies of Council Members; and between research priorities and corporate subscriber support, that this kind of data, as we have shown in this study, becomes sociologically significant.

(F) VOLUNTARY APPOINTMENTS AND PUBLIC DISTINCTIONS

As, perhaps, is to be expected, all Who's Who listed Members belonged to and held appointments in more than one voluntary organisation. Thirty-three of them or 76.7% (Who's Who listed) and 61.1% (all Council Members) belonged to general Commonwealth/ Colonial bodies, ranging from cultural and social to colonial retirement associations; and twenty-four of them, or 55.8% (Who's Who listed and 44.4% (all Council Members) were Members of other race relations groups, such as CARD, NCCI, Runneymede, CRCS, RRB Conciliation Committees, (International) Friendship Leagues, Advisory bodies and so on. It is interesting to note in the context of the race relations industry and as we have demonstrated IRR's principal role in its formation how that through interlocking memberships, IRR remained both in touch and, as we have argued here, in intellectual control of the industry it primarily established. The number of race relations bodies, both outside or based in the United Kingdom but concerned with other situations, figure quite prominently in the list of voluntary organisations, particularly those based in or concerned with relations in Southern Africa (Rhodesia, South Africa, Mocambique, Angola, etc), the United States of America and the Caribean. It appeared that it was partially through these that the IRR was able to extend its reputation and international network of 'recognised' contacts: in fact for twenty years it was a deliberate policy to make organisational contact with 'recognised' bodies, such as the South African Institute of Race Relations, and comparable race research and political organisations in the States and the old and new Commonwealth. Whether some Council Members were recruited because they belonged to these international and national groups, or whether Members joined then after contact had been established, is, of course, difficult to ascertain with any precision: what we have suggested, however, is that both procedures operated; and, in the case of British race relations groups, both operated as an expression of a reciprocal relationship.

Finally, as well as belonging to various voluntary organisations, most Members possessed a number of 'honours' or public distinctions. During his life, Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders, the first IRR Chairman after 1958, received a minimum of fourteen; Leslie Farrer-Brown, the second Chairman, six, and Lord Walston, the last Chairman before 1972, a minimum of five. Other founding Members also scored quite highly: Sir Kenneth Grubb possessed a minimum of six, Sir Jeremy Raisman seven, Sir Ronald Prain seven, Harry Oppenheimer six, Lord Seebohm six, Sir Robert Birley ten, and Lord Boyle nine. Nearly all honoured Members received some of their distinctions whilst IRR Council Members, and, in this respect, it is interesting to consult pre-1972 editions of Who's Who and compare them with 1972 to 1976: in earlier editions former Council Members, even those who had retired from the Council, included in their entry their services to the IRR, but after 1972 most Members exercised their annual right to edit their entries in such a way as to obscure or omit altogether their past involvement!

CONCLUSION

Although the theme of race, class, and authority and the connections between each rests only just beneath the surface of this Appendix - indeed one of the main themes explored in Chapters 4 and 5 - we should like finally to reiterate the limitations of drawing apparently watertight conclusions from this kind of data. Its purpose, like material of this kind, should be to inform, aid, and ground sociological analysis and not replace it.

A P P E N D I X 'C'

IRR CORPORATE SUPPORTERS 1967 - 1974

CORPORATE SUPPORTERS, 1967 - 1974

	67/68	68/69	69/70	70/71	71/72	72/73	73/74	CT	F	M	R	CP	Ch	EM	FINANCE B	FINANCE Is	FINANCE Iv	I	D	IML	AFL	S.A. Connection Rh.	S.A. Connection SA	S.A. Connection O
The Administrative Staff College	*	*	*	*	*	*													*					
The Allen Lane Foundation					*	*						*						*					*	
Allied Breweries			*							*								*		*	*	*	*	*
Anglo American Corp. of South Africa	*	*	*											*				*			*	*	*	*
Associated British Picture Corp.	*	*	*									*						*					*	*
Viscount Astor's Charitable Trust		*						*																
Associated Portland Cement						*				*								*		*	*	*	*	*
Baker Perkins Holdings Ltd.			*		*									*				*		*	*		*	
Bank of England			*	*	*				*						*				*					
Barclays Bank Ltd.	*	*	*	*	*	*			*						*			*			*		*	*
Barclays Bank International (D.C.O.)	*	*	*	*	*	*			*						*			*			*		*	*
Bell's Asbestos & Engineering (Bestobell)	*	*												*				*		*	*	*	*	*
J. Bibby & Sons Ltd.	*												*						*	*				
Guy Birkin Ltd.				*						*									*	*				
	7	7	8	5	6	5	-	1	3	3	-	2	1	3	3	-	-	9	4	6	7	4	9	7

	67 68	68 69	69 70	70 71	'71 72	72 73	73 74	CT	F	M	R	CP	Ch	EM	FINANCE B	FINANCE Is	FINANCE Iv	I	D	IML	AFL	S.A. Connection Rh.	S.A. Connection SA	S.A. Connection O
	7	7	8	5	6	5	-	1	3	3	-	2	1	3	3	-	-	9	4	6	7	4	9	7
Birmingham Post and Mail Ltd.	*	*	*									*							*					
Birmingham Small Arms Co. Ltd.			*	*		*								*					*	*				
Booker Brothers McConnell Ltd.	*	*	*	*	*	*							*					*			*			*
Boris Ltd.					*									*				*			*	*		
C.T. Bowring & Co. Ltd.	*	*	*	*	*	*			*							*		*				*	*	*
British American Tobacco Co. Ltd.	*	*	*	*	*	*							*					*			*	*	*	*
British Insulated Callenders Cables	*													*				*			*	*	*	*
The British Oxygen Co.Ltd.	*				*	*							*					*			*	*	*	*
British Petroleum Co.Ltd.	*	*	*	*									*					*			*	*	*	*
British Broadcasting Corporation						*						*							*					
British Sugar Corp.			*	*	*	*				*									*					
British United Shoe Manufacturing Co.					*								*					*			*	*	*	*
The Burmah Oil Co. Ltd.	*	*	*	*									*					*			*	*	*	*
The Noel Buxton Trust	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*																
	16	14	17	13	14	13	1	2	4	4	-	4	7	6	3	1	-	18	8	7	15	12	16	15

	67 68	68 69	69 70	70 71	'71 72	72 73	73 74	CT	F	M	R	CP	Ch	EM	FINANCE B	FINANCE Is	FINANCE Iv	I	D	IML	AFL	S.A. Connection Rh.	S.A. Connection SA	S.A. Connection O
	16	14	17	13	14	13	1	2	4	4	-	4	7	6	3	1	-	18	8	7	15	12	16	15
Sir Felix Brunner Charitable Trust			*					*																
Cadbury Brothers Ltd. (Cadbury Schweppes)	*	*	*	*	*					*								*		*	*	*	*	
W.A. Cadbury Charitable Trust	*	*	*	*	*	*		*																
Edward Cadbury Charitable Trust			*	*	*	*		*																
B.H. Chamberlain					*																			
Chance Education Trust	*	*						*																
Charter Consolidated Ltd.	*	*	*	*	*									*				*			*	*	*	*
The Chartered Bank			*	*	*	*			*						*			*				*	*	*
City Parochial Foundation						*	*	*																
The Commercial Bank of Australia	*								*						*			*						
Commercial Union Assurance Co. Ltd.	*	*	*	*					*							*		*					*	
J. Reginald Corah Foundation Fund	*	*						*																
Courtaulds Ltd. (inc. Augustine C.T.)	*	*	*	*	*								*					*			*	*	*	
	24	21	25	20	21	17	2	8	7	5	-	4	8	7	5	2	-	24	8	8	18	16	21	17

	67/68	68/69	69/70	70/71	71/72	72/73	73/74	CT	F	M	R	CP	Ch	EM	FINANCE B	FINANCE Is	FINANCE Iv	I	D	IML	AFL	S.A. Connection Rh.	S.A. Connection SA	S.A. Connection O
	24	21	25	20	21	17	2	8	7	5	-	4	8	7	5	2	-	24	8	8	18	16	21	17
Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths & Co.	*	*	*						*									*				*	*	*
Dunlop & Co. Ltd.	*	*	*	*	*	*							*					*			*	*	*	*
English Calico Ltd.	*	*	*	*						*									*	*			*	*
English Sewing Co.	*	*	*	*						*									*	*	*			
Exchange Telegraph Co. Ltd.					*							*							*					
Fishmongers Company			*	*					*										*					
The Ford Foundation				*	*	*	*	*																
Louis Freedman Discretionary Trust			*	*	*	*		*																
Friends Provident & Century Group			*	*	*				*							*		*				*		*
General Refractories Group Ltd.			*	*										*				*		*	*		*	
Gestetner Ltd.					*									*				*				*	*	*
Ghana High Commission			*																					
Anthony Gibbs & Sons (Insurance) Ltd.	*	*	*	*					*							*		*				*		
The Gillet Charitable Trust					*			*																
Gillette Industries Ltd.	*	*	*	*	*	*								*				*		*	*	*	*	*
	30	27	36	30	29	21	3	11	11	7	-	5	9	10	5	4	-	31	12	12	22	22	27	23

	67 68	68 69	69 70	70 71	'71 72	72 73	73 74	CT	F	M	R	CP	Ch	EM	FINANCE B	FINANCE Is	FINANCE Iv	I	D	IML	AFL	S.A. Connection Rh.	S.A. Connection SA	S.A. Connection O
	30	27	36	30	29	21	3	11	11	7	-	5	9	10	5	4	-	31	12	12	22	22	27	23
Glaxo Charity Trust	*	*	*					*																
The Goldsmiths Company	*	*	*	*	*				*										*					
Gratton Warehouses Ltd.	*	*	*	*						*									*	*				
Arthur Guinness Sons & Co.	*	*	*	*	*	*				*								*		*	*	*	*	*
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation				*	*	*		*																
Hambros Bank Ltd.			*						*						*			*				*	*	*
H.J. Heinz & Co. Ltd.	*	*	*	*	*	*				*								*		*	*	*	*	*
John Holt Development Ltd.	*	*	*	*	*				*								*	*		*	*	*	*	*
The Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corporation	*	*	*	*	*				*						*			*				*	*	*
The Humanitarian Trust					*			*																
I.B.M. United Kingdom Ltd.			*											*				*				*	*	*
I.C.I.	*	*	*	*	*	*							*					*		*	*	*	*	*
Imperial Metal Industries Ltd.			*	*	*	*								*				*		*				
Imperial Tobacco Ltd.	*	*											*					*		*	*	*		*
The Inchcape Charitable Trust Fund			*	*	*	*		*																
Instone Bloomfield Charitable Trust		*						*																
	39	37	48	40	39	27	3	16	15	10	-	5	11	12	7	4	1	40	14	19	27	30	34	31

	67 68	68 69	69 70	70 71	71 72	72 73	73 74	CT	F	M	R	CP	Ch	EM	FINANCE B	Is	Iv	I	D	IML	AFL	S.A. Connection Rh.	SA	O
	39	37	48	40	39	27	3	16	15	10	-	5	11	12	7	4	1	40	14	19	27	30	34	31
International Distillers & Vintners Ltd.			*										*					*		*	*	*	*	*
International Computers Ltd.					*									*				*			*	*	*	*
The Ernest Kleinwort Charitable Trust			*	*	*	*		*																
Kodak Ltd.			*											*				*						
Ladbroke Group Ltd.					*				*								*							
John Laing & Son Ltd.		*												*				*		*	*		*	
Lazard Brother & Co. Ltd.	*	*	*	*	*	*			*								*	*					*	
Leek & Westbourne Building Society					*				*							*			*					
Legal & General Assurance Society	*	*	*	*	*	*			*							*		*					*	*
Lloyds Bank Limited	*	*	*	*	*	*			*						*			*						*
The London Press Exchange Ltd.	*	*	*									*						*				*	*	
Joseph Lucas Ltd.	*	*												*				*		*	*		*	
Marks & Spencer Ltd.	*	*	*	*	*	*					*								*	*				
Martins Bank Ltd. (now Barclays Bank)	*	*	*						*						*			*				*	*	*
	46	45	57	45	47	32	3	17	21	10	1	6	12	16	9	6	3	50	16	23	31	34	42	36

	67 68	68 69	69 70	70 71	'71 72	72 73	73 74	CT	F	M	R	CP	Ch	EM	FINANCE B	Is	Iv	I	D	IML	AFL	S.A. Connection Rh.	SA	O
	46	45	57	45	47	32	3	17	21	10	1	6	12	16	9	6	3	50	16	23	31	34	42	36
Mercantile Credit Co. Ltd.	*	*	*	*	*	*			*								*	*				*	*	*
Midland Bank Limited	*	*	*	*	*	*			*						*			*					*	
Mitchell Cotts Group Ltd.			*								*							*			*	*	*	*
Montague Burton Ltd.	*	*	*	*							*								*					
Moss Bros Ltd.			*	*	*	*					*								*					
Mutual Clothing Supply Co. Ltd.					*					*									*	*				
National & Grindlays Bank Limited	*	*	*	*	*	*			*						*			*				*	*	
National Provincial Bank Limited	*	*							*						*			*				*	*	*
(Westminster Bank)	*	*							*						*			*				*	*	*
National Westminster Bank			*	*	*	*			*						*			*				*	*	*
The Ocean Steamship Co. Ltd.	*	*	*	*	*	*						*						*		*	*	*	*	*
The P & O Group Ltd.					*	*						*						*		*	*	*	*	*
Pilkington BRothers (inc. Sir Harry Pilkington)	*	*	*							*								*		*	*	*	*	
The Post Office						*	*					*							*	*				
Proctor & Gamble Limited			*	*						*								*		*	*	*	*	
	54	53	67	53	55	40	4	17	27	13	4	9	12	16	14	6	4	61	20	29	36	44	53	43

	67/68	68/69	69/70	70/71	71/72	72/73	73/74	CT	F	M	R	CP	Ch	EM	FINANCE B	FINANCE Is	FINANCE Iv	I	D	IML	AFL	S.A. Connection Rh.	S.A. Connection SA	S.A. Connection O
	54	53	67	53	55	40	4	17	27	13	4	9	12	16	14	6	4	61	20	29	36	44	53	43
Racal Group Services Ltd.					*									*				*		*	*		*	*
Redland Holdings Ltd.	*	*	*	*	*	*								*				*		*	*		*	
The Rhodes Trust	*	*	*	*	*	*		*																
The Eva Reckitt Trust						*	*	*																
Roan Selection Trust	*	*	*						*								*	*			*	*	*	
Roots Motors Ltd.			*											*				*		*	*		*	
N.M. Rothschild & Sons	*	*	*	*	*				*						*			*				*	*	*
R.T.Z. Services Ltd.	*	*	*	*										*				*			*	*	*	*
Rowe & Pitman	*	*	*	*					*								*	*			*	*	*	
Royal Insurance Group			*	*	*	*			*							*		*			*		*	
Walter Runciman & Co. Ltd.			*	*								*						*		*	*		*	
Sandbach Tinne & Co. Ltd.	*	*	*	*										*				*			*	*	*	
Schroder Charity Trust	*	*						*																
J. Henry Schroder Wagg & Co. Ltd.			*	*					*								*	*					*	
Shell International Petroleum Co.	*	*	*	*	*	*							*					*		*	*	*	*	*
Standard Bank Ltd.	*	*		*	*				*						*			*				*	*	*
	64	63	79	64	62	45	5	20	33	13	4	10	13	21	16	7	7	74	20	34	46	51	66	48

	67 68	68 69	69 70	70 71	'71 72	72 73	73 74	CI	F	M	R	CP	Ch	EM	FINANCE B	FINANCE Is	FINANCE Iv	FINANCE I	D	IML	AFL	S.A. Connection Rh.	S.A. Connection SA	S.A. Connection O
	64	63	79	64	62	45	5	20	33	13	4	10	13	21	16	7	7	74	20	34	46	51	66	48
Sir Halley Stewart Trust				*	*	*	*	*																
Ann Susman Charitable Trust		*						*																
Tanganyika Concessions Ltd.		*												*				*			*	*	*	*
Tate & Lyle Ltd.	*	*	*	*						*								*			*	*	*	*
Textured Jersey Ltd.					*					*									*	*				
The Mrs. Gladys Tompson Trust	*							*																
Tube Investments Ltd.	*	*	*	*	*	*								*				*		*	*	*	*	*
Turner & Newall Ltd.	*	*	*	*										*				*		*	*	*	*	
Unilever Ltd.	*	*	*	*	*	*							*					*		*	*	*	*	*
Wates Foundation					*			*																
The Weir Group Ltd.			*											*				*			*	*	*	
Westminster Press Ltd. (inc. West. Prov. New)	*	*	*	*	*	*						*							*					
Whitbread & Co. Ltd.	*	*	*	*	*					*								*						
World Council of Churches						*	*	*																
	71	71	86	71	69	50	7	25	33	16	4	11	14	25	16	7	7	81	22	39	53	57	73	53

KEY

CT : Charitable Trust, F : Financial Institution,
M : Manufacturing, R : Retail,
CP : Communications and Publishing, Ch : Chemical,
EM : Engineering and Mining, B : Bank, Is : Insurance,
Iv : Investment, I : International Operation,
D : Domestic Operation, IML : U.K. Immigrant Labour,
AFL : African Labour, Rh. : Rhodesia, SA : South Africa,
O : Other Overseas Third World Areas.

SOURCES

List of IRR Corporate Supporters held at the IRR, London: Company Annual Reports: Who's Who in Finance 1972: The Business Who's Who, 1970: The Times 500: The Times '1000': and Directory of Directors.

IRR CORPORATE SUPPORTERS, 1962 - 1974

NOTES

1. Of the 131 corporate supporters, three could not be analysed under any of the headings employed. They were the Administrati Staff College, B.H. Chamberlain and the Ghana High Commission. For analytical purposes this left a total number of 128, of which 103 were profit making.

2. The Nuffield Foundation has not been included as its donations (£50,000 for initial development purposes and a total of £93,500 for the British Survey or Colour and Citizenship) were all received by 1965.

3. The 'flight of capital' that occurred after the successful resistance in 1972 can be readily seen from the following figures:

Year	No. of Contributors
1967	71
1968	71
1969	86
1970	71
1971	69
1972	50
1973	7

The decline in supporters during 1971/72, the period of struggle, is also noticeable.

4. All the national companies noted were also international in as much that their sales business extended beyond the U.K. The distinction made here is between companies that possessed no operational sites abroad and those that did; between those whose investments abroad were an integral part of their overall operation.

5. It will be noted that a significant proportion of all companies 92 out of 103 or roughly 90%, either employed black immigrant labour in the U.K. or black indigenous labour in the Third World. These companies therefore possessed quite specific interests in terms of both promoting 'good race relations' and seeing the survival of the Institute they supported.

6. Whilst it was difficult to establish the precise nature of the Southern African Connection that, through its supporters, featured in the Institute's history from 1952 onwards, it is clear from the figures under this column that approximately 75% of all supporting companies were involved directly in the Southern African economy.

7. In the context of the note above it is therefore not surprising to find that nearly 60% (58 of 103) of the supporting companies were either financial institutions, including the major international banking corporations, or they were engaged in engineering and mining. The figures here are as follows:

COMPANIES	NUMBER
Finance	33
Manufacturing	16
Retail	4
Communications and Publishing	11
Chemical	14
Engineering and Mining	25
TOTAL	103

8. Whilst our researches on the actual 'parentage' of each company, that is the actual holding company if any and its country of registration did not reveal anything interesting other than that Lonhro contributed mainly through the John Holt Development Company and that the vast majority of companies were U.K. registered (80%), our researches into the kind of financial institutions supporting IRR did suggest that the international banking corporations played a central role. The figures were as follows:

Banks	16
Insurance Companies	7
Investment Companies	7
Others	3
TOTAL	33

9. This appendix has been included to give a general idea of the 'biographies' of corporate supporters. Although it, and the research involved in its compilation, has been sufficient for the purposes of this study to generate the evidence required to support some of our arguments, it of course does not give us a comprehensive picture. All corporate supporters would need to be investigated over the full period of the 'old' Institute's history of 20 years rather than approximately 40% over merely 7 years. What it does do, we believe, is to suggest the kind of features that would be found in such a comprehensive investigation.

A P P E N D I X 'D'

LETTERS SENT TO IRR MEMBERS BETWEEN 22nd March, 1972 and 12th April, 1972.

(i) Letter from Chairman, Michael Caine, 22nd March, 1972.

(ii) Letter from the Director, Professor Hugh Tinker, 22nd March, 1972.

(iii) Letter from the Council Minority, 28th March, 1972.

(iv) Letter from Philip Mason, undated.

(v) Letter from Professor Roland Oliver, 29th March, 1972.

(vi) Letter from Joan Lestor, M.P. and Dipak Nandy, 30th March, 1972.

(vii) Letter from Chairman, Michael Caine, 10th April, 1972.

(viii) Letter from the staff of IRR, 12th April, 1972.

LETTERS SENT TO IRR MEMBERS BETWEEN 22nd March, 1972 and 12th April, 1972.

(i) Letter from Chairman, Michael Caine
22nd March, 1972.

To all Members

Dear Member,

I am writing to tell you about certain important decisions which the Council has found it necessary to take.

A majority of the Council has felt for some time that the Director and some of the staff of the Institute were moving away from the objective presentation of facts, discussion and research. This is the purpose for which the Institute was founded; it is embodied in its Memorandum of Association, and it is for this that its funds have been subscribed. The Council had made clear their anxiety to those concerned and had been hoping for some time that these differences - differences essentially of emphasis and method - could be overcome by persuasion and discussion. But this hope has not been realised and the time has come when there is no alternative but to take radical steps if the Council are to fulfil their responsibilities.

They have therefore asked Professor Tinker to go on study leave on his present salary until the expiry of his contract, which ends on 30th September 1972. He has known since last October that it would not be extended beyond that date.

Secondly, they have decided that Race Today in its present form shall cease publication after its next issue. They are discussing with the Editor and his Assistant future arrangements for them.

The Council have no doubt that both the Director and the Editor have sincerely believed that the line they have followed has been in the interest of better relations between the races. Nor would they question the value of much that has appeared in Race Today. It has made points that need to be made. But while the Council recognise the sincerity and devotion of its Editor, they do not consider that its general style and tone have been in keeping with the objects of the Institute or the status of the Institute as a charity. A new Director will shortly be appointed and it is the purpose of the Council with his help to return to the original objects and style of the Institute.

These were reaffirmed by the Council in a series of Resolutions passed in May 1971. The Resolutions were accepted by the staff as constituting a frame of reference within which they could work. A summary of them was included in an article published in Race Today in September 1971. The most relevant points are:

(i) The Memorandum of Association provides that the Institute "shall not express an opinion on any aspect of relations between different races..." This prohibits a corporate opinion, expressed by the Institute as a body; the Council reaffirmed their acceptance of this principle, largely though not wholly on the practical ground that a unanimous opinion on anything worth saying would be difficult to obtain. This prohibition is legally binding.

(ii) There are certain assumptions implicit in the purposes of the Institute. These are that race is irrelevant to the potential of a human being, that human behaviour can sometimes be affected by rational argument, that race relations can be affected by government action, and that government actions can be affected by reason.

(iii) Members of the staff, however strong their personal views, should maintain the highest standards in distinguishing fact from opinion and treating fact as sacred, should emphasise that their opinions are personal, state the views of opponents fairly and recognise that other people may hold different views without being stupid or wicked.

The Council believe that in general style and tone there has been some departure from these standards, which they are determined to reassert. They wish in particular to emphasise their belief that in the United Kingdom the Government and the majority of the people do sometimes listen to reason and pay attention to the facts if they feel they can trust them, and that the Institute has an essential role as a provider of objective information. They recognise that some Members of the Institute may disagree with their action, but they believe that the only alternative to that action is to close the Institute. The Institute however has valuable assets in its library and collection of press cuttings and there is still important work for it to do, which was outlined in the article already referred to. The Institute can and should:

(i) publish books
(ii) provide an information service
(iii) produce facts, papers and pamphlets
(iv) organise study groups and larger meetings
(v) provide a centre where university research workers meet each other and people from outside the university world
(vi) encourage and sometimes initiate work on race relations in universities
(vii) provide a home for academic visitors from abroad.

The Council believe that it can be reconstituted to perform this work in a way consistent with its legal framework.

I have stated the principles on which the Council have acted, but I have not mentioned finance. This is relevant for two reasons: in the first place, Race Today runs at a considerable loss. Since a stage has been reached where drastic economies have to be made, even if the Council had felt that the magazine was operating within the Institute's style and standards, they would probably have had to decide that it could not continue. Secondly, some of our principal supporters have felt they could not continue to support a body which appeared to them to have departed by the style of this magazine so clearly from its stated purposes.

It is clearly necessary for the Council to meet the Members and an Extraordinary General Meeting will shortly be summoned for this purpose. A minority of the Council disagree with these decisions and voted against them. At the Extraordinary General Meeting, the majority including myself will seek your support for the general policy here outlined. I shall move a Resolution asking for your support for the Council's general policy; of this you will receive a formal notice with a form of proxy. I ask every Member who wishes the Institute to continue on the lines here indicated either to attend the meeting or to appoint a proxy to vote on his behalf.

The alternative is disruption and an end to the Institute we know; I believe this would be a tragedy.

Members may like to know that at the Council meeting held on Monday, 20th March 1972, the vote was as follows:

For	Against
The Rt. Hon. Lord Boyle of Handsworth	Miss Stella Colkett
Mark Bonham Carter	C.R. Hensman
Richard Hornby MP	Augustine John
Anthony Lester	Louis Kushnick
Miss Joan Lestor MP	Douglas Tilbe
Philip Mason	Reverend W. Wood
Dipak Nandy	
Professor Roland Oliver	
Sir Ronald Prain	
E.J.B. Rose	
W.G. Runciman	
Sir Frederic Seebohm	
D. Sieff	

Sir Robert Birley, who was unavoidably not at the meeting, has told me that he also supports the majority.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Michael H. Caine

(ii) Letter from the Director, Professor Hugh Tinker
22nd March, 1972.

To: All members of the Institute of Race Relations

Dear

At a Council meeting on 20 March 1972 the Chairman asked the Council to approve a resolution which requires me to cease acting as Director in an executive capacity and to proceed on study leave. The Council were also asked to agree that Race Today should cease publication after its May issue. This proposition was accepted by a majority of the members - 13 voting in favour with six voting against. An explanatory letter - which I understand is being sent to all members of the Institute - begins with a very serious allegation: "The Council has been concerned for some time at the extent to which the Director and some of the staff of the Institute were moving away from the objective presentation of facts, discussion and research." This allegation has not been substantiated, and I am quite certain that it would not be possible to substantiate it. During the last two years this Institute has been going through a process of evolution in response to the great changes in the race situation in Britain and in the world and in response to the demands made upon us. There are, indeed, new developments and a greater emphasis upon certain activities; but the "core activities" of the Institute continue undiminished and strengthened. In his letter the Chairman indicates seven kinds of activity which he believes the Institute can and should support. All members should understand that these activities are at the present time fully functioning. We continue to publish books of a serious and solid character, and I myself am engaged upon a full length historical study. These books continue to be analytical academic studies, together with some important pieces of serious journalism. We continue to provide an information service which is extensively used by the BBC, the Press, local agencies and hundreds of individuals. We continue to produce facts, papers and pamphlets. Recently the Facts Paper produced in association with the British Council of Churches has appeared - price 5p. - our first venture in mass information. Also, the library, which is the bedrock of the Institute, has been very considerably extended and equipped with modern facilities during my directorship.

We continue to organise study groups and larger meetings. The latest was a full-day meeting following the Carr-Saunders lecture at which Members of Parliament from Westminster and from Ireland participated, together with social workers, journalists and university teachers. We continue to provide a centre where university research workers meet. Each Summer the Institute offers a temporary place of work for dozens of research workers and professors from Britain and overseas. We continue to encourage work on race relations in universities - at the present time eight full-length studies are going forward under our auspices by university workers in different continents. And finally we continue to provide the only place where people working on the world scale in race relations can meet and exchange information.

Amid this activity the journal, Race, continues to enjoy a reputation for scholarship. The only significant change during my directorship has been to introduce special numbers each year which attempt to explore major themes in an organised framework. Race Today actually started before I became Director and in my opinion it has consistently upheld the task of improving race relations by searching and sometimes challenging enquiry. However, Race Today is the "visible" part of the Institute and all members can judge for themselves on this.

There are two major directions in which it can probably be claimed that a significant change has occurred during the last two years. One is in the nature of the annual conference and the second is in the new programme of action research funded by the City Parochial Foundation. A few years ago the annual conference was an occasion on which university people read papers to each other, with a small fringe of social workers hovering rather uncertainly around. The conference has now become a forum in which almost every kind of person working in race relations has a place. Those participating last year included very many social workers, educators, businessmen, journalists and academic people and also a sizeable number of black people who would cantingly be called "militants". We cannot pretend that this conference has achieved a finite or even very satisfactory form. The encounter between very different kinds of people can be disturbing: but this forum remains just about the last place where all the people in race relations still talk to each other and listen to each other. On a more limited scale we achieved something of the same dialogue in a meeting held only last week in Notting Hill in which some of us, some for the first time, listened to people living in the ghetto and found that we had a good deal to talk about.

The other new venture is an experiment in action research which we have been enabled to embark upon with a grant of £45,000 from the City Parochial Foundation, a well-known metropolitan charity. Ironically the CPF included within its grant £15,000 which could be applied for the extension of Race Today. The remainder is being used by local voluntary agencies operating on a self-help basis; some of these are in powerful motion, others are at an early stage, but all represent activities which are additional to established social and welfare services. We hope to learn from them about the nature of the social condition in the inner city areas. It is quite clear that this experiment does not fall within the rubric of the Chairman's definition of the role of the Institute and it is therefore certain that those who endorse the Chairman's proposal will be cutting short this extremely valuable experiment: possibly the most exciting upon which the Institute has ever embarked.

In concluding this letter I wish to make it clear that my own position as Director is not a substantive issue. I am concerned that the Institute should develop and not shrivel. I am not in the slightest concerned about my own position: indeed I have already made arrangements to undertake what I believe is an important race study when I leave the Institute. I was concerned until recently because it seemed possible that there was no suitable Director in sight; but I am now satisfied that it will be possible to pass on the direction of this Institute to a worthwhile successor; providing that he knows that he is free to promote the affairs of the Institute without the threat of a Council veto. What most concerns me about the present situation is that we have a Council - some of whose members only turn up for meetings once or twice a year - who insist upon the right to take decisions vital to the Institute over the heads of staff members. This is the issue which must now be resolved: and unless the members of the Institute feel able to face this squarely then I very much fear that the Institute of Race Relations will become as irrelevant to the circumstances of our times as some other of our institutions.

In case this should be my last opportunity to communicate with all the members of the Institute I wish to assure them that those who are employed as the staff are people with whom it has been an honour to work. We have had many arguments and differences of opinion, but in essentials we have been a united staff. All this is so very different from certain Press stories which appear to have been carefully contrived to create an impression of division and disloyalty.

The choice which the members of the Institute will be asked to make on 18 April is extremely serious and upon their judgement depends the whole future of this Institute. Some of the members have known me for many years; others do not know me at all. Equally some of you will have relationships with members of the Council. I hope that it is possible for everybody to put aside these personal relationships in coming to a final decision.

(Signed) Professor Hugh Tinker

(iii) Letter from the Council Minority,
28th March, 1972.

To all Members

Dear Member,

As Council members directly elected by you in the first contested election in the history of the Institute of Race Relations in July 1971, we feel it incumbent on us to bring to your attention some of the issues that have either not been raised or have been inadequately treated in the Chairman's letter. That we were unable to inform you of these matters earlier was due to the fact that we ourselves were unaware of the resolutions till five minutes after the meeting began. Several of the members who voted for the resolution, on the other hand had, it is now revealed, been approached by the Chairman in advance.

You will know that the Chairman's charge that the Director and some of the staff had "moved away from the objective presentation of facts, discussion and research" has been challenged by Professor Tinker as not having been substantiated, and incapable of substantiation. But it should also be pointed out that the term "objective" when used in the race relations industry has come to acquire a specialized meaning - a meaning best described by Joe Rogaly in the Financial Times of 21st March, who speaks of restoring "the Institute's position as a generally accepted source of reliable information about black people". Even such a perverse reasoning must accept that reliable information about black people must include black people's own views about the society of which they form part. To exclude these views today simply because they were considered unimportant in the past would be to move away from the "Institute's" reputation for objectivity won in easier times.

We ourselves are convinced that the professional sensibility and expertise of a staff working full time in this field cannot be lightly set aside - especially when it accords with the experience of those of us who live and move in areas where day to day normal human relationships involve people of different races. We cannot believe that those members of the Council who are occasional participants in certain contrived situations are better judges of objectivity in this field.

What Race Today has done has been to present a venue in which a variety of views, ranging from those of the Monday Club to those of a black prisoner, could be heard. It has not violated the terms of the Memorandum and Articles of Association which require that the Institute does not express a corporate view. Indeed, it includes in every issue a quotation that: "Any opinion expressed in articles and other materials published in Race Today are, therefore, those of the contributors". It has published articles critical of the Community Relations Commission, the Race Relations Board and the Rhodesia Settlement which we judged to be the

legitimate business of an independent Institute. As the Association of Community Relations Officers declared in their press statement of 22nd March: "If the proposed line of action is followed through, one independent objective voice on matters of vital concern in race relations will be silenced."

We feel that the issues involved are of fundamental importance not merely for the continuation of the Institute but for the future development of race relations in this country. But the alternatives suggested by the Chairman are not necessarily accurate. A vote against the Council's majority resolution may well lose the Institute the financial support of certain business interests, but we ourselves and the staff believe sufficiently in the integrity of the Institute and its need to include on its Council the knowledgeable as well as the influential to address ourselves to the task of securing alternative support.

If you are unable to attend the meeting of 18th April, Douglas Tilbe, J.P. and the Rev. Wilfred Wood, J.P., would be quite happy to act as your proxies, for which of course they will need your authorization.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Miss Stella Colkett
C.R. Hensman
Augustine John
Louis Kushnick
Douglas Tilbe
Reverend W. Wood

Postscript

In view of the fact that the Chairman has changed the ground* on which he is claiming to have acted in summarily suspending the Director, closing down Race Today and refusing to take into account the views of the minority, we should like to make it clear:

(1) that we all believe that the Institute should not corporately express an opinion on matters connected with race.

(2) that no staff member should act in such a way as to prevent contrary opinion being expressed in meetings and journals of the Institute.

(3) that the Institute should aim to do research of the highest quality possible.

(4) that the situation of the victims of racial prejudice and discrimination can be ameliorated by the publication of the facts, and by the use of rational argument, and by action taken by the Government and other authorities on the basis of reliable information.

(5) that race relations are not always governed or determined by purely rational considerations.

What is really at issue for all of us as members of the Institute as we decide on the future, is the correctness of the action taken at the last meeting of the Council.

*
See the final phrasing of the resolution.

(iv) Letter from Philip Mason, undated.

You will probably by now have received a letter from the Chairman of the Institute of Race Relations telling you of the Extraordinary General Meeting to be held on the 18th April. I am writing to you and to other Members I know personally to ask you to read the Chairman's letter with care and to give him your support if you can, either by your presence or by sending a proxy, not to me but to the Institute's Secretary, at least 48 hours before the meeting.

If the Members of the Institute do not support the Chairman's policy, fourteen members of the Council, including myself, will feel compelled to resign and it is my belief that within a few months the Institute will come to an end. If the majority of the Council have your support, I believe we can make a fresh start and continue to do useful work. The voting may well be close.

(Signed) P. Mason.

(v) Letter from Professor Roland Oliver,
29th March, 1972.

At the risk of irritating you by intruding on a matter on which you may already have made up your mind, may I please add my plea to that of Michael Caine in his recent letter addressed to the Members of the Institute of Race Relations?

As a regularly attending member of the Council, with a special interest in the Institute's research programme, I have been increasingly worried by what I have seen during the past eighteen months, and I do not believe that there is any future for the organisation under its present leadership.

Indeed I believe that the great majority of the present staff have come to think of themselves in an agitational role which is incompatible with the Institute's Memorandum of Association and with its charitable status.

If you have not already decided to do so, may I ask you to act in support of the decisions of the majority of the Council at the Extraordinary General Meeting to be held on 18th April, either by attending in person or by sending a proxy vote? I am assuming that, if the Council's action is upheld, a far-reaching reconstruction will follow under a new Director.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Roland Oliver

(vi) Letter from Joan Leston, M.P. and Dipak Nandy, 30th March, 1972.

TO: ALL MEMBERS OF THE INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS

Dear Member,

We are writing to you because we have felt a growing concern at the way in which the affairs of the Institute of Race Relations have been reported in the press, and because we felt that we ought to put before you our reasons for voting the way we did at the Council meeting of March 20.

First of all, neither of us is unduly worried about the £20,000 alleged to have been lost to the Institute as a result of the February issue of Race Today. This is not surprising, because one of us was billed as a speaker at the Rhodesia meeting advertised in that issue which is alleged to have given offence. We certainly take the view that the Institute is better off without money which comes with strings such as these.

But this item of news, of which so much has been made, should not be allowed to obscure the main issues with which we were confronted. They are:

1. As long as we have been on the IRR Council, the question of the financial loss incurred, first by the old Newsletter, and then by Race Today, has appeared repeatedly on the agenda. Each time some member of the Council has argued that it should be allowed to go on for another year or two before it was closed down. We have both, at one time or another, urged this view. But as time passes the argument becomes less and less plausible. We hope that members realise that the Institute is facing a grave financial crisis, and that unless we can reach the first target of £150,000 in the next few weeks there is no guarantee that the Institute will survive by the end of this year. In the circumstances, voting to keep Race Today in its present form meant committing ourselves to spending money which is not there.

   It has been said that Race Today is financially secure because of a grant made by the City Parochial Foundation. This was not our understanding of the situation. We understand that the City Parochial Foundation has given £45,000 for projects to the Institute over 3 years, of which £5,000 a year is to be devoted to Race Today. Race Today incurred a loss of over £9,000 in the year April 1970 - March 1971, and the loss in the year April 1971 - March 1972 was estimated to be

over £12,000. We also understand that the number of subscriptions in the U.K. has gone down between October 1971 and January 1972, and that the number of copies sold through booksellers and wholesalers has also gone down. An injection of £5,000 a year still means that the Institute would have to find something like £7,000 a year simply to keep Race Today going - this at a time when the main question was whether and how long the Institute itself would survive.

2. It is said that the Council decided to close down Race Today because it was too radical. We think this is a piece of misleading over-simplification, and certainly misrepresents our position. No one disputes that Race Today has been moving in a radical direction. Given this fact, if we had a criticism to make, it is that Race Today is not radical enough. The result is that it alienates the establishment without finding a solid base at the community level. We believe that there is, and always has been, a need for a radical journal in race relations, which can be committed without being sectarian, which can be critical of Government departments, local councils, the Race Relations Board, the Community Relations Commission, the Runnymede Trust, Members of Parliament, and whoever else deserves criticism. Such a journal, we believe, would find wide support in the communities - wider than the narrow circle of 'the race relations industry' to which Race Today is now confined (current circulation : under 2,500). It could campaign and comment without compromising the Institute's charitable status and without compromising its own freedom. It would no longer be a plush journal issued from 36 Jermyn Street, but that might well increase its appeal to ordinary people at the grass-roots level. We have both been used to flogging journals like this outside tube stations, and we would be prepared to do so again, and so no doubt would many members of the Institute who wish to see Race Today survive.

We must also point out that the Chairman, Michael Caine, and the Vice-Chairman, David Sieff, stated at the Council meeting that they personally were prepared to try to raise funds for such an independent journal. We do not think that Institute members know this. We did, and it had a bearing on our decision.

An independent Race Today which does not have to bow and scrape because it is securely based in the community, and which can be irreverent of institutions and serious about politics, would be well worth having. We would be prepared to work for it. But none of us, we hope is so naive as to imagine that such a journal can turn to business and to corporations for its livelihood, nor that it could remain within the Institute of Race Relations so long as the Institute continued to be a charitable organisation.

To our knowledge something like this has been proposed over and over again in the past year, in the Institute's Council and on its Executive Committee. If such a decision had been taken in time, it would have spared us a lot of bitterness and it would have spared the Institute much publicity which can do no good either to the Institute or to race relations. But it was because we believed that it was still possible to do this that we voted as we did.

3. We think also that there is a real need for an Institute of Race Relations as it was originally conceived. The work of improving race relations on the ground, which is where it really matters, has hardly begun, and the obstacles are more formidable than some of us had imagined. But just for that reason we think it is important to keep alive a body such as the Institute was intended to be - objective but not necessarily impartial, above all free of the suspicion of having sectarian axes to grind. We voted in the way we did because we believed that it was the only way in which such an Institute could survive. We may have been wrong but that was what we believed.

We think we were right. If you disagree, you have a simple recourse: you can vote against the proposal being put to you on April 18. We hope in any event that you will vote, and if it transpires that a majority of members think we were wrong, we would be happy to give up our places on the Council to those who better represent the wishes of the members of the Institute of Race Relations.

JOAN LESTOR DIPAK NANDY

(vii) Letter from Chairman, Michael Caine
10th April, 1972.

Dear Member,

The Secretary of the Institute has already sent you the Resolution for the Extraordinary General Meeting which is being held on Tuesday, 18th April at 6 p.m. in St. James's Church Hall, Piccadilly, London, SW1.

Because this matter vitally concerns the future of the Institute, I urge every Member to exercise his right to vote. If you cannot attend the meeting please send a proxy in favour of the Resolution before the 14th April.

I explained in my previous letter that a majority of the Council has for some time been concerned that the Director and some of his staff were moving away from the expressed aims of the Institute. When it finally became clear, after prolonged discussion, that the Director felt unable to keep the work of the Institute within what we believe are its expressed aims, the majority of the Council concluded that they had no other choice but to take the actions described in my previous letter. It is for this reason that I seek your support, believing that the alternative is an end to the Institute.

Over the past week the press has carried a number of reports on the Institute and taken together they have, in my view, identified many of the issues that are before you.

I would like none the less to emphasise the points which to me seem most important.

In problems so complex and difficult as those involved in prejudice about race there can be no single approach which is "correct". Many are needed and they complement each other. But in particular, there is a need for a body which stands up for the "non-white" citizen and voices his protest. There is also a need for a body which will soberly and unostentatiously present facts to society as a whole. The two tasks demand a different style of advocacy. What will encourage the converted may repel the unconverted. There can be no doubt that the Institute was founded to fulfil the sober factfinding role. It was for this that the Institute's funds were subscribed, that the Director was appointed and that the Institute has been able to claim charitable status. To the majority of the Council it seems that Race Today, taken as a whole, aims at the other role, that of voicing the protest of the minority. It is directed to the converted.

I and other Members of the Council at both Executive and Council meetings have said that we would be eager to find some other independent body which could continue with those aspects of Race Today which we find at variance with the purposes of the Institute. We think it has things to say which need to be said, but not by us.

It is only <u>in its present form</u> that the majority of the Council wish to cease publication of Race Today. They intend to continue with an information publication.

Also, they mean to carry out the responsibilities involved in the large grant made by the City Parochial Foundation. They believe that much care - perhaps more than hitherto - must be devoted to this responsibility and to the full appraisal of the success or otherwise of the expenditure.

I have been asked why we have had to act with what to some appears such haste. This must be seen against the financial background. The Institute faces a deficit for the year just ended of the order of £50,000. We are in the middle of an appeal - the promises so far made are conditional on our reaching a first target, of which we are in sight. But we cannot continue to ask for money for one purpose and use it for another. Nor can the Institute continue for another twelve months without new sources of finance, which will not be forthcoming unless our performance agrees with our stated aims. We have been discussing the matter for a year; when I became chairman, six months ago, I hoped to be able to find gradual means of returning to our proper role. But I am forced to the conclusion that radical steps are necessary - and at once.

If you give me your confidence, but not I fear otherwise, I have every hope that we shall reach our immediate target. Even so, there will be a need for drastic economy and Race Today is running at a loss of £7,000 per annum. The minority on the Council, in a letter to Members, say that if left in control they would "address themselves to the task of securing alternative support". But in our present appeal these Members have not been able to help. Those who have experience of raising money, and who know how much hard work is involved, are all in the majority.

Finally, we must face the fact that a divergence has grown up between the majority of the Council and the staff of the Institute. To a large extent, the Director has allowed this to develop and it need not have happened. In his latest proposal, the Director has suggested that Race Today should be given a clear run for twelve months without interference. This is quite unrealistic in the light of our financial position. The responsibility for finance rests squarely with the Council and it is they, not the staff, who must in the last resort decide matters of this kind.

With your support, and with a new Director, I am confident that we can surmount the financial crisis, establish a happier relationship with the staff, and make a new start with our work. There is more need for our kind of work than ever before.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Michael H. Caine

(viii) Letter from the Staff of IRR,* 12th April, 1972.

To: The Members of the Institute of Race Relations

We are sorry to inflict yet another Institute letter on you. In the normal circumstances we would have expected the Members of the Council to speak for us, but not only have the majority systematically destroyed the trust we had reposed in them but also left us open to attack from the outside. We now feel that we must write to you on our own behalf.

What is called into question is indeed the independence of the Institute, but we see this to include independence from big business pressures. To threaten the closure of Race Today and, if necessary, the Institute if we do not submit to such pressure is to ignore a whole middle-range of funds to which the Council has never addressed itself. Our construction of objectivity, too, is different from the Council's in that we think it our function to cover the whole spectrum of race relations, including the activities of other race relations agencies in this country. No definition of objectivity, we believe, should exclude certain views being put forward, and when there are views which are not allowed expression elsewhere we have an added responsibility to let them be heard.

In December 1971 we handed up to the Council a unanimous resolution which reads as follows: "That the staff are entirely opposed to any suggestion that Race Today should cease to be an integral part of the Institute because they believe it to be an objective expression of the values which they and the Institute hold". It should be remembered that Race Today is, and has been, only a small part of the Institute's work in that only two staff have been employed full-time on it (with the Area Round-Up being provided separately by a third member), and that is is costing about one-eighth of annual expenditure. The Library and Information Service collects and makes available a wide variety of printed and written materials. The research workers are employed on more detailed long-term projects on specific subjects. The Publications Department generally deals with the results of such work, whether carried out by the Institute or other academics; the learned quarterly Race does the same, and by its very nature cannot respond to or document day-to-day events. It is chiefly through Race Today that we have collectively and individually been able to be active, immediate, comprehending and caring.

*The Company Secretary, by the nature of his office, is not associated with this letter.

That a staff composed of people from different countries, creeds and colours, of varying ages and given to diverse interests should be of one accord on the matter of Race Today reflects a liberal-democratic consensus rather than an ideological bias. What is more, many of the Members of Council who voted against Race Today have rarely attended Council meetings or had any connection with the staff.

As for the matter of the Director, we have for a long time been put in an invidious position by a Council which did not support a Director who was supportive of us. In the original draft of this letter we merely wished to state that Professor Tinker appears to have been victimised for the stand he has taken on freedom of speech in general and Race Today in particular. But in view of Mr. Michael Caine's letter of 10th April we would ask you to study the shift in emphasis, changes in argument and even the alterations to the original resolution presented to you in the succeeding letters written by the Chairman, and the letters of Philip Mason, Dipak Nandy and Joan Lestor, so that you yourselves have some understanding of our view that the majority of the Council is not merely not responsive to us but unreliable and inconsistent.

In fact we are unable to follow the logic of a council which speaks of the "need for a body which stands up for the 'non-white' citizen and voices his protest", yet at no time has addressed itself to the failure of the Runnymede Trust which was set up to perform this very function - by (and still has on its own Board of Directors) members of the Institute's own Council. Nor can we believe that the Council's professed intention to set up an alternative to Race Today outside the Institute is not post hoc.*

It has been reported that the staff intend to resign en bloc if the majority of the Council is given a vote of confidence by you. We wish to state categorically that we are much too committed to the cause of improving race relations in this country, within the terms of the Institute's aims and objectives, to consider such a course of action.

*To put the record straight, what Mr. Caine calls "the latest proposal" of the Director - that Race Today should be given a clear run for twelve months - was in fact provisionally accepted by the Council at their meeting on 6th December 1971, and was definitely agreed to at the meeting of the Executive Committee on 5th January 1972 (See executive committee minute no. 247).

A P P E N D I X 'E'

MEMBERSHIP OF THE AFRICAN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE GROUP AT SEPTEMBER, 1967

MEMBERSHIP OF THE AFRICAN PRIVATE ENTERPRISE GROUP AT SEPTEMBER, 1967.

P.H.A. Brownrigg, CMB, DSO, OBE, Executive Director, Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Ltd.

Dick de Bruyne, Shell Centre

Sir Sidney Caine, KCMG, London School of Economics

Lord Campbell of Eskan

The Rt. Hon. Robert Carr, PC, MP.

William Clark, Overseas Development Institute

J.A..Clay, Rio Tinto Zinc Services Ltd.

Sir Andrew Cohen, KCMG, KCVO, OBE, Ministry of Overseas Development

Prof. Daryll Forde, Director, International Africa Institute

Arthur Gaitskell, CMG, Colonial Development Corporation

Guy Hunter

Roy Lewis, The Times

J.B. de Loynes, The Bank of England

Brian Macdona, CBE, Barclays DCO.

Sir Herbert Marchant, KCMG, OBE, Institute of Race Relations

Lance Martin, Standard Bank

Philip Mason, CIE, OBE, Institute of Race Relations

Prof. Roland Oliver, School of Oriental & African Studies

F.J. Peller, Unilever Ltd.

Trevor Peppercorn, Triplex Holdings Ltd.

Colonel Sir Charles Ponsonby

Sir Ronald Prain, Kt.OBE, Chairman RST Group

Sir John Rankine, KCMG, KCVO.

Frederic Seebohm, TD, Barclays DCO

Sir George Sinclair, Kt, CMG, OBE.

Dr. Tom Soper, Overseas Development Institute

Sir Roger Stevens, GCMG, Vice Chancellor's Office, University of Leeds

John Stourton, Liebigs Ltd.

A P P E N D I X 'F'

PARTICIPANTS AT THE DITCHLEY PARK CONFERENCE,

31st October - 2nd November, 1962.

PARTICIPANTS AT THE DITCHLEY PARK CONFERENCE,

31st October - 2nd November, 1962.

Peter Calvocoressi
Prof. Daryll Forde
Stanley Gordon
Dr. Juan Maiguashca Guevara
Guy Hunter
Dr. David Lowenthal
Philip Mason
Dr. David Maybury-Lewis
Dr. Roland Oliver
Miss Margery Perham, CBE, FBA.
Dr. Julian Pitt-Rivers
Prof. Margaret Read
F. Seebohm
J.F. Sinclair
J.H.A. Watson, CMG.
Guy Wint
Dr. Donald Wood
The Rt. Hon. Kenneth Younger
Dr. M. Zuberi

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IRR PUBLICATIONS, 1958 - 1973

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SSRC RESEARCH PROPOSAL

by

CHRIS MULLARD

Proposed Investigation

Before completing this section, please consider carefully the notes on page 1. You do not have to confine yourself to the space provided on pages 7 and 8. If you do want to write more, please do so on paper the same size as this, keeping within margins the same size as those on this application form, heading each page 'Proposed Investigation (cont'd)'.

numbering the pages in sequence and clipping them to the back of the application form. These pages should be submitted in duplicate. If you want the Council to consider other material (such as working papers, offprints, etc) along with the application form you should send 40 copies.

THE MANAGEMENT OF AND REACTION/CHALLENGE TO RACIAL POLICY AND PRACTICE

The recent events that occurred in St Paul's, Bristol, brought the following remarks from the Chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality:

> "There's been too much apathy. As a nation we haven't done enough to get to the root of the sort of problems that boiled over last night. I must make it clear that it could happen again."1

The need to understand what David Lane terms the 'roots' of the problem and, more specifically, the form of racial policies and practices required to develop improved race relations is even more pressing now than before the race-class/authority confrontation in St Paul's. Although it would be pretentious to suggest that this proposed investigation attempts to fill this need, the proposal that follows should however be seen as a relevant contribution to the kind of research needed 'to get to the root of the sort of problems' that characterise the pattern of British race relations.2

The proposal will be divided into three main sections: (A) The Project; (B) The Research Design; and (C) Phasing and Implications of Research.

(A) THE PROJECT

1.00 INTRODUCTION

Over the last two decades two distinct though related British racial groupings have emerged.3 The first (consists of mainly government-sponsored race relations, immigration, and community relations agencies. Since the early 1960s with the official establishment of the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants (NCCI) this grouping has always been concerned with the formulating, implementing, and managing of racial policies and practices ostensibly designed to improve race and community relations. As an organised collection of management/implementing groups and agencies, this dominant racial grouping has developed and been directed at national and local levels by mainly middleclass white and black liberal 'race professionals'.4 It has gained a certain degree of legitimation from the fact that it sees itself and is seen by other non-racial groupings in the institutional order as representing national interests vis a vis the improvement of race relations.5

In contrast the second racial grouping (reaction/challenging grouping) has evolved alongside and it would appear in reaction to the first. Possibly emerging as a national black expression of political intent during the takeover struggle at the national Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD) in the mid-sixties, it now consists of many hundreds of black groups that have either withdrawn from the dominant racial grouping or, like 'Towards Racial Justice' and the various Rastafarian groups in Britain, have evolved as politically independent and ideologically self-sustaining entities.6 As an often fragmented expression of black discontent and alienation, the reaction/challenging groups and agencies which make up this less powerful racial grouping appear to possess a predominantly black working class based membership, one that is collectively directed by black political workers who tend to explain the 'black experience in Britain from a social stance within the Third World order and in

Proposed Investigation (cont'd)

terms of the operation and requirements of both international and domestic capital.7

This project represents the first attempt in British race relations research to study the deveopment of both racial groupings, the evolution of racial policies and practices associated with both, and, particularly, the relationships that exist between them.

The project will be limited to a study of Afro-Caribbean groups for the following reasons:

(i) It is not possible to design a project fulfilling the intentions of this proposal within the funding limits of the present grant which could include the specific history, positions and practices of the range of Asian groups.

(ii) The experience, rapport, and research required for a more general study is probably beyond the capabilities of any one researcher.

(iii) It is hoped that the present research limited as it is to the Afro-Caribbean groups will serve as a model for a more general programme.

2.00 FOCUS

The general focus of this project will centre on a systematic investigation of the kind of relationships that exist between these two racial groupings. Through a study of the policies, and practices of the two groupings research attention will be concentrated, firstly, on analytically unpacking the relationships, and, secondly, on specifying the conditions under which the relationships are maintained, altered, or changed. Such a dual focus will not only help to develop the applicant's previous substantive and theoretical work on the resistance against and organisation of racial policy and practice (see C.V.) but just as importantly it will facilitate improved understanding of the effectiveness of dominant forms of racial policy and practice.8

3.00 GENERAL AIMS

3.01 To describe and explain the development of the two racial groupings, the management and reaction/challenging groupings.

3.02 To establish more precisely than speculation allows the nature of the relationships that exist:

(a) within the two racial groupings
(b) between the two racial groupings
(c) between the two competing and alternative institutional orders in which both are located.

3.03 On the basis of 3.01/2 to ascertain how racial policies and practices are constructed, legitimated, and implemented so as to contribute:

(a) to an improved understanding of the forms and nature of organised racial policy and practice in Britain
(b) to a sociological understanding of the forms of reaction and challenge to racial policy and practice
(c) to making a number of policy recommendations in relation to the present and future development of race relations policy and practice in Britain.

4.00 OVERVIEW: TOWARDS A MODEL FOR RESEARCH

The small literature in the specific field of race relations policy and practice tends to be largely atheoretical, ahistorical, and uncritical.9 In the case of the few studies that exist on for instance 'official' organisation of racial policy and practice, these tend either to be impressionistic;10 too narrowly based on the detailed operation of a small number of community relations councils;11 too broadly based and internationally focussed to provide other than a general account of British racial policy and practice; 12 or are conducted within inadequately worked out theoretical frameworks.13 The studies (including the major research in the field by Rose et al) nearly all fail to problematise the existence and work of the management/implementing groups and agencies.14 They assume incorrectly that a critical orientation would be counter-productive and possibly ultimately destructive in terms of the stated objectives of these groups and agencies. Thus the direction of racial policy and practice in these studies is seen to emanate from above and perculate through the organisational structure of the racial grouping to below without any major transformations taking place. The existence of the work of the reaction/challenging groups and agencies and the relationship between the two groupings is nowhere to be found, particularly in the pre-1973 literature.

Even the more recent and more theoretically interesting work available, which tends to reflect the structural context of race relations, fails to emphasise the central importance of the relations between racial groups and definitions of racial and social reality in the formulation, management, and reaction or challenge to the dominant forms of racial policy and practice.15 Either this important area is assumed, redefined in terms of other substantive and theoretical interests, or it is accommodated by paying lip service to the contributions of politically organised black groups.

Apart from one or two pieces of work, the few studies available on groups and agencies in the reaction/challenging grouping possess only marginal relevance to this proposal.16 In the main, the latter are largely descriptive, focussed on the history and work of one particular group or related groups.17 Like the majority of studies alluded to above they either employ a 'downward' model of social research and investigation which tends to devalue the contributions black groups make to racial policy and practice and thereby perpetuate a conception of racial-white dominance or, because of the dominant order bias implicit in their conceptualisations, they fail to see and hence locate black reactions and challenges as an activating and consciousness-producing phenomena. Even the less patronising sociological account of black resistance that exists in the field (Moore 1975) reflects the tendency in all specific and general race relations literature to view statically the organisation of racial policy and practice; something that is totally controlled, determined, and dictated by state sponsored agencies in the field.18 Whilst this possesses the theoretical merit of describing the black experience in Britain against a background of immigration control and 'containment policies' it negates the resistance described through rigidly underplaying the dynamic nature of what the author sees as the oppression/resistance relationship.

Similarly the same criticism can be levied against the most recent of all major studies in the field (Rex & Tomlinson 1979).19 Within the framework of a class analysis of race relations, this otherwise impressive study fails further to articulate in any way that is theoretically and practically useful the precise nature of the 'opposition' or resistance it structurally depicts. Transposed into the framework of this proposal, it would suggest that not only does institutional separation marked by opposition exist at the level of white-black working class social life but that it also occurs at the specific level of the organisation of racial policy and practice. That is to say, whilst opposed to each other, the two racial groupings distinguished here exist separately and in isolation to each other.

Proposed Investigation (cont'd)

In fact, directly or indirectly, these racial groupings are either reflected in the literature as one overall grouping which is organisationally, ideologically, and politically 'closed' (Fig.1); as being 'open' but institutionally separate, pursuing different approaches to an agreed/negotiated set of problems without any noticeable conflict and occupying culturally distinctive social spheres of existence (Fig.2); or, they are seen to be completely 'separate' and in total opposition (Fig.3).

Fig.1: Closed Model of Racial Policy and Practice



(Historically, the above is essentially a pre-1973 racial picture of policy and practice credentialised largely by Rose et al's (1969) Survey of British Race Relations)

Fig. 2: Open Model of Racial Policy and Practice



(Historically, the above is a post-1973 picture detectable if not completely credentialised in the kind of research produced by the CRC/CRE and to a lesser extent by the SSRC Race and Ethnic Studies Unit when based at Bristol University.)

Proposed Investigation (cont'd)

Fig. 3: Separate Model of Racial Policy and Practice



(This is a model constructed by applying Rex & Tomlinson's (1979) more general model to the organisation of racial policy and practice)

It should be remembered that the above models have not been formed to embrace the complexity of the reality in the management of and challenges to racial policy and practice: they only represent general theoretical positions to be found in the literature.

But as general theoretical and hence explanatory positions, they are unable to account for what is specifically occurring in the substantive world of racial policy and practice. For all the models preclude (i) the forming of a comprehensive conceptualisation of the management of and challenges to racial policy and practice; (ii) the forming and posing of significant questions related to forms of management and reaction/challenge; (iii) the presenting of a scientifically reliable account of modes of racial policy and practice; and, finally, (iv) they preclude the possibility of a much needed analytical description of the current 'state' of British race relations.

Thus in order to move some way towards transforming the kind of dominant-order bias that exists in the literature and towards constructing a model that illustrates the major research intentions discussed here it is necessary to: (i) incorporate and connect structurally within one model the two racial groupings; (ii) locate the levels at which dynamic processes occur; (iii) locate the activating and consciousness-producing groups and indicate their polarities; (iv) suggest the nature and direction of power in the model.

5.00 RESEARCH PROPOSAL

The features outlined above can now be systematised as a set of related conceptual constructions as follows in which PX symbolises the management grouping and PY the reaction/challenging grouping.

(cont'd)

Proposed Investigation (cont'd)

Fig. 4: Relational Model of Racial Policy and Practice



5.01 Key

PX1 - House of Commons Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration/ Occasional political debates on race relations and immigration/and formalised intention of state policy in legislation, White Papers, Green Papers, and circulars.

PX2 - Specialised consultative advisory, research, and policy action units located within government departments.

PX3 - Principal state advisory, co-ordinating and implementing body of racial policy and practice: the statutory CRE

PX4 - National management and implementing groups (formal)

PX5 - National management and implementing groups (informal)

PXPY1 - Institutionally and ideologically incorporated 'black' groups

PXPY2 - Non institutionally and ideologically incorporated 'black' groups with strong apolitical cultural bases.

(cont'd)

Proposed Investigation (cont'd)

PY4 - Black groups with a strong cultural base. (Implicit)

PY3 - Black groups with a strong political base. (Explicit)

PY2 - National reaction/challenging groups (specialised - explicit)

PY1 - National reaction/challenging groups (general - explicit)

(i) Continuous arrowed lines indicate the direction of strong influence

(ii) Broken arrowed lines indicate the direction of weak influence

(iii) The organisational/institutional levels in the overall structure of the two racial groupings is depicted in the direction of policy and practice.

5.02 Notes

(i) This model should be viewed as only a general representation of the complexity of reality which incorporates as a basic feature the management of and reaction/challenge to racial policy and practice.

(ii) The Western and Third World Order: This refers to the dominant, legitimate representations of the relationship between the metropolitan colonising societies and the colonised. It should be noted that not all the groups within either the management and reaction/challenging groupings necessarily subscribe to or hold stable positions or relations to each of the opposing representations.

(iii) The Western and colonial/Third World bases in the model thus reflect only the basic polarity that appears to exist in the organisation of racial policy and practice. That is to say the racial groups and agencies themselves are not necessarily attached to the conceptions of the polarised versions of reality. Some groups will possess explicit or implicit and others a variable attachment to one or both polarities.

(iv) These polarities should themselves not be viewed as being static: wider social and economic changes in society will produce corresponding shifts in the position within each polarity which in turn will trigger various movements within and between groups and agencies in both racial groupings.

Whereas part of the problem of the research will be to identify those groups which hold and change positions within each polarity and the external features which regulate such movements, the overall purpose of the research is to examine and refine the relational model in Fig.4.

(B) THE RESEARCH DESIGN

6.00 RESEARCH DESIGN: MANAGEMENT GROUPS AND AGENCIES

For the purpose of the organisation of this research, these groups can be divided into two broad categories:

(i) Formal groups: This category consists of two sub-categories: statutory and quasi-statutory agencies such as the Commission for Racial Equality, the Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Service, and officially approved national bodies and groups such as the Runneymede Trust.

(cont)

Proposed Investigation (cont'd)

(ii) Informal Groups: This category includes national bodies concerned with education (the National Association for Multicultural Education - NAME); immigration (the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants - JCWI); and the professional organisation of race relations work such as the National Association of Community Relations Councils (NACRC) and the race and community relations groups in ASTMS.

Clearly, as there are approximately 4800 'informal' groups ranging from local parish based international friendship groups to regional specialist groups attached to trade unions or other organisations, all the informal groups cannot be studied individually: research attention will therefore be focussed on the national informal groups.

6.01 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The specific research objectives of this part of the project are to describe and explain the historical development, organisational and social structure, and the assumptions on which racial policies and practices have been constructed by management groups and agencies. Special attention will be given to the way in which the various national groups and agencies have undergone modifications or transformations in policy and practice.

6.02 GENERAL DESIGN

The design then will be planned to cover three aspects of research:

(i) The historical and social structural context of the formal and informal groups and agencies.

(ii) The formulation, management, and implementation of policies and how these have been transformed into specific racial practices by the formal and informal groups.

(iii) The analytical work to be undertaken to establsih (a) the relationships between and within formal and informal groups and (b) how both view their relationship(s) with the various reaction and challenging groups.

6.03 SPECIFIC DESIGN

(i) History:

(a) The first task will be to map and reconstruct the social history of the formal and informal groups. This part of the research will seek to answer the following questions: Who were they? When did they exist, reform, and/or transform into other groups or agencies? How did they organise themselves and their work? What were their social careers and social bases?

(b) The second task will be to establish the wider historical and social context of the formal and informal management groups. This will be reconstructed through:

An examination of the colonial/Commonwealth connection vis a vis black immigration to Britain and thus the establishment of early informal bodies such as the International Friendship Council concerned with the welfare of 'immigrants'.

An examination of the development of similar racial situations in other Western societies, such as the USA and Canada, to ascertain the extent of the importation of policies and practices like the concept of 'conciliation' from Canada and 'community action' from America, and the implications thesepossessed for the establishment

(cont'd)

Proposed Investigation (cont'd)

of formal bodies such as the Race Relations Board and the Community Relations Commission.

An examination of relatively recent social, economic, and political changes which have led to the present centralisation and combination of the work of statutory bodies in the formal management groups (1976 Race Relations Act).

The two questions which will underpin these examinations will be: What were the external and domestic conditions and influences that led to the establishment of both formal and informal management groups? How were these conditions and influences interpreted by the various groups?

(ii) Policy

The work here will be subdivided into the following areas:

(a) an evaluation of statutory policies that have structured the major formal management groups (eg Immigration legislation, Race Relations legislation, and the Urban Aid Programme).

(b) an examination of substantive policies that relate to specific social areas. As some work exists on housing and some is being planned on employment at the SSRC's Race and Ethnic Studies Unit, the area of education will be given special attention here. It is expected that such an examination will help to reveal more clearly than any other social area the ideological bases of racial policy and practice and the general educational bases of the work of nearly all formal and informal groups.

(c) an examination of the interpretive structure of statutory and substantive policy; how practitioners in the formal and informal management groups have interpreted and transmitted upwards or downwards their interpretations. Whilst these will be assembled from mainly material derived from interviews, they will need to be checked for 'inconsistencies' against documentary material on stated objectives, policies, and practices, and actual project work.

The main questions that will underpin these examinations are: What relations, if any, are there between statutory policy and the structure and objectives of formal and informal management groups? What are the ideological bases of particularly substantive policy? How are racial policies and practices formed, transformed, and implemented? How are policies and practices legitimated?

(iii) Analysis

Whilst it is difficult at this stage to be at all precise, as the data collected cannot be predetermined, it is likely that the analysis will:

(a) focus on and include an evaluation of the connections and relations that are revealed between the history of formal and informal management groups and the history of wider social developments and changes;

(b) focus on the social structure and bases of formal and informal management groups;

(cont'd)

Proposed Investigation (cont'd)

(c) focus on, in particularly the case of the substantive area of education, the relations established and processes involved in the formation and ideological bases of policy;

(d) and include a sorting out, from the standpoint of practitioners in these groups, of the specific relations/interactions that occur in the forming of policy interpretations - and hence the extent and nature of contact with both other management groups and reaction/challenging groups.

6.04 Methods of Investigation

Although the difficulties in carrying out sociological and scientific research in race relations should not be underestimated, it is believed here that the principal investigator's past professional experience will not only help to minimise the impact of some of these difficulties but will also help to sensitise the research methods to be used. They include the employment of survey, interview, and documentary methods.

(i) Survey

A survey-questionnaire will be sent to all formal and informal national management groups, and will be used to gather material relating to the history, social and racial structure, membership, policies, and practices of each group. Special care will need to be taken in the construction of specific questions on the social and racial structure of groups, particularly in the case of those groups which have experienced the withdrawal of blacks and are conscious of their failure to attract black support. Indeed this critical area in the research might very well have to be removed altogether from the questionnaire and pieced together from documentary and interview material. Whilst the success of the survey-questionnaire can be partly assured with the co-operation of the National Association of Community Relations Councils (NACRC) and the links the principal investigator has with the professional community relations group in ASTMS (formerly NACRO), and many other national and local bodies such as the Runneymede Trust, NAME, and JCWI, non-response will need to be corrected and the collection of in depth qualitative material facilitated through an intensive programme of interviewing.

(ii) Interview

To be conducted by the researchers employed on this part of the project and supported by a number of short-term/part-time interviewers which have been costed for, the interviewing programme will be designed to incorporate three interview groups.

The first small group will consist of the formal statutory and officially approved bodies. Whenever possible an attempt will be made to interview the members of the executive committee or commission and the chairmen and/or chief executive officers of each body.

The second interview group will be made up of the executive members/chairmen/chief officers of those national informal groups and agencies which are seen by practitioners in the formal group to possess a certain influence in the formulation and management of racial policy and practice.

And, finally, the third group will consist of a selected number of groups or bodies which institutionally symbolise a point of contact

(cont'd)

Proposed Investigation (cont'd)

with and position in both management and reaction groupings. Whilst it is expected that these will include some community relations councils, it is difficult to list specific groups before some of the research outlined in 6.03(i) has been completed. Like the survey-questionnaire, the interview schedule will be designed to elicit reponses on the significance stated interests of black groups possess for the way in which interviewees perceive and conduct their work.

(iii) Documentation

The collection and cataloguing of documentary materials relating to the objectives and work of groups and agencies will form an ongoing activity throughout the research. As a method of investigation, the extensive documentary material available, ranging from Select Committee reports to descriptions of projects by groups working in the urban community, will be used not only to construct a work profile in terms of policies and practices of the formal and informal management groups, but also to assess and chart the discrepancies, if any, that might exist between official policies and actual practices, the reactions of groups and agencies to black demands and definitions of situations, and the way in which these demands and definitions have been wholly or partly accommodated in formal accounts of actual or intended racial polciy and practice. As the principal investigator over the last seventeen years of professional and academic work in race relations has collected a substantial amount of official documentation, covering for instance the history and work of the Institute of Race Relations, the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination, the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants, the Race Relations Board, and the Community Relations Commission, this will be made available as a research resource and archive for the project.

7.00 RESEARCH DESIGN: REACTION/CHALLENGING GROUPS AND AGENCIES

As these groups are nearly all 'collectives' they cannot be classified like the management groups in terms of their organisational and authority structures. A more useful mode of classification would be one that symbolises their explicit or implicit radicalism. Thus, for the purpose of the organisation of this part of the research, these groups can be divided into two broad categories:

(i) Explicit groups: These include political groups such as the post-1972 Institute of Race Relations, the Race Today Collective, Towards Racial Justice; economic groups such as the recently reformed Caribbean and Workers Movement; largely cultural groups such as the Rastafarians.

(ii) Implicit groups: More numerous and indeed more difficult to define, these include the majority of the black educational groups such as the Black Parents' Movement, the Black Students' Movement, and the Caribbean Teachers Against Racism Group; black religious groups such as the Pentecostalists (Church of God); black 'immigrant' co-ordinating groups such as the West Indian Standing Conference and the National Afro-Asian Caribbean Peoples' Council which is to be formed in June 1980; and black commercial media groups such as the West Indian World.

7.01 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The specific research objectives of this part of the project are similar to those outlined in the management groups (6.01). Where these groups differ is in their orientation. That is to say special attention will be given to not only the kind of racial policies and practices that characterise this racial grouping but also to the form of challenge/reaction to dominant racial policy and practice that appears to exist.

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Proposed Investigation (cont'd)

7.02 GENERAL DESIGN

The design will be planned to cover three aspects of research: (i) the historical and social structural context of the reaction/challenging racial grouping; (ii) the ways in which dominant racial policies and practices appear to be challenged in respect to the creation of alternative policies and practices and institutionalised expressions of these policies and practices; and (iii) the kind of analytical work to be undertaken.

7.03 SPECIFIC DESIGN

(i) History

Given the fragmented nature and development of the reaction/challenging racial grouping, the task of mapping and reconstructing its social history will be further complicated by the absence of a full range of documentary materials. Research here will therefore need to be designed to include:

(a) an examination of the 'formal' history of the groupings, the tracing of organisational forms from the early UK based colonial freedom groups such as the Colonial Workers Association in the 1940s and 1950s;

(b) an examination of the 'relational' history of the groupings, the tracing of explicit bodies and groups that have developed as a consequence of and in relation to groups and agencies in the management racial grouping such as the post-1972 Institute of Race Relations;

(c) an examination of the wider historical and social context of the racial grouping which will be researched through an investigation of the organisational and ideological relations national explicit groups have established with international emancipatory bodies or specific Third World societies; and

(d) an examination of the social bases/structure of both explicit and implicit groups in the racial grouping. (Whilst it will be difficult to ascertain precisely the social bases of this grouping, an attempt will be made through an interview-based investigation of the members of a small number of explicit and implicit groups viewed by others as influential.)

The questions that will inform this section of the research will be: Who, when and why did these groups emerge? How are they organised? How does each view itself in relation to others in the grouping and groups in the management grouping? What are their distinguishing social structural features?

(ii) Policy

To explore the relationship between the grouping's history and its stated policy objectives, the research here will need to include:

(a) an investigation of reactions and challenges to dominant racial policy with particular reference to educational policies through th examination of documented reactions and of alternative organisational and community practices developed by particularly explicit reaction/challenging groups and bodies.

(b) an investigation of both the explicit and implicit groups that have submitted formal policy statements to, for instance, the Select Committee on Immigration and Race Relations, the

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Proposed Investigation (cont'd)

currently sitting Rampton Committee, or the Commission for Racial Equality in order to establish the ideological/policy distances that exist between the two categories of reaction/challenging groups and between the two racial groupings.

(c) an investigation of the interpretative structure of dominant racial policy and practice as defined by national explicit and implicit groups in the reaction/challenging grouping.

(d) an investigation of the structure of policy forming, reacting, and challenging points in the racial grouping through an examination of the policy relationships that exist within the grouping.

The questions that will underpin this section of the project will be: What are the various forms of reaction and challenge? How do these explicit and implicit groups perceive dominant racial policy and practice? Why and how are alternative policies and practices formed?

(iii) Analysis

Given the same qualification expressed in 6.03 (iii) above, the analytical work to be undertaken here falls into three parts:

(a) an analysis of significant interactions in the racial grouping's history; analysing the different histories as constructed on the basis of different definitions of social and racial reality, and analysing the nature of 'withdrawal' and change of allegiance that has characterised the specific histories of some explicit groups;

(b) an analysis of the categories of reactions and challenges to dominant racial policies and practices with special reference to the implications they possess for the re-positioning of reaction/challenging groups in relation to the management groups and within the space occupied by the two racial groupings;

(c) an analysis of the relations between explicit and implicit groups within the reaction/challenging grouping, between these and the formal and informal management groups, and lastly, between the two major racial groupings themselves.

7.04 METHODS OF INVESTIGATION

As a survey-questionnaire would not be completed in the present climate of distrust that exists between especially explicit reaction/challenging groups and all publicly funded reseachers, it will be necessary to concentrate on interview and documentary methods. It will also be necessary for the principal investigator to direct closely and undertake all negotiations that relate to access to specific research sites and research relations with both explicit and implicit groups. His previous research on the Institute of Race Relations, professional work experience with the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination, the Black Peoples Alliance, and other groups, and his extensive network of close contacts with many explicit and implicit groups should help to facilitate access, the development of trust and confidence, and the successful completion of this part of the research.

(i) Interview Method

The interviewing programme will consist of the following:

(a) general interviews with the Committee and/or leading members of

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Proposed Investigation (cont'd)

national explicit and implicit groups designed to gather material on group histories, social and racial structures, membership, policies and practices, and particularly group definitions of their position within the reaction/challenging racial grouping and their relationships with other explicit and/or implicit groups.

(b) Specific and in depth interviews with explicit groups perceived by implicit groups and formal/informal management groups to be influential in the reaction/challenging grouping. These interviews will be designed to gather material on the degree of explicitness possessed, the positioning of these groups within the Third World polarity, and the specific nature of contact they have with formal and informal groups in the management grouping.

(c) Specific and in depth interviews with national implicit groups perceived by explicit groups and formal/informal management groups to be influential. These interviews will be designed to gather material on their definitions of social and racial reality and dominant policies and practices; and on the nature of the relations they possess with other implicit groups, explicit groups in the reaction/challenging racial grouping, and with the formal and informal groups in the management racial grouping.

(ii) Documentation Method

Although less 'published' documentary material is available on and produced by reaction/challenging groups, the collecting of that which exists in the form of reports, constitutions, submissions to formal statutory management groups, leaflets, and pamphlets will form an essential ongoing part of the research. Because of the rhetorical nature of much of this material and because, unlike the relatively uniform style and social direction of material produced on and by the formal and informal management groups, it is oriented towards specific audiences, it will need to be sorted into several categories for eventual analysis.

These will include the following:

(a) Private: material that has been produced for internal consumption by explicit and implicit groups (eg reports, notes, memoranda, and reflections on dominant racial policy and practice or group strategies to challenge the definitions of policy and practice projected by management groups).

(b) Public: material that has been produced for public consumption by explicit and implicit groups (eg submissions for official or parliamentary committees and statements or reports to statutory and approved formal managing groups; publicly available Newsletters; constitutions; and terms of reference.)

(c) Commercial: material that is largely based on (a) and (b) above but which has been transposed into a qualitatively different style and rhetoric by both the profit-making establishment and underground press controlled by implicit black media groups (eg West Indian World, West Indian Digest, The Gleaner, and Roots).

It is expected that this material along with that gathered from interviews will be sufficient to complete the investigations and sustain the analysis outlined in 7.03 (i), (ii)

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Proposed Investigation (cont'd)

and (iii) above.

It should be finally noted that all the research outlined here (Section B) has been designed not only to explore the relational and positional features symbolised in the Relational Model (5.00) but it has also been designed to establish how and why shifts in positions and relations occur within and between the management and reaction/challenging groupings.

(C) PHASING AND IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH

8.00 PHASING

The first two years of the project will be chiefly concerned with the completing of the specific investigations already described, the undertaking of preliminary analytical work, and the writing up of research summaries, which will form the foundation for more intensive analysis during the third year.

8.01 It is believed that the concentration of resources and research expertise in this way will help to:

(i) focus immediate research attention on the practical rather than theoretical (and hence debateable and time-consuming) research issues;

(ii) utilise effeciently and effectively the limited resources available to the project;

(iii) and help to militate against the non-co-operation that can and has in some cases occurred in extended periods of empirical research in race relations.

8.02 Although it is accepted that a two year period for empirical research possesses a number of disadvantages in some fields, in the kind of research envisaged here, where there always exists a political and often emotional interplay of expected and unexpected factors, a concentrated and relatively short period of site-based research is a vital prerequisite for successful completion.

8.03 Given the above statement which is based upon the applicant's decade of research experience in this particular sub field of the sociology of race relations the research tasks will be phased as follows:



NB: Continuous lines indicate concentration of work
Broken lines indicate preliminary beginning and ultimate ending of work

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Whilst the writing up has been phased over Terms 6 to 9 it should be remembered that all researchers will be encouraged to write up in draft form each piece of research as and when it is completed.

9.00 DISSEMINATION

As the premature dissemination of research findings could prejudice the effectiveness of research to be completed, it is felt that publications during the first and second year should be in the following form: (i) Annual Reports on Research in Progress for the funding agency; (ii) a number of exploratory and largely theoretical papers for academic journals; and (iii) research summaries in the form of reports and/or working papers to be presented to conferences and/or other bodies on request.

9.01 During the third year a book on the research will be prepared for publication for possibly one of three publishers that have displayed some interest in the proposed research, (Oxford University Press, Heinemann, and George Allen and Unwin).

10.00 IMPLICATIONS FOR STAFFING

In addition to the principal investigator, four full time researchers (two on Range 1A, two on Range 1B) and one secretarial assistant (Clerical 3) will be required to undertake the research described in this project.

10.01 The principal investigator will spend 50% of his normal working week on the project. He will be engaged in planning and directing the overall project as well as (a) conducting some of the specific research outlined in particularly 7.03(ii); and (b) writing up the research during the third year.

10.02 Two researchers (one 1a and one 1B) will concentrate on the research described in 6.00. The specific tasks of the first researcher (1A) will be to carry out the research outlined in 6.03(ii) and, along with the principal investigator, to help supervise the research in 6.03(i) which will be undertaken by researcher (1B). Both researchers will be involved in the analytical work set out in 6.03(iii).

10.03 Three researchers, including the principal investigator, will concentrate on the research described in 7.00. The principal investigator, whilst responsible for the supervision of all research, will carry out the investigations listed in 7.03(ii). Under direct supervision, with the assistance of the principal investigator, the second researcher's (1B) tasks will be solely related to carrying out the research in 7.03(i). The third researcher (1A) will concentrate on the analysis of documentary material which forms a vital part of all the investigations outlined in 7.03(i), (ii) and (iii), and together with the principal investigator assist with the research in 7.03(iii).

10.04 All researchers will be expected to have academic qualifications in sociology and interests in race relations, social policy, and, possibly, social history. The two researchers on the 1A Range will be expected also to have some experience/knowledge of the work of the groups described in this project and some previous research experience at preferably post-doctoral level. Finally all researchers will be expected to carry out interviews; so experience in the conducting of interviews would be useful.

10.05 A full time secretary/administrative assistant (Clerical 3) will be required to transcribe interview material, catalogue, cross-index and file research materials; assist with the large correspondence that this kind of research generates; and administratively co-ordinate a busy research project office.

10.06 It is hoped that from 1980/81 the project will be able to sustain the work

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Proposed Investigation (cont'd)

of two linked studentships. A separate application for these studentships will be made in December 1980.

11.00 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY

Whilst it would be highly premature to try and accurately assess the implications this research possesses for the development of sociological theory on race relations or for race relations policy and practice, several things can be cautiously and generally suggested.

11.01 If the theoretical part of the project's general aims are attained this research could, firstly, add to a knowledge of the dialectical processes involved in resistance, secondly, move some way towards refining a theory of resistance outlined by the principal investigator in earlier works, thirdly, provide some grounds for holding that the state (in terms of the management of racial policy and practice) functions socially and politically not only at the level of administrative bureaucracies but especially in relationships constructed at much lower levels in the institutional order, and, finally, it could contribute to the general development of a theory of the management of social order.

12.00 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

Here it would seem that the policy implications of this research will be mainly determined by its theoretical conclusions. Whatever these finally turn out to be it can be suggested that this research possesses crucial potential for future race relations policy and practice.

12.01 It should create a systematic and empirical basis for the review and evaluation of racial policy and practice. It should illuminate the role of the professional organisation of policies and practices in relation to the various forms of its challenge. This in turn could help to establish a more productive foundation for the development of black communities, and thus help to provide a context which symbolises the relational structure of policy and practice.

12.02 Without wishing to indulge in spurious optimism the research could provide firmer ground for all groups involved in the construction of the policies and practices of race relations.

APPENDIX I: NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Quoted in Robert Chesshyre and George Brock, 'The Revolt of Britain's Lost Tribe', The Observer 5 April 1980.

2. Ibid.

3. The concept 'racial grouping' has been employed here rather than, for instance, 'network' or 'formation' as it possesses general rather than specific sociological meaning.

4. For a partial analysis of the role of what Heineman calls the 'race professionals' in the organisation of race relations work see, Benjamin W Heineman, The Politics of the Powerless: A Study of the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination Oxford University Press, London, 1972

5. See Chris Mullard, Black Britain, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1973

6. Heineman, op cit, for an account of the development of Black Power and Black Consciousness in Britain, particularly during the summer of 1967.

7. As an example of this see A Sivanandan (The Director of the Institute of Race Relations) 'Race, Class, and the State', Race and Class, Vol. XVII, No. 4, Spring, 1976.

8. See in particular Chris Mullard, 1973, op cit, 'Racism in Britain: Management Concepts, 1948-1975',1976; and Race, Power and Resistance: A Study of the Institute of Race Relations, 1952-1972, 1980

9. For two quite different though recent reviews of the literature see Robin Ward, 'Race Relations in Britain', British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 29, No. 4, December, 1978; and Gideon Ben-Tovin and John Gabriel, 'The Sociology of Race - Time to Change Course?'. The Social Science Teacher, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1979.

10. See, for instance, Lionel Morrison, As They See It, CRC Publications, London, 1976.

11. See, for instance, Michael Hill and Ruth Issacharoff, Community Action and Race Relations: A Study of Community Relations Committees in Britain, Oxford University Press, London, 1971; and A J Barker, Strategy and Style in Local Community Relations, Runneymede Trust, London, 1975

12. See, for instance, Ira Katznelson, Blackmen, White Cities: Race, Politics, and Migration in the United States 1900-30 and Britain, 1948-68, Oxford University Press, London, 1973.

13. John Rex's work over the last decade or more has taken up rigorously the challenge presented in much of the atheoretical literature on race relations; see, for instance, his Race Relations in Sociological Theory, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1970, and, almost a decade later, John Rex and Sally Tomlinson, Colonial Immigrants in a British City: A Class Analysis, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979.

14. E J B Rose and Associates, Colour and Citizenship: A Report on British Race Relations, Oxford University Press, London, 1969.

15. See in particular John Rex and Sally Tomlinson, 1979, op cit; and Stuart Hall, et al, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order, The Macmillan Press, London, 1978.

16. The exceptions include ASivanandan Race and Resistance: the IRR Story,

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APPENDIX I (cont'd)

Race Today Publications, 1974; Chris Mullard, 1980 op cit; and a number of other brief articles that have appeared in Race Today since Darcus Howe took over the editorship in 1973.

17. As a general illustration of this trend see R Desai's study of Indian Workers associations: Indian Immigrants in Britain, Oxford University Press, London, 1963.

18. Robert Moore, Racism and Black Resistance in Britain, Pluto Press, London, 1975.

19. John Rex and Sally Tomlinson, op cit, 1979.