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A STUDY OF THE IDEOLOGY OF PALESTINIAN
ARAB NATIONALISM SINCE 1948

by

JUDITH NOTTINGHAM

THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF M.A.

ABSTRACT

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the predominant ideas in Palestine, as in the rest of the Arab world, were of freedom from European rule. This was gradually achieved, at least formally, and new ideas of pan-Arabism and unity became ascendant. The old Palestinian nationalist parties disintegrated in face of the new ideas and the loss of part of Palestine to the Jews.

With the expulsion of many Palestinians to surrounding countries and the establishment of the state of Israel, ideas of Palestinian liberation developed based upon Third World theories of people's war and in some cases upon Marxism.

At first the Arab establishment attempted to control the new Palestinian institutions and in some cases actually set them up. However, they were eventually taken over by al-Fateh, the most powerful and successful of the new guerrilla groups. Al-Fateh's strength was based initially upon its careful assessment of the situation and its refusal to become the creature of any particular Arab state. However, it refused to commit itself to the formation of any definite form of Palestinian state in the event of liberation, and faced growing criticism from more radical groups dedicated to the establishment of a socialist Palestine.

Because of its failure to bring about unity between the various groups and also because of its internal differences, al-Fateh missed its chance of seizing power in Jordan in 1969 and was heavily defeated the next year by King Husain's army. It remains to be seen whether the Palestinians will be able to overcome their disunity to form a more viable resistance movement in the future.

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INTRODUCTION

"Our Palestinian brothers have lost almost everything, but in the process they have discovered something precious, their semi-obliterated Palestinian personality, which the Israelis and Imperialists and reactionary Jordanian regime have tried to destroy and which their twenty-year status as displaced persons had threatened." 1

Since the June War of 1967, it has become generally recognised, even by Israel, that the Palestinian resistance movement constitutes an important new element in the Middle East. An Israeli military intelligence expert wrote:

" after the downfall of the Arab armies the fedayeen action gained renown for them in the Arab countries and outside, and the Palestinians were transformed from an inferior factor into the standard-bearer of Arab nationalism and a source of pride." 2

It is the purpose of this thesis to trace the re-emergence of the Palestinians, as an organised entity with a specifically Palestinian-oriented ideology, from the fragmentation which resulted from the 1948 war.

For the purpose of this paper, ideology can be defined as a body of inter-related ideas providing a coherent interpretation of the existing situation within both the historical and environmental context. Ideologies in this sense are usually formulated with reference to a specific group of individuals with certain characteristics in common, perhaps a class, a religious community or a nation. The ideology explains the position of the particular group in the order of things and provides them with both long-term and immediate aims.

1. Carlos Belle, Address to the International Union of Students, meeting in Berlin (GDR), March 20th-26th 1968. Belle was Angolan delegate.
2. Y. Harkabi, The Position of the Palestinians in the Israeli-Arab Conflict and their National Covenant 1968 (Translated from the Hebrew by J. Kraemer).

Nationalism may be defined as an ideology which gives a group an identity as a nation, the members of which have common characteristics and history. Once identified, the nation is provided with certain aims for which all members of the group must strive. The effort to realise their common destiny then further unites the members of the nation into a recognisable entity.

Palestinian nationalism offers the Palestinians an explanation of the situation in which they found themselves after the 1948 war. It also gives them an end for which they can strive, the liberation of their country, and the means for achieving this, armed struggle.

Since no ideology can exist in isolation from the material world which it seeks to explain, it is necessary to consider in some detail, the context within which Palestinian nationalism arose. Thus a large part of the thesis is devoted to an historical account of the Palestinians and the forms of organisation they adopted after 1948.

At the same time, no ideology is totally unaffected by the ideas which preceded it or those which developed concurrently in other parts of the world, especially since the development of mass communication. It is therefore necessary to understand the ideas predominant in the Arab world before 1948 and the circumstances which produced them. This is the subject of the first chapter.

During the 1950s, Palestinian nationalism as such was obscured by the rise of new forms of pan-Arab oriented nationalism and this period is covered in chapter two. Chapters three to five deal with the re-emergence of Palestinian nationalism, the institutions through which it was expressed, and the different trends which developed within it.

The sixth chapter is a discussion of the ideological differences between these trends. It attempts to assess and compare the main rival theories, first as coherent and internally consistent bodies of thought and second, with respect to their relevance to the situation they attempt to explain. The guide to action each provides is judged according to its success in practice, until the crushing of the resistance in September 1970.

CHAPTER ONE: PALESTINE BEFORE 1950

Background

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, certain sections of the Arab intelligentsia within the Ottoman empire developed a desire first for Arab autonomy inside the empire and later for complete Arab independence. Palestine at this time was a recognised geographical area within the province of Syria. Still under nominal Turkish rule, Syria suffered severely from the neglect and corruption which characterised the final stages of Ottoman decline. Before the first World War the boundaries of the area known as Palestine included both present-day Israel and Jordan.

The Arabs recognised the existence of different regions within their world but the ideal for which they strove was an undivided Arab entity. Neguib Azoury, a one-time assistant to the Ottoman Governor of Jerusalem and an ardent Arab nationalist defined Palestine as

" divided into three different administrative spheres. All of the TransJordan area is dependent on the Governor General of Damascus. The CisJordan area (north) . . . is linked to that of Beirut, the part below this depends on the Governorate of Jerusalem, which, because of the problem of sanctuaries, is similar to a Governorate General and corresponds directly with Constantinople. The whole area between Beersheba and Mt. Sinai and the Suez Canal has belonged to Egypt since the Treaty of London in 1840." 1

Azoury thus included not only Israel and Jordan to be in the area called Palestine but also the Sinai peninsula.

The Middle East in the nineteenth century saw a significant change in ideas beginning with the desire to reform Islam and its institutions by a return to the basic essentials of the Qur'an. 2 Other attempts were made to save the empire by moderate constitutional reform and modernisation along European lines. The failure of these attempts led to the rise of the Young Ottoman movement, comprised of several clandestinely

1. Azoury, Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe pp. 42-3. Translation by the author.
2. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age chapters 1-9, especially chapter 9.

organised groups seeking more radical change. 1 The movement, which included both Arabs and Turks came to power in 1908 through a successful revolution and for some time it seemed the empire might regenerate itself from within. This era was accompanied by the Arabs' desire for autonomy inside a reformed empire.

After the revolution the appearance of a rabid form of Turkish nationalism caused the new government to undertake a policy of 'Turkification', imposing Turkish as the official language, even in purely Arab areas. The nascent grievances of the Arabs were consequently transformed into a struggle for independence and existing theories of Arab nationalism were developed and extended in defence of the Arab identity. 2

An almost parallel development, of which little notice was taken at the time, was the growth of the Zionist movement in Europe. In the late nineteenth century the movement approached the Ottoman Sultan in the hope of persuading him to allow Jewish immigration to Palestine in return for the settlement of his financial problems. Although officially refused permission, several settlements of new Jewish immigrants were established in Palestine before the turn of the century, bringing the total Jewish community to nearly 10 per cent of the population as a whole.

Arab nationalism was essentially cultural and linguistic in character. It took little account of the rise of Zionism. Its aims were vague and simple - independence, unity and an opportunity for the Arab nation to express itself. Only Azoury seemed to realise the potential danger of the Zionist movement, and he had little influence on the Arab nationalist movement as a whole. He wrote in 1905,

"Two important phenomena of a similar but opposite nature ... are manifesting themselves at this time in Asiatic Turkey. These are the rebirth of the Arab nation and the latent effort of the Jews to rebuild on a very large scale the ancient kingdom of Israel. These two movements are destined to fight each other continually until one of them triumphs over the other." 3

1. Zeine N Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism chapters 1-4.
2. ibid chapter 5. Hourani, op cit, pp. 260-83.
3. Azoury, op cit, p. V Introduction.

By 1913, the Arab nationalists had formed a number of secret societies to forward their aims within both the civil and military institutions of the Ottoman administration. Student sympathisers abroad held a congress in Paris that year in support of Arab independence from the Turks. 1

Arab nationalism was therefore the main political force affecting Palestine before the first World War. Although the Zionist movement had ambitions to establish a state there, it had not become a threat to the inhabitants of the area. Both these movements had to decide their attitudes to the collapse of the Ottoman empire, and in this they were not alone. The European powers had long been troubled by the 'Eastern Question', that is to say, how best to assure their continued influence in the area. The first World War was the arena in which the division of the spoils was eventually decided. Britain, made use of every available means to ensure possession of the spheres of influence it desired. It simply promised all interested parties what they most wanted in return for their support in the war. The Arabs were promised independence, the French Syria and Lebanon and the Zionists Palestine.

The agreement with the French, undertaken secretly in 1916, became known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement. 2 The promise to the Arabs, undertaken in 1915 and 1916, was contained in a series of letters between Sherif Husain, the ruler of Hejaz, and Sir Henry MacMahon. 3 Another letter from Lord Balfour 4 to Lord Rothschild in November 1917 contained the promise to the Zionists. It stated in part,

"His Majesty's Government view with favour
the establishment in Palestine of a national
home for the Jewish people ..." 5

1. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, passim. Hassan Sa'ab The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire, passim.
2. Woodward and Butler (Eds), Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 1st series, Vol. 4, pp. 241-251. This was a tripartite agreement, the third party being Russia. Antonius, op cit, Appendix B, pp. 428-30.
3. G.B., Parliamentary Papers, Cmd 5974. Antonius, op cit, Appendix B, pp. 413-27.
4. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
5. The Times 19th November 1917.

These promises, though perhaps conflicting, exhibited a certain logical consistency in that they were all designed to promote British interests. The promise to the French was honoured in the peace negotiations. The resultant system of mandates, conferred by the newly-formed League of Nations, divided Syria between the British and the French, the northern region (present-day Syria and Lebanon) going to France and Palestine (including present-day Jordan) going to the British who also held the mandate for Iraq.

The promises to the Zionists were also honoured. The terms of the Balfour Declaration were incorporated into the Palestine mandate and even before it was legally in effect, the British Military Government permitted an increase in Jewish immigration and the establishment of Jewish political and economic institutions.

The promises to the Arabs were never honoured. Sherif Husain persuaded the Arab nationalists to support his 1916 revolt against the Turks because he believed the letter he had received from MacMahon had promised complete independence for the whole Arab world including Syria. 1 However, the wording of the correspondence proved sufficiently vague for widely different interpretations to be placed upon it. 2

When hostilities ended in a British victory, the Arab army, under Sherif Husain's son, Faisal, established a provisional government in Damascus until Syria could form a permanent Arab government on a constitutional and legal basis. Faisal administered Syria in this way for two years during the peace negotiations, in spite of the presence of the British and French armies on part of the territory.

As the peace negotiations drew to a close, it became increasingly obvious that the European powers had no intention of allowing Syria to achieve either independence or unity. In an attempt to forestall Syria's division and subjection to Europe. An Arab nationalist congress in 1920 declared Faisal king. He retained this position for only a

1. Antonius, op cit, passim.

2. For the Arab case see W.F. Boustani, The Palestine Mandate, Invalid and Impractical, pp. 38-47.

few months following the publication of the mandates. In July 1920, the French army marched into Damascus and ejected Faisal's government, well aware that the British would do nothing to stop them. The British were occupied with consolidating their position in Palestine, which they later insisted was excluded from the area promised independence by MacMahon. 1

To compensate Faisal for his rough treatment at the hands of the French, the British made him head of state in Iraq. The advance of Faisal's brother, 'abdallah, coming from the south with an army to defend Damascus, was also effectively stopped. The British offered him the position of head of state in the area of Palestine east of the River Jordan, if he stopped his march there. This region subsequently became TransJordan, and was excluded from the area included in the Palestine Mandate which was destined to become the national home of the Jews.

Arab Political Organisation in Palestine

This was the historical context within which Arab political organisation developed in Palestine. It was rooted in the pre-war pan-Arab movement for independence and unity, but soon adapted to the specific conditions prevailing in Palestine itself. The pan-Arab trend continued in Palestinian politics and was eventually crystallised in one of several parties formed in the 1930s, the Istiqlal (Independence) Party. 2

1. Ibid.

2. The Istiqlal was really a continuation of one of the pre-war Arab secret societies, al-Hizb al-'ahd (The Party of the Pact). It took the name Istiqlal during the war. With the subsequent disillusion caused by the imposition of the mandates, it ceased to operate in an organised way until its regeneration in the 1930s.

This was a relatively progressive force, representing the rising middle class, and essentially anti-British rather than anti-Zionist. Its membership included many who had been members of Faisal's short-lived Damascus government, 1 and others prominent in the economic life of the country. 2 The Istiqlal was very active in the Arab insurrection of 1936 against the British. As a result, it faced the death, exile or imprisonment of most of its leaders and the disappearance of its more radical elements, whether through their physical or psychological destruction. Those who remained alive were dispirited and the party never recovered. 3 The final blow came with the establishment of the Arab League in 1945. 4 For the first time, Arab unity was given a formal and legal mode of expression. Since many Arab states had, by this time, attained independence from direct colonial rule, the Istiqlal lost its raison d'etre.

By the end of the 1920s a specifically Palestine oriented nationalism had developed represented in two rival parties, al-Hizb al-'arabi (The Arab Party) controlled by the Husseini family, and Hizb ad-Difa' (The Defence Party), controlled by the Nashashibi family. 5 Apart from family rivalry, the main difference between these two parties lay in the methods they used to achieve essentially similar objectives,

1. For example, the party's leader, Auni 'abd-al-Hadi, was Faisal's secretary. Further examples can be found in "Arabs' Who's Who," Colonial Office Papers, CO/733/248/17693: Shaikh Kamal Kassab: 'One of the earliest members of the pan-Arab movement - was president of the National Defence Committee in Damascus under Faisal and was a prominent leader in the movement against the French.'
2. For example: Rashid Hajj Ibrahim: "Member of the Istiqlal party. He is manager of the Arab Bank in Haifa ... president of the Arab Chamber of Commerce in Haifa." Ibid. (Arabs' Who's Who was compiled for the internal use of the Colonial Office).
3. J. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, p.82.
4. The League was established with British approval. Cecil Hourani, "The Arab League in Perspective", MEJ Vol. 1 No. 2, p. 129.
5. Details of these two parties can be found in Hurewitz, op cit, passim, and M.E.T. Mogannam, The Arab Woman, passim.

independence from British rule, an end to Jewish immigration, an end of the sale of land to the Jews and repudiation of the Balfour Declaration. While the 'extremist' Husseinis refused to co-operate with the British in any way, the 'moderate' Nashashibis attempted to achieve their ends by compromise and argument with the authorities.

The Husseinis were by far the most popular, largely because of their control over the religious institutions of Islam which gave them immense psychological and financial advantages. The most prominent political figure during the mandate was Hajj Amin al-Husseini 1, president of the Supreme Muslim Council 2 and Mufti 3 of Jerusalem. He became undisputed Arab leader in every period of crisis.

In spite of considerable popular support, which could be rallied whenever necessary, both the Arab and Defence parties failed to organise or educate their supporters. They represented the traditional semi-feudal and middle class interests. The idea of delegating any responsibility to their followers was utterly foreign to them.

1. Hajj Amin was born in the 1890s, the son of Tahir al-Husseini, Mufti of Jerusalem. He was educated in Turkish schools and at al-Azhar in Cairo. During the first World War he was an officer in the Turkish army until 1917 when he went to Jerusalem to recruit volunteers for Faisal's Arab army. By 1919, realisation of Britain's real intentions for Palestine reached the Arabs by way of the Peace Conference and from being very pro-British, Hajj Amin became an important nationalist figure, helping to organise the first Arab Congress. During the disturbances of 1920, when Faisal was declared King of Syria, Hajj Amin's inflammatory speeches against the British made it necessary for him to flee to Damascus and then TransJordan. He was amnestied by the British after a short time, but his name remained on their police files. Colonial Office Papers, op cit. Elie Kedourie, "Sir Herbert Samuel and the Government of Palestine," MES Vol 5, pp. 50-69.
2. The Council was set up by the British for the administration of the Islamic institutions including Muslim charities, properties and trusts. It also appointed judges (qadis).
3. Religious leader.

In addition to these various nationalist forces, there was a small communist party and labour movement, both of which reached the height of their popularity during the second World War, when the Communists enjoyed a brief period of legality. 1 The party had both Arab and Jewish members and consequently at every point of crisis split along communal lines. 2 It officially supported the anti-British insurrection in 1936, although most of the Jewish members split away or left as a result. 3 During this period it had quite strong links with the Istiqlal party. 4

Arab Political Activity in Palestine

The 1936 insurrection was the high point of Arab political activity in Palestine, but insofar as it was organised at all, it owed very little to Hajj Amin or any other recognised political leader. It sprang from a peasant movement led by a little-known religious preacher, Shaikh 'az ad-Din al-Qassam. 5

1. Walter Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, p. 109.
2. ibid, pp. 77-110. Martin Ebon, "Communist Tactics in Palestine" MEJ Vol 2 No 3 passim. Yehoshua Porath, "Revolution and Terror in the PCP 1929-39" New East Vol 18 Nos 3-4, passim.
3. Laqueur op cit, p. 110.
4. This was logical since, in semi-feudal societies, new middle class parties are progressive forces, and as such the Communists are usually prepared to enter alliances with them.
5. Al-Qassam started preparing for armed struggle in 1928, in the belief that any revolution should depend upon the organised peasants and workers and that popular feeling was not enough to liberate a country. He thought the existing leaders incapable of the task, and thus began organising a clandestine, principled, revolutionary movement based essentially on Islamic beliefs. In 1928 he asked Hajj Amin to appoint him as a travelling preacher so that he could move about the country to gather followers. Hajj Amin refused and al-Qassam continued on his own initiative. By 1935 his group numbered 200, mainly peasants and workers from the slums of Haifa. He launched his armed struggle in November of that year. Naji 'allush, al-Magawamah al-'arabiyah fi Falastin 1917-1948 pp. 101-3.

Once the insurrection was underway, the political leaders had no alternative but to assume control of it and accept it as their own. 1 Al-Qassam was killed very soon after he began operations in November 1935, and his death was mourned throughout the country. 2 His followers continued their activity, precipitating a general strike in April 1936 which was country-wide and threatened to take the initiative from the political leaders. All parties therefore quickly endorsed the strike and a few days later united to form a ten-man Executive, al-Hayah al-'arabiyyah al-'uliah (The Higher Arab Committee) which then took control of the subsequent insurrection. 3 After six months the Higher Committee called off the strike in face of a plea from several Arab Heads of State assuring the Palestinians of Britain's "good intentions". 4

Armed struggle broke out again in 1937 after a Royal Commission of Enquiry chaired by Lord Peel, recommended the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab areas, as the best solution. 5 The insurrection lasted three years in all, during which time all Arab political institutions were declared illegal and most of the leaders imprisoned or deported. Only the Nashashibis co-operated with the British and consequently lost virtually all the support they had. The Husseinis and those Istiqlal leaders who escaped deportation, fled to the surrounding countries and set up bases from which they tried to continue to direct the insurrection.

1. John Marlowe, Rebellion in Palestine, p. 152.
2. Colonial Office Papers, "Political Events in 1935 and 1936 down to Outbreak of Disorders", memo by the Government of Palestine to the Permanent Mandates Commission 1936, CO/733/287/75031/2 p. 3 para. 19.
3. This unification was effected on the initiative of Rashid Hajj Ibrahim, a member of the Istiqlal (see p.8 fn.2). The Higher Committee for most of its existence was under the control of the Husseinis.
4. Notes were sent to the Higher Committee by Emir 'abdallah of TransJordan, King Ghazi of Iraq and Abd al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia, asking that the strike be ended.
5. G.B., Parliamentary Papers, CM 5479.

For a time, in 1938, the British appeared to have lost all authority over the country 1 but they ultimately reasserted control, partly by force, and partly by making political concessions. 2 In addition, the Husseini-Nashashibi rivalry began to degenerate into a civil war, which seriously undermined Arab morale. 3

By the second World War, the Palestinian Arabs were in a very weak position, their political institutions smashed, their leaders in exile, their arms supplies exhausted. In addition, Jewish immigration had brought the Jewish population to 30% of the total. When war actually broke out many of the exiled Arab leaders worked in Germany in anti-British propaganda. 4 Hajj Amin played a prominent role in this. 5

When the war ended the British began to consider withdrawing from Palestine. This entailed reaching some kind of compromise formula with both Arab and Jewish communities and consequently many deported leaders were allowed to return. Hajj Amin, who had been interned in France, mysteriously escaped to Cairo at the end of 1946, and though still banned from Palestine, began to reorganise his supporters from Egypt.

1. G.B., The Political History of Palestine under the British Administration, memo to UNSCOP, July 1947, pp. 20-21.
2. In May 1939, the British Government issued a White Paper which acceded to many of the Arabs' demands. It promised independence after ten years and an end to Jewish immigration, except with Arab consent, after five. Cmd 6019.
3. 'allush, op cit, pp. 126-33.
4. This was logical under the circumstances since most of them had spent three years actively fighting the British in the 1930s. On the other hand, it should be noted that the communists had also fought in the 1936 insurrection but during the second World War devoted much energy to anti-fascist propaganda, especially after Germany invaded the USSR.
5. Maurice Pearlman, The Mufti of Jerusalem, passim. Joseph B. Schechtman, The Mufti and the Feuhrer, passim. Lukasz Hirsowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, pp. 312-3. Hajj Amin himself says that he collaborated with Germany as a state though he did not support Nazism as a doctrine. Jacques Derogy and Edouard Saab, Les Deux Exodes, pp. 183-4.

The situation differed from that of the 1930s in many ways, not least of which was the emergence of the newly independent Arab states and the Arab League. The League supported Hajj Amin, not only because he was the logical choice as a figure-head for Palestine, but also because of the rivalry between Egypt, supported by the other states, and the Hashemites of TransJordan. The League feared Emir 'abdallah's ambitions for leadership of a 'Greater Syria'. Thus, as 'abdallah was supporting the 'moderates' in Palestine, 1 the League naturally backed Hajj Amin.

The alliance was mutually necessary, since Hajj Amin had lost the Supreme Muslim Council 2 as a source of financial and psychological power and was obliged to trust in appeals to national sentiment for popular support, and the Arab League for material support.

In the course of 1947 it became increasingly clear that Palestine would be partitioned. Britain submitted the question to the United Nations, leaving the Arab case to be defended by the new Arab states, inexperienced in international diplomacy. They lost from the beginning, when the UN, contrary to their wishes, insisted on sending a Commission of Enquiry to Palestine. 3 In November 1947 the UN formally adopted a resolution for partition with economic union of Arab Palestine to TransJordan. 4

1. The remnants of the Nashashibi Defence Party, and another small party which took the same line, the Reform Party of Dr. Khalidi.
2. See above p. 9 fn. 2.
3. The United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) was the last in a long line of commissions of enquiry sent to Palestine to investigate the various 'disturbances' which occurred during the mandate. The Arabs were totally disillusioned with such commissions and wanted the question of independence for Palestine judged on its merits. UN, GA OR First Special Session Vol I, pp. 122-77.
4. TransJordan was not a member of the UN at this time, which saved 'abdallah the embarrassment of voting.

Even before November, the Palestinians had begun to prepare for military action to prevent the implementation of partition. The Higher Committee hastily organised a military force from wherever possible 1 and by the end of 1947 had formed a sort of army, Al-Jihad al-Muqaddas (The Holy War). This army began operations in November and by March 1948 the Palestinian Arabs had control of much of the country. The following month, however, as the British completed their withdrawal, they began to lose ground to the Jewish forces. The Palestinians' most important military leader, 'abd-al-Qadir al-Husseini 2 was killed in mid-April 3 and from that time the situation deteriorated rapidly for the Arabs. Many fled the country to the safety of neighbouring states.

The defeat of the Palestinians had many causes. Their organisation had never fully recovered, materially or psychologically, from the 1936 insurrection. Moreover, they had become dependent on the Arab League for arms and ammunition, 4 and this material support was withdrawn at a critical moment. 5 As in the 1930s, their ranks were weakened by internal division and lack of central control. 6

1. There was already in existence the military arm of the Arab Party, al-Futuwwah (The Youth) led by Kamal Arakat. This had been set up in 1935 but was disbanded after the insurrection. Another group, an-Najaddah (the Scouts) based in Jaffa and led by a Muslim lawyer, Muhammad Nimr al-Hawari, was set up in 1945, consciously modelled on the Jewish Haganah.
2. 'abd al-Qadir had been active in the 1936 insurrection as leader of the Jerusalem area. He was the son of Musa Kazem al-Husseini, a prominent nationalist figure in the 1920s. Although 'abd al-Qadir was a member of the Husseini family, he was not involved in the inter-Arab faction fights in Palestine.
3. He was killed defending the town of al-Qastel. It was a strategically important town, yet the Arab League had refused to send arms and ammunition for its defence. Al-Fateh, "Abdel Qadir al-Husseini; A Symbol of Resistance 1948", Fateh Vol 1 No. 7, (January 1st 1970) p.6.
4. The League had decided to back the Palestinians with arms and volunteers at the end of 1947. Muhammad Darwaza, Al-Qadih al-Falastiniyyah fi Mukhtalif Marahilha Vol 1, pp. 97-101.
5. See above fn. 3.
6. Volunteers from the Arab states were under one Fauzi al-Kauqji, variously described as 'soldier of fortune' and 'charlatan'. He relinquished a post in the Iraqi army to participate in the 1936 insurrection and had worked for several different Arab governments in his chequered career. Hurewitz, op cit p. 69; Sir A.S. Kirkbridge, A Crackle of

Thorns, pp. 154-7.

Kauqji disliked 'abd al-Qadir and refused to co-operate with him in 1947. It is widely believed that he collaborated with the Haganah in order to hasten 'abd al-Qadir's defeat. Rony E. Gabbay, A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict, p. 81.

On May 14th 1948, one day before the last of the British withdrew, the Jews declared an independent state of Israel in the areas of Palestine under their control. The Arab states who, a few weeks earlier, had refused the Palestinians vital arms, now sent in their regular armies. Initial successes short-lived and after the first truce in June 1948 they lost ground to the Zionists. Only 'abdallah's Arab Legion held its position. 1

By the beginning of 1949 most of Palestine was occupied either by the Zionists or 'abdallah's forces. The Egyptian army retained control only over the Gaza Strip. This distribution of forces was the basis for the Armistice Agreements.

The Palestinians were in complete disarray. Most of them had fled, creating an enormous refugee problem for the surrounding states. The population remaining in areas under Zionist control was only 10% Arab. The only political institution left to the Palestinians was the Higher Committee, which had attempted to direct operations from outside the country throughout the war. What remained of al-Jihad al-Muqaddas continued to put up some resistance in the Jerusalem area both to the Zionists and to 'abdallah's forces. 2 All the Palestinians could do in the circumstances was to try to save the West Bank from annexation by 'abdallah.

1. This may have been the result of superior military training or some pre-arrangement with the Zionists. 'abdallah had conducted secret negotiations with the Zionists since 1947 to try to ensure some personal advantage from partition. Marie Syrkin, Way of Valour, pp. 213-9; Benjamin Shwadran, Jordan a State of Tension, p. 249; 'abdallah at-tal, Karithah Falastin, pp. 344, 438-65, 529-36; James MacDonald, My Mission in Israel 1948-51, pp. 124, 193-4. One of the main reasons for the Arab armies' failure was their disunity and lack of co-ordination, mainly due to 'abdallah-Egypt rivalry.
2. Al-Jihad represented the so called 'extremists' linked to the Higher Committee. It sought above all an independent Palestine and was thus as much a threat for 'abdallah as the Zionists were.

'abdallah had made no effort to conceal his ambitions to annex part of Palestine and as his Arab Legion advanced, local inhabitants were systematically disarmed. 1 Military governors were appointed to the major towns. 2 In addition, the union with TransJordan of those parts of Palestine assigned to the Arabs in the partition resolution, was under consideration by the UN. The UN Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, had suggested as a basis for peace talks:

"... that ... Palestine ... including Trans-Jordan, might form a union comprising two members, one Arab and one Jewish." 3

The Arab League was thus obliged to take some decisive action to protect their interests and prevent 'abdallah from achieving his ambitions. Their first step was the establishment of a provisional Palestinian administration. This administration, though purely nominal with no real power, 4 included several members of the Higher Committee. Hajj Amin himself was not given a place on this body, which was intended more as a psychological weapon than an active institution, 5 since the League feared he would take the initiative away from them.

1. 'allush, Al-Masirah ila Falastin, p. 187.
2. John Baghot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, p. 82.
3. Letter from Bernadotte to Israel and the Arab states June 27th 1948. Count Folke Bernadotte, To Jerusalem, p. 129.
4. The League stipulated 'it shall not have competence at present over higher political affairs.' Muhammad Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League Vol. 2, pp. 566-8.
5. One of its first actions was to disband the Communists and arrest them, ostensibly for their acceptance of the Partition resolution. Cahiers Vol. 14-15, p. 141.

Hajj Amin had no intention of being excluded from Palestinian affairs however and in September 1948, on the eve of United Nations discussions of the Bernadotte Plan 1 he began pressing for the establishment of a real Palestinian government based upon an elected General Assembly. 2 Under the circumstances the League had to do more or less as Hajj Amin wished and announced the establishment of a Government of All Palestine 3 with Ahmed Hilmi 'abd al-Baqi 4 as Prime Minister. The League still managed to exclude Hajj Amin from any position of responsibility and had come to agreement with the Higher Committee on this point. 5 However, when he returned to Gaza several days later, entering Palestine for the first time since his exile in 1937, 6 the Higher Committee called a Palestinian Congress 7 which unanimously elected him its president. The Congress accepted the Government of All Palestine set up by the League, 8 proclaimed Palestine independent 9 and voted a provisional constitution to be valid until general elections could be held.

1. This was essentially partition and economic union of Arab Palestine with TransJordan.
2. Cahiers Vol. 14-15, pp. 141-2.
3. MEJ Vol. 3 No. 1, p. 77.
4. Hilmi was a prominent member of the Istiqlal and president of the Arab National Bank. He had also been appointed military Governor of Jerusalem by 'abdallah. When he accepted the position of Prime Minister, 'abdallah dismissed him. ibid, p. 75.
5. 'arif al-'arif, An-Nakhbah Vol. 3, p. 703.
6. MEJ Vol. 3 No. 1, p. 77.
7. It was constituted as follows: 8 from the Higher Committee; 10 local mayors; 14 presidents of local councils; 21 from the national committees; 12 delegates from those defending the Arab case in Europe during the mandate; 6 tribal chiefs; and 4 from the unions of engineers, lawyers and pharmacists. 'arif, op cit p. 703. The Assembly was essentially representative of the feudal and middle classes. Even the unions represented were professional unions.
8. Cahiers Vol. 16, p. 236.
9. That is, Palestine excluding TransJordan.

This constitution, which transformed the Congress into a sort of parliament, brought Hajj Amin back into the position of official Palestinian leader as a result of his being president of the Congress, and he was empowered to appoint the government in any time of crisis. 1

The re-emergence of Hajj Amin provoked an immediate response from 'abdallah 2 who called his own Palestinian Congress in 'amman, formed mainly from the traditional opponents of the Husseinis. 3 This 'amman Congress passed resolutions condemning the Gaza government, re-opening factional differences which had remained in abeyance for over a year. The Gaza government, which was very definitely a coalition began to show signs of disintegration. 4 Most important, however, the 'amman Congress provided some sort of legitimate basis for 'abdallah's subsequent persecution of Husseinis supporters in the West Bank. The day after the Congress the Arab Legion started to round up the remnants of al-Jihad al-Muqaddas still active in the Jerusalem area 5

1. Cahiers Vol. 16, p. 236. Marcel Colombe, "Le Probleme de l'Entite Palestinienne dans les Relations Interarabes," Orient No. 29, p. 60.
2. He considered setting up his own Palestinian Government but rejected the idea. Esmond Wright "Abdallah's Jordan," MEJ Vol. 5 No. 4, p. 466.
3. The president was Sheikh Taji al-Faruqi, an old opponent of Hajj Amin.
4. Two of its members attended the 'amman Congress. Wright op cit p. 466.
5. Glubb, op cit, p. 192.

and at the same time the TransJordan Ministry of Defence demanded that all Palestinians surrender their arms or join the Arab Legion. The last stronghold of al-Jihad fell soon afterwards. 1

For a while the position appeared to be one of stalemate, with the Arab League morally supporting the Gaza Government and 'abdallah remaining de facto ruler of the West Bank. Then on 1st December 1948 'abdallah called another Palestinian Congress, this time in Jericho 2 which proclaimed him 'King of all Palestine' and recommend the election of Palestinian representatives for 'consultation on the matter of Palestine'. 3

In spite of indignant protests from all over the Arab world 4 'abdallah continued with his plans and the Jericho resolutions were ratified by the TransJordanian parliament. 5 His main concern was that annexation, when it finally happened, should appear 'constitutional' and it was therefore necessary to wait until an election could be held which would bring West Bank representatives into the parliament. A year elapsed before all the necessary amendments could be made to TransJordanian law. 6 In the meantime de facto rule was con-

1. ibid.
2. There were many delegates (estimates range from 500-2000) including mayors, tribal chiefs, mukhtars, military governors and representatives from refugee camps not under TransJordanian rule. Delegates were transported to the Congress by the Arab Legion. The President of the Congress was Sheikh Muhammad 'ali al-Ja'bari, mayor of Hebron, nominated by the TransJordan Government. 'arif, op cit Vol. 4, p. 877; at-Tall, op cit, pp. 375-6; Wright, op cit, p. 466; Ann Dearden, Jordan p. 77.
3. 'arif, op cit Vol. 4, p. 877.
4. There were also allegations that the Congress had been conducted in an atmosphere of "repression and threats". Journal d'Egypte 12th December 1948.
5. Benjamin Shwadran "Jordan Annexes Arab Palestine" MEA Vol. 1 No. 4 pp. 102-4.
6. In December 1949 all Palestinians were granted Trans-Jordanian nationality if they wished it. The post of Governor General for Palestine was allowed to lapse and all areas were administered directly from 'amman. Jordanian Government, Al-Jaridah ar-Rasmiyyah, 17th December 1949, p. 405.

solidated. 1 When the elections were finally held in April 1950 2 the new parliament 3 formally proclaimed the union of the two banks of the Jordan in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 4

Thus Palestine disappeared from the map to be replaced by Israel and Jordan. Throughout the annexation 'abdallah had been helped by the support he received from the West, and in particular Britain. Immediately after the 1950 elections the status quo, that is, the existence of Israel and Jordan, was officially guaranteed in a joint declaration by Britain, America and France. 5

Both the Gaza Government and the Arab League had proved totally incapable of holding their ground in the face of the interests ranged against them. From the time of the Jericho Congress Hajj Amin and his government had been faced with both internal dissent and a growing indifference on the part of the Arab states. By February 1949 the Government had left Gaza for "a modest villa in a Cairo suburb" where it survived "only as a focus for anti-'abdallah propaganda and conspiracies. 6

The League itself had threatened to expel TransJordan if 'abdallah continued negotiations with Israel on the one hand 7 and his policy of annexation on the other. When it came to

1. In March 1949 military rule was replaced by civilian. Agil Hyder Abidi, Jordan - A Political Study 1948-57, p. 68. Palestinians were given responsible positions in the TransJordan administration, usually the opponents of Hajj Amin, like Ragheb Nashashibi who was appointed Minister for Refugees in August 1949. Shwadran op cit (NEA), p. 105. In November 1949 the last economic barriers between the East and West Banks were cut. Cahiers Vol. 20, p. 243.
2. These, like the Jericho Congress were held in an atmosphere of repression. 'abdallah had been systematically and imprisoning both supporters of Hajj Amin, and members of the Communist Party. He also disbanded the Palestine Arab Workers Society, the largest Arab trade union in Palestine. Cahiers Vol. 18-19, pp. 151-2. Laqueur op cit, p. 127.
3. The new parliament was 50% Palestinian, that is to say 20 of the 40 members were from the West Bank.
4. King 'abdallah, at-Takmilah, p. 17.
5. Text in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East Vol. II, pp. 308-9.
6. Dearden, op cit, p. 76.
7. See above p. 15 fn. 1.

the point a compromise was reached whereby 'abdallah dropped his contacts with Israel (at least for a while) and was allowed to annex Palestine as trustee until such time as the country could be totally liberated. 1

Palestine after Annexation

From the early 1950s Palestine not only ceased to exist physically but also as a political entity. The majority of the Palestinian Arabs were dispersed throughout the Arab world, most of them in refugee camps hastily set up by the United Nations. 2 Many of them were still technically on Palestinian soil, that is to say on the West Bank of Jordan, in Gaza or inside Israel. Although their conditions varied from country to country they were all to some extent deprived of their civil and political freedom. 3

Their remaining political institutions found it increasingly difficult to operate in any effective way. Hajj Amin and the Higher Committee were based in Cairo but their activity consisted largely of issuing protests and manifestos on every possible occasion. 4 Popular support for this body gradually diminished. Hilmi's Government of All Palestine continued in existence but did nothing on its own initiative. It became merely a rubber stamp for Arab League policy. In 1952 the Government's functions were assumed by a Palestine Directorate, a department of the Arab League 5 and in 1954 even this ceased to function. 6

1. Text in Khalil op cit Vol. II, p. 166.
2. See Table I.
3. Gabbay op cit, pp. 206-16; Sabri Jiryis, The Arabs in Israel, *passim*.
4. Even so Hajj Amin's supporters continued to be persecuted in Jordan along with the Communists. The persecution increased after 'abdallah's assassination in July 1951 allegedly by Hajj Amin's followers. SGT, "Abdallah's Assassins" World Today Vol. 9 No. 10, pp. 411-49; Abidi op cit, pp. 85-106; Jean Pierre Alex, "En Jordanie L'Agonie d'un Royaume" Orient No. 2, pp. 103-7.
5. Text of Arab League Resolution in Khalil op cit Vol. 2, p. 171.
6. MEJ Vol. 8 No. 2, p. 188.

CHAPTER TWO: THE LOSS OF THE PALESTINIAN
IDENTITY 1950 - 1961

With the collapse of old Palestinian political institutions, political organisation of the Palestinians as a separate group ceased along with any ideas of Palestinian nationalism which might have otherwise developed. New forces appeared in the Arab world in the form of a regenerated Arab nationalism. Any possibility of forming a separate Palestinian political entity was lost for some 10 years.

The loss of Palestine shook the Arab world and although the old-guard leadership tried to attribute the defeat to Arab material backwardness, many of the new generation felt that the failure was primarily due to the pro-West orientation of the traditional leadership, its reactionary nature and its disunity.

There was a profound discontent in the Arab world and as a result many governments fell. The new regimes which replaced them were pledged not to repeat the mistakes of their predecessors.

1. In 1952 a coup in Egypt eventually brought Nasir to power, whose nationalist attitude and actions provoked the tripartite invasion of Suez in 1956. Peter Mansfield, Nasser, passim; Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson, passim. In Syria in 1954 the fall of Shishakli brought back parliamentary government to the country which provided a channel through which the new progressive elements could gain power. The coup which deposed Shishakli was the fourth since 1948. The first two were in 1949 bringing to power first Colonel Husni az-Za'im (non-political) and then Colonel Hinnawi who was a conservative and sympathiser of Hizb ash-Sha'b (People's Party). Shishakli came to power in 1949 by constitutional methods but subsequently assumed complete control through a coup in 1951. He was a member of Hizb al-Qawmi as-Suri (see page 24 fn. 1).

Thus in foreign policy they tended to be neutralist, in domestic policy, socialist, and on the Arab level, dedicated to unity. These developments can best be understood by a look at the new forces which came into their own after the Palestine war, in the form of new mass parties with relatively well defined ideologies. An examination of these parties also explains the failure of any new Palestinian organisation to develop in the 1950s.

The Parties

Before 1948 there had been several parties that could be described as mass parties and a few that had quite sophisticated ideologies. With the exception of the Communist parties these were based either upon Islamic principles, like Jama'iyah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (The Muslim Brotherhood) 1 or had limited regional aims like Hizb al-Wafd (Delegation Party) 2

1. The Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1922 by Sheikh Hassan al-Banna. It believed that only a return to Islamic principles could regenerate Egypt. It became increasingly political in character and established branches throughout the Arab world. By 1940 it had a terrorist wing. Its branch in Palestine was set up in 1945 by 'ali al-Jabiri. (Progres Egyptien, 10th November 1945). By 1947 this branch claimed 100,000 members (Al-Ahram, 30th January 1947).
2. The Wafd began in Egypt in 1919 after a demand by the Egyptian nationalists that they should be allowed to send a delegation to the Paris Peace Conference which was then discussing the fate of Egypt. It was essentially a party seeking national independence. Its leader was Sa'ad Zaghlul. J.M. Ahmed The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism, passim.

in Egypt or Al-Hizb al-Qawmi as-Suri (Syrian National Party).¹ Arab nationalism remained little more than a vague sentiment, or at best was crystallised into relatively small elitist parties like al-Istiqlal in Palestine. Arab nationalism faded with the first generation of leaders, most of whom had either died, retired from active politics or become part of the establishment by 1948.

After the Palestine war two new parties emerged as vital popular forces in the Arab world, based on the belief that more than anything else the Arabs needed freedom from foreign domination and unity. The two parties differed fundamentally over some points but in general they both expressed the pervading disillusion with the old corrupted leadership. They had a massive following even in countries like Jordan, where they were illegal. The popular desire for unity swept all before it. For more than a decade the problem of liberating Palestine was shelved until Arab unity could be achieved. There was no place for any kind of regionalism, that is to say, there was no place for Palestinian nationalism. A detailed look at the new two Arab nationalist parties and their ideologies will illustrate the dominant ideas of the 1950s and show why the liberation of Palestine ceased to be a priority.

1. The SNP was established in 1932 in Lebanon by Antun Sa'adah. Although it was a clandestine party it soon established branches in Syria and Palestine. It was based on the belief that there was a separate Syrian nation unrelated to the Arabs. It was therefore very hostile to Arab nationalism. It attempted a coup in Lebanon in 1949 and its relations with Syria were good at this time. Later it was banned from Syria with the rise of Arab nationalism there and became semi-legal in Lebanon supporting the conservative forces there. Labib Zuwiyya Lamak, The Syria Social Nationalist Party, passim.

1) Hizb al-Ba'th al-'arabi al-Ishtraki (The Arab Socialist Resurrection Party).

The Ba'th party was founded in 1940 in Damascus by Michel Aflaq. 1 It began working openly in 1943 after Syria became independent. It went from strength to strength until it gained power in Syria in 1958. Though the party was still small it actively helped the Palestinians in 1948, pledging its members in the surrounding countries to do all they could for the war effort and sending one battalion to the front to fight. 2 It also tried to put pressure on the Arab states to honour their obligations with respect to Palestine while at the same time it pointed to the weakness and disunity of these governments, and called on the Arab people to take action themselves. 3 An article written on January 12th by Salah ad-Din Bitar, one of their leaders, outlines this position:

"The war places a heavy responsibility on the Arab governments and people, and imposes grave sacrifices.

"The duties of the people, in short, are to prepare for war - a victorious war. They must put an end to the inactivity and promises of peace, which have led them to this national disaster. They must make a new pact which will involve every Arab man and woman in the war effort and which all Arab countries must join.

"As to the governments, they must extend considerably both their activity and their influence.

1. They should realise that the international policy they have pursued until now with respect to Palestine is an utter failure. They must therefore change this policy fundamentally.

1. Kemal Karpat, Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, p. 185.
2. 'allush, op cit (Masirah), p. 100.
3. Anon (collective), Nidal al-Ba'th Pt. 1, (Dar at-Tali'ah), p. 222.

2. They should realise that political success in the international arena depends upon internal strength.
3. They should take steps against those states which support partition ... including cutting diplomatic, economic and cultural relations. "The effort to unify and Arabise Palestine should be made not only to fulfill Arab history ... but also to prevent all the Arab nation falling prey to this new Imperialism - international Zionism." 1

The party did not limit their criticism to the Arab governments. It also criticised the Palestinian leaders for lack of positive action. 2 After the war the party worked to reveal the link between the defeat of the Arabs and the corruption of their governments. It demanded free and honest elections throughout the Arab world. 3

However, in spite of its genuine concern over Palestine in 1948 the party's real aim was Arab unity and progress. Its constitution, published in 1948, defined the Arab nation in cultural and linguistic terms, 4 stressing the harmony between personal freedom on the one hand and the national interest on the other. 5 The Arab nation's universal mission was to renew human values and aid progress. 6 The Party was not to limit itself to any one Arab country. It described itself as, first, "socialist":

"... socialism constitutes the ideal social order which will allow the Arab people to realise its potentialities ..."

second, "popular":

"... sovereignty is the property of the people alone, which is the source of all power ..."

and third, "revolutionary":

"socialism cannot be achieved except by revolution and struggle ..." 7

1. ibid, pp. 229-33.
2. In February 1948 the party pointed out that the actions the Palestinians had undertaken up to that time were so few that they only served to show that the Arabs were incapable of really decisive action. ibid, p. 222.
3. 'allush op cit (Masirah), p. 104.
4. The Constitution was first published in English in MEJ Vol. 13 No. 2, pp. 195-200. Translated by Leonard Binder. First principle.
5. ibid, second principle.
6. ibid, third principle.
7. ibid, articles 4-6.

The two main slogans of the party were Wahdah, Hurriyah Ishtirakiyyah (Unity, Freedom, Socialism) and Ummatun 'arabiyyatun wahidah, thatu risalatin khalidah (one Arab nation, possessor of an immortal mission). The party's membership was restricted mainly to the intellectuals although it had quite a wide following.

In spite of its ideology of revolution, it relied upon elections and coups to gain power. Occasionally it would strike up an alliance with the Communists, but in general it criticised them for their materialism and dependence upon the USSR. 1 The party had a high regard for the legacy of Islam, though it was in no way a religious organisation. 2

From 1949-54 the party based itself upon four main principles. The first of these held that popular, united Arab struggle was the only way to liberate Palestine in particular and the Arabs in general. To achieve liberation it was necessary first to put an end to the disunity which had caused the loss of Palestine. Imperialism and Zionism were viewed as essentially the same phenomenon. The party raised two slogans in connection with this principle, namely that the liberation of Palestine was linked to unity, and that the Arab League should be replaced by a genuinely popular Arab federation.

The second principle held that there could be no liberation of Palestine without complete liberation from Imperialism.

The third considered that the establishment of a socialist system for the achievement of social justice, was a national duty. Moreover, this should be facilitated by putting an end to foreign trade.

The final principle held that there should be a foreign policy of neutrality and that all foreign troops should be expelled from Arab soil. There should be no defence pacts, and no reliance on foreign aid. 3

1. Karpas, op cit, pp. 189-97.

2. Michel Aflaq, "The Characteristics of Arab Socialism", Arab Socialism, Sami Hanna and George Gardner (eds), pp. 297-303.

3. 'allush, op cit (Masirah), p. 103.

The Ba'th therefore did not see the liberation of Palestine as an immediate aim, nor did it contemplate the establishment of any Palestinian organisation separate from its political organisations in the different Arab states. Palestinian members of the party were members in the country of their residence, dedicated above all to the achievement of Arab unity and socialism.

When the party began to achieve some measure of power after the fall of Shishakli, Palestine, as a separate issue sank even further into obscurity. The focus of interest shifted to organising opposition to the Baghdad Pact, and bringing about the Syrian-Egyptian Union. 1 In February 1966 a further coup took place in Syria which ultimately resulted in the discrediting of Aflaq and the rapid movement of the party to the left.

2) Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-'Arab (The Arab Nationalist Movement)

This organisation, although by no means as large as the Ba'th, was in some respects more important. It reflected the extent to which the problem of Palestine came to be viewed only within an Arab context, and of less immediate importance than unity. Unlike the Ba'th, the ANM was formed as a direct result of the 1948 defeat.

The movement was initiated by some students at the American University of Beirut between 1949 and 1952 with the establishment of a Committee for Resisting Peace with Israel. This Committee took the name al-'urwah al-Wuthqah (The firm tie), and published a weekly magazine. 2 Its members were from

1. ibid, pp. 104-5.

2. Leila S. Kadi, Basic Documents of the Armed Palestinian Resistance Movement, p. 14.

many different Arab countries including Palestine, 1 but they agreed in the course of discussion:

"... that Arab nationalism is a fact and we are one people ..." 2

From 1949-51 the organisation was not a party in the proper sense:

"We are still undergoing the emotional reactions of students. Our cultural discussions led into political matters We discussed the problem of how to return to Palestine By 1951-2 our group was ready to graduate and return to our homelands. We asked ourselves: were we really sincere or were we only salon intellectuals? If we were sincere then we must fight and not keep silent. We agreed to consider forming a party." 3

Even so, at that time:

"... we lacked a full ideology. It stopped short at certain points. Instead, we had a collection of some political and organisational ideas and topics." 4

With respect to Palestine, the organisation considered that liberation was:

"... something not to be isolated from events in the rest of the Arab world as a whole. We saw the need for scientific and technical renaissance The main reason for our defeat had been the scientific society of Israel as against our own backwardness ..." 5

1. Palestinian members included George Habbash, a medical student from Lydda; Wadi Haddad, Ahmed al-Khatib, and Ahmed Ghurshi, all medical students. In addition there was Hani al-Hindi from Syria and Hamad al Farhan, an economics student from Jordan. They were all influenced by a professor of politics at the university, Constantin Zurayk. (Interview by author with Abu Fadi, al-Fateh, summer 1969 'amman).
2. George Habbash, unpublished interview given to John Cooley (Christian Science Monitor), March 23rd 1969, 'amman.
3. ibid.
4. ibid.
5. ibid.

The ANM therefore accepted the old-guard argument that the defeat was in large measure due to material backwardness. At the same time, like the Ba'th they stressed the need for unity. In the first days of their existence as a party the slogan they adopted was: Wahdah, Hurriyah, Thar, Dumm, Hadid, Nar (Unity, Freedom, Revenge, Blood, Steel, Fire). By Unity, the ANM meant a political unity achieved through popular struggle, coup, conspiracy or any other method. There was no clear definition of the type of unity to be sought. They even supported British inspired moves to unite the Hashemite regimes of Iraq and Jordan in the early 1950s. They were severely criticised by the Ba'th for lack of political discrimination in supporting such a reactionary alliance.

By Freedom, the ANM simply meant an end to Imperialism and the Revenge they sought was to be through a quick, decisive and violent battle between the unified Arab states and Israel. No special role was assigned to the Palestinians as such. Moreover, the ANM did not distinguish between rich, poor, bourgeoisie or peasant. They differentiated only between ally and opponent. 1

The party began its organised activity in Jordan in 1953 where it founded a magazine called Ar-Rai (Opinion) - "We sold all the copies we could publish ..." 2 It clashed with the Ba'th from the beginning for two main reasons. First, the Ba'th could not understand the need for another party with aims similar to its own. Second, the Ba'th felt that the ANM slogan of "Revenge" instead of its own slogan of "Socialism" served only to divert the people from their real social problems. 3 On the other hand, the ANM rejected the Ba'th because:

"we saw that its party organisation did not totally mobilise the people for its cause ..." 4

1. 'allush, op cit (Masirah), p. 144.
2. Cooley interview, op cit.
3. 'allush, op cit (Masirah), p. 144.
4. Cooley interview, op cit.

However, it would appear that the differences were much more deep-seated, being based mostly on the question of social change. The ANM's attitude to the Communist parties, for instance, was one of complete antagonism, unlike the Ba'th which did contemplate alliances with the Communists.

After 1956 and the invasion of Suez, social and economic change in Egypt became one of Nasir's priorities. This put the ANM in an awkward position because by this time support for Nasir was one of their main concerns:

"... we saw the path to the liberation of Palestine as co-operation with the UAR" 1

The movement therefore had to re-think its attitude. It solved the problem by theoretically dividing the battle of liberation into two stages, the political and the social. In May 1957 a book was published with the title Ma' al-Qawmiyyah al-'arabiyyah (With Arab Nationalism). This was the first publication which could be looked upon as a constitution or programme for the ANM. It listed both immediate and future aims. The immediate aims were:

"An end to the hateful division of the Arab land and complete Arab unity. An end to Imperialism in all its forms by complete liberation. An end to Israel by revenge" 2

The future aims were:

"A national Arab society to realise social justice in all its forms, to realise the humanity of the Arab individual, and to make possible the Arab mission on a practical and effective level." 3

The two stages of the struggle were described as:

"First, the stage of political struggle, aimed at freeing the Arabs and establishing a sound external framework for the united Arab society. Second, building Arab society with a social-democratic content so that this united Arab society might realise social justice.

"It is clear that we cannot end one stage except after freeing ourselves from division, Imperialism, Israel and the corrupt officials who cling to the status quo and prevent change." 4

1. ibid.

2. 'allush, op cit (Masirah), p. 146.

3. ibid, pp. 146-7.

4. ibid, p. 147.

Although this constituted a considerable departure from original ANM ideas which discounted social change altogether, it still did not conform to the Ba'th line which saw unity as impossible without socialism. The change in ANM thinking reflected more than anything else, the changes within Egypt, and showed a bankruptcy of original thought within the movement at this stage.

With the formation of the UAR in 1958, the ANM drew much closer to the Ba'th. Wadi Haddad, one of the ANM leaders was noted for a saying during this period that "the Ba'th is the brains of Arab nationalism and we are the muscles". However, when the contradictions between Nasir and the Syrian Ba'th caused the rupture of the UAR the ANM once more became a rival.

Although, as time went on, the ANM entered into occasional alliances with both the Ba'th and the CP its hostility towards them did not lessen especially its hatred of the Communists. However, the ANM did express a genuine popular feeling within the Arab nation in its desire for unity. It had considerable success because of the simplicity of its slogans compared to the relatively complex ideologies of the Ba'th and the CP, both of which relied heavily on intellectuals for support and membership.

This brief look at the new Arab nationalist parties shows why there was no attempt to build new Palestinian institutions after 1948. The emphasis was upon unity and it was through unity that the liberation of Palestine would ultimately be achieved. There was an overwhelming popular support for these ideas, and the Palestinians themselves joined the new parties in great numbers.

Palestine and the Arab states

The Arab states and leaders were quite prepared to accept the new Arab nationalist line on Palestine since it released them from any immediate responsibility for undertaking a war of liberation. On the other hand they could not abandon Palestine completely since it provided them all at times of internal trouble with something external upon which they could focus attention. It provided them with the eternal excuse for failures of domestic policy.

In the early fifties the main concern of the Arab states was to relieve themselves of as much responsibility for Palestine as they could without appearing to be traitors. During the Armistice negotiations in 1949¹ the Arab states insisted on repatriation and compensation of the refugees as a prerequisite to any peace settlement.² This could be interpreted as recognition of partition, although no Arab state dared to recognise the Zionist entity officially or sign a peace treaty.³

While the Arabs accepted the short term relief of UNRWA⁴ they at first rejected any idea put forward by the UN for permanent resettlement of the refugees, insisting on repatriation as the only solution. However, in 1950 the UN set up a reintegration fund to finance large economic development projects in the Arab countries which would enable them to absorb the refugees into their economies. The largest scheme based on this idea was the plan to exploit the Jordan waters for the benefit of both the Arab states and Israel.⁵ Although such a scheme was entirely against the Arabs' principles, virtual agreement had been reached by August 1955, the obvious economic advantages of the scheme having overcome any scruples about resettlement.⁶

1. These were conducted indirectly through the United Nations.
2. U.N., "Ad Hoc Committee 54th Meeting", General Assembly Official Records 4th Year. This includes texts of speeches by the Arab representatives.
3. Israel insisted, on the contrary that repatriation could only be discussed after a peace settlement was agreed and the talks were deadlocked. Israel refused to implement a UN resolution which demanded that the refugees be allowed to return. UN Resolution No. 194 (III), 11th December 1948, UN Doc. A/810, GA OR 3rd Year, pp. 21-5.
4. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency was set up in 1949 by UN Resolution No. 302 (IV), 8th December 1949, UN Doc. A/1251, GA OR 4th Year, pp. 23-5. See also Don Peretz, "The Arab Refugee Dilemma", Foreign Affairs Vol. 33 No. 1, pp. 134-48. Ahmed Hilmi in his capacity as Prime Minister of the All Palestine Government accepted UNRWA on the condition it did not prejudice eventual repatriation. Text in Khalil, op cit Vol. 2, pp. 167-8.
5. This scheme was commissioned by UNRWA in 1952 from the Tennessee Valley Authority, with the financial backing of the USA. Earl Berger, The Covenant and the Sword, p. 135.
6. Talks lasted for some two years and many counter-schemes were proposed. Ibid, pp. 137-41; Peretz, op cit, pp. 398-412.

The scheme only failed to be put into operation because the Americans tried to make it part of an overall peace plan. 1 After this, Israel continued with her own plans for diversion of the Jordan waters to the Negev. 2

If this gradual backsliding on principle by the Arab states characterised the early fifties, the late fifties saw a qualitative change in attitude. Instead of simply relinquishing their responsibility for Palestine, the Arab leaders began to encourage the Palestinians to accept this "responsibility" for themselves. There were three factors which favoured this development, first, the need to find some alternative to full-scale war with Israel, second, the re-emergence of Hajj Amin to political life and third, the use of Palestine as a weapon in the inter-Arab struggle for leadership of the Arab world. Underlying all these factors was the rise of power of Nasir in Egypt, and his desire to be both powerful and popular. It was essentially Nasir's need to preserve his popular image which gave these three factors their significance. We will take them in turn.

1. The Alternative to War with Israel

As soon as the Palestine war of 1948-9 had finished many Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and Gaza began to "infiltrate" back across the armistice lines on raiding expeditions. Usually the infiltrators were "raiding" their own farms which they could see from the border, since the armistice lines cut many villages in half or separated them from their farmlands. 3 Later, however, these excursions began to develop into organised and politically motivated undertakings, especially in Jordan, where the ANM became involved. 4 At this stage the raids became an embarrassment both to King Hussein in Jordan and President Nasir in Egypt

1. Berger, op cit p. 142.

2. It was the completion of this scheme in 1964 which finally detonated the Palestinian armed struggle.

3. Peter Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt, p. 56.

4. Cooley interview, op cit.

by bringing disproportionately heavy Israeli retaliation on the border villages of both countries.¹ Public opinion in the Arab world began to demand some decisive action as a reprisal for the Israeli attacks.

King Hussein tackled the problem by imprisoning any infiltrators that were caught and instituting border patrols. President Nasir who wished to preserve his popularity, could not solve the problem in this way. Thus, in order to prevent demands for an all-out war which he knew the Arabs could not win, he organised and trained commando groups from among the Palestinians in Gaza. These groups then entered Israel and undertook sabotage operations. Although these operations were only of limited effectiveness, and brought even heavier Israeli retaliation, both on Gaza and the West Bank, they succeeded in lessening the pressure for full-scale war.² However, war was not avoided in the end for these operations together with Nasir's gradual slide towards the Communist bloc in Foreign Affairs resulted in the tri-partite invasion of Suez in 1956.

The guerilla raids ceased after this, but they had achieved several things. They had given the Palestinians in Gaza a taste of specifically Palestinian military organisation and had provided them with some limited experience in guerilla activity. Moreover, Nasir had shown that for him the Palestine issue was one which could not be ignored. On the one hand it could be useful to him politically and on the other as a popular leader he could not afford to neglect the interests of the Palestinians entirely. From the beginning his regime extended a certain degree of formal recognition to a distinct and separate Palestinian identity. For example, new constitutional laws in Gaza³ gave the Palestinians a greater measure of self-government within the context of Egyptian military rule.⁴

1. Mansfield, op cit (Egypt), p. 56. The largest Israeli retaliation raid was on the West Bank villages of Nahhalin causing 9 deaths. Berger, op cit, p. 101; op cit, p. 118.
2. Mansfield, op cit (Egypt), p. 56.
3. January 1954.
4. MEJ Vol. 8, p. 200.

2. The Re-emergence of Hajj Amin

The occasion Hajj Amin chose to begin serious political activity again was the apparent fulfillment of Arab nationalist hopes, the formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958.

In November 1957 with the union only a few months away, Hajj Amin demanded that Palestine become "an inseparable part of Syria" and be included "within its natural frontiers" as part of the UAR. 1

When the union actually took place his demands were renewed "in the name of the Palestinian people". 2 This was followed by a massive propaganda campaign by the Higher Committee. 3 When Nasir visited Damascus in March 1958 he was met by a Palestinian delegation which handed him a petition containing the same demands signed by over 5,000 people. 4

The Higher Committee used the argument that Palestine was "the only bridge linking Egypt and Syria and uniting them". Thus, inclusion of Palestine within the UAR would realise "the aspirations of the Arab nation." It was in addition "an essential factor for the defeat of colonialism and Zionism." 5 Hajj Amin's propaganda campaign was given added force by the revival of the National Congress in Gaza which had in 1948 ratified the All Palestine Government. 6 The Congress was called together on the grounds that it was:

"in the actual circumstances . . . worthy to be recognised as the best representative of the Palestinian Arab people."

It immediately proclaimed the union of Palestine to the UAR. 7

1. Colombe, op cit, p. 61.
2. ibid.
3. See above, p. 11.
4. Al-Ahram, 10th March 1958.
5. Colombe, op cit, p. 62.
6. See above, p. 17.
7. Colombe, op cit, p. 62.

Nasir was put in a very difficult position, Union of Palestine to the UAR was out of the question. "Palestine" included the West Bank of Jordan as well as Israel and therefore any move towards annexation would bring the UAR into conflict not only with Israel but also Jordan. At the same time, Nasir could not ignore the wishes of the Palestinians. He had to find a compromise. He refused to bring Palestine into the UAR on the grounds that he did not wish to behave like 'abdallah had done previously in annexing the West Bank. Moreover he refused to allow that the reconstituted National Congress in Gaza was any more representative of Palestinian wishes than 'abdallah's Jericho Congress 1 had been. 2 New Palestinian institutions would have to be set up through which the Palestinians could really express their wishes.

Thus in February 1958 Gaza was given a special charter which provided for an Executive Committee and a Legislative Council to be elected mainly from the refugees. 3 Two months later at its first meeting the new Executive Committee passed a unanimous resolution recommending:

"to the relevant authorities, the realisation of the annexation of Palestine to the UAR at an opportune time and in a way judged to be convenient." 4

In this way Nasir did not have to reject the union of Palestine to the UAR out of hand. But he was given the power to decide when and how it should take place. However, the Palestine issue was not permitted to sink into obscurity again. Hajj Amin continued to agitate and Nasir himself had come to realise what a useful tool Palestine and the Palestinians might be for him provided he could keep the situation under control.

1. See above, p. 19.
2. Colombe, op cit, p. 63.
3. The Executive Committee numbered 10, the Legislative Council 40 - 30 from the refugees, 5 of whom were to represent the doctors, lawyers, teachers, merchants and farmers. The other 10 were to be Egyptians. Colombe, op cit, p. 63.
4. ibid.

In March 1959 he submitted a proposal to the Arab League:

"... to organise the Palestinian Entity and permit the Palestinian people to make their voices heard through elected representatives on both the national and international level." 1

Naturally Nasir tried to ensure that his initiatives on Palestine did not undermine Arab Nationalism. A charter which was publicly read by the Mayor in Gaza in March 1959 shows how Palestinian developments were being firmly placed within the Arab nationalist context:

"We the sons of Palestine proclaim this Charter to which we pledge our allegiance: First: Palestine is an inseparable part of the Arab land and its liberation the sacred duty of all Arabs. Its union with the UAR is natural and indispensable to unity.

Second: Israel is an aggressive state, illegally established by Imperialism on the ruins of Arab Palestine and it is our duty to crush all such Imperialist bases.

Third: Arab nationalism and the total unity of all Arabs is the inspiration and aim of our battle.

Fourth: It is necessary to establish a socialist, democratic and just society in which freedom and the rights of man are respected.

Fifth: Peace and prosperity must rule in the Arab land.

Sixth: The establishment of the national union 2 is a positive measure necessary to prevent dissension." 3

This Charter faithfully reflects the Arab Nationalist sentiment of the time. More than anything else it is an affirmation of faith in Nasir and his policies.

1. Colombe, op cit, p. 63.
2. Nasir set up the National Union as a substitute for political parties.
3. Colombe, op cit, p. 64, fn. 3.

Hajj Amin had begun by trying to use Nasir but Nasir had taken his place as champion of the Palestinian cause especially in the minds of the new generation. In May 1959 Nasir announced his intention to call a general Congress for Palestinians and set up a commission to make the necessary preparations. Hajj Amin protested that the Higher Committee was the only body which could genuinely represent the Palestinians and "revive the Palestine cause". 1 His protest went virtually unheard and overwhelming popular support went to Nasir. By August the contradiction between the two men had reached crisis point and Hajj Amin was officially asked to leave Cairo. 2

3. Palestine between the Arab states

Nasir's popularity throughout the Arab world was so great by this time that it was becoming an embarrassment to the other governments. His concern with the Palestine issue obliged these other governments to show that they were also concerned with the subject. When Nasir dismissed Hajj Amin from Cairo he gave the other Arab regimes the opportunity they had been waiting for, and Palestine was brought into the arena of inter-Arab rivalries. Interest in the Palestine question was given an additional impetus at this time by the imminent discussion at the UN of a new plan to reintegrate the refugees in the host countries. 3 The implementation of such a plan was obviously not in the interests of Lebanon with its delicate Muslim-Christian balance to maintain. Thus Lebanon was the first to take advantage of Hajj Amin's dismissal and allowed him to establish his new Headquarters in Beirut. On August 22nd 1959 Pierre Jemayal, Minister of Public Works and leader of Hizb al-Kata'ib

1. ibid, pp. 64-5.

2. Schechtman, op cit, p. 264.

3. This plan was sponsored by the Secretary General of UN, Dag Hammarskjöld, after he had visited the area earlier in the year.

(Phalangist party) 1 proposed that a Palestinian state be created in the parts of Palestine still in Arab hands. 2

This, in turn provoked an immediate reaction from the Jordanian government which had no intention of relinquishing its hold on the West Bank. On 28th August Hazza' al-Majali, the Prime Minister 3 stated:

"Jordan categorically refuses the establishment of a Palestine Government We would consider any call for the constitution of (such) a government an attack on our constitution and sovereignty We would not, however, oppose a regrouping of Palestinian refugees on our territory." 4

This controversy between Jordan and Lebanon continued to develop and throughout Hajj Amin backed Jemayal. Then in November 1959 the dispute was widened when the Higher Committee sent a long memorandum to all the Arab Heads of State and to the Arab League. It said essentially:

"... the Arabs of Palestine request the Arab states to handle the Palestine question with a view to realising one aspiration... - to stamp out Jewish aggression against Palestine and purge it of Zionism and Imperialism ...

"In view of the great part the Palestinians could play in regarding their homeland we appeal to the Arab states to take the initiative and bring Palestine back into existence in a manner desired by the Palestinian Arabs, whether by plebiscite or free popular election.

"Such a move must be backed by training, arms and money etc. All Palestinians from 18-50 must be brought under compulsory military training and a Palestine army must be created, trained and armed to be the vanguard of the Arab force which will march to regain Palestine." 5

1. Christian Conservative.
2. L'Orient, 23rd August 1959.
3. Majali first became Prime Minister at the end of 1955 when Jordan was considering entry into the Baghdad Pact. He lasted only one week in the face of hostile anti-Pact demonstrations. He assumed power again in 1959 as the third Prime Minister since the 1957 coup which had deprived Jordan of its first glimmer of political democracy. He was assassinated one year later. From the start he was strongly pro-Hashemite.
4. L'Orient, 29th August 1959.
5. Full Text in Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, January 15th 1960.

This could have remained just one of the many memoranda and manifestos issued by the Higher Committee had it not been for the support accorded to it by General 'abd al-Karim Qasim, the new revolutionary leader of Iraq. Qasim had overthrown the Iraqi monarchy the previous year through an army coup. Instead of taking Iraq into the UAR as had at first been expected, Qasim gradually became Nasir's main rival for leadership of the Arab world. The final break in relations between Qasim and Nasir came in March 1959 after a pro-UAR revolt had been crushed in the Mosul district of Iraq. 1

By championing the Palestinian state, Qasim could embarrass both Nasir with his moderate approach and King Hussein with his outright rejection of the idea. He risked nothing by this attitude since he had neither borders with Israel nor a large refugee problem to contend with. Thus on 15th December 1959 before the Iraqi Medical Congress, Qasim declared:

"The Palestinian Arabs cannot continue to live under foreign tutelage. They are ready now for their own state and government Three gangsters have committed aggression against Palestine, Israel ... Jordan, and Egypt - under Farouk These annexations no longer have any justification and the Arabs of Palestine can assume administration of their own affairs. The Iraqi Government will support with all its means the new Government of Palestine ..." 2

The reactions of Jordan and Egypt to this suggestion were quick, predictable and hostile, 3 but Qasim could not be deflected from his path by criticism. He continued to promote his idea of a Palestinian state and elaborated it.

1. Uriel Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, pp. 164-77.
2. L'Orient, 16th December 1959.
3. See L'Orient, 24th December for Majali's reaction, and also Qasim's.

He published the full text of Hajj Amin's long memorandum accusing the other governments of suppressing it. 1 In this way he obliged the other states to take some sort of action on Palestine simply to prevent him from having the sole initiative in this field.

Thus on January 4th 1960 Nasir announced the establishment of a specifically Palestinian National Union in the northern province of the UAR (that is, Syria) like the one already established in Gaza. 2 The Union in Gaza had not been considered Palestinian as such apart from the fact that all the inhabitants of Gaza were Palestinians. The establishment of a Palestinian as distinct from Syrian Union in the northern UAR was a real advance in recognition of the Palestinians as a separate entity. 3

Jordan's response to Qasim was less positive. On 19th January Majali 4 in a speech to the parliament outlined his plan for solving the Palestine problem. He said the Palestine issue should not be used as a weapon of political bargaining and that Arab co-operation in the widest sense was needed. However, the most significant points he made were the following:

first: Any attempts to transfer the Palestine problem from the inter-Arab level to one of narrow regionalism would be considered as a plot against Palestine and a flight from responsibility.

second: The Jordanian entity must be recognised on both banks of the river.

third: The special position of Jordan should be recognised in that the majority of Palestinians now had Jordanian nationality.

1. Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, 15th January 1960.

2. See above, p. 38 fn. 2.

3. MEJ Vol. 14, p. 194.

4. See above, p. 40 fn. 3.

By this time the dispute had reached such a pitch that the Arab League called a Foreign Ministers Conference in Cairo. 1 Iraq refused to attend, conducting a continual propaganda war from Baghdad for the duration of discussions. 2 Egypt accused Iraq of betraying Arabism and making common cause with Zionism. Jordan repeatedly threatened to walk out unless discussions on the Palestinian entity ceased. 3 The discussions ended on 29th February 1960 and the following resolution was agreed upon:

"The Council of the League of States has studied the problem of re-organising the Arab Palestinians and evaluating their personality as a unified people or simply as refugees. All the world should hear the voices of the Palestinians on the national and international level through the medium of their elected representatives. The Council noted the points of view expressed and decided to study the question when next it meets." 4

The Council met again in August, and although Iraq participated the results were equally negative. 5 After this the League gave up any serious attempt to bring about agreement and relegated the Palestine issue to sub-committees of "experts". All the recommendations of these sub-committees foundered on the rocks of Jordan's hostility towards any form of Palestinian entity. 6

In the meantime, the various Arab regimes continued with their own policies. Both Iraq and Egypt began to establish Palestinian armies, each trying to appear as the one true champion of the Palestinian cause. 7 At a passing out parade in August 1960 Qasim addressed his Palestinian troops with the assurance:

1. It opened on February 8th 1960.
2. Colombe, op cit, p. 78.
3. ibid.
4. ibid pp. 78-8, fn. 14.
5. MEJ Vol. 14, p. 448.
6. Meetings were held in May and June 1961 and recommended the creation of a Palestinian Government. But the recommendations remained on paper only.
7. The Egyptian trained troops made their first appearance in Gaza on 23rd July 1960. MEJ Vol. 14, p. 448; The Iraqi troops held a passing out parade on 11th August. Colombe, op cit, p. 70.

"You will very soon see with your own eyes, the Holy War which will start I congratulate you on the birth of the eternal Palestinian Republic." 1

Jordan's response was to intensify efforts to Jordanise her Palestinians. New procedures were adopted to enable Palestinians to obtain Jordanian nationality with much less formality than before. 2

Up to this point, Hajj Amin had been careful not to favour any one side in the dispute, and continually pressed for unified Arab action on Palestine. By the middle of 1961 he realised that this policy could not succeed and he decided to throw in his lot with Qasim. In July he went to Baghdad to inspect the Palestinian troops there. 3 It was an unfortunate choice, for the death of Qasim in February 1963 was also the political death of Hajj Amin. He was reduced once more to simply issuing declarations and protests.

Before 1962 this wrangling over Palestine did not signify any real revival of popular Palestinian feeling, although, as a by-product, it resulted in the establishment of new "Palestinian" institutions. 4 Popular feeling remained with Arab nationalism and unity. Palestinians continued working

1. Colombe, op cit, p. 70.

2. ibid, p. 74.

3. ibid, p. 75.

4. In addition to the armies, the political institutions in Gaza and the National Unions in both parts of the UAR, the Palestinian students in both Iraq and the UAR were unionised. Moreover in March 1962 Gaza was given a new Constitution which nominally gave the Palestinians more independence there within the context still of Egyptian military rule. It must be realised however, that in the case of all these institutions their establishment had been solely to act as instruments for the regime which initiated them. They were not initiated by the Palestinians themselves.

for Arab unity through the nationalist parties in each separate country. Nasir's popularity was a major factor in this especially for the duration of the UAR experiment. The Palestine issue influenced Arab nationalism only insofar as it reinforced the anti-Western element and became an obstacle in the path of any permanent rapprochement with the West.

In summary, we can say that throughout the 1950s Arab nationalism prevented the development of any specifically Palestinian political institutions or the organisation of the Palestinians as a separate entity. Only the use of Palestine as a political weapon by the different Arab regimes saved it from complete obscurity during these years.

CHAPTER THREE: THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY

1961-1964

Having seen how Arab nationalism obscured the growth of any specifically Palestinian nationalism in the 1950s, we will now examine its rebirth in the early 1960s. This period was difficult for the Palestinians since Arab nationalism was not by any means dead and the new Palestinian nationalism had to struggle against its well-established ideology and institutions. At first the Arab leaders tried to ignore and crush the new feature in Middle East politics. Later, however, they tried to adopt it as their own by modifying their ideology and allowing the establishment of new Palestinian institutions.

Thus in the early 1960s, Palestinian nationalist feeling re-emerged and was expressed in the formation of small groups dedicated to armed struggle. A certain level of ideological awareness also developed, especially with al-Fateh's belief in Palestinian independence of action.

The previously strong Arab nationalism, which had in some states become part of the ruling establishment, was forced to accept the setting up of new Palestinian institutions. However, it managed to curb their power by placing them in the hands of what was left of the old-guard Palestinian leadership rather than allowing them to fall into the hands of the more radical elements.

The Decline of Arab Nationalism

The first real blow to Arab nationalism was the secession of Syria from the UAR at the end of 1961. 1 The failure of this first experiment in unity caused all the nationalist leaders and parties considerable loss of face. Moreover it established the Syrian Ba'th as yet another rival for the popular leadership of the Arab world.

The second blow came in 1963. In February of that year Qasim was killed as the result of a Ba'thist coup. Iraq, Syria and Egypt thus all had leaders dedicated to Arab nationalism and the achievement of unity. Talks began almost immediately in the hope that some form of political union could be agreed upon. Formal agreement was reached in April but it was never put into practice and by the end of the year the Arab world was more divided than ever. 2

Thus by 1963 the Arab nationalists, whether Ba'thists or Nasirists (ANM) had revealed that they were incapable of putting their principles into practice. The split between the Ba'th and the ANM was wider than before. The two Ba'thist regimes in Iraq and Syria were in keen competition with each other. The ANM had split after the failure of the UAR, one wing remaining as a close adherent of Nasir's policy and the other wing moving to the left. 3 All the nationalists, whatever their party, were hostile to the Communist parties.

1. Unless otherwise stated, general historical background for this chapter was drawn from Keesings Contemporary Archives; Cahiers de L'Institut de L'Orient Contemporain; the newspapers cited in the bibliography; IPS, Kitab as-Sanawi, 1964.
2. Later in 1963 Nasir published the text of these negotiations, revealing the Ba'th in a relatively unfavourable light. Nasir's part in these negotiations and his subsequent behaviour seemed to indicate that he was never really in favour of these new talks. Full text of the various discussions, both bilateral and trilateral, in American University of Beirut, Arab Documents 1963, pp. 75-213.
3. The left wing included the Palestinian branch led by George Habbash. This was itself divided between right and left, the left centred on Naif Hawatmeh and the newspaper al-Hurriyah published in Beirut. Authors interviews, Beirut, summer 1969.

Consequently, there appeared a general disillusion with all the existing Arab political organisations.

It is perhaps significant that the main source of the party differences was Palestine. Both the Ba'th and the ANM rejected the Communists because they had accepted partition and recognised Israel, while the Ba'th and the ANM continued to argue over the priority of "socialism" or "revenge". 1

The Beginnings of the Fedayeen 2

As early as 1956 a new factor had appeared on the Arab political scene. This was the development among the Palestinians themselves of small clandestine groups dedicated to regaining Palestine through armed struggle. They had remained totally insignificant while Arab nationalism maintained its popularity but in the early 1960s the situation became more favourable for their growth and acceptance. As well as the disillusion with Arab Nationalism, there was the success of the Algerian armed struggle in 1962. The defeat of the French army by popular warfare had a profound effect on the Arab world and gave impetus to the new third world theories of national liberation war.

The most important of these new Palestinian groups was al-Fateh. 3 The original cells of this movement were formed in Gaza during Israel's occupation of the area after the invasion of Suez in 1956. For the founders of al-Fateh, the invasion of Suez was conclusive proof that the Palestinians could not depend on the Arab states to prevent further Israeli expansion. They therefore reasoned that the Palestinians must in the future adopt a policy of self-reliance and independent action. The first stage in their strategy was to reassert the Palestinian identity. When this had been achieved it would then be possible to enter the second stage of their strategy, armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine.

1. See Ch. 2 pp. 30-32.

2. The word "feda'i" implies readiness to sacrifice ones life for a cause. It is more loosely used to mean partisan or guerilla fighter.

3. The organisation derived its name from the reverse of its initials, Harakat at-Tahrir al-Watani al-Falastini (Palestinian National Liberation Movement). The name itself means "victory" in the sense in which the word was used in the Qur'an.

With the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force along the border, al-Fateh was obliged to transfer its centre of activity elsewhere. Kuwait was chosen, and more cells were formed among Palestinians not only in the Arab world but also in Europe, especially West Germany. 1 Nasir accused the movement of being linked with CENTO 2 in an attempt to destroy its reputation before it could establish itself. At this stage the existence of al-Fateh was not a threat to Nasir. None of its collective leadership was known by name.

The basic principles of the movement were drawn up in 1958 by its Central Committee. 3 They can be summarised as follows:

1. Revolutionary violence is the only way to liberate the homeland.
2. This violence must be exercised by the masses.
3. The aim of this violence is to liquidate the Zionist entity, politically, militarily and economically, from the whole of occupied Palestine.
4. Revolutionary action must be independent of any state or party.
5. Revolutionary action should not interfere in the affairs of the Arab states.
6. Revolutionary action will be of long duration.
7. Revolutionary action will be based upon a clandestine form of organisation.
8. The revolution is Palestinian in origin and Arab in its extension.
9. The Palestinian revolution is an integral part of the Arab revolution, which is itself part of the world revolution.
10. The land of Palestine is for those who actively fight for its liberation.
11. The future Palestinian state will be non-sectarian and democratic, where Jews, Muslims and Christians will live in equality with equal rights and duties. 4

In autumn 1959 as part of the first phase of their strategy, al-Fateh began publishing a magazine in Beirut called Falastinuna (Our Palestine), in which it expounded ideas of a separate Palestinian identity and the need for independent action. Three main points, continually stressed in this publication were:

1. Leila S. Kadi, op cit, p. 16.
2. ibid, p. 17.
3. Author's interview with Abu Ibrahim, al-Fateh, summer 1969.
4. These principles have never been published as a manifesto or programme. They can be extracted from later publications, the pamphlets Dirasat wa Tujarib Thawriyyah especially the

first one, Min Muntalaqat al-'amal al-Feda'i. See also Risalah Min al-Fateh ila ash-Sha'b al-Lubnani.

First, establishing a Palestinian entity was essential for the liberation of Palestine since the Arab states had failed to do anything towards this end. 1

"We, the Palestinians, are enthusiastic and favourable towards the realisation of Arab unity, but we regret we cannot do anything under present circumstances, in this area because we have no Entity to represent us on an equal footing with the Arab entities Let the Entity be first and the struggle for unity follow ..." 2

Second, the Palestinians should not side with any party in the inter-Arab disputes since this would merely exacerbate the hostility of the opposing parties. 3

"It is unreasonable for us to align ourselves with those who are conspiring against our cause since this means national treachery. It goes without saying that we are careful to differentiate between liberals and non-liberals. Our battle is not between regimes and beliefs, it is a battle of a people scattered throughout the world." 4

Third, the only solution to the Palestinian problem would be the emergence of a fedayeen movement "... to destroy those things considered essential for life support in the usurped homeland ..." 5

The magazine gave five reasons for the importance of establishing a fedayeen movement:

"First, the establishment of groups in each Arab country, independent of any particular line, would give these countries no reason to ban them on the grounds that they were working for a rival government.

Second, many non-Palestinian Arabs would be prepared to help a liberation movement provided it did not participate in the inter-Arab bickering.

1. Falastinuna, March 1962 p. 3.
2. ibid, April 15th 1963, p. 6.
3. ibid, March 1962, p. 3.
4. ibid, April 15th 1963, p. 20.
5. ibid, March 1962, p. 3.

Third, Israel would have no internationally recognised right to retaliate against any Arab state since initially the movement would have no central direction. It would be simply groups of Palestinians trying forcibly to return home in pursuance of a right long recognised by the UN.

Fourth, once the Entity had been established these groups would unite spontaneously to form a real Palestinian entity based upon the Palestinians. They would not accept any ephemeral political entity set up by the Arab states.

Fifth, once this unification had occurred the Palestinians could demand Arab resistance through their free Palestinian Government, a real not a nominal body, which would fight to regain Palestine with force not with words unlike those who had hitherto claimed trusteeship over the Palestine problem." 1

Thus we can see that al-Fateh recognised the bankruptcy of Arab nationalism as a practical tool for regaining Palestine at a very early stage. By the early 1960s, when disillusion was becoming general, al-Fateh had already developed its theory and laid the foundations of its organisation which would ultimately provide an alternative to the old ideas and institutions.

Al-Fateh was not the only organisation of its kind at this time. One other deserves mention insofar as it continued to exist in various forms down to the 1970s. 2 This was Jabha at-Tahrir al-Falastiniyyah (Palestine Liberation Front) PLF. 3 It professed no political ideology of any kind other than the use of armed struggle to liberate Palestine. It was an essentially military group comprising some twenty Palestinians mainly ex-members of the regular Arab armies and mostly from Syria. 4 It began clandestine organisation inside Syria during the UAR and for some time maintained links with al-Fateh.

1. ibid.

2. There were many small groups of three or four people. These groups were of a transient nature.

3. See Table II.

4. The leaders of the group were Ahmed Jibril, ex-Sandhurst officer in the Syrian Army, and Ahmed Za'rur, formerly an officer in the Jordanian Army and politically a Nasirist. Author's interviews, 'amman, summer 1969.

At this period it explained its separate existence and development on purely geographical grounds. 1 It was basically an unstable organisation allying itself with other groups not on principle but on the basis of self-interest. 2

Al-Fateh and the PLF were the seeds of a new Palestinian-based and Palestinian-oriented Resistance movement, but these seeds were unable to grow while Arab nationalism and Arab unity maintained their popular appeal. There were a number of specific as well as general developments in 1963 which favoured this new Palestinian feeling, and which forced the old parties and regimes to take a less hostile attitude towards it.

Arab Attitudes to Palestinian Nationalism

In June 1963, Ahmed Hilmi, 3 the head of the moribund All Palestine Government 4 and the Palestinian representative to the Arab League, died. The problem of his successor was discussed at the 40th Session of the League held in September. These discussions showed that there were still deep divisions between the regimes over Palestine although there was an increasing desire to come to some kind of agreement.

The positions taken by the various states was consistent with their past attitudes. Nasir was not hostile to the creation of a Palestinian Entity, providing he could ensure control of it. Lebanon favoured the idea since this lessened the possibility of the Palestinian refugees becoming integrated into Lebanon and upsetting the Muslim-Christian balance there. On 12th September the Foreign Minister, Philip Takla declared:

"The concern of Lebanon is always to maintain intact the Palestinian personality, preventing their establishment in another home and doing everything to allow the Palestinian Arabs to take fate into their own hands and defend their interests more effectively." 5

1. Al-Fateh was based in the Gulf. The PLF noted other differences, claiming military superiority for themselves but allowing that al-Fateh was politically more sophisticated because its members were drawn from workers, administrators, engineers and others employed professionally in the Gulf. Al-Fateh was also more viable financially. Author's interviews, 'amman, summer 1969.
2. The PLF later left al-Fateh and allied itself with the ANM when the latter seemed to be increasing in popularity. It later left the ANM for al-Fateh again. See Tables II & IV.
3. See Ch. 1, p. 17 fn. 4.
4. See Ch. 1, p. 17.
5. L'Orient, 13th September 1963.

The new Ba'thist regime in Iraq carried on with Qasim's policy and took the initiative at the Arab League by submitting a resolution which, in addition to pressing for the replacement of Hilmi, stated:

"The Iraqi Government considers that the time has come for the Palestinians to take their affairs and problems in hand on a vast scale The Iraqi Government considers possible the meeting of representatives for the Palestinian people in the form of a National Council charged with choosing the Palestinian representative to the League and on international levels The Council will then ... choose members of an All Palestine Government to represent the Palestinians. (This Government) will be charged with initiating the fight to liberate Palestine, taking as its example the Algerian situation before independence (It will undertake) the formation of a Palestine Liberation Army" 1

As on previous occasions the main obstacle to acceptance of a Palestinian Entity was not so much the rivalry between Nasir and the Ba'thists as the down right hostility of Jordan. Now that Arab unity had been revealed as incapable of achieving anything with respect to Palestine King Hussein felt safe in using the unity argument to combat the idea of a Palestinian Entity:

".... There must be a concerted Arab political effort to rally the necessary international support ... to enable ... authentic and fundamental unity between the Arab states, especially those bordering on Palestine" 2

In an attempt to appease Jordan one Ahmed Shuqeiry, 3 who was

1. Orient No. 27, pp. 229-30.
2. L'Orient, 27th August 1963. King Hussein's address to Arab students in America.
3. Ahmed Shuqeiry had been a prominent nationalist figure in Palestine before 1948, where he practised as a lawyer. He was born in Acre the son of a religious sheikh who was an adherent of the Nashashibis. Ahmed Shuqeiry himself supported Hajj Amin. He was well known as an orator. After 1948 he became Assistant Secretary General to the Arab League, then a member of the Syrian delegation to the UN and finally Saudi Arabian delegate there. He has been described as "... a nationalist of the old type linked to the upper strata of society and to the Arab governments with no confidence in the masses or their organisation. He is an individualist and a demagogue." Author's interview with Abu Fadi 'amman, summer 1969.

becoming something of an unofficial spokesman for Palestine, was called to the League meeting. The general communique published at the end of the session was slightly less negative than previous ones. It affirmed the right for the Palestinians

"to take their cause into their own hands and for the League to permit them to affirm their personality and Entity." 1

It also accepted the principles upon which the Iraqi note was based. The practical result of this meeting was the appointment of Shuqeiry to replace Hilmi. He was delegated to visit the Arab states to discuss the Palestinian situation and draw up practical plans for "defence of the cause at the level of action." 2

The League meeting had thus gained limited official Arab approval for some form of Palestinian organisation and had appointed Shuqeiry to undertake practical measures to this end. The meeting differed from its predecessors in one other respect. It had been the subject of pressure from the Palestinians themselves in support of the Iraqi project. The Palestinian students in Iraq sent a manifesto to the League which stated:

"The Palestinian Entity can only be realised through the constitution of popular Palestinian organisations based on a progressive political front commanding the Palestinian fighters in the place of combat ..."

The manifesto condemned:

"those corrupt elements who use the Palestinian problem for bargaining It is for the young people, sharpened by life in the refugee camps, to take action which will bring victory ..."3

At the end of 1963 two developments concerning Palestine hastened the process which had already started towards the establishment of a Palestinian Entity. First, it was generally

1. Al-Ahram, 15th September 1963.
2. ibid.
3. L'Orient, 14th September 1963.

believed that when the UN debated the Annual Report of UNRWA that year, the occasion would be used to force a final settlement of the Palestine problem through compensation of the refugees. 1 Only Jordan was not disturbed by this rumour since settlement of the refugee problem would be a kind of guarantee for continued Jordanian possession of the West Bank. The popular regimes, on the other hand, could not afford to let this happen without offering some kind of opposition. By this time Syria, as well as Iraq and Egypt, had begun to show public concern over Palestine. Thus in November, when the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine announced that the USA had begun contacts with the Arab states and Israel with a view to settlement of the Palestine problem, the Syrian Foreign Minister declared:

"... there is no truth whatever in this statement It is clear that this is consistent with information already received to the effect that the Palestine problem is to be exploited once more by American efforts to gratify American Jews in view of the proximity of the Presidential elections." 2

This time, however, the defence of Palestine at the UN was not left in the hands of the Arab states. The Arab League authorised Shuqeiry to lead an 18-member Palestinian delegation to put the Palestinian case before the General Assembly. In the course of four major speeches, Shuqeiry made it quite clear that the Palestinians were no longer prepared to be considered simply as a problem of relief. At the end of his final speech he summarised the new attitude which was developing among the Palestinians:

"First, repatriation is our right without qualification or reservation
Secondly, on the refugee question and on the Palestine question as a whole, the United Nations should address itself to us, the people of Palestine The final destiny of our people ... and the future of our country shall be determined by our people

1. Ania Francos, Les Palestiniens, p. 149.
2. Al-Ba'th, November 6th 1963.

Thirdly, any resolution calling for negotiations between the Arab states and Israel shall be of no avail. Such a resolution would be addressed to the wrong party The Arab states are no party to negotiate the national rights of the people of Palestine ...

Fourthly, the only solution lies in the recognition of the rights of the people of Palestine ... to live in their homeland in dignity and liberty and with national sovereignty.

Fifthly, should the United Nations continue a policy of inaction ... we the people of Palestine shall seek by all means to regain our homes, our land and our homeland.

As a colonial issue the problem of Palestine can only be solved through an Algerian solution" 1

The second, and most important development was the imminent completion of the Israeli scheme to divert water from the Jordan river to the Negev. This was viewed by the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular as a humiliation second only to the defeat of 1948. Public opinion ran dangerously high calling for all-out war if necessary to prevent the project from being put into operation.

Although Arab nationalism and unity had lost much of its popular appeal, Nasir's personal popularity was still very high. In times of crisis the Arabs still looked to him for a solution. As on the previous occasion 2 when there had been a demand for war, he knew that, if such a war broke out, the Arabs would lose it. He therefore had to find an alternative. His reluctance to fight with Israel gave his opponents, both progressive and traditionalist, the chance to launch a bitter propaganda campaign against him, accusing him of evading his responsibilities. In spite of these inter-Arab divisions, Nasir realised that the only real solution to the immediate problem was to draw up a policy of united action with which the other regimes would have to agree. Nasir did not want to take sole responsibility for solving the problem.

1. UN, GA OR 18th Year, UN Doc. A/SPC/PV 413.

2. See Ch. 2 pp. 34 & 35.

Thus, on 23rd December 1963 he issued a call for an Arab Summit Conference to discuss the situation:

"... we are prepared to meet those with whom we are in conflict. For the sake of Palestine, we are prepared to sit with those with whom we have a dispute We tell you truthfully that we cannot use force today because our circumstances do not allow us. Be patient with us, the battle of Palestine can continue Let us try to forget all the stupidities and irritations of the last few years ..." 1

The First Arab Summit Conference, January 1964.

The summit met between 13th and 17th January 1964. All the Arab Heads of State attended, including Ahmed Shuqeiry as representative for Palestine. The two main subjects of discussion were the Jordan Waters Scheme and the possible establishment of a Palestinian Entity.

Nasir's suggestion for solving the problem of the Jordan waters without declaring or provoking war with Israel was that the Arab states should immediately begin their own schemes to divert the water from the tributaries of the Jordan. This suggestion was readily accepted by the Arab states as an official policy and Nasir's popularity was still sufficient to carry public opinion in its favour. Moreover, to protect the Arab schemes, a Unified Arab Command was set up as a military substitute for political unity.

The other important decision of the summit was the confirmation of the Arab League decision of the previous September to set up a Palestinian entity. Shuqeiry was confirmed in his position and agreed to undertake a further tour of the Arab states. The aim of this tour would be to discuss and publicise two documents which he had drawn up, the draft constitution for the entity, 2 and the draft of a Palestinian National Charter. 3 After consultation with all interested parties these documents would be submitted to a Palestinian National Congress for ratification.

1. American University of Beirut, Chronology of Arab Politics Vol. 1 No. 4, p. 69.
2. See Appendix II.
3. See Appendix I.

Jordan had agreed to the establishment of the entity only under protest and as an alternative to war with Israel. Hussein made his position abundantly clear:

"... I wish all Arabs to understand my personal conviction about the Palestinian entity as the organisation of the Palestinian people and the concentration of its forces. It is a new force to be added to the existing Arab forces and to give them new vigour We want the realisation of this entity, but it must in no way threaten our Jordanian unity The Palestinian entity must not in any way change the fact that Jordan, with its two banks, is the only base which can serve as a point of departure for liberation of the usurped homeland." 1

Hussein could only tolerate the Palestinian entity as long as it was merely a tool of Arab policy and had no inherent power or effectiveness. In fact an entity with real independence of action would not only have alarmed Hussein but also all the other Arab leaders including Nasir. Thus the entity was subject to considerable limitations in its power and independence of action. Ahmed Shuqeiry had been carefully selected by the Arab states as someone upon whom they could rely not to embarrass them. He had great freedom of action and held the entire responsibility for developing the entity. He drew up its constitution and the Palestinian National Charter in consultation with the Arab states and on his numerous visits to different Arab countries he had the freedom to choose those with whom he consulted. In this way any undesirable influence on the entity could be avoided.

Shuqeiry spent much effort following the Summit in allaying the fears of the Arab establishment in general:

"... The Palestine Organisation will not take the form of a government and will have no constitutional authority over the Palestinians ..." 2

and King Hussein in particular:

"... It is not our intention to create a Palestinian state in Jerusalem or elsewhere, but to launch liberation ..." 3

However, Shuqeiry was not so successful in reassuring the new Palestinian groups whose fears were of quite a different kind.

1. Speech before the Jordanian Parliament 25th February 1964.
2. Progres Egyptien, 20th January 1964.
3. ibid, 20th February 1964.

The New Palestinian Organisations and the Palestinian Entity

By 1964 the new Palestinian organisations, that is the unions of students workers etc. which had sprung up during the Qasim-Nasir dispute, and the new fedayeen groups, were becoming an alternative to the established Arab nationalist parties. Three days before the summit opened the PLF 1 issued a statement warning against any attempt to solve the Jordan waters problem by diverting the tributaries. This would be a return to the abortive plans 2 of the 1950s. The statement asked the Arab states to take a clear stand against foreign intervention in the event of an Arab-Israeli war. The PLF said that the battle over the Jordan waters should be part of the liberation battle demanding recognition of the Palestinian personality and the right of the Palestinians to be the vanguard of any armed revolutionary action to regain Palestine. In addition, the PLF asked that Western economic interests, like the oil, be used as a weapon in the battle. Finally the front warned that a hundred million Arabs, including a million expelled Palestinians, were looking to the summit:

"... with hearts throbbing with fear and unease that your decisions will not be equal to the honour of this nation which you represent." 3

The fact that the PLF felt able to make such a public declaration indicated better than anything else the change in the political atmosphere. It showed the extent to which scepticism of Arab policy and intentions had developed among some sections of the Palestinians. The declaration also revealed several facts about the front itself. It showed lack of vision and a certain degree of irresponsibility. The only thing to be gained from this declaration was to publicise the front's existence, which, in the prevailing state of Arab public opinion, could hardly be designed to further any plans to launch a national liberation war. Disillusion had not yet reached the stage where such a policy, if publicly stated, would be tolerated, or could force toleration through public support. The PLF's attitude was in fact in keeping with that of the Syrian

1. See above pp. 51 & 52.

2. See Ch. 2 pp. 33 & 34.

3. Institute for Palestine Studies (IPS), Al-Kitab as-Sanawi lil-Qadih al-Falastiniyyah Vol. 1 1964, pp. 92-3.

Ba'th. In view of Ahmed Jibril's 1 origins in the Syrian Army it is not inconceivable that the main aim of the declaration was simply to add an element of Palestinian support to Syria's stand against Nasir.

In contrast to the PLF, al-Fateh showed more caution. Although the movement agreed with the criticisms levelled against the summit, it considered that if any response was to be forthcoming it should be an effective one, not just a declaration. Al-Fateh therefore debated the possibility of immediately transferring to the stage of armed struggle but ultimately decided against it. The time was not yet ripe for such an undertaking and the Palestinian entity was not yet firmly established. 2 Unless action would be of maximum effect it was thought preferable to do nothing and say nothing that could "obstruct overall Arab policy". 3

Thus by the beginning of 1964 some Palestinian organisations were becoming active pressure groups, openly expressing their views on the issues of the day. At this stage, the opinions expressed generally supported one or other of the Arab governments. In spite of this, the established political parties, that is, the Ba'th and the ANM, 4 began to view the Palestinians as a serious threat to their popularity. The ANM in particular since it had control of no state or government, tried to infiltrate and gain control of the new Palestinian institutions themselves, and initially had considerable success in this.

ANM influence can be seen on the Union of Palestinian Students in Gaza, 5 which held a conference on 17th February 1964

1. See above p. 51 fn. 4.
2. Author's interview with Abu Fadi (al-Fateh) 'amman, summer 1969.
3. Ania Francos, op cit, p. 149.
4. That is to say, the left wing of the ANM. The right wing had become virtually indistinguishable from Nasir's Arab Socialist Union and considered itself as a branch of the union outside Egypt. The left wing was still pro-Nasir but tended to criticise him from a leftist point of view.
5. The union of course also reflected its origins as an instrument of Nasir's policy although it had become more independent in its thinking. The Gaza union at this stage was still a separate organisation from Palestinian student unions in other Arab countries. The unions were not centralised to become the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) until after the Entity had come into official existence. The GUPS now operates on an international level, not just in the Arab world.

to discuss the summit. The conference accepted the summit decisions, but only on a radical interpretation of their meaning. The diversion of the Jordan tributaries should be taken to its extreme. With respect to the entity, the conference specified that it should be:

"... a revolutionary democratic organisation, throbbing with life and energy, to mobilise all the Palestinian forces, material and spiritual, in order that they may assume their role as vanguard in realising the duty of all Arabs, the liberation battle. It is essential that such an Entity be founded on an organised revolutionary base, guaranteeing its advance with all the determination and seriousness needed to achieve their aims." 1

Representation within the entity should not be on a numerical basis but on the basis of the organised militant forces and revolutionary institutions such as the unions and the fronts. 2 Thus the entity could play an effective role and face future challenges with "a new dynamic conscious mentality" and could abolish the trend of "inherited leadership" in the Palestinian struggle. Moreover, the entity should have:

"independence and autonomy spiritually and symbolically equal to other Arab political entities ..." 3

However, it was the practical recommendations of the students which really revealed the ANM influence with its Nasirist and "Arab" orientation. The students demanded that financial backing for the entity should come from the Arab states and facilities should be granted enabling the entity to tax Palestinians in the various Arab countries. The entity should be authorised to undertake military training of the Palestinians "under the auspices of the Supreme Arab Command". In addition it should draw up its information and political policies in co-operation and discussion with the Arab states. 4 In these important and fundamental practical issues, the students recommendations were completely in line with the

1. Al-Muharrer, 25th-28th March 1964.

2. Article 5 of Shuqeiry's draft constitution states that until free elections are possible the National Congress of the Entity will represent "all Palestinian factions, emigrants and residents including organisations, societies, unions, trade unions and representatives of Palestinian public opinion of various ideological trends. Article 6. Gives Shuqeiry the right, after discussion, to set up preparatory committees in each country to select representatives. See Appendix II.

3. ibid.

4. ibid.

proposals of Shuqeiry's draft constitution, 1 except in their demand for organisational representation.

Thus the students were demanding the impossible. The Entity was to be based upon the new revolutionary Palestinian organisations but was to remain in fact under Arab control. This reflected the dilemma of the ANM at this stage in trying to satisfy both the Palestinians and Nasir. Even so, the party continued its efforts to gain control of the Palestinian institutions, and found an easy target in the PLF.

On March 5th 1964 a statement was issued in Beirut over the joint signatures of the ANM the students and the PLF. It contained more specific demands concerning the entity. Like the students conference, it insisted that the entity be a revolutionary organisation constituted either through general election or representation on the basis of revolutionary bodies. The National Congress of the entity should elect an executive which should then elect a leader.

On the military level, Palestinians in Arab countries should be recruited into regular units which should be subordinate to a leadership which would be responsible to the entity. This leadership would be represented on the Unified Arab Command and any movement of the units would be linked to movements of the Command in the context of a general Arab plan. 2 Once again the practical recommendations in no way contradicted those of the draft constitution and amounted to a virtual endorsement of Shuqeiry's proposals, or in other words of official Arab policy.

The attempt of the ANM to incorporate both Palestinian and Arab Nationalist sentiment produced clear contradictions which became increasingly difficult to reconcile as the situation developed. Nasir had agreed to the Palestinian entity as long as it remained more or less under his control. At the same time there was a growing number of Palestinian groups demanding that some really revolutionary action be taken. The ANM could not afford to alienate either Nasir or the Palestinians and solved the problem by adopting revolutionary terminology in generalities, while in practice demanding nothing which might

1. See Appendix II.

2. Al-Muharrer, 16th March 1964.

undermine Nasir's position. The strategy of the ANM therefore, before the first Palestinian National Congress, was one of close co-operation with both Shuqeiry and the Palestinian groups in the hope of gaining the support of the latter to execute the policies of the former. On the eve of the congress this policy seemed to have succeeded. Four days before it opened a statement appeared issued by a body called al-Maktab as-Siyasi lil-Qoa ath-Thawriyyah al-Falastiniyyah lil-'amal al-Muwahhad (Political Bureau of the Palestinian Revolutionary Forces for United Action). This bureau was composed of six small military groups including the PLF, 1 and, from the contents of its statement ANM influence would seem to have been paramount. 2

The declaration affirmed the Arab character of Palestine and the necessity of liberation through war, involving the entire Arab nation with the Palestinians in the vanguard. The framework for liberation would be the entity. The statement stressed that the entity was not the product of regionalism.

The Bureau declared that its members:

"... base themselves on their undeclared revolutionary experience which was accumulated secretly among the dark tents through the practice and direction of silent active struggle. These movements will proceed with the execution of the articles of the National Charter". 3

The Bureau agreed:

"as the vanguard of Arab action to liberate Palestine, and as one face of the Arab struggle for liberation and unity, to cooperate with all loyal Arab forces to the fullest extent, in accordance with the interests of liberation."

Finally the statement asserted that the Bureau had not been set up to oppose Shuqeiry's attempt to build the Palestinian entity:

"... but will make every effort to help Mr. Shuqeiry construct a revolutionary and effective Palestinian entity, since the Bureau believes that an official entity based simply on individual contacts could never succeed if isolated from the revolutionary movements." 4

1. The other groups were: al-Jabhah ath-Thawriyyah lil-Tahrir Falastin (The Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine); Jabhah at-Tahrir al-Watani al-Falastiniyyah (Palestinian Front for National Liberation); Takkatul al-Feda'iyyeen al-Falastiniyyeen (Palestinian Fedayeen Group); Jabhah at-Tahrir al-'arabiyyah li-Falastin (Arab Front of

Liberation for Palestine); al-Munathamah al-Qawmiyyah lil-Tahrir (Nationalist Organisation for Liberation).

2. It is likely that one or more of these groups was of ANM origin.
 3. See Appendix I.
 4. IPS, Kitab Vol. 1, pp. 100-101.
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Thus, since its creation in the late 1950s, the PLF had shifted its ground several times. The front had grown impatient with the caution and reticence of al-Fateh at the time of the first Summit, and after a brief flirtation with the Syrian Ba'th had firmly allied itself with the new-style ANM. It became one of the many pressure groups trying to influence the Palestinian entity through declarations and manifestos.

This brings us directly to consider the attitude of al-Fateh towards the summit and its decisions. Al-Fateh never deviated from its original intention of launching an armed struggle to liberate Palestine when the circumstances were right. Having decided that the time had not yet come for this, the movement had nothing to gain by revealing its existence and publicly declaring its intentions, in a vain attempt to influence official Arab policy. These months were used instead to continue building the organisation and preparing its members for the task which confronted them.

The movement was particularly strong in the Gulf states among the Palestinians there. Its influence is noticeable in a statement addressed to Shuqeiry, issued by a body named "The Executive Committee of the Palestinian Conference in Qatar."

The statement criticised the form of Palestinian congress proposed in Shuqeiry's draft constitution. 1 Such an assembly would not represent the Palestinians "revolutionary will". It should be constituted through free and direct general elections in all places where Palestinians were resident. The Qatar conference itself was based upon such elections.

1. See Appendix II.

On the military level, the statement criticised Shuqeiry's proposals as ambiguous, thus, by implication also criticising the military recommendations of the ANM and the PLF. The raison d'etre of the entity should be the creation of a Palestinian military apparatus free in leadership, policy and planning to undertake the liberation battle. In the process all Palestinians would become part of a revolutionary fedayeen army. 1

There are two basic differences here from the statements and recommendations of the ANM dominated institutions. In the first place the demand for general elections in choosing members of the proposed National Congress is made to appear a concrete possibility, since the Qatar conference was constituted in this way.

Secondly, the conference demanded that the Palestinian military institutions must not be linked or subordinated to Arab military strategy. Furthermore, the type of army proposed by the conference would be based upon the entire Palestinian population, which would require the arming of that population. In view of the demographic dispersion of the Palestinians such a suggestion was hardly designed to reassure the Arab leaders of Palestinian obedience to Arab policy.

As a result of its independent stand in face of Arab attempts to assume direction of the Palestinian movement, al-Fateh was favourably looked upon by Syria during this period. Statements from the Syrian Ba'th tended to support independent Palestinian action rather than to support Shuqeiry's Palestinian entity. There were several reasons for this.

Since the failure of the 1963 unity talks, relations between Nasir and the Ba'th, especially the Syrian Ba'th, steadily worsened. Both aspired to leadership of the Arab world through a policy of progressive Arab nationalism with a socialist content. Nasir still retained overwhelming popular support and the Ba'th therefore had to find some issue of principle upon which to take a more radical stand than Nasir. As on previous

1. Al-Hayat, 27th April 1964.

occasions the Palestine issue seemed to be the ideal choice.

On the other hand, the Ba'th could not oppose the entity unless it could offer some viable alternative. Al-Fateh provided the model. The logic of the Ba'thist position forced them further than mere verbal support for al-Fateh which enjoyed a period of complete freedom of action inside Syria. A communique issued by the National Revolutionary Command in Damascus on March 5th 1964 illustrated the position:

"To realise its objectives fully, the Palestinian entity should have the following characteristics:

1. It should be a single popular organisation through which the Palestinians can express their wishes in complete freedom. It must also have the effective authority to exercise the sovereign rights of the Palestinians.
2. It should have an army composed of and commanded by Palestinians under the direction of the organisation of the Palestinian people. This army will be a revolutionary organisation capable of fulfilling its responsibilities in agreement with other Arab armies. The formation of an essentially Palestinian army is the principal condition for the success of an effective Palestinian entity.
3. The Arab states have a duty to support the entity morally and materially. They must not put pressure on it or hinder the accomplishment of its mission." 1

Eight days before the National Congress opened the Syrian Ba'th produced an alternative to Shuqeiry's plan for organising the entity. The Ba'th asked that the Congress be constituted through general election. It suggested that these elections could be supervised by a committee drawn from the Arab states' highest judicial bodies. 2 The entity itself should be built on three effective bases, the territory, the people and sovereignty. Palestinian sovereignty should extend over all of mandatory Palestine. 3

1. Al-Ba'th, 5th March 1964.
2. MEJ Vol. 18 No. 3, p. 339.
3. Cahiers Vol. 55, pp. 206-7.

The Syrian Ba'th was thus suggesting the impossible, that the Palestinians should have power over their own affairs including the territory of the West Bank and Gaza. This suggestion was indeed an alternative to Shuqeiry's entity, and at the same time an indirect criticism of both Jordan and Egypt. Even al-Fateh, with its independence of thought, did not ask such concessions, realising their impossibility. However, such an extremist stand suited the Ba'th's purposes at that time, and their patronage was useful to al-Fateh on the practical level.

This was the position on the eve of the first Palestinian National Congress. The Arab states were as disunited as ever. Nasir and the Ba'thists were at loggerheads and both were hostile to the Jordanian regime. On the Palestinian level new groups and organisations were coming into existence threatening the position of the Arab nationalists. All these forces were acting upon the Congress and much depended upon the outcome.

The first Palestinian National Congress

In spite of overwhelming pressure from all sides that the Congress should be constituted through general election, the selection of members was made basically as stipulated in Shuqeiry's draft constitution, that is, by preparatory committees appointed by him in each Arab country. 1

As a result, when the Congress met, all the political and military radical groups together with the various unions, formed, between them, less than 10% of the membership. The majority of representatives came under the category of "public opinion of various ideological trends" 2 and had been chosen by Shuqeiry in agreement with the Arab governments to ensure that the official version of the Palestinian Entity would be ratified without too many fundamental and perhaps dangerous alterations. 3

1. See above p. 61 fn. 2.

2. As specified by article 5 of the draft constitution. See Appendix II.

3. This is the generally accepted version of what happened according to members of the various Palestinian resistance movements. Authors interviews, 'amman and Beirut, summer 1969.

The Congress opened on 28th May 1964 in Jerusalem. The first session, which was attended by Arab states representatives, 1 was given over to formal speeches of welcome. The opening address was given by King Hussein. When the formalities were over the work of the Congress began. On this first day Shuqeiry was voted president of the Congress and the draft constitution of the entity was adopted without amendment, bringing into existence Munathamah Tahrir Falastiniyyah, (The Palestine Liberation Organisation - PLO).

Congress was then split into a number of committees each dealing with one aspect of the work. 2 Great care was taken to ensure that radical elements did not have a majority in any of these committees. 3 The most important committees were those dealing with finance, military affairs, and the Palestinian National Charter.

With respect to finance, congress had already set up a Palestinian National Fund (PNF) and laid down the basic regulations for its administration. 4 The Fund would be composed from a tax imposed on all Palestinians over 18 5 plus an income tax of 2-6% on merchants, employees, companies and institutions. 6 Palestinian Bonds and Liberation Stamps would also be issued. However, by far the largest contribution to the fund would come from the annual allocations of the Arab Governments. 7 In addition to these basic regulations, the Finance committee recommended tax on oil exports.

1. Only Saudi Arabia boycotted the Congress. The reasons for this were that the previous August Shuqeiry had resigned from his post in the Saudi administration in protest over the Yemen dispute. Secondly, Saudi Arabia was now backing what was left of Hajj Amin's Higher Committee which also boycotted the Congress, insisting that the old All Palestine Government was the only true representative of Palestine.
2. As specified by article 8 of the constitution. See Appendix II.
3. Authors interviews, 'amman and Beirut, summer 1969.
4. Articles 20 and 21 of the constitution.
5. The tax would be 250 fils per head.
6. Rules for collecting these taxes would be drawn up by the local bureaux of the PLO in each country, according to the situation. Agreements were drawn up with governments, companies and individual employers.
7. IPS, Kitab Vol. 1, pp. 81-2.

on airports and seaports. Such recommendations would naturally depend upon the goodwill of the Arab states for their implementation.

In the military sphere the basic guidelines were laid down by the constitution, 1 giving ultimate control to the Unified Arab Command. The military committee made further recommendations, requesting immediate military training for Palestinians and the formation of both regular and fedayeen Palestinian brigades. It asked the Unified Command to assume its full responsibilities with respect to Palestine. Finally steps should be taken to ensure that the families of any Palestinians killed in battle, be taken care of. 2 Once again the agreement of the Arab states was a prerequisite to the implementation of any of these suggestions.

The committee set up to study the Draft National Charter 3 recommended its acceptance without amendment. The charter lay down the basic principle upon which the entity was to be founded. Its essential task was to define the entity with respect to territory and population, 4 and to place it firmly within the context of Arab nationalism and unity. 5 It condemned Zionism 6 and provided for the liberation of Palestine from its grasp, but liberation only in "the various political spheres". 7 To this end it established the PLO. 8

The charter was careful to emphasise that the PLO would have no authority to practice sovereignty over the West Bank or Gaza. 9 This, together with the provision that the PLO

1. Articles 18 and 19 of the constitution.
2. IPS, Kitab Vol. 1, p. 82.
3. See Appendix I.
4. Articles 2, 6 and 7.
5. Articles 1, 3, 11, 12, 13 and 14.
6. Articles 17-20.
7. Article 25.
8. Article 23.
9. Article 24.

would not interfere in the internal affairs of the Arab states 1 effectively rendered the entity impotent except insofar as the Arab states agreed with its activities. The lack of any real independence manifested in the various committee proposals can be seen as a simple reflection of a fundamental principle.

Other committee recommendations concerned information, propaganda, and the establishment of unions for women, students, workers etc. The Arab states were requested to allow Palestinians freedom of movement and work in their countries and even priority of work. The word lajiyyun (refugees) was not to be used in future and would be replaced by the term a'idun (returners). National days were instituted and the decision made to issue identity cards to all Palestinians. 2

The decisions of the congress and the recommendations of the various committees all revealed the total ineffectiveness of the Palestinian radical groups in influencing developments within the entity. By the end of the congress they were thoroughly disillusioned with the PLO and with their own inability to make any impression on the proceedings.

On the final day, Shuqeiry was elected president of the PLO and, at his own request, contrary to the express wishes of the popular groups he was given sole responsibility in choosing the members of the Executive Committee. The congress then transformed itself into the National Council of the PLO thereby gaining a mandate for the next two years in its existing form. By this move the popular groups were deprived of any opportunity to change the balance of power in their favour within the entity until the constitution of a new congress.

The first congress therefore, resulted in the creation of a number of institutions for expression of the Palestinian identity. These institutions subsequently received official Arab recognition from the second Arab summit which was held in the following September. 3 Palestine thus ceased to be merely a refugee problem and to this extent this first congress

1. Article 26.

2. IPS, Kitab Vol. 1, pp. 83-4. AUB, Arab Doc. 1964, pp. 235-8.

3. The second Summit was held to assess progress made since the previous January. It marked neither any change of policy, nor any change of attitude on the part of the participants. It was, however, the last expression of any real inter-Arab co-operation. From September 1964 the situation deteriorated again.

can be viewed as a success.

On the other hand, the Palestinian institutions born of the congress had a built-in guarantee of ineffectiveness. They were materially and spiritually dependent upon the Arab states and had freedom to act only within the context of over-all Arab policy. Any power which did accrue to the institutions was concentrated in the hands of Shuqeiry. The representatives of radical Palestinian nationalism had been denied any positions of responsibility in the entity. These groups thus had to reassess their positions vis-a-vis the PLO, and decide their action accordingly. Their criticisms began almost immediately.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE RISE OF THE FEDAYEEN

1964 - 1967

In the last half of the 1960s, the Palestinians rapidly gained strength. Even the ANM-based groups criticised the institutions which the Arab states had set up for them. Al-Fateh, not content with mere criticism, refused to have any part in Palestinian organisations sponsored by the Arab establishment. The movement pushed all the other groups to be more critical than would otherwise have been the case.

Reassessment of the Palestinian Entity

From September 1964, when the Second Summit endorsed the PLO, until the Second Palestinian National Congress in June 1965, Shuqeiry was busy consolidating both his position vis-a-vis the PLO and the PLO's position vis-a-vis the Arab states and the Palestinian popular groups.

Among other things, Shuqeiry established contact with the Communist bloc, in particular China. He visited Peking in March 1965 where he received promises of material help and was accorded official recognition of the PLO as representative of the Palestinian struggle. 1 This visit strengthened Shuqeiry's position in three ways. First, he gained a source of arms for the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) which gave him an advantage over new rivals for his power who were emerging within the PLA. 2 Second, it helped him to keep

1. A joint communique between the PLO and China was issued on 22nd March and published in Peking Review, 26th March 1965.
2. These were not rivals for Shuqeiry's personal position. It was rather that the PLA was becoming an alternative focus of authority to the PLO.

mass support with the PLO rather than losing it to the new movements. 1 Third, it placed him in a more independent bargaining position with the Arab governments by weakening his material dependence upon them.

Whilst the PLO was thus establishing itself as a new force in the arena of Arab politics, the situation in the Arab world was beginning to deteriorate again. The brief period of Arab co-operation which followed the first summit was coming to an end and it was becoming increasingly difficult to seal over the fundamental divisions in inter-Arab relations. The causes of this break-down were either directly or indirectly related to Palestine.

First, the Arab projects for diverting the Jordan tributaries had reached a point of deadlock. Work on all projects had stopped because it had been found impossible to form a joint Arab force for protection against Israeli retaliation.

Second, President Bourguiba of Tunisia publicly began to advocate peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem. He wanted settlement on the basis of the 1947 Partition resolution, repatriation of the refugees and a negotiated settlement with Israel. 2 Tunisia began to boycott Arab meetings. The other Arab states had to decide their attitudes towards Bourguiba, and the differences between these attitudes caused further division.

1. It was later learned that al-Fateh had already established relations with China. Author's interview with Abu Fadi (al-Fateh) 'amman, summer 1969.
2. Speech delivered 3rd March in Jericho. Al-'amal, 5th March 1965.

Third, the development of the PLO itself, and its contacts with China, though supported by "progressive" states like the UAR and Syria, began to alienate others like Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

In short, the old divisions between conservative and progressive regimes, and differences within each camp, reappeared, forcing Shuqeiry to perform a delicate balancing act between them. At the popular level, recognition of the Palestinian entity, disappointment over the first congress and the general deterioration of Arab co-operation, led to a massive increase in the number of small fedayeen groups. Most of their efforts were channelled into issuing declarations and manifestos. The situation was one of growing confusion on both the Palestinian and Arab levels.

In spite of the multiplicity of Palestinian groups, the main ideological divisions on the Palestinian level were between the ANM, the Ba'th and al-Fateh. Of all the Palestinian groups only al-Fateh had a clearly defined ideology and thus the others either remained essentially military organisations, were easily won over by the ANM or the Ba'th, or alternatively joined with al-Fateh. After the first congress these three main ideological groups had to decide their future policy towards both the PLO and Shuqeiry.

The ANM found itself in an even more contradictory position than before. It still needed the support of the popular organisations but was loath to condemn official UAR policy. It therefore condemned the proceedings of the first congress without condemning the PLO in principle, and moderated its criticisms of Shuqeiry, since such criticism might imply disapproval of Nasir's support for him. A statement issued by the ANM on 14th June 1964 illustrated these points. It began

by praising the Summit decision to recognise the Palestinian entity. It said the "Palestinian revolutionary elements" had worked for months that the entity might be acceptable and effective,

"putting much effort into backing Shuqeiry against the many obstacles he is facing from the reactionaries who do not want the entity to be more than a formality to abort real Palestinian revolutionary action, and to give these reactionary forces the opportunity of crushing the Palestinian revolutionary forces under the name of the entity."

The declaration said that Shuqeiry was a target for many pressures from the "reactionary Arab Governments" but that his capitulation to these pressures constituted "a deviation and an abortion of the entity". It accused the Jordanian Government of "continual harrassment and terrorising" of some of the members of the Jerusalem Congress and also of "tyrannically prohibiting" some congress members from entering Jordan without any reason. The declaration criticised the proceedings of the congress in its refusal to discuss some collectively approved committee recommendations and its rejection of others. The arbitrary manner in which the congress was transformed into a National Assembly, and the authorising of Shuqeiry to choose the Executive Committee were also severely criticised. The declaration said that the congress had resulted in the creation of, "an

"an organisation which has no relation with the masses, without the base which is essential to any real Liberation Organisation, that is, the military organisation and the establishment of a National Council able practically to discuss, plan, decide and supervise. It has resulted in an Executive Committee which does not represent the masses but is appointed from elements whose ability and work can only be judged by Shuqeiry."

The declaration said there were indications that Shuqeiry intended to "continue isolating the revolutionary organisations" and it concluded that it was the ANM's responsibility

"to register that this organisation and congress were unable to realise the acceptable minimum demands of the Palestinian masses The crippled results of the Jerusalem Congress prove again that the masses are the start, the tool and the aim, and that effective revolutionary organisation is the road. Thus the revolutionary forces and elements should take their historic role on the path to united and serious action." 1

This declaration was obviously intended to impress the Palestinian popular organisations. While criticising the congress, it avoided fostering any discontent with Arab policy in general. The accusation that the PLO was being used simply to control the Palestinians was aimed only at the "reactionary" governments and in particular Jordan. Had the congress been held on UAR territory, interference would probably have been of a less blatant nature, but wherever the congress met some kind of pressure would have been exerted on its members, to ensure that the entity did not get out of hand. However, the ANM by its selective criticism, exonerated the UAR from any responsibility for the stunting of the PLO.

In spite of its appeal that the popular organisations should unite and assume their "historic role", the ANM at this stage did not seem to contemplate the possibility of independent Palestinian armed struggle. It continued to petition and pressure the Arab states through its various sympathisers like the PLF, the students unions, and the political Bureau. 2 The latter sent a memorandum to the second Summit in September 1964 asking that various measures, already accepted in principle, like the training of Palestinians, be put into immediate effect. 3 The Palestinian students in December 1964 went as far as declaring their public approval of the PLO, the two summits' decisions and Nasir's policy in general. 4 Thus the contradiction within the ANM and

1. Al-Hurriyah, 15th June 1964. A similar declaration criticising the Congress was issued by the GUPS on 18th June 1964 and published in Al-Hurriyah on 29th June 1964. (GUPS was still ANM dominated at this time -
2. See above Ch. 3 p. 63 fn. 1.
3. Al-Hayat, 4th September 1964.
4. Al-Ahram, 16th December 1964.

within those organisations under its influence, continued to grow.

The attitude of the Ba'th was less equivocal. It had consistently maintained a more radical stand than Nasir on the Palestinian issue, advocating strong and violent action to liberate Palestine. It found no reason to change this after the congress. Syria's position during the Second Summit was predictable. It held that Palestine was the affair of the Palestinians and should be free from Arab interference. Like the ANM, the Syrian Ba'th also had their "Palestinian" sympathisers, to act as a pressure group in their interest. At the time of the second summit the newspaper al-Ba'th published a declaration by a group calling itself Al-Jabhah ath-Thawriyyah al-Falastiniyyah (The Palestinian Revolutionary Front). 1 The ideas contained in this declaration were in line with those of the Ba'th and nearer to al-Fateh than to the ANM:

"... spontaneous growth from within the ranks of the masses is an essential condition for the establishment of any revolutionary organisation. Popular organisations, capable of being both revolutionary and effective can never be imposed from above or created by decision. They must spring from the development of the daily struggle ..."

The declaration said that the second summit through its decisions could never

"... realise the aspirations of the Arab masses to liberate Palestine, in the face of all the demands and limited territorial interests, without entering the wilderness of minor battles and gradually capitulating to defence of the status quo, transforming the slogan 'unity of ranks' to one of 'unity of defeat'."

The solution to this dilemma was to:

"... launch the liberation battle through the revolutionary method of exploding the potentialities of the Arab people and involving the masses in the heart of the battle." 2

1. The existence of this Front except as a vehicle for Ba'thist propaganda is a matter of conjecture.
2. Al-Ba'th, 7th September 1964.

For reasons we have already discussed, 1 the Syrian Ba'th was able to take a far more logical and consistent attitude than the ANM. It could reject official Arab policy and bear no responsibility for its failures. It could support Palestinian independence without any risk to its own position.

This leaves only al-Fateh. The movement made no public criticism of the congress or the second summit, although its members who had attended the congress were as disillusioned as the members of other militant groups. 2 By the end of 1964, with Shuqeiry increasing his power, Israel diverting the Jordan unopposed and the number of fedayeen groups growing daily, al-Fateh could see only one course of action. It began military operations on New Years eve 3 in order to:

"... distinguish the sincere movements and slogans from the demagogic and false ones and to put an end to the chaos and stalemate " 4

Thus, on the first of January 1965 a number of men from al-'asifah (The Storm) 5 crossed into Israel and blew up a water pump at the village of Eitan. Six days later they achieved their main objective and destroyed some of the installations of the Israeli water diversion scheme. 6

1. See above Ch. 3 pp. 64 & 65.
2. Based on Author's interviews.
3. The decision was taken at a meeting on December 18th 1964. Free Palestine (Suppl.), 8th January 1970, p. 31.
4. Author's interview, Abu Ibrahim (al-Fateh), 'amman, summer 1969.
5. Al-Fateh used the name al-'asifah for this first operation so that any failure would not reflect on the movement as a whole. Military preparations were started in 1962 and arms gradually collected through individual purchase on the home market, or through smuggling across the border. Arms stores were located in the areas from which initial operations would be launched. 1962-5 the emphasis was on training and reconnaissance. By 1965 the movement was organised into 10 squads totalling 82 men. These covered six regions of the occupied territory, 2 in the north; 2 around Deir Nakhas; 2 around Tulkarm; 2 in the south; 1 at Beit Jibril and 1 in Jerusalem. The first operation resulted in one fedayi being captured (Mahmoud Hajjazi) who was later tried in Israel, and one killed by the Jordanian army (Ahmed Musa Ibrahim) on returning. Free Palestine (Suppl.), 8th January 1970, p. 2.
6. The installation destroyed was part of the Eilabun tunnel. The operation was carried out by 11 men.

The first military communique described this operation and warned Israel against any reprisal action "because our forces will reply to aggression in kind." Al-'asifah also warned the Arab states against interfering in the interests of the enemy "for our forces will reply to this action by exposing the interests of the state concerned to ruin, wherever they are." This was the first of 39 such communiqués issued in 1965.

Al-'asifah's first political statement was issued on 28th January.

"For sixteen years our people have lived alienated from their cause, treated by the UN as a problem of displaced refugees. Meanwhile, the enemy has pursued his plans, locally and internationally, for an extended stay in our homeland ...

"... al-'asifah forces have taken action to show the enemy and the world at large that our people are not dead, and that armed revolution is the road to return and victory ...

"Our point of departure is Palestine, the soil of our nation. Our directing force is our belief that this is the correct way to extricate our cause from the vicious circle in which it is caught. We expect support from the Arab nation in its common struggle as well as from forces of liberation throughout the world."

Having finally entered the second stage of its strategy, that is, armed struggle, al-Fateh sought the greatest possible publicity for its actions. The extent to which it constituted a new and dangerous element on the Palestinian scene can be deduced from the near-panic reactions of the Arab states. Old charges of connections with CENTO were repeated and publication of al-'asifah communiqués prohibited. A few newspapers evaded these restrictions by publishing Israeli communiqués about the operations. 1

1. Al-Fateh, Dialogue with Fateh, (Translation of a dialogue between Salah Khalaf (Abu Eyad) of the Central Committee and at-Tali'ah magazine published monthly in Egypt. June 1969, pp. 36-7.

In protest at the censorship, al-'asifah sent a long Memorandum to the first Congress of Arab pressmen, held in Kuwait in February 1965. It accused the Arab press of:

"... a lazy, incorrect attitude in repressing news of the revolutionary events which announced our armed struggle We believe that the great Arab revolution can only be achieved at the regional level. The liberation of any Arab region will not begin unless this region moves of its own accord ... through the growth of the revolutionary elements inside it Our work is therefore devoted to developing Palestinian Arab efforts on the basic problem, the Liberation of Palestine The Palestine battle will decide the Arab destiny. It needs unity of the Arab revolutionary forces, based upon united Palestinian effort. Thus it will confirm the Algerian experience and prove true the concept of armed struggle ..."

The memorandum acknowledged the Summit's support for Palestine but stated that:

"... to plan on the basis of a defence strategy puts the reins in the hands of the enemy (while the involvement of the Palestinian people and their revolutionary vanguards could) ... remove Arab strategy from these circumstantial limitations ... that is, Arab strategy could become an offensive strategy thanks to the Palestinians ..."

Turning to Arab unity, the memorandum continued:

"The slogan of Arab unity is a revolutionary slogan, but it can only be achieved through the battle to decide the Arab destiny when a determined section of the Arab revolutionary forces rush forward with moral and material support. Then the slogan of Arab unity will become a revolutionary slogan in the context of liberation. (The new slogan should be) ... 'Liberation of Palestine, the road to unity' not 'unity the road to liberation'."

The memorandum emphasised that time was on the side of Israel. After three years it would achieve a certain population density and might have a nuclear deterrent. Finally al-'asifah insisted that it did not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of the Arab states. On the other hand, it had undertaken to liberate Palestine and would not be deflected from this path, though it would never "raise arms against any Arab

army or government." Al-'asifah requested that the text of the memorandum be carried in the coming issues of all Arab newspapers. 1

The difference between al-Fateh and the other groups is well illustrated by these documents. Al-Fateh considered popular armed struggle as the only way to liberation and explicitly relegated Arab unity to second place. The movement showed a unique determination of purpose and a quiet confidence. Declarations were only issued to support actions or explain them not as a substitute for them. The rise of al-Fateh to a degree of prominence in 1965 provided Shuqeiry with a rival who would not compromise, unlike the ANM and the Ba'th.

By the time of the second Palestinian congress in May 1965, the pressures upon Shuqeiry both on the Arab level and from the Palestinians themselves, were forcing him to actions he might otherwise have deemed inadvisable. He walked out of a meeting of Arab Heads of State in April when it refused to expel Tunisia from the Arab League because of Bourguiba's attitude on Palestine. 2 He could hardly have done otherwise in the face of the growth of radical Palestinian opinion. It was thus in an atmosphere of suspicion and uncertainty that the second congress opened in Cairo at the end of May.

The Second Palestinian National Congress

The membership of the congress was the same as on the previous occasion giving little representation to the new Palestinian organisations. Nasir's opening speech revealed the many contradictions which had appeared in the Arab world since the first congress. He criticised Bourguiba "who wishes to sell the Arab land to the Zionists and Imperialists." He criticised Syria for attacking the Unified Arab Command and the summit conferences on the grounds that such criticism "means that we are despairing There exist problems

"between the PLO and certain Arab states and this should not surprise you for there is suspicion and complication, but this must not lead us to despair ..." 3

1. IPS, Kitab 1965 Vol. 2, pp. 111-113.
2. Keesings (1965), p. 207-45.
3. Orient No. 34, (1965), pp. 181-95.

But perhaps most significantly, much of his speech was devoted to rejecting the stand of al-Fateh, although the movement was not mentioned by name. He said,

"Certain people see the future in terms of the past ... these people declare that the Palestinian cause lasted 16 years and it is now time to act and stop talking. They say the PLO has been in existence for a year and a half and has done nothing but confer, and that it must act. These people consider that the contradictions which surround the Palestine problem are a matter for despair They claim that the aim of the summit was to liquidate the Palestine problem. We have one alternative, either proceed in this way or finish collective Arab action They say 'we must this very day make war with Israel'. Why? Israel would welcome an attack today for she knows that revolutionary Arab action and capability will grow." 1

Nasir's speech was followed by an address from Shuqeiry in which he explained his attitude towards the Arab Officials' meeting in April. He had walked out because of the weakness of Arab criticism of Bourguiba, and for the same reason, he offered his resignation to this congress. However, the congress postponed discussion of this matter until the last session so that Shuqeiry could present his report. He was again elected president. 2

Shuqeiry's report outlined the activities of the last year. He said special importance had been given to developing the military role of the PLO. Units of an Army had been formed in Gaza and the UAR and in the former a law had been passed making general mobilisation compulsory. Training camps and offices had been established in many Arab countries. With respect to popular organisation, 50 offices had been opened in villages, towns and refugee camps to train the people in civil defence. On the financial side an executive had been appointed for the National Fund and Arab governments had been asked to tax all Palestinians. Response to an appeal for funds had realised 100000 dinars 3 from the Palestinians

1. ibid.

2. IPS, op cit Vol. 2 1965, pp. 48-9.

3. A dinar was a little more than £1 sterling.

themselves. 1

The congress divided as before into committees. Their recommendations differed little from the previous year and deserve no comment. At the end of the congress Shuqeiry's resignation was refused and he was re-elected President of the PLO. He asked the Arab Governments to make possible elections to both the PLO and to the congress. 2

Among the declarations and manifestos distributed by the various groups at the congress, the most notable were those from the ANM, the Political Bureau and al-Fateh. They show the main criticisms levelled against the congress and the PLO as well as different suggestions for reform.

The Political Bureau 3 offered the most detailed but least fundamental criticism. It can be summarised as follows:

1. The Organisation's lack of directed planning and its pursuance of a confused and improvised policy, if continued, would lead to a deterioration of hopes placed in the Organisation.
2. Since they failed to realise that Palestinian activity should be based on the Palestinian people, and their revolutionary cadres, and since they lacked sound popular organisation and planning, every official behaved like a director of the organisation, working according to his own personal judgement.
3. The spontaneous issue of emotive speeches, instead of presentation of the true facts and difficulties would not prepare the people to meet the necessary challenge.
4. The attitude towards the Arab countries sometimes flattering, and sometimes abusive, would lead to the liquidation of the Palestine problem and bargaining over it.
5. The luxury, comfort and exorbitant salaries of the Organisation officials would create a bourgeois class among the Palestinians living off the Organisation instead of sacrificing for it.
6. Appointments depending on family ties and personal relations were being made instead of on the basis of loyalty and competence.

1. ibid, pp. 49-50.

2. ibid, pp. 52-55.

3. The Political Bureau was now composed of Jibril's group; Jabhah at-Tahrir al-'arabiyyah al-Falastiniyyah (Palestine Arab Liberation Front); Al-Jabhah ath-Thawriyyah li-Tahrir Falastin (Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine); Jabhah al-Feda' (Fedayeen Front)*; Jabhah at-Tahrir al-Watani al-Falastini (Front for National Palestinian Liberation)*; Al-Jabhah al-Qawmiyyah lil-Tahrir al-Falastini (Nationalist Front for Palestinian Liberation)*; Takattul al-Feda'iiyyeen al-Falastiniyyeen (Palestinian Fedayeen Group). Compared with the previous year the Bureau had lost two organisations and gained three (*). In addition to this Jibril's group had split into two, both called Palestine Liberation Front but distinguished

by using the initials L.P. (Liberation of Palestine) and PLF. This is a good indication of the increase and instability among the fedayeen groups. Their number was such that finding names was becoming impossible.

7. Personal struggles within the administration were attempting to involve the masses in their quarrels.
8. There was no control over the bureaux opened in different countries, allowing some of them to undertake useless work, like the training of school boys as assistants on the battlefield while there were no soldiers for them to assist.
9. The Executive Committee members were following a policy of flattering the Political Bureau and other elements, without any serious intention of arriving at arrangements with them to co-ordinate activities.

At the end, the memorandum asked that an Executive Committee be formed based on collective leadership and a centralised clear policy guaranteeing a vanguard role for the Palestinians at all levels, working through the Arab League and united leadership with equal status to the Arab states. Failing this they should be content to co-operate with those Arab states which did accept the principle of equality. As long as the organisation did not recognise the Palestinian revolutionary movements these groups would have to work alone and this would impede any progress. Otherwise the Political Bureau expressed its intention of "continued co-operation with all Palestinian sincere elements headed by the PLO." 1

This memorandum was interesting from two points of view. In the first place it gave a detailed picture of the administrative aspects of the PLO which were giving rise to concern. Second, it showed that the Political Bureau was still not prepared to give up any chance of gaining a hold in the PLO and of working within the context of an overall Arab strategy, in spite of its criticism of the organisation.

1. IPS, op cit Vol. 2 1965, pp. 132-35.

The position of the ANM was essentially similar although its objections were far less directly concerned with the actual working of the PLO and far more concerned with the form which the popular organisation of the Palestinian entity should take.

"... the organisation is a popular organisation and popular organisation is not merely one of the offices of the organisation but is the organisation in its entirety." 1

The Liberation battle

"... means a determined fight into which the whole Arab nation will be plunged with the Palestinians in its vanguard The organisation must be the context within which the power of the Palestinians is mobilised and which pushes them forcefully to the battlefield ..." 2

The ANM considered that the basic principles of the organisation must be:

1. The organisation is a popular revolutionary organisation to mobilise the power of the Palestinian people and enlist them for the battle.
2. The organisation must be based upon the organised Palestinian people, who will choose their leadership and hold it responsible. They will participate in planning at all levels.
3. The organisation will be built upon a system of centralised democracy ... leaders at all levels will work on the collective principle, responsible to the congresses which choose them.

The organisation will be founded upon two bases:

1. Unions of all kinds.
2. Geographical areas.

The National Congress would be the highest authority, its members chosen by regional congresses. 3 The Executive Committee must be formed upon the criterion of efficiency of the members although it must represent the different unions. 4

This memorandum of the ANM can be seen as a complement to that of the Political Bureau. While the latter concentrated upon criticising the existing system, the former offered an

1. ibid, p. 130.
2. ibid.
3. The ANM gave a detailed breakdown of how members would be selected on the basis of one per 500 Palestinians. IPS, op cit 1965, p. 131.
4. ibid, pp. 129-132.

alternative system in considerable theoretical detail. However, neither group showed any inclination to repudiate overall Arab responsibility for Palestine, and the ANM's recommendations, although attractive on paper, stood no chance at all of being put into effect without radical change of the existing conditions. The ANM made no suggestion as to how they could be put into effect even within the Palestinian context, let alone the Arab or international context. The movement was making suggestions in a vacuum.

By contrast, the statement distributed to the congress by al-Fateh 1 contained a detailed analysis of the situation in all its dimensions before offering reforms. It is interesting for this reason alone, quite apart from the light it throws upon al-Fateh's own position.

The statement began by defining membership of the congress as a duty and responsibility, not as honour and prestige: It severely criticised the committees, bureaux, declarations and historical pamphlets which had appeared in the last year.

"If we speak in revolutionary terms we must prove our words with practice, otherwise our will becomes paralysed and we cannot effect reality. We become professionals with words and without work opening the door to opportunism within the ranks of the leadership."

It continued by criticising the legalisation accorded to the PLO by the Arab states while the real revolutionary organisation fighting in the occupied land faced all kinds of persecution and torture.

Following this introduction the statement was divided into separate sections each dealing with a different subject. It ended with a possible programme of action to rectify the mistakes made at the beginning.

The first section, entitled "Our entity and the reasons for our beginning," began by restating al-Fateh's basic belief that armed struggle was the road to victory and that this

1. Al-Fateh, Wahdat ath-Thawrah al-Falastiniyyah (Dirasat No. 9), pp. 1-41.

struggle must be based on the masses. It continued by insisting that the over-riding aim at that time was for Palestinian unity. The cadres of the movement

"... are from different political trends who left their parties in full consciousness. It was not easy for the Movement to work with all these trends, but practical experience and action were the main uniting factor ..." 1

Unity was to be achieved through active struggle. Al-Fateh next restated its belief that the Palestinian revolution was linked to the great Arab revolution, and re-emphasised its policy of non-interference in the affairs of the Arab states. Turning to more specific matters it said that at first accusations of regionalism were made against Al-Fateh, yet:

"... when the Summit Conference gave birth to the PLO as a regional organisation it proved our policy correct We sympathise with the creation of the PLO but feel its institutions may become a danger if they remain unchanged, because the PLO in its existing form may freeze Palestinian efforts and potential."

The statement said that although everyone agreed that armed struggle was the only method of regaining the homeland there were disagreements about the timing. 2 Al-Fateh's decision to begin armed struggle in 1965 was not the result of a formula

"... but the result of an overall study of the situation, the correctness of which could only be proved in practice. From our analysis we found positive encouraging elements and negative discouraging elements ... and by comparing these through the course of time we proved to ourselves that our timing was correct ..."

Having justified its existence and action, Al-Fateh proceeded to the second section of the statement, entitled "The Arab Situation". This dealt with Israel and the Arab states in very general terms. It said the Zionist danger had existed for a long time, while the Arab Revolutionary forces had become

1. During the summer of 1969 the author met al-Fateh members who had previously been members of religious parties, the Ba'th and the Communist party.
2. One of the main accusations made against al-Fateh was that by starting their armed struggle in 1965 they would draw the Arab states into a war before the necessary preparations had been made.

involved in ideological battles and "the Palestine cause was forgotten except in nationalist slogans raised by each country and group." It added that the problem was now urgent because of Israel's imminent acquisition of the Atomic Bomb. However,

".... It is due time to raise our voices in the face of our brother Arab countries (asking them) to postpone or freeze their problems and launch with us the battle to liberate Palestine. Arab Unity ... cannot be achieved except through a battle of destiny like the Palestine battle which imposes of necessity the unification of all Arab revolutionary forces ..."

This section ended with a specific condemnation of Bourguiba.

The third section, and perhaps most important and essential to the statement was headed "The PLO and the Armed Revolution". It began:

"No problem can find solution except in the hands of the people and its revolutionary forces. Liberation causes therefore have a popular content and whoever imagines that complete liberation can be achieved by armies isolated from the masses is wrong. The armies without the masses can do nothing. The role of the army is in the final stages of the mass struggle. We need a revolutionary transformation in our daily lives to rid ourselves of sickness, apathy, defeatism and factionalism. This transformation can only be achieved in the course of the armed struggle. The stages of preparation and organisation and the building of cadres may prepare the masses to a certain extent to accept revolutionary thought but will not create the necessary consciousness for battle. We must run before events to direct them, otherwise events will dictate to us ..."

Thus for al-Fateh armed struggle was not just a method for liberating Palestine. It was something more than that, the means through which the Palestinian and Arab mentality could be revolutionised. Moreover, unlike the other groups, when al-Fateh discussed armed struggle it was on the basis of experience not mere theory.

The statement then criticised the PLO's strategy more directly:

"It is wrong for any revolutionary movement to dwell upon building revolutionary cadres at the level of a classical army. The revolution for military cadres of a liberation movement depends upon experience and armed practice.

To deceive the Palestinian masses by the illusion of creating a liberation army is at this stage a great crime for this action acts as a drug to the masses isolating them from the struggle, because the army will take sole responsibility."

The charge then was that the PLO by creating a classical-type army was in fact creating an elite and thereby avoiding the responsibility of involving all the people consciously in the coming liberation war.

The next part of the statement was directed at the ANM and at its proposals for reforming the PLO, although the ANM was not explicitly named.

"If you adopt the principles of democracy as one of the features of the PLO you are wrong. Any democracy based upon representatives and elections within a liberation revolution is false democracy because it will bring to the fore the opportunist elements and defunct traditional leadership. The party, the family, the profession, and material considerations will govern the results of the elections and even the nomination of the representatives.

Some consider that we should organise the masses through revolutionary institutions like unions In reality you won't be organising the masses but creating skeletons and organising institutions without a popular content, headed by leaders elected upon a false basis. In this way you freeze the general development and drug the masses by giving them the right of elections and nominations, while the electoral process will push forward unrevolutionary leadership in the name of democracy and transform the popular organisations and consciousness into lectures on the history of Palestine and a philosophy of unrealistic struggle."

The section ended with a more stinging condemnation of the PLO, than any of the other groups or organisations dared to give.

"The PLO cares for the form and not the content. The PLO takes and does not give. It takes taxes, parts of salaries, and donations and spends liberally on delegations, bureaux and salaries. This is a revolution on its head. What has the PLO given the people except words, declarations, conferences and emotion? Many of us preach revolutionary principles ... but they are rare who practise them. The mobilisation of the masses needs the participation of the masses in revolutionary action and armed struggle. If such action contradicts the Arab states, what is the use of the PLO as a revolutionary organisation when it takes its right to act from the Arab countries."

The last part of the statement concerned "The situation of the enemy in the occupied land". It described the effects of the fedayeen actions upon Israel and listed Israel's main tactical and strategic objectives. 1 Al-Fateh again stressed the need to involve all the Palestinians actively within the entity:

"It is better to hold a small candle than to curse the darkness a thousand times. Let each Palestinian group light a small candle to chase the darkness from our lives, and show the road of return lit by the candle of armed revolution. The roads of degeneration are numerous, but at this stage we should not use armed violence against everyone who takes these paths. On the other hand, traitors and deviators must be punished without delay."

The statement ended with recommendations, though much less detailed than those of the ANM or the Bureau. On the Palestinian level al-Fateh demanded that the PLA be free to act independently and be transformed into a fedayeen-type army. National unity should be promoted through the active involvement of all the people and the wall of silence surrounding fedayeen actions should be broken so they might become "a revolutionary example for the people." The diversion of the tributaries must not be a substitute for direct action against Israel. The entity should be a really popular organisation and its executive should maintain continuous contact with the congress. A committee should be established immediately to study possible re-organisation. Remuneration for service within the entity should be on the basis of need only.

1. Strategic aims, according to al-Fateh, included increasing population density; freeing the economy from dependence on foreign investment. Industrialising and populating the Negev with immigrants; building a canal from Ashdod to Aqaba to compete with the Suez canal etc.

Tactical aims include widening the rifts in the Arab world; maintaining tension in the area to mobilise world opinion; reducing Palestine to a problem of refugees.

On the Arab level, the reorganisation of the entity should mark the end of Arab guardianship and responsibility for the Palestine problem. The Arab states must begin to prepare for the real battle and understand its dimensions. Calls to implement UN resolutions on Palestine should cease and the right of the Palestinians to regain their land by force be recognised.

Finally, on the international level the Palestinians should announce their stand on the side of all people struggling for their liberation.

Of the three statements considered here, that of al-Fateh alone shows evidence of real study of the situation in all its aspects. Historical study had shown that there was nothing to be gained from relying upon the Arab states to solve the problem of Palestine. Al-Fateh thus rejected any attempts by the Arab states to link the liberation of Palestine to over-all Arab strategy. Liberation was henceforth the province of the Palestinians and this was the foundation of all al-Fateh's criticisms and recommendations. Study of the existing situation on all levels including the situation of the enemy was the basis of al-Fateh's own strategy and tactics. By the time of the second congress the movement's armed struggle was underway and it was on the basis of actions and experience that the statement distributed to the congress members was drawn up. The statement was not framed in a vacuum. It did not hide defence of the status quo behind revolutionary terminology. It asked the congress to reform itself and to adopt an independent and effective policy.

The National Congress closed without solving any of the fundamental contradictions which were surrounding the Palestinian entity. Disintegration at the Arab level increased daily and the PLO although superficially growing stronger through the multiplication of its institutions, was losing moral authority over the popular organisations. Perhaps the one thing to be illustrated through the Congress was the increasing importance of al-Fateh.

This organisation was proving itself both through its theory and its practice to be something entirely new. Moreover, if this was not yet fully realised by the Palestinians themselves it was certainly realised by the Arab states, for of all the organisations al-Fateh was the one against which the Arab governments 1 were taking the severest action. 2 Its members were subject to arrest, imprisonment, torture and even death at the hands of the Arab states, and its communiqués were still banned from publication. Were it not for this, its mass following could have grown more quickly than it did.

The Third Arab Summit Conference

In the course of 1965 Shuqeiry found it increasingly difficult to continue his delicate balancing act between the different Arab states, the different popular organisations and his personal rivals. He was facing increasing pressure from the competition offered by al-Fateh and increasing apathy from the Arab states sometimes verging on hostility.

In this atmosphere, in September 1965, the third summit conference was held. As on the previous occasion Bourguiba boycotted the meeting because of the dispute caused by his stand on Palestine. Also, as on the previous occasion, Shuqeiry attended to give a report about the PLO activities and submit a list of demands. He had publicly announced that his intention in going to the conference was to "overcome the difficulties". He said he hoped the summit would transform the PLO from its existing condition of "working under licence" to one in which it could work freely. 3

Shuqeiry's report reflected the growing difficulties of the PLO with the Arab states. He claimed that the Arab states had not co-operated with him on the question of residence, travel and work permits for Palestinians nor had they facilitated recruitment or movement of Palestinian troops. None of the states had paid their dues to the PLA and some had even defaulted in

1. With the exception of Syria, although at one point most of the leadership were arrested in Syria on charges of having assassinated another member of the organisation. Author's interview with Abu Ibrahim, 'amman, summer 1969.
2. This action was taken on the explicit orders of the Unified Arab Command. These orders were executed overzealously by both Jordan and Lebanon. *ibid*,
3. Al-Manar, 12th September 1965.

their payments to the PLO. In particular he accused Lebanon of placing obstacles before the PLO in not allowing Palestinians to train on Lebanese soil. He asked that an additional tax for the PLO be levied on the oil states and demanded special taxation facilities and administrative authority over the Palestinians. Both these requests were refused. 1

While the conference was in session the PLO Bureau in Damascus sent telegrams to all heads of state demanding:

1. A serious plan for liberation including finance and training.
2. Complete freedom of action in all Arab countries.
3. Recognition of the PLO's complete freedom of direction. 2

None of these demands was granted and the conference was no more successful in other respects. Work on the Arab Jordan water projects was still deadlocked and cracks in the facade of Arab unity were becoming wider each day. It would seem that the main obstacles to any sort of progress on the Palestinian demands came from Jordan, whose period of co-existence with the Palestinian entity was rapidly drawing to a close.

To this third and abortive summit conference al-Fateh sent a long memorandum. 3 This was the first time the movement had directly communicated with the Arab states and it was more a declaration of defiance than a request for favours:

"Al-Fateh is embarrassed to address the summit since the tradition of such memoranda demand politeness and protocol Our movement has no big army, huge budget or international capabilities. We are thus embarrassed to address the kings and presidents of the Arab homeland - one of the largest, most sensitive and most dangerous areas in the world. We cannot make long speeches or offer theoretical analyses for two reasons:

First, we know, and the masses know, that in such historical situations as this the bullet is what will dispel injustice and it is ridiculous to work through speeches and memoranda ...

1. Kadi, Arab Summit Conferences and the Palestine problem, pp. 176-7.
2. L'Orient, 15th September 1965.
3. Al-Fateh, Mawaqif wa Muntalaqat Thawriyyah (Dirasat No. 10), pp. 5-15.

Second, our movement does not have the apparatus for writing speeches and fabricating declarations, not through impotence but because our members refuse to do such work ..."

Having dispensed with the opening formalities al-Fateh reaffirmed its belief that liberation required armed struggle based on the masses, that time favoured the enemy, and that popular liberation war was the only solution to inter-Arab differences. The first half of the memorandum ended with a condemnation of the PLO:

"The PLO was created as an alternative to forcibly preventing the Zionist diversion of the Jordan. It ended by turning the eyes (of the people) away from this fateful problem which has now become a reality We still declare our readiness to co-operate with any Palestinian or Arab group which wishes actively to liberate Palestine, but on two conditions:
First, meeting and co-operation should occur on the battlefield not in offices and conferences.
Second, leadership must be in the hands of the Palestinian people, far from the hostilities and conflicts in the Arab world."

The rest of the memorandum criticised the Arab states' attitude towards and treatment of al-Fateh. It described the persecution, arrests and torture to which the Arab governments had subjected Fateh members. It condemned again the ban on publishing al-'asifah communiques:

"Our movement was silent in the face of this anti-nationalist hostility and tried to solve the difficulties through personal contacts and by offering proof of our good intentions towards the Arab regimes We have decided to remain silent no longer after showing restraint for more than nine months resulting only in increased pressure upon us We will accept in future only practical proof of good will towards us, namely:
First, an end to persecution of al-'asifah forces in the Arab countries ... and the immediate release of all those arrested.
Second, an end to the ban on al-'asifah news in many Arab countries.
Third, an end to the obstruction of al-'asifah men undertaking operations ... or seeking refuge in a neighbouring country."

Fourth, Arab defence of al-'asifah men
arrested in Israel. 1

This was the minimum the Arab states could do. In addition they should make available to the movement the accumulated stocks of arms and ammunition they held in quantities at least equal to the offers made to African and Asian liberation movements.

The third summit achieved nothing in itself other than marking the end of any semblance of inter-Arab co-operation, and revealing the beginning of differences between the Arab states and the PLO. It marked also the end of al-Fateh's unofficial attempts to come to some degree of understanding with the Arab governments over its activities. From now on the movement protested publicly against any official attempts to suppress it.

The PLO and Jordan

The third summit, and in particular Jordan, had refused all of Shuqeiry's requests. He could not afford to ignore this insult in the face of the growing popularity of other organisations like al-Fateh which might prove an alternative to the PLO. His reaction to the insults was the standard one of threatening to resign. 2 On arriving in Beirut after the conference the PLO bureau there confirmed this intention:

"... the negative attitude of Jordan is the main reason behind the proposed resignation, because Jordan refused obligatory recruitment to the PLA and popular organisation of the Palestinians in its territory. The work of the PLO in Jordan is therefore paralysed." 3

On 30th September 1965 over Voice of Palestine radio from Cairo, Shuqeiry expressly condemned the Summit:

"... all the demands presented to the Casablanca conference 4 by the PLO were refused ... the PLO will not become a toy. If everything is closed to us in some countries the Palestinians will seek other ways, outside Arab conferences. We announced the diversion of the Jordan tributaries in loud voices, and now we are paralysed. Time works in Israel's favour, not ours."

1. During 1965 al-Fateh had been using all the diplomatic methods at its disposal to get good legal defence for Mahmoud Hajjazi who was arrested during al-'asifah's first operation in January 1965. IPS, Kitab Vol. 2, p. 121.
2. Al-Ahrar, 19th September 1965.
3. Al-Nahar, 21st September 1965.
4. The Third Summit was held in Casablanca.

He placed the main blame on Jordan for the paralysis, alleging that Jordan:

"... refused to allow Saudi and Iraqi forces to enter Jordan, leaving the Arab projects ... without defence ..." 1

As usual the executive refused Shuqeiry's resignation 2 and a virulent press and radio campaign began in Jordan against the PLO. It was ended only by the intervention of Nasir's Government a few weeks later and mediation attempts continued throughout the rest of 1965.

At the same time, relations with Iraq and Syria remained at least superficially good. 3 Shuqeiry held a meeting with Amin Hafiz, the Syrian President in December which he described as "very useful". He said there had been a "very sincere and deep response". The head of the PLA in Syria said the army had become a reality there due to the help and cooperation of Syrian Army. 4

There was still no PLA in Jordan and on December 8th the Jordanian Government sent notes to diplomats in all the Arab countries stating that it had:

"... supported all PLO requests but there was no question of permitting the creation of an independent Palestinian Army." 5

The dispute had not been solved and mediation efforts were intensified in early 1966. In March a tentative agreement was finally reached and its terms published. The agreement showed Jordan's determination to maintain control over any military activities undertaken on Jordanian soil, while offering certain freedom on the political and financial levels. 6 The military provisions were ambiguous and vague. For instance, conscription for the Palestinians "would be studied on the basis of the

1. Al-Hayat, 28th September 1965.

2. Al-Muharrer, 4th October 1965.

3. On 12th November Iraq waived all customs duties on military goods for the PLO and on 19th December the PLO announced that National Service for Palestinians would be instituted in Syria. L'Orient, 12th November 1965 and 20th Dec. 1965.

4. Al-Ba'th, 13th-14th December 1965.

5. L'Orient, 9th December 1965.

6. For example the freedom to levy taxes and make collections, and freedom of residence, travel and work.

directives of the Unified Arab Command", and any summer training camps which might be run for the Palestinians would have Jordanian instructors. 1

Clearly, any real understanding between the two sides in this dispute was impossible for it would need to reconcile the interests of two separate entities, the Palestinian and the Jordanian, based upon the same land and the same people. By April, the situation had deteriorated again, and attempts to reach agreement were shelved. The Jordanian Government began systematically to arrest Palestinian activists both from the PLO and from other groups, using the pretext that they were members of illegal parties. 2 On 14th May King Hussein declared:

"The PLO is in the hands of subversive agents who have become the instruments of destruction within the ranks of Arab unity and unified action. The organisation has become the cause of discord among the Arabs." 3

A battle of words began to rage once more. On 8th June Shuqeiry announced that:

"The PLA was born of the summit conference but it will not end with the ending of these conferences. 4 I declare that the army will remain. This is what will end the summit conference." 5

The following week the PLO accused Jordan of non-co-operation and violation of the March accord, and requested that the Jordanian Government resign. At the end of June during a meeting of Arab heads of state in Cairo, Jordan demanded that the Arab states withdraw their recognition of the PLO accusing the organisation of tending towards Communism. Shuqeiry for his part presented a report to the meeting denying the allegations and demanding Hussein's abdication. 6

1. Al-Hayat, 2nd March 1966.
2. The Communist party and the various nationalist parties were still illegal in Jordan.
3. L'Orient, 15th May 1966.
4. It was already suspected in many quarters that the fourth Summit scheduled for September would not in fact be held.
5. L'Orient, 9th June 1966.
6. ibid.

The situation came to a head in July. More arrests were made of Palestinian activists and on 17th July the Prime Minister of Jordan before an extraordinary session of the Parliament declared:

"Jordan was the first nation to defend the Palestinian entity and to support the PLO under Shuqeiry. However, the latter has exceeded the limits of his authority in the organisation which he has placed under the influence of subversive political parties in the orbit of certain international political blocs. We have ceased connection with the PLO." 1

The following day Parliament ratified the suspension of Jordan-PLO relations.

The end of Jordanian recognition was also the end of the summit conferences. A few days later President Nasir announced that the UAR would boycott the coming summit. He said

"We cannot sit down at the same table with the reactionary forces. For this they must leave the zones of Imperialist influence and put an end to their plans against the Arab revolution We are not losing sight of our essential objective which is the liberation of Palestine. We shall co-ordinate our efforts with all Arab revolutionaries with a view to liberating Palestine by the revolutionary road not the traditional road." 2

Nasir then requested the postponement of the summit and this was accepted by the other states almost immediately. The postponement was later made permanent by the Arab League. Shuqeiry said that the PLO would in any case not have participated in the summit as most of the Arab states had defaulted on their payments to the organisation. In future the PLO would rely on bilateral agreements with each separate state. 3

1. Le Monde, 19th July 1966.

2. Keesings Contemporary Archives (1966), p. 21663.

3. ibid.

It is not surprising that the failure of the summit conferences should have coincided with Jordan's rejection of the PLO. It was only the change in Jordan's hostile attitude towards the Palestinian Entity which had made the summits possible in the first place. Jordan had accepted the PLO only as an alternative to military action against Israel's diversion of the water. Now the crisis surrounding the diversion had died down toleration of the PLO was no longer necessary. In addition to this, Jordan had assumed that the PLO would simply be a formal institution or at worst a tool of the UAR, but the development of the fedayeen was forcing Shuqeiry to take an increasingly independent stand.

The growing strength of al-Fateh 1 was obliging Shuqeiry to seek allies among the other Palestinian groups. From February 1966 the PLO began negotiations with the ANM, the Ba'th (Palestinian branch) and other groups with a view to some sort of unity. These groups eventually formed "The Preparatory Committee for United Palestinian Action," 2 which almost immediately began issuing statements and declarations couched in extremely revolutionary language. On 12th February, for instance, in protest against the sale of American tanks to Israel, the PLO Bureau Director in Lebanon on behalf of the committee, stated that this event:

"... placed responsibility on the shoulders of all revolutionaries, both Palestinian and Arab, to act immediately, declaring their anger against this American colonialist state by means other than telegrams of denunciation and statements of regret." 3

Al-Fateh had participated in the initial negotiations on unity but refused to join the committee insisting that unity must occur

1. Al-Fateh was living up to its decision not to remain silent any longer in the face of Arab persecution. In the first months of 1966 the Movement had gained a lot of publicity over the arrest of some of her members in Lebanon, and the subsequent death of one of them while under investigation. Massive demonstrations were held in Damascus and Beirut in protest and a public enquiry held as a result. L'Orient, January 16th and 21st.
2. They included the Palestinian section of the ANM; the Palestinian branch of the Ba'th; representatives of various left-wing groups; and the PLF (Jibril).
3. IPS, op cit Vol. 3 1966, p. 125.

"on the battlefield of Palestine and not in offices and bureaux".¹ Al-Fateh wanted real unity based upon action, not formal unity based upon declarations. By mid-1966 Al-Fateh had issued over fifty communiques. Their operations increased in spite of Jordan's punitive measures to stop them. This in turn increased tension between Israel and the Arab states giving Jordan yet another reason for hostility against the Palestinians. Al-Fateh was producing the very situation the PLO had been created to avoid.

As a result of these developments the Palestinians were gradually isolated from the Arab states and lost the Arab support they had previously enjoyed. The PLO and the other groups were therefore obliged to adopt at least in part the logic behind Al-Fateh's analyses of the situation. This was illustrated at the third Palestinian National Congress held in Gaza in May 1966.

The Third Palestinian National Congress

The proceedings and membership of this congress were like those of its predecessors, but the changed situation resulted in some significant differences. The congress insisted as before that the Arab states should honour their commitments to the entity² but in addition to this, many of the decisions made were based upon preparation for immediated military action of some kind, regardless of official Arab plans. Four of the decisions suggested by the political committee of the congress illustrate this shift of emphasis.

First, congress undertook to make preparations for an armed clash while ensuring protection from the rear. It emphasised that this action would not "challenge the internal affairs of the Arab world except in the event of an attempt to prevent its free expression ... arrests, expulsion or persecution of nationalist elements is the worst kind of transgression."

1. ibid.

2. This Congress was again not constituted by election. ibid., p. 93.

3. Appeals were made to the Arab states to honour their financial obligations, allow military recruitment (directed at Lebanon and Jordan), and allow freedom of work, travel and residence. ibid., pp. 95-8.

Second, congress declared that freedom of Palestinian action was necessary for liberation, and appealed for the immediate release of all nationalist elements and an end to persecution of the Palestinians everywhere.

Third, congress sought unity of the revolutionary forces insisting that collective revolutionary leadership should spring from united revolutionary action. Co-operation should be sought until unity could be effected.

Fourth, congress asserted the inevitability of the battle and suggested transfer to the final stages of preparation. To avoid launching the battle would be equivalent to losing it. 1

The change in attitude of the congress revealed in these decisions was the logical result of the PLO's estrangement from the Arab states in particular Jordan. They did not reflect any direct influence by al-Fateh although the form of the decisions would perhaps indicate such influence. They reflected only the fact that al-Fateh's actions had forced the PLO into a position where some change of attitude was unavoidable.

The Acceptance of the Fedayeen

Through the last months of 1966 the situation continued to deteriorate as al-Fateh raids increased and were joined by raids of other groups. 2 Partly in response to this, Israel launched a massive attack on the Jordanian villages of as-Sammu' 3 on 13th November. It developed into a battle involving the Jordanian Army and Air Force, although the Jordanian forces did not arrive until the village had been devastated.

Massive demonstrations broke out throughout the West Bank with the people taking to the streets and demanding arms to protect themselves. 4 In Nablus when the Jordanian Army began to fire on the crowds the people fired back from behind barricades. Curfews were imposed and stringent security measures

1. IPS, Kitab Vol. 3, pp. 93-6.
2. The ANM had set up a group called Abtal al-'audah which had conducted one operation before November. See below page See Table IV.
3. As-Sammu' was situated on the West Bank near the Israeli border.
4. Keesings (1966), pp. 21819-20.

enforced, but to no avail. The demand for arms spread, backed by a general strike. A petition supporting the demand was sent to Hussein by the mayors and officials of the West Bank. 1 Support also came from Palestinian students in other Arab countries. 2 Disturbances continued into December in spite of the severest security measures. On one occasion Palestinian flags were flying from all the main buildings in Hebron while the army was conducting a search for arms there. 3

The effects of the as-Sammu' raid were felt at all levels. At the Arab level it provided an opportunity for the expression of progressive-conservative contradictions. Syria claimed that the raid was merely a diversionary tactic to draw attention away from a planned Israeli attack on Syria and that its main aim was to strengthen the reactionary regime in Jordan. 4 The UAR accused Hussein of collaborating with Israel by preventing fedayeen raids by the Palestinians. 5 Jordan, for her part accused Syria of sending infiltrators into the country to incite disturbances and accused the UAR of failing to provide necessary air cover during the raid. 6

The effect of the raid on the PLO was very profound. At first Shuqeiry's attitude was conciliatory. He suggested that the PLA should be allowed to protect the border and prevent future raids. 7 King Hussein preferred to accept help from the Saudi Arabian Army rather than permit the PLA on Jordanian soil. He said "I do not see why I should offer my head to the executioner." 8

Shuqeiry's response was to affirm that the Palestinians would continue to attack Israel, but he added "... in order to liberate Tel-Aviv we must liberate 'amman". 9 The PLO hence-

1. ibid.
2. ibid.
3. L'Orient, 5th December 1966.
4. Al-Ba'th, November 14th 1966.
5. Al-Ahram, November 19th 1966.
6. Keesings (1966), p. 21820.
7. Keesings (1966), p. 21820.
8. Le Monde, November 24th 1966.
9. Keesings (1966), p. 21820.

forth participated openly in the anti-government demonstrations in Jordan. Shuqeiry appealed to the Jordanian army to stay in their barracks and ... "allow the popular revolution to liberate the homeland." Communiques were issued calling on the government to resign and asking the army to join the revolution. 1

Shuqeiry's brave statements during this period were necessary for his survival as a "progressive" figure in Palestinian politics. The as-Sammu' crisis resulted in a general radicalisation of the PLO and a certain measure of re-organisation. The Executive Committee was replaced by a Revolutionary Council. Its activities and personnel were not revealed, since its task was to prepare for war. 2 Shuqeiry warned Israel that activities would continue. He said the new Council was based upon the Algerian experience and advised that the Jordanian army be re-organised along the lines of the North Vietnamese, Cubans and Algerians.

On 3rd January 1967 Shuqeiry announced that the PLO had formed special commando units to work within Jordan and on the same day several explosions took place in Jerusalem and 'amman. As a result of this, on the following day all the PLO offices were closed and many of its senior members arrested. 3

The reorganisation within the PLO marked the Palestinian entity's formal acceptance of the concept of armed struggle. 4 At the same time it sharpened personal antagonisms which had developed within the organisation. Both Shafiq al-Hout (director of the Beirut office) and Wajih al-Madani (head of the PLA) criticised Shuqeiry for his unconstitutional methods in executing these reforms without consulting the National Congress. 5 A further minor re-organisation settled these differences at least temporarily.

1. ibid, p. 21820-1.

2. IPS, Kitab Vol. 4, p. 97.

3. Keesings (1967), p. 21821.

4. The fourth National Congress, scheduled for May was never held due to the imminent war with Israel, and therefore could not ratify the principle.

5. IPS, Kitab Vol. 4, p. 98.

The PLO by 1967 was firmly committed to the Palestinians since the as-Sammu' raid and the subsequent events had shown them to be an important and growing force. Al-Fateh's influence had been considerable in encouraging the demands of arms for the people, and while Shuqeiry was issuing statements from the safety of Cairo, al-Fateh's members were marching in the demonstrations distributing pamphlets and facing the guns of the Jordanian army. 1 Popular support and recruitment to al-Fateh increased rapidly and the ANM and Ba'th were put in the position of having to accept the principle of armed struggle, or lose their popularity.

Both these parties had taken a step in this direction before the as-Sammu' raid. The ANM had set up Abtal al-'audah (Heroes of the Return), though it did not acknowledge connection with the group at this time. 2 The ANM was still having difficulty reconciling Palestinian and Arab nationalism. It could not ignore the popular trend in favour of the former, while to deny the latter would be to deny the rationale behind the movement's existence. After the raid the ANM just issued a vague, revolutionary statement condemning Jordan, extolling the fedayeen, and demanding freedom of action. The statement also, true to form, demanded the right of the people to depend on the revolutionary Arab states and their armies. 3 In early 1967, Abtal were obliged to link themselves with the PLA for financial reasons. 4 The financial difficulty of the movement was to the advantage of Shuqeiry in his search for allies against the increasing popularity of al-Fateh. At the same time the ANM wanted to retain some independence and set up another group called Shebab ath-Thar (Youth of Revenge). 5 Thus by 1967 the ANM had developed a revolutionary form for its ideology although the content was still basically the same. The titles of its new groups strongly reflected the original ideas of the movement, Unity, Liberation and Revenge. It still lacked any social content whatever.

1. ibid Vol. 3, p. 117.

2. See above p. 101 fn. 2.

3. IPS, Kitab Vol. 3, p. 124.

4. Kadi, op cit (Resistance), p. 23.

5. This may not have been a new group but simply the Nationalist Front for the Liberation of Palestine (a member of the Political Bureau) renamed. The connection between the Nationalist Front and the ANM was never declared at any time.

The Ba'th, at its ninth congress in September 1966, agreed in principle to set up its own fedayeen group but by the end of the year no action had been taken. 1 However, we have seen that the Syrian Ba'th's attitude towards Palestine placed it in a less contradictory position than the ANM with respect to fedayeen action. The Congress decision was finally put into effect in early 1967 with the formation of as-Saiqah (Thunderbolt), officially entitled Tala'i Harb at-Tahrir ash-Sha'biyyah (Vanguard of Popular Liberation War).

Al-Fateh used the as-Sammu' raid to prove the correctness and consistency of its position. On 10th December 1966 it issued a long statement analysing the post-Sammu' situation. 2 There were nine main aspects of the new situation which al-Fateh considered significant.

First, escalation of al-'asifah activities inside the occupied territory.

Second, increased participation of the Palestinians in the armed struggle.

Third, PLO backing for the fedayeen activities.

Fourth, the heroic stand of the Palestinians in the face of the as-Sammu' raid.

Fifth, the Palestinians' public endorsement of armed struggle and the fedayeen.

Sixth, the attempts of Israel and the West to attribute the fedayeen to Syria, in an effort to hide the newly emergent Palestinian movement.

Seventh, the fear and terror caused in Israel by the fedayeen actions.

Eighth, the appearance of the American Sixth Fleet and the British Fleet during the disturbances following as-Sammu'.

Ninth, the transfer of Palestine from an issue of refugees, borders and relief to one of national liberation.

In listing and expanding upon these new elements in the situation, al-Fateh sought to prove its critics wrong. Fedayeen action had already produced results, converting Palestine into a question of national liberation, creating economic and psychological insecurity in Israel, and most important, restoring the self-confidence of the Palestinians themselves.

1. OSPAL, Palestine Crisis and Liberation, p. 197.

2. Al-Fateh, Mawaqif wa Muntalagat Thawriyyah (Dirasat 10), pp. 29-37.

With respect to the PLO the statement acknowledged its initiative in backing the fedayeen and asked that the PLA should be sent to join the armed struggle. New fedayeen groups were requested to co-operate with al-Fateh in the exchange of information on the battlefield.

Finally the statement denounced:

"... the pompous speeches, conferences and broadcasts in Jordan which attacked the fedayeen. We say to these lackeys in 'amman that our people are bored with these empty words and cowardly speeches about mobilisation and planning. Where is this planning after nineteen years?"

Thus al-Fateh was finally in a position of strength from which it felt able to criticise the regimes. It had attracted the people to its cause by its armed struggle and its refusal to compromise. Now it faced Jordanian persecution on the basis of its growing popular support. As-Sammu' had shown the Palestinians that they could not depend upon the Arab states to protect them. Al-Fateh was proving that they were capable of defending themselves.

For the first months of 1967 the situation continued to develop in this way. The PLO extolled the virtues of armed struggle and did all it could to consolidate its position alongside the ANM in an effort to stem the increasing influence of al-Fateh. Al-Fateh for its part, continued with its military operations 1 and became the focus of international attention in May when Israel officially complained to the UN about its activities. 2

In three years, the face of the Palestinian problem had changed beyond recognition. The myth that united Arab action would some day liberate Palestine had been destroyed. The Palestinians under pressure from al-Fateh were finding their own methods. The Arab nationalists, whether embodied in party or state were being forced to swim with the tide. Al-Fateh achieved this through the possession of a new Palestine-oriented ideology. This showed itself in all of the movement's statements and declarations. The underlying important belief

1. Al-Fateh published 11 military communiques in the first five months of 1967.
2. IPS, Kitab Vol. 4, p. 127.

of the movement was that only independent Palestinian action would ever liberate Palestine. Restrictions placed on the Palestinians by the Arab states, with their Arab Nationalist ideology, should be resisted to the end. In this context of increasing Palestinian activity and increasing Arab-Israeli tension, war broke out.

CHAPTER FIVE:

The Development of the Fedayeen 1967-1970

The General Effects of the June War 1967 1

One of the reasons given by Israel for her part in the June war of 1967 was the increase in guerilla activity by Palestinians from the surrounding states. However, the war itself was, in large part, responsible for developing a situation favourable to a further increase in such activity.

After only six days of fighting, no Palestinian territory remained in Arab hands. The Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were faced with the choice of either remaining under Israeli occupation or fleeing to neighbouring states. For many this meant becoming refugees for the second time in their lives. The war resulted in some 90,000 displaced persons, 60% of whom had been registered refugees since 1948, leaving about 40% homeless for the first time. Ten emergency camps were set up by the UN, six in East Jordan and four in Syria. 2

The defeat demoralised the Arab leaders and established political parties, discrediting them in the eyes of the people. In addition, the Arab states suffered loss of arms, men and territory. Nasir's reputation was in the greatest danger since he had for so long been the accepted leader of the Arab nation. However, it seems that his self-confidence suffered more than his public image. Massive demonstrations throughout the Arab world followed his offer to resign. 3 In addition to self-confidence, Nasir lost large sections of territory (Gaza and Sinai) as well as his control over the Suez Canal from which Egypt derived a substantial portion of its income.

King Hussein's reputation suffered less, since his popularity in the Arab world and among the Palestinians in Jordan had never been great. His difficulties were of a more practical

1. It is not proposed to undertake an account of the war as this has been extensively dealt with in many other places. Unless specifically stated, historical and factual material for this chapter was taken from general sources such as Cahiers; Keesings; The Arab World, and The Arab Report and Record.
2. See Table I.
3. Nasir offered to resign on 9th June.

nature. He had lost the most fertile part of his country, as well as most of Jordan's tourist attractions. The drop in his food supply was not compensated by a drop in population. On the contrary the majority of the refugees from Gaza and the West Bank came to the East Bank expecting to be fed and housed. Some brought money, as in 1948, but some brought nothing at all. The Palestinians in Jordan's population reached 70% with the new influx, making Jordan the obvious base for any attempts at organised resistance.

Syria suffered considerable loss of face. After persistent calls to war in the preceding years, the Syrian Army collapsed before Israeli attack. It was widely believed that only minimal resistance had been offered. Moreover, Syria lost territory of considerable strategic importance (The Golan Heights). The entire population of this area fled towards Damascus creating a Syrian as well as Palestinian refugee problem. 1

During the atmosphere of tension preceding the war, Nasir and Hussein had found it in their mutual interest to sink differences and sign a joint defence pact. 2 In the atmosphere of despair which followed the defeat, it was tacitly accepted that a continuation of the truce would be mutually beneficial. Other inter-Arab differences were also moderated. Syria still took a more radical stand than Nasir but was no longer in a position to offer such severe criticism. Thus at the end of August in Khartoum a fourth Summit conference was held. It was attended by all the Heads of State or their representatives, including Ahmed Shuqeiry as head of the PLO. Its aim was to define a common Arab policy in face of the new situation and in this it was moderately successful. A number of inter-Arab problems were solved 3 and some constructive proposals made with respect to Palestine. It was decided that Arab oil should be used in a positive way in that a proportion of the revenue

1. The problem was managed more easily than in Jordan. Syria had never had a problem of over-population, quite the reverse.
2. The pact was signed on May 30th 1967.
3. The Yemen dispute between the UAR and Saudi Arabia was solved and in exchange for Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen, Saudi Arabia offered financial assistance.

should go to those states most affected by the war. 1 In addition a social and economic fund was set up for reconstruction and development. 2 It was also decided that immediate military preparations should be made for future confrontations and that in the meantime steps should be taken to remove all foreign bases from Arab soil as soon as possible. 3

The Arab states had suffered heavy military defeat but the Summit showed their determination not to be forced into a humiliating settlement with Israel. Partly as a sign of this defiance and partly as a result of their weakness the Arab states openly re-emphasised their collective support for the Palestinians. However they still intended to keep the reins of control firmly in their hands and in concrete terms gave nothing to the PLO. Shuqeiry quarrelled with King Hussein during the conference because the latter still refused to allow the PLA to enter Jordan. 4 It was not only Hussein who was unco-operative with Shuqeiry. The PLO presented six demands to the conference based on the principle that no state should have the right to make separate peace settlements and that any such decisions should have the unanimous agreement of all the Arab states and the PLO. 5 When these demands were rejected Shuqeiry withdrew from the conference and it was said that the Arab states had decided to "freeze" the PLO until further notice.

The attitudes of individual Arab states towards the Palestinians was much as before. The UAR supported the Resistance with the intention of using it as an instrument of pressure

1. A Conference of Economic and Finance Ministers in Baghdad had suggested that oil be used as a weapon against the West and Israel. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya agreed to give £140m a year to those states affected by the war.
2. This suggestion was made by Kuwait.
3. IPS, op cit 1967, pp. 56-7.
4. During the war the PLA had fought under UAR orders and had shown great courage, especially in Gaza. Walter Laqueur, The Road to War, p. 54.
5. IPS, op cit 1967, pp. 56-7.

on Israel to obtain favourable settlement terms. Syria supported the Resistance virtually unconditionally. Jordan was still hostile but in view of the defeat was obliged to moderate this hostility. No Arab state was in a position to openly criticise Palestinian activity or to apply the pre-1967 decisions of the Unified Arab Command. 1

The issues with respect to settlement were basically the same as in 1948, peace, recognition of Israel, border adjustment and refugees. On November 22nd 1967 as a result of a compromise peace formula drawn up by Britain, the United Nations passed a resolution outlining the terms of a possible agreement. 2 The attitude of both Israel and the Arabs made any settlement virtually impossible at this stage. Although both Israel and the UAR accepted the resolution, their interpretation of its terms were radically different. Jordan also accepted the resolution, but Iraq, Syria, Algeria and the Palestinians totally rejected it.

The Effect of the June War on the Palestinians

The June defeat thoroughly demoralised and bewildered the Palestinians. It dispelled any last hope that the Arab armies might eventually liberate Palestine.

In July 1967 a series of conferences was held between the fedayeen organisations to decide on future policy and find some formula for unity. 3 The conferences had no positive result since al-Fateh refused mere formal unity, still insisting that any unification should take place on the battle field. The movement had for too long been carrying the burden of action inside Israel while other organisations benefitted from the reflected glory.

1. See above Ch. 4 p. 92 fn. 2.

2. See Appendix III.

3. Kadi, op cit (Resistance), pp. 23-4.

Al-Fateh stressed that the most important thing at this stage was to restart operations in order to raise the sinking morale of the Palestinians. The other organisations refused and al-Fateh began operations alone on August 29th. Preparations had been laid for this immediately after the war. All the movement's members who found themselves outside the occupied territory were ordered back inside before the borders could be properly sealed. In this way al-Fateh ensured that there was a nucleus of men positioned to organise resistance inside the recently expanded Israel. The intention was to set up bases in these regions. In addition to this, al-Fateh carefully collected some six thousand small arms left behind by the retreating Arab armies. 1

The movement benefitted considerably from the war both materially and psychologically. As a result of its initiative in restarting the armed struggle, the Palestinians' self-confidence was steadily restored and their desire to resist increased. Al-Fateh gained popularity at the expense of the other groups which appeared to have been totally immobilised by the defeat.

While al-Fateh was beginning military operations again, and building up its organisation, the various factions of the ANM continued with their unity talks. In October 1967, the political and military sections of the ANM joined with Jibril's Palestine Liberation Front to form Al-Jabhah ash-Sha'biyyah li-Tahrir Falastin (The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- PFLP). 2 The Front was a tenuous amalgamation of many dissimilar elements with no coherent ideology. Jibril's group was still primarily military with no deep political commitment and no compunction about co-operating with the Arab governments. It had already changed allegiance several times

1. ibid, p. 39.

2. Kadi, op cit (Resistance), p. 24.

within the Palestinian field. 1 The right wing of the ANM, led by George Habbash, was becoming increasingly alienated from the left centred on Naif Hawatmeh. 2 For the moment, however, these groups managed to hold together and the front followed al-Fateh in restarting military operations. The first PFLP communique was issued in December.

The PLO, after the defeat, was in a sad state and Shuqeiry's position as figurehead was shaken to its foundation, following the hysterical statements attributed to him during the war threatening to "throw the Jews into the sea". 3 Finally on December 24th as a result of the combined pressure of other Palestinian organisations, dissatisfied elements within the PLO and the PLA together with public opinion in general, Shuqeiry was forced to resign. 4 He was replaced by Yahya Hammouda, a known leftist. 5 In February the PLO set up their own commandos, Qoat Tahrir Sha'biyyah (Popular Liberation Forces - PLFs).

Al-Fateh's Unity Congress

In January 1968 al-Fateh decided that it was time to attempt some real unity. It called a congress in Cairo inviting all groups to participate. 6 Both the PLO and the PFLP refused,

1. See previous chapter. The PLF had changed alliances from al-Fateh to the Syrian Ba'th to the ANM.
2. See above Ch. 3 p. 47 fn. 3.
3. Attributed to Shuqeiry on 1st June. He strenuously denied it.
4. IPS, Kitab Vol. 4, pp. 108-12. Shuqeiry's final action which gave his opponents the chance to oust him, was to set up a niminal organisation called "Council of Revolution for the liberation of Palestine". Its formation was announced on 7th December 1967 and communique concerning non-existent operations were issued in its name.
5. Hammouda was born in Lifta village near Jerusalem about 1910. He was a prominent lawyer before 1948 supporting the Istiqlal and Hajj Amin. In 1951 and 1954 he unsuccessfully stood for the Jordanian parliament, the latter time with Communist backing. In 1956 he supported the Communists in the election and the following year fled with them to Iraq and Syria. He then went to Czeckoslovakia where he remained until 1965, when following a dispute with the Communists he returned to Jordan.
6. Al-Fateh, al-Kitab as-Sanawi, 1968, p. 127.

but eight other groups attended including the Ba'thist as-Saiqah and Jibril's group. 1 A certain measure of unification was affected.

On the military level a co-ordinating council was formed called the Permanent Office of Commando Action. Closer military unity was achieved between al-Fateh, Jibril, and two more groups. 2 Two other groups united with as-Saiqah 3 and one remained independent. 4

On the political level it was decided to create a general executive secretariat resident in Cairo with branches in Damascus and elsewhere. The congress drew up a charter embodying nine principles.

First, the present stage was one of armed struggle against the enemy and the only valid unity was unity on the battlefield.

Second, armed struggle was the only road to liberation.

Third, all political solutions must be rejected.

Fourth, the leadership of the armed struggle should seek a positive relation with the Arab states on condition this did not affect the security or escalation of the armed struggle.

Fifth, the Palestinian personality and its revolutionary content must be promoted on the international level.

Sixth, a firm stand must be taken against any attempt by the counter-revolutionary forces to liquidate the revolution.

Seventh, it should be stressed that armed struggle was a strategy and not just a tactic. The Palestinian people and their revolution were the decisive element in liberation from Zionism.

Eighth, all friendly states and forces throughout the world should denounce the Zionist occupation and its Nazi methods.

Ninth, all states, especially those in Arab Africa, should put an end to Jewish emigration to Israel. 5

1. Although Jibril's group was part of the PFLP at this time it seems that it did not accept the front's policy on the Unity Congress. It would appear that until Jibril split from the front later in the year he was active both in the PFLP and the Permanent Office.
2. ibid. That is, the military wing of Harakah ash-Shebab ath-Thawri (Revolutionary Youth Movement); and the military wing of al-Hayat al-'amilah li-da'am ath-Thawrah. (Action Organisation for the Support of the Revolution).
3. ibid. That is, the military wing of Jabhah Thawar Falastin (Front of the Rebels of Palestine); and military wing of Jabhah at-Tahrir ash-Sha'biyyah al-Falastiniyyah (Popular Palestinian Front for Liberation).
4. ibid. This was, Munthamah Tala'i al-Feda'i (Organisation of the Vanguard of the Fedayeen).
5. ibid, p. 128.

The Congress also formulated some demands concerning the PLO and the Palestine National Congress (PNC). It suggested that a preparatory committee should be formed from those attending the unity congress, the PLO Executive and representatives of the unions. This committee would select members for the forthcoming PNC meeting at which a plan for the unification of the revolution would be drawn up. Reduction of the administrative costs and officials' salaries in the PLO was recommended so that more money could be given to the armed struggle. The PLO was warned against doing anything which might fragment the revolution and the PLA was asked to co-ordinate its activities with the new Permanent Office. Members of the unity congress regretted the absence of the PLO and expressed their readiness to co-operate with any willing organisation or group. 1

After affirming the generally accepted Palestinian nationalist principles the congress stated its aims. These were:

First, complete liberation and liquidation of the Zionist entity.

Second, the establishment of a democratic state guaranteeing the legitimate rights of the original citizens without discrimination of religion or belief.

Third, creation of a progressive society guaranteeing human rights and freedoms.

Fourth, active participation to achieve the aims of the Arab nation, its liberation and the establishment of a united progressive Arab society.

Fifth, support for all peoples in their struggle for liberation and building world peace on a just basis. 2

This unity congress was no more than one step in the right direction. Obviously it could achieve very little without the PLO or the PFLP. Further steps had to await the development of events. It is obvious from the principles and aims of the congress that al-Fateh was the dominant force, although the influence of as-Saiqah can also be seen in the social content of the third and fifth aims.

1. ibid.

2. ibid, p. 129.

Continued Tension with Jordan

Al-Fateh was by far the most effective and active of all the groups especially in terms of military operations. The success and growth of the movement had become a real embarrassment to King Hussein's regime. For the first three months after the war al-Fateh tried to establish secure bases inside the occupied territory, but this proved impossible:

"... a secure base implies that the revolutionaries can work in it openly and without interruption. It implies that it should be located amidst the masses but in contact with the enemy so that its members can learn warfare by actual practice. It also implies that it can be defended. Fateh realised that occupied Palestine constituted the actual battlefield rather than the secure base." 1

Al-Fateh thus began to establish bases in the Aghwar area of Jordan and in consequence had to face renewed efforts on the part of the Jordanian Government to suppress their activities. On 16th February 1968 King Hussein announced over radio 'amman:

"As Head of State, responsible for my country and perfectly conscious of my duties, I cannot permit anyone to furnish the enemy of my country and people with the pretext for attacking Jordan ..." 2

The following day the Minister of the Interior announced that:

"... it would be forbidden henceforth for anyone to expose Jordan to enemy reprisals in Jordanian territory."

The police immediately began taking action against the fedayeen, conducting searches and confiscating arms caches. The solution for the fedayeen was supplied by Israel in the attack on the town of al-Karamah on 21st March 1968.

The Battle of al-Karamah and its Effects on the Palestinians

Al-Karamah is situated on the East Bank of the Jordan River. It was established after the 1948 war as a centre for refugees who had fled from Palestine in the course of the fighting. By 1967 it had become a flourishing market town. Following the

1. Fateh Vol. II No. 2, January 19th 1970, p. 8.
2. The Times, 17th-18th February 1968.

1967 war it was the target of several Israeli shelling and bombing attacks 1 on the grounds that it had become a base for the fedayeen. This allegation had a certain factual basis insofar as the population was especially sympathetic to the fedayeen and provided a useful recruiting centre for the organisations.

On March 19th al-Fateh issued a statement warning of Israeli troop concentrations along the river. The General Command of the organisation met to consider reports from members inside the occupied territory concerning other troop movements. From these reports it was apparent that an attack of very large scale against al-Karamah was imminent. 2

It is considered standard practice in a guerilla-type war to avoid any real confrontation with the enemy in the early stages and to retreat before enemy advance. This was the position taken by most of the guerilla organisations including the PFLP. Al-Fateh, on the other hand, decided that in this instance, there was more to be gained by standing firm before the Israeli Army. The aim was to raise the morale of the Palestinians and at the same time destroy the enemy's self assurance. In addition to this it was hoped that such action would provide an opportunity for rapprochement between the fedayeen and the Jordanian Army. A confrontation if successful, would discredit the critics of the fedayeen on the East Bank and also discredit proponents of a political solution by showing that popular liberation war was possible. It was hoped that this action would test the abilities of the fedayeen themselves and illustrate their readiness to move from the stage of mere "hit and run" operations to the stage of "limited confrontation." 3

1. Attacks took place on November 20th 1967, January 8th and 25th 1968, February 9th, 11th and 15th 1968.
2. Al-Fateh, Revolution Until Victory, p. 9.
3. Al-Fateh, Revolution Until Victory, pp. 9-10.

Having taken this decision al-Fateh prepared to face the Israeli Army. 1 During the course of the fighting which lasted over fifteen hours, al-Fateh was reinforced by some fifty members of the Popular Liberation Forces (PLO) and sections of the Jordanian Army. 2 Losses were heavy on both sides but finally the Israelis withdrew defeated and shaken by the unexpected resistance.

The victory showed that al-Fateh had taken the right decision and had analysed the situation correctly. The position of the fedayeen was finally established as a new power in the Arab world and acknowledged by the Arab leaders. King Hussein had to retreat from the stand he had taken the previous month. He even felt obliged to declare in a press conference a few days later "We are all fedayeen". 3

The psychological effect of the battle on Palestinians of both Banks was positive. In 'amman, massive demonstrations attended the funerals of the killed fighters. The Arab population of the West Bank realised what had happened when they saw the nervous behaviour of the Israeli soldiers 4 and hospitals in Jerusalem 5 being evacuated to make room for the wounded. 6 The spirit of defeat which had resulted from the June war began to disappear. The myth of the invincible Israeli soldier had been dispelled.

1. Al-Fateh evacuated most of the women and children from the town and positioned some 400 fighters in the area on the expectation that Israeli forces would advance from the north, south and east simultaneously using ground troops, tanks and parachutists. The situation developed as anticipated and the Israeli army virtually walked into a trap. General Sources, also al-Fateh, Ma'arakah al-Karamah.
2. According to al-Fateh, the involvement of the Jordanian Army was against specific orders to the contrary, but in the event the Government had to accept it. It was later exploited by al-Fateh in an attempt to consolidate links between the Resistance and the Army. One of the current revolutionary songs which is very popular begins "Wahadna Damm Ya Karamah" (Our blood unites us O Karamah).
3. Financial Times, 25th March 1968.
4. This information is based on the author's interviews with refugees at al-Baqa'a Refugee Camp in Jordan in summer 1969. The refugees had left the West Bank shortly after the battle of al-Karamah.
5. For example the Augusta Victoria Hospital on the Mount of Olives.
6. Al-Fateh, Ma'arakah al-Karamah.

The effect of the victory on the fedayeen organisations, especially al-Fateh was to increase membership to a point where it was impossible for such numbers to be absorbed. Al-Fateh's membership increased from about 700 to several thousand, presenting the movement with a problem of training. 1 Training became the main preoccupation throughout 1968 2 and the number of operations had to be restricted in consequence. 3

Not only did membership of existing organisations increase, but the number of organisations itself rocketed, bringing them to nearly fifty. Every party and regime found it advisable to set up their own group rather than lose what influence they had left over the Palestinians.⁴ Thus, although the number of groups increased, no new ideological elements entered the Palestinian scene. If the groups were not simply military organisations, they were linked to one of the Ba'th parties or the ANM. The main ideological differences therefore remained those between the Ba'th, the ANM and al-Fateh.

The Ba'th-based groups

The Syrian Ba'th, as the ruling party in Syria, had supported al-Fateh from the beginning and given it considerable freedom of action. However, after as-Sammu' the party began to realise that al-Fateh while accepting Syrian support was not prepared to become a tool. The Ba'th therefore formed as-Saiqah to perform this role. 5

As-Saiqah was formed mainly from Palestinian members of the Ba'th, although its leaders were Jordanian. 6 By establishing

1. Fateh, Vol. II No. 2, January 19th 1970, p. 9.
2. Some were sent to Algiers and China. Author's interview with Abu Dahoud, Summer 1969.
3. Even so, the increase over previous years was substantial. See Table III.
4. Author's interview with Abu Fadi, 'amman summer 1969.
5. See above Ch. 4 p. 105.
6. Dafi al-Jamani (Abu Musa) and Mahmoud al-Ma'ita were Jordanian officers. They were convicted in 1957 of conspiracy against the Jordanian regime.

their own fedayeen section, the Syrians gained three things, a voice for the Ba'th within the Palestinian revolution, an increase in popularity, and the strengthening of the party element in Syria against the military. Because of the old hostility between the Ba'th and the ANM, as-Saiqah co-operated closely with al-Fateh, although ideologically in many respects they were closer to the ANM, that is to say, the PFLP. 1 Tension between the Ba'th and the ANM reached a peak in March 1968 when the Syrian Ba'thist government arrested and imprisoned three members of the PFLP, including the leader, George Habbash. 2 The charge against them was plotting to overthrow the Syrian government. 3

As-Saiqah never entered into any really detailed ideological discussions with the other groups, simply stating its basic aims, as briefly as possible whenever necessary. The organisation differed from al-Fateh on several points. While proclaiming the unity of the Arab and Palestinian revolutions, as-Saiqah's priority was always the Arab revolution. In addition the organisation insisted that the revolution should have a socialist content.

To quote one of its leaders:

"As-Saiqah believes in the unity of the Arab homeland, in achieving its liberation and building a socialist system there. It believes that anyone facing Zionism and Imperialism must inevitably take a leftist path. As-Saiqah has no programme for interfering in the internal affairs of the Arab states but believes in the ideology of the Arab socialist Ba'th party. The Palestinian liberation movement is part of the Arab liberation movement and has only limited tasks, that is, to liberate the Palestinian region. Through this and through mobilising the masses it will have an indirect influence on other Arab regions." 4

1. See above pp. 112 & 113. See also Table II.
2. The others were Fayez Qaddurah and 'ali Bushnaq.
3. They were released by the PFLP in November 1968 during an attack on the jail. It is widely believed that the release was a relief to the Syrians also, as the prisoners were becoming an embarrassment to them.
4. Al-Muharrer, 2nd January 1970.

Like Syria, Iraq also offered facilities to al-Fateh for a while but failed to gain control of the movement. Thus after the Bakr coup in 1969, the Iraqi Ba'thists set up their own fedayeen section, Jabhah at-Tahrir al-'arabiyah (Arab Liberation Front - ALF). The motives for establishing the ALF were much like Syria's motives in setting up as-Saiqah, though there was the additional reason, by that time, of rivalry between the two Ba'thist regimes. This led Iraq and the ALF to support and co-operate with the PFLP, Syria's long standing opponent. Relations between the PFLP and Iraq had become very strong by 1970. 1

The ALF was essentially Ba'thist, like as-Saiqah, but with less concern over the socialist content of the revolution. The ALF stressed the nationalist nature of the Palestinian struggle in an Arab context. It emphasised the danger of the Palestinian revolution becoming isolated from the Arab masses:

"The task of this popular war is to recruit all the Arab people voluntarily and freely and put them beside the popular, struggling, courageous Arab armies. The battle required that every Arab participate The Arab nationalist character of the popular struggle will guarantee the spread of consciousness to all parts of the nation ..." 2

Thus the Ba'th was represented in the Palestinian revolution by two movements which were basically hostile to each other and which formed alliances on the basis of this hostility.

The ANM-based groups

The ANM had already set up at least two fedayeen groups before the June war, Abtal al-'audah and Shebab ath-Thar. 3 After the war these two groups, together with the Palestinian section of the ANM, and Jibril's Palestine Liberation Front united to form the PFLP. 4 The ANM itself was divided along a right-left axis. 5 These diverse constituent parts of the PFLP made any firm ideological stand impossible. The front could be distinguished from al-Fateh at this stage mainly by its lack of any integrated, coherent theory, or decisive action.

1. Joint operations were conducted by the PFLP and the ALF in early 1970 and Habbash paid several visits to Baghdad. Al-Hadaf, 14th March 1970.
2. ALF, Political declaration 3rd August 1969, quoted in Naji 'allush, Munagishat hawl ath-Thawrah al-Falastiniyyah.
3. See above Ch. 4 p. 104.
4. See above p. 112.
5. See above Ch. 3 p. 47 fn. 3.

The front recognise and admit their early inadequacies:

"In its first stage, the Popular Front lacked a defined, left political line, but on the other hand it was progressive and definitely wanted to regain Palestine. That is to say, when it was founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine did not have all the ideological, political and organisational characteristics that the Palestine section of the ANM claimed." 1

The front was not only weak politically, but also militarily. It propounded armed struggle, but in the event showed little practical understanding of guerilla warfare. On the basis of classical theory, the front refused to participate in the battle of al-Karamah believing that it was too early for real confrontation with the enemy. 2 It did not realise that the rules of guerilla warfare should always be adapted to the specific situation. The front's military actions were mainly terroristic and their targets often civilian. 3 Such tactics could never lead to a popular war of liberation. They needed only a few well trained cadres and no mass participation.

In the latter half of 1968 the political and ideological condition of the front improved. Two events led to this improvement. First, Jibril and his group left to form a separate organisation and second, the left-wing of the ANM began to apply pressure.

From the beginning Jibril had had some sort of link with the Syrian regime. 4 When Habbash and the others were arrested by Syria, 5 Jibril refused to condemn this action. 6 A split became virtually unavoidable.

1. Quoted in OSPAAL, op cit, p. 192.

2. This information is based upon extensive author's interviews with members of several different groups not including the PFLP itself. Unfortunately the PFLP has in retrospect claimed "successful participation in the Battle of al-Karamah" (see previous footnote). However there seems to be general agreement from the other groups including the PLO that such participation did not occur, at least not as official Front policy. This is just one example of many in which PFLP declarations concerning their activities have proved to be unreliable. In many cases for instance, for instance the blowing up of the Haifa pipeline in June 1969, the Front have claimed responsibility for operations which have later proved to have been carried out by other groups. Such proof is possible since members of the Palestine Armed Struggle Command (see Tables II and IV) had to place sealed envelopes with the Command before conducting any operation stating their intentions. For these reasons PFLP sources have been avoided wherever possible.

3. For example, hijacking an El Al plane from Rome to Algeria on July 23rd 1968.
4. Based on author's interviews with members of the various resistance groups, summer 1969, 'amman.
5. See above p. 119.
6. Kadi, op cit, p. 30.

Jibril did not explain the split in this way. He issued a communique claiming that a conference held in October 1968 by the PLF (Jibril) and Abtal al-'audah had decided to expel Shebab ath-Thar 1 from the PFLP on the grounds that it had agreed to a policy of interference in the internal affairs of the Arab states. 2 The PFLP, excluding Jibril and his group, issued a communique in response to this denying the charges and accusing Jibril of undertaking operations in the name of the PFLP without notifying the Central organisation. 3 In any case, Jibril and his group left the PFLP and set up a new organisation called Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - Al-Qiyadah al-'amah (General Command) PFLP-GC.

At this stage the PFLP indignantly denied Jibril's charges of accepting a policy of intervention. Yet later this same policy became a fundamental part of their programme, and a source of criticism against al-Fateh. That is to say, they later used al-Fateh's acceptance of non-intervention as proof of its reactionary nature. 4

The other element in the re-orientation of the PFLP, the left-wing pressure, also led to a split. In August 1968 the PFLP held a conference in the course of which the left-wing gained acceptance for their programme. 5 It was couched in strong Marxist terminology and far too radical for the moderates. It eventually provoked armed clashes between the two factions in January 1969 in 'amman. The left-wing subsequently formed a new organisation, al-Jabhah ash-Sha'biyyah ad-Democratiyyah li-Tahrir Falastin (Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine - PDFLP).

1. Shebab ath-Thar contained most of the radical ANM elements.
2. PFLP, Communique, 18th October 1968.
3. ibid.
4. See next chapter for further discussion.
5. Kadi, op cit (Resistance), pp. 31-2.

Because of PFLP links with Iraq and rivalry with al-Fateh, the PDFLP eventually found itself linked to Syria, and as-Saiqah. 1 From the beginning the PDFLP co-operated with al-Fateh and as-Saiqah and later the PLO. Its greatest hostility was towards the PFLP.

The August 1968 programme of the front 2 can be considered as the platform of the PDFLP. It began with a superficial class analysis of the history of Palestine and continued with a class analysis of the 1948 and 1967 defeats. These defeats were attributed to the class nature of the Arab regimes. 3 The programme then attacked the policy of non-intervention and the UN resolution of November 1967.

Concerning the weaknesses of the resistance movement as a whole, the programme pointed to the policy of non-intervention and the lack of national unity. The resistance had fallen victim to the reactionaries and become dependent on the Arab states. The people were suffering from ideological ignorance. As a solution to these problems the PDFLP demanded the development of a revolutionary scientific ideology, the development of national consciousness, rejection of the UN resolution, and the introduction of debate and criticism within the movement.

When the PDFLP officially came into being in February 1969, it issued a statement of its aims. 4 These were basically to work for national unity, to struggle continuously and to co-operate with other revolutionary groups. The PDFLP considered all liberation movements as well as the socialist countries to be allies.

By way of answering the PDFLP, and in order to prevent them from taking all the initiative, the remaining part of the PFLP issued a Political, Organisational and Military Report, in February 1969. 5

1. Based on author's interview with al-Fateh representative, London March 1970. Also in a recent interview a leader of as-Saiqah affirmed that:

"Al-Fateh and the Democratic Front are the nearest organisations to as-Saiqah, al-Fateh because it believes in liberation and works sincerely, and the Democratic Front because it believes in liberation and works sincerely in addition to being close to as-Saiqah in its ideas." Al-Muharrer, 2nd January 1970.

2. Translation in Kadi, op cit (Resistance), pp. 145-71.
3. Ideological differences between the groups are discussed in the next chapter.
4. Abridged translation in Committees For Solidarity with the

Palestinian Revolution, Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, pp. 12-13.

5. Translation in Kadi, op cit (Resistance), pp. 180-247.

It gave the main lines of policy which were remarkably similar to the August Platform. However, it was less academic, more practical and showed greater awareness of the realities of the situation than the August Platform.

The report began by emphasising the need for scientific revolutionary thought, but at the same time attacked "verbal philosophising". In this way criticism was directed both at al-Fateh for its lack of open Marxist ideology, and the PDFLP for its intellectualism. Neither group was actually mentioned by name.

The next part of the report was entitled "Who are our enemies?", a direct quotation from Mao-Tse-Tung.¹ The enemies were defined as Israel, World Zionism, World Imperialism and Arab reaction, and their superiority in both technology and experience was admitted. The report stressed the importance of knowing the nature of the enemy, as this should determine the nature of the battle. Like the August platform it was essentially a class analysis.

The section of the report dealing with "Who are our Friends" was divided into three parts, the Palestinian, the Arab and the international. In all cases the answer was the "Forces of Revolution", and these forces were based on a class analysis. The report stressed the need for Palestinian unity and also for an Arab Hanoi. Internationally the friends of the revolution were the other liberation movements and the Socialist Bloc.

The second half of the report dealt exclusively with the strategy of organisation. It contained very precise, critical, and self-critical discussions on party formation. It had a strong Marxist orientation, calling for a revolutionary party based upon revolutionary ideology and constituted on a class basis.

1. Mao-Tse-Tung, "Analysis of Classes in Chinese Society", (March 1926), Selected Works, Vol. 1; p. 13.

Thus, like the Ba'th, the ANM had split into two antagonistic factions, which in their ideology and theory were virtually indistinguishable from each other. Both factions had suddenly become Marxists, and were using their new-found ideology as a weapon against other groups, in particular al-Fateh, which they began to label as reactionaries.

These, then were the main ideological divisions inside the Palestinian movement after al-Karamah. They will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. There were other small organisations of importance, but these were based mainly upon personal differences with the main groups and had no ideological significance. [1]

Towards Palestinian Unity

Although the number of new organisations and through splits in those already existing, there was a deep desire among the Palestinians for unity. Many of the new groups set up by the regimes and parties for their own purposes were in a sense artificial and most of these disappeared again quite quickly. The splits, on the other hand were a kind of rationalisation. They had to occur before any real unity could be attempted. A group with such great contradictions inside it as the PFLP, for example, could not develop or grow, but would become paralysed and unable to move in any direction.

In addition to the desire for unity, the increasingly frequent crises between the fedayeen and the Arab governments [2] made unity not only desirable but also necessary. As a result, there developed two sets of machinery within which the various groups could meet and co-operate. One of these was based upon a reformed PLO, and the other developed spontaneously in response to the situation.

After al-Karamah, the first attempt at formal unity was made by the fourth Palestinian National Congress which was held in Cairo in July. It was attended by 100 members, 50 of whom represented the fedayeen organisations, namely, al-Fateh,

[2.] Major crises occurred in November 1968 with Jordan, April and October 1969 with Lebanon, and February, June and September 1970 with Jordan.

[1.] See Table II.

as-Saiqah, the PFLP, the PLO and the PLA. 1 In this the fourth congress gave much greater voice to the fedayeen than its predecessors. The change in representation was reflected in its decisions. It amended both the National Charter and the constitution of the PLO.

The charter in its revised form put much less emphasis upon Arab unity. 2 It stressed instead Palestinian nationalism and the Palestinian identity. 3 All reference to peaceful co-existence and international peace efforts was dropped, 4 and any peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem completely rejected. 5 The most important innovation, however, was the adoption of armed struggle as the only means for liberating Palestine. 6

Amendments to the PLO constitution were basically intended to introduce more democracy into its institutions. The National Congress was made the highest authority and the executive held responsible to it. The functions of each institution were clearly defined, and the power of the executive and the president reduced. 7 Perhaps most important of all was the recognition of the PLA as an official part of the PLO, that is to say, an independent Palestinian military force. 8 Decisions of the congress and the executive were to be made by simple majority vote 9 and the quorum for each was two thirds. 10 The 1964 version of the constitution had made no such provisions, leaving both institutions open to control by a minority.

1. ibid. Kadi, op cit (Resistance), p. 25.
2. Compare the two texts, Appendix I (1964) and Appendix IV (1968): Article 3 (1968) and articles 3 and 4 (1964); articles 26-30 (1968) and articles 26 (1964).
3. Articles 4, 7 and 8 (1968) and articles 5, 8 and 9 (1964).
4. Article 24 (1968) and article 21 (1964). Article 22 of 1964 was completely dropped.
5. Article 21 (1968).
6. Article 15 (1968) and article 14 (1964); new articles 9 and 10 (1968).
7. Compare the two texts Appendix II and Appendix V.
8. Article 22 (1968).
9. Articles 12 and 21 (1968).
10. ibid.

The statement issued at the end of the congress rejected the UN resolution of November 1967 and unequivocally endorsed the armed struggle, emphasising:

"... the determination of the Palestinian people to continue this struggle until it becomes a popular war of liberation, undertaken by all the Arab nation with all its forces and resources." 1

Even so, there were still many problems which the congress could not solve. It could not agree upon the formation of the new executive and Yahya Hammouda was asked to continue with the old executive for another six months. During this time another congress would be held. On the practical level, the congress set up machinery for military co-ordination between the groups. This new Military Co-ordination Bureau began effective work in October. 2

Al-Fateh, however, was not satisfied with the proceedings of the congress and refused to allow any of its members to stand for the executive. One of the movement's representatives told the final session:

"We came to this assembly in response to the appeal of the Palestinian and Arab masses. They expect the armed revolution to be intensified, the pillars of the Palestinian revolution to be consolidated, and the bases of national unity to be emphasised. To our regret we have been utterly disappointed in this assembly. Bargaining and an irresponsible spirit of factionalism have predominated at the expense of the revolution, its ideas and its principles." 3

From this criticism it would seem that this fourth congress saw only a change of form, not a change of content, in spite of the apparent radicalisation.

1. ARR, op cit, p. 215.

2. It included al-Fateh, as-Saiqah and the PLA. The PDFLP joined in February 1969. See Table IV.

3. ARR, op cit, p. 215.

The next occasion for a move towards unity was the crisis which developed between the fedayeen and the Jordanian Government in November 1968. 1 As a result of this, a Palestine Emergency Council was formed from al-Fateh, as-Saiqah, the PFLP and the PLO, together with the "National Bloc" 2 a Jordanian-Palestinian political organisation headed by Suleiman Nabulsi. 3 The Council undertook liaison between the fedayeen and the Jordanian Government, and established links with other Palestinian organisations like the unions and parties. 4 This Council also spawned a bureau for military co-ordination of the fedayeen. It included more groups than that established in October by the PLO. The crisis was resolved by negotiation between the groups and the Jordanian Government. The agreement included concessions on both sides. 5

The real turning point in Palestinian unity came with the fifth Palestinian National Congress which was held in Cairo in February 1969. The PLO Executive allocated 105 seats, 77 of them to the Palestinian organisations. They were distributed

1. The incident was provoked by a small organisation called Kata'ib an-Nasr (Phalanges of Victory). Because of this organisation's behaviour, the Jordanian Government moved against the Resistance movement as a whole. Al-Fateh and the other groups claim that this organisation was set up by Jordanian Intelligence merely as a pretext to crush the fedayeen. The latter were becoming quite powerful in Jordan, setting up their own administration.
2. Arab World, 20th November 1968, p. 2.
3. Nabulsi had been Prime Minister of the first and only democratically elected government in Jordan in 1956. He held position for only a few months before a right-wing coup in April 1957.
4. Kadi, op cit (Resistance), p. 27.
5. The fedayeen agreed not to carry arms or wear uniforms in Jordanian cities. Their vehicles were to carry Jordanian number plates issued by the authorities. They agree not to try to enlist Jordanians conscripted by the regular army. In return the government dropped demands they had made that the refugee camps be disarmed and that the fedayeen organisations notify the army before undertaking any operation. This agreement was in fact a defeat for the government because in practice they alone observed the conditions laid down. The fedayeen continued to appear in public armed and in uniform. They continued to drive unlicensed vehicles. Conditions of Agreement in Arab World, 20th November 1968, p. 5.

according to the strength of each group, its membership and its popular support. Of these 77 seats, al-Fateh received 33, 1 and the PFLP 12. The PFLP, however, refused to attend, on the grounds that it objected to the PLO as the framework for unity. The PLA, which had been allocated 6 seats also refused to attend, claiming that it should have been given more representation. Although these were undoubtedly part of the reason behind the boycott of these two groups the situation was further complicated at this time by contradictions within each of them. 2 However an 11-member sub-committee 3 was set up to try to come to some arrangement with the two groups. The committee was authorised to offer the PFLP 20 seats and the PLA 12. 4 If agreement was reached within three months a new Congress would be held with the new membership. 5

President Nasir opened the congress and pledged the unconditional support of the UAR to the Palestinians, but he called upon them to unite their ranks. The Agenda was in fact largely concerned with unity, unity of action, unity of organisation and the establishment of a joint fund for all the organisations drawn from taxes levied on Palestinians everywhere. 6 The most significant event of the congress was the election of the new executive. Of 11 members, al-Fateh took four including the presidency which went to Yasir Arafat. 7 Arafat was also put in charge of the military section which brought the PLA under his control.

1. ibid, February 3rd 1969, p. 9.
2. The PLA in July 1968 had mutinied against its Commander and arrested him. A compromise Commander had been found but tension had remained. The PFLP was in the throes of splitting.
3. Arab World, 3rd February 1969, p. 9. The committee was headed by Hammouda and included representatives of al-Fateh, as-Saiqah and the PLO.
4. ibid.
5. Free Palestine, Vol. I, No. 9, February 1969, p. 1.
6. Arab World, 3rd February 1969, p. 9.
7. ibid. 5th February 1969, p. 2. Of the others two were from as-Saiqah. See Table V. Arafat was born in Jerusalem in 1929. During the 1948 war together with his father and brothers, he fought with al-Jihad al-Mugaddas (See Ch.1 p.14). After the defeat he lived as a refugee in Gaza. He studied engineering at Cairo University and in 1952 became chairman of the Palestine Students Federation in Egypt. While still a student he participated in Egyptian commando activity against British troops based near Suez in 1954 and served in the Egyptian army as a demolitions expert in 1956. The following year he went to Kuwait where he remained

working until 1965 when al-Fateh began military operations. Kadi, op cit (Resistance), p. 16; author's interviews with members of the Resistance Movement, 'amman, summer 1969.

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The statement issued at the end of the congress contained a ten-point programme which al-Fateh had submitted to congress when it opened. 1 It warned that the Palestine problem faced liquidation through the UN Security Council Resolution and rejected all political settlements including the Soviet proposals. It continued:

"The Palestinian National Council ... emphasises that the Palestine case is the property of the Palestinian people. The Palestinian people, adhering to its sacred right to its entire homeland, Palestine, emphasises its full rejection of Arab and international political interference that violates its right to its homeland ... and rejects all forms of subservience or official Arab or international interference in the affairs of Palestine ..."

The statement declared that through their struggle the Palestinian people:

"... seek to establish a free and democratic society in Palestine for all Palestinians, Moslems, Christians and Jews, and to deliver Palestine and its people from international Zionism, which is a racist, confessional and reactionary movement with fascist roots and organically tied to international imperialism ..."

The statement appealed to the Palestinian and Arab masses to mobilise all their resources to help the Palestinian resistance and to consider the Palestinian liberation movement as part of the general Arab revolution. The fundamental conflict was with Zionism and all other internal contradictions should be suppressed and become secondary. Finally the statement declared that a plan had been prepared for the escalation of resistance and that its first step:

1. ibid.

"... will be the unification of commando activity, collection of funds and strengthening of the PLA by boosting its fighting ability as well as its interaction with the Palestinian revolution in order to develop this revolution into a popular war of liberation ..." 1

The new PLO began constructive activity almost immediately and generally behaved in a manner designed to restore confidence in its machinery. Executive members had clearly defined areas of responsibility compared with the period of Shuqeiry's presidency. 2

The first meeting was held in a refugee camp in an effort to show the sincerity of the new committee. 3 Arafat quickly solved the contradictions with the PLA and began to reorganise the army along lines more suitable for a guerilla-type war. Several contingents of the army were moved from Egypt to Jordan to be more available for action. Arafat went to the contingents themselves to announce this decision, not to the headquarters in Damascus. 4 Soon after this, the Commander-in-Chief 5 declared that in future the army would accept orders from the new executive. 6

In accordance with the council decisions the new executive set about strengthening and unifying commando activity. In April the Military Co-ordination Bureau was replaced by new machinery, the Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC). 7 Its authority over member organisations was much stronger than that of its predecessor, and it comprised over 90% of actual combatants in the field. 8 It was in fact:

1. ibid, and Kadi, op cit (Resistance), p. 29.
2. See Table V.
3. Arab World, 5th February 1969, p. 11.
4. Arab World, 6th February 1969, p. 2.
5. Misbah al-Budeiri. See Table II.
6. Arab World, 17th February 1969, p. 8.
7. Initially it comprised al-Fateh, as-Saiqah, the PDFLP, the PLFs and the PLA. Eventually all the groups of any importance joined except the PFLP. See Table IV.
8. Al-Fateh, op cit (Dialogue), p. 6.

"... a national front within the frame of the PLO." 1

One month after its establishment, the first jointly-planned guerilla operation was launched against Israel, 2 and a PASC strike force was established in October. 3

Apart from work resulting from the council decisions the new executive undertook other work. One of its first tasks had been to mediate between the two wings of the PFLP when their differences resulted in armed clashes in 'amman in February. 4 A few days after Arafat had intervened in the dispute the left wing set up the PDFLP, 5 which from its inception played an active part in all the machinery of co-ordination and unity in the PLO.

Attempts to bring the remainder of the PFLP into the PLO were less successful. The differences between the front and al-Fateh were based upon two entirely different conceptions of Palestinian unity and the methods through which it could be achieved. According to the PFLP:

"The form of national unity is the creation of a front in which all the classes of the revolution - workers peasants and petty bourgeoisie - should be represented We should attend actively to the mobilisation of workers and peasants in one revolutionary, political organisation armed with the ideology of scientific socialism". 6

Essentially the PFLP wanted a front based on the equal representation of each organisation not on the strength of and support for each organisation. 7 Al-Fateh's approach to unity was of a more practical nature. Al-Fateh had already attempted unity through a front formula in January 1968 8 and had failed to bring in either the PFLP or the PLO. Pressure for unity

1. ibid.
2. On May 2nd an operation by al-Fateh captured the town of al-Hammah and held it for several hours. The operation was jointly planned by PASC. ibid, p. 21.
3. From al-Fateh, as-Saiqah and the PDFLP. Fateh Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 1.
4. Arab World, 6th February 1969, p. 5.
5. ibid, 24th February 1969, p. 2.
6. Kadi, "PFLP Political Report", op cit (Resistance), p. 205.
7. Author's interviews, 'amman summer 1969.
8. See above pp. 113-115.

increased on all the groups and in particular on al-Fateh as the largest. Al-Fateh saw two possibilities

"It was possible to have a national front in which the PLO would be one of the parties ... on the same footing as the other organisations This trend was not opposed by al-Fateh; on the contrary we were prepared to follow it to the end. However there was another view regarding the PLO, an objective view which considered the welfare of the Palestinian people before that of al-Fateh. According to this view the PLO represents for the first time official Arab commitment to the Palestinian people. To regard the PLO as a private force would result in weakening the PLO itself and dissolving this commitment It was decided that the PLO was a suitable background for the national front which would group together all the Palestinian forces, and that our insistence on entering it on a level of equality was possibly unrealistic, besides the fact that it would paralyse the PLO. This would create a situation where these equal forces would, under all circumstances, have to agree unanimously on any action or decision. Failing such unanimity any small organisation would be in a position to oppose any decision thus creating a vicious circle by veto The voice of any organisation's representative should have the weight actually carried by that organisation in the field of action ... it is not a matter of imposing this or that opinion but of determining what this or that organisation is capable of contributing ..." 1

This was the rationale behind al-Fateh's acceptance of the PLO as the framework for Palestinian unity. However it was not acceptable to the PFLP who boycotted both the National Congress and PASC, although negotiations between the front and al-Fateh did not cease. 2 The front justified its position as follows:

1. Al-Fateh, op cit (Dialogue), pp. 10-11.
2. ibid, pp. 15-17.

"Experience has proved that the variety of Palestinian organisations cannot be explained on the basis of accident or mere desire for leadership. It is based upon real differences over organisation and strategy The formula to unite these movements is a front formula The representation of Palestinian fighting forces should be equal frontal representation." 1

The PFLP maintained this position consistently, realising that proportional representation based on the size of the movements would automatically give al-Fateh control of any machinery for unity.

Although the fifth National Congress made great progress towards unity, serious divisions still existed within the ranks of the Palestinians. These divisions were of both an ideological nature, and the result of the continual creation of small groups by Arab governments in an effort to crush the movement as a whole. 2 The problem had become so serious by mid-1969 that it was the main subject of the speech delivered by the al-Fateh representative to the annual congress of the General Union of Palestinian Students in 'amman in July. Al-Fateh pointed out the dangers of these divisions which would result in:

1. Fragmentation of Palestinian action.
2. A suitable climate for the development of contradictions and political polarisation.
3. Dissipation of loyalty and support for the revolution
4. The creation of confusion in the minds of the masses from a multiplicity of ideologies and slogans.
5. A return to the state of purely ambiguous and theoretical slogans unrelated to reality ... thus dissipating efforts in an ideological battle.
6. The possibility of infiltration of anti-revolutionary forces in the ranks of the revolution, exploiting differences and subverting confidence ...
7. Diverting the masses from fundamental practical activity ...
8. Divesting fedayeen activities and the armed struggle of its revolutionary content by classifying into right and left ...

1. Al-Hadaf, 15th February 1969; PFLP, Political Communique, 15th February 1969.
2. Al-Fateh, op cit (Dialogue), pp. 13-14, discusses some of these small groups.

9. Subverting the national conduct and behaviour of the fedayeen, thereby eroding any sense of trust between them and the masses ...
10. Immobilising a large percentage of our human potential ...
11. Allowing the authorities to interfere in the affairs of the revolution on the pretext of protecting the citizens from misconduct ...
12. Preparing the ground for clashes between the local authorities and some of the Palestinian organisations ..." 1

Al-Fateh's realisation of the inherent danger of the situation resulted in the movement urging, in addition to unity within the PLO, "the establishment of a wide national front from among the different national forces ..." 2 This was not a national front as envisaged by the PFLP but something much more general.

"The revolution in its different phases should establish a national front which will fulfill the aims of each phase. The structure of the front is not meant to be a permanent one which organises relations among the national forces and groups. On the contrary it is a temporary framework which develops in accordance with changes that occur in each phase ..." 3

For the time being the deadlock between the PFLP and the PLO remained. The Sixth Palestinian National Congress was held in Cairo at the beginning of September 1969, and once again the front refused to attend on the grounds that:

"All the resistance movements should be equally represented in the Palestinian National Congress. Everyone knows that al-Fateh and the PFLP are the two most important groups ..." 4

Other groups were brought in, including the PDFLP who were given eight seats and provided the PFLP with yet another excuse for its boycott. 5 Jibril's group (PFLP-GC) which had by this time also

1. Statement by al-Fateh to the Fifth National Congress of the General Union of Palestinian students, 'amman 31st July 1969. Translation by author.
2. Al-Fateh, "Political Struggle", Al-Fateh (Weekly Bulletin, 'amman), August 1969.
3. ibid.
4. ARR, 1st-15th September 1969, p. 376.
5. Arab World, 1st September 1969, p. 2.

split, 1 was given representation, and the new ALF (Iraqi Ba'th) sent one observer. In all membership was increased to 112 seats. 2

This congress, although it was held in an atmosphere of crisis due to the deterioration of relations between the Resistance movement and the Lebanese Government, 3 was perhaps most important in illustrating the contradictions between the various groups. The PFLP, although it did not attend, made its voice heard in other ways. Two days before the congress opened the front hijacked a TWA plane from Rome bound for Israel. 4 They used this to declare a popular war of liberation against US interests and severely criticised the other groups, in particular al-Fateh and as-Saiqah for their policy of non-intervention.

In the course of the congress as-Saiqah replied, emphasising that it had no political ambitions in the countries from which it operated, except to liberate Palestine and establish a socialist state there. 5 The movement condemned the PFLP for its adventurist actions. The ALF, feeling the need to establish its identity, differentiated itself from the other groups by emphasising Arab unity. It raised the slogan of Arab unity through liberation of the land, and stressed the need to give the revolution a social-democratic face. Finally the ALF declared that its organisation was open for membership to all Arabs. 6

1. Ahmed Za'rur had split with Jibril to form a new group called Munathamah al-'arabiyah li-Tahrir Falastin, (Arab Palestine Organisation - APO). The split was caused over distribution of money given to the group for services rendered to the Jordanian Government. The APO took a Nasirist line. (Author's interviews 'amman, summer 1969). See Tables II and IV.
2. See Table V.
3. The Congress was extended two days to discuss the crisis. In the course of its business, the congress rejected any undertaking to withdraw the guerillas from Lebanon. Arab World, September 3rd 1969, p. 1. The crisis continued and developed into open armed confrontation with the Lebanese army. The fedayeen refused to give up their right to mobility across the Lebanese border. Eventually after the intervention and mediation of President Nasir, Arafat reached an agreement with the Government. This "Cairo Agreement" like previous ones with Jordan contained concessions from both sides, but again was in the long run to the advantage of the fedayeen. The crisis began at the end of 1968 when Israel raided Beirut airport in retaliation for a PFLP attack on an El Al plane in Zurich. The airport raid in turn led to the fall of the Lebanese Government and tension between the Lebanese authorities and the fedayeen. This tension increased throughout 1969 while the Lebanese tried to put restrictions on fedayeen activity from Lebanese territory.

4. This was the second hijacking undertaken by the Front, but the first had been an El Al plane not an American one.
5. Arab World, 1st September 1969, p. 9.
6. ibid, September 5th 1969, p. 7.

However, the greatest activity at the congress came from the PDFLP, which submitted two draft resolutions one on the Democratic State of Palestine 1 and one on the National Front, both couched in intellectual and Marxist terminology. The resolution on unity 2 began with a long preamble on the historical significance of unity, and its present necessity. It drew a comparison between the "contradictions and centrifugal forces" operating within the resistance movement and the fact that "the reactionary regimes ... are prepared to clamp down on the movement and are united ..."

As a solution the PDFLP suggests that:

"The alliance of all the patriotic forces in a United Front with a common platform, based on egalitarian relationships among its different organisations, is the effective answer to the dangers that threaten the Palestinian national liberation movement. . . The various organisations of the resistance movement should understand objectively the contradictions existing within the resistance movement Such contradictions will become of secondary importance only by the formation of a national liberation front which would contain them within the limits of a minimum national platform, while each organisation preserves the right to independent action beyond the limits of that platform." 3

This position is similar to that of the PFLP - a plea for equal frontal representation. It is a logical position but not a principled one for a small organisation to adopt. It has been explained by a representative of al-Fateh as follows:

1. Arab World, 2nd September 1969, p. 6.
2. Committee For Solidarity With The Palestinian Revolution, op cit, pp. 25-9.
3. ibid, pp. 28-9.

"If we want to understand national unity, we must see it as similar in many aspects to the establishment of a coalition government in any democratic state. Each party will try to take as many seats as possible. But the organisation with the strongest base and mass support should take the leading role, for example in China and Vietnam unity was based on the Communist party because it was the biggest popular movement. However it is natural that the smaller should try to be equal to the bigger though one can see that they are illogical in their attitude. If one asks the PFLP whether they are equal to the PDF they will denounce this proposition asking what the PDF represents. Practically they want equality only with al-Fateh and as-Saiqah. Similarly, if one asks the PDF if they are equal to Jibril or the APO they will deny this, wanting equality only with al-Fateh and as-Saiqah." 1

The Front's resolutions were rejected by the congress, and, in spite of the principle of frontal equality to which they adhered, they accepted a seat on the Executive Committee of the PLO when it was re-elected on 8th September. 2

The statement issued at the end of the congress, as on the previous occasion, strongly reflected al-Fateh's ideas:

"The Congress resolutions reaffirmed the insistence of the Palestinian people on rejecting all submissive solutions It emphasised that the aim of the Palestinian revolution is to achieve complete and comprehensive liberation of the Palestinian homeland. The Congress declared the Palestinian people's determination to pursue the revolution until victory is achieved and a Palestinian democratic state is established free from all forms of racial and ethnic discrimination.

The Congress also affirmed that the method of revolution is armed struggle The tool of the revolution is the masses of the Palestinian people

The Congress emphasised ... the independence of Palestinian action and rejected all attempts to impose on it restrictions domination or tutelage

1. Author's interview with Abu Fadi, representative of al-Fateh, 'amman, Summer 1969.
2. Arab World, 8th September 1969, p. 3.

The Congress paid special attention to the subject of national unity and emphasised its eagerness to continue the efforts to achieve it in the most perfect manner

The Congress recommended that measures for unifying the financial levy system be completed especially in Jordan. It also recommended the consolidation and development of the PLA in accordance with the requirements of the coming phase.

The Congress entrusted the Palestinian Red Creseent with the task of providing medical services to all (Palestinian) fighters and charged the Executive Committee with the responsibility of increasing care offered to the families of the martyrs and wounded. 1

The Congress discussed the means of bolstering the technological aspect of the revolution and the importance of planning, programming and statistics as a basis for revolutionary action in theory and practice

Among the most important decisions of the Congress was the establishment of a Revolutionary Court which will be the only authority to pass sentences which would ensure the rule of justice and security of the revolution

The Congress resolved to co-operate fully with the liberation movements in all parts of the Arab homeland and in the world" 2

In general the results of this congress can be considered satisfactory. It had brought into the PLO most of the main groups except the PFLP and had undertaken to streamline and make the resistance movement more efficient. Moreover the PLO had assumed responsibility for social services which had previously been maintained only by al-Fateh.

1. Al-Fateh had established the Palestinian Red Crescent in January 1968. By mid-1969 it had established several hospitals and 22 clinics in the refugee camps. These clinics unlike the UNRWA gave free treatment and free medicines to the refugees. The medicines were free samples supplied mainly by the Arab states, and the doctors though paid were volunteers. Al-Fateh had established also a fund from which aid was given to families of fighters killed or wounded in action. There were also educational services for the children to supplement not replace UNRWA which was proving incapable of dealing with the increased numbers. (Based on personal experience of the author, 'amman, summer 1969).
2. Text in Fateh Vol. I No. I, p. 4.

Even so, the formal unity which had been achieved on both the military and political levels was still more nominal than real. Each group had its own strategy, tactics, aims and slogans, and, with the exception of al-Fateh and as-Saiqah, continued to attack and criticise each other publicly.

The next step towards unity was impelled by force of circumstances. The simmering crisis in Lebanon and an acute crisis with the Jordanian Government in February 1970 made some sort of practical unity essential. The Popular Front would not retreat from its demand for equal representation and thus a new formula had to be found which they could accept. This new formula was a Unified Command of all the main groups, including a new group formed from ex-Communists called the Peoples Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine. 1 The Command comprised eleven groups in all, each sending one representative. In effect, however, al-Fateh remained the leading force by virtue of its overwhelming superiority of manpower, equipment and support. 2 The new Command called a meeting of all sympathetic organisations and individuals on 11th February and a joint statement calling for popular resistance was issued over their signatures. 3 The statement ended by saying:

"All the commando organisations which have realised their complete merger, stand united today with the popular masses in Jordan to announce their avowed intention to safeguard their unity and name and keep up their armed struggle against the Zionist and imperialist enemy." 4

1. The POLP was pro-Chinese in orientation and had originally joined the PDELP in February 1969. They had ultimately left it on the grounds that it did not live up to its slogans. There was another Communist fedayeen group formed from the official Communist Party, called Qoat al-Ansar (Partisan Forces). It did not join the Unified Command because al-Fateh vetoed its entry. The Communists had from the beginning been isolated from the mainstream of the fedayeen movement because of their recognition of Israel and insistence that liberation should be restricted only to post-1967 occupied territory. The party was composed of three factions. One led by Fahimi as-Selfiti was opposed to any form of armed action. Another faction led by Fa'iq Warrad saw that unless some action was taken the party would lose all its support. A middle line was taken by Fuad Nassar who finally accepted the Warrad argument and allowed al-Ansar to be set up. Al-Fateh put three conditions on their entry into the Unified Command. They should reject the November 1967 UN Resolution, they should declare their aim to liberate all of Palestine, and they should denounce the 1948 partition. They refused these conditions. (Based on author's interview with representatives of al-Fateh, London March 1970).

2. ibid.
 3. Full list of signatures in Table VI.
 4. Complete text in Fateh Vol. II No. 4, 15th February 1970, p. 4.
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When the crisis was over, following a negotiated settlement, the Unified Command, along with the PLO and PASC became part of the co-ordinating machinery of the Palestinian resistance inside Jordan. Moreover it sought to develop a formula for closer and more permanent unity. On 17th February the Command issued a statement severely criticising the past disunity of the movement:

"The Resistance Movement, which overcame the February 10th Crisis with firmness and unity in its ranks believes that it continues to be burdened with errors The endeavour for criticism and self-criticism exercised today by the Unified Command with regard to the 1969 experience confirms the revolutionary initiative of the resistance to correct its mistakes and to develop

As it stands before the 1969 experience the Unified Command observes that:

1. It is called upon by the masses of our people and the Arab nation to redress its internal relations so as to build a strong and unified national front on the basis of a defined political and military programme
2. It is called upon to make available and to build wide and sound relationships with the masses and become aware of its mistakes in these relationships
3. It must consolidate relations with the people - including soldiers, officers and security forces
4. All bases of the resistance movement must observe mature revolutionary discipline and realise the importance of equality among all citizens
5. All factions of the resistance movement must abide by the political military and disciplinary instructions of the Unified Command
6. Violations should be reported to the Unified Command so that an end may be put to them immediately....
7. Annoyances to citizens in their homes, in work or production locations and in official offices tarnish relations between the people and the armed and mass

"The Unified Command has taken a series of internal measures to implement this statement in full. It pledges to take a longer critical stand in the near future in order to build a wide revolutionary relationship with everyone and without regional discrimination between the masses of Jordan and Palestine." 1

This statement illustrates the dominance of al-Fateh in the Unified Command. It is devoid of any mention of class struggle and is generally moderate in tone. Moreover it deals with practical difficulties and seeks practical answers to them. In spite of this, the actual form of the command enabled the PFLP to accept al-Fateh's leadership without having to go back on their previous position. In a real crisis they had to accept the existence of a leading force within the movement. They supported the command completely:

"... the PFLP declares its backing to the Unified Command. It is the correct formula for uniting the Palestinian movements. This Palestinian Unified Command should work under the slogan 'freedom of discussion and dialogue for all forces' and should be based on collective leadership guaranteeing the expulsion of any individual or organisation for individual or spontaneous action." 2

On May 6th 1970 the command issued a statement agreeing that in the future the PLO should be the framework for unity. It was signed by all the organisations including the PFLP. The statement gave the formula as follows:

- A. "All resistance movement groups regard the PLO as the broad framework for national unity.
- B. Matters agreed upon, commit all groups collectively, while matters still pending are left for each group to deal with as it deems fit. Matters related to the security of the revolution commit all groups collectively.
- C. All groups shall participate in the forthcoming Palestinian National Congress and the institutions emanating from the PLO. The question of the percentage representation of each of the organisations ... shall not become a point of issue
- D. By a National Congress decree a Central Committee shall be formed, with the participation of all resistance groups, to assume its leadership role in the resistance movement. The Central Committee ... shall replace the current Unified Command. (It) shall comprise the

1. Text in Fateh Vol. II No. 5, March 14th 1970, p. 7.
2. Al-Hadaf, 7th March 1970, p. 9.

Executive Committee of the PLO, representatives of the commando organisations, the head of the Palestinian National Congress the head of the PLA and some independents.

The Palestinian resistance movement ... agreed that the points listed here below represent, together with the National Charter and the National Congress resolutions, the broad framework for joint political and military action:

1. The working, toiling and all other forces of the Palestinian and Arab masses that have an interest in the stage of national liberation and in the complete liberation of the Palestinian homeland constitute the forces of the Palestinian Revolution.
2. The Palestinian struggle springs from faith in the unity of the people on the Palestinian-Jordanian level as well as from faith that the people of Palestine are part of the Arab nation and that the land of Palestine is part of the Arab land.
3. The Palestinian Revolution is an integral part of the contemporary Arab revolutionary movement and of the world national liberation movement.
4. The enemies of the national liberation movement are represented by Zionism Israel, Imperialism and all lackey forces that are dialectically or consciously linked to Imperialism and colonialism.
5. The objective of the Palestinian struggle is the liberation of all of Palestine to establish a community in which all citizens will have equal rights and obligations within the Arab nations aspirations for unity and progress.
6. Popular liberation war is the main path to the liberation of Palestine.
7. The people of Palestine ... reject all peaceful ... solutions; all reactionary and colonialist conspiracies to establish a Palestinian state on parts of Palestinian territory; and the stifling UN resolution of November 22nd 1967.
8. The Palestinian revolution considers the Arab land surrounding Israel as legitimate ground for struggle, and any attempt to close any Arab country to the Palestinian resistance would be tantamount to treason

9. The Palestinian Revolution declares its complete independence of all Arab regimes, and rejects all attempts to circumscribe, tutor, contain or subordinate it.
10. All resistance groups consent to the formation of a unified military committee to move into a new stage of commando action and popular liberation warfare.
11. We must arm the masses of our Palestinian and Arab people bordering occupied Palestine to protect the resistance ... and to participate effectively in confronting any Zionist-Imperialist invasion of Arab territory bordering Palestine.
12. Israel by virtue of its structure, represents an exclusivist, racist society tied to imperialism. As such the limited progressive forces within it cannot effect any basic change in its ... structure. This is why the aim of the Palestinian Revolution is to dismantle this entity ..." 1

The PFLP accepted this declaration though it was largely a reflection of al-Fateh's policy. The formula for the Central Committee was virtually a return to proportional representation. Through the inclusion of the PLO executive, al-Fateh once more got a majority. Moreover, the first point in the programme rejected any idea of class struggle, while the fifth point avoided any mention of a socialist system for the future state of Palestine. The other points were all parts of al-Fateh's programme from the beginning.

The PFLP was thus brought back into the PLO and sent delegates to the seventh Palestinian National Congress in Cairo in May 1970. It insisted that its participation in the congress was only 'symbolic', 2 and justified its previous attitude blaming the ambiguous programme and bureaucracy of the PLO. The front pressed for the reform of the PLO during the congress and asked that a programme should be drawn up defining relations with the Arab states. It insisted that both reactionary and nationalist Arab states should be fought because they sought either directly or indirectly to undermine the revolution. The front also asked that the PLO programme should undertake to strike at imperialist

1. Text in Fateh Vol. II No. 9, May 29th 1970, p. 4.

2. Al-Hadaf, 30th May 1970.

interests. It maintained its insistence that representation within the PLO should be on a frontal basis. 1 However, its suggestions were rejected.

The main achievements of the congress was the establishment of the Central Committee as defined in the Unified Command declaration quoted above. The congress also decided to set up a unified military command to incorporate some units from each organisation and to standardise guerilla training. In addition to this two committees were set up, one including representatives of the Jordanian progressive forces and the other including representatives of the Lebanese progressive forces, to plan and direct the joint struggle. 2

The seventh congress, like its predecessors, illustrated the dominance of al-Fateh within the PLO. The PFLP was not able to get its programme accepted nor did it manage to amend the policy put forward by al-Fateh. It continued to lose ground in the following months and progress towards unity continued. Soon after the congress al-Fateh began to publish a daily newspaper in 'amman and after eight or nine issues the Central Committee decided to adopt the paper as its official organ. 3 The paper, in the hands of a radical faction of al-Fateh, was praised by all groups even the PFLP:

"The daily Fateh newspaper which started recently in 'amman is achieving continuous success in all Arab markets. Its decisive voice is playing an increasing role in revealing enemy compromise and consolidating the unity of the Palestinian national forces Al-Hadaf warmly salutes al-Fateh and we believe this paper is qualified to play an essential vanguard revolutionary role in the daily information life of the revolution ..." 4

1. ibid.
2. Fateh Vol. II No. 10, June 25th 1970, p. 14.
3. Author's interview with representative of al-Fateh, London March 1970.
4. Al-Hadaf, 26th June 1970. This crisis like all previous ones was resolved through agreement, but not before it developed into a military confrontation in which the fedayeen maintained the upper hand. The provisions of the agreement were much as on previous occasions. There was a difference in this crisis in that the PFLP defied the Unified Command and held hostage the personnel of the Intercontinental Hotel in 'amman, causing great embarrassment to the Jordanian Government. Agreement was reached on 10th July with the Government giving more concessions than before, allowing light arms in the towns. Text in Fateh, Vol. II No. 12, August 5th 1970, p. 7; Keesings (1970), pp. 24059-60.

Although it seemed that unity was about to be realised, this was more formal than real. Groups were still undertaking independent political and military action and were publishing their own newspapers. Before the few hesitating steps towards unity could be consolidated, President Nasir accepted the Rogers peace plan. The resistance movement, though undoubtedly more united than before, was not strong enough to bear this blow. It rapidly disintegrated into its various disparate groups. Al-Fateh, while attacking the peace plan itself did not attack Nasir personally, realising that such a move would only result in a loss of support, since Nasir was still popular. The fronts however organised a demonstration in 'amman at which Nasir was strongly attacked 1 and as a result clashed with two other groups which supported Nasir's move as 'clever tactics.' 2

It was during this period of tension and uncertainty that the PFLP staged their spectacular hijacking of four planes to Jordan. 3 Their membership in the Central Committee was frozen for this action and they were severely criticised. However, it was too late and King Husain took advantage of the incident using it as a pretext to attack the resistance movement as a whole. He sent his entire army against the guerillas and a violent civil war resulted. Moreover, he had western support for his actions. 4

As a result of the civil war and the unpreparedness of the resistance movement, the guerillas lost their hold in 'amman and were forced to return to underground activity. Their morale was severely damaged and in the succeeding year they lost control of all of Jordan. By the end of 1971 they could act openly only in south Lebanon and in the Golan Heights and even then

1. July 25th 1970.
2. The Arab Palestine Organisation (APO) which was led by Ahmed Za'rur and had split from Jibril, and the Action Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP) led by Dr. Issam Sartawi, which had split from al-Fateh. See Table II and IV.
3. Peter Snow and David Philips, Leila's Hijack War, passim.
4. ibid.

they were restricted by the governments of those countries. In a few weeks they lost what had taken more than ten years to build. The appearance of unity was seen for what it was, a mere facade, and even al-Fateh began to suffer from internal discord. All the groups devoted their time and energy to analysing the September civil war in Jordan. They criticised themselves and each other, sought justification for their actions and generally became involved in a profound reassessment of the situation. It remains to be seen whether they will learn anything from their past mistakes and will build up their movement again to a point where it can be a power in the Middle East.

CHAPTER SIX: ASSESSMENT OF AL-FATEH AND THE FRONTS

The four most important fedayeen groups are al-Fateh, as-Saiqah, the Democratic Front and the Popular Front. All these groups can be said to have ideologies as defined in the introduction. They each offer an explanation for the situation in which the Palestinians find themselves and each tries to provide a solution for the Palestinians' problems. Each group interprets the situation differently and therefore the solutions offered are also different.

The two largest groups in terms of organised membership and popular support are al-Fateh and as-Saiqah. 1 The ideological differences between these two have been pointed out in previous chapters. They concern the relative importance of the Palestinian and Arab revolutions and the structure of the future state of Palestine. For as-Saiqah the Arab revolution is the priority and the Palestinian revolution merely a means to that end. Moreover, as-Saiqah insists on the socialist nature of the future state of Palestine. 2 Al-Fateh, on the other hand, believes the Palestinian revolution to be of prime importance and refuses to consider the nature of the Palestinian state as of any consequence at this stage.

The differences between as-Saiqah and the fronts seem to be more concerned with strategy and tactics than with basic ideology. 3 As-Saiqah from the beginning tried to avoid involvement in purely ideological disputes. It co-operated with al-Fateh and the PLO in all their attempts to set up machinery for military co-ordination and to establish a framework for national unity.

As-Saiqah only states its views when absolutely necessary and consequently documentation is relatively sparse. For this reason, and since as-Saiqah's ideology was never an obstacle to the development of the Palestinian revolution or the achievement of national unity, this chapter will be concerned only with the fronts and al-Fateh.

1. This is based upon the author's observations in 'amman in the summer of 1969 and also upon the allocations of seats in the Palestine National Congress which is decided according to the strength of the groups (Table V).
2. See above Ch. 5 pp. 120-121.
3. See above Ch. 5 pp. 120-126.

Both the Popular Front (PFLP) and the Democratic Front (PDFLP) have conducted an unceasing propaganda war against al-Fateh, criticising and challenging, both directly and indirectly, the policy and personnel of the organisation. The standpoint from which both fronts launch their attacks is their Marxist-Leninist theory, although, before the June war, the parent organisation, the ANM, was to the right of most of the other parties in the Arab world. 1 Before we consider the differences between the fronts and al-Fateh, it might be useful to list the points on which they are in agreement.

First, all groups consider Israel as an imperialist base in the Middle East and see its creation and maintenance as the work of first British and then American imperialism. There is consequently an anti-imperialist orientation about the entire resistance movement and a certain sympathy towards the communist bloc. The Palestinian revolution is seen as part of an international third world revolution against imperialism. It is a national liberation revolution.

Second, armed struggle and the organisation of the masses is generally accepted as the means for liberating Palestine. Any international pressure for compromise or for a peaceful solution is rejected.

Third, the aim of the armed struggle is the creation of a democratic state where Jews, Muslims and Christians will enjoy equal rights and duties. All groups are careful to distinguish between the Jews as a religious-cultural group and Zionism as a political movement.

These three points are the essence of the Palestinian revolution. All were contained in al-Fateh's original programme drawn up in 1958. 2 They only became acceptable to the Ba'th and the ANM after the defeat of June 1967. They were then adopted by the groups based on these parties and the groups themselves became even more radical in their outlook.

The differences between al-Fateh and the fronts arose mainly over how best to achieve the agreed aim - the liberation of Palestine through armed struggle. There were three main areas

1. See above Ch. 2 pp. 28-32.
2. See above Ch. 3 p. 49.

of disagreement. What political and military strategy and tactics to employ first with respect to the Arab states, and second with respect to the different classes and groups in Arab society. The other point of debate concerned the best type of organisation for the Palestinians to adopt. We will consider these three areas of difference in turn.

The Palestinian Revolution and the Arab regimes

As we have seen, al-Fateh's position on this question is that the Palestinian revolution, though part of the Arab revolution, is a prerequisite for Arab liberation and must have priority. This attitude made al-Fateh unique in its ideas when, throughout the Arab world, it was generally accepted that the liberation of Palestine could only come through Arab unity.

In order to protect itself in the early stages when Arab hostility was very strong and the movement very weak, al-Fateh raised the slogan, 'non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Arab states.' It continued to press this policy in spite of growing criticism from the fronts.

Originally the slogan was accepted by all the groups, including the PFLP before its split. 1 However, as tension mounted between the two factions of the front the left wing was obliged to adopt attitudes which would distinguish it both politically and ideologically from the right wing. As a specific point of difference it categorically rejected the policy of non-intervention. Criticism of the slogan was included in the left-wing's programme of August 1968: 2

"How did the movement translate this slogan?
It is clear that the Palestinian resistance movement is not required to take the place of the national liberation movement of each Arab state But it is also clear that the slogan ... should also mean that the Palestinian resistance should interfere with whatever affects the Palestine problem in the policies adopted by the Arab regimes

The Popular Front openly condemns this slogan in the context in which it has been practised for the last fifteen months. The resistance movement is not expected to substitute for the national liberation movements in the Arab countries but it is expected to criticise the stands adopted by Arab governments towards the Palestine

1. See Ch. 5. p.122. The PFLP statement issued on the occasion of the Jibril split specifically denied Jibril's charges that the Front had adopted a policy of intervention in the affairs of the Arab states.

2. Text translated in Kadi, op cit (Resistance), pp. 145-171.

problem and put blame on those responsible for the (1967) defeat."

The August platform not only implied that the Palestinian movement should on occasions interfere in the internal affairs of Arab states, it also rejected any support which the Arab regimes might offer the movement.

"Through its dependence on the Arab regimes for arms, the resistance movement has allowed itself to be transformed into a tactical weapon of pressure in the hands of the regimes - a tactical means of putting pressure on imperialism and Israel in order to attain a political settlement of the Palestinian problem. It is hoped that the concessions demanded by Israel and imperialism as a price for application of the Security Council resolution ... will be minimised as a result." 1

Later, when the left wing formed itself into the Democratic Front, it adopted the provisions of the August platform 2 and increased its criticism of the Arab regimes. It accused them of attempting to split the Resistance movement:

"The Arab regimes, at this time, are setting up nominal organisations within the resistance movement and are backing the weakest groups These regimes, when they cannot control the Palestinian movement in conformity with their policies and programmes try to plant dynamite inside the movement to explode when the decisive hour comes, the hour of peaceful liquidation The Arab regimes try to exploit the contradictions between the Palestinian groups by backing some and denouncing others, forcing many to conform to their programmes and policies

The Palestinian movement denounces the attitude of many Arab regimes which donate money to some movements and not to others because this serves to increase the splits in the movement." 3

1. ibid, pp. 159-65.
2. Henceforth the platform, when quoted, will be attributed to the Democratic Front, although it was issued before the split.
3. Democratic Front, Harakah al-Magawamah al-Falastiniyyah fi Waqi'ha ar-Rahin, pp. 125 and 149. Translation by the author.

The Democratic Front went as far as to attack Nasir, though without mentioning him by name:

"The Palestinian resistance movement must put as a priority the struggle against liquidationist schemes and should prepare to overthrow them. One of the best ways of doing this is to expose these schemes and those who support them ..." 1

This, then was the position of the Democratic Front with respect to the Arab regimes. After the split what was left of the Popular Front did not totally reject the August platform but tried to adopt an even more radical position. It accepted the criticisms against the Arab regimes and while it differentiated between traditional and progressive regimes, it condemned them both. In relation to the 'reactionary' regimes, 'Jordan, Lebanon and other Arab states'; the Popular Front considered:

"... the relation of the armed struggle - Palestinian at the moment and Arab in the future - is one of conflict with these regimes in spite of any tactical temporary positions that may be forced on both sides." 2

With respect to the progressive regimes, especially the UAR, the Popular Front, while acknowledging the advances they had made, stated:

"... the June defeat is not only a military defeat but also a defeat for these regimes and their programmes and demonstrates their inability to undertake the political, military, economic and ideological mobilisation which can resist and defeat neo-colonialism and its plans in our homeland." 3

The distinguishing feature of Popular Front ideology was the insistence that the battle was not only with Israel and Zionism but also directly with Imperialism and Arab reaction:

"The road which will lead to victory is, armed struggle against Israel and the imperialist interests in our homeland, extending the front of armed struggle which resists Arab reaction and the interests and bases of Imperialism in the Arab homeland ..." 4

1. ibid, p. 96.

2. Kadi (trans), 'Popular Front Report of February 1969', op cit (Resistance), pp. 208-9.

3. ibid, p. 213.

4. ibid, p. 207.

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"The road which will lead to victory is, armed struggle against Israel and the imperialist interests in our homeland, extending the front of armed struggle which resists Arab reaction and the interests and bases of Imperialism in the Arab homeland" 1

The fronts' attitude to the Arab regimes were thus totally hostile, blaming them for past failures and accusing them of working for the destruction of the Palestinian resistance or at the very least trying to gain control of it. By contrast, al-Fateh's attitude was one of moderation. Al-Fateh defended its adoption and retention of the non-intervention policy as follows:

"This policy is objectively sound since it requires al-Fateh not to concern itself with who shall become Prime Minister in this country or that. However, there is in reality an interconnection between Palestinian action and Arab action, and consequently we have always proclaimed that we are part of the Arab revolution We believe that none of the progressive policies announced by the Arab nation is capable of implementation except through our battle and the liberation of Palestine How can we build a progressive society in our country while we are having to allocate all our income and productive effort to the procurement of military hardware for use against the colonising aggressor? Therefore this policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Arab countries does not preclude interconnection between the Arab countries and Palestine." 2

Al-Fateh not only refrained from direct attack on the Arab regimes but even considered co-operation as a possibility, at least in theory.

1. ibid, p. 207.

2. Al-Fateh, op cit (Dialogue), pp. 52-3.

"We have our own clear-cut concept of co-ordination from which we do not deviate. In our view, co-ordination is first of all anything contributed to the resistance movement by way of support, assistance and training. We do not refuse any of these things but welcome them heartily. However, we are not prepared to be part of a regional co-ordination plan.... If we find Arab regimes which have a serious plan for the liberation of Palestine, and want us to be part of this plan, then we have no objection at all. But if certain Arab regimes want to contain us under the name of co-ordination and the preservation of their regional frontiers then, frankly, we will refuse." 1

Here then, we have two very different points of view with al-Fateh consistently rejecting any direct or indirect action which might incur the hostility of the Arab states and the fronts increasing their criticism of and accusations against the regimes. Let us now attempt to assess the validity of these two approaches, remembering that the aim of all the groups was the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

At the beginning, when the conditions for the development of any specifically Palestine-oriented movement were extremely unfavourable, the policy of non-intervention was a wise and necessary one. Without the utmost care to reassure the Arab regimes of its peaceful intentions towards them, the movement would have had to face even harsher repression than it did. 2 In this early stage, the fronts did not exist and their parent organisation, the ANM still believed implicitly in Arab unity and Nasirism. Since the front was formed only after the June 1967 war and took no part in the difficult initial stages of forming a Palestinian movement, there was no real reason why it should understand the importance of the non-intervention policy.

Once the Palestinian movement had gained some kind of acceptance, the continued application of the slogan enabled its members to work with Palestinians in different Arab stages and to mobilise them. The Arab states also provided a rich source of finance and arms for the movement and gave it the chance to

1. ibid, p. 85.

2. See above Ch. 4 p. 92 fn. 2.

build itself into a relatively powerful organisation. At this stage, al-Fateh skillfully exploited inter-Arab rivalries to gain as much as possible from every regime. It equally skillfully avoided becoming linked to any particular state or become a tool of Arab policy. In spite of their allegations against al-Fateh, it was the fronts which eventually became bound up with specific regimes. The PFLP became allied with Iraq because of previous rivalry with the Syrian Ba'th 1 and in answer to this, the PDFLP established good relations with Syria. 2 The fronts were used by both regimes in their rivalry with Egypt.

Whenever disputes with the Arab regimes did arise, it was al-Fateh, as the most powerful organisation, that had to resolve them. In the early stages, it never allowed any dispute to reach the point of open confrontation (as in November 1968 in Jordan and April 1969 in Lebanon). 3 However, the movement was equally not prepared to give any ground and the agreements concluded with Arab governments were always to the advantage of the Palestinians. 4 Their main effect was to give legal and official Arab recognition to the movement and its right to independent action. In October 1969 in Lebanon and in February and June 1970 in Jordan, the movement showed the Arab regimes that if forced to open confrontation it would not compromise on anything of fundamental importance to its future development.

On the other hand, the fronts' extremist actions were responsible, on at least two occasions for actually precipitating crises with the Arab regimes. It was the PFLP attack on an El Al plane in Zurich which caused Israel's raid on Beirut airport in December 1968. This in turn led to the fall of the Lebanese Government and to a political crisis which eventually developed into open confrontation between the Lebanese Army and the

1. See above Ch. 5 p. 121 fn. 1.

2. See above Ch. 5 p. 124 fn. 1.

3. See above Ch. 5 p. 129 fn. 1 and p. 137 fn. 3.

4. ibid.

Palestinians. 1 Likewise, the fronts' actions in June 1970, holding as hostages the personnel of the 'amman Intercontinental hotel, together with their subsequent hijackings, gave King Husain the pretext for the showdown in September. 2

Finally we come to consider the advisability of openly attacking specific regimes and Arab leaders, even though the attacks might be justified. It is obvious that such attacks will not predispose the regimes to be more tolerant to the Palestinian movement, but in addition to that the fronts' attacks, particularly on Nasir, had an adverse effect on the Palestinian movement itself. Public demonstrations and declarations against Nasir after his acceptance of the Rogers plan 3 not only resulted in the closing down of facilities for the Palestinians in the UAR but also split mass support for the Palestinian movement down the middle. Nasir still had a large personal following in the Arab world and among the Palestinians in particular. Al-Fateh had realised this from the start and although it attacked, for instance the UN resolution and the Rogers plan, it never personally attacked any Arab leader.

Al-Fateh's policy of caution and diplomacy was, it would seem, correct for the formative period of the Palestinian movement. It enabled the movement to develop relatively unhindered to a point where it became a real political and military force in the Middle East. However, al-Fateh should have been aware that the Arab regimes would not allow the process of development to continue to a point where it became a threat to their existence. It should have realised that a time would come when the non-intervention policy would become a brake on its growth. The power of the movement in Jordan was such that King Husain was merely looking for the right opportunity to strike. The fronts gave him that opportunity in 1970. The fact that the Palestinians lost the battle must be the responsibility of al-Fateh as the best organised, best equipped and richest of the groups. In the September 1970

1. See above Ch. 5 p. 137 fn. 3.

2. See above Ch. 5 p. 146 fn. 4.

3. See above Ch. 5 p. 147.

battle they were pushed out of 'amman and in the subsequent year they lost their other bases in the country. If al-Fateh had either taken the initiative in bringing down the regime in Jordan or had at least had proper contingency plans for the showdown which they must have seen coming, they could have taken over the country. 1 Thus the fronts' charges against al-Fateh are in one sense correct. It became rigid in its outlook and did not change its policy when the proper time for such a change came.

The Palestinian Revolution and Arab Society

Both the Democratic and Popular Front adopt traditional Marxist classifications in deciding which sections of Arab society are to be considered friends and which enemies. The Democratic Front adopts a rigid formula which follows the traditionally accepted ideas of Marxist class analysis. It believes that the petty bourgeoisie has control of both the Arab and Palestinian liberation movements and that because of this they are weak and ineffective:

"The June defeat put the programme of the petty bourgeoisie and its leadership to the test The defeat proved their failure ... to solve the dilemmas of national liberation in an under-developed country in this age ...

Thus the petty bourgeoisie was confronted with two alternatives, either to adopt the Vietnamese-Cuban course of action to face the consequences of the June war or to retreat continuously before the forces of counter-revolution and accept the liquidationist UN Security Council resolution of 22 November. The petty bourgeoisie has chosen what best serves its interests ... that is, the Security Council resolution ...

The Palestinian liberation movement is of the same ideological class and political structure as that of the Arab national liberation movement led by the petty bourgeoisie. At the same time it represents one of the weakest groups ... because of several subjective and objective conditions, in particular the contradictions of the Palestinian problem and the large number of

1. The author was in Jordan in the summer of 1969. At this time the Jordanian authorities appeared to have totally lost control of the country. The fedayeen were policing not only the refugee camps but also 'amman. They were directing traffic, setting up road blocks wherever they wished, carrying arms openly in the main streets and generally doing whatever they wanted without any check on their activities at all.

unproductive human beings among the dispersed Palestinian people ...

The petty bourgeoisie, leading the Arab liberation movement, was able to eliminate the forces of feudalism and the bourgeoisie from a leading position within the national movement and was able to expose the alliance of these forces with colonialism and imperialism. Yet the Palestinian petty bourgeoisie failed to remove this incapacitated bourgeois class from playing a national role. The Palestinian right, supported by the Arab right, was able to dominate the resistance movement" 1

Thus, for the Democratic Front, the enemies of the revolution are not only the feudalists and bourgeoisie class, but also the 'petty bourgeoisie', both on the Arab and Palestinian level.

The Popular Front also adopts a classical Marxist class analysis in deciding its allies and enemies within Arab society. However it is much more definite:

"Defining Arab reaction as part of the enemy's forces is a matter of paramount importance. The absence of this fact implies an unclear vision of the enemy and of the forces which support it among us." 2

The Popular Front describes each of the Palestinian classes and assesses its value as an ally. The core of the revolution is the workers and peasants:

"These classes daily suffer from the oppressive exploitation practised by world imperialism and its allies in the Arab homeland. Workers and peasants are the ones who fill the camps of misery in which the great majority of the Palestinians live. When one talks about the camps, this means in fact talking about a class structure which represents the workers, peasants and destitute bourgeois Palestinians. The Palestinian bourgeois class does not live in the camps." 3

The front describes the Palestinian petty bourgeoisie as:

1. Kadi (trans), "August Platform", op cit (Resistance), pp. 166-7.
2. Popular Front, "Political Report", Kadi, op cit (Resistance), p. 188.
3. ibid, pp. 194-5.

"... craftsmen and manual workers, small intellectuals such as students, elementary and high school teachers, small officials lawyers, small shopkeepers, engineers and physicians ...

Generally, it could be said that the petty bourgeoisie could be an ally of the revolution ... during the stage of democratic national liberation. But such an alliance should be on an enlightened basis to avoid it infiltrating into positions of leadership and subjecting the revolution to vacillation, deviation and stagnation." 1

Finally, the Palestinian bourgeoisie:

"The Palestinian bourgeoisie is in reality a commercial and banking bourgeoisie whose interests are linked with the ... interests of imperialism The Palestinian bourgeoisie which is living ... under Zionist occupation - even if it has not overtly joined Israel - is not a force of the revolution. It will objectively remain the class through which the enemy will try to abort the revolution

As for the Palestinian bourgeoisie now living outside Palestine, its interests, at the moment, are not contradictory to guerilla action as long as it remains within a limited ... field of vision. Thus occasionally (this class) supports guerilla action with part of its surplus wealth. But the revolutionary development of the Palestinian national movement ... will make the bourgeoisie adopt an attitude which will ... conform to its class interests." 2

For the Popular Front then, the forces of revolution are the workers and peasants and sections of the petty bourgeoisie. The majority of the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie itself, however, are not considered reliable allies.

In contrast to both fronts' approaches, al-Fateh does not use a Marxist class framework in deciding its allies. It adopts a pragmatic attitude:

1. ibid, pp. 195-9.

2. ibid, pp. 199-202.

"The enemies of the revolution are numerous but we have to know the main enemy, isolate and destroy it. Then the revolution will choose a second enemy to concentrate on and confront The friends of the revolution vary. There are temporary friends who may become enemies in the future. There are other long-term friends who may lag behind the revolution in its development. There are also permanent friends who will be able to support the revolution under all circumstances." 1

It recognises the weakness in the fronts' approach:

"There are classes, or sections of classes now which were unrecognised in the days of Karl Marx. Did Marx study a class called the displaced persons class which has appeared among the Palestinians? The displaced person is a labourer who used to work as such in his country, but now he no longer works as a labourer. The displaced person is a farmer no longer engaged in farming. How do we evaluate this? There is thus a displaced persons class which imposes its presence and cannot be defined according to traditional standards, although its circumstances and origin may be of a revolutionary character." 2

Because of its refusal to approach the problem on the bases of classes, al-Fateh is severely criticised by the fronts. However, we must first see whether a class analysis in the traditional Marxist manner is valid for the situation of the Palestinians before we can decide whether the criticism is valid or not.

Nineteenth century Marxist analyses were based upon European industrialised society. The categories used, although valuable and basic, were not meant to be applied automatically to other societies in different circumstances. Lenin himself realised this:

1. Al-Fateh, "Political Struggle", Kadi, op cit (Resistance), pp. 111-2.
2. Al-Fateh, op cit (Dialogue), pp. 53-4.

"Relying on the general theory and practice of communism, you must adapt yourselves to specific conditions such as do not exist in the European countries. You must be able to apply theory and practice to conditions in which the bulk of the population are peasants and in which the task is to wage a struggle against medieval survivals and not against capitalism You will have to base yourselves on the bourgeois nationalism which is awakening and must awaken among these people and which has its historical justification." 1

Both the fronts took over the categories used in traditional Marxist class analysis without considering their aptness to the Palestinian situation. The categories working class, peasantry, bourgeoisie etc. when used in true Marxist analysis are economic terms based on the material conditions and occupations of the members of the class concerned. It is therefore not possible to describe the refugee camps as being filled with workers and peasants, especially since many of the refugees were born in the camps and have never known any other way of life. Even the older inhabitants of the refugee camps have, for the most part, not worked for more than 20 years. They represent a new phenomena which cannot be fitted into the old class categories.

The Palestinian petty bourgeoisie referred to by the fronts does not exist in the true Marxist sense either. The Palestinians can only form part of the petty bourgeoisie in the countries where they are resident. They are not a separate class. The same would apply to Palestinian capitalists since there is no state of Palestine, no separate recognisable political entity, in which they can own the capital.

None of the groups has undertaken a thorough analysis of Palestinian society. The best attempt at a class analysis is contained in a book by an Arab Marxist, Munir Shafiq. He gives some general characteristics which he believes could be used as a basis for a proper study in the future. 2

1. V.I. Lenin, "Address to the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East", (2 November 1919) Selected Works, pp. 514-5.
2. Munir Shafiq, Hawl at-Taaqad wal Mumararah fi ath-Thawrah al-Falastiniyyah.

The first 'class described by Shafiq are the Palestinians expelled in 1948, whatever their class before that time, who became the inhabitants of the refugee camps. These Palestinians,

"... after the loss of an economic base ... formed a new class, if one can use that term in speaking of a group outside the forces and relations of production and outside the existence of either state or society. It is perhaps more accurate to describe them as crushed refugee masses, since they own nothing, do not participate in the productive process and live under regimes as foreigners." 1

Shafiq then discusses the second category, the group of Palestinian capitalists who have grown up since the 1948 defeat:

"They do not comprise a Palestinian class in the scientific sense since they lack unity. They do not work in one land under one social, political and economic regime

These capitalists of Palestinian origin are exploiting Arab workers not Palestinians. This makes the form of contradictions within the Palestinian revolution of a very special type needing deep study It is a new phenomenon." 2

Turning to the Palestinian workers, Shafiq points out that,

"The Palestinian workers, although they are a small part of the population as a whole, are dispersed in many countries from Jordan to the oil states to West Germany They do not live in one land and face one capitalist class. They do not enjoy the simplest civil rights. They work by virtue of permits and the host country can expel them without reason The Palestinian workers cannot organise trade unions to defend their rights or struggle for their daily economic interests ... because they do not work as one unity The General Union of Palestinian Workers, organised after the establishment of the PLO does not struggle as a trade union. It is more like the mass women's or youth organisations." 3

The same analysis is applied to the Palestinian petty bourgeoisie. They are also linked to the economic system of the host country. Finally, Shafiq considers the peasantry.

1. ibid, pp. 67-9; (translation by author).
2. ibid, pp. 69-71.
3. ibid, pp. 72-4.

"The Palestinian peasantry is much smaller than in any other Asian or Arab country. The villages remaining to the Palestinians are either in the West Bank, Gaza or the occupied territory of Palestine (Israel). The villages were deserted by the young elements after 1948 because of the poverty, the occupying power's policy of terrorism and work opportunities elsewhere." 1

None of the groups attempts a proper analysis of Palestinian society like Shafiq's. While the fronts try to impose invalid analytical frameworks on the situation, al-Fateh remains silent. As an organisation it never attempts class analysis. Shafiq is a supporter of al-Fateh and a strong critic of the fronts, although he is a Marxist. 2 His ideas may therefore be taken as reflecting the thought of at least some sections of the movement. However, it should be emphasised that al-Fateh's failure to undertake class analysis is not mere oversight but a calculated policy. 3 In this way, the movement avoids alienating important and rich sections of the community from which it seeks support, that is to say, the entire Palestinian population.

Since we have defined an ideology as something which seeks to explain the situation of a particular group we can say that all the groups' ideologies fail to some extent in this respect. None of them have attempted really to understand or analyse the fragmented Palestinian society of which they are part. The fronts merely offer stilted explanations bearing no relation to reality and based on a superficial and to some extent faulty understanding of Marxism. Al-Fateh on the other hand although it recognises that traditional Marxist class analyses are not valid for the Palestinian situation, does not attempt an analysis of its own for fear of alienating certain sections of the Palestinian population.

1. ibid, p. 76.

2. Based on author's interviews.

3. ibid.

Palestinian Organisation

All the Palestinian groups agree that the Palestinian revolution is passing through a democratic national liberation stage. It is not a socialist revolution. Perhaps the best examples of such revolutions are the Chinese revolution during its phase of struggle against the Japanese and the Vietnamese struggle against first the French and then the Americans. All the groups and in particular the fronts, cite these examples frequently in their writings.

All the groups agree that the creation of a national front embracing most sections of Palestinian society is necessary. The Democratic Front sees it as an umbrella grouping different class organisations:

"It is natural that each of the people's classes should build for itself a political organisation which defines its programme and interests Although we are conscious of this fact, we find it of fundamental importance to call for the unity of all national groups ... because national liberation achieves their aims and does not contradict them at this stage." 1

However, it is also necessary:

"... to openly criticise the Arab national liberation movement in all its regimes and organisations besides cutting all alliances that have a feudalist, big-bourgeoisie, rightist class nature and declaring an end to these alliances openly and clearly." 2

The Popular Front adopts a similar attitude:

"We should work for the mobilisation of workers and peasants in one revolutionary political organisation with the ideology of scientific socialism The petty bourgeoisie will not join such an organisation Thus it will join those Palestinian organisations which raise general liberal slogans, avoid clarity of thought and analysis of class structure In other words the petty bourgeoisie will fill ... the ranks of al-Fateh and the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

1. Democratic Front, op cit (Harakah al-Maqawamah), p. 124.
2. Democratic Front, Hawla Azmah Harakah al-Maqawamah al-Falastiniyyah, p. 149. (Translation by author).

We should work for the establishment of a national front with al-Fateh and the PLO which can offer the war of liberation the necessary class alliance and protect the right of each class to view the war and plan for it in accordance with its class vision on the other." 1

In contrast the approach of al-Fateh is again pragmatic and flexible:

"Every nation which is passing through the phase of national struggle needs to find a common formula to unify its efforts. Thus the creation of a national front is a fundamental determining factor in preparing the basic conditions for the continuation of the revolution and its victory. The fragmentation of our society and the dispersion of our people has contributed to their weakness vis-a-vis their enemies. There are many forces and groups who are loyal to our nation, but because of their political beliefs and social status, cannot join the revolutionary organisations. There are other forces and groups who can, at one stage, participate, in one form or another alongside the revolution. Thus the revolution in its different phases should establish a national front which will fulfill the aims of each stage In the first stage the national front can include all popular groupings, but in its more developed stages the front becomes clearer and more revolutionary so that it expresses the aims of the revolution. A large number of the allies of yesterday become the enemies of today, many of the allies today will become the enemies of tomorrow." 2

Al-Fateh's conception of a front is a dynamic one, taking into account the existing situation of the Palestinians and the changes which will occur as the revolution develops. The movement is never specific in referring to its enemies or allies. It does not define them once and for all like the fronts. The fronts do admit the need for an alliance with the 'bourgeoisie' and 'petty bourgeoisie', but it is difficult to see how such an alliance can succeed for even a short time when they have made it quite clear that these groups will ultimately

1. Popular Front, "Political Report", Kadi, op cit (Resistance), p. 205.
2. Al-Fateh, "Political Struggle", in Kadi, op cit (Resistance), pp. 111-2.

be their bitter enemies. To be more precise, the fronts have not learned the art of diplomacy. Even if they intend to fight these sections of Palestinian society in the future it is not to their advantage to say so while they still need to form an alliance with them. The fronts' Marxist ideology may indicate that these sections are potential traitors to the revolution but there is no need to broadcast this and thus make these sections withdraw their support in the early stages. An ideology is essentially a guide to action. It should not be employed to make the realisation of certain aims more difficult, in this case the formation of a wide national front.

The leaders of the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions, so revered by the Palestinian groups, did not make such mistakes. To quote Mao-Tse Tung:

"It is an accepted principle that in the anti-Japanese war everything must be subordinated to the armed resistance. Therefore the interests of the class struggle must not conflict with, but must be subordinated to, the war of resistance." 1

More explicitly:

"To reject the participation of the bourgeoisie in the revolution on the grounds that it can only be temporary and to describe the alliance with anti-Japanese sections of the bourgeoisie (in a semi-colonial country) as capitulation is ... an approach with which we cannot agree." 2

If we look at the Vietnamese revolution, we find that the VietMinh when fighting the French did not call only on the workers and peasants to join the struggle or even imply that there were sections of the community which would not be welcome in the national front. The Vietnamese communist party proposed that:

"Within the country the entire people must be united. The national front against French aggression must be consolidated and developed day by day. To wage a long resistance war the entire people must be united and single-minded." 3

1. Mao-Tse-Tung, 'The role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War' (October 1938) Selected Works Vol. III, p. 32.
2. Mao-Tse-Tung, 'Win the Masses in their Millions for the Anti-Japanese National United Front', Selected Works Vol. I, pp. 290-1.
3. Truong Chinh, The Resistance Will Win, p. 42.

The communist-led National Liberation Front in south Vietnam has adopted a similar principle in fighting the Americans. Its five-point programme adopted in March 1965 contains the aim:

"To unite the entire people, arm the entire people, continue to march forward heroically and be resolved to fight and defeat the US aggressors and Vietnamese traitors." 1

The NLF itself is comprised of many different organisations from all social and economic levels. Among some 15 mass organisations, like students' and womens' unions there is one called, 'The Group of Traders and Industrialists Opposing the US-Diem Dictatorship.' In addition there are three political parties including the 'Democratic Party', four religious organisations, two movements representing national minorities and the liberation armed forces. 2

All these examples would seem to illustrate that any party which seriously sets about pursuing a national liberation war, cannot afford to discount the middle classes of the society merely because they are considered on the basis of theory to be unreliable or vacillating. Of the Palestinian groups only al-Fateh seems aware of this and as a result it is criticised by the fronts and described as a petty-bourgeois organisation. It is labelled a liberal organisation because of the moderation of its slogans.

If we look at its achievements in practice, it is difficult to see al-Fateh as a petty-bourgeois or middle class organisation. In the first place, these terms cannot be applied to the refugees in the camps, and that is where al-Fateh is most popular, rather than in the cities and towns or among intellectuals. 3 Al-Fateh alone provided for the refugees a relatively extensive network of social services in the educational, medical and financial fields. It began the armed struggle and built up the movement from nothing.

1. 'Fundamental Problems', Vietnamese Studies No. 12, p. 168.
2. ibid, pp. 168-9.
3. Based on observations of author in Jordan in 1969.

The slogans which the fronts object to so strongly and label 'liberal' are perhaps one of the secrets of al-Fateh's initial success. The simple moderate slogans had meaning for the ordinary Palestinians in the camps. Far more than any other group, al-Fateh could communicate with the refugees because it did not adopt terminology which was meaningless and confusing to the poor and uneducated refugees.

On the question of organisation then al-Fateh was at least in the beginning more successful than the fronts. It managed to mobilise the majority of Palestinians in support of the armed struggle and adopted an approach which could be understood by the inhabitants of the camps. It gave them what they wanted - a future to believe in, and in more concrete terms, skeleton social services.

We have now considered the fronts and al-Fateh from three angles, their attitudes towards the Arab regimes, towards Arab society and towards organisation. On the first point we have seen that while al-Fateh's attitude made possible the emergence of the Palestinian movement in the face of Arab hostility, its failure to change at the proper time caused the defeat of the resistance in Jordan in 1970. On the second point, we have shown that while the fronts attempted to impose an analytical framework on Arab society which was not appropriate, al-Fateh did nothing at all and failed to undertake any analysis whatsoever. Finally on the question of organisation we have seen that the fronts were so determined to spread their Marxist ideology that they did not approach the formation of a national front with proper caution. Al-Fateh, on the other hand tried to keep support on as wide a basis as possible, and because of this found it much easier to grow. It made a point of not alienating any specific groups. It is, of course, possible to argue that al-Fateh carried this policy too far and allowed certain unrevolutionary elements to gain positions of power within the movement, and that this was one of the reasons why al-Fateh was slow to move in the crisis of September 1970 in Jordan. Whether or not this is true, bad organisation was certainly one of the factors which led to the defeat of the resistance, bad organisation in the sense of lack of communication and preparations. Although al-Fateh gave the Palestinians an

identity and set up political, social and military institution for them, it failed to develop proper protection for these institutions which crumbled before the onslaught of the Jordanian Army. As the largest and most powerful of the groups, al-Fateh must take the responsibility for the failure.

Naji 'allush points out in his analysis of the September events that two such contradictory forces as the Palestinian resistance and the Jordanian Government could not co-exist in the same country indefinitely. 1 Al-Fateh as the most powerful of the groups should have made preparations for the confrontation which was bound to come.

'allush says that the fact that 'amman defied the Jordanian Army at all was not because it was expecting an attack but simply because the masses decided to fight. 2 Munir Shafiq, in another article on the September events insists that if the necessary preparations had been made, the resistance could have won. 3 However, instead of dealing with dull practicalities, the groups had been absorbed in theoretical disputes:

"The Palestinian resistance became the arena for ... theoretical political disputes and for a war of slogans Those who spoke about "revolutionary theory" never bothered to discuss the problem of shelters for the masses or of ensuring their participation in the event of an armed clash Such issues were considered trifles compared with discussions on ... the laws of class struggle in history, the problem of non-intervention in Arab affairs etc ..." 4

It would seem then that the ideologies of the various Palestinian groups were ultimately their downfall. Because of failure to agree on a single approach to the problem of liberating Palestine, the energy of the resistance was diverted from the really important matters in hand. The fronts, which were instrumental in bringing about the September civil war, had not made any preparations to face the crisis they sought to provoke.

1. Naji 'allush, "Ma'araka Aylul wal Haqa'iq alati ak-Kadaha", Dirasat 'arabiyyah No. 11, September 1971, pp. 2-6 and 148-152.
2. ibid.
3. Munir Shafiq, "Ma'araqah Aylul 'askariyyan", Al-Magawamah al-Falastiniyyah al-Waqi'a wa Tawago'at (Dirasat Arabiyyah - special issue July 1971), pp. 159-67.
4. ibid, pp. 163-4.

Al-Fateh, on the other hand, although it did not seek a crisis should have made contingency plans, since it was obvious it would happen sooner or later.

Palestinian nationalism gave the Palestinians an identity and an aim - the liberation of their country. As developed by al-Fateh, however, the ideology did not properly analyse the situation or see the dangers facing the revolution. The other groups pointed to al-Fateh's failings but could offer no real alternative. They simply applied old and invalid theories to the Palestinian situation which were equally unable to provide a guide to action.

From this we can say that an ideology, as well as defining the group at which it is directed, should accurately analyse the situation of that group. It should give that group something to work for and should work out the most efficient means of achieving its aims. Since within the Palestinian resistance movement, there were several different methods put forward for achieving liberation, it is no wonder that the movement failed. Al-Fateh did much to achieve formal and practical unity, but did very little on the ideological level. All the groups were too interested in maintaining their ideological purity to admit at any point that they might be wrong. Action essentially follows thought, therefore attempts at unity were bound to fail while several different and often antagonistic ideologies flourished.

None of the groups accurately analysed the situation of the Palestinians, and although al-Fateh did not make a wrong analysis like the fronts, it offered no alternative. Its pragmatic approach was immensely successful at the beginning but failed when the movement became a real political and military force in the area. At this point a true and accurate understanding of the conditions was essential. None of the groups had this understanding.

Palestinian nationalism therefore qualified as an ideology up to a point. It provided the basis for the establishment of a powerful political and military force which threatened the existing regimes in the area. It unified a national group, to a certain extent, but not enough. To be fair, it faced overwhelming difficulties in that the group it sought to unify was scattered in many different countries and was living under different sets of conditions. Because of this the ideology was required to be especially detailed in its explanation of the group's situation.

The aim and national awareness that Palestinian nationalism gave to the Palestinians will not be so easy to destroy as the movement built around them. For this reason, what is left of the resistance may learn from its past errors and rebuild itself along different lines. It remains to be seen, however, whether the deep divisions in Palestinian society can be properly understood and overcome. If they can a strong resistance movement will result, otherwise disunity and factionalism will again bring defeat.

CONCLUSION

We have now described the development of the Palestinian resistance and discussed various aspects of its ideology. We have seen that it was al-Fateh which developed the concept of Palestinian nationalism and built up a movement on this concept dedicated to the liberation of Palestine by armed struggle. Other movements like as-Saiqah and the fronts took this new nationalism and tried to impose pre-conceived analytical frameworks on it, Ba'thist in the case of as-Saiqah and Marxist in the case of the fronts.

While al-Fateh's theory was drawn from the actual situation in which the Palestinians found themselves and in this sense was a true ideology, that of the fronts was in many cases a strait-jacket which prevented a real understanding of the situation. Because of this the fronts cannot claim to have an ideology in the sense of offering an explanation to the Palestinians for the conditions in which they were living. The terms peasant, worker and bourgeoisie have little meaning to the inhabitants of refugee camps. The fronts' superficial reading of Marxism and adoption of its terminology prevented them from joining or co-operating with al-Fateh's efforts to achieve national unity. They were therefore a source of continual weakness to the resistance movement.

On the other hand, we have also defined an ideology as offering both short and long term aims. Al-Fateh's ideology stops short at the liberation of Palestine and the creation of a democratic state there. Both the fronts and as-Saiqah insist that the state created must be socialist, and it could therefore be argued that they are more far-sighted. If al-Fateh's reluctance to discuss in any detail the form of the future Palestinian state is calculated policy designed not to alienate certain sections of Palestinian society it is not short-sighted but merely wise and following well known precedents. The South Vietnamese NLF officially aims for,

'... an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral South Vietnam with a view to reunification ...' 1

1. 'Fundamental Problems', Vietnamese Studies No. 12, p. 168.

but, since it is led by a well disciplined communist party it is certain that in reality its ultimate aim is socialism. Similarly, Mao-Tse Tung agreed to work for the liberal aims of Sun Yat Sen in the early stages of his struggle. These were Nationalism, Democracy and People's Livelihood. There was no mention of socialism, although again since he was leader of a communist party his ultimate aims were obviously not those of Sun Yat Sen.

The question is whether al-Fateh is remaining silent on the subject of the future of Palestine for reasons of policy or because it has no programme for the future. It seems likely that the latter is the case. Its leadership is made up of very diverse elements, Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf) is left-wing, Abu Sayid (Khalid Hasan) is right wing and Yasir Arafat (Abu Ammar) performs a delicate balancing act between the two. 1 There are many other factions inside the movement which are not represented in the leadership. Thus although al-Fateh's ideology and actions can be interpreted as the result of caution and diplomacy, they might also be the result of a desire not to bring factional differences within the movement out into the open. This would account for al-Fateh's inability to change its policy and overthrow the Jordanian regime when it had the power. It would also account for its apparent inability to move quickly during the September 1970 crisis. It may have been paralysed by disparate elements in the leadership pulling in different directions. Al-Fateh's refusal to carry out any sort of analysis of Palestinian society could be the result of the same kind of paralysis.

Whatever the true interpretation of the defeat of the Palestinians in Jordan, it is certain that al-Fateh did proceed with great wisdom in its early days. However, the problems it had to face were tremendous. The population it sought to lead was scattered in several different countries and had been subjected to different influences for more than twenty years. The Palestinians before 1948 were not particularly notable for their unity and old rivalries were passed down in a diluted form to the next generation.

1. Based on author's interviews.

When al-Fateh was a small persecuted group it acted with the caution necessary to its survival, however, as it became bigger and more powerful the weakness of Palestinian society in general came to be reflected inside the movement. The fronts suffered the same problems of disunity and did not cover them so well, openly splitting several times. None of the groups managed to develop the type of organisation really needed for underground liberation struggle. Although in the examples of revolutions we have cited, China and Vietnam, the overall organisation has been a front including all sections of the community, in both cases the front was led by a well-disciplined and highly organised communist party guided by certain basic and unanimously accepted principles. This cannot be said of any of the groups. Al-Fateh's leaders proceed according to what seems wise at any particular time and the fronts disagree bitterly over their respective interpretations of Marxism.

Palestinian nationalism suffers from the same disorder it did in the 1930s - disunity and lack of discipline. It remains to be seen whether the shock of September 1970 will result in a new form of organisation which can properly exploit the new feeling of Palestinian identity fostered by al-Fateh.

Appendix I

The Draft Palestinian National Charter 1964

1. Palestine is an Arab homeland tied by Arab nationalism to the Arab countries which together form the great Arab homeland.
2. Palestine, within the boundaries it had during the British Mandate is an indivisible territorial unit.
3. The Palestinian Arab people have a legal right to their homeland. They are an integral part of the Arab nation and share in its hopes, sufferings and struggles for freedom, sovereignty, progress and unity.
4. After the liberation of their homeland, the Palestinian people will of their own free will, decide its destiny with respect to its sovereignty, national (Qawmiyyah) life and political future.
5. The Palestinian identity is an essential, innate, persistent characteristic, transmitted from generation to generation.
6. The Palestinians are those Arab citizens who were in Palestine until 1947, whether they left or remained there. Anyone born after that date, of an Arab Palestinian father, whether inside or outside Palestine, is also a Palestinian.
7. Jewish citizens of Palestinian origin are considered Palestinians provided that they pledge themselves to live peacefully and loyally in Palestine.
8. The education of Palestinians not born in Palestine is a primary national (Qawmi) duty. Every means must be employed to enlighten and educate this generation so that it may acquire strong spiritual ties with its homeland.
9. Different political, social and economic ideologies must not distract the Palestinian people from their first duty, the liberation of their homeland. All Palestinians form one national (Qawmiyyah) front working with all their moral and material resources to liberate their homeland.
10. The Palestinians shall have three slogans: national (Watan-iyvah) unity, national (Qawmiyyah) mobilisation and liberation. After the liberation of their homeland the Palestinian people shall choose any political, economic and social system they desire.
11. The Palestinian people believe in Arab unity. In order to play their part in achieving this unity, they must, during this stage of their struggle, safeguard their Palestinian identity and develop their consciousness of it. They must oppose any plan which may dissipate or weaken (this identity).
12. Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary objectives. The attainment of either one of them facilitates the attainment of the other. Thus Arab unity leads to the Liberation of Palestine and the liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity. Both objectives should be pursued simultaneously.

13. The fate of the Arab nation, and indeed the Arab existence itself, depends upon the fate of the Palestine cause. This common destiny must be the basis for the Arabs' struggle to liberate Palestine and in addition must guide the people of Palestine to achieve their national (Qawmi) aim.
14. The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab point of view, is the national (Qawmi) duty and responsibility of the entire Arab nation, both governments and people, led by the Palestinian Arab people. Accordingly the Arab nation should mobilise all its spiritual and material forces to liberate Palestine and should give every support to the Palestinian Arab people for the liberation of their homeland.
15. The liberation of Palestine, from the spiritual point of view, will give the Holy Land an atmosphere of security and tranquillity. This in turn will safeguard the country's religious sanctuaries and will guarantee freedom of worship and pilgrimage to all, whatever their race, colour, language or religion. Accordingly, the Palestinian people expect the support of all the spiritual forces in the world.
16. The liberation of Palestine, from an international point of view, is an act of self-defence in the terms of the UN Charter. Accordingly, the Palestinian people, seeking the friendship of all people, expect the support of those states which cherish freedom, justice and peace, in restoring their legitimate rights in Palestine and re-establishing peace and security in the country, thus enabling them to exercise national (Qawmi) sovereignty and freedom.
17. The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of Israel are invalid (and will remain so) regardless of the passage of time. These acts were contrary to the will of the Palestinian people and their natural right to their homeland. They were inconsistent with the general principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular the right to self-determination.
18. Claims of historical and religious ties between the Jews and Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the true conception of what constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a heavenly religion worthy of respect, is not an independent nationality. The Jews do not comprise a single nation with an identity of its own. They are citizens of the states to which they belong.
19. The Zionist movement is Imperialist in origin, aggressive and expansionist in its aims, fanatically racist in its formation and fascist in its practice and methods. Israel, being the leader of this destructive movement is a constant source of instability in the Middle East in particular and in the world in general. Accordingly, the Palestinians deserve world-wide sympathy and support.

20. The demands of peace and security, as well as the demands of right and justice require that all states view Zionism as an illegal movement. Its existence should be outlawed and its operations prohibited so that friendly relations between peoples may be preserved and the loyalty of citizens to their respective homelands safeguarded.
21. The Palestinian people believe in the principles of justice, freedom sovereignty, self-determination and human dignity as well as the right of all peoples to exercise them. The Palestinian people support all international efforts to establish peace on the basis of justice and free international co-operation.
22. The Palestinian people believe in peaceful co-existence based upon legitimacy. There can be no co-existence with aggression and no peace with Imperialism and usurpation.
23. To implement this Charter a Palestinian national (Qawmiyyah) organisation shall be established and shall be called the Palestine Liberation Organisation. It shall play a full role in the liberation of Palestine in accordance with its constitution.
24. This Organisation shall not exercise any regional sovereignty over the west Bank of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan nor over the Gaza sector. Its activities will be on the national (Qawmi) popular level in the political, organisational, financial, and liberation spheres.
25. The Organisation will be responsible for the Palestinian people's movement in the struggle to liberate their homeland in the political and liberation spheres and will do whatever may be required for the Palestinian cause on the Arab and international levels.
26. The Palestine Liberation Organisation will co-operate with each Arab state according to its potentialities and will not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state.
27. The Organisation shall have a flag, an oath of allegiance and an anthem. These things will be decided by special regulation.
28. Regulations to be known as the Constitution of the Palestine Liberation Organisation shall be annexed to this Charter. It shall define the manner in which the Organisation with its institutions and authorities shall be constituted and all their powers and duties under the terms of this Charter.
29. This draft Charter must be submitted for consideration to the National Congress described in the Constitution. After ratification, it shall be amended only by a two-thirds majority vote of the National Congress at a special session convened for that purpose.

Source: Watha'iq al-'arabi, 1964. American University Beirut - pp. 80-82.

Translation by the author.

Appendix II

The Draft Constitution of the Palestine Liberation

Organisation 1964

1. In accordance with this constitution, an organisation known as "The Palestine Liberation Organisation" shall be formed and shall launch its responsibilities in accordance with the principles of the National Charter and clauses of this constitution.
2. All the Palestinians are natural members of the Liberation Organisation exercising their duty in the liberation of their homeland in accordance with their abilities and efficiency.
3. The Palestinian people shall form the larger base for this Organisation; and the Organisation, after its creation, shall work closely and constantly with the Palestine people for the sake of their organisation and mobilisation so they may be able to assume their responsibility in the liberation of their country.
4. Until suitable conditions are available for holding free general elections among all the Palestinians and in all the countries where they reside, the Liberation Organisation shall be set up in accordance with the rules set in this constitution.
5. Measures listed in this constitution shall be taken for the convocation of a Palestinian General Assembly in which shall be represented all Palestinian factions, emigrants and residents, including organisations, societies, unions, trade unions and representatives of Palestinian public opinion of various ideological trends; this assembly shall be called "The National Congress of the Palestine Liberation Organisation."
6. In preparation and facilitation of the work of the assembly, the Palestinian representative at the Arab League (Ahmed Shuqeiry) shall, after holding consultations with various Palestinian factions form:
 - a) A Preparatory Committee in every Arab country hosting a minimum of 10,000 Palestinians; the mission of each of these committees is to prepare lists according to which Palestinian candidates in the respective Arab country will be chosen as members of the assembly; these committees shall also prepare studies and proposals which may help the assembly carry out its work; these studies and proposals shall be presented to the Co-ordination Committee listed below.
 - b) A Co-ordination Committee with headquarters in Jerusalem; the mission of this committee shall be to issue invitations to the assembly, adopt all necessary measures for the holding of the assembly, and co-ordinate all studies and proposals as well as lists of candidates to the assembly, as specified in the clause above; also the committee shall prepare a provisional agenda - or as a whole undertake all that is required for the holding and success of the assembly in the execution of its mission.

7. The National Congress shall be held once every two years; its venue rotates between Jerusalem and Gaza; the National Congress shall meet for the first time on May 14th 1964 in the city of Jerusalem.
8. To facilitate its work the assembly shall form the following committees:
 - a) The Political Committee: this shall be in charge of studying the political aspects of the Palestine question in the Arab and international fields.
 - b) The Charter, Bye-Laws and Lists Committee: this shall consider the National Charter as well as the various bye-laws and lists required by the Organisation in the execution of its duties.
 - c) The Financial Committee: this shall formulate a complete scheme for the Palestine National Fund required for financing the Organisation.
 - d) The Information Committee: this shall work out a complete plan for information and offices to be established in various parts of the world.
 - e) The Juridical Committee: this shall study the various legal aspects of the Palestine question, be it in relation to principles of International law, UN Charter, or international documents pertaining to Palestine.
 - f) Proposals and Nominations Committee: this shall co-ordinate proposals and nominations submitted to the assembly.
 - g) Consciousness Committee: this shall study ways and means for the up-bringing of the new generations both ideologically and spiritually so they may serve their country and work for the liberation of their homeland.
 - h) The National Organisation Committee: this shall lay down general plans relating to the trade unions, federations, sports organisations and scouts groups; this will be in accordance with rules and laws in effect in the Arab countries.
9. The National Congress shall have a President's Office composed of the President, two vice-presidents, a secretary and a secretary general: these officers shall be elected by the National Congress when it meets.
10. These (eight committees) shall submit their reports and recommendations to the National Congress which, in turn, shall discuss them and draw up the necessary resolutions.
11. The National Congress shall have an executive apparatus called "The Executive Committee of the Liberation Organisation" which shall practise the responsibilities of the Liberation Organisation in accordance with general plans and resolutions drawn up by the National Congress.
12. The Executive Committee shall be formed of fifteen members elected by the National Congress; the Committee shall in turn elect a President and two Vice Presidents and a Secretary General.

13. The Executive Committee can be called to a meeting in the time and place decided by the President or on a request of five members of the Committee.
14. The President of the Executive Committee shall represent the Palestinians to the Arab League: thus his office shall be in Cairo since that is the seat of the League headquarters.
15. The Executive Committee shall establish the following departments:
 - a) Political and Information Affairs.
 - b) National Fund.
 - c) General Affairs.Each department shall have a Director General and the required number of employees. Duties of each department shall be defined by special bye-laws drawn up by the Executive Committee.
16. The Executive Committee has the right to call the National Congress at a place and time it specifies; it also has the right to call a meeting of any committee of the National Congress to study a certain subject.
17. The Executive Committee shall have a Consultative Council to be known as "The Consultative Council"; The Executive Committee shall choose the President and members of this Council from renowned and respected people among the Palestinians; the prerogatives of the Consultative Council are in matters proposed to it by the Executive Committee.
18. The Arab states shall give the sons of Palestine the opportunity of enlisting in their regular armies on the widest possible scale.
19. Special Palestinian contingents shall be formed according to the military needs and plans drawn up by the Unified Arab Command in agreement and co-operation with the Arab states concerned.
20. A fund known as "The Palestinian National Fund" shall be set up to finance the operations of the Executive; the Fund shall have a Board of Directors elected by the National Congress.
21. Sources of the Fund will be:
 - a) Fixed Taxes levied on Palestinians and collected in accordance with special laws.
 - b) Financial assistance from the Arab Governments and people.
 - c) A "Liberation Stamp" issued by the Arab states and used in postal and other transactions.
 - d) Donations on national occasions.
 - e) Loans or aid from Arab or friendly nations.
22. Committees known as "Palestine Support Committees" shall be set up in Arab and friendly countries to collect donations and support the Liberation Organisation.

23. The Executive Committee shall have the right to issue by-laws to fulfil the provisions of this constitution.
24. The draft constitution shall be submitted to the National Congress for consideration what is ratified cannot be changed except by a two-thirds majority of the National Congress.

Source: Walter Laqueur - The Arab-Israeli Reader, pp. 131-135.

Appendix III

The United Nations Security Council Resolution of

22nd November 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasising the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
 - i) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
 - ii) termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
 - a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
 - b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
 - c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area through measures including the establishment of demilitarised zones;
3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution;
4. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Appendix IV

The Palestinian National Charter 1968

1. Palestine is the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people. It is an integral part of the Arab homeland and the Palestinian people are an integral part of the Arab nation.
2. Palestine, within the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.
3. The Palestinian Arab people have a legal right to their homeland. They have the right to determine their destiny, after liberating their country, according to their wishes and in complete accord with their own free will and choice.
4. The Palestinian identity is an essential, innate, persistent characteristic, transmitted from generation to generation. The Zionist occupation, and the dispersion of the Palestinian Arab people resulting from the disasters which befell them, do not cause them to forfeit their Palestinian identity nor their membership of the Palestinian community. (The Zionist occupation and the dispersion of the Palestinians) do not negate (the Palestinian identity nor membership of the Palestinian community).
5. The Palestinians are those Arab citizens who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine, whether they were evicted or remained there. Anyone born after that date, of an Arab Palestinian father, whether inside or outside Palestine, is also a Palestinian.
6. The Jews who normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians.
7. The existence of a Palestinian community and its material, spiritual and historical connection with Palestine, are indisputable facts. It is a national duty to bring up individual Palestinians in a revolutionary Arab way. All means of informing and educating the Palestinian must be adopted so that he may become as firmly acquainted with his country as possible, both materially and spiritually. He must be made ready for the armed struggle and be prepared to sacrifice his wealth and his life to regain his homeland and achieve its liberation.
8. The historical stage through which the Palestinian people are now passing is that of national (Watani) struggle to liberate Palestine. Any conflicts among Palestinian national (Wataniyyah) forces is thus secondary and should be suspended in favour of the basic conflict between the forces of Zionism and Imperialism on the one hand and the Palestinian and Arab people on the other. Accordingly, the Palestinian masses, whether they reside in the national homeland or in the diaspora, both in their organisations and as individuals, constitute a single national (Wataniyyah) striving for the recovery of Palestine and its liberation through armed struggle.

9. Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. It is therefore an overall strategy and not just tactics. The Palestinian Arab people proclaim their absolute determination and firm resolution to pursue their armed struggle and to march forward to the armed popular revolution to liberate their country and make possible their return to it. They also proclaim their right to a normal life in Palestine and their right to exercise self-determination and sovereignty there.
10. Fedayeen action forms the basis of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This war requires the promotion, extension and protection of such action. (It also requires) mobilisation of all the mass and scientific capabilities of the Palestinians and their organisation and involvement in the Palestinian armed revolution. In addition it is necessary to achieve the unity of the Palestinian people and unity between the Palestinian people and the Arab masses, in order to insure the revolution's continuation, escalation and victory.
11. The Palestinians shall have three slogans: national (Wataniyyah) unity, national (Qawmiyyah) mobilisation and liberation.
12. The Palestinian Arab people believe in Arab unity. In order to play their part in achieving this unity, they must, during this stage of their national (Watani) struggle, safeguard their Palestinian identity and develop their consciousness of it. They must oppose any plan which may dissipate or weaken (this identity).
13. Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary objectives. The attainment of either one of them facilitates the attainment of the other. Thus Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine and the liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity. Both objectives should be pursued simultaneously.
14. The fate of the Arab nation, and indeed the Arab existence itself, depends upon the fate of the Palestine cause. From this dependence spring the Arab nation's endeavours and striving for the liberation of Palestine. The people of Palestine have the vanguard role in the achievement of this sacred, national (Qawmi) aim.
15. The liberation of Palestine, from an Arab point of view, is a national (Qawmi) duty. It seeks to oppose Zionist and Imperialist aggression against the great Arab homeland. It aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine. The entire responsibility for this rests with the Arab nation, both peoples and governments, with the Arab people of Palestine in the vanguard. Accordingly, the Arab nation must mobilise all its military, human, moral and spiritual capabilities to participate actively with the Palestinian people in the liberation of Palestine. Especially during the stage of the armed Palestinian revolution, (the Arab

- nation) must offer to the Palestinian people, and supply them with all possible help in terms of material and human support. It must make available to (the Palestinian people) the means and opportunities to enable them to continue playing their leading role in the armed revolution until their homeland is liberated.
16. The liberation of Palestine, from the spiritual point of view, will give the Holy Land an atmosphere of security and tranquillity. This, in turn will safeguard the country's religious sanctuaries and will guarantee freedom of worship and pilgrimage to all whatever their race, colour, language or religion. Accordingly the Palestinian people expect the support of all the spiritual forces in the world.
 17. The liberation of Palestine, from the human point of view, will restore to the Palestinian individual his dignity, pride and freedom. Accordingly the Palestinian Arab people expect the support of all in the world who believe in human dignity and freedom.
 18. The liberation of Palestine, from the international point of view, is an act of self-defence. Accordingly, the Palestinian people, seeking the friendship of all people, expect the support of those states which cherish freedom, justice and peace in restoring their legitimate rights in Palestine and re-establishing peace and security in the country, thus enabling them to exercise national (Wataniyyah) sovereignty and national (Gawmiyyah) freedom.
 19. The partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of Israel are invalid, (and will remain so) regardless of the passage of time. These acts were contrary to the will of the Palestinian people and their natural right to their homeland. They were inconsistent with the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, the first of which is the right to self-determination.
 20. The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate for Palestine and everything based upon them are to be considered null and void. Claims of historical and religious ties between the Jews and Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the true conception of what constitutes statehood. Judaism being a heavenly religion is not an independent nationality. The Jews do not comprise a single nation with an identity of its own. They are citizens of the states to which they belong.
 21. The Arab people of Palestine, expressing themselves through the armed Palestinian revolution, reject any solution proffered as a substitute for the total liberation of Palestine, and reject any proposal for liquidating the Palestine problem or seeking its internationalisation.
 22. Zionism is a political movement organically linked to international Imperialism. It is antagonistic to any action for liberation and to any progressive movement in the world. It has a racist, fanatic nature, aggressive, expansionist and colonialist aims and employs fascist methods. Israel is the instrument of the Zionist movement. It is a human and geographical base of World

Imperialism, strategically placed in the Arab homeland to strike at the aspirations of the Arab nation for liberation, unity and progress. Israel is a constant threat to peace in the Middle East and the whole world. Since the Liberation of Palestine will destroy the Zionist, Imperialist presence, thus contributing to the establishment of peace in the Middle East, the Palestinian people expect the support of all the forces of peace and progress, and urge them, whatever their affiliations and beliefs, to offer the Palestinian people every help and support in the just struggle to liberate their homeland.

23. The demands of peace and security, as well as the demands of right and justice require that all states view Zionism as an illegal movement. Its existence should be outlawed and its operations prohibited so that friendly relations between peoples may be preserved and the loyalty of citizens to their respective homelands safeguarded.
24. The Arab Palestinian people believe in the principles of justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination and human dignity, as well as the right of all peoples to exercise them.
25. To realise the aims and principles of this Charter, the Palestine Liberation Organisation will be set up to play a full role in the liberation of Palestine.
26. The Palestine Liberation Organisation, as representative of the Palestinian revolutionary forces, is responsible for the Palestinian Arab people's movement in the struggle to regain, liberate and return to their homeland where they can exercise the right of self-determination. (The Organisation is responsible) in the military, political and financial spheres and whenever necessary will be responsible for the Palestine cause at the inter-Arab and international levels.
27. The Palestine Liberation Organisation will co-operate with each Arab state according to its potentialities and will adopt a neutral policy among them as may be dictated by the needs of the liberation war. Accordingly (the Organisation) shall not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state.
28. The Palestinian people proclaim the reality and independence of their national (Wataniyyah) revolution. They reject any form of interference patronage or domination.
29. The Palestinian people have a basic and real legal right to liberate and regain their homeland. The Palestinian people will determine their attitude towards any state or force on the basis of its stand vis-a-vis the Palestine case, and the extent of its support for the Palestinian revolution to achieve the aims of the Palestinian people.
30. Those who fight and bear arms in the liberation war are the nucleus of the popular army which will protect the gains of the Palestinian people.
31. The Organisation shall have a flag, an oath of allegiance and an anthem. These things will be decided by special regulation.

32. Regulations to be known as the Constitution of the Palestine Liberation Organisation shall be annexed to this Charter. It shall define the manner in which the Organisation with its sub-organisations and institutions, shall be formed. It will outline the respective competence of each with its obligations under the Charter.
33. This Charter shall only be amended by a vote of a two-thirds majority of the total membership of the National Congress of the Palestine Liberation Organisation taken at a special session convened for that purpose.

Source: Al-Mithaq al-Watani al-Falastini - Palestine Liberation Organisation.

Translation by the author.

Appendix V

The Constitution of the PLO, 1968

General Principles

1. In accordance with this constitution, the Palestinians form a body which shall be called the Palestine Liberation Organisation.
2. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation will undertake its responsibilities in accordance with the principles of the National Charter, the articles of this constitution and any other regulations, decisions or orders which may be based upon them.
3. Relations within the organisation shall be based upon commitment, struggle and national action. The rank and file of Palestine Liberation Organisation shall be strongly linked to the collective leadership and the minority will respect the will of the majority. The confidence of the people will be gained by convincing them through continuing the Palestinian struggle and supporting the armed Palestinian revolution, striving for its escalation which will bring the masses to victory.
In order that these principles may be applied and executed the Executive Committee will issue a special order which will define the formation of the Organisation, taking into account the different conditions of the Palestinians in their places of residence, the conditions of the Palestinian revolution, and the need to achieve the aims of this constitution and the Charter.
4. All Palestinians who recognise their duty to liberate their homeland, according to their abilities and potentialities, are members of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. The Palestinian people constitute the wide base of the Organisation.

The National Council

5. The members of the National Council will be chosen through direct election by the Palestinian people in accordance with an order issued by the Executive Committee.
6.
 - a) If it should be impossible to hold elections for the National Council the existing Council will continue until elections are possible.
 - b) If one or more seat is vacated in the Council for any reason the Council will appoint a member, or members, to fill the vacancy or vacancies.
7.
 - a) The National Council is the highest authority in the Palestine Liberation Organisation and will draw up the policy and plans of the Organisation.
 - b) Jerusalem will be the permanent residence of the National Council.

8. The mandate of the National Council shall last for three years and it will hold regular sessions on a call from the President every six months. Extraordinary sessions can be called by the President on the demand of the Executive Committee or on the demand of one quarter of the members. The Council may meet in Jerusalem, Gaza or any other place depending on the circumstances. If the President does not call the meeting, it will be held at a time and in a place assigned by the Executive Committee or the members.
9. The National Council will have a praesidium consisting of the President, two Vice-Presidents and a Secretary who will be elected by the Council at its first meeting.
10. The National Council in its regular meetings will:
 - a) Study the annual report submitted by the Executive Committee concerning the achievements of the Organisation.
 - b) Study the report of the National Fund concerning the budget.
 - c) Study suggestions from the Executive Committee and recommendations of the committees of the Council.
 - d) Study any other problems which may arise.
11. The National Council will elect the necessary committees to facilitate proceedings. These will report to the Council with their suggestions and advice. The Council will discuss these suggestions and will then take decisions.
12. The quorum of the National Council is two thirds of the membership, and decisions will be taken on a simple majority.

The Executive Committee

13.
 - a) All the members of the Executive Committee shall be elected from the National Council.
 - b) The President of the Executive Committee will be elected by the Executive Committee.
 - c) The Executive Committee shall be elected by the National Council.
14. The Executive Committee will consist of 11 members including the president of the Administrative Council of the Palestinian National Fund. If any seat on the Executive Committee is vacated between meetings of the National Council:
 - a) If they constitute less than one third they will remain vacant until the National Council meets.
 - b) If they are one third or more the National Council will be called to a special meeting within thirty days.
 - c) If the National Council cannot meet for any reason the vacancies will be filled by the Executive Committee, with the Praesidium of the Council and any Council members who can attend a joint meeting of these bodies. The replacement members will be elected by a simple majority at this joint meeting.

15. The Executive Committee is the highest executive authority of the National Council and must be in continuous session. Its members will be full-time workers in the Committee. It will be responsible for executing the policy programme and plans decided by the National Council and will be held responsible to the Council collectively and individually.
16. The Executive Committee will:
 - a) Represent the Palestinian people.
 - b) Supervise the formation of various organisations.
 - c) Issue rules and regulations concerning the work of the Palestine Liberation Organisation providing they do not contradict the Constitution or the Charter.
 - d) Control the financial policy of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and prepare its budget. In general the Executive Committee will practise all the responsibilities of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in accordance with the general plans and decisions of the National Council.
17. The permanent seat of the Executive Committee will be Jerusalem but it may meet in any other place if necessary.
18. The Executive Committee will form the following departments:
 - a) Military.
 - b) Information and Political Affairs.
 - c) The Palestinian National Fund.
 - d) Research and Specialist institutions.
 - e) Administration.
 - f) Any other department the Executive Committee deems necessary.Each department will have a General Director and the requisite number of employees. The authority and duties of each department will be defined by special orders issued by the Executive Committee.
19. The Executive Committee will strengthen its relations and co-ordinate its work with all Arab and international institutions, organisations and unions which agree with or help in the achievement of the aims of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.
20. As long as the Executive Committee has the confidence of the National Council, it will continue to exercise its authority and duties. The Executive Committee should resign to the new National Council at its first meeting, but it may be re-elected.
21. The Quorum of the Executive Committee is two thirds. Its decisions will be taken on a simple majority of the attending members.

General Points

22. The Palestine Liberation Organisation will establish an army for the Palestinian people to be known as the Palestine Liberation Army. It will have an independent leadership which will work under the supervision of the Executive Committee and carry out the special and general decisions and orders of the latter. Its national duty is to act as the vanguard for the Liberation Battle.

23. The Executive Committee will endeavour to let the Palestinians join the Arab military academies and schools for military training in order to mobilise all Palestinian efforts and potentialities for the battle of liberation.
24. A Fund will be established called the Palestinian National Fund to finance the activities of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. It will be directed by a special Administrative Council which will be formed according to a special order issued by the Executive Committee.
25. The resources of the Fund will be:
 - a) A regular tax on the Palestinians imposed and executed by special order.
 - b) Financial aid from the Arab nation and governments.
 - c) A Liberation Stamp which the Arab states will issue through their postal systems.
 - d) Donations and contributions.
 - e) Loans and aid from Arab and friendly peoples.
 - f) Any other resources which the Council may decide.
26. Committees will be established in all Arab and friendly countries known as Committees for the Support of Palestine, which will collect donations and support the Palestine Liberation Organisation in its national endeavours.
27. The Palestinian people will be represented in Arab conferences and institutions at the level decided upon by the Executive Committee which will also nominate the representative for Palestine to the Arab League.
28. The Executive Committee has the authority to issue all necessary orders or regulations to execute the articles of this Constitution.
29. The amendment of this constitution or any additions to it can be undertaken by the National Council of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation with a majority of two thirds.

Transitional Provisions

30. The National Council which will be held in Cairo on 10th July 1968 will replace the previous transitional Council of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and will henceforth practise all the authority given it by this constitution.
31. The mandate of the new National Council will extend for two years from 10th July 1968. If it is not possible to hold elections for the members of the subsequent Council, this Council will hold a meeting to decide whether to extend its mandate or to form a new Council in some other way.
32. The Council, and only the Council, has the right to add new members from time to time if necessary and according to the needs of the Liberation Battle and the need to deepen national unity. This will be done in the light of the articles of the National Charter and in accordance with regulations which will be issued by the Executive Committee in the coming session.

Source: An-Nitham al-Asasi li-Munthamah at-Tahrir al-Falastiniyyah - Palestine Liberation Organisation.

Translation by the author.

Population of the Refugee Camps 1967-69 (UN figures)

Region	May 31st 1967		June 30th 1968		June 30th 1969		Total
	Registered	Emergency	Registered	Emergency	Registered	Emergency	
Jordan	232,686	156,178	78,400	234,578	137,854	90,900	272,591
East Bank		89,681	78,400	168,081	70,539	90,900	198,689
West Bank		66,497		66,497	67,315		73,903
Gaza	201,828	196,879		195,879	191,551		195,446
Occupied Areas		262,376		262,376	258,866		269,349
Lebanon	75,316	78,449		78,449	81,031		86,459
Syria	23,160	73,726	7,746	31,472	24,516	9,041	36,192
TOTAL	532,990	454,232	86,146	540,378	434,952	99,941	590,689****

* Refugees in camps hastily erected after the June 1967 War.

** Refugees living in or near the camps but not registered or receiving rations.

Number of Camps (UN figures)

Region	Number of Camps (UN figures)		Total
	Regular	Emergency	
Jordan	25***	6	31***
East Bank	5***	6	11***
West Bank	20		20
Gaza	8		8
Occupied Areas	28		28
Lebanon	15		15
Syria	6	4	10
TOTAL	54***	10	64***

Estimate of Total Palestinian Population 1965

Region	Estimate of Total Palestinian Population 1965 (ANM figures)	
	Registered	Emergency
Jordan	1,200,000	
Gaza	450,000	
Lebanon	150,000	
Syria	120,000	
Kuwait	40,000	
Iraq	10,000	
Others	30,000	
TOTAL	2,000,000****	

These figures illustrate the trend which developed for Palestinians to work in Kuwait and the Gulf from where they sent money to their families in the camps. The 30,000 "others" include those in Europe and the Americas.

*** Includes al-Karamah which ceased to exist after March 1968.

**** The discrepancy between the UN and ANM totals is the result of the very narrow definition used by the UN of the term 'refugee'. The 1950 UNRWA definition which has never been changed, was "... one whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum period of two years preceding the outbreak of the conflict in 1948 and who as a result of this conflict has lost both his house and his means of livelihood."

SOURCES: Annual Report of the UNRWA Commissioner General:

- UN, GA OR 5th Session Annex UN Doc A/1451 p.10
- UN, GA OR 22nd Session Suppl. 13 UN Doc A/6713 p.62
- UN, GA OR 23rd Session Suppl. 13 UN Doc A/7213 p.62
- UN, GA OR 24th Session Suppl. 14 UN Doc A/7614 p.70
- IPS, AI-K'tab as-Sanawi lil-Qadiah al-Falastiniyyah 1965 p. 131

THE MAIN PALESTINIAN ORGANISATIONS AND OFFICIAL BODIES

Name or Initials	Full Title in Arabic and English	Date Established	Leaders	Arab Support	Political Orientation	Comment
Al-Fateh	Harakah at-Tahrir al-Watani al-Falastini. (Palestine National Liberation Movement)	1958	Yasir Arafat (<i>Abu Ameer</i>) Salah Khalaf (<i>Abu Eysel</i>) Faruq Kaddumi (<i>Abu Lutf</i>) Khalid Hassan (<i>Abu Sayyid</i>)	non-specific	Independent, Palestinian Nationalist Liberation Movement based upon armed struggle. Bases action on careful analysis of the situation. The oldest and most experienced group.	The leading and guiding force in the Resistance. No ties with any Arab state or party. Took control of the PLO in February 1969.
PLF	Jabhat Tahrir Falastin. (Palestine Liberation Front)	1958-69	Ahmed Jibril Ahmed Za'rur	unstable	Vacillating with no ideological basis. Essentially military but tends to strike up alliances with whichever group appears to be strongest at the time.	Opportunist.
As-Saiqah	Tala' Harb at-Tahrir ash-Sha'biyah. (Vanguard of the Popular Liberation War)	March 1967	Daf al-Jamani (<i>Abi Muz</i>) Yusuf Burji (<i>Abu Issa</i>)	Syria	Ba'athist	Co-operated with al-Fateh and the PLO at first then later began to co-operate more closely with the PFLP.
PFLP	Al-Jabhat ash-Sha'biyah li-Tahrir Falastin. (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine)	October 1967	George Habbash Wadi Haddad Hani al-Hindi Hannad Farhan Basel Kabalei Ahmed Khateib	Iraq	Originally ANM then later "Marxist".	Originally contained Jibril and Za'rur along with the ANM. Suffered many splits. Adventurist
PFLP-GC	Al-Jabhat ash-Sha'biyah li-Tahrir Falastin - al-Qiyadah al'amah. (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command)	August 1968	Ahmed Jibril	unstable	Vacillating with no ideological basis. Essentially military.	Opportunist. Believed by other groups to have links with Arab intelligence services.
PSF	Jabhat an-Nidal ash-Sha'bi. (Popular Struggle Front)	January 1969	Barjat Abu Gharbiyah	non-specific	Al-Fateh. Split on organisational grounds only.	Originally set up inside the occupied territory after 1967. Leader ex-Ba'athist and old PLO.
PDFLP	Al-Jabhat ash-Sha'biyah ad-Democratyyah li-Tahrir Falastin. (Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine)	February 1969	Naif Hawatmah Mohsin Ibrahim Muhammad Kishli	Syria & Iraq	"Marxist"	Split from PFLP as left wing. Co-operated with al-Fateh and closely with as-Saiqah. Pseudo-intellectual.
AOLP	Al-Hayah al-'arabiyyah al-'amiliyah li-Tahrir Falastin. (Action Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine)*	March 1969	D. Issam Sartawi	UAR and Iraq	Al-Fateh. Split on personal grounds.	Opportunist.
APO	Munathamah al-'arabiyyah li-Tahrir Falastin. (Arab Palestine Organisation)*	August 1969	Ahmed Za'rur	UAR	Nasserist.	Split from Jibril over some money the group received from the Jordanian government for services rendered. Opportunist.
ALF	Jabhat at-Tahrir al'arabiyyah. (Arab Liberation Front)	May 1969	Dr. Munif Razzaq	Iraq	Ba'athist.	Co-operated with PFLP.
POLP	Al-Munathamah ash-Sha'biyyah at-Tahrir Falastin. (Peoples Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine)	February 1970	--	non-specific	Pro-Chinese Marxists.	Small group of about 16, split from the Jordanian Communist Party. Inactive.

OFFICIAL BODIES

Name or Initials	Full Title in Arabic and English	Date Established	Leaders	Arab Support	Political Orientation	Comment
PLO	Munathamah Tahrir Falastiniyah. (Palestine Liberation Organisation)	May 1964	<i>President</i> Ahmed Shuqriyy (1964-8) Yahya Hammouda (1968-9) Yasir Arafat (1969-)	All Arab states, non-specific	Set up by the Arab states in 1964 in an attempt to control the growing Palestinian national movements. It remained a tool of the Arab states, in particular the UAR until the 1967 defeat. It was gradually reformed and finally al-Fateh took control in February 1968.	After al-Fateh took control the PLO became the framework within which the various Palestinian groups cooperated. The PFLP remained outside until mid-1970.
PLA	Al-Jaysh al-Tahrir al-Falastiniyyah. (Palestine Liberation Army)	mid-1964	Wajil al-Madani (1964-7) Sohbi al-Jabi (1967-8) 'abd al-Razzak al-Yahya (1968) Mishah al-Budeiri (1968-9) Yasir Arafat (1969-)	All Arab states, then non-specific.	The PLA was established first as units of Palestinians within the Arab armies. However, it gradually became more of an independent entity. Al-Fateh took control through Yasir Arafat in February 1969 after the fifth Palestinian National Congress. The PLA was then reorganised and changed from a classical army into an army designed to support a popular war. Since that time the PLA has been well integrated into the Resistance Movement.	The PLA was never looked upon favourably by the Arab states although they agreed, with the exception of Jordan, to its establishment. In the first years Madani became an opponent of Shuqriyy and was instrumental in the latter's dismissal in December 1968. The PLA then underwent internal difficulties including a mutiny against Yahya, in July 1968 and his replacement.
PLFs	Coat Tahrir Sha'biyyah. (Popular Liberation Forces)	February 1968	as PLA	non-specific	The PLFs are the commando forces of the PLA. They were established after Shuqriyy's dismissal.	
PASC	Qiyadah al-Kifah al-Musallah al-Falastini. (Palestine Armed Struggle Command)	April 1969		non-specific	The Palestine Armed Struggle Command was set up following the decision of the Fifth National Congress. It replaced the Military Co-ordination Bureau which had been set up in October 1968 on the decision of the Fourth Congress. PASC members were al-Fateh, as-Saiqah, PDFLP, PLFs, and PLA. Other groups except the PFLP joined later. In October 1969 PASC set up its own strike force from al-Fateh, as-Saiqah and the PDFLP. The leading force was al-Fateh.	

* The English title is not a direct translation, but is commonly used.

Sources: IPS, Al-Kitab as-Sanawi III-Qadih al-Falastiniyyah 1964-7

Al-Fateh, al-Kitab as-Sanawi 1968

Fateh

Free Palestine


Al-Jihad

The Arab World

Arab Report and Record

Newspapers in bibliography

Interviews




 al-Fateh operations
 PASC operations
 * These figures do not appear in the sources but can be calculated from the total given for April 1969 - April 1970.

Sources: Fateh
Free Palestine.

Table IV

UNITY AND SPLITS IN THE RESISTANCE



References: — I.P.S., *Al-Kitab as-Sanawi lil-Qadih al-Falastiniyyah 1964-7*, *al-Fatah, Al-Kitab as-Sanawi 1968*, *Arab World*, *Arab Report and Record*, *Keatings Contemporary Archives*, *Newspapers in Bibliography*, *Interviews*.

Table V

Membership of the Palestine National Congresses and the PLO Executives

Date	Congress Membership		PLO Executive		
Fourth Congress July 1968	Al-Fateh		Shuqairy's Old Executive now led by Yahya Hammouda was asked to continue for another six months.		
	As-Saiqah	50			
	PLO PFLP Individuals	50			
	TOTAL	100			
Fifth Congress Feb. 1969	Al-Fateh	33	Name	Organisation	Duties
	As-Saiqah	12	Faruq Qaddumi (Abu Lutf)	Fateh	Popular Organisation
	PFLP	12*	Khalid Hassan (Abu Sayyid)	Fateh	Political Bureau
	PLO (Exec)	11	Yasir Arafat (Abu Amar)	Fateh	President and Military
	PLA	5*	Muhammad Najjar (Abu Yusuf)	Fateh	unknown
	Fund	1	Yusuf Burji (Abu Issa)	Saiqah	unknown
	Unions	3	Ahmed Shehabi	Saiqah	unknown
	Individuals	28	Kamal Nasir**	PLO	unknown
	TOTAL	105	Ibrahim Bakr**	PLO	unknown
			Hamid Abu Sittah	PLO	Occupied Palestine
			'abdul Majid Shuman	PLO	Finance
			Yasir Amr***	PLO	unknown
	Sixth Congress Sept. 1969	Al-Fateh	33	Faruq Qaddumi	Fateh
As-Saiqah		12	Khalid Hassan	Fateh	Political Bureau
PFLP		12*	Yasir Arafat	Fateh	President and Military
PDFLP		8	Muhammad Najjar	Fateh	unknown
PFLP-GC		3	Yusuf Burji	Saiqah	unknown
PSF		2	Ahmed Shehabi	Saiqah	unknown
APO		1	Kamal Nasir**	PLO	unknown
Unions		5	Khalid Yashruti**	PLO	Finance
Students		3	Dr. Hassan Khatib	PLO	unknown
Women		2	Hamid Abu Sittah	PLO	Occupied Palestine
Individuals		21	Balal Hassan	PDFLP	unknown
TOTAL		112			
June 1970		New Central Committee		This Committee included the PLO Executive plus one representative of each organisations. These representatives were not permanent and individuals varied from meeting to meeting.	
	Al-Fateh	5			
	As-Saiqah	3			
	PLO****	5			
	PDFLP	2			
	PFLP	1			
	AOLP	1			
	APO	1			
	PSF	1			
	ALF	1			
	POLP	1			
	PFLP-GC	1			
	PNC (Pres)	1			
Jordanians	4				
TOTAL	27				
		* These groups boycotted the Congress.			
		** Pro-Fateh.			
		*** Pro-Saiqah.			
		**** Including two pro-Fateh.			

Sources: Arab Report and Record
Arab World
Keesings
Fateh
Interviews
Newspapers in bibliography.

Table VI

Signatories of Joint statement issued February 1970

Al-Fateh
As-Saiqah
PFLP
PDFLP
APO
AOLP
PFLP-GC
ALF
PSF
PLFs
General Union of Jordanian-Palestinian Women
General Federation of Labour Trade Unions in Jordan
Jordanian Communist Party
General Union of Palestinian Women
Arab Women's League
General Union of Palestinian Workers
Union of Medical Doctors
Union of Pharmacists
Dentist's Union
General Union of Palestinian Students
Jordanian Student's Union
Bar Association
Engineers Union
Agriculturists Union
Save Jerusalem Committee (Suleiman Nabulsi)
Sheikh Abdul Hamid Sayeh
Ibrahim Bakr
Ruhi al-Khatib
Akif Fayeze
Dr. Daoud Husseini
Kassem Rimawi
Kamal Dajani
Isaac Khatemdar
Father Iliya Khoury
Dr. Nabih Moammar

Source: Fateh Vol. II No. 4. p.4.

A Note on the Sources

Many of the sources used for this thesis are unavoidably the subject of considerable bias.

In the case of the English-language sources the bias is either the result of open hostility towards the Arab case in general, or based upon considerations of British interest. Open hostility for example, characterises the books by Pearlman, Schechtman, Laqueur and the ESCO Foundation. Whereas essentially British interpretations of the situation are contained in the books by Glubb, Kirkbride and Marlowe. Dearden's book is strongly pro-Hashemite and Mogannam's book is written from the point of view of the Palestine Defence Party.

In the case of the Arabic sources, the bias is of a different kind. Naturally they all put forward the Arab case very strongly, but in addition to this some were written to support a particular regime or party in the inter-Arab disputes. The most notable in this respect is the book by at-Tall which is very anti-Hashemite and was written while at-Tall was in exile in the UAR. Fortunately, however, much of his case is borne out by strictly pro-Zionist sources like Syrkin's book on Golda Meir and Eytan's book on Israel's first ten years.

These comments apply only to the secondary sources. Primary sources are, in general, most valuable because of their bias, not in spite of it. That is to say, political documents and pamphlets are useful because they show the opinion of one particular party or group.

Finally, some explanation is needed concerning the lack of any real detail in many of the interviews cited. These interviews were conducted in the midst of an armed struggle. The Resistance movement felt itself in constant danger not only from Israel, but also from the so called friendly Arab governments. The divisions within the Resistance movement itself was another reason for caution. Thus interviews were only granted in many cases under assurances of anonymity and in conditions of great secrecy. Wherever possible, code names and organisation are given.

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Supplement 8 and 18

6th Session (1951)	Supplement 16 and 16A	UNRWA
7th Session (1952)	Supplement 13 and 13A	UNRWA
8th Session (1953)	Supplement 12 and 12A	UNRWA
9th Session (1954)	Supplement 17 and 17A	UNRWA
10th Session (1955)	Supplement 15 and 15A	UNRWA
11th Session (1956)	Supplement 14 and 14A	UNRWA
12th Session (1957)	Supplement 14	UNRWA
13th Session (1958)	Supplement 14	UNRWA
14th Session (1959)	Supplement 14	UNRWA
15th Session (1961)	Supplement 14	UNRWA
16th Session (1962)	Supplement 14	UNRWA
17th Session (1962)	Supplement 14	UNRWA
18th Session (1963)	Supplement 13	UNRWA
19th Session (1964)	Supplement 13	UNRWA
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7th Year (1952)	S/INF/7/Rev. 1
8th Year (1953)	S/INF/8/Rev. 1
9th Year (1954)	S/INF/9/Rev. 1
10th Year (1955)	S/INF/10/Rev. 1
11th Year (1956)	S/INF/11/Rev. 1
13th Year (1958)	S/INF/13/Rev. 1
16th Year (1961)	S/INF/16/Rev. 1
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